Establishing Possession (prāpti) as an Entity in the Vaibhāṣika Tradition

Abstract

In the Vaibhāṣika system, possession (prāpti), classified as a factor that is neither material nor mental, is posited as a real entity that links the various dharmas associated with a sentient being to its individual continuum. In this context, possession does not refer to legal ownership or supernatural possession; rather, it refers to the attainment or endowment of dharmas, that is, how particular qualities, actions, or mental states come to be present in a given individual. This paper examines the strategies by which Vaibhāṣikas defend the ontological status of possession, thereby shedding light on the motivations underlying this doctrinal commitment. Through close philological and historical analysis of a wide range of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma sources, including passages from a newly available manuscript folio of the Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti, this study reconstructs the diachronic development of Vaibhāṣika arguments for the real existence of possession. Vaibhāṣikas consistently employ two principal modes of justification: appeals to scriptural authority (āgama) and logical reasoning (yukti). As the tradition develops, their defenses of possession shift from reliance on scriptural sources toward increasingly sophisticated forms of doctrinal and functional integration. Possession thus evolves from a dharma serving to clarify specific doctrinal difficulties into a structurally embedded component of Vaibhāṣika doctrinal architecture, playing an important role in its accounts of soteriology, causality, and karma.

1. Introduction

The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma is characterized by its systematic analysis and classification of dharmas, which are understood here as basic analytical factors employed in Abhidharma discourse. On this basis, the Sarvāstivādins developed the well-known system of the five categories and seventy-five dharmas, which also includes later doctrinal innovations, such as the category of conditionings dissociated from mind (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra). Among these later developments, possession (prāpti), a dharma classified under this innovative category, came to be regarded as playing an important role in maintaining the coherence of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma system. In general terms, possession, understood as the attainment of dharmas, connects various dharmas associated with a sentient being to its continuum. Functionally, possession serves to ensure that the dharmas one has acquired, whether wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral, remain connected to a given continuum, thereby allowing karmic results and progress on the Buddhist path to be explained. Its ontological status became a persistent point of controversy within the Sarvāstivāda tradition. The central dispute concerns whether possession should be regarded as a real entity (dravyasat), as maintained by the traditional Vaibhāṣikas, or merely as a conceptual designation (prajñaptisat), a position associated with the Dārṣṭāntikas in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVŚ) and with Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh).

A number of modern scholars have examined possession, among whom Japanese scholars have undertaken detailed studies of its definition, functions, and doctrinal roles across Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma literature, some of which also touch upon the question of possession as a real entity. Representative studies include Kato (1984, 1985), Fukuda (1990a, 1990b), Sakurai (2003a, 2003b) (later published under the name Nasu), Nasu (2004), Kusunoki (2007, 2008, 2012), Shimizu (2014), and Murakami (2015). A focused discussion of possession is also found in Chou (2012). In scholarship in English, no study devoted specifically to possession has yet appeared. Studies by Cox (1995) and Dhammajoti ([2002] 2009, pp. 285–320) provide systematic accounts of the functional mechanisms of individual dharmas within the category of conditionings dissociated from mind, including possession. Possession is also discussed in a broader doctrinal context in Dessein (2008), particularly in connection with the emerging seed theory reflected in the Sarvāstivāda Hṛdaya treatises.

Previous scholarship has significantly advanced our understanding of the possession’s definition and functional role within the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma system. However, the Vaibhāṣikas’ justification of its real existence, crucial to the system’s internal coherence, has not been examined in a systematic and diachronic manner. Reconstructing their strategies of justification is therefore essential for understanding how the Vaibhāṣikas maintained the coherence of their Abhidharma system in response to persistent doctrinal challenges.

Building upon earlier research, this study systematically examines arguments for the real existence of possession in extant Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma materials. The arguments focus on two strategies, appeals to scriptural authority and logical reasoning, and trace their development through close philological and historical analysis within the Vaibhāṣika tradition. Drawing on newly available manuscript materials of the Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti (ADV), this study also incorporates the later Vaibhāṣika phase into the analysis.

This paper demonstrates that early Vaibhāṣika defenses of the real existence of possession relied primarily on scriptural authority, which later gave way to increasingly systematic forms of logical reasoning. Through this shift, possession developed from a response to specific doctrinal difficulties into a structurally integrated element of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma system.

2. Endowment (Possession) as an Entity in the *Mahāvibhāṣā

This section examines how the MVŚ articulates and justifies the real existence of endowment (samanvāgama), focusing on a key discussion1 in fascicles 932 and 1573 of the MVŚ, where a similar argument is presented. Notably, the terminology employed in the MVŚ centers on endowment (samanvāgama) rather than possession (prāpti). Although distinct in origin, the Vaibhāṣikas treat the two as synonymous or as denoting the same object-referent, a move whose doctrinal implications will be clarified in Section 2.4. In this discussion, the Vaibhāṣikas draw on a classical Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma model of justification, appealing to both scriptural authority (āgama) and logical reasoning (yukti).

At this stage, the MVŚ justifies the real existence of endowment by reasoning from the consequences of its denial, rather than by offering a constructive account. On the level of scriptural authority, such denial conflicts with canonical teachings; on the level of logical reasoning, it entails a range of undesirable consequences.

2.1. Arguments from Scriptural Sources in the MVŚ

The appeal to scriptural authority is carried out through a close engagement with four sūtra passages in the MVŚ.4 The following analysis explores how the MVŚ interprets each of these sūtra passages in order to argue that denying the real existence of endowment would conflict with scriptural authority.

(1) The first sūtra passage cited states: “A trainee on the path of practice is endowed with the eight dharmas for trainees. An arhat whose outflows have been exhausted is endowed with the ten dharmas for non-trainees.”5 In this context, the eight dharmas refer to the Eightfold Noble Path, while the ten include these together with right liberation and right insight.6

The MVŚ draws attention to situations where noble ones, including trainees and arhats, experience an impure mind in the present, or enter a state in which no mind is present. The text argues that if endowment were not a real entity, those noble ones would not be endowed with the noble path in such moments, since the dharmas currently operative are either impure or absent. In that case, the scriptural statement that they are endowed with eight or ten dharmas, each of which is a pure dharma, would become untenable.7

(2) The second sūtra passage shifts the focus to ordinary persons and states: “Such a person (pudgala) is endowed with wholesome and unwholesome dharmas.”8 Within the Sarvāstivāda framework, dharmas with opposite qualities, here, the wholesome and unwholesome, cannot coexist simultaneously within a single moment of mind, a principle repeatedly employed in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma analyses.

On this basis, the MVŚ argues that without recognizing endowment as a real entity, the sūtra passage itself would become internally inconsistent. The text asserts that when wholesome dharmas arise, one would not be endowed with unwholesome dharmas; when unwholesome dharmas arise, one would not be endowed with wholesome dharmas; and when neutral dharmas arise, one would not be endowed with either wholesome or unwholesome dharmas.9 Such circumstances make it impossible to uphold the sūtra’s statement that an ordinary person is endowed with both wholesome and unwholesome dharmas.

(3) The third sūtra passage concerns a monk who is endowed with seven virtuous qualities, stating: “If a monk is endowed with seven virtuous qualities, he will abide in joy and happiness in the present life.”10 In this context, seven virtuous qualities refer to knowing the dharma, knowing the meaning, knowing the proper time, knowing moderation, knowing oneself, knowing the assembly, knowing the superiority and inferiority of individuals.11

The MVŚ argues that this scriptural statement would be untenable if endowment were denied as a real entity. When any one of the seven virtuous qualities arises directly before the monk, he would be endowed with only that single quality. The reason, as the text explains, is that all seven virtuous qualities have insight as their intrinsic nature, and two insights cannot arise simultaneously, let alone seven. Moreover, when other dharmas arise directly before him, he would not be endowed with any of the seven virtuous qualities.12 Under such conditions, the sūtra’s claim that a monk is endowed with seven virtuous qualities could not be sustained.

(4) The final sūtra passage makes a similar claim concerning the tathāgata: “The tathāgata, namely the arhat, the one who has awakened completely, is endowed with ten powers.”13 The ten powers include, among others, knowledge of what is right or wrong under all conditions, knowledge of various forms of meditation, and knowledge of the eradication of all contaminants.14

The argument presented here mirrors that of the preceding passage. If endowment is not recognized as a real entity, the tathāgata would be endowed with only a single power or with none at all. Since all ten powers likewise have insight as their intrinsic nature, their simultaneous endowment cannot be explained. When other dharmas arise directly before him, none of the ten powers would be present. This result directly contradicts the sūtra’s assertion that the tathāgata is endowed with ten powers.15

Taken together, these four sūtra passages reveal a consistent argumentative strategy in the MVŚ. The text repeatedly argues that denying the endowment’s real existence renders various scriptural statements untenable within the specific doctrinal frameworks of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.

2.2. A Scriptural Objection and the Vaibhāṣika’s Response in the MVŚ

In the MVŚ, a further sūtra passage is cited and interpreted by the Dārṣṭāntikas to challenge the real existence of endowment.16 For the Dārṣṭāntikas, endowment is merely a conceptual designation (prajñaptisat) rather than a real entity (dravyasat), analogous to the way a fist is conventionally designated when the five fingers are brought together.17

They justify this thesis by appealing to scriptural authority, citing a sūtra that states: “There is a wheel-turning king who is endowed with seven treasures.”18 If endowment were a real entity, they argue, a series of undesirable consequences would follow.

(1)

If the wheel-turning king were endowed with the Wheel Treasure and the Jewel Treasure, he would thereby be both a dharma pertaining to sentient beings and a dharma not pertaining to sentient beings, which would invalidate the [category of] dharma.

(2)

If he were endowed with the Elephant Treasure and the Horse Treasure, he would then be both human and animal, which would invalidate the planes of existence.

(3)

If he were endowed with the Woman Treasure, then he would be both male and female, which would invalidate the body.

(4)

If he were endowed with Minister Treasure and General Treasure, then he would be both king and minister, which would invalidate the karma.

To avoid these absurdities, the Dārṣṭāntikas conclude that endowment cannot be a real entity.19

In response to this objection, the Vaibhāṣikas in the MVŚ clarify that the term samanvāgata in the wheel-turning king sūtra should be interpreted as mastery (vaśitva), indicating that the king possesses free will over those treasures.20 In this context, the endowment is indeed a mere designation, but it is based on an underlying entity.21 By contrast, in the sūtra stating that the trainees are endowed with eight dharmas, the endowment is a real entity. Accordingly, the Vaibhāṣikas interpret samanvāgata in the sūtras from both absolute and conventional perspectives: “The nature of endowment or non-endowment is existence in the ultimate sense, whereas the designation of endowment or non-endowment is conventional existence. ”22

2.3. Arguments from Logical Reasoning in the MVŚ

Alongside its appeal to scriptural authority, the MVŚ also advances a logical reasoning that exposes the undesirable consequences that would follow if endowment were not a real entity. This line of reasoning is developed in relation to the first sūtra passage.

The text argues that if endowment did not exist as a real entity, ordinary beings would be regarded as having detached from the defilements of the three realms, while arhats would be regarded as ordinary beings. This is because, when ordinary beings have wholesome or non-veiled, non-defined (anivṛta-avyākṛta) mind, or are in a state without mind, there are no defilements present in the current moment. If they were not endowed with defilements in the past and future, they would then have to be regarded as detached from the defilements of the three realms. Conversely, when arhats experience an impure mind or are in a state without mind, and the noble path is not present in the current moment, the absence of endowment with the noble path in the past and future would entail that they lack noble dharmas and thus should be considered ordinary beings. Such logical absurdities are deemed unacceptable. Therefore, endowment must be admitted as a real entity.23

Another closely related line of reasoning, articulated in fascicle 90 of the MVŚ, further posits that if the nature of endowment did not exist, the definite establishment of ordinary beings, noble ones, trainees, non-trainees, those whose wholesome roots have been cut, and those whose wholesome roots have not been cut could not be achieved, since there would be no definite causes and conditions.24 At first glance, this reasoning appears to be a reductio ad absurdum. Yet, it implies a positive identification of endowment as the causal basis for the definite establishment of soteriological distinctions.

In sum, the logical reasoning in the MVŚ operates on two levels: it proceeds primarily from the undesirable consequences of denying endowment, while also pointing to its role as the causal basis of soteriological distinctions.

2.4. Endowment and Possession: A Terminological Identification in the MVŚ

The foregoing examination shows that, irrespective of whether the argument proceeds from scriptural authority or logical reasoning, it is endowment (samanvāgama), not possession (prāpti), that is explicitly established as ontologically real. This is probably due to the fact that the term prāpti is rarely attested in the sūtras25 in the technical sense later developed by the Sarvāstivādins, whereas endowment frequently appears as the adjective, samanvāgata, describing a state of possessing, from which the nominal form, samanvāgama, is derived.

In the course of developing their doctrinal framework, the Sarvāstivādins may have deliberately avoided the more common term samanvāgama, which by that time already carried a range of connotations and invited divergent interpretations. Thus, they adopted the rarer term prāpti as a technical term to avoid potential interpretive ambiguities and thereby define the doctrinal content of prāpti in their own way.

When the Vaibhāṣikas faced the task of legitimizing possession as a real dharma, especially in the contexts where scriptural support was required, they subsumed endowment under possession, explaining that possession, endowment, and obtainment (lābha/pratilābha) are synonymous, or alternatively, that endowment constitutes a specific kind of possession. The MVŚ cites a passage from the Prajñaptiśāstra to support this claim, stating that although the terms possession, obtainment, and endowment differ in sound, their object-referent is identical.26

3. Possession as an Entity in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

This section examines how Vasubandhu, in the AKBh, presents and criticizes the Vaibhāṣikas’ attempt to establish possession as a real entity. Although fundamentally critical, his treatment remains an indispensable source for understanding the internal logic and points of the Vaibhāṣika position.

The sūtra passages cited by Vasubandhu do not introduce materials beyond those already discussed in the MVŚ. In contrast to the MVŚ, however, the focus of his argument shifts from exposing undesirable consequences to an examination of the functions of possession.

3.1. Revisiting the Scriptural Sources in the AKBh

In the AKBh, Vasubandhu revisits two sūtra passages cited in the MVŚ. Rather than adopting the Vaibhāṣikas’ attempt to reconcile these passages, however, he juxtaposes them in order to expose tensions within the Vaibhāṣika doctrinal framework and thereby call into question the thesis that endowment exists as a real entity.

First, he cites the sūtra passage describing the noble ones as endowed with ten non-training dharmas, which the Vaibhāṣikas had employed as a scriptural support for establishing the real existence of endowment. The version cited in the AKBh, however, exhibits slight variations from the version found in the MVŚ. One notable difference is that samanvāgama appears in nominal form rather than the adjectival form samanvāgata:

[Possession is a distinct entity], because it is said in the sūtra: “Due to the arising, obtainment and endowment of ten non-training dharmas, one becomes the noble one who has abandoned five members [i.e., the five fetters pertaining to the upper realms (pañca ūrdhvabhāgīya)]…” etc.27

The wording cited by Vasubandhu corresponds closely to that found in the Arthavistarasūtra,28 which, according to Hartmann (1992, p. 284), belongs to the Dīrghāgama within the Sarvāstivādin school’s canon. The Sanskrit text of this passage, preserved in the Gilgit manuscript fragments of the Arthavistarasūtra, provides textual evidence indicating that the nominalization of samanvāgata into samanvāgama occurred at a certain stage within the Sarvāstivāda tradition. This helps to clarify the conditions under which the Vaibhāṣikas could later construe endowment (possession) as a technically defined and ontologically real entity.

Vasubandhu then turns to the sūtra passage concerning the wheel-turning king being endowed with seven treasures.29 In the MVŚ, this passage had been cited by the Dārṣṭāntikas as a scriptural objection to the real existence of endowment. By examining this passage, Vasubandhu draws attention to a difficulty that arises if endowment is interpreted as a real entity: namely, that such an interpretation would require admitting that one would be endowed with dharmas that do not belong to sentient beings or that belong to other sentient beings.30 This implication stands in tension with the Vaibhāṣikas’ doctrine that no one can be endowed with what belongs to others and no one can be endowed with what does not belong to sentient beings.31

From Vasubandhu’s perspective, this difficulty indicates the need for a consistent interpretation of samanvāgama across different scriptural contexts if it is to be regarded as a real entity. In this respect, his treatment of the sūtra passages closely resembles that of the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ. On this basis, Vasubandhu rejects the Vaibhāṣika’s exegetical resolution of interpreting samanvāgama differently from both absolute and conventional perspectives, as shown in Section 2.2. The divergence between the two positions thus lies in underlying assumptions about whether a single term may legitimately bear different ontological meanings in different contexts.

3.2. Critique Through Logical Reasoning in the AKBh

Having brought to light the limits of scriptural justification as employed by the Vaibhāṣikas, Vasubandhu proceeds to examine the status of possession through logical reasoning. He argues that it is unreasonable to establish possession as a real entity, since its intrinsic nature (svabhāva) cannot be perceived—unlike material phenomena such as matter and sound, or mental states such as greed and hatred—and since its function (kṛtya) likewise cannot be perceived, unlike the functions of the eyes and ears.32

In response to this criticism, the Vaibhāṣikas attempt to substantiate possession’s real existence by demonstrating that it performs causal functions. In the AKBh, two such functions are identified: possession is said to serve as the cause for the arising (utpattihetu) of a dharma, and as the cause for the establishment (vyavasthāhetu) of the distinction between ordinary beings and noble ones. Vasubandhu explicitly rejects the former function by showing that it leads to undesirable doctrinal consequences. However, this function is not clearly attested in extant Vaibhāṣika treatises predating the AKBh.33

The second function, by contrast, is rooted in the MVŚ, as Sakurai (2003b, p. 178) has observed. It addresses the long-standing problem of how to distinguish noble ones from ordinary beings, even in cases where noble ones may experience mundane mental states.34 In the AKBh, this function is articulated more explicitly and affirmatively than in the MVŚ, where it appears primarily in discussions of undesirable consequences. Unlike the first function, Vasubandhu does not directly refute this role of possession. Nevertheless, he does not accept it as a sufficient account of the distinction between noble ones and ordinary beings.

To address this issue, Vasubandhu introduces the well-known doctrine of the seed (bīja).35 Within this framework, possession or endowment is merely a designation. When defilements have been abandoned, as in the case of a noble one, it is said that such a person is no longer endowed with defilements. What truly differentiates the noble one, however, is that their basis has been transformed through the power of the paths of insight and cultivation, so that the seed of defilements cannot arise in their basis anymore, like grains of rice that have been burned by fire.36

Accordingly, Vasubandhu maintains that only the seed, which is uneradicated, unimpaired, and increased at the time of mastery, obtains the name of the endowment.37 Therefore, the endowment is merely a designation, and not a real entity.38 In this respect, Vasubandhu’s position aligns closely with the Dārṣṭāntika’s standpoint preserved in the MVŚ.39

Vasubandhu’s critiques in the AKBh mark a turning point in Sarvāstivāda discussions of possession. Although fundamentally critical of the Vaibhāṣika commitment to possession as a real entity, these critiques became a point of reference for later authors, who either refined its ontological defense or reinterpreted its function. The following sections examine these responses in the *Nyāyānusāra (Ny),40 the *Abhidharmāvatāra (Avatāra), and the ADV.

4. Possession as an Entity in the *Nyāyānusāra

This section examines how Saṅghabhadra, in the Ny, responds to the challenges raised by Vasubandhu in the AKBh by offering a systematic defense of possession as a real entity. While continuing to rely on sūtra passages already examined in the MVŚ, Saṅghabhadra reinterprets these sources more explicitly and rigorously. At the level of logical reasoning, he further develops the Vaibhāṣika position by articulating additional functions of possession.

4.1. Scriptural Sources Reconsidered in Response to Vasubandhu in the Ny

Saṅghabhadra’s discussion of the existential status of possession takes up the second sūtra passage examined in the MVŚ: “Such a person is endowed with wholesome and unwholesome dharmas.” He considers this passage, together with the sūtra cited by opponents concerning the wheel-turning king endowed with seven treasures, and employs it to defend the claim that possession exists as a real entity in response to the challenges raised in the AKBh.

Saṅghabhadra begins by conceding that, in the context of the wheel-turning king sūtra, samanvāgata may legitimately be understood as mastery, insofar as the seven treasures are sovereign effects that are present and constantly before the king, and thus subject to his control.41 However, Saṅghabhadra argues that this interpretation cannot be extended to the case of wholesome and unwholesome dharmas. When wholesome dharmas are present, an individual may be said to be endowed with present wholesome dharmas, but this does not yet determine the individual’s relation to past and future unwholesome dharmas.42 It therefore remains unclear how mastery, understood as present control, could be predicated in such cases.

Saṅghabhadra further contends that if one denies the real existence of possession in the present, it becomes unclear on what basis mastery could be designated at all.43 Moreover, if the real existence of past and future possessions is completely denied, as Vasubandhu’s position appears to require, it is likewise unclear with respect to what the mastery could be predicated and thereby be designated as the endowment.44

In response to Vasubandhu’s challenge, Saṅghabhadra systematically applies two fundamental theses of the Vaibhāṣikas: that all dharmas exist as real entities across the three temporal periods, and that any designated dharma must be grounded in a real entity. While the former thesis is not explicitly invoked in the discussion of these two sūtra passages in the MVŚ, Saṅghabhadra mobilizes it to clarify the relation between endowment and dharmas more rigorously than his predecessors. At the same time, his interpretation remains firmly rooted in the exegetical principles of the MVŚ. On the one hand, he maintains that the same term may require different interpretations in different contexts. On the other hand, he consistently preserves the Vaibhāṣika principle that any designated dharma must be grounded in a real entity.

4.2. Reformulation Through Logical Reasoning in the Ny

Saṅghabhadra’s logical reasoning, like that of the Vaibhāṣikas presented in the AKBh, proceeds by establishing the causal functions of possession. However, rather than restricting the function of possession to serving as the cause for the establishment between ordinary beings and noble ones, he reformulated two more general accounts of its function. He asserts that this possession functions as the cause of the non-disappearance of factors that have been acquired and as the marker of the knowledge expressed as “this belongs to that.”45

This broader formulation marks a significant shift in the scope of the argument for the real existence of possession. Rather than treating the distinction between noble and ordinary beings as the primary locus of its function, Saṅghabhadra extends the role of possession to dharmas in general. This wider application is reflected in his choice of scriptural passages, particularly his reliance on sūtras concerning the possession of wholesome and unwholesome dharmas in general, rather than passages restricted to noble persons.

5. Possession as an Entity in the *Abhidharmāvatāra

This section examines how the Avatāra adopts a selective and affirmative strategy in employing both previously discussed and newly introduced sūtra passages to establish the real existence of possession. At the level of logical reasoning, the Avatāra accepts the function of possession articulated in the AKBh, while also preserving the strategy of exposing the undesirable consequences employed in the MVŚ.

5.1. Arguments from Scriptural Sources in the Avatāra

The Avatāra’s treatment of scriptural authority engages three sūtra passages. It relies on two sūtra passages that had already been invoked in the AKBh and the Ny, while no longer engaging the wheel-turning king passage introduced by opponents. In addition, it introduces a third sūtra passage which, although incorporated into the discussion, does not directly contribute to establishing the real existence of possession.

The first sūtra passage resembles the version found in the Arthavistarasūtra and AKBh, according to which, due to the arising, obtainment, and endowment of ten non-training dharmas, one becomes the noble one who has abandoned the five members.46 This passage belongs to a well-established scriptural lineage that had already been employed to support the real existence of possession.

The second passage, which states that a person is endowed with wholesome and unwholesome dharmas,47 is likewise well attested in earlier Vaibhāṣika treatises, including the MVŚ and the Ny, and has long served as scriptural evidence for possession. Together, these two passages constitute the primary scriptural basis upon which the Avatāra affirms possession as a real entity.

By contrast, the third passage, where the Buddha says, “O bhikṣus, a pudgala should not measure, a pudgala should not be measured,”48 does not appear in earlier Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts in connection with the proof of possession’s real existence. Its relevance to establishing possession’s ontological status is therefore not immediately evident.

The textual situation is further complicated by an additional statement transmitted between the second and third sūtra passages, concerning the infinite accumulation of wholesome and unwholesome possessions in a person’s mental continuum. This statement is attributed differently in the Classical Chinese and Tibetan translations: while the former presents it as part of the Buddha’s teaching, the latter does not.49 Given that the passages concerning a person’s endowment with wholesome and unwholesome dharmas, as well as the passage regarding not being judgmental about persons, are independently attested in the extant Āgamas or Nikāyas, it is more plausible that the claim of infinite accumulation of possessions in the mental continuum reflects a later doctrinal elaboration rather than a direct teaching of the Buddha.

When the second and third sūtra passages are read together with the intervening statement concerning the infinite accumulation of wholesome and unwholesome possessions, the function of the third passage becomes clearer. Rather than serving as scriptural proof for the real existence of possession, it appears to be cited to address the problem of infinite regress. If possession were a real entity, then for every dharma a person obtains, there would have to be a possession, and further, a possession of that possession, leading to an infinite regress. However, the Blessed One states that ordinary people are not capable of measuring others; thus, they cannot assess a person’s possessions.

Notably, this concern with infinite regress is not addressed in connection with discussions of the real existence of possession elsewhere in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. Although the same sūtra passage appears in the ADV,50 it is introduced there specifically to address the problem of infinite regress, which is treated separately from the establishment of the real existence of possession.

In summary, Avatāra’s use of scriptural sources thus reveals a close continuity with the AKBh and Ny. While the third sūtra passage is incorporated into the discussion of the real existence of possession, it does not directly serve to establish this thesis. It is in the ADV that this passage is deployed to address the problem of infinite regress.

5.2. Arguments from Logical Reasoning in the Avatāra

In the Avatāra, the first logical argument adopts a basic standpoint already shared by the AKBh and the Ny, namely that possession functions as a cause and is therefore established as a real entity.

Possession is defined as the cause (kāraṇa) which permits the affirmation: “One is in possession of a certain dharma (dharmavat)”. Dharmas are classified into three kinds: pure, impure, and neutral. Pure dharmas include faith and so on; impure dharmas include greed and the like; and neutral dharmas include, for example, the mind that creates magically (nirmāṇacitta). One who possesses any of these dharmas is said to be “in possession of the dharma,” and the causal basis for such an assertion is named as possession (prāpti), obtainment (lābha, pratilābha/pratilambha), or endowment (samanvāgama).51

This causal function closely resembles the second function discussed in the AKBh and can be traced back to its prototype in the MVŚ. Unlike the AKBh, but in a manner comparable to Saṅghabhadra, the Avatāra does not restrict this function to accounting for the distinction between ordinary beings and noble ones; rather, it extends the scope of possession to all dharmas.

The second logical reasoning follows the framework already established in the MVŚ, according to which denying the real existence of possession would lead to the undesirable consequence that ordinary beings and noble ones could not be distinguished.

The Avatāra, however, introduces an additional perspective: without the possession of nirvāṇa, a further consequence would follow, namely that ordinary beings could also attain liberation.52 This implication constitutes a serious soteriological problem. Such an emphasis is absent from Saṅghabhadra’s defense of the real existence of possession but is clearly articulated in the ADV. The close parallels between the Avatāra and the ADV in their respective treatments of possession will be examined in detail in the following section.

6. Possession as an Entity in the Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti

The ADV,53 a treatise that aims to criticize AKBh and present the traditional Vaibhāṣika standpoint, can be seen as representing a further stage in the Vaibhāṣika engagement with the real existence of possession after the AKBh. The following section examines how the ADV develops its account of possession as a real entity.

6.1. Arguments from Scriptural Sources in the ADV

In contrast to the preceding texts, the ADV does not employ sūtra passages to establish the real existence of possession; instead, it grounds its defence almost entirely in systematic logical reasoning.

6.2. Arguments from Logical Reasoning in the ADV

The ADV employs logical reasoning structurally and lexically similar to that of the Avatāra, combining arguments that expose the undesirable consequences of denying possession with positive accounts of its function. While it synthesizes earlier Vaibhāṣika arguments, it further advances the discussion by introducing a karmic perspective and clarifying the grounds for attributing merit and vice.

6.2.1. Prasaṅga Arguments in the ADV

The ADV incorporates all the undesirable consequences already attested in the MVŚ and the Avatāra, which mainly concern the collapse of the distinction between noble ones and ordinary beings. The formulation of these arguments closely parallels that of the Avatāra in both structure and wording as illustrated in

Table 1. Parallel Passages from ADV and Avatāra (T) Illustrating the Prasaṅga Argument against Denying the Real Existence of Possession ¹.

	ADV (ADV, fol.46a2–3)	Avatāra (D 4098, 316b5–6)
Prasaṅga 1	tāsu hi prāptiṣv asatīṣv āryāṇāṃ rāgaparyavasthitānāṃ kuśalānāsravadharmabījābhāvād āryatvaṃ na syāt	de med du zin na ‘dod chags la sogs pas kun nas dkris te ‘dug pa’i ‘phags pa rnams la zag pa med pa’i sems med pas ‘phags pa nyid ma yin par ‘gyur ro//
Prasaṅga 2	pṛthagjanānāṃ ca kuśalacittāvasthitānāṃ vītarāgatvaṃ syāt	byis pa dge ba dang lung du ma bstan pa’i sems la gnas pa rnams kyang ‘dod chags dang bral bar ‘gyur ro//
Prasaṅga 3	pūrvajanmakṛtānāṃ ca śubhāśubhānāṃ karmaṇāṃ dharmādharmalakṣaṇānāṃ pratisandhānatatsamanvāgamaphalotpādanaśaktir na syāt |	Absent
Prasaṅga 4	nirvāṇaprāptyabhāve pṛthagjanasyāpi kaivalyaprasaṃgaś ceti |	mya ngan las ‘das pa’i ‘thob pa med par ‘dra na ni byis pa rnams kyang ma ‘dres par thal bar ‘gyur ro//

¹ For English translations of these passages, see Table A1 in Appendix A.

.

In addition to these inherited prasaṅga arguments, however, the ADV introduces a further undesirable consequence articulated from a karmic perspective, as seen in prasaṅga 3. Specifically, if possession were denied, virtuous and non-virtuous karma performed in previous lives—characterized, respectively, by righteousness and wickedness—would lose their capacity to give rise to rebirth, to be endowed with, and to generate their corresponding effects.54 (see Note 28)

By incorporating karmic consequences into the third prasaṅga argument, the ADV broadens the scope of earlier Vaibhāṣika reasoning. The denial of possession is no longer shown merely to undermine soteriological distinctions, but also to render the functioning of karma unintelligible.

6.2.2. Positive Functional Accounts in the ADV

Having thus presented the undesirable consequences of denying the real existence of possession, the ADV turns to a positive articulation of possession’s functions, developing a more elaborate account within the Vaibhāṣika framework. In this context, the text identifies four functions, as illustrated in

Table 2. Parallel Formulations of the Function of Possession in the ADV and Avatāra (T) ¹.

	ADV (Verse AD 86,9; Commentary ADV, fol.45b9–46a1; ADV, fol.46a3)	Avatāra (D4098, 316b3–5)
Function 1	prāptiḥ samanvitir labdhir dharmavattāvyavasthitiḥ | [129ab] … dharmavattāvyavasthitiḥ | dharmāḥ khalu trividhāḥ kuśalākuśalāvyākṛtāḥ | tatra kuśalāḥ śraddhādayaḥ | akuśalā rāgādayaḥ | avyākṛtā nirmāṇacittādayaḥ | te yeṣāṃ vidyante dharmavantās, tadbhāvo dharmavattā, tasyāṃ ca dharmavattāyāṃ vyavasthitiḥ prāptir ity ucyate | te khalu dharmāḥ kuśalākuśalāvyākṛtāḥ karmalakṣaṇās teṣu tadvatsu tābhiḥ prāptibhir vyavatiṣṭhante |	chos ‘di dang ldan pa nyid du zhes nges par bsnyad pa’i rgyu ni ‘thob pa’o// ‘di na ni gdon mi za bar chos rnam pa gsum ste/dge ba dang mi dge ba dang/lung du ma bstan pa’o//de la dge ba ni dad pa la sogs pa’o//mi dge ba ni ‘dod chags la sogs pa’o//lung du ma bstan pa ni sprul pa’i sems la sogs pa’o// de rnams gang dag la yod pa de dag ni chos ‘di dang ldan pa’o//de’i dngos po ni chos ‘di dang ldan pa nyid do//de’i nges par bsnyad pa’i rgyu’i chos gang yin pa de ni ‘thob pa ste/rnyed pa dang ldan pa zhes kyang bya’o//
Function 2	tasmād āryānāryavyavasthāniyamaliṅgaṃ	Absent
Function 3	bhoktṝṇāṃ ca svakarmaphalopabhogasambandhasaṃkarāsaṃkarabhāvaniyamacihnaṃ	Absent
Function 4	guṇadoṣatadvattāvyapadeśaniyamahetuś ca prāptiḥ	Absent

¹ For English translations of these passages, see Table A2 in Appendix A.

, which highlights the close parallel in formulation between the first function and the Avatāra.

Among these four functions, the first two belong to a well-established Vaibhāṣika framework already attested in earlier Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma literature. The first concerns the role of possession in establishing the state of those who possess dharmas (dharmavattā). The second regulates the distinction between noble and non-noble beings, a role that has been central to Vaibhāṣika discussions of possession from an early stage.

The distinctive contribution of the ADV lies in the third and fourth functions, which extend the role of possession beyond these inherited frameworks. The third function assigns to possession the role of regulating karmic attribution, specifically ensuring that karmic enjoyment is not conflated among different enjoyers. The fourth function concerns the regulation of the attribution of merit and vice, treating possession as the cause that renders such attribution determinate.

Through positive functional analysis, the ADV preserves earlier Vaibhāṣika accounts while extending them in a distinctive way. In particular, its treatment of karmic enjoyment and the attribution of merit and vice situates possession within a broader moral and causal framework.

In sum, the ADV’s logical reasoning establishes the real existence of possession through a complementary structure of prasaṅga reasoning and positive functional accounts, grounding its necessity in the coherent attribution of karma, merit, and vice rather than in scriptural authority.

7. Conclusions

This article reconstructs the historical development of Vaibhāṣika arguments for the real existence of possession across the full range of extant Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma literature by tracing both scriptural and logical strategies from the MVŚ through the AKBh and Ny to the Avatāra and ADV.

With regard to scriptural authority, the MVŚ establishes the basic exegetical framework within which all subsequent Vaibhāṣika debates on possession unfold. It assembles four sūtra passages used to support the reality of endowment while also preserving a scriptural objection raised by the Dārṣṭāntikas. The Vaibhāṣika response to this objection is that the same term may bear different meanings in different sūtra contexts.

In the AKBh, Vasubandhu argues that if possession were a real entity, it should admit a uniform interpretation across scriptural contexts, and by juxtaposing passages already preserved in the MVŚ, he seeks to highlight the resulting tension. Saṅghabhadra responds by maintaining that the same term may legitimately be understood differently in different contexts and by further grounding the reality of possession in the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of the real existence of dharmas across the three times, thereby reinforcing the same exegetical framework with the MVŚ through more explicitly systematic doctrinal commitments.

From the Avatāra onward, however, the strategy to employ scriptural sources changes. Only passages supportive of the real existence of possession are cited, while counter-evidence disappears from discussion, and an additional sūtra passage is incorporated in a patchwork manner without directly establishing the reality of possession. In the ADV, scriptural authority disappears altogether from the defense of the real existence of possession. Scriptural proof thus shifts from a central justificatory resource to a marginal element within Vaibhāṣika doctrinal development.

Logical reasoning follows a different but complementary trajectory. In the MVŚ, arguments are predominantly prasaṅga-style, emphasizing the undesirable consequences that would follow if possession were denied real existence, above all, the collapse of the distinction between ordinary persons and noble ones.

In the AKBh, the Vaibhāṣikas shift toward positive functional arguments, centering on possession as the causal basis for distinguishing the noble from the ordinary, while other proposed functions are criticized by Vasubandhu and set aside. The Ny further elaborates on positive functional analysis by introducing additional roles of possession, such as the non-disappearance of acquired factors and the cognitive marker “this belongs to that”, thereby articulating a more expansive functional trajectory that diverges from the functions accounted for in the Avatāra and the ADV.

From the Avātāra onward, prasaṅga-style argumentation and constructive strategies are reintegrated. The denial of possession is again shown to entail the collapse of the distinction between ordinary and noble beings, a consequence that had already motivated earlier Vaibhāṣika defenses. At the same time, possession is positively defined as the cause that permits the predication “one is in possession of a dharma”, extending its function beyond a soteriological perspective to all dharmas. The ADV systematizes this synthesis by combining prasaṅga-style argumentation and positive functional accounts inherited from earlier texts with an expanded analysis that incorporates karmic perspective and the regulation of the attribution of merit and vice.

These developments show that Vaibhāṣika defenses of possession gradually shift from scriptural debate to systematic logical and functional integration. Possession is thus transformed from a dharma invoked to avert specific doctrinal difficulties into a structurally embedded element of Vaibhāṣika’s doctrinal architecture, shaping its accounts of soteriology, causality, and karma.