Mutual Embeddedness of the Religious and the Secular in Muslim Responses to Blasphemy

Abstract

This article examines Muslim responses to two blasphemy controversies that provoked widespread public backlash in Türkiye in 2022 and 2024. Drawing on news coverage from three leading conservative newspapers (Sabah, Yeni Şafak, and Yeni Akit) and user commentary on X, the analysis explores how these reactions complicate the conventional religious–secular binary often applied to blasphemy disputes. The findings show that while piety and devotion to the Prophet Muhammad were central, responses also heavily employed the language of possession, identity, dignity, collective honor, and experiences of discrimination and exclusion. These dynamics demonstrate that Muslim reactions are not confined to religious experience, which may appear inaccessible to secular reasoning, but also draw on secular reflections that can be articulated within European human rights frameworks and resonate in broader public discourse. Given their deep attachment to faith, some Muslims may perceive such expressions as attacks on their religious feelings, identity, dignity, and security. At the same time, some may seek political advantage by demanding heightened deference to religious sensibilities or attempting to suppress critical opinions. Claims of religious injury in blasphemy disputes may therefore operate either as defenses of self and faith or assertions of identity and strategies of political contestation. The article concludes by highlighting the complex task of balancing the protection of believers with the safeguarding of freedom of expression.

1. Introduction

From David Low’s 1925 “gallery of the most important historical celebrities” to the Charlie Hebdo cartoons and more recent Qur’an burnings, the modern debate over blasphemy and free speech remains highly charged, particularly in cases involving Muslims in Europe and beyond (Sherwood 2021, p. 94; Larsson et al. 2024). Many Euro-Americans have perceived the social conflicts over blasphemy regarding the Prophet Muhammad as a clash between secular democracy and liberty on the one side and oppressive religious violence on the other (Asad 2009, p. 21). In response, scholars such as Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood have sought to articulate an account of religiosity that, they argue, is “unintelligible” from a liberal secular perspective.

Talal Asad states that “it becomes difficult for the secular liberal to understand the passion that informs those for whom, rightly or wrongly, it is impossible to remain silent when confronted with blasphemy, those for whom blasphemy is neither ‘freedom of speech’ nor the challenge of a new truth but something that seeks to disrupt a living relationship” (Asad 2009, p. 46). Similarly, Saba Mahmood argues for the need to develop a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the moral injury that blasphemy can inflict on Muslims. According to Mahmood, the relationship Muslims have with the Prophet is often characterized as “a relation of similitude.” Many Muslims strive to emulate the Prophet in their daily lives in eating, dressing, walking, and even sleeping. Therefore, for many Muslims, the offense is not merely a violation of a moral prohibition (such as the injunction against creating images of Muhammad) but an affront to a deeply ingrained structure of feeling, or habitus, which experiences such blasphemous acts as a profound wound (Mahmood 2009, pp. 847–49). As Mahmood thinks that this type of wound requires moral action, she questions whether judicial mechanisms and the legal language of rights are adequate to address such injuries. Thus, Mahmood suggests that Muslims should not rely on European human rights law to address blasphemous speech about the Prophet (Mahmood 2009, p. 849).

Andrew March raises important questions about Asad and Mahmood’s account of Muslim reactions and highlights other plausible accounts of Muslim reactions to blasphemy such as the role of moral codes, honor, and social identity in shaping responses to blasphemy (March 2011, p. 326; March 2012, p. 326). Indeed, several reasonable questions emerge in relation to this issue. What motivates a Muslim’s reaction to a blasphemous remark? Are Muslims deeply hurt out of love, enraged out of pride, or concerned about personal security within a complex social environment? Where is the reaction directed: towards protecting God, the Prophet, the religious moral code, the community honor or simply their social and political interests? During a perceived attack on their religion, can a devout individual easily separate their identity from what is being attacked? Similarly, can an outsider clearly distinguish between a religious individual and the religion itself when observing a negative representation of that religion? Although Mahmood seems to be aware of these possible questions and notes that Muslim reactions to blasphemy cases are highly diverse, making it impossible to encapsulate them within a single causal narrative, she nevertheless focuses on examining a specific aspect of these complex and varied reactions, namely the concepts of “moral injury” and “religious pain” (Mahmood 2009, p. 842). Recognizing the wide-ranging responses to blasphemy, this article seeks to illuminate another dimension, which can be described as the mutual embeddedness of the religious and the secular. In other words, in such reactions, the defense of one’s self, honor, and group identity is often inseparable from the defense of Islam or the Prophet Muhammad. Religious values are not only revered as exemplary ideals, and the Prophet as the beloved guide, but are also experienced and expressed as personal and collective possessions. Thus, such a situation does not generate a pre-given moral obligation on those who share the public sphere to affirm or defend the claims of protesting Muslims; rather, it brings forth a more complex field of responsibility that requires balancing various competing rights between protesting Muslims and others.

Similarly, Tariq Modood states that when Muslims encounter blasphemy their reactions regarding honor and dignity cannot be understood solely through theology. Although the reactions originate in religious feelings, they are also closely related to social standing and respectability. In Muslims’ psyches, the honor of the Prophet Muhammad is central and linked to their honor as well as his vilification to their hatred (Modood 1993, pp. 143–46). From many Muslims’ perspectives, the anger against blasphemy stems from a deep sense of being disrespected and from the perception that Muslims and their most cherished feelings are routinely deemed fair targets (Modood 2006, p. 5).

Faisal Devji states that disputes over blasphemy are closely related to discussions of ownership. Muslims argue that the Prophet Muhammad belongs to them; therefore, insults against him hurt their feelings (Devji 2024, p. 183). According to Devji, when Muslims object to blasphemy, they usually rely on secular terms such as “insult”, “libel”, “defamation”, and “injury” (Devji 2015, p. 173).

In a similar vein, some scholars have drawn attention to the race–religion nexus in the discussion of Islamophobia and multicultural citizenship (Jansen and Meer 2020; Meer and Modood 2009; Modood 2005). Nasar Meer argues that Muslim identity has ethnic and religious boundaries that are not demarcated. For instance, British Muslims’ mobilization for faith schools or against Islamophobia could also be read as parallel to a mobilization initiated by ethnic minority groups (Meer 2008, p. 66). According to Hilal Elver, Muslims as a minority can be treated as a racial group rather than merely a religious one through political practices, media representations, and public discourse (Elver 2012).

On the other hand, Veninga argues that the Danish and French cartoon debates took place within their respective social contexts, where notions of secularism and religious identities are intertwined. According to Veninga, in these countries the majority defines itself vis-à-vis Muslim immigrants, while Muslim immigrants, in turn, are compelled to define themselves vis-à-vis the majority (Veninga 2016, p. 28). Similarly, Kaya examines how discourses about European heritage and Islamophobia are employed to reinforce exclusionary identities (Kaya 2019). In short, the mutual embeddedness of the religious and the secular exists not only in certain Muslim responses to blasphemy but also in certain secular appeals to the protection of secularism and heritage populism.

This article examines two blasphemy and free speech cases that occurred in Turkish society in 2022 and 2024. The first incident took place on 27 April 2022 when a Pegasus Airlines employee posted a photo on his social media account. The photo showed a group of Pegasus Airlines staff at a rakı table toasting, captioned “Special for Laylat al-Qadr. May God accept it.” The 27th of April was Laylat al-Qadr, which is considered one of the holiest times by Muslims and described as better than a thousand months in the Qur’an (Qur’an 97: 1–5). It commemorates the night when the first verses of the Qur’an were revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. Turkish Muslims have a strong tradition of observing Laylat al-Qadr. When the post was circulated on the internet, it ignited intense backlash, leading to the dismissal of the employee who posted the photo and criminal charges against him. According to the dismissed employee, CİMER (the Presidential Communication Center, which receives complaints and petitions) received more than ten thousand complaints against him.1 The juxtaposition of alcohol consumption, prohibited in Islam, with a devotional formula traditionally reserved for acts of worship, on one of the holiest nights in the Islamic calendar, was perceived by many as a profound transgression that trivialized sacred values.

The dismissed employee stated at an interview that the group was celebrating the birthday of one of their coworkers. When he was informed at the gathering that it was Laylat al-Qadr, he called his mother to celebrate her holy night. The person whose birthday was being celebrated made wishes. They thought that, according to popular belief, prayers would be accepted during this sacred night; they likened the birthday wishes to those prayers.2

As the backlash mounted, Pegasus Airlines released a statement regarding the matter on the following day. The company stated that “These opinions and statements are personal and have no connection to our company’s position. As Pegasus Airlines, we find the offensive remarks in the relevant post, directed at religious beliefs, social views, and ideas, to be absolutely unacceptable. Accordingly, we wish to inform you that the matter has been urgently referred to our company’s ethics committee and that the necessary actions will be taken promptly”.3 Subsequently, it was reported that the employee’s contract was terminated.4 Also, the Anadolu Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office launched an investigation against the employee who posted the photo on charges of “inciting the public to hatred and hostility or degrading” on the 29th of April.5 The court sentenced the defendant to three months and twenty-two days in prison for the offense of “publicly insulting religious values adopted by a segment of society”; however, taking into account the defendant’s lack of prior criminal record and conduct during the trial, the court decided to defer the announcement of the verdict.6

The second incident occurred when two young social media personalities, Asrın Tok and Diamond Tema, debated on a YouTube channel on 14 June 2024. June 15 was the eve of Eid al-Adha. The two social media personalities engaged in a debate about Islam in general and Sharia in particular. While pro-Sharia Asrın Tok appeared uneducated about the topic and unprepared for the debate, anti-Sharia Diamond Tema gave the impression of having come well-prepared for the debate. Showing the Bukhari narration published by the Directorate of Religious Affairs at one point in the debate, Tema argued that the Prophet Muhammad got married to a six-year-old and consummated the marriage when she was nine years old, which he characterized as morally wrong and contrary to human rights values. Tema stated that “he married her at the age of six, raised her, and when she grew up a little consummated the marriage with a girl of nine who had not even reached puberty. In a system where beliefs and customs like these are considered legitimate, I’m curious how much you can really talk about human rights.”7 After the debate circulated on social media, it sparked a significant controversy. The ministry of justice announced on his social media account that an investigation has been initiated against Tema on the charges of “inciting the public to hatred and hostility.”8

The charges in these two incidents were based on Article 216 of the Turkish Penal Code, which reads as follows:

“(1) A person who publicly provokes hatred or hostility in one section of the public against another section which has a different characteristic based on social class, race, religion, sect or regional difference, which creates an explicit and imminent danger to public security shall be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of one to three years. (2) A person who publicly degrades a section of the public on grounds of social class, race, religion, sect, gender or regional differences shall be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to one year. (3) A person who publicly degrades the religious values of a section of the public shall be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to one year, where the act is capable of disturbing public peace.”

Materials and Methods

This article examines the protesting reactions of pious and conservative individuals to alleged blasphemous speeches in the two public incidents, drawing on news reports and opinion columns from the three highest-circulation conservative newspapers, namely Sabah, Yeni Şafak, and Yeni Akit, as well as critical comments on X. The article employs qualitative coding in order to identify recurring themes, discursive patterns, and normative claims within these reactions. The focus on conservative newspapers and critical social media comments provides access to prominent expressions of protest and contestation against perceived blasphemy in the Turkish public sphere.

It is important to note that the conservative newspapers and critical comments on X examined here do not represent the full range of positions held by all Turkish Muslims. On the contrary, some Muslims argue that strict and disproportionate measures or violent protests against perceived blasphemy in the name of Islam, in fact, defame their religion. From this perspective, a more appropriate Muslim response to transgression is to engage in moral reasoning and persuasion through strong arguments rather than coercion or violence (Akyol 2023, p. 327). Furthermore, some Muslims view the selective policing of expressions deemed offensive to Islam as imbalanced and unfair in a plural society as it privileges one set of sensitivities over others and undermines equal citizenship in Türkiye.9 Likewise, some Muslim scholars criticize the contemporary misuse of blasphemy laws and vigilantism in various Muslim-majority contexts, calling for a re-evaluation of classical jurisprudential interpretations in light of contemporary commitments to freedom of religion and belief (Kutty 2018, p. 218; An-Na’im 2008, p. 122; Hasan 2017, p. 107).

Against this broader backdrop of diverse positions, this article focuses specifically on protesting reactions to perceived blasphemy in order to analyze the social and discursive contexts in which such grievances emerge. It does not offer a legal assessment of whether freedom of expression in the two incidents should be protected or restricted under the ECtHR jurisprudence. Instead, it uses these incidents as a lens to illuminate the complexity of public controversies surrounding blasphemy, which encompass a wide range of religious, moral, social, and political concerns and rivalries. By analyzing this complexity through the concept of mutual embeddedness, the article aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the social contexts in which blasphemy cases arise and the ways in which affected religious individuals respond. In short, it examines whether the responses of religious individuals to blasphemy can be meaningfully articulated within the European human rights framework. However, determining whether these claims to restrict free speech in these particular incidents should be legally upheld lies beyond the scope of this article.

2. Reactions Against the Laylat al-Qadr Post

2.1. Examining News Articles and Comments on Sabah, Yeni Şafak and Yeni Akit Newspapers

There are 25 news articles reporting on the incident and four opinion columns addressing the subject. The newspapers employ similar discourse and themes in their coverage of the incident, although they cite different examples when referring to social media comments by ordinary users criticizing the Pegasus employee’s post. All three newspapers reported on the same public figures. The themes in the news articles can be analyzed under the following categories:

• The Importance of Laylat al-Qadr: The news articles point out the importance of Laylat al-Qadr referring to its sacredness with descriptions such as “one of the most special days for the Muslim world”10, “most special day of Ramadan”11, and “a night better than a thousand months”.12 The contrast between the Muslims’ reverence for the sacred night and the playful demeanor of the Pegasus employees is emphasized.13
• Disrespect and Mockery Towards Religion: The news articles frame the caption of the post, “Special for Laylat al-Qadr. May God accept it,” as the part that is disrespectful and ridiculing in tone. This caption is cited as the primary reason for the strong reactions the picture elicited.14 The newspapers draw a stark contrast between the devout practices of Muslims during Laylat al-Qadr, who spend the night in worship, and the actions of Pegasus employees, who are described as reveling with alcohol. This portrayal implicitly reinforces an “us versus them” divide. However, the newspapers specifically pinpoint the caption as the source of offense, labeling it as an “insult,” “disrespect,” “humiliation,” “mockery,” “blatant attack on faith” and “scandal”.15 They clarify that the critique is not aimed at lifestyle choices but at the disrespect shown towards religious beliefs. The issue taken is not with the alcohol consumption by Pegasus employees but with the mocking nature of the post. All three newspapers reference a tweet by the celebrity Alişan, who emphasizes, “You can make jokes about everything, but you can’t do that when it comes to religion. No one can interfere with what someone else drinks, eats, or what they believe. However, no one can curse my religion!”16
• The National Backlash: The newspapers highlight that the social media post made by Pegasus employees provoked a huge public backlash and became a nationwide topic of discussion.
• Religion as Identity, Muslims as a Group: When the disrespect is communicated, many reports mention Muslims as the disrespected; for example, “a group of employees posted images of a table laden with alcohol and glasses on social media, using disrespectful language that disregarded Muslims’ beliefs”.17 “People flocked to mosques and masjids in the excitement of Laylat al-Qadr. On this night, which is considered more virtuous than a thousand months, Muslims meticulously performed their prayers seeking forgiveness for their sins. However, a post from a group claiming to be Pegasus employees infuriated everyone (all Muslims).” Furthermore, the statement by President Erdoğan reported in this context also highlights Muslims’ beliefs, rather than religion in the abstract. Erdoğan stated that “In our country, there is still a segment of the population that harbors hatred against our millet’s18 culture, history, and values, and spews hatred whenever the opportunity arises. Like every year, this Ramadan, we have been subjected to the hate crimes of the soulless. I leave these kinds of images, which are incompatible with democracy, freedom, law, morality, and conscience, to God. I leave it to the judgment of our millet”.19 In a similar fashion, the quote from the celebrity Alişan also emphasizes the possessor of the religion: “No one can curse my own religion” (benim dinime). Religion is not independently identified as the disrespected, but Muslims’ religion, i.e., Muslims’ possession is identified as the victim in these responses.
• The Coverage of the Famous Laicist Journalists’ Reactions: All three newspapers report the reactions of staunch laicist journalists, Nevşin Mengü and Şirin Payzın. They criticize Nevşin Mengü for her differential treatment with regard to respecting religious sentiments. Mengü previously shared a verse from the New Testament, Matta 6:5, in the context of the Donald Trump photo holding a Bible at St. John’s Church. A Jewish-Turkish person objected to the mention of “synagogues” in the shared verse and stated that “Can’t you deliver your message without mixing up the synagogues?”. Mengü responded promptly and apologized to all Jewish people explaining that she had not noticed the antisemitic tone in the verse and affirming that she did not mean to hurt Jewish people. Mengü is criticized for not showing equal respect to Muslims and Islamic values and in this case for not seeing any problem with mixing up Laylat al-Qadr with having fun. The newspapers’ criticism emphasizes that the problem was not with drinking or having fun per se, but with conflating such behavior with the sacred night of Laylat al-Qadr, which, according to them, Mengü failed to understand.20

Şirin Payzın, on the other hand, objected to the airline’s statement regarding urgent referral of the employees to the ethics committee and stated that “This is a laic country…Is this country a theocracy? Does Pegasus defend theocratic regulations? Will you still be able to carry out these layoffs even if someone who dines at the same table with sects (tarikats) comes forward?… For example, is Pegasus from now on also going to fire employees who wear bikinis, flight attendants in sleeveless dresses, or pilots who pose with their partners? Stand your ground for once. Is it really that hard? Have you bowed down so much that you can’t even say, “What’s it to you what I do in my private life?”

In response to Payzın, by using some social media comments the newspapers pointed out that the issue was not about the alcohol of the employees, but the “provoking”, “insulting”, “mocking” and “attacking” nature of their statement in the post.21 These journalists are seen as defending the attack on Islam due to their personal animosity towards Islam, rather than impartially advocating for freedom of speech on principled grounds. Their ideological leanings, along with their connections to the CHP (the Republican People’s Party), are highlighted as influencing their stance.

The newspaper reports and the three opinion columns perceive the incident as yet another manifestation of the ongoing conflict between the laicists and the religious community, rather than viewing it as an isolated event. Yeni Akit columnist Ali Akben states as follows:

“Dear readers, almost every Ramadan our noble religion is targeted, and those who openly criticize our religion while flaunting themselves thereby confirm their enmity toward it and earn the disdain of our esteemed millet. Although hostility toward religion and religiosity has relatively decreased compared to previous years, an ignorant and deviant mob mocked our sacred night on Laylat al-Qadr, which Muslims regard as better than a thousand months and celebrate with reverence. They sought to provoke certain powers by sacrificing Pegasus Airlines.” (Akben 2022).

Similarly, Yeni Şafak columnist İsmail Kılıçaraslan states that “supposedly, the so-called liberals and our own naive zealots united to defend this “rubble of curs and scoundrels” who directly attacked our sacred values, as you know. Regardless of religion or belief, if someone retreats quietly when their sacred values are attacked, it means that they lack dignity and honor, not that they are sensitive.” (Kılıçarslan 2022). Another well-known Yeni Şafak columnist, Yusuf Kaplan, describes the incident as Islamophobic and thinks that the level of Islamophobia in this country makes those in the West seem mild by comparison.22 In a similar fashion, Yeni Akit columnist Ali Karahasanoğlu criticizes the lawyer of the Pegasus employee and highlights his former ties with CHP (Karahasanoğlu 2022). In addition to Karahasanoğlu’s column, all three newspapers report the lawyer’s interview with the Cumhuriyet newspaper.23 The lawyer, Kerem Donat stated as follows:

“Due to the Republic of Türkiye being a secular state, the term ‘Ramadan’ frankly does not exist for us; it’s a month observed according to a different calendar that concerns only a segment of our society. This isn’t something that concerns our lifestyle or causes us to face pressure regarding it. However, we are being subjected to the prevailing opinion. They say that how dare you drink during Laylat al-Qadr? How can you make posts about it, or even mock it? Religious dogmas bind only those who believe in them. For those who do not believe, these cannot be cited as grounds for any religious sanctions. Moreover, even if such an offense exists, it is not considered a crime by our standards. This is because there is something called freedom of expression in this country.”24

The lawyer’s statement about Ramadan reinforces an “us vs. them” divide, a dynamic that the newspapers highlight in their coverage. He is also criticized for displaying double standards: defending freedom of speech when it involves mocking religion, yet adopting an authoritarian stance when it comes to criticism of Atatürk.

2.2. Evaluating the X Comments

Using the advanced search on X for the period from 27 April 2022 to 30 April 2022, with the hashtag #Pegasus, 1819 tweets opposing the post shared by the Pegasus employee were collected. These tweets reflect the following thematic categories:

1.

Call for a boycott of the company, the dismissal of the employees, and the prosecution of those responsible for the controversial post.

2.

Verses from the Qur’an, good prayers, imprecatory prayers, and insults. The remarks limited to the items mentioned in the first two categories do not offer insights into what specifically triggered the backlash against the controversial post.

3.

Respect: Respect emerges as the most recurrent theme when analyzing the underlying reasons for the rejection of the Pegasus employee’s post. The incident is characterized as “disrespectful,” “mocking,” “insulting,” “provocative,” “humiliating” and “impudent.” The prevailing pattern underscores that the reactions to Pegasus employees were not triggered by the mere act of drinking alcohol during Laylat al-Qadr. Instead, according to these statements, it was the employees’ disrespectful behavior in using the caption that incited the backlash.

What did the users identify as the object of the disrespect? This question is crucial for a deeper understanding of the underlying reasons behind the backlash. “Muslims,” “Islam,” “nation,” “people,” “religion,” and “faith” are identified as the objects of disrespect. God himself is mentioned less frequently as the main object of disrespect. Similarly, as discussed earlier, the newspapers do not specifically identify God as the main target of disrespect either. Although God is the only one directly addressed in the controversial caption, “Special for Laylat al-Qadr. May God accept it,” the outrage is not primarily framed as a direct offense against God. Instead, it is communicated as an act of disrespect toward his believers and the religion itself.

Except for a few tweets, Islam and religion are mentioned either with possessive expressions25 or in relation to believers. For instance, one user states that “no one has the right to mock our religion; preventing this disrespect is a command of Islam and a requirement of our self-respect.”26 Another states that “Muslims living in Türkiye should also respond appropriately by boycotting those who commit such insolence, so that no one in our country dares to disrespect our religion again.”27

The belief that Islamophobia is prevalent in Turkish society leads some users to compare the treatment of Islam with that of other religions. They believe that those who disrespect Islam in Türkiye actually show proper respect for other religions. Some remarks in this context can be read as follows: “Türkiye is full of Islamophobes like these. But could this group mock the religious days or customs of Alevis, Christians, or Jews in the same way? It would be too much. They would be thrown out immediately. However, in this country, one can mock Islamic elements without any repercussions.”28 “The most fierce enemies of Islam reside in Türkiye. These individuals, who claim to be sensitive towards Jews, Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists, unleash intense hatred when it comes to Islam.”29 Some users also compare the treatment of free speech when the subject concerns Islam and Atatürk, the founding father of Türkiye. They believe that when Atatürk is the object of criticism, those who advocate for free speech in the case of Islam would instead call for strict repercussions.

4.

Us vs. Them Divide: Some users emphasize that the Pegasus employees in question do not belong to their society. Some question the employees’ lineage and some label them as “Armenians” or “Greeks”. A well-known Yeni Şafak columnist asks, “What has Islam done to you for you to behave in such a despicable manner? Whose child are you?”30 While this approach places the Pegasus employees outside the community bonds, framing them as a kind of enemy, some users, on the other hand, emphasize that Christians, Jews, and foreigners are respectful toward Islam, unlike certain Turkish individuals who mock it. Thus, these remarks position Turkish people who mock Islam as the ultimate “other”. For instance, one user states that “supposedly, the West is Islamophobic and we are a country with a Muslim majority. I have never encountered the kind of disrespect shown by these Pegasus employees during all my years living abroad.”31

Furthermore, some users state that they will continue to be polarized against those who mock Islam. While anti-polarization discourses of “common sense” often attempt to function as a mediating language that seeks to soften sharp divisions between secularists and conservatives in Turkish society, these users instead emphasize their refusal to overcome polarization. For instance, one user states that “these are the kind of godless infidels who would turn Laylat al-Qadr into a joke at a drinking table. Then they say, “We’ve become too polarized.” Being polarized against you is a badge of honor for us. We will remain polarized against you for as long as we live. We will remain polarized until our strength runs out.”32

Considering the remarks that signal possession and an “us vs. them” divide, the community of practicing Muslims emerge as the main target of disrespect in the newspaper coverage and comments on the X platform. According to these remarks, there is a prevailing perception that Islamophobia is widespread among laicist people in Türkiye, who are hostile only to Islam while treating other religions with due respect.

On the other hand, statements made by the employee’s lawyer and remarks from two laicist journalists also reflect an “us vs. them” divide. Their commentary suggests that they interpreted the conservative backlash primarily as a reaction against the rejection of religious obligations. As a result, they fail to grasp the main reasons behind the Muslim backlash. As discussed above, the prevailing theme was about respect.

In contrast to the message conveyed by his lawyer during the initial controversy, the dismissed Pegasus employee gave interviews more than a year after the incident, stating that he had no intention of disrespecting practicing Muslims. Unlike his lawyer, his tone and message in these interviews do not reflect an “us versus them” divide, even though he refrained from expressing regret for his humorous remarks, which he insisted were not meant to be taken seriously.

Overall, the controversy seems to have evolved into a partisan issue, reigniting social cleavages between conservatives and laicists, which in turn hindered a more nuanced evaluation of the incident based on its specific context. Over the last two decades, these cleavages have been shaped by recurring struggles over the public role of religion and the meaning of Turkish secularism. While conservative actors have challenged rigid interpretations of Kemalist secularism as exclusionary toward public manifestations of Islam, laicist groups have viewed such challenges as part of a broader Islamist threat to the secular foundations of the Republic.

3. Reactions Against Asrın Tok and Diamond Tema Debate

3.1. Evaluating News Articles

Eighteen newspaper articles and one opinion column criticizing Diamond Tema were identified across the three conservative newspapers. Only Yeni Akit provides extended coverage, while Yeni Şafak and Sabah confine their reporting to two brief items each. None of the newspapers reported or discussed the actual substance of Tema’s statements in the controversial debate. When referring to Tema’s remarks, they employ terms such as “inappropriate words,” “ugly words,” “insult,” “despicable insult,” “provocative,” “slander,” “baseless accusations,” and “disgraceful expressions.” Diamond Tema himself is further depicted as a “provocateur,” “depraved,” “snob,” “despicable,” and “agent of influence.”

The newspapers present the controversy as if the CHP supports Tema, who had insulted the Prophet Muhammad. In this framing, the CHP’s stance is not contextualized in terms of freedom of expression or opposition to Sharia, but rather as an endorsement of an individual accused of insulting the Prophet. By contrast, the statements attributed to CHP members depict the debate as a confrontation between “anti-Sharia” Diamond Tema and “pro-Sharia” Asrın Tok. Thus, the emphasis in CHP members’ remarks appears to lie more in opposing the punishment of a figure critical of Sharia.33

Quoting Mustafa Destici, the leader of the Great Unity Party, Yeni Akit emphasizes that reactions against Tema are not due to his opposition to Sharia but rather to his remarks about the Prophet. Destici asserts: “The prosecution did not launch an investigation because this thug said, ‘I am against Sharia.’ Let nobody turn this into a debate about whether they ‘wanted Sharia’ or ‘did not want Sharia.’ This is not a matter of Sharia; this is a matter of insulting our Prophet (peace be upon him).”34

Quoting Dursun Ali Erzincanlı, a well-known naat writer and performer, Yeni Akit compares Tema to the enemies of the Prophet and emphasizes that the current enemies of the Prophet are even worse than those of the past. Erzincanlı states that “The polytheists of Mecca called our Prophet (peace be upon him) ‘mad/insane,’ ‘a sorcerer,’ and ‘a poet,’ but none of them ever questioned His (peace be upon him) truthfulness, honesty, trustworthiness, or morality; it was left to the senseless and heartless polytheists of the end times to attack His (peace be upon him) character.”35 Similarly, a Sabah columnist characterizes Tema’s remarks as a hostile provocation and as Islamophobia, akin to what has been observed in the West (Kalçık 2024).

Beyond the content of Tema’s remarks, Yeni Akit highlights his Albanian and Christian family background, his alleged role in encouraging Turkish youth to abandon religion, and the online mobilization of “opponents of sacred values” in his defense. According to the newspaper, Tema and his supporters are responsible for spurring increased searches on deism and atheism in Google Trends. Thus, Yeni Akit underscores the perceived influence of a foreigner in leading Turkish youth to question religious teachings.

3.2. Evaluating X Comments

Using the advanced search on X for the period from 14 June 2024 to 19 June 2024, with the hashtag #DiamondTemaTutuklansın (Diamond Tema should be arrested), 1741 tweets were collected. In addition to these, other comments related to Tema’s arrest and punishment, as well as various insults, were also found. However, these comments do not contain statements that help to analyze the underlying triggers of the reactions from protesting Muslims. The themes of the collected comments can be categorized as follows:

1.

Love: Various expressions of love towards the Prophet Muhammad are attached to the tag such as “May my mother and father be sacrificed for you”, “I/We love you”, “Our noble Prophet, who was sent as a mercy to all worlds”, “No one has ever been loved as much as him, nor will anyone ever be”, “O Messenger of Allah, if you had not existed, we would not have been”, “O Messenger of Allah, I would sacrifice myself for the dust beneath your feet!”, “Our beloved Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him), who was honoured with Allah’s words: ‘If not for you, I would not have created the worlds,’ and for whom we would sacrifice our very souls”, “I can forgive anyone who insults me, but I cannot tolerate an insult to my Prophet.”, “the sultan of my heart, the crown upon my head.”, “The Lord of the Roses”, “The Sun of Islam and the Last Guide of Humanity.”, “The Master of the Universe, the Leader of the World, our Soul and Lifeblood, our Everything.”, “Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) is the Supreme Honor.”, “the Honor of the Universe”, and “The light of our eyes.”

Some comments emphasize the responsibility of holding Tema accountable out of love for the Prophet and the hope of gaining his intercession with God.

2.

Foreignness of Tema: The posts in this group emphasize Tema’s Albanian descent and background. For instance, one post states: “his name is not Turkish, and he is not Muslim himself. On top of that, he is insulting our Prophet in an Islamic country.”36 Another repeatedly shared a verse from the famous poet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek that reads: “Your grandfather couldn’t extinguish the light of Islam; do you think you will, grandchild of Abu Jahl?”.37 Other posts use various expressions for Tema such as “non-Turk,” “enemy of the Turk and Islam,” “son of a bitch,” “operation kid,” “baseborn,” “son of a Greek,” “the influence operative of Albanian descent,” “child of Zürafa Street,” “grandchild of Abu Jahl,” “British pawn,” “crypto-Jew,” “of unknown origin,” “son of a church,” “son of the Pope,” “Albanian refugee,” and “modern Lawrence”. Additionally, some posts emphasize that Tema is an operative funded by foreign sources and that he is a provocateur attempting to divide society.

3.

Muslim Homeland and Muslim Millet: The posts in this group emphasize Türkiye as the homeland of Muslims and highlight the values of the Turkish millet. One post states: “Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) is the light of our eyes, our eternal leader, and our red line. Even if a minority of disbelievers roam around, the true owner and ruler of these lands is the Turkish nation that follows Muhammad. Everyone will act accordingly. No one will speak against our Prophet. Otherwise, they will pay the price.”38 A recurring statement asserts that “the Turkish millet will not allow insults to its sacred values.”39

Additionally, some posts emphasize the identity of those who uphold the sacred values at stake. For instance, one post states: “No one can insult or slander my own Prophet (Pbuh).”40 Another post states that “We are tired of the insults directed at our religious values, beliefs, and our cherished one in this country.”41 On the other hand, some posts state that Tema does not have to believe in Islam, but he has to respect what Muslims hold sacred.

4.

Hostility Towards Islam: Some posts highlight that Tema is not simply a critic of religions; instead, he specifically targets Islam, and by extension Muslims, with ill intent. Others emphasize that Tema does not criticize other religions such as Christianity and Judaism. Some posts claim that atheists in Türkiye are not genuine atheists, but rather enemies of Islam.

5.

Necessity of Blasphemy Laws: The posts in this group state that similar to the Law on Crimes Committed Against Atatürk, the government should introduce laws to protect the Prophet and religious values. One recurring statement asserts: “Our only leader, Our Prophet, Hz Muhammad (Pbuh)-Let insulting him be recognized as a crime!”42 Similarly, Yeni Şafak columnist Yusuf Kaplan states in his post: “…Will this state not classify as a crime the attacks on the highest values of Islam—the very values that bind this society together, help it stand strong in its hardest times, and serve as the guarantee of our peace, harmony, and brotherhood?…”43

6.

Drawing a Comparison between Atatürk and the Prophet Muhammad and Targeting the CHP: The phrase “ulu önder”, meaning “great leader”, is a Turkish honorific title often attributed to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Alluding to the use of “ulu önder”, one recurring statement asserts: “The one and only Great Leader is Prophet Muhammad.” Drawing a comparison to the protection of Atatürk, one post states that “in Türkiye, not only is insulting M. Kemal forbidden, but even insulting his statue or memory is illegal. Yet, such shameless insults against the Prophet, who is a mercy to the worlds, are deemed acceptable. This is completely unacceptable.”44 Additionally, some posts highlight that CHP protects Tema who attacks the Prophet Muhammad and Islamic values.

7.

Rejection of the Claim That Aisha Was a Child at the Time of Her Marriage to the Prophet: With various references, the posts in this category emphasize that Aisha was not a child when she married Prophet Muhammad. Some posts also highlight that the pro-Atatürk theologian Yaşar Nuri Öztürk argued that Aisha was 17 or 18 years old at the time of her marriage. These posts address pro-Atatürk and pro-laicite individuals, urging them to pay attention since Öztürk is the kind of Islamic scholar they would regard.

8.

Demanding Sharia: Several repeated statements and individual remarks express a desire for Sharia. Some posts assert that the solution to protecting the Prophet, properly punishing offenders, or addressing related issues lies in the implementation of Sharia.

9.

Disrespect, Insult, Degradation, and False Accusation in Tema’s Remarks: Posts in this group highlight that Tema is guilty of various wrongdoings due to his remarks, including disrespect, insult, degradation, and false accusations against the Prophet Muhammad and Muslims.

As in the Pegasus case, the reactions to Tema in the newspapers and the X posts illustrate that, alongside expressions of devotion, there is a significant dimension related to identity, honor and power relations. In this context, the Prophet is seen as inseparable from both the individual believer and the community of believers. Thus, an attack on the Prophet is perceived as an attack on Muslim individuals and their millet. Additionally, these reactions reflect a perception that Islam is being unfairly singled out in critiques of religion. In this context, the longstanding conflict between laicist and conservative camps resurfaces, and for some, it becomes the central issue.

4. Mutual Embeddedness of the Religious and the Secular

As presented above, the news reports and X comments largely do not frame the Pegasus controversy around the lifestyle choices of the employees. The core of the discontent expressed by many Muslim respondents does not center on the act of alcohol consumption per se, but rather on the perceived sacrilege of mocking Laylat al-Qadr. Nevertheless, whether explicitly stated or subtly implied, an underlying “us versus them” dynamic emerges as one of the most salient themes in these public reactions. As discussed above, this controversy exposes deep-rooted social cleavages between conservative and laicist identities in contemporary Turkish society. The prominent laicist journalists are criticized for exhibiting double standards, meticulously respecting the religious sensitivities of non-Muslim communities while appearing dismissive toward Muslim beliefs and practices. Both the news coverage and X comments illustrate how religion is communicated not merely as a set of beliefs, but as a collective identity, something owned and defended by the millet. In this context, expressions of disrespect are interpreted not simply as offenses against abstract religious concepts or God alone, but against Muslims and values owned by them, signaling a personal and communal affront. Similarly, the discussion above shows that the Diamond Tema incident rapidly evolved into an ideological battleground between certain laicists and conservatives. In short, in both cases, the reactions from those Muslim respondents suggest an inseparability between personal identity and religious sanctities. Criticism or mockery of Islam or the Prophet Muhammad is thus internalized as a direct attack on their individual and communal dignity.

As noted in the introduction, Saba Mahmood contends that Muslims should advocate for a moral discussion in the public sphere instead of pursuing legal recourse through human rights courts in Europe. Her argument rests on the claim that Muslim responses to blasphemous expressions are not fundamentally rooted in legal frameworks; more importantly, she argues, the moral injury and religious pain experienced by Muslims are often unintelligible by secular reasoning. Contrary to Mahmood’s account, the Muslim examples presented in this article display mutual embeddedness of the religious and the secular. These examples suggest that when Muslims react against blasphemy, they do so not only to express piety but also to protect identity, personal and communal honor, and social and political standing. Such reactions can therefore be understood as efforts to safeguard rights against discrimination in everyday social life at the micro level, while simultaneously seeking advantage in broader political struggles at the macro level. In this dual context of protection and dominance, claims of religious injury ought to be critically examined.

As a contracting party to the European Convention on Human Rights, Türkiye is subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of religion and freedom of expression as fundamental rights under Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention. The ECtHR does not impose a clear obligation on states to protect believers from offense to their religious feelings; instead, it grants a margin of appreciation to states that choose to provide such protection. Consequently, blasphemy cases are not examined under Article 9 as such, but restrictions on blasphemous expression are assessed under Article 10, in connection with the protection of the peaceful enjoyment of Article 9 rights, thereby leaving a gray area in the Court’s case law.

Although the ECtHR recognizes no general right not to be offended, it has upheld certain restrictions on blasphemous expressions on two legal grounds. The first is to “ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under Article 9” of the European Convention on Human Rights; in other words, the right of citizens not to be insulted in their “religious feelings” (Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania 2018, para. 74; Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, para. 48). The second is to preserve religious peace and the peaceful coexistence of diverse religious and non-religious groups in the society (E.S. v. Austria 2018, para. 57). The restriction of expressions has to be “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic society” pursuing a legitimate aim (Lewis 2017, p. 259).

Although the Court states that the right to freedom of expression encompasses the right to “shock, offend and disturb” (Handyside v. The United Kingdom 1976), it does not extend protection to expressions deemed “gratuitously offensive”, that is, expressions which hurt the feelings of believers, incite hatred, destroy religious peace and fail to contribute to enhancing public debate capable of fostering further progress in human affairs (Giniewski v. France 2006, para. 52; Evans 2010, p. 349). The boundaries of the protected religious feelings are not defined by how believers explain their feelings, religious experience or theological doctrines. For instance, in Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, the Roman Catholic Church argued that the advertisement in question portrayed Jesus and Mary in a way that undermined their sacred significance within the Christian faith. As a result, the Church maintained, the depiction was offensive to the religious feelings of believers (Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania 2018, para. 16). However, the Court ruled that the expressions conveyed through the applicant’s advertisement, which depicted Jesus and Mary wearing jeans and a dress, did not amount to gratuitously offensive expression. The Court did not accept the reasoning of the domestic courts that held that the advertisements were against public morals because they used religious symbols for superficial purposes, distorted their essential meaning, and were deemed inappropriate. In the Court’s view, although some believers might have been genuinely offended, such reasoning does not adequately clarify why the references to religious symbols were gratuitously offensive, apart from the fact that they appeared in a non-religious context (Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania 2018, para. 79). As this example illustrates, the assessment of whether an expression is gratuitously offensive is based on secular reasoning, which involves weighing whether the expression amounts to an unwarranted and abusive attack on religious beliefs.

Through this reasoning, the Court does not accommodate religious feelings qua religious feelings; rather, it operates on a basis that recognizes the mutual embeddedness of the religious and the secular, seeking to shield believers from disproportionate hostility, targeted offensiveness, and profound discomfort. As articulated in İ.A. v. Turkey, the Court acknowledges that believers may legitimately perceive an attack on their religion as an attack on themselves. The Court states the following:

“However, the present case concerns not only comments that offend or shock, or a ‘provocative’ opinion, but also an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam. Notwithstanding the fact that there is a certain tolerance of criticism of religious doctrine within Turkish society, which is deeply attached to the principle of secularity, believers may legitimately feel themselves to be the object of unwarranted and offensive attacks through the following passages: ‘Some of these words were, moreover, inspired in a surge of exultation, in Aisha’s arms. … God’s messenger broke his fast through sexual intercourse, after dinner and before prayer. Muhammad did not forbid sexual intercourse with a dead person or a live animal…”(İ.A. v. Turkey 2005, para. 29).

While the ECtHR recognized that portraying religious figures in a grossly indecent manner may legitimately provoke indignation among believers, as demonstrated by the cases of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, Wingrove v. United Kingdom, and İ.A. v. Turkey, the Court did not find the portrayal of a religious figure in an otherwise acceptable commercial dress as gratuitously offensive in the case of Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania. The distinction between these cases does not arise from the protection of religious sensibilities qua religious sensibilities, but rather from a secular rationale grounded in commonly accepted moral norms within society. Protecting religious sensibilities as believers define them would undermine multicultural democratic societies. For example, the representation of the Prophet Muhammad is regarded as a blasphemous offense by many Muslims, while the consumption of pork and beef is profoundly objectionable to numerous Jews and Hindus. Yet, such representations or dietary practices, in and of themselves, cannot constitute grounds for legal sanction in democratic societies (Levey and Modood 2009, p. 431).

In sum, only when depictions of religious figures or statements about religion amount to an attack of considerable seriousness may states, within their margin of appreciation, legitimately restrict freedom of expression. The Strasbourg authorities have found this threshold met in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (1994), Wingrove v. the United Kingdom (1996), İ.A. v. Turkey (2005), Gay News Ltd. and Lemon v. the United Kingdom (1982), E.S. v. Austria (2018), and X Ltd. and Y v. the United Kingdom (1982). By contrast, in cases such as Giniewski v. France (2006), Klein v. Slovakia (2006), Aydın Tatlav v. Turkey (2006), Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria (2007), Tagiyev and Huseynov v. Azerbaijan (2019), Gachechiladze v. Georgia (2021), Rabczewska v. Poland (2022), and Dubowska and Skup v. Poland (1997), the Court ruled that the contested expressions remained within the bounds of permissible public debate, falling within the limits of a critical denial of others’ religious beliefs.

Scholars critical of the ECtHR’s case law contend that the European Convention on Human Rights does not extend protection against insults to religious feelings within the scope of freedom of religion (Bielefeldt 2020, p. 15; Temperman 2008, p. 535; Howard 2018, p. 26). They stress that unlike the ECtHR, the other organs of the Council of Europe such as the Parliamentary Assembly and the Venice Commission passionately pleaded for unabridged freedom of speech (Temperman and Koltay 2017, pp. 5–6). In particular, they argue that in cases involving majority religions, such as the Otto-Preminger case, the notion that blasphemous expressions can inflict harm on members of the majority faith is untenable (Temperman 2015, p. 388).

On the other hand, some scholars argue that instead of prioritizing freedom of religion or freedom of expression at the expense of one another, the ECtHR grounds its reasoning in the principle of reciprocal respect, permitting state intervention only when deemed essential to safeguard affected believers (Evans 2009, p. 211; Evans 2010, p. 352). Notably, ECtHR case law does not impose a clear duty on states to protect such believers, but rather grants a margin of appreciation to those that prefer to do so. Nevertheless, when the Court authorizes state intervention against certain contested speech, it signals that it recognizes something fundamentally human and essential as worthy of protection for those believers.

The effective exercise of freedom of religion or belief by both religious and non-religious individuals presupposes a social environment characterized by tolerance, mutual respect, and the absence of coercion or intimidation. A climate marked by verbal hostility or violence undermines the conditions essential for the authentic and unimpeded exercise of such liberties (Martínez-Torrón 2007, p. 263). In short, because the ECtHR protects individual believers and the maintenance of peaceful coexistence rather than religions, religious figures (such as God or the prophets), or religious feelings per se, the circumstances of each case play a crucial role in striking a balance between freedom of expression and freedom of religion.

5. Conclusions

Religion not only shapes the habitus and cultivates the selves of believers, but it is also possessed and shaped by them. Muslims not only respond with profound pain due to a disrupted habitus, but also react in order to safeguard their identity, honor, and sense of possession. This protective impulse, by extension, is related to everyday experiences of dignity, discrimination and exclusion in social life as well as to broader contests over political representation and influence. Thus, such reactions should be understood as multidimensional, encompassing moral, social, and political registers simultaneously.

The Muslim reactions examined in this article reveal that they not only include forms of religious reasoning and experience that may appear incomprehensible from a secular perspective, but also incorporate secular reflections that can be articulated in ways accessible to human rights courts and the broader public. This mutual embeddedness of the secular and the religious creates a point of intersection through which the European Court of Human Rights engages with and adjudicates blasphemy cases.

In blasphemy cases, the Court faces the complex task of balancing the rights of believers with the right to freedom of expression. Given their deep attachment to faith, some Muslims may perceive such expressions as attacks on their religious feelings, identity, and dignity. At the same time, some Muslims may also pursue political advantage by demanding excessive deference to religious sensibilities and by suppressing critical opinions. In other words, on the one hand, Muslims themselves may be the target of abusive attacks that can be legitimately and necessarily restricted in a democratic society. On the other hand, Muslims’ reactions may also aim to dominate the public sphere and create political superiority, which must be balanced with others’ right to freedom of expression.