Reconstructing Evangelical Soteriology and Missiology: A Theology of Human Flourishing

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

To begin, I appreciated reading a well-written and clearly structured paper. I was heartened to see that questions emerging as I read were anticipated and addressed in later sections. The author has a clear focus on the main points of their argument and developed them in an orderly manner. Second, Jordan Peterson has been a prominent figure in cultural discourse over the last decade or so, and has shown increasing interest in biblical literature, themes, and imagery in his most recent work. The originality of this paper lies in its utilisation of Peterson's work for theological reflection. Third, I resonate with the author's primary concerns that evangelicals (i) live out their salvation with real this-world intentionality; (ii) especially with respect to care for the poor and suffering; and (iii) contribute to the common good with an emphasis on civilisational renewal. 

Despite these strengths, however, I do not find the argument 'compelling' (as desired above). Several lines of reasoning influence my ambivalence:

1. I wonder at the initial diagnosis of evangelical malaise, here traced to its 'overwhelmingly afterlife-focussed soteriology.' Perhaps the author runs in different circles to me: I don't see this. Further, I suggest that other forces are also at work shaping evangelical spirituality and practice which are not explored here. For example, the penetration of the prosperity gospel or 'therapeutic moralistic deism' or the voluntarist nature of much evangelical ecclesiology; the societal loss of 'thick' community coupled with increasing personal autonomy and 'expressive individualism,' coupled with the increasing pressure of cultural expectations, work-life balance, and economic and 'individualist' pursuits that leave little time for serious participation in Christian community, biblical engagement, or missional praxis; 'curiously thin' (shallow) experiences of spiritual formation whether in worship that caters primarily to felt needs, or reduced knowledge of Scripture and its moral and missional entailments, cultural captivity to moral and political agendas on both left and right, etc. All these and more contribute to the present evangelical malaise. There are indications that the author is aware of this complexity but has presented an overly-simplified version of the problem.
   
   The criticism is also a little ironic given the statements concerning the 'remarkable vitality' of evangelicalism, its 'extraordinary global vigour,' its enduring strength [which] lies in its experiential appeal', etc. If this is true as well as the malaise, perhaps wholesale reconstruction is not what is required, but a greater faithfulness to that which is already exhibited more truly in present evangelicalism.
   
   
2. The question of theosis (perhaps nuanced) is relatively uncontroversial in evangelical theology, although it is certainly not its main emphasis. Properly speaking, theosis is also an eschatological concept, although this might also be said of other soteriological metaphors and images. It is a concept that could enrich evangelical soteriology but I cannot see it supplanting other central categories such as regeneration, justification, reconciliation, adoption, or sanctification. All such images are complementary and mutually-conditioning, and among them theosis can make its contribution. It seems to me that a 'reconstruction' of evangelical soteriology overstates the matter, and in this form, risks serious theological reductionism. 
   
   
3. I have a question concerning the validity of the argument: has the substance of the gospel been altered in this 'reconstruction'? I understand that the author insists that this is not the case but questions remain.
   
   For example, Walker's conclusion that Jesus "is both 'Son of God' and 'Son of Joseph' because he is the 'Son of Man' (line 130; my emphasis) is, to me, quite wrong. I either need more analysis and discussion to clarify and establish the point or a different formulation, more in accord with orthodox trinitarian and christological reflection. If the immanent trinity has been collapsed into the economic trinity, how is the priority of grace maintained?
   
   For example, does the redefinition of sin as "self-deception, refusal of responsibility, and collapse into psychological chaos" or the refusal "to become fully actualised, truthful, courageous, and oriented toward the good" flatten or psychologise the biblical concept? What has happened, here, to the relational dynamic of what sin is, to the divine address and divine command? Passages such as Romans 1 or Ephesians 4 can speak of sin in terms of self-deception but this is a consequence of something more fundamental, the rejection of God himself, of God's rule and way, of the substitution of idols in the place of God, etc.
   
   For example, "salvation is neither mere legal acquittal nor moral self-improvement but a transformation of being through meaning-making, value-alignment, and courageous confrontation with the realities of existence" (lines 241ff; cf. also the previous sentence). It is difficult to know what to make of this bold sentence. Evangelical soteriology does not equate salvation with 'mere legal acquittal' although it insists on justification as central to Christian faith and experience. Justification, properly understood, is much more than 'mere legal acquittal.' Salvation does entail transformation of being but through Christ and the work of the Spirit. Are Christmas, Good Friday, Easter, and Pentecost actually necessary if salvation is a transformation achieved through 'meaning-making,' value-alignment, etc.?Although the author insists that the proposal is not Pelagian, rhetoric like this is, at best, ambiguous. Lines 299-304 provide a much better description of what salvation is; nevertheless a tension is evident in the paper. 
   
   For example, has the church been eclipsed in this proposal, line 400 notwithstanding? Is the church, too, a part of the gospel we proclaim, the divine-human fellowship restored through Christ and in the Spirit, and human 'participation' in God restored in and through the believer's participation in the life and mission of the body of Christ? 
   
   
4. Finally, I have a question concerning the usefulness of the proposal as it stands. How likely is it really, that such a wholesale reconstruction of Christian doctrine will take root in the life of the church, especially given the supplanting of biblical and theological language with that of philosophy and psychology? This point may be moot: it is not the purpose of academic study per se to have practical utility (though I suspect the author desires such utility). But perhaps the question can be put more sharply: does Peterson's 'grammar' serve more to obscure than to enlighten? I have not found it particularly helpful or illuminating, but that could just be me.

It will be apparent now that while I think the paper well-written and clearly structured, I have concerns about its conception and argument. I suspect that the author is attempting too much in a single paper and as a result is premature in their argument. I wonder, if in fact, there might be two quite discrete projects here.

First, there is value in the critical analysis and assessment of Peterson's work as a resource for theological reflection. This would involve a more detailed (exegetical) exposition of his work and a thoroughgoing assessment of his proposals in terms of their consonance with Christian theology. The easy acceptance of Peterson in this essay is problematic (e.g. the claim of lines 237ff), and that much more analysis, exposition, and evaluation is required to make the case, if indeed it can be made.

Second, the author clearly has concerns about the spiritual and formational inadequacy of some forms of evangelicalism - with good reason. I suggest that these concerns could be addressed with reference to the best of evangelical theology, heritage, and spirituality, and that such a task has great urgency in the modern west, and perhaps more broadly. I suggest that this would be more fruitful than the approach adopted here. 

Further - and this is not a further suggestion for a third project! - the author seems to equate Christian mission with a civilisational task though s/he also indicates that this is a consequence of formation. Still, I would like to see much more definition of what is meant here, and what is not meant. 

Thus, I suggest that this project be reconceived, and the author determine what they most want to pursue initially. In its present form, it appears premature. If the author wanted to revise the paper for this Special Issue, I would probably recommend:

1. Strip the Peterson material and conceptuality from the paper
2. Develop the concept of the Divine Individual with more careful attention to (and nuance with respect to) the biblical and theological underpinning of the concept. 
3. Ask what does formation of the Divine Individual require and entail and how might this formation occur?
4. Ensure that the paper is properly referenced - every citation or paraphrase should be specifically referenced. There are numerous instances where this is not the case, at present.

But this might not be the project that the author wants to pursue, and I understand that. 

I intend this feedback to be helpful rather than hurtful, and I hope it might be received in this spirit.

Author Response

Comment 1 — Oversimplified diagnosis; and the irony of “vitality” vs. “malaise”

Comment 1: I wonder at the initial diagnosis of evangelical malaise, here traced to its ‘overwhelmingly afterlife-focussed soteriology’… other forces are also at work—the prosperity gospel, ‘therapeutic moralistic deism,’ the voluntarist nature of much evangelical ecclesiology, the loss of ‘thick’ community, ‘expressive individualism,’… There are indications that the author is aware of this complexity but has presented an overly-simplified version of the problem. The criticism is also a little ironic given the statements concerning the ‘remarkable vitality’ of evangelicalism… perhaps wholesale reconstruction is not what is required, but a greater faithfulness to that which is already exhibited more truly in present evangelicalism.

Response 1: I agree, and this was among the most valuable corrections. The diagnosis has been de-simplified at two levels. First, the categorical claim has been qualified: “overwhelmingly afterlife-focused” now reads “in many (though by no means all) of its expressions, its soteriology has tilted so heavily toward the afterlife…” Second, a new sentence and footnote (Section I, the “Here-and-Now Crisis” paragraph; footnote 21) explicitly name the multiple, overlapping drivers the reviewer lists: “The prosperity gospel, a moralistic-therapeutic reduction of faith, a voluntarist and consumerist ecclesiology, the erosion of thick community, and the broader cultural drift toward expressive individualism each compound the malaise—even as a substantial and growing body of evangelical social engagement pushes vigorously against it.” Footnote 21 cites Smith & Denton, Bellah et al., Taylor, and Steensland & Goff. On the irony: I take the point fully, and it now governs the paper’s self-understanding. The thesis has been reframed away from “wholesale reconstruction” toward “recovery and enrichment”—a greater faithfulness to evangelicalism’s own best instincts. The revised diagnosis closes by stating that the dominant soteriological grammar “under-resources the very this-worldly intentionality that its best practice already exhibits.”

Comment 2 — “Reconstruction” overstates; theosis enriches but cannot supplant other categories

Comment 2: Theosis… could enrich evangelical soteriology but I cannot see it supplanting other central categories such as regeneration, justification, reconciliation, adoption, or sanctification. All such images are complementary and mutually-conditioning… a ‘reconstruction’ of evangelical soteriology overstates the matter, and in this form, risks serious theological reductionism.

Response 2: Agreed without reservation. The word “reconstruction” has been changed to “recovery and enrichment” in the title-claim, abstract, introduction, and conclusion. The abstract now states the relationship explicitly: “This article argues not for the replacement of Evangelical soteriology but for its recovery and enrichment… The theotic dimension developed here complements rather than supplants the forensic categories of justification, regeneration, and reconciliation.” The point that the images are “complementary and mutually-conditioning” is now my explicit position; theosis takes its place among the other images rather than absorbing them.

Comment 3a — Walker’s Christology “quite wrong”; immanent/economic Trinity; priority of grace

Comment 3a: Walker’s conclusion that Jesus ‘is both “Son of God” and “Son of Joseph” because he is the “Son of Man”… is, to me, quite wrong… If the immanent trinity has been collapsed into the economic trinity, how is the priority of grace maintained?

Response 3a: This was the single most important correction, pressed by all three reviewers. I have added a Chalcedonian clarification immediately after the Walker quotation (Section III-A) and a supporting footnote (footnote 22, citing the Definition of Chalcedon): “the unity named here is not a Hegelian fusion of two prior terms into a third, but the Chalcedonian confession of one person in two natures, united without confusion, change, division, or separation… Christ is the Son of Man uniquely and by nature… the figure is christologically singular before it is anthropologically exemplary.” Footnote 5 has also been reworded to remove “Hegelian-style synthesis” and to describe “Son of Man” as the single subject of the hypostatic union. The priority of grace is preserved by this asymmetry: Christ is Son of Man by nature; the believer is conformed to him by grace and the Spirit.

Comment 3b — Does the redefinition of sin flatten or psychologise the biblical concept?

Comment 3b: Does the redefinition of sin as ‘self-deception, refusal of responsibility, and collapse into psychological chaos’… flatten or psychologise the biblical concept? What has happened to the divine address and divine command? Passages such as Romans 1 or Ephesians 4… speak of sin in terms of self-deception but this is a consequence of something more fundamental, the rejection of God himself…

Response 3b: I agree entirely. A new passage in Section III-B now subordinates the phenomenological redescription of sin to its relational essence: “Sin is first and foremost the rejection of God himself—of his rule, his address, and his way—and the substitution of idols in his place (Rom 1.21–25; Eph 4.17–19). Self-deception, the refusal of responsibility, and collapse into psychological chaos are the existential consequences and symptoms of that prior God-ward rupture, not its essence.” This adopts the reviewer’s own formulation and the very texts they cite.

Comment 3c — The “transformation of being” sentence is ambiguous / Pelagian-adjacent

Comment 3c: ‘salvation is neither mere legal acquittal nor moral self-improvement but a transformation of being through meaning-making, value-alignment, and courageous confrontation with the realities of existence’… Are Christmas, Good Friday, Easter, and Pentecost actually necessary if salvation is a transformation achieved through ‘meaning-making’…? rhetoric like this is, at best, ambiguous.

Response 3c: Agreed. I have added a qualifier directly after that sentence (Section III-C): “The transformation in view is wrought by Christ and applied by the Spirit; meaning-making, value-alignment, and courageous confrontation with reality are its phenomenological signature in the believer’s experience, not its efficient cause. The objective acts of incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, and Pentecost remain its ground and source: without them there is no transformation to describe.” Section III-F reinforces this: Peterson can describe the shape of transformation but never supply its source.

Comment 3d — Has the church been eclipsed?

Comment 3d: Has the church been eclipsed in this proposal…? Is the church, too, a part of the gospel we proclaim… and human ‘participation’ in God restored in and through the believer’s participation in the life and mission of the body of Christ?

Response 3d: The ecclesial dimension is affirmed in Section V-C, where the Divine Individual is defined as the person-in-communion, “constituted by direct address from God and from neighbour, fulfilled only in the relational matrix of the Body of Christ.” I have foregrounded this person-in-communion language (now also in the abstract and footnote 23) so that the personal and the ecclesial are mutually constituting rather than competitive. I take the point that this could be developed further and flag it as the project’s most natural next step; within this paper the corporate is named as intrinsic to, not a sequel to, personal participation in God.

Comment 4 & closing — Usefulness of Peterson; “easy acceptance is problematic”; two projects; strip Peterson; referencing

Comment 4 / closing: Does Peterson’s ‘grammar’ serve more to obscure than to enlighten?… The easy acceptance of Peterson in this essay is problematic (e.g. the claim of lines 237ff)… I wonder if there might be two quite discrete projects here… [recommendations:] 1. Strip the Peterson material… 2. Develop the concept of the Divine Individual with more careful… underpinning… 4. Ensure that the paper is properly referenced—every citation or paraphrase should be specifically referenced.

Response 4: This is a fair and searching challenge, and I have taken a deliberate middle path between the reviewer’s two suggested projects rather than splitting the paper. (i) The “easy acceptance” of Peterson is remedied by the new Section III-F, “Assessing Peterson: Grammar, Not Substance,” which states the (limited, missional-apologetic) gain and then names three points at which Peterson is corrected: an autonomous-subject anthropology answered by grace; a Kantian/perspectivist metaphysics answered by a realist doctrine of creation and resurrection; and an archetype-Christology answered by Christ as ontological source. (ii) The Divine Individual is given more careful biblical-theological underpinning (Chalcedonian clarification; person-in-communion; conformitas Christi; footnotes 22–24). (iii) A full referencing audit has been completed—which is also where the “every citation or paraphrase should be specifically referenced” concern is met: several passages previously set as direct quotations of Peterson are now correctly rendered as paraphrase, and remaining citations checked and supplemented. I retain Peterson because, once disciplined in this way, his vocabulary does real apologetic work for late-modern readers; but he is subordinated to the biblical-patristic substance at every load-bearing point.

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The article aims to analyze protestant evangelical soteriology with two - according to the author - innovative approaches: with reference to the Eastern theological notion of "theosis" and with reference to the contemporary/temporal/societal/cultural consequences of redemption and of the prospect of salvation. The article has a lot of merits: it tries to find a biblical ground for its statements; it has a clear and well considered structure; it has an interesting starting point (the idea of an evangelical paradox of highlighting salvation without its earthy consequences); it uses good literature and excellent authors; it tries to demonstrate the legitimacy of a Christian "individualism" understood as personalism; and it provides good arguments for its suggestions.

 At the same time, the article has three major inconsistencies.

 1. A major inconsistency can be found in the fact that the article tries to use Jordan Peterson's ideas of the meaningful and flourishing life, although the roots and the fundamentals of the author's theology and Peterson's psychological anthropology are completely different. The author is convinced that Peterson's ideas of failure and meaning can be read as adequate translations of authentically Christian ideas (of sin and theosis) in a psychological key, but at the same time he has to emphasize the difference between the Christian dependence on grace and Peterson's self-help program with an autonomous subject in its center. As a result, it is not obvious how Peterson can help in understanding the Christian message better if there are such significant theoretical differences between them. The author states that "Peterson supplies grammar, not substance" (line 383), but it is not demonstrated in a convincing way that his psychology is a successful translation of the patristic notion of theosis and asceticism (line 388).  

2.  The use of the expression "Divine Individual" in the text seems to be exclusively bound to Peterson's books and is rather disturbing in a Christian/theological context. The phrase "divine individual" is sometimes uses in Christian texts, but mostly referring to God understood as person (cf. Richard Swinburne). The reference to the human person as "divine individual" should me avoided in a Christian/theological context.

3. There is a significant tension in the text in the understanding of "Son of Man". In some parts, there is a theological interpretation of the phrase (Christ as the only Son of Man by nature: line 248), but in lines 293-296, there is a relativistic reinterpretation of this: the Son of Man is the divine individual "revealed christologically". This seems to mean that Christ is just a manifestation of anthropology.  The whole text is imbued by this ambiguity: it is not clear how the human person and Christ are related to each other. 

 

Some suggestions:

1. the author should explain why Peterson provides a successful translation of traditional Christian ideas; what is the gain in using Peterson?; how is this related to Evengelicalism which is not mentioned in the text later?
2.  It is a valuable feature of the text that it tries to highlight the "hear and now theology of meaning" - this section could be amplified and extended so that it can be seen how the "hear and now" in neglected in Evangelical soteriology;
3. to the biblical literature the author could add some more recent works as he seems to pay undue attention to the '60s;
4. the ambiguities concerning the term "Son of Man" should be reconsidered, especially the psychological ones (lines 176-183): this is a non-theological summary and seems to have the approval of the author;
5. too easy parallelisms should be avoided between pychology and traditional theology, e.g. concerning the understanding of sin as self-deception (l. 198) and failire of likeness (l. 204);
6. the section on an authentic Christian individualism is excellent (part IV);
7. the same is true of section V which witnesses the author's readiness to provide sound arguments;
8. the section of mission as formation is also very valuable;
9. however, the tension between the cognitive content of mission (proclamation and doctrine) and the psychological/anthropological dimension of it (transformation of culture, responsibilities) is not worked out.

Author Response

Comment 1 — “Grammar, not substance” is asserted, not demonstrated

Comment 1: …the roots and the fundamentals of the author’s theology and Peterson’s psychological anthropology are completely different… it is not obvious how Peterson can help… The author states that ‘Peterson supplies grammar, not substance’ (line 383), but it is not demonstrated in a convincing way that his psychology is a successful translation of the patristic notion of theosis and asceticism.

Response 1: This is the central methodological challenge, and I have answered it with a dedicated section rather than a reassertion. The new Section III-F demonstrates the claim by doing three things: it states the precise nature of the gain (a missional and apologetic translation device, and a corroborating witness from outside the household of faith); it concedes the very difference the reviewer highlights—the autonomous subject vs. dependence on grace—and resolves it in theology’s favour; and it specifies the rule of use: “wherever his anthropology, his metaphysics, or his Christology diverges from that substance, the substance governs and the grammar is corrected.” The translation is thus shown to be partial and disciplined, which is the only sense in which I claim it succeeds.

Comment 2 — “Divine Individual” is Peterson-bound and theologically disturbing (cf. Swinburne)

Comment 2: The use of the expression ‘Divine Individual’… seems to be exclusively bound to Peterson’s books and is rather disturbing in a Christian/theological context… mostly referring to God understood as person (cf. Richard Swinburne). The reference to the human person as ‘divine individual’ should be avoided in a Christian/theological context.

Response 2: I have qualified the term rather than letting it stand unexamined. A new footnote (footnote 23) distinguishes my usage from Swinburne’s use of “divine individual” for the persons of the Godhead in The Christian God, and insists the phrase be heard relationally—as “the human person-in-communion (Yannaras) conformed by grace to Christ (conformitas Christi)—a participatory and Spirit-dependent realization of the imago Dei, never an independent divinity proper to the creature as such.” The abstract introduces the term “with deliberate qualification,” and person-in-communion / conformitas Christi now carry the technical weight. I retain “Divine Individual” as the framing shorthand for the constructive proposal, but stripped of any implication of self-divinization.

Comment 3 — “Son of Man” tension; Christ as “just a manifestation of anthropology”

Comment 3: …in lines 293-296, there is a relativistic reinterpretation… the Son of Man is the divine individual ‘revealed christologically’. This seems to mean that Christ is just a manifestation of anthropology… it is not clear how the human person and Christ are related to each other.

Response 3: Addressed at the root. The Chalcedonian clarification in Section III-A states that Christ is the Son of Man uniquely and by nature, “christologically singular before… anthropologically exemplary.” The theosis statement in the same section has been qualified so it can no longer be read as identity: the human person “comes to share by gift in what the Son of Man is by nature—never collapsing the distinction between the one who deifies and those who are deified.” Section III-F (divergence three) further insists Christ is the ontological source, not merely the archetype. The person–Christ relation is therefore asymmetrical participation, not mutual manifestation.

Suggestions 1–9

Suggestions 1, 4, 5 (Peterson translation / Son-of-Man ambiguities / easy parallelisms): All three are met by Section III-F and by the Section III-B addition on sin, which distinguishes the phenomenological redescription of sin from its relational essence rather than simply equating self-deception with “failure of likeness.”

Suggestion 2 (amplify the “here-and-now theology of meaning”; show the neglect): The diagnosis has been sharpened (Section I; footnote 21) to show precisely where present-day soteriology under-resources this-worldly intentionality.

Suggestion 3 (add more recent biblical literature; less reliance on the 1960s): Done. Footnote 24 and new reference entries add Marianne Meye Thompson, The God of the Gospel of John (2001), and Delbert Burkett, The Son of Man Debate (1999), with a sentence in Section III-A acknowledging that the mid-century essays are reaffirmed by more recent scholarship.

Suggestions 6, 7, 8 (Sections IV, V, and mission-as-formation are strong): I am grateful for these affirmations; those sections are substantially retained.

Suggestion 9 (tension between the cognitive/proclamatory and anthropological dimensions of mission): I have strengthened the objective/proclamatory pole: the Section III-C qualifier insists the gospel events remain the ground and source of transformation, and Section III-F’s second divergence affirms the objective reality of creation and resurrection against any purely psychological reading. I acknowledge this tension would reward fuller treatment and flag it as a direction for future work.

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Thank you for the bold contribution. However, I have some comments requiring a clarification.

P. 2 In the current discussion it seems that the situation is not so simplified that evangelicals would categorically represent an overwhelmingly afterlife-focused soteriology. Cf. regarding the discussion for example: https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/themelios/review/the-new-evangelical-social-engagement/

P. 2 The term "divine individual" doesn't necessarily produce the connotation which refers to the classical idea of a person created to be an image of God, or created in the image and likelihood of God. It seems to imply that a person is somehow divine in themselves. The concept "image of God" or "divinization"/theosis is a relational concept which indicates that a human person is dependent on the work of God in the human being.

P. 3 Do you refer here with "coercive transformation" to Christian understanding of theosis, and with the voluntary transformation to some kind of "self-made man", or "man as the blacksmith of his happiness"? If so, it seems that Christianity is used only as an inspiration for a secular psychological ideology. Later in the article you express appreciation to the orthodox understanding of theosis but it is not clear here.

P. 3, footnote From the point of view of Chalcedonian Christology it seems that a philosophical use of a "Hegelian style" idea of "Son of Man" as a synthesis of divine origin and human origin would distort the Christological paradox. It states that as a Son of God Jesus Christ is also fully human, although without sin. His personality is a unique divine-human person but without any confusion of divine and human natures: Without confusion (Greek: asynchytos); Without change (Greek: atreptos); Without division (Greek: adiairetos); Without separation (Greek: achoristos).

P. 4 The conclusion that because he is 'Son of Man' Jesus would be 'Son of God" and 'Son of Joseph at the same time as a synthesis doesn't fit with the Chalcedonian logic and its divine-human paradox. It is of course possible to construct a philosophical-theological idea of the person of Jesus but from the dogmatic point of view it is not very convincing. It seems that the concept 'Son of Man' is not a theoretical one as such but has roots in the Old Testament and gets a specific frame of interpretation when referring to the person of Jesus Christ.

P. 4 It would be useful to analyze here the relationship between the concept "individual" and "individualistic" and the relational concept "person". Classically the Gospel of John is an important source for Trinitarian theology. As Marianne Meye Thomson writes: "The figures of the Father and the Son are not simply fused, but neither are they to be so completely distinguished and held apart as though they could simply be known and comprehended separately and apart from each other." (2001, 239)

P. 4 I suggest that you use also newer exegetical authors, not so much writers from the early 1960's.

P. 5 The classical New Testament Christology is not about an 'ideal human being' but about the incarnation of the Son of God. Therefore it appears that the concept of the 'archetypal ideal human being' is not compatible with the Chalcedonian synthesis but a philosophy of its own. The exegetical material doesn't bring any convincing new insights to this.

P. 6 Although the restoration of the image of God in a human person is the goal of theosis, using Christological terms like 'Son of Man' does not clarify but rather blurs the point and seems to be at least unnecessary. The classical vocabulary about 'conformitas Christi' seems to be more accurate as a technical term.

P. 6 Connecting 'meaning' with salvation is not necessarily a reinterpretation but an explication of the classical content in the contemporary context. Peterson can no doubt be a useful discussion partner in this.

P. 6 Peterson builds on a Kantian framework with his phenomenological perspectivism but Christian faith speaks also about the objective reality, about the creation. Salvation is not only an anthropocentric psychological reality. From this point of view the use of Peterson's argumentation in the context of current holistic theological understanding would presuppose a revision to this point before further theological use.

P. 8 The phrase "The Divine Individual is theosis described phenomenologically" is not quite accurate because the classical content seems to be transformed, not only described.

P. 10 Theosis can make grace constitutive, but connected with Petersonian vocabulary this is not as clear as in the original context.

P. 10 It may be that the inspiration of the proposal is mainly biblical and patristic but other sources seem to redirect that basis.

P. 10 If the 'divine individual' is 'person-in-communion' why don't you use that clearer concept from ecumenical theology?

 

Author Response

On the diagnosis (p. 2)

Comment: In the current discussion it seems that the situation is not so simplified that evangelicals would categorically represent an overwhelmingly afterlife-focused soteriology. Cf.… the-new-evangelical-social-engagement…

Response: Agreed. The categorical claim is now qualified (“in many, though by no means all, of its expressions”), and footnote 21 cites the very volume the reviewer points to—Steensland & Goff, The New Evangelical Social Engagement (2014)—as evidence of the counter-current of evangelical this-worldly engagement.

On “divine individual,” imago Dei, and conformitas Christi (pp. 2, 6, 10)

Comment: The term ‘divine individual’… seems to imply that a person is somehow divine in themselves. The concept ‘image of God’ or ‘divinization’/theosis is a relational concept… [p.6] The classical vocabulary about ‘conformitas Christi’ seems to be more accurate as a technical term… [p.10] If the ‘divine individual’ is ‘person-in-communion’ why don’t you use that clearer concept from ecumenical theology?

Response: I have adopted the reviewer’s vocabulary. Footnote 23 now states that the term must be heard relationally as person-in-communion conformed by grace to Christ (conformitas Christi), “a participatory and Spirit-dependent realization of the imago Dei, never an independent divinity proper to the creature as such.” The abstract foregrounds person-in-communion and conformitas Christi. I retain “Divine Individual” as the named proposal but explicitly qualified; the clearer ecumenical concepts now carry the technical load.

On the Hegelian “Son of Man” and Chalcedon (p. 3 footnote, p. 4, p. 5)

Comment: …a ‘Hegelian style’ idea of ‘Son of Man’ as a synthesis… would distort the Christological paradox… Without confusion (asynchytos); Without change (atreptos); Without division (adiairetos); Without separation (achoristos)… [p.5] the ‘archetypal ideal human being’ is not compatible with the Chalcedonian synthesis.

Response: Acted upon precisely. Footnote 5 no longer contains “Hegelian-style synthesis”; it describes “Son of Man” as the single subject of the hypostatic union. A new footnote 22 quotes the Chalcedonian formula in the reviewer’s four terms: “without confusion, without change, without division, without separation.” The “archetypal ideal human being” phrasing has been removed from direct quotation and recast as paraphrase, and Section III-F (divergence three) states that orthodoxy “confesses Christ as the ontological source—the Logos made flesh… not merely the exemplar.” The Chalcedonian clarification in Section III-A makes the same correction in the body.

On individual / individualistic / person, and newer exegesis (p. 4)

Comment: It would be useful to analyze… the relationship between ‘individual’ and ‘individualistic’ and the relational concept ‘person’… As Marianne Meye Thomson writes: ‘The figures of the Father and the Son are not simply fused, but neither are they to be so completely distinguished…’ (2001, 239)… use also newer exegetical authors, not so much writers from the early 1960’s.

Response: The individual / individualistic / person distinction is handled in Section V-C, which sets the atomistic “individual” of late liberalism against the relational person-in-communion. On newer exegesis: footnote 24 engages Thompson’s point that, in John, Father and Son are neither simply fused nor wholly separable, and adds Burkett’s survey of the Son-of-Man debate, with both added to the references. (Author’s note: the exact wording and page of the Thompson quotation are being verified against the source before final submission, and it is presently rendered as paraphrase.)

On voluntary vs. coercive transformation, and the Kantian frame (pp. 3, 6)

Comment: Do you refer… with the voluntary transformation to some kind of ‘self-made man’…? it seems that Christianity is used only as an inspiration for a secular psychological ideology… [p.6] Peterson builds on a Kantian framework… but Christian faith speaks also about the objective reality, about the creation. Salvation is not only an anthropocentric psychological reality… [it] would presuppose a revision to this point before further theological use.

Response: Both concerns are answered in Section III-F. The “self-made man” worry is met by the first divergence (grace, not self-rescue). The Kantian point—stated exactly by the reviewer—is met by the second divergence: “Peterson works within a broadly Kantian and pragmatist frame: meaning, not being, is his primary datum… Christian faith… confesses the objective reality of creation, of the incarnation, and of the bodily resurrection of Christ… Peterson’s perspectivism must accordingly be received critically and ordered beneath a theological realism that it does not itself supply.” This is the “revision to this point before further theological use” that the reviewer requires.

On “meaning” as explication, and “theosis described phenomenologically” (pp. 6, 8, 10)

Comment: Connecting ‘meaning’ with salvation is not necessarily a reinterpretation but an explication… Peterson can no doubt be a useful discussion partner… [p.8] ‘The Divine Individual is theosis described phenomenologically’ is not quite accurate because the classical content seems to be transformed, not only described… [p.10] other sources seem to redirect that basis.

Response: I accept the distinction between explication and reinterpretation and have moved the paper toward “explication”: the framing language is now “recovery and enrichment,” and Section III-C affirms that the gospel events remain the source of the transformation that “meaning” describes. On the worry that the content is transformed and the basis redirected: Section III-F governs the whole relationship, making explicit that Peterson’s grammar is subordinated to—and where necessary corrected by—the biblical-patristic substance, so the substance is translated, not transmuted.

On grace made constitutive (p. 10)

Comment: Theosis can make grace constitutive, but connected with Petersonian vocabulary this is not as clear as in the original context.

Response: To make this clearer I have (a) completed the previously empty footnote (now footnote 18) on the “by nature / by grace” distinction, cross-referenced to Athanasius and Lossky; and (b) added the first divergence in Section III-F, which states that the power of transformation “is itself a gift, not a native capacity of fallen agency,” so the constitutive role of grace is asserted independently of, and over against, the Petersonian vocabulary.

I am grateful for this exceptionally careful reading. The revisions are marked in red throughout the manuscript.

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Thank you for your detailed response to the suggestions I made - and I assume to the suggestions of other peer reviewers. The revised paper is much improved, reads well, and your nuance and additional explanation at various points has clarified or mitigated my earlier concerns.

For what it is worth, I still think an analytical exposition and theological assessment of Peterson's work would be a valuable contribution to theological work. 

Blessings to you.

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Thank you for the clarifications and additions. The article is now much clearer.