1. Introduction
In the early period of Islam, the companions’ understanding of religion was reflected not only in the political and social structure of the Arabian Peninsula, but also in the language of hadith transmission. Having learned the hadiths from the Prophet, the companions employed various transmission formulas, such as ḥaddathanā (He narrated to us), samiʿtu (I heard), akhbaranā (He informed us), and qāla (He said), when conveying them to subsequent generations. Among these, one of the most striking is the expression amara (the Prophet commanded). This particular formula, preferred by the companions who stand at the beginning of the chain of hadith transmission, contains noteworthy clues regarding how they understood and interpreted hadiths, which constitute one of the principal sources of religion. Indeed, this expression is significant not only for identifying the Prophet’s commands but also for understanding how his recommendations and requests were perceived by the companions and how these were transformed into religious knowledge and practice.
The aim of this study is to examine, through the form amara (the Prophet commanded), the language of transmission employed by the companions, the primary agents of the act of understanding, when conveying the commands they heard from the Prophet. Evaluating language in isolation from its context and its users does not yield sound conclusions. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the expressions used with precision and to properly examine the semantic world of the words. At this point, particular importance must be attached to how the Companions, as the users of the language, perceived and understood what they encountered, as well as to the everyday meanings of the words they employed. Indeed, every language implicitly contains a worldview. To study a language is, in a sense, to uncover the worldview expressed through it. From this perspective, the hadith transmission style of the companions reflects not only the technical dimension of narrating hadiths, but also their approach to religious rulings and their understanding of and practice of religion (
Sezgin 1983, 1/72).
In this study, the hadiths cited as examples have been selected from al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī, which Muslims regard as the most authentic collection of hadith. A qualitative approach has been adopted toward the reports transmitted through the amara form, and the hadiths have been classified in terms of the information and legal rulings they convey. Furthermore, an analysis has been conducted of how the companions transmitted various subject matters using the same narrative formula. In this way, the study aims to reveal not only the verbal dimension of the language of transmission, but also its religious and sociological aspects. The examples have been selected from various domains, such as acts of worship, social relations, and economic regulations, to demonstrate that the companions employed hadiths containing imperative content holistically, without drawing strict normative distinctions. In this way, it is also intended to emphasize that the expression amara in companions’ transmissions is not merely a neutral form of narration, but a deliberate choice reflecting their understanding of religious rulings.
Within this framework, the article interprets the fact that companions from different segments of society and holding different religious interpretations employed the same transmission formula (amara) in their hadith narrations (riwayāt) not merely as a linguistic preference, but as a reflection of a shared understanding of religion. This, in turn, demonstrates that in order to comprehend the religious understanding of the early Islamic community, the formulas of hadith transmission should be regarded as historical and sociological sources. The conclusions reached in this study, along with the paradigm shift identified between the era of the companions and subsequent scholars, are predicated upon the methodological premise that the core of the hadiths transmitted from the Prophet has been preserved without distortion. It must be noted that if this baseline assumption is not integrated into the analysis, certain conclusions arrived at in this study will inevitably become open to debate. However, reports demonstrating that the companions who were particularly renowned for transmitting a high volume of hadiths (the mukthirūn) strived to transmit the Prophet’s words exactly as they heard them suggest that there may be no significant discrepancies between the texts available to subsequent jurists and the original hadiths of the Prophet. The fundamental divergence between the era of the companions and the subsequent period lies not in the textual integrity but rather in the very approach to adhering to these hadiths.
Although some indirect studies have been conducted on the subject, it can be observed that Western scholarship on ḥadīth has generally focused on the reliability of ḥadīths (
Schacht 1950;
Sezgin 1967;
Crone and Cook 1977;
Juynboll 1983;
Motzki 2002;
Schoeler et al. 2006;
Brown 2009), whereas in the Islamic world the subject has been addressed within the framework of uṣūl al-ḥadīth and the interpretation of transmitted reports. Approaches in the West, which are predominantly centered on debates concerning isnād (chain of transmission) and textual authenticity, have largely left aside inferences regarding the companions’ understanding of religion. In studies within the Islamic tradition, although some awareness has emerged regarding the normative dimensions embedded in transmission formulas, it is still evident that no comprehensive analysis has been conducted focusing on a specific narrative formula, such as the expression amara. In this study, the usage of the verb amara, along with all its morphological derivatives in the hadiths of al-Bukhārī’s
al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, was systematically compiled and analyzed by searching through
al-Maktaba al-Shāmila and similar Arabic database programs. Every instance of amara and its various inflections within the aforementioned work was comprehensively examined and evaluated for the purpose of this research. The rationale for selecting the case studies exclusively from al-Bukhārī’s aforementioned work lies in the unrivaled reliability of the text, as well as the author’s meticulous precision in selecting specific textual formulations when incorporating reports into his
Ṣaḥīḥ. Furthermore, the narration of al-Barā’, which was selected as a primary example, is a well-known report (khabar) that is featured not only in al-Bukhārī’s compendium but also across the vast majority of Sunni hadith sources. From this perspective, the issue has been examined and analyzed chiefly through the lens of the Sunni Hadith tradition.
The approach adopted in this article aims to address two gaps in the existing literature: Methodological gap: Rather than restricting the study of hadith transmission to discussions of the reliability of the isnād or the text, this study seeks to demonstrate that the linguistic structures of transmission formulas (ṣiyagh al-riwāya) can also be read as historical, sociological, and theological data. Conceptual gap: Moving beyond the normative discussions of command and prohibition formulas in uṣūl al-fiqh, this study aims to understand the companions’ approaches to religious comprehension and interpretation through the language of transmission they employed in hadith narration.
In conclusion, by placing the expression amara at the center of analysis, this article aims to demonstrate how the narrative style preferred by the earliest Muslim generation reflects their understanding of religion and thereby shows that the companions regarded religious norms not only as legally binding but also as morally significant. To achieve this aim, the study will first examine the patterns of usage and meanings of the expression amara in Arabic. It will then analyze the companions’ hadith-transmission style using selected example reports on the subject. This paper does not intend to engage in the historical authenticity or fabrication debates of the hadith literature (such as the isnād-cum-matn debates). Rather, it treats the available literary corpus as a site of discursive practice to analyze the paradigm shift between early textual reception and subsequent formalistic legal codification.
2. The Forms of Usage and Lexical Meanings of the Expression “Amara” in Hadiths
One of the transmission formulas used by the companions when reporting the hadiths of the Prophet, namely the form amara, appears in different variations within hadith transmission. These forms generally occur in hadiths with the following expressions:
Amaranī/amaranā Rasūlullāh/al-Nabiyy… (The Messenger of Allah/the Prophet commanded me/us the following) (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 2/170; 4/55);
Umirtu/umirnā (I/we were commanded the following) (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 4/85, 2/62);
Kāna ya’muru Rasūlullāh/Nabiyyunā (The Messenger of Allah/our Prophet used to command us the following) (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 1/129; 2/2; 8/78).
The use of these expressions in plural or passive forms indicates that the companions were addressed by the words and actions of the Prophet both collectively and individually. It also reveals, as will be shown below, that some of the Prophet’s requests were understood by the companions as direct religious commands.
The expression amara, which is frequently used in the Companions’ transmission of hadiths, has a remarkably wide semantic range in Arabic. This verb does not denote only “to command,” but also encompasses a range of meanings, including directing, indicating, consulting, encouraging, increasing, and elevating. Despite this semantic diversity, why did the companions prefer to convey different types of content using the same expression? In order to understand the semantic relationship they established with the words of the Prophet, it is necessary to examine how this expression is used in hadith reports.
The most fundamental meaning of the verb amara is “to command/order”. Derived from the same root, al-amīr denotes a person vested with authority, while al-imāra signifies governance and authority. In this respect, the verb amara conveys the act of an authority normatively commanding that something be carried out (
Ibn Manẓūr 1414, 4/27).
This verb is also used to mean “motivating, encouraging, and prompting” (
Ibn Manẓūr 1414, 4/27). The fact that some of the Prophet’s commands were understood not as conveying obligation (wujūb) but as encouragement is reflected in hadiths such as the command to emancipate a slave during a solar eclipse (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 2/38) and the instruction for young children to perform prayer (
Abū Dāwūd 2009, 1/367). Such examples indicate a process of habituation and encouragement toward a particular behavior. In these cases, the command appears primarily as a moral and pedagogical form of guidance rather than a strictly binding obligation.
The verb amara also carries the meaning of “indicating or guiding by way of a sign” (
al-Zabīdī 2001, 10/74;
Ibn Fāris 1986, 103;
al-Jawharī 1987, 2/582). The Prophet’s gesture during his illness, instructing Abū Bakr to lead the prayer, followed by his statement, “Did I not command you to lead the prayer?” (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 1/138), demonstrates that a command may at times be conveyed through a physical indication. This meaning reveals that the expression amara in hadith transmissions also encompasses a dimension of direction and guidance.
In sum, the Arabic word amara encompasses a wide range of meanings, including command, authority, indication, obedience, consultation, encouragement, and recommendation. This semantic richness confirms the central argument of this article, namely, that the expression amara was employed by the companions not merely in a strictly normative sense as a religious command, but in a broader manner encompassing multiple dimensions.
3. The Meaning and Source Problems Arising from Transmission Through the Amara Form
In the early period of hadith transmission, the companions’ narrative style also gave rise to various technical and semantic problems. Among the primary issues encountered in the textualization of hadiths are the omission of contextual elements in reports, the neglect or absence of indicators (qarāʾin) that determine the hadith’s intended meaning, and the lack of awareness of other narrations on the same subject, resulting in fragmented transmissions. This situation raises the possibility that, in transmitting the Prophet’s hadiths, the companions may have incorporated their own observations and evaluations into the body of the transmitted material.
In reports transmitted with the expression amara (the Prophet commanded), the omission of context emerges as a particularly prominent issue. Narrations concerning the killing of certain harmful animals may serve as an example of this (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 4/128–129; 3/13). In different transmission routes (ṭuruq), it is observed that a statement of the Prophet, originally expressed merely as a permission, was generalized and conveyed by some companions using the amara form. As a result, a practice that was originally concessive (rukṣa/rukhsah) in nature, when detached from its context, was transformed into the form of a legal command. This example demonstrates that reports transmitted by the companions in the imperative form do not always carry legal binding force; rather, the same expression often conveys encouragement, permission, or guidance based on considerations of public interest (maṣlaḥa).
A similar situation applies to the passive form of the verb amara, namely umira (it was commanded). “The following can be cited as examples: the ḥadīth narrated by some of the Companions after the revelation of Sūrat al-Naṣr, stating, ‘We were instructed to express gratitude (ḥamd) and seek divine absolution (istighfār) in the event of successful endeavors and territorial openings (fatḥ)’ (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 1/80); and the ḥadīth requesting the participation of everyone without exception in the festival prayers, which states, ‘We have been enjoined to ensure that menstruating women come out to the prayer grounds on the occasions of the two Eids (ʿĪd al-Fiṭr and ʿĪd al-Aḍḥā)’ (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 2/22).”, For in this form, the identity of the one issuing the command is not clearly specified: is it the Prophet, one of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (al-khulafāʾ al-rāshidūn), or another leading figure among the companions? This issue has been examined in detail in both hadith methodology and legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) (
al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī 1357, 419;
Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ 1986, 50;
al-Sakhāwī 2003, 1/144). At this point, it can also be observed that contemporary scholarship has offered certain assessments of the relationship between oral and written transmission of reports (
Schoeler et al. 2006, pp. 101–2).
All these discussions indicate that, in the early period, narrations embodied certain technical challenges regarding both their textualization and interpretation. However, the point that warrants particular attention, beyond these technical issues, is the possibility that the companions reflected their own understanding of religion through the linguistic framework of these narrations. Consequently, in the following section, we will analyze specific examples of narrations to examine how the companions employed the imperative style and how this stylistic choice was influenced by the conceptualization of religion in early Islam.
4. Analysis of Narrations Pertaining to the Subject
One of the essential sources of religious rulings is the imperative forms (ṣīghat al-amr) found in Qur’anic verses and hadiths. Indeed, the jurisprudential maxim stating that “rulings are discerned through imperatives, and the lawful (halāl) is distinguished from the prohibited (harām)” (
al-Sarakhsī 1395, 1/11) clearly demonstrates the function undertaken by imperatives within religious evidence. This context necessitates an examination of how a companion who heard an imperative, based hadith understood it, and whether they transmitted the text verbatim or restructured it into a new form. If such a modification occurred, the underlying reasons for this intervention must be scrutinized. The pivotal point to consider here is the ability to accurately analyze the intent maintained during the re-textualization of imperative forms, as the original utterance was detached from its initial context. Consequently, through these specific wordings, it will be possible to identify the companions’ understanding of religion and how this conceptualization influenced subsequent generations.
The examples provided in this section aim to demonstrate how the term amara was utilized by the companions during the transmission of hadiths. In other words, the objective is not to determine whether the companions categorized these commands in terms of their legal obligatoriness, but rather to illustrate how they conveyed rulings, which were later classified by subsequent jurists (fuqahā) and legal theorists (uṣūlīyyūn) within a hierarchy of farḍ (obligatory), wājib (necessary), mustahabb (recommended), ḥarām (prohibited), and makrūh (disliked), under the overarching umbrella of the term amara without making such distinctions (
al-Rāzī 1997, 1/89).
The Hadith of the Seven Commands
The narration concerning the seven commands serves as a primary case study for examining how the companions employed the term amara to encapsulate various legal and ethical categories.
al-Barā’ b. ‘Āzib narrated: “The Prophet commanded us to do seven things and forbade us from seven others: He commanded us to visit the sick (‘iyādat al-marīḍ), to follow funeral processions (ittibā‘ al-janā’iz), to invoke God’s mercy upon the one who sneezes (tashmīt al-ʿāṭis), to accept invitations (ijābat al-dā‘ī), to spread the greeting of peace (ifshā’ al-salām), to assist the oppressed (naṣru al-maẓlūm), and to believe the one who takes an oath (ibrār al-qasam)” (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 3/129; 7/113;
Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj 1955, 3/1635;
al-Tirmidhī 1975, 5/80;
al-Nasāʾī 1930, 4/54).
The narration transmitted by al-Barā’ b. ‘Āzib is noteworthy both for its thematic diversity and its mode of transmission. Indeed, the commands encompass a wide spectrum: religious and social duties such as visiting the sick and following funeral processions; behaviors regulating social relations such as spreading the greeting of peace and accepting invitations; justice-centered obligations such as assisting the oppressed; and ethical recommendations such as fulfilling the oath of the one who swears it. This variety underscores how the companion utilized a singular imperative framework to encapsulate distinct categories of action.
The significance of this narration for our study lies in the fact that the companion transmitted rulings possessing diverse degrees of religious obligatoriness under the single umbrella of the verb amara. For instance, visiting the sick or attending a funeral, both mentioned in the hadith, are categorized as sunna (non-obligatory meritorious act), wājib (necessary), mandūb (recommended), or farḍ al-kifāya (collective obligation) depending on the circumstances (
al-ʿAynī, n.d., 6/142, 8/9–10). Similarly, invoking mercy upon one who sneezes is regarded as sunna al-kifāya (collective recommended practice), wājib, or mustaḥabb (commendable/meritorious). Accepting an invitation is classified as sunna, farḍ al-ʿayn (individual obligation), or farḍ al-kifāya according to the context (
al-Nawawī 1392, 14/32). While initiating and spreading the greeting of salām is considered sunna, fulfilling the oath of one who swears is deemed mandūb or an emphasized (mu’akkad) mustaḥabb. Furthermore, assisting the oppressed is accepted as either farḍ al-ʿayn or farḍ al-kifāya (
al-ʿAynī, n.d., 8/10;
al-Nawawī 1392, 14/32). As observed, al-Barā’ b. ‘Āzib transmitted all these distinct legal statuses through the template of amara without making any categorical distinction.
The mode of textualization of the hadith is also of particular importance. The presence of elements such as transposition (taqdim–tehir) (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 7/155), omission (hazif) (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 7/24), fragmentation (taktī‘) (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 7/116), or addition (ziyāda) in various chains of transmission (tarīq) (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 2/71; 8/49; 7/24) suggests the possibility that the hadith was textualized by the companion in this specific form. In particular, the fact that the commanded or forbidden matters appear with explicit wordings (sarīh words) in other narrations (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 2/85; 7/116) strengthens the likelihood that this information was brought together by al-Barā’ under the heading of the ‘seven commands.’
At this point, the narration reveals that the companions (sahāba) were not merely passive actors who only transmitted what they heard; on the contrary, they exerted a conscious effort to remember, classify, and transmit those reports. To this end, it demonstrates that they occasionally summarized, categorized, and textualized the hadiths. Indeed, al-Barā’s statement in other reports, “Not all of us heard the hadiths directly from the Prophet; we also narrated them from one another” (
al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī 1990, 1/27), points to this compilation process and indicates that their understanding of religion was reflected in the narration of hadiths during this process. This furthermore provides significant insights into how the companions conceptualized adherence to the Prophet’s Sunnah, how they operationalized hadiths within religious life, and the specific model of religious praxis they sought to develop.
From a sociological perspective, the content analysis of the narration reflects the hierarchy of values of early Islamic society. The expression of domains that transcend the ritualistic dimension, such as social solidarity (visiting the sick, following funeral processions, assisting the oppressed), ethical sensitivity (fidelity to oaths, spreading the greeting of salām), and communal unity (accepting invitations), through the imperative form may be interpreted as an indication that the religion’s function in regulating the social structure was prioritized and emphasized by the companions. This structure of the narration, provided that it is accepted as authentic, supports the premise that religious norms in early Islamic society also played a role in establishing a moral order that reinforced social solidarity. However, it can be argued that in subsequent centuries, these norms were approached from a more formalistic and categorical perspective rather than through this lens of general utility, ultimately leading to the oversight of the holistic structure of religion.
Similarly, another instance where individual and social religious moral norms are conveyed through the imperative mood in hadiths is the following narration from Abu Dharr al-Ghifari: “My friend, the Messenger of Allah, commanded me seven things: regarding worldly matters, not to look at those above me but to look at those below me; to love the poor and be close to them; not to ask for anything from anyone; to maintain ties of kinship even if my relatives turn away from me; to always speak the truth even if it is bitter; not to fear the blame of any critic concerning Allah; and to frequently say ‘La hawla wa la quwwata illa billah.’ He also mentioned that this last phrase is a treasure from Paradise” (
al-Bayhaqī 2003, 10/155).
This hadith also demonstrates that the normative distinctions such as fard, wajib, sunna, and mustahabb, which were developed by scholars of legal theory in subsequent centuries, had not yet emerged during the period of the companions. This transition is evident in the reception of the hadith: for instance, Abu Dharr perceived the matters commanded in this tradition as obligatory (fard) acts that must be strictly performed and strove to comply with them accordingly. However, in subsequent periods, these same matters were re-categorized by legal scholars as recommended (mustahabb) acts—deeds considered religiously meritorious if performed, yet not sinful if omitted. This shift in perception among the companions compared to later scholars demonstrates that the rigid normative hierarchies of later legal theory were not yet operative during the early period. Consequently, instead of these distinctions, it shows that social and ethical matters were religiously perceived under the overarching umbrella of a command, and this perception was directly reflected in the hadiths.
In later periods, legal theorists (uṣūlīs) categorized and developed the rulings of religious accountability to articulate the relationship between textual sources (naṣṣ: verses and hadiths) and human conduct—a framework later designated as af‘āl al-mukallafīn (the acts of legally responsible individuals). Consequently, they ascribed legal qualifications to human actions such as vujūb (obligation), nedb (recommendation), ibāḥa (permissibility), and karāha (reprehensibility), which were neither conceptualized nor utilized during the period of the companions (ṣaḥāba). Based on the degree of authenticity (thubūt) and textual implication (dalāla) of the verses and hadiths, actions whose performance is religiously required were designated as farḍ or wājib; actions whose performance is religiously encouraged were termed sunna or mustaḥabb; and actions whose commission or omission is entirely equal were classified as mubāḥ. Conversely, actions whose performance is religiously prohibited were deemed ḥarām, while those considered objectionable were categorized as makrūh (
al-Ghazālī 1993, 54;
al-Taftāzānī 1957, 1/294).
Consequently, actions that the companions (ṣaḥāba) initially conceptualized as a holistic religious duty under the overarching textual implication (dalāla) of a single command were subsequently subjected to a rigorous lexical and conceptual stratification by later legal theorists (uṣūlīs). However, in doing so, the holistic framework through which religion aims to lead humanity toward goodness, righteousness, and truth may have been compromised, even if only to a certain extent. Albeit unintentionally on the part of the jurists (fuqahā’) who developed this taxonomy, ordinary people (‘awām) frequently contented themselves with performing only the mandatory (farḍ) and obligatory (wājib) duties, consequently tending to neglect the prophetic recommendations classified as mustaḥabb and mandūb. This very shift is presumably one of the main underlying causes of the divergence between the social fabric of the companion era and the religious understanding, as well as the social structure of subsequent periods.
Similarly, there are other narrations in which matters belonging to different religious categories are expressed using the same verb, amara (to command). For instance: “I command you four things and forbid you four things. What I command you are: worship Allah and do not associate anything with Him, establish the prayer, pay the alms (zakat), and give one-fifth of the spoils of war (to the head of state). What I forbid you are: dubbā’ (gourd vessels), ḥantam (earthenware jars), muzaffat (pitch-smeared jars), and naqīr (hollowed-out stumps)” (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 2/105). Likewise, Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī stated: “My friend, the Messenger of Allah (pbuh), commanded me seven things: to look at those below me and not those above me, to love the poor and be close to them, to ask for nothing from anyone, to maintain ties of kinship even if my relatives turn away, to always speak the truth even if it is bitter, to disregard the blame of those who reproach for the sake of Allah, and to frequently recite the words “Lā ḥawla wa-lā quwwata illā billāh.” He also told me that these words are a treasure from Paradise” (
al-Bayhaqī 2003, 10/155). When examining these two hadiths, it is evident that the first includes the most fundamental obligatory (fard) duties of religion, while the second contains ethical recommendations regarding noble character. Crucially, both are expressed through the same imperative verb, amara.
It is possible to further expand the examples on this subject. For instance, the witr prayer, which was categorized as obligatory (wājib) by later Hanafi jurists (
al-Mawṣilī 2011, 1/76), was narrated by Ibn ‘Umar with the expression: “Because the Prophet had commanded (amara) it” (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 1/102). Similarly, many other rulings that imply obligatory force (vujūb) are expressed with the same template: the recitation of Sūrat al-Fātiḥa in prayer (
al-Mawṣilī 2011, 1/78); the command to touch the ground with seven limbs (forehead, nose, knees, hands, and feet) during prostration (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 1/162); certain essential (farḍ) and obligatory (wājib) acts of the pilgrimage (ḥajj) such as the circumambulation (tawāf) of the Kaaba, the running (sa‘y) between Safa and Marwa, and shaving the hair when exiting the state of iḥrām (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 2/174); the command to recite the phrases of the adhān twice and the iqāma once (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 1/111); the command for those who slaughtered their sacrifices before the ‘Īd prayer to slaughter them again (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 2/23); and the command for the companions to fast on the day of ‘Āshūrā’ (
al-Bukhārī 1893, 3/43). (For other narrations where the word amara is used in the sense of ‘making obligatory,’ see:
al-Bukhārī 1893, 2/14; 3/10; 7/43; 9/83; 9/112;
Ibn Ḥibbān 2012, 5/92). Furthermore, these hadiths indicate that legal and practical matters in early Islamic society were resolved using the same linguistic template, thereby suggesting, on the condition that the authenticity of the narrations is acknowledged, that daily life and the normative order were not treated as separate or disconnected entities.
5. Evaluation
The examples mentioned above demonstrate that the companions used the term amara across a wide spectrum, ranging from obligatory acts of worship to daily needs, and from political–administrative instructions to ethical recommendations. This situation reveals that their narrative language differed from the categorical distinctions, such as fard, wajib, mandub, and mustahabb, developed by later jurists; rather, it was based on a more holistic and inclusive religious perception.
What is remarkable is that companions with diverse personal characteristics utilized the same narrative pattern: various figures such as Ibn Mas’ud, known for his strong legal orientation; Abu Hurayra, prominent for his meticulousness in transmitting hadiths; Ali, recognized for his scholarly, political, and military genius; Ibn Umar, known for his ascetic personality; Abu Sufyan, for his witnessing of social events; and Aisha, for her observations regarding the Prophet’s family life, all commonly resorted to the amara form in their narrations. The fact that these individuals, who would normally be expected to exhibit different scholarly orientations and personality traits, converged on the same pattern demonstrates that the term amara was an established and collective linguistic preference within the narration culture of the companions’ period.
This commonality reveals several important points:
Linguistic Unity: The narrative patterns were based on a collective language of authority, independent of the individual inclinations of the companions. Words heard from the Prophet were framed within a mindset centered on the axis of command and prohibition in everyone’s mind.
Absence of Legal Categories: The use of the same pattern for different situations by various companions shows that distinctions such as fard, wajib, and mandub had not yet been constructed at the linguistic level. This demonstrates that the systematic efforts of later jurists represent a different epistemological stage than that of the Companions.
Breadth of the Normative Horizon: The consistent use of the term “amara” (command) across ritual worship, ethics, and socio-political spheres indicates that the Companions approached religion holistically. For them, a command was not merely a legal regulation but also an instrument for communal unity and ethical construction.
Sociological Integrity: The existence of a common narrative pattern across different companions indicates that the regulatory function of religion in early Islamic society was perceived through a shared language. Thus, in the eyes of the companions, the amara form became a normative language that strengthened social solidarity and curbed individual ambition, rather than a mere legal code.
Consequently, the fact that jurist-companions, those focusing on hadith transmission, and those centered on daily practices all utilized the same amara form suggests that this narrative pattern may be understood not as an individual preference during the period of the companions, but rather as the product of a collective perception and a shared language. Therefore, the term amara may be viewed not merely as an ordinary form of transmission, but as one of the narrative instruments reflecting the companions’ approach to religious and social events.
When the subject is examined within the moral and legal framework of the Arabian Peninsula during the early period of Islam, it can be argued that hadiths transmitted with the term amara also served a significant role in constructing the social order, reinforcing ethical values, and strengthening social solidarity. Thus, it can be maintained that the narrative language of the companions may be accepted as a viable source of data for understanding the religious and sociological structuring of the early Islamic community.
Legal deductions drawn from the hadiths should not overshadow the reality that religion prioritizes morality, and that every divine command, in essence, serves to cultivate or mature a moral disposition. Therefore, every deduced legal norm must be approached with the understanding that it is merely an instrument enabling the manifestation of moral values, and morality must consistently be viewed as the ultimate, sublime objective. Consequently, law and morality are deeply intertwined; law necessitates morality, and morality necessitates law. Nevertheless, whichever of these two is placed at the center of life and religious understanding will fundamentally shape the resulting religious perception and its extension, namely, praxis (‘amal). Judgments regarding religious priorities will differ entirely depending on which of these two perspectives is applied to the received commands. Otherwise, religion faces the risk of being reduced to a mere set of devoid-of-wisdom legal norms consisting of dry commands and prohibitions. While morality instills a consciousness of individuality and guides the person toward society, a purely legalistic system demands societal conformity without engendering the sense of individual awareness brought by internal purification, the action of the heart (‘amal al-qalb). This, in turn, adversely affects the internal ascension and individual perfection (kamāl) of the human being (
Abdurraḥmān 2021, 657).
6. Conclusions
By focusing on the verb amara employed by the companions when transmitting hadiths containing imperative content, this study aims to offer a perspective on how the narrative language of hadith reflects their understanding of religion and how it influenced the religious conceptions of subsequent Muslim generations. As demonstrated in the study, the companions often gathered rulings, which Muslim jurists later categorized as fard, wajib, mustahabb, or mubah, and presented them under the same narrative pattern, using the verb amara. This situation may be interpreted as an indication that, instead of dividing the normative field of religion into sharp categories, they evaluated subjects with a more holistic perspective centered on the axis of command and prohibition. Indeed, patterns such as “The Prophet commanded these and forbade those” appear not merely as linguistic preferences but as manifestations of a religious understanding that distinguishes between the virtuous and the non-virtuous, or the ma‘rūf (good) and the munkar (evil), according to Islam. Consequently, this situation may be evaluated as an indication that they perceived religious commands primarily along the axis of good and evil (ma‘rūf and munkar) rather than from a strictly normative perspective, and that they tended to center on the ethical dimension of religion rather than on the degrees of legal bindingness in hadith expressions. Indeed, the amara form, used across diverse fields ranging from daily practices to social relations and from ritual worship to ethical recommendations, offers certain insights into the companions’ understanding of religion. In this context, the narrative forms used by the companions can also be understood as a reflection of the principle of ‘enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil’ (amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa nahy ‘ani’l-munkar), frequently emphasized in the Quran, onto the language of narration. Provided that the texts transmitted by the companions from the Prophet, and subsequently by later scholars from the companions, have been accurately preserved, then the available data can be said to point to a paradigm shift. Otherwise, it would not be possible to formulate a sound academic evaluation. The findings obtained during the study can be summarized as follows:
The companions sometimes transmitted the direct imperative expressions of the Prophet, and at other times, the meaning they derived from his words through the amara form. Rather than being a simple transmission of wording, this method is a process of textualizing meaning that prioritizes the intent and significance of the heard utterance. A crucial point that must not be overlooked here is the probability that the linguistic formulations appearing in the form of amara, which reflect the companions’ understanding of the intended meaning behind prophetic hadiths, were further formulated by subsequent generations of traditionists (muḥaddithūn) or jurists (fuqahā’). In other words, the phenomenon of riwāya bi-al-ma‘nā (transmission by meaning), which is readily assumed for the companion era, can also be postulated for later transmitters; thus, it is highly conceivable that subsequent transmitters paraphrased the companions’ original formulations, converting them into their own vocabulary and syntax during the transmission process.
Narrations have often been transmitted by being abstracted from the original contexts and clues of the hadiths. This situation reveals how crucial it is to identify the context when evaluating the form transmitted by the companions. Furthermore, the possibility should not be discounted that the narrations under discussion do not invariably represent the verbatim speech of the companions, and that certain textual formulations were instead shaped by subsequent generations of transmitters.
Narrations have often been transmitted by being decontextualized from the original settings and contextual clues of the hadiths. This situation reveals how crucial it is to identify the context when evaluating the specific form transmitted by the companions.
The fact that companions with such diverse backgrounds as Ibn Mas’ud, Abu Hurayra, Abdullah b. Amr, Ali, and Aisha utilized the same narrative pattern suggests the possibility that this language was a common and established usage among the companions. Such a correlation may be evaluated as an indication that historical actors across disparate social strata construed prophetic exhortations as binding injunctions. Indeed, even prophetic counsels that were not considered legally binding in subsequent periods could be perceived as direct commands of the Prophet by the companions and transmitted to subsequent generations using the amara form. In subsequent epochs, however, this acute discursive responsiveness gradually transitioned, ultimately giving way to a more codified, normative, and formalistic legal framework.
The style of commanding and forbidding in the narrations of the companions serves not only to produce legal norms but also to construct moral order and social solidarity. Commands such as visiting the sick, following funeral processions, assisting the oppressed, and spreading the greeting of salām have undertaken a function that transcends the boundaries of ritual worship, reinforcing social ethics and solidarity.
The transmission style offers certain insights into how commands and prohibitions were understood, the contexts in which this understanding was transmitted, and how they were transformed into legal categories in the subsequent process. Indeed, the companions often transmitted rulings with varying degrees of bindingness under a single umbrella. This situation may be evaluated as an indication that, in their religious life, ethics preceded normativity.
All of these demonstrate that centering the usages of the term amara during the period of the companions provides a significant key to analyzing the religious understanding of the early Islamic community. This key enables one to transcend a purely law-centered perspective in hadith studies and to construct a holistic conception of Islam grounded in the balance between ethics and law.
The conclusions reached in this study are based on the premise that the companions reliably transmitted the Prophet’s hadiths to subsequent periods, and likewise, that the scholars who received these narrations from them and derived normative principles from these reports accepted them as authentic (saḥīḥ). This very assumption underlies the selection of the hadiths cited as examples in this study from the work of al-Bukhārī, whose authority is widely recognized by Sunni hadith scholars. If this premise were rejected and these rulings were assumed to be built upon fabricated (mawḍū‘) narrations, it could be argued that the conclusions reached herein would become highly disputable. However, this study does not operate under such an alternative assumption.
Ultimately, the language and forms used by the companions in hadith transmission open a door not only to methodological (usūl) discussions but also to understanding the ethics-centered religious perception of the early Islamic community. They demonstrate how religion was practiced within society, which ethical structure it prioritized, and on which foundation it paved the way for the scholarly heritage of subsequent centuries. In this respect, more detailed studies on the narrative terms used by the companions are poised to open new horizons both in the field of hadith sciences and in the sociology of religion.