Yan Zun’s Approach to Resolving Contradictions in Laozi’s Theory of the Dao: An Analysis of the Laozi Zhigui

Abstract

The Laozi Zhigui of Yan Zun occupies an important place in the history of interpretation of the Laozi, and his thoughts had an enormous influence on the xuanxue scholars of the Wei-Jin period afterward. This study examines the ways in which Yan Zun attempted to resolve some contradictions in the theory of the Dao in the Laozi, such as how the Dao relates to the myriad things and to ziran, and the problem of how the Dao can be heard. This study also examines how, in his attempt to resolve these contradictions, Yan Zun could not escape creating a few contradictions of his own, such as the opposition between the theories that the Dao generates things and things self-generate; the opposition between Dao and Virtue following from ziran and the Dao embodying ziran inherently; and how the top, average and lowest kinds of scholars who have heard the Dao, despite all finding joy in their different hearings of the Dao, nevertheless exist in a hierarchical relation to each other. But from the point of view of the Laozi Zhigui as a whole, Yan Zun nevertheless tried to resolve these contradictions. Of course, some of these resolutions succeed, while others do not. This study also examines how, in his effort to resolve these contradictions, Yan Zun often took recourse to Zhuangzi’s conception of the Dao.

1. Introduction

The author of the Laozi Zhigui (The Essential Meaning of Laozi, 老子指归), known today as Yan Zun 严遵,1 style name Junping 君平, had an unclear lineage of teachers. Although Yan Zun shared the same surname as Zhuang Zhou 庄周, there is no evidence to show whether he and Zhuang Zhou had any lineage relationship. While his Laozi Zhigui was once suspected of being a forgery, scholars such as Yan Lingfeng 严灵峰, Zheng Liangshu 郑良树, Wang Liqi 王利器 and Wang Deyou 王德有 have demonstrated its authenticity (Fan 2020, pp. 13–19).

According to the “Biographies of Wang, Gong, Liang, Gong and Bao” in the Book of Han, Yan Zun “practiced divination in the market of Chengdu… limiting himself to seeing only a few people each day. Having earned a hundred coins, enough to support himself, he would close his stall, lower the curtain, and study the Laozi. He read extensively, leaving nothing unpenetrated, and authored works of over a hundred thousand words based on the tenets of Laozi and Yan Zhou [i.e., Zhuangzi]” 卜筮于成都巿…裁日阅数人，得百钱足自养，则闭肆下帘而授老子。博览亡不通，依老子、严周之指著书十余万言. The Chronicles of Huayang 华阳国志 record that he was “proficient in the Book of Changes 易 and immersed himself in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi” 专精大《易》，耽于《老》《庄》, showing that he had mastered the Laozi, the Zhuangzi and the Zhouyi 周易. He may therefore have been the earliest to study the “three texts of profundity” (三玄 san xuan), making him a forerunner of Wei-Jin thought. The biography of Qin Mi 秦宓 from the Book of Shu 蜀志 in the Records of the Three Kingdoms 三国志 says that “Yan Zun, after encountering the works of Huang-Lao, wrote the Zhigui” 见黄老，作《指归》, suggesting that he was also a scholar of the Huang-Lao tradition; and in terms of their argument, there are similarities with the Mawangdui Daoyuan silk manuscripts (Dai 2007).

Dating the Laozi Zhigui relative to the Heshang Gong Commentary on the Laozi Daodejing 老子道德经河上公章句 is an important problem. Many scholars believe that this text was completed during the middle period of the Western Han or slightly earlier (see Jin 1987; Huang 2001). Both books touch on the issue of whether the style of ‘annotating the classics directly’ (就经为注 jiu jing weizhu) originated with Ma Rong.2 Chen Zhi has concluded from cursive clerical script inscriptions dating to 85 CE, during the reign of Emperor Zhang of Han 汉章帝, that both forms—“annotating the classics directly and separating the classics from the commentaries” (经传分离 jing zhuan fen li)—were in use during the Han dynasty.3 Furthermore, as seen in the Han dynasty bamboo slips on ritual and etiquette from Wuwei 武威, commentaries often cited relevant passages from the classics when necessary for explanation (Shen 1999). Wong Yiu Kwan 黄耀堃, taking a phonological approach, believes that “part of the Heshang Gong Commentary certainly comes from the Western Han or earlier, and moreover avoids the Qin-era taboo on the character zheng 正” (Wong 2004, pp. 207–18). However, there are Buddhist phrases within the Heshang Gong Commentary, for example, “the ten directions” (十方 shifang), which complicate this picture (Gu 1982).

In my opinion, the Heshang Gong Commentary possibly underwent changes over successive generations, taking shape gradually (R. Li 2020a, pp. 369–70), whereas the Laozi Zhigui is fundamentally the work of a single individual; and although books such as the Wenzi 文子, the Han Feizi 韩非子, and the Huainanzi 淮南子 contain commentaries on the Laozi, none of them constitute a complete commentary. The Laozi Zhigui is therefore the earliest surviving ancient commentary containing the entire text of the Laozi after the Han. Unlike the Heshang Gong Commentary, it does not especially concern itself with care for life or self-cultivation. Its philosophical content is relatively rich, and it may well be a predecessor of the commentary on the Laozi by Wang Bi 王弼. It is regrettable that the complete text has been lost, leaving only the Daojing 道经 section, along with scattered passages from the Dejing 德经 section, extant today. The Jin Han Wen 金汉文 includes his lengthy “Zuoyou Ming” (Inscription for Desk and Carriage), which contains over 170 characters. Although the extant Laozi Zhigui is incomplete, Yan Zun, as a lifelong student of the Laozi, was renowned for his work. The very title Zhigui, “pointing to the essential,” suggests he possessed profound, original insights into the Laozi, and these insights were in all likelihood broadly consistent throughout his work. Consequently, despite the fragmentary nature of what remains, we can still discern the main thrust of his thought. Moreover, the issues this paper seeks to discuss are found primarily in the extant portion on the Dejing. The Zhigui places the Dejing before the Daojing and comments on it first; its treatment of the contradictions discussed in this article should therefore be relatively complete. Any relevant material in the Daojing portion, were it extant, would likely neither diverge significantly from nor substantially supplement what the Dejing commentary provides.

Current research on the philosophical thought of the Laozi Zhigui has yielded valuable insights from numerous scholars. In the English-speaking academic world, Aat Vervoorn has argued that, at its core, the Laozi Zhigui is a political treatise primarily concerned with statecraft and the establishment of social order. Within its metaphysical framework, the concept of ziran 自然 (variously translated as “nature/natural,” “spontaneous” or “self-so”) serves as the cornerstone of its ideological system. For Yan Zun, ziran is a fundamental meta-concept that refers both to the Dao and its manifestation in the phenomenal world, encompassing the generation and dissolution of concrete things as well as the universal principles underlying their transformations. Ziran represents the intelligible order of the cosmos, the eternal truth discernible through introspection and observation. Vervoorn also astutely notes the philosophical dilemma posed by the notion of a “first cause” within a system of thought grounded in spontaneous change. Consequently, he emphasizes that all things are not “generated” by the Dao or any other ontological entity, but instead arise spontaneously according to the patterns termed “the Dao.” On the level of human affairs, the Laozi Zhigui asserts that success comes from following the Dao’s principle of non-action (无为 wuwei), while failure stems from defying it. As Wang Liqi underscores, Yan Zun’s central concern remains governing in accordance with the spontaneous order of things, a preoccupation that aligns the Laozi Zhigui with the classic Huang-Lao Daoist tradition of the Western Han (Vervoorn 1988–1989, pp. 69–94).

Alan Chan 陈金 similarly acknowledges the text’s emphasis on Huang-Lao statecraft, noting that the concept of ziran holds a pivotal place in Yan Zun’s commentary, which focuses on two practical issues: self-cultivation and governance (Chan 1998, pp. 105–27). The text posits that ideal rulership and the golden age of the “Great Peace” (太平 Tai Ping) are rooted in personal cultivation. A striking contrast emerges between the political vision of the Laozi Zhigui and Confucian cosmology. While Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 correlates the ruler with yang 阳 and the ministers with yin 阴 within a heaven–human correspondence framework, Yan Zun asserts the inverse, the ruler as yin and ministers as yang. Grounded in the Huang-Lao tradition, the text thereby pioneers a novel interpretive approach to politics. Additionally, Isabelle Robinet’s French-language scholarship explores the philosophical dimensions of the Laozi Zhigui, suggesting that Yan Zun anticipates certain traits which Wang Bi and the Chongxuan School will later emphasize, within a framework largely faithful to Laozi’s classical philosophy (Robinet 1977, p. 11).

In Chinese academic circles, following debates over the authenticity of the Laozi Zhigui, Wang Deyou collated and annotated the text, and composed a preface to the work outlining its philosophical distinctiveness. Influentially, he highlighted its cosmogony of “generating being from nothingness” 由无生有, an “ontology grounded in nothingness” 以无为本, and the idea of “self-generation and self-transformation of all things” 万物自生自化 (D. Wang 1994, pp. 5–18). Subsequent scholarship has explored Yan Zun’s discourse on the Dao and philosophical thought, including a course paper written by one of the author’s students (A. Li 2005), and Fan Bocheng 樊波成 has recently produced a detailed commentary on the Laozi Zhigui and a monograph, Research on the Laozi Zhigui, that have reinvigorated scholarly interest in the text (Fan 2013, 2020). Zheng Liangshu conducted a careful comparison of the silk manuscript and Yan Zun’s versions of the Laozi, identifying 24 passages in which Yan Zun’s text diverges from all other received versions yet accords with the Mawangdui silk manuscript Laozi (see Zheng 2011). Han Wei, comparing the Peking University Han bamboo slip Laozi with the Laozi Zhigui, found that the extant Yan Zun version “preserves some of the original features of Western Han exemplars” (see Han 2012).

The works surveyed above are all valuable, deepening our understanding of the Laozi Zhigui, and particularly its relationship with the thought of its era. However, the focus of the present article is not on identifying the main ideas of the Laozi Zhigui or on explicating its theory of the Dao. Instead, it approaches the text as an exegetical work on the Laozi classic, examining how Yan Zun explicates and resolves apparent contradictions within the Laozi’s theory of the Dao—particularly those aspects that contain contradictions or have sparked debates among later scholars (see R. Li 2022)—and how it resolves these issues. In so doing, it will reveal the depth of Yan Zun’s understanding and his development of Laozi’s thought. This perspective has regrettably been under-explored in Chinese-, Japanese-, and English-language scholarship. Many scholars approach the Laozi through what Skinner would call the “myth of coherence,” assuming that the text contains no contradictions and, where apparent contradictions arise, offering interpretations designed to dissolve them rather than entertaining the possibility that the text is genuinely problematic. Controversy is permitted only in cases of acknowledged ambiguity, such as the question of whether dao fa ziran means that the Dao is subordinate to ziran or that the Dao simply is ziran. Following Skinner’s approach, however, one can investigate whether incoherences or contradictions exist within the Laozi, in particular within its theory of the Dao, and some scholars have already done so. Cao Feng, for instance, has identified contradictions in the Laozi across six dimensions: “control versus non-control” 控制还是不控制, “opposition to war versus the use of troops” 反战还是用兵, “something arising from nothing versus something and nothing giving rise to each other” 无中生有还是有无相生, “namelessness versus having a name” 无名还是有名, “having feelings versus being without feelings” 有情还是无情, and “balance versus imbalance” 平衡还是失衡 (see Cao 2025). However, his discussion does not touch on the theory of the Dao itself.

In recent years, the author has focused on the theory of the Dao in the Laozi, and in particular on the question of its existence. This focus shaped the author’s engagement with the Laozi Zhigui, directing attention to how Yan Zun handles the internal contradictions of the Laozi. Since these contradictions are embedded in the text itself, a cursory reading would not bring them to light, and only a study as deep as Yan Zun’s would be likely to notice them, let alone attempt to resolve them. Of course, the profundity of the Laozi’s thought means that discovering its contradictions does not guarantee resolving them, and Yan Zun may well have fallen into contradictions of his own in the attempt. Even so, the attempt itself represents genuine progress and deserves recognition.

Those who have discussed the contradictions within the Laozi’s theory of the Dao are few. Tang Junyi, cited below, is one example. Treatments of the discourse on the Dao in the Laozi Zhigui are similarly scarce. No existing scholarship has been identified that addresses the intersection of these two topics, namely how the Laozi Zhigui resolves the contradictions within the Laozi’s theory of the Dao. The present article aims to explore this question and to invite colleagues with similar interests to join the discussion. One might ask whether this project is vulnerable to the critique Skinner levels against the history of ideas or the history of categories, a critique directed in particular at Arthur O. Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of Being (namely that such approaches neglect the intellectual context of the texts they examine). Fortunately, this concern does not apply here: Yan Zun, though engaged with the problems of the Laozi’s theory of the Dao, also bears the distinctive intellectual imprint of his own era, and this study attends to that context accordingly.

The Laozi’s theory of the Dao raises a number of interpretive difficulties. This article focuses on three that are most central to understanding the Dao itself: the relationship between the Dao and the ten thousand things, the problem of the Dao’s imitating ziran (dao fa ziran 道法自然), and the problem of hearing the Dao. These three problems correspond primarily to Chapters 51, 25, and 41 respectively. Chapters 51 and 41 are preserved in the De section of the Laozi Zhigui, and although Chapter 25 is no longer extant there, the De section contains extensive discussion of the problem of dao fa ziran. Since the Han-dynasty arrangement places the De section before the Dao section, Yan Zun composed his commentary on the De section first. It is therefore unlikely that his treatment of the issues raised by Chapter 25 would differ substantially in the Dao section. While one cannot rule out the possibility that the lost Dao section of the Zhigui contains new ideas, the author’s interpretation of dao fa ziran, which departs from all previous philological readings known to the author and does not appear to have been proposed by any earlier scholar, Yan Zun presumably included, is one that, having found no trace of it in the De section, is unlikely to appear in the Dao section either. Whatever new interpretations the Dao section might have offered, they would in any case be of significance primarily as data points in the history of thought.

2. The Relationship Between the Dao and the Myriad Things

The question of the relationship between the Dao and the myriad things is central to any discussion of the Dao. Contrary to the common understanding that the Dao generates and governs the myriad things, Tang Junyi 唐君毅 drew particular attention to two chapters of the Laozi: “When things are at their peak (壮 zhuang) they grow old. This is called ‘lacking the Way’ 谓之非道” (Laozi 55; c.f., Laozi 30).4 He explored the question of why the Dao itself neither ages nor dies, while all things do, writing:

“The Dao, in generating things, enables them to obtain from the Dao and possess Virtue 德, granting them the capacity to generate; but also, after they have come into being and have themselves generated others, allows their generative power to exhaust itself. Thus, they depart from the virtue they once received from the Dao, leading to aging and death.”

道之生物，乃既使其有所得于道而有德，具能生之功能；又于其既生而有所生之后，任其功能之竭，而离于其所得于道之德，以老以死。

(Tang 2005, pp. 247–50)

This reveals the problem of the myriad things departing from the Dao after being generated by it. However, he interprets the aging and death of things as their “returning to the root and reverting to destiny” 归根复命. This seems incompatible with descriptions of death as “withered and desiccated” 枯槁, since aging and death have no inherent connection to “returning to the root.”

II have previously pointed out a similar paradox in the Laozi’s understanding of the Dao. Laozi 51 says that “the Dao 道 generates them and Virtue 德 nourishes them; … grows them and raises them; … determines them and settles them; … nurtures them and protects them” 道生之，德畜之，长之，育之，成之，熟之，养之，覆之. The Dao has mysterious Virtue; the myriad things rely on it for generation and growth, and so they inevitably grow strong and mature. But strength is not in accordance with Laozi’s Dao: “When things are at their peak (壮 zhuang) they grow old. This is called ‘lacking the Way’” 谓之非道 (Laozi 55; c.f., Laozi 30).5 Only sages and those who have attained the Dao can recognize the Dao and take the initiative to preserve their suppleness (柔 rou), “concentrating (their) qi (to stay supple as) a baby boy” (专[or 转]气至柔 zhuan qi zhi rou) (Laozi 10). They thus complete the cyclical motion of the Dao. However, as they relate to the common people, the sage “weakens their will, strengthens their bones” 弱其志，强其骨 (Laozi 3).

If “strength” (强 qiang) here refers to the same sort of peak state 壮 mentioned earlier, then this way of dealing with the myriad things seems, unexpectedly, not to accord with the Dao. The Dao would seem only to have the same birthing relationship with the myriad things as a mother does to her offspring: although the Dao generates them, it cannot ensure that they will always possess it. It would follow that, as far as the myriad things—including ordinary people—are concerned, their relationship to the Dao is only temporary (R. Li 2020b). And yet Zhuangzi says of the Dao that “there’s no place it doesn’t exist… it is in the ant … in the panic grass … in the tiles and shards … in the piss and shit” (Zhuangzi 22, Watson 2013, p. 182). On this account, the myriad things would seem to share an eternal relationship with the Dao. The difference between Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s views on the Dao would thus seem to be considerable.

Yan Zun must have thought over this problem, and yet his commentary also appears to fall into the same contradiction. On the one hand, in his commentary on Laozi 51, he says:

“considering the Dao as a thing… The myriad things are generated from it, but it is not thereby diminished… As if it merely generated the myriad things, and nothing more! It generates them, forms them, establishes and completes them, classifies and distributes them, halts and accommodates them, ends and begins them, places them first and last…”

道之为物… 万物以生，不为之损… 其于万物也，岂直生之而已哉！生之形之，设而成之，品而流之，停而就之，终而始之，先而后之。

(D. Wang 1994, p. 133)6

So he acknowledges that the Dao generates the myriad things. However, commenting on Laozi 66, he says,

“The Dao and Virtue do not generate the myriad things, yet the myriad things spontaneously self-generate. Heaven and earth do not contain the various kinds of beings, yet the various kinds of beings rely on them. Ziran things do not seek to be kings, yet things spontaneously make them kings.”

道德不生万物，而万物自生焉；天地不含群类，而群类自托焉；自然之物不求为王，而物自王焉。

(D. Wang 1994, p. 250)

Here he seems to actually believe that the Dao (and Virtue) do not generate the myriad things at all, that the myriad things instead arise through spontaneous self-generation.

The apparent contradiction is resolved by Yan Zun’s commentary on Laozi 39, where he writes: “all things obtain a portion of the One for their generation, and all complete their forms through the transformations of the One” 皆得一之一以生，尽得一之化以成 (D. Wang 1994, p. 25). This clarifies that, for him, the Dao does not generate things through direct action, but rather provides the foundational principle, the One, that makes self-generation possible; and so, “without generating, things self-generate; without acting, things accomplish themselves” 不生也而物自生，不为也而物自成 (D. Wang 1994, pp. 24–25). In this way, Yan Zun avoids a true contradiction: the Dao does not generate things actively, yet they arise because of its inherent nature.

His discussion of the Dao’s generative role in Laozi 51 closely parallels the Mawangdui Daoyuan silk manuscript, as well as the Daoyuan chapters of the Wenzi and of the Huainanzi. These works describe the Dao as unknowable, yet functionally responsible for activating and empowering the myriad things. It is by attaining the Dao, or the One that is “the child of the Dao” (“道生一,” Laozi 42), that the things are able to self-generate. However, in this way, Yan Zun’s position implies that the Dao has the role of “something [that] makes it like this,” a role which it expresses by generating the myriad things. On this view, the Dao is an unnamed driving force causing movement and change, which leads to the problem of an infinite regress in causality. At the same time, by insisting that the myriad things self-generate, he implies that “nothing does it,” that the myriad things move and change spontaneously. This view in turn runs into the problem of where the chain of causation begins and how to reconcile freedom with causality.

This tension between “something makes it” and “nothing does it” recalls Zhuangzi 25, which dismisses both theories concerning the existence or non-existence of a prime mover as partial. “[The theories of] ‘nothing does it’ [and] ‘something makes it like this’ … occupy a mere corner of the realm of things” 或使、莫为，在物一曲 (Watson 2013, p. 225). The Zhuangzi suggests that neither concept is sufficient for discussing the Dao, and moreover that the Dao needs to transcend such antinomies as “something makes it” and “nothing does it” in order to serve as what resolves them. But, in contrast to Zhuangzi 25, Yan Zun invokes both “something makes it” and “nothing does it” to discuss the action of the Dao and how the things generate themselves. Because he both attributes generation to the Dao and locates it in the myriad things themselves, the Dao can no longer function as the transcendent ground that resolves this antinomy. This leaves his argument entangled in a contradiction that remains difficult to reconcile. Some scholars have noted accordingly that his “idea of the myriad things generating themselves and transforming themselves” may not account comprehensively enough for the Dao’s overarching role (D. Wang 1994, pp. 15–18).

However, Yan Zun’s approach may have inspired Guo Xiang. Guo Xiang once annotated the Laozi, but as that text has been lost, his most well-known commentary is on the Zhuangzi. Faced with the same difficulty as Yan Zun, Guo Xiang resolved it by doing away with the Dao as an active principle altogether, without saying much about “something makes it,” and placing the weight of his account on “nothing does it.” In doing so, he worked instead with the relatively simpler notions of self-generation, self-attainment and independent transformation. In an inner chapter, Zhuangzi says, “the [Dao] has its reality and its signs but is without action or form. You can hand it down, but you cannot receive it; you can get it, but you cannot see it. It is its own source, its own root” 夫道，有情有信，无为无形；可传而不可受，可得而不可见；自本自根 (Zhuangzi 6, Watson 2013, p. 45). Guo Xiang comments that

“the Dao itself has no capability (能 neng). To say here that they achieved (得 de) it from the Dao is just a way of elucidating that they achieved it spontaneously (自得 zide). They just achieved it spontaneously, and that is all there was to it. The Dao can’t make one achieve anything, and what I myself am not up to achieving I can’t make myself achieve either. That being so, whatever can be achieved, externally does not depend on the Dao and internally does not depend on the self (己 ji). Vacuously one but achieves it spontaneously and in so doing undergoes independent transformation (独化 duhua)”.

道无能也，此言得之于道，乃所以明其自得耳。自得耳，道不能使之得也。我之未得，又不能为得也。然则凡得之者，外不资于道，内不由于己，掘然自得而独化也。

(Lynn 1999, p. 139)

Scholars have reconstructed the theory of “self-generation” on the basis of the “Hengxian” 恒先 section of the Shangbo bamboo slips (see R. Li 2004). While Yan Zun is unlikely to have read this particular text, he may have been influenced by the extensive discussion on self-generation and self-transformation in the Zhuangzi. His view that the Dao operates on all things is remarkably similar to the Daoyuan tradition. In this sense, his theory of the Dao aligns more closely with the omnipresent Dao of the Zhuangzi than with that of the Laozi, and his talk of self-generation and self-transformation may bear the marks of the Zhuangzi’s influence. This suggests that Yan Zun had deeply absorbed Zhuangzi’s thoughts and interpreted the Laozi through a Zhuangzian lens.

When Laozi 51 states that “the Way generates them and Virtue nourishes them; material embodies them and the final shape completes them,” we should understand that the Dao’s generation need not be direct. This context helps to reconcile the views that “the Dao generates them” and “the things self-generate.” Yan Zun’s deep familiarity with the Book of Changes is also relevant here. The Xiangzhuan commentary on the image of the Qian hexagram also uses the language of “flowing into form” in the line “clouds move, rain falls; the various things flow into form” 云行雨施，品物流形. But in the intellectual context of the time, this line alone was not enough for Yan Zun to arrive at the insight that the Dao’s generative role is merely indirect.

Yan Zun did attempt to address this problem. Commenting on Laozi 44, he says,

“that with which my nature (性 xing) is endowed and makes me who I am is the Dao and Virtue; what it borrows to give me life is spirit (神明 shenming, i.e., essential qi [精气]); on what it depends for completion is the Great Harmony (太和 taihe, i.e., primordial qi [元气]); and what it takes as the foundation for its form is heaven and earth.”

我性之所禀而为我者，道德也；其所假而生者，神明也；其所因而成者，太和也；其所托而形者，天地也。

(D. Wang 1994, p. 68)

Here, the Dao and Virtue bestow nature, while heaven and earth provide physical form. This is a coherent and reasonable account, and one that certainly influenced later views about xingming 性命 (sometimes translated as “[inner] nature and life” or “nature and fate”) and corporeal existence. It is unfortunate that Yan Zun did not articulate this explicitly in his commentary on Laozi 51, leaving later scholars to draw the connection. This may be a consequence of the section-and-sentence commentary format in which he was working.

Given that Yan Zun never diminished or fundamentally altered the role of the Dao, it seems inaccurate to say, as some scholars have, that he has an ontology based on nothingness (以无为本 yi wu wei ben), or that he takes non-action as the basis for the generation and development of heaven, earth and the myriad things (see D. Wang 1994, pp. 12–15). Nothingness and non-action are undeniably important in his thought, but the Zhigui consistently presents them as secondary to the Dao in importance. This becomes particularly clear in Yan Zun’s treatment of Laozi 40, which reads: “Reversal is the moving of the Dao; Weakness is the using of the Dao. The world’s myriad things are generated from being; Being is generated from nothingness” 反者道之动；弱者道之用。天下万物生于有，有生于无. His commentary here is surprisingly brief, only noting: “act in accordance with Dao. The ultimate law and highest method of the Dao is that changes occur in opposite directions and are gentle, subtle and invisible as the normal rule” 因道而动，循一而行。道之至数，一之大方，变化由反，和纖爲常 (D. Wang 1994, p. 32). Other passages reveal more nuanced views. Commenting on Laozi 42, he says that “what has form comes from what has no form, and substantial things come from the nothingness of the Dao and Virtue” 有生于无，实生于虚 (D. Wang 1994, p. 48); on Laozi 63, that “nothingness will not generate nothingness, and being will not generate being. Only the nothingness that is neither being nor nothingness and that combines being and nothingness into one can produce nothingness and being” 无不生无，有不生有，不无不有，乃生无有 (D. Wang 1994, p. 223); and notably, on Laozi 52, that “Being gives rise to nothingness, and nothingness gives rise to being, reciprocally and continuously, thus zìrán maintains its course” 有以生无，无以生有，反复相因，自然是守 (D. Wang 1994, p. 138).

These texts collectively suggest that Yan Zun did not regard nothingness as an absolute root, in which case it is doubtful that the Zhigui promotes a theory of cosmic evolution from nothingness to something (see D. Wang 1994, pp. 5–12). Instead, Yan Zun emphasized the unity of the Dao and the One. His commentary on Laozi 51, cited above, clearly presents the Dao, not non-action, as the basis for the generation and the transformation of the earth, the heavens and the myriad things, in line with the Daoyuan tradition.

This priority is reinforced in his commentary on Laozi 62, where he says the following.

“The Dao is formed by combining nothingness and being into one, and takes formlessness as its appearance. It opens up void, guides spirit, connects heaven and earth, harmonizes yin and yang, regulates the four seasons, and resolves the four corners. Different forms and categories all achieve self-realization. The beginnings and endings of the transformation (of the great Dao) all take non-action as the constant.”

道以无有之形、无状之容，开虚无，导神明，通天地，和阴阳寧，调四时，决万方，殊形异类，皆得以成。变化终始，以无为为常。

(D. Wang 1994, p. 215)

While non-action governs or expresses the beginnings and endings of the Dao’s transformation, it is clearly the Dao itself that plays the generative role.

The mention of the One in the Zhigui commentary on Laozi 39 further confirms this hierarchy:

The One is the child of the Dao… It is the nothingness of nothingness-of-nothingness; it is the beginning of the beginning-of-beginning. The transformation of its outer expression and inner aspects is chaotic and muddled, vast and boundless, now on the left, now on the right… “One” is its name; “Virtue” is its designation. Having no visible form is its state of rest; non-action is its mode of operation; formlessness is its principle; reversal (反 fan) is its supreme method; harmony is its direction; subtlety and weakness are its ways of functioning. Therefore, those who understand the “One” are not confused or lost amidst the myriad transformations; those who do not understand the “One” may encounter misfortune at times and good fortune at others, with rulers losing their states and those cultivating life suffering premature harm.

一者，道之子……无无之无，始始之始，无外无内，混混沌沌，芒芒泛泛，可左可右……一，其名也；德，其号也；无有，其舍也；无为，其事也；无形，其度也；反，其大数也；和，其归也；弱，其用也。故，能知一，千变不穷，万输不失。不能知一，时凶时吉，持国者亡，守身者没。

(D. Wang 1994, p. 24)

In this framework, non-action appears only as the mode of operation of the One, comparable to how it is formless (无形 wuxing) or beingless (无有 wuyou), while the One remains a child of the Dao. This systematic subordination demonstrates that non-action cannot serve as the basis for the generation and transformation of the earth, heavens and the myriad things in Yan Zun’s philosophy.

3. The Problem of the Dao Imitating Ziran

Unlike the relationship between the Dao and the myriad things, a topic which has been discussed by contemporary philosophers, “the Dao imitating ziran” is an issue that has been debated since ancient times. The Laozi Zhigui presents a cosmological sequence unfolding beneath the Dao and Virtue. In his commentary on Laozi 39, Yan Zun says that “The One is the child of the Dao, mother of the spirits (神明 shenming), ancestor of the Great Harmony (太和 taihe), progenitor of the heavens and the earth” 一者，道之子，神明之母，太和之宗，天地之祖 (D. Wang 1994, p. 24), proposing a sequence (1a) from the Dao to the One, to the spirits, to the Great Harmony, and finally to heaven and earth. Elsewhere, commenting on Laozi 44, he says, “what endows me with my nature (性 xing) and makes me who I am is the Dao and Virtue; what I rely on to be born is spirit; what I depend on to grow is the Great Harmony; and what I take as my foundation to have a physical form is heaven and earth” 我性之所禀而为我者，道德也；其所假而生者，神明也；其所因而成者，太和也；其所托而形者，天地也 (D. Wang 1994, p. 68). Here, he offers a nearly identical sequence (1b) from Dao and Virtue to spirit, to the Great Harmony, to heaven and earth, notably omitting the One. Compare this with his commentary on Laozi 38:

“What heaven and earth arise from, what the myriad things depend on—the Dao is their origin, Virtue is their beginning, spirit is their ancestor, and the Great Harmony is their progenitor. The Dao has depth and subtlety; Virtue has thickness and thinness; spirit has clarity and turbidity; and the Great Harmony has high and low.”

天地所由，物类所以，道为之元，德为之始，神明为宗，太和为祖。道有深微，德有厚薄，神有清浊，和有高下。

(D. Wang 1994, p. 5)

Yan Zun’s sequence in this commentary runs (1c) from the Dao to Virtue, to spirit, to the Great Harmony, with the Dao set apart from Virtue.

In his commentary on Laozi 42, Yan Zun again repeats this sequence, but includes another alongside it:

“The nothingness-of-nothingness (无之无者 wu zhi wuzhe) generates nothingness (wuzhe); and nothingness generates what has form (有形者 youxingzhe). Thus, all things with form belong to the category of physical objects. Things have their ancestors, and categories have their progenitors. Heaven and earth are the greatest of things, with humans coming next. As for the generation of heaven and humans, their forms follow qi; qi follow the Great Harmony; the Great Harmony follow the spirits; the spirits follow the Dao and Virtue; and the Dao and Virtue follow ziran. In this way, the myriad things exist.”

无之无者生无者，无者生有形者。故诸有形之徒皆属于物类。物有所宗，类有所祖。天地，物之大者，人次之矣。夫天人之[生也]，形因于气，气因于和，和因于神明，神明因于道德，道德因于自然：万物以存。

(D. Wang 1994, p. 48)

This passage introduces another variation on the first sequence, running (1d) from ziran to Dao and Virtue to the spirits to (the Great) Harmony to qi to form to the things (the heavens, earth and people). Generally stated, then, the first sequence that has appeared in multiple contexts runs (1) from ziran, to the Dao, to Virtue, to the One, to the spirits, to the Great Harmony, to qi, to form, to heaven and earth. There are also some places in the Zhigui that have different expressions after “the heavens and earth,” but I will not elaborate on these here.

In his commentary on Laozi 42, cited above, Yan Zun also introduces a second sequence, running in parallel, (2) from the nothingness-of-nothingness to nothingness, to what has form (the myriad things). I expressed skepticism in Section 1 about the theory of cosmic evolution from nothing to something, which I find reinforced by Yan Zun’s claim in this passage that the nothingness-of-nothingness comes before nothingness. Later in the same commentary, he says that “The nothingness of nothingness-of-nothingness-of-nothingness (wu wu wu zhi wu), the beginning of the beginning-of-beginning (shi wei shi zhi shi), there from which the myriad things arise, that on which xingming depends—what cannot be named by any specific name is called the Dao” 无无无之无，始未始之始，万物所由，性命所以，无有所名者谓之道 (D. Wang 1994, p. 49). So, before the “nothingness-of-nothingness” in the second sequence (i.e., from the nothingness-of-nothingness, to nothing, to what has form) comes “the nothingness of nothingness-of-nothingness-of-nothingness,” and this is the Dao. (The nothingness of nothingness-of-nothingness would then map onto the One; see Yan Zun’s commentary on Laozi 39, discussed in Section 1.) The two sequences mentioned above can therefore be consolidated into a single lineage.

The real challenge then lies in explaining the relationship between ziran on the one hand, and Dao and Virtue on the other, when Yan Zun says that “the Dao and Virtue follow ziran” 道德因于自然. A similar sequence appears in Laozi 25: “Humans imitate the earth; earth imitates heaven; Heaven imitates the Dao, the Dao imitates ziran” 人法地，地法天，天法道，道法自然.7 Yan Zun’s interpretation thus has textual grounding, but the meaning of “the Dao imitates ziran” in the Laozi has been subject to differing interpretations since antiquity.

Two major interpretations have remained influential to this day. The Heshang Gong Commentary states that “the nature 性 of the Dao is ziran; there is nothing which it can imitate” 道性自然，无所法也 (K. Wang 1993, p. 103). However, this reading sits uneasily with the parallel structure established by the preceding lines: “people imitate the earth; the earth imitates the heavens; the heavens imitate the Dao.” According to Wang Bi’s commentary on this line:

“‘To imitate’ means ‘to follow as a model.’ It is by imitating the earth that humans avoid acting contrary to the earth, and so obtain complete safety. It is by imitating heaven that the earth avoids acting contrary to heaven, and so achieves its capacity of upholding all things. It is by imitating the Dao that heaven avoids acting contrary to the Dao, and so achieves its capacity to encompass everything. It is by imitating ziran that the Dao avoids acting contrary to ziran, and so realizes its own nature.”8

法，谓法则也。人不违地，乃得全安，法地也。地不违天，乃得全载，法天也。天不违道，乃得全覆，法道也。道不违自然，乃得其性，法自然也。

(B. Wang 2008, p. 64)

Although this interpretation preserves the parallel structure, it places ziran above the Dao, creating tension with the Laozi’s discourse about the Dao and Virtue elsewhere.

For this reason, Li Yue in the Tang Dynasty reorganizes the line to read, “people who imitate earth as earth, imitate heaven as heaven, imitate the Dao as the Dao—they imitate ziran” 人法地地，法天天，法道道，法自然. He explains: “‘imitate earth as earth,’ as earth selflessly upholds all things; ‘imitate heaven as heaven,’ as heaven selflessly encompasses all things; ‘imitate the Dao as the Dao,’ as the Dao selflessly generates all things; that is all” “法地地”，如地之无私载; “法天天”，如天之无私覆；“法道道”, 如道之无私生而已矣. This allows “imitating ziran” to summarize “imitating earth, heaven, and the Dao,” as “earth, heaven, and Dao all possess the wondrous principle of ziran” (Y. Li 1987, p. 328 ff.). Although some scholars such as Gao Heng, Zhang Songru, Gu Di and Wang Qingjie have endorsed this interpretation, the majority of scholars have not, and debate continues over whether to place the Dao above ziran, or to identify the Dao with ziran.

Yan Zun’s Laozi Zhigui is incomplete, and there is no direct commentary on Laozi 25. We have seen him write, in his commentary on Laozi 42, that “the Dao and Virtue follow ziran” 道德因于自然. Elsewhere he says that:

“The Dao is high and Virtue is great, so profound it cannot be expressed in words. Things cannot make it wealthy, titles cannot make it noble. It accomplishes all things without acting, but does not act on behalf of all things. There is no external force urging it; its nature 性 is always ziran.”

道高德大，深不可言，物不能富，爵不能尊，无为为物，无以物为，非有所迫，而性常自然。

(D. Wang 1994, p. 132)

In identifying the nature 性 of the Dao with ziran, Yan Zun’s interpretation aligns closely with that of Heshang Gong, but without adding the additional claim that “there is nothing to imitate.”

Yan Zun also speaks in several places about the “Dao of ziran.” Commenting on Laozi 61, for example, he says that “the Dao of ziran cannot be forced or contrived. Water flows downward, people move toward gain” 自然之道，不可强致，水动下流，人动趋利 (D. Wang 1994, p. 214); on Laozi 63, he says, “The workings of spirit, the Dao of ziran: nothingness does not generate nothingness, being does not generate being; only when there is neither nothingness nor being can nothingness and being be generated” 神明之数，自然之道，无不生无，有不生有，不无不有，乃生无有 (D. Wang 1994, p. 223). Looking at his commentary on Laozi 38, we find the following: “[the ruler of highest virtue] returns all merits and achievements to the myriad things, whereupon they all say, ‘we accomplished this ziran” 德归万物，皆曰自然 (D. Wang 1994, p. 6); “the ruler of the highest virtue receives the subtle and profound essence of the Dao as their xing and attains the refined essence of the One in their ming. Their xingming are united with ziran” 上德之君，性受道之纤妙，命得一之精微，性命同于自然 (D. Wang 1994, p. 10); “the ruler of lesser virtue receives the upright energy 正气 in their xing, and attains the average and lower aspects of the One in their ming. Their xingming strive toward ziran” 下德之君，性受道之正气，命得一之下中，性命比于自然 (D. Wang 1994, p. 12). His commentary on Laozi 39 reads, “their xingming embody ziran, and their actions are guided by the One” 性命自然，动而由一也 (D. Wang 1994, p. 30). Finally, in his commentary on Laozi 43, he speaks about “observing the ziran of the myriad things” 观万物之自然 (D. Wang 1994, p. 63).

The above texts show that, when Yan Zun discusses ziran, he may do so in terms of “the Dao of ziran,” “xingming as ziran” 性命自然, “the ziran of the myriad things,” and so “ziran” can refer to or predicate many subjects. When Yan Zun says that “the Dao and Virtue follow ziran,” he may only mean that the xing of the Dao embodies ziran; it need not imply that ziran stands hierarchically above it. He therefore manages to stay within the limits of the Laozi’s words here; he cannot avoid discussing the notion that “the Dao and Virtue fa ziran,” but he does not allow ziran to be higher than the Dao. However, when we reconstruct his cosmological lineage, ziran still appears first in the sequence. He does not fully resolve the tension; and yet, his exploration of the relationship between the Dao and ziran is profound. This interpretation of his clearly influenced Wang Bi.

A further interpretive possibility deserves consideration. In the phrase “人法地，地法天，天法道，道法自然” from Laozi 25, the verb fa 法 need not mean “to imitate.” The Zuozhuan, in the entry for the 23rd year of Duke Zhuang, records Cao Gui saying: “The actions of the ruler must be recorded, but if what is recorded does not conform to proper standards (法), what will future generations have to observe 君举必书，书而不法，后嗣何观?” Here, the term fa means “to conform to proper standards” or “to follow the rules,” and we might understand Laozi’s usage similarly. On this interpretation, the Dao does not imitate ziran, nor is the Dao itself identical to ziran. Rather, it means that the operation of the Dao conforms to the ziran way (法度 fa du).

Importantly, the Dao does not conform to the ziran way intentionally. Rather, it simply does so of its own accord, spontaneously and without effort. “The honor they give to the Dao, the esteem they give to virtuosity, happen of their own accord without being imposed [i.e., ziran], obeying no command” 道之尊，德之贵，夫莫之命而常自然 (Laozi 51). This is similar to Confucius’ description of “following what his heart desired without overstepping what was right” 从心所欲, 不逾矩 (Analects 2.4). This reading does not subordinate the Dao to ziran (see R. Li 2023), preserves the parallel structure of the passage, and respects the transcendental nature of the Dao.

4. The Problem of Hearing the Dao

Unlike the long-standing controversy surrounding “the Dao imitates ziran,” there is another issue concerning the Dao in the Laozi that has only become disputed in modern times. The opening chapter of the Laozi says, “of ways you may speak, but not the Perennial Way.” This suggests that the Dao cannot be put into words; what can be put into words is not the constant Dao. And yet Laozi 41 says:

“Top scholars hear the Way: they can (hardly) fare by her.

Average scholars hear the Way: parts they keep; parts they lose.

Low scholars hear the Way and greatly mock her.

上士闻道，勤而行之；

中士闻道，若存若亡；

下士闻道，大笑之，不笑，不足以为道。

Commentators such as Wang Bi and Heshang Gong have generally taken the highest-order scholar as the model to be followed. Wang Bi, for instance, glosses “top scholars hear the Way: they can (hardly) fare by her” with the remark “they have resolve” 有志也, while Heshang Gong comments: “When a scholar of the highest order hears the Dao, he exerts himself strenuously and exhausts his energies in putting it into practice” 上士闻道，自勤苦竭力而行之.

But if the eternal Dao cannot be put into words, what kind of Dao is it that the three scholars hear? Since Fu Shan first proposed that “the one who has grasped the Dao is the lowest scholar” 以下士为得道之人, scholars such as Zhang Hanmo 张瀚墨, Zhu Jie 祝捷 and others have all endorsed this view, arguing that those who laugh at the Dao may actually be the ones who embody it (Zhang 2017; Zhu 2019). In his manuscript on “Interpreting Laozi” <老子解>手稿, Fu Shan writes:

“Regarding the passage on ‘the top scholars hearing the Dao,’ I contend precisely that the lowest scholars are those who attain the Dao. Why? The ‘diligent practitioners’ are those who reify being. The ‘half-believers’ waver between being and nothingness. The ‘great laughers’ have nothing to act upon… The twelve lines that follow all describe the lowest scholars’ refusal to ‘diligently practice’ or ‘half-believe’—they dwell in what the masses detest, free from contention.”

‘上士闻道节’，山于此章，恰要以下士为得道之人。何也？‘勤行’者，崇有者也。‘若存亡’者，参之于有无之间者也。‘大笑’者，无可行矣……下十二言，皆下士不‘勤’、不‘存亡’之用……处众人之所恶，而不争者也。

(Fu 2016, p. 123)

Zhu Jie elaborates further:

“Truly ‘Dao-attained’ lowest scholars, through their ‘hearty laughter,’ dismiss the very method of ‘hearing the Dao.’ The Dao is neither something heard nor immediately acted upon; only through silent assimilation can one apprehend the ‘Great Dao.’”

真正‘得道’的‘下士’则通过‘大笑之’将‘闻道’这种方法一笑了之，‘道’不是听来的，也不是马上就能行动出来的，只有通过潜移默化才能体会‘大道’。

(Zhu 2019, p. 10)

This points to the paradox of “hearing the Dao”: If the Dao cannot be spoken, and what is spoken is not the Dao, then from where does one “hear” it? Is what is heard truly the perduring Dao? After all, Laozi 35 states:

The discourse of the Way is insipid and tasteless:

Looking at her, you will not see her;

Listening to her, you will not hear her,

Yet she cannot be used up.

道之出口，

淡乎其无味，

视之不足见，

听之不足闻，

用之不足既。

Here, the Dao is described as “insufficient to be heard” 听不足闻, which suggests that it cannot be apprehended through the faculty of hearing at all.

Yan Zun, for his part, did not think that the Dao was beyond hearing. The Zhigui states: “what the average kind of scholar hears is not the most beautiful” 中士所闻非至美也 (D. Wang 1994, p. 35). His commentary on Laozi 51 further clarifies that “all these six [xing, ming, emotion, will, ambition, desire] have their origin in the Dao and Virtue, which are ever-changing and boundless. Only those who have heard the Dao and Virtue can follow its principles” 凡此六者 (性、命、情、意、志、欲)，皆原道德，千变万化，无有穷极，唯闻道德者，能顺其则 (D. Wang 1994, p. 132). Yan Zun clearly believed neither that the Dao is unhearable nor that it is the lower scholars who have truly heard it.

Yet his interpretation contains tensions of its own. Firstly, he draws on a theory of following one’s nature and wandering freely (适性逍遥 shi xing xiao yao)—one that predates Xiang Xiu 向秀 and Guo Xiang9—to analyze the three types of scholar, concluding that despite their differences, “they each find joy in their way” (皆以为娱 jie yi wei yu):

The Dao, virtue, heaven and earth: each have their external manifestations. Among the myriad things, some are high, and some are low; some have long qi, and some have short qi. Each creature labors according to its own preferences, worries about what worries it, sees what phenomena it can see, and hears what sounds it can hear. Their choices and rejections differ, and their fears and preferences vary. So the quail, though capable of flying high, spends its entire day bustling about, yet its aspirations lie only in the lowly wormwood grass. The swan, on the other hand, can soar far and wide, traversing east and west, crossing thousands of mountains and rivers, yet its aspirations lie only in the pond. As for the phoenix, it glides above the towering mountains, at ease in the vast sky, yet it often feels that such heights are still too humble. Thus, it stretches its neck, spreads its wings, flies beyond the dark clouds, approaches the sun and moon, soars high and far, goes without food for long periods, travels across the nine regions, and perches in the farthest corners of the eight directions. Only then does it feel comfortable and at ease, having found a living environment suited to itself. Although these three birds differ in their ways and habits, they all find joy in their unique lifestyles.

道德天地，各有所章，物有高下，气有短长。各劳其所乐，患其所患，见其所见，闻其所闻，取舍殊（殁）缪，畏喜殊方。故鹑鴳高飞，终日驰骛，而志在乎蒿苗；鸿鹄高举，径历东西，通千达万，而志在乎陂池；鸾凤翱翔万仞之上，优游太清之中，而常以为卑。延颈舒翼，凌苍云，薄日月，高翔远逝，旷时不食，往来九州，栖息八极，乃得其宜。三者殊便，皆以为娱。

(D. Wang 1994, p. 34)

However, he goes on to reassert the hierarchy between the three scholars, so that their differing paths, each a source of joy, ultimately reflect “the difference between big and small” from Zhuangzi 1:

… It is for this reason that they abandon the cleverness and cunning of the mundane world, discard scheming thoughts, return to a pure and unhewn state, roaming in the midst of the primordial chaos of the universe. They look down on worldly customs and disdain the ordinary world, stand alone and uncontaminated; joy, anger, sorrow and pleasure do not entangle their hearts and make them disordered; profit, harm, gain and loss do not touch their thoughts and make them move; whether they are noble or humble, they regard all as the same realm; life and death, existence and extinction, they see all as the same returning; they act in accordance with non-action, having insight into the mysterious ways of the universe; their spirit is calm and serene, their nature and will are free from burdens and obstructions; they embrace the Dao, Virtue and harmony, and return to their original essence in flow with their natures; this is what the great sages revere, and what the top kind of scholar pursues.

…是以捐聪明，弃智虑，反归真朴。游于太素，轻物傲世，卓尔不污。喜怒不婴于心，利害不接于意，贵尖[贱]同域，存亡一度。动于不为，览于玄妙，经神平静，无所章载，抱德含和，帅然反化∶大圣之所尚，而上士之所务，中士之所眩爚，而下士之所大笑也。

(D. Wang 1994, p. 35)

In this discussion, what Yan Zun means by “hearing the Dao” carries the dual sense of both hearing the Dao directly and hearing words about it, as is suggested by such expressions as “the villagers passing down traditions,” “expounding grand theories and presenting profound discussions,” or “floating words and wandering arguments.” However, in the passage that follows, he still uses the concept of “hearing the Dao” in its original sense:

Therefore, the established words of the sage say that “it (i.e., the Dao) exists.” This so-called “existence” means that, although the Dao is profound and difficult to understand, it drives and governs the operation of ziran, and directs the course of all things. Grasping the existence of the Dao is not something that mediocre people can hear and understand. Why is this? It is because the Dao of the sage is profound and subtle, vague and difficult to understand, both dark and light, both empty and silent. And yet the myriad things are born and develop through it. Both minute and immense, there is no concrete image that can describe it. If you explore it to the extreme, you will find that wisdom cannot fully grasp it; if you try to summarize it simply, you will find that language cannot fully express it; if you try to infer and analyze it, you will find that writing cannot fully convey its profound meaning.

故圣人建言曰”有之”。有之者，言道之难知，推柄自然之归，以统万方之指者能有之，非庸庸者之所能闻也。夫故何哉？圣人之道，深微浩远，魁魁忽忽，冥冥昭昭。虚无寂泊，万物以往。纤微高大，无有形象。穷而极之，则知不能存也；要而约之，则口不能言也；推移离散，则书不能传也。

(D. Wang 1994, p. 35)

Yan Zun’s original version of the Laozi likely differed from the received version’s “it is there in the statements they make” 故建言有之, possibly reading “therefore, the established words say: ‘it exists’” 故建言曰：有之, or having some other variant. But since the Dao “cannot be preserved by knowledge,” “cannot be spoken by mouth,” “cannot be passed on by books,” that is, as Bai Juyi said, even the Laozi cannot transmit the Dao, then where and how can it be heard?10

Yan Zun did not answer this question directly, but his reference to “what the great sages revere, and what the top kind of scholar pursues” 大圣之所尚，而上士之所务 (D. Wang 1994, p. 35) suggests one possible approach. The figure of the “great sage” is probably based on Zhuangzi 2: “Yet after ten thousand generations, a great sage may appear who will know their meaning, and it will still be as though he appeared with astonishing speed” 万世之后而一遇大圣，知其解者，是旦暮遇之也 (Watson 2013, p. 17). The great sage knows the Dao and, in the context of Zhuangzi 2, is able to resolve various difficulties; but such a person is rare. In the Laozi, the sage by definition embodies the Dao. By evoking the “great sage,” Yan Zun may be suggesting that, though such people are rare, there really are some who have heard the Dao and can speak of it.

We may thus consider Yan Zun a forerunner of the theory of following one’s nature and wandering freely. On the question of the three types of scholar, he maintains that the Dao can be heard, but qualifies that “it is not something that the average person is able to hear” 非庸庸者之所能闻也 (D. Wang 1994, p. 35). And yet he also says that the Dao “cannot be preserved by knowledge,” “cannot be spoken by mouth,” “cannot be passed on by books,” and only vaguely mentions the great sage who could probably resolve this problem.

The remainder of the passage at Laozi 41 goes:

Therefore, a proverb puts it: Bright Way looks obscure; Forward Way looks reversed; Smooth Way looks rough. Utmost vitality looks like a gully; Great purity looks filthy; Expansive vitality looks inadequate; Affirmative vitality looks insouciant; Substantive authenticity looks unstable. The great square has no corners; The great completion is not completed; The great note has no voice; The great symbol has no shape. The Way is great yet nameless. The Way alone is good at inaugurating and then completing things.

故建言有之：明道若昧，进道若退，夷道若类；上德若谷，大白若辱，盛德若不足，建德若偷，质真若渝；大方无隅，大器晚成，大音希声，大象无形，道隐无名。夫唯道,善贷且成。

Perhaps this is speaking about the Dao, that is, what Yan Zun calls “the words of the sage that it exists.” He might then mean to use “Why is this so? The advancing Dao seems to retreat…” to introduce the paradoxical statements that follow as an explanation. However, whether hearing such words can lead to true understanding of the Dao ultimately remains uncertain.

5. Conclusions

Unlike discussions that survey the general ideas contained in Yan Zun’s Laozi Zhigui, this article specifically examined Yan Zun’s contributions to the genealogical discourse on the Dao in the Laozi. Against the backdrop of the prevailing “myth of coherence” and the canonical reverence for the text, this study identified certain contradictions and contentious points in its discourse on the Dao that have sparked later debates. On three key and perplexing issues in the Laozi—the relationship between the Dao and all things, the sense in which the Dao “imitates” ziran, and the paradox of hearing the Dao—Yan Zun offers searching reflections and attempts at resolution. He uses the theories of “something makes it” and “nothing does it” to explain the Dao’s operation and the self-generation of the myriad things, returns repeatedly to the relationship between the Dao and ziran, and draws on the Zhuangzian figure of the “great sage” to elucidate the problem of apprehending the Dao.

Although Yan Zun is deeply influenced by the Zhuangzi, and often interprets the Laozi through a Zhuangzian lens, his basic philosophical concerns remain centered on the issues raised in the Laozi itself. These challenging questions receive relatively little sustained attention in other interpretive texts such as the Zhuangzi, the Han Feizi, or the Huainanzi, while later scholars such as Li Yue and Fu Shan addressed only isolated issues. This underscores the distinctiveness of Yan Zun’s Laozi Zhigui. Within the intellectual landscape of the Han dynasty, often overshadowed by the vibrancy of the Warring States period, the Laozi Zhigui stands out as a remarkably sophisticated philosophical work, earning Yan Zun admiration from both his contemporaries and later generations. Furthermore, the Laozi Zhigui notably influenced Wang Bi’s interpretation of the Laozi, as argued by Robinet, and Guo Xiang’s interpretation of the Zhuangzi (e.g., the concept of following one’s nature to achieve contentment), as discussed in this paper. In this way, Yan Zun’s work effectively served as a bridge linking pre-Qin thought, Han learning, and Wei-Jin metaphysics, thereby securing its unique position in the history of Chinese philosophy.

Regrettably, some contemporary scholarship underestimates the depth of the Laozi Zhigui, treating it merely as a conventional Han-era exegesis that mechanically follows the principle of “commentary without challenging the canon” 注不破经, while overlooking Yan Zun’s critical engagement with the Laozi’s contradictions and his innovative solutions. Only through such rigorous analysis can we appreciate his philosophical depth and do justice to his devotion in “earning a hundred coins, enough to support himself, then closing his stall, lowering the curtain, and studying the Laozi.” Deeper research on the Laozi Zhigui remains imperative.

This study also challenges the conventional perception of Han scholars as rigid classicists preoccupied with textual commentary and scholastic traditions while lacking philosophical originality. Of course, in Yan Zun’s time, he no longer had access to many ancient versions of the Laozi, and his understanding of Laozi’s thought was inevitably shaped by Han-era intellectual influences. Moreover, viewing the Laozi as a sacred classic, he aimed at preserving the Laozi’s coherence, and his solutions were not always adequate to the problems he identified. This illustrates a mode of reflection shaped by reverence rather than the modern, Western-influenced focus on exposing internal contradictions in the text. Nevertheless, Yan Zun’s methodology of identifying and resolving textual contradictions may provide a new criterion for evaluating the hermeneutical depth of later commentators, as well as a fresh perspective on Han dynasty exegesis and the intellectual landscape of the period.