Cross-Cultural Theological Discourse During the Late Ming and Early Qing: Zhang Xingyao’s Confucian–Christian Perspective on Catholicism and Buddhism

Abstract

The eastward transmission of Catholicism and Western learning during the late Ming and early Qing, and its subsequent epistemic friction with indigenous Chinese philosophies, engendered a highly dynamic intellectual space for cross-cultural ontological discourse. As a prominent representative of Jiangnan Confucian Christians in the early Qing dynasty, Zhang Xingyao (张星曜, 1633–post 1715) articulated a perspective on the relationship between Catholicism and Buddhism (Ye-Fo) that transcended superficial anti-heterodox polemics, penetrating instead into the core reconstruction of soteriology, theodicy, and political philosophy. Relying on primary historical manuscripts—namely Zhang’s Pi lueshuo tiaobo 辟略说条驳 [Refutations and Counter-Arguments against the Brief Treatise] and Lidai tongjian jishi benmo buhoubian 历代通鉴纪事本末补后编 [Supplements to the History of the Comprehensive Mirror Topically Arranged]—this paper investigates his ontological critique of Buddhism from the perspective of comparative theology and through the analytical lens of “meaning systems”. It reveals how Zhang utilized an exclusionary anti-Buddhist framework, marked by inherent historical limitations, to reshape the ultimate concerns and moral order of the Chinese literati. This research demonstrates that Zhang not only established the absolute transcendent authority of Catholicism over the afterlife and hell through rigorous logical argumentation in the Pi lueshuo tiaobo, but also pioneered the “topical arrangement of religious history” (zongjiao jishi benmo ti) in his Buhoubian. This historiographical innovation seamlessly synthesized his apologetic mission to “refute Buddhism and Daoism” (pi Fo Dao) with his statecraft ambition to “assist state administration” (zi guo zheng), effectively achieving a historical “disenchantment” of the enduring religious mysticism embedded within traditional Chinese politics.

1. The Intellectual Upheaval of the Late Ming and Early Qing

The intellectual history of China during the late Ming and early Qing was characterized by a dramatic paradigm shift and profound spiritual turbulence. Accompanied by the arrival of Jesuit missionaries, Catholicism introduced not merely Western astronomical techniques and exotic rituals, but a heterogeneous ontology that profoundly impacted the traditional intellectual framework. As the eminent French sinologist Jacques Gernet astutely observed in his classic work China and the Christian Impact: A Conflict of Cultures, deep-seated divergences between Chinese and Western cultures at the levels of ontology and values led to systemic difficulties for the spread of Catholicism in the late Ming and early Qing China. Hermeneutically, the faith embraced by contemporary Chinese believers was essentially a hybridized product, shaped through the arduous compromise and integration of Confucian contextual frameworks and core Catholic concepts (Gernet 1985, pp. 66–67).

Conversely, researchers seeking to deconstruct this overarching narrative of absolute “failure” have increasingly re-evaluated the substantive efficacy of localized religious practices. In Preaching Christ in Late Ming China, Italian sinologist Gianni Criveller exhaustively demonstrated that missionaries successfully introduced the theological core of “Christology” into Chinese intellectual discourse, while native believers exhibited a profound capacity to internalize these doctrines. Viewing this historical encounter through the dual dimensions of theology and mission history, Criveller argued that the meeting was by no means a defeat; even the most general achievements carried significant theological weight (Criveller 1999, p. 384). Although Gernet posited an insurmountable “ontological gulf,” Belgian sinologist Nicolas Standaert suggested viewing Sinology as an art of “in-betweenness,” a dynamic approach capable of bridging divergent theoretical paradigms (Standaert 2015, pp. 91–103). When the Christian substantialist theology of creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing)—anchored by a transcendent, singular Creator—confronted the traditional Chinese philosophies of qi (material force) monism, the “unity of all things,” and immanent transcendence within Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, fierce hermeneutical conflicts and metaphysical collisions were virtually inevitable (Gernet 1985, pp. 66, 201–13)1. From a micro-historical perspective, the precarious reality of this intercultural encounter is vividly documented in the internal correspondence of the early Jesuits. In a letter directed to Girolamo Costa dated 12 October 1594, Matteo Ricci chronicled the severe hostility emanating from local factions, explicitly noting that in Shaozhou, a multitude of over fifty individuals congregated before a grand temple idol to orchestrate a persecution against them—an endeavor that ultimately proved unsuccessful (Ricci [1594] 2018, pp. 106–9). This intense societal and religious friction arguably implies an objective urgency for both the missionaries and indigenous converts to actively construct a harmonized apologetic framework, attempting to alleviate the profound cultural and physical tensions between the imported faith and indigenous traditions.

Within this grand historical process of reshaping ultimate concerns, intellectual ferment birthed highly complex academic landscapes and identity formations. Situated within the intellectual upheaval of the late Ming and early Qing transition, native anti-Christian scholars, operating from the inherent paradigm of traditional theories of mind and nature (xinxing lun 心性论), rejected the heterogeneous Catholic doctrines of “original sin” and the “substantial soul” at both anthropological and ontological levels. Viewed through a comparative lens, this profound theoretical antagonism reflected the divergence in ultimate concerns between Chinese and Western cultures, arguably constituting a formidable epistemological defense by the native intellectual tradition against foreign faith (Xu 2010, pp. 1–11)2. Paradoxically, Zhang Xingyao (1633–post 1715), a third-generation early Qing Confucian Catholic situated at the center of the Jiangnan cultural vortex, exhibited remarkably divergent theoretical creativity (Mungello 1994, pp. 70–71)3. A historian and Confucian Christian whose courtesy name was Zichen 紫臣 and baptismal name was Ignatius, Zhang was deeply immersed in Confucianism in his youth while also reading broadly across Buddhist and Daoist texts (Kan 2008, pp. 43–45, 221)4. Having endured the historical trauma of the Ming collapse and the Qing ascension, he was baptized around the seventeenth year of the Kangxi reign (1678, at age 46)5, subsequently emerging as a core architect of early Qing apologetic theory (J. Liu 2012, pp. 230–33; Xiao 2013, pp. 40–53)6. Zhang did not confine his intellectual pursuit to pure ultimate reality; rather, he precisely anchored the Sino-Western confrontation within the meaning system of theodicy and the political–philosophical context of state governance. The master historian Chen Yuan 陈垣’s assessment of Zhang as an “outstanding writer among early Qing believers” illuminates his formidable textual productivity and profound scholarly foundation when navigating these cross-cultural intellectual engagements (Chen 1943, p. 31).

Previous international sinological narratives have occasionally reduced this unique intellectual community of “Confucian Catholics” to passive recipients of the Jesuit “accommodation” strategy. David E. Mungello, for instance, proposed the famous “Trojan Horse” hypothesis, suggesting that Zhang’s overt “refutation of Buddhism to align with Confucianism” was merely rhetorical camouflage for his Catholic evangelism, positing his core identity as purely Catholic (Mungello 1994, pp. 147–50). Offering a robust counter-perspective, Liam M. Brockey, through exhaustive examinations of missionary reports and local archives, convincingly demonstrated that due to a severe shortage of European personnel and frequent political suppression in the early Qing, the leadership of local Catholic communities had substantively shifted to native Chinese believers. He urged a deeper appreciation of the agency and multiple identities of Chinese literati in reshaping their faith (Brockey 2007, pp. 138–51)7. Leveraging his profound mastery of national learning and historiography, Zhang constructed an apologetic discourse that was rigorous and uniquely tailored to native problematics. Targeting the relativism of Buddhist “mind-only creation,” Zhang and Hong Ji 洪济 delivered a severe rebuttal in Pi lueshuo tiaobo 辟略说条驳, thereby solidifying the uncompromising Catholic baseline of substance ontology alongside the principle of “divine justice and punishment.” Concurrently, Zhang pioneered the compilation of Lidai tongjian jishi benmo buhoubian 历代通鉴纪事本末补后编 (hereafter Buhoubian 补后编), the first chronologically and topically arranged religious history in Chinese historiography. This comprehensive work effectively integrated his apologetic mission with his statecraft aspirations, objectively executing a profound historiographical “disenchantment” of the enduring religious mysticism embedded in the Chinese political tradition.

In delineating the intellectual trajectory of Zhang Xingyao during the late Ming and early Qing, contemporary scholarship has furnished an indispensable textual foundation. Xiao Qinghe 肖清和 meticulously excavates the dual dynamic of “integration” (qiutong求同) and “differentiation” (bianyi 辨异) within Zhang’s thought, highlighting his profound faith agency and pragmatic hermeneutical strategies as a third-generation Confucian Christian (Xiao 2013, pp. 40–84). Liu Weijie 刘维杰 situates Zhang’s tripartite paradigm—Catholicism coalescing with, complementing, and transcending Confucianism (he Ru 合儒, bu Ru 补儒, chao Ru 超儒)—within the quintessential dialogical tensions of the late Ming and early Qing, systematically examining his Catholic–Confucian perspective through a hermeneutical lens (W. Liu 2023). Exploring the early Catholic construction of the afterlife and ultimate concerns, Liu Jingjing 刘晶晶’s textual anatomy of the Piwang tiaobo heke illuminates how the ostensible textual antagonism between Catholicism and Buddhism functioned, rather paradoxically, as a vital conduit for deep inter-religious dialogue (J. Liu 2007, pp. 111–35). Concurrently, in their philological authentication of the Lidai tongjian jishi benmo buhoubian manuscript, Wu Qing 吴青 and Chen Huanqiang 陈焕强 observe that this corpus is by no means a one-dimensional compilation of historical data; rather, it constitutes an apologetic masterpiece deeply embedded with profound political considerations (Wu and Chen 2011, pp. 134–41). Existing scholarship, however, tends to orbit primarily around Zhang’s religious identity formation or localized textual exegesis, rarely venturing into a profound anatomical critique of his anti-Buddhist polemics from the vantage point of comparative theology. Addressing this specific historiographical lacuna, the scholarly innovation and intrinsic value of the present study lie in transcending singular theological speculation. Grounded in close textual readings of Zhang’s primary manuscripts—namely, the Pi lueshuo tiaobo 辟略说条驳 and the Buhoubian 补后编—this article executes a rigorous critique of his anti-Buddhist discourse from the perspective of comparative theology and through the analytical lens of “meaning systems”. In doing so, it seeks to decipher a central problematic: how did Zhang appropriate the intellectual resources of both Catholicism and Confucianism to deconstruct Buddhist paradigms, thereby attempting to reshape the ultimate concerns and moral order of the Chinese literati during the late Ming and early Qing?

Exploring Zhang Xingyao’s views on Catholicism and Buddhism is not merely an exercise in reconstructing the historical reality of an early Qing inter-religious polemic; it serves as a crucial philosophical case study of how Chinese scholars reorganized their values and beliefs amidst dynastic collapse. Paradoxically, while Zhang’s early intellectual formation involved profound immersion in Buddhist scriptures, this prolonged textual engagement did not convert him into a faithful adherent. Instead, it equipped him with a forensic, internal critical vantage point to deconstruct its soteriological apparatus and expose the inherent paradoxes of its salvific mechanisms. His practice of “refuting Buddhism” and “transcending Confucianism” was a grand intellectual experiment amalgamating ontological debate, historical disenchantment, and theological reconstruction, profoundly demonstrating the theoretical ingenuity of early Qing literati under the impact of heterogeneous cultures. An evaluation of Zhang Xingyao’s outlook on Catholicism and Buddhism from the perspective of contemporary comparative theology illuminates inherent historical and ideological constraints; yet, his creative scholarly legacy underscores a significant contribution to early cross-cultural religious dialogue. Zhang Xingyao’s critique ought to be carefully contextualized within the broader institutional realities of Ming–Qing Buddhism. As Chün-fang Yü profoundly elucidates, the late imperial sangha was beset by internal degeneration, marked by a neglect of monastic discipline alongside the creeping secularization and commercialization of penitential rituals (Yü 2020, pp. 170–90). Viewed from a certain historical vantage point, this might imply that Zhang’s polemic was driven less by a purely doctrinal engagement with Buddhist ontology and more by a reactive stance against these highly conspicuous institutional transgressions. Concurrently, as historian Xiuping Hong observes, the distinct trajectory of secularization defining Buddhism during this era provided scholars like Zhang with a potent forensic instrument; such sociological decay was strategically mobilized to dismantle the fundamental legitimacy of Buddhist soteriology (Hong 2024, pp. 149–58).

2. The Critique of Buddhism Within the Theodicy of Pi Lueshuo Tiaobo 辟略说条驳

Viewed through the lens of the sociology of religion—particularly drawing upon the examination of competing “meaning systems” within late Ming and early Qing theodicy (Xiao 2024, pp. 1–20)—the transformation of belief systems among intellectuals during this period was never a conceptual game played in a vacuum. Nor was it merely an intellectual preference derived from the superiority of Far Western calendrical sciences over indigenous calculations. Rather, it constituted a profound ontological struggle and inquiry concerning life, death, and eternity as divergent religions confronted the reality of evil, social upheaval, and human suffering. Concurrently, from the perspective of comparative theology, this faith reconstruction and anti-heterodox critique reveal a more complex hermeneutical tension. As articulated in the theoretical reflections of Francis X. Clooney, S.J., unilaterally employing one’s own theological framework as an analytical baseline for dissection—absent profound insight into the religious “Other”—fundamentally reflects a latent impulse to domesticate and subordinate alternative faith traditions (Fredericks 1999, pp. 139–69). Examined through these dual lenses, the capacity of Catholicism to breach formidable cultural barriers and attract Jiangnan intellectuals like Zhang Xingyao lies not solely in its provision of a rigorous explanatory framework for worldly suffering; it may also imply that Zhang, upon embracing the Catholic meaning system, sought to wield it as an instrument to execute a deep theological disciplining upon indigenous Buddhism. As Xiao Qinghe astutely noted in his study of theodicy in late Ming Fujian and Jiangnan, the introduction of Catholicism triggered a fundamental reassessment of cosmic justice and the origins of suffering among literati. By meticulously demonstrating “20 similarities, 21 supplements, and 15 transcendences” between Catholicism and Confucianism, Zhang theologically confirmed that the externally transcendent meaning system offered by Catholicism was “evidently more reasonable than both Buddhism and Confucianism” (Xiao 2024, p. 3)8.

Co-authored by Zhang and another prominent Hangzhou believer, Hong Ji9, Pi lueshuo tiaobo 辟略说条驳 represents the intense development of this theological interrogation at the levels of eschatology and soteriology. Concentrating its critical firepower on the contemporary Pure Land master Puren Jieliu (普仁截流, also known as Xingce 行策, 1628–1682), the text showcases a systematic debate between Catholic substance ontology and Buddhist idealism. Published in 1689 (the jisi year of Kangxi), the treatise was jointly printed with Xu Guangqi’s Refuting the Various Absurdities of Buddhism under the title Combined Edition of Refuting Absurdities and Counter-Arguments. According to Xiao’s bibliographic investigations, extant copies of this work are primarily housed in four core academic institutions: the Bibliothèque nationale de France, the Jesuit Roman Archives, the Vatican Library, and the Zikawei Library (Xiao 2015, p. 110)10. The textual lineage traces back to Xu Guangqi’s late Ming work; decades after its publication, the monk Puren Jieliu of Lushan Beijian launched a counterattack titled Refuting the Absurdities and the Brief Treatise, specifically targeting chapters on “chanting mantras,” “breaking hell,” and “feeding hungry ghosts.” Rising to the defense, Hong and Zhang co-authored their treatise, systematically rebutting the “most absurd” points in Puren Jieliu’s text to serve as “a divine needle for the monk Jie to confront, and a helping hand for those trapped by false beliefs” (Zhang and Hong 2003, pp. 499–500). Within the intellectual milieu of the late Ming and early Qing, the Catholic doctrine of a substantial Creator engendered profound debates with the Buddhist establishment. The Buddhist community articulated multifaceted responses to Catholic apologetics; for instance, the eminent monk Zhu Hong, in his Tianshuo (Discourse on Heaven), cautioned his contemporaries that the Chinese tradition had already cultivated a comprehensive understanding of “Heaven” through ancient sages, suggesting that the Catholic dogma constituted an unnecessary theological construct alienated from intrinsic human nature (Zhu 2003, pp. 216–17). In a parallel critique, the monk Ji Ji, in his Zhaojian (Exposing Treachery), interpreted Matteo Ricci’s appropriation of the term ‘Tianzhu’ (Lord of Heaven) as a calculated maneuver designed to plagiarize and disrupt orthodox Chinese intellectual lineages, consequently questioning the conspicuous absence of creationist narratives within the Six Classics (Ji 2003, pp. 352–53).

2.1. Refuting “Mind-Only Creation”: Establishing the Theological Baseline of Catholic Substance Ontology

The central focus of Zhang’s critique erupted initially over the fierce contestation regarding the ontological attributes of “hell” in the afterlife. From the perspective of Mahayana Buddhist idealism (represented by the Yogacara and Chan schools) espoused by Puren Jieliu, hell is not an objectively existing physical space or a transcendent penal realm established by a supreme God; rather, it is an illusory product falsely generated by the ignorant karma of sentient beings. Anchored in the doctrine of mind-only creation, Puren Jieliu contended in the polemic that:

Because they are inherent within the mind, they cannot be said to be non-existent; because they are constructed by the mind, they cannot be said to possess substantial existence. (以心具故，不可言無也；以心造故，不可言有也)

(Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 514)

He thus arrived at the relativistic conclusion that hell “both exists and does not exist” (Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 514), entirely dependent upon “the manifestation of karmic consciousness” (“業識變現”) (Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 531). He even equated the suffering in hell to “being devoured by tigers and wolves in a dream… upon waking, there is nothing to be seen” (Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 522).

To Zhang Xingyao, deeply influenced by Catholic substance theology, this philosophical rhetoric—attempting to dissolve the objective substantiality of hell and subjectivize absolute divine punishment—was intellectual poison designed to dismantle the cosmic penal mechanism and induce unbridled wickedness. Countering this slide into nihilistic relativism, Zhang employed the rigorous Western scholastic “law of non-contradiction,” alongside traditional Neo-Confucian concepts of “seeking truth from facts” and “substantial principle” (shili). In the first section of the Pi lueshuo tiaobo 辟略说条驳 (“Refuting the Fallacy that Hell Both Exists and Does Not Exist”), Zhang definitively proclaimed the uncompromising objectivity of Catholic substance ontology:

Regarding the ontological principles of the empirical world, that which exists, truly exists, and that which does not exist, truly does not; reality does not bifurcate into contradictory extremes. To posit that phenomena simultaneously exist and do not exist is characteristic of the doctrinal perspective held by your Chan school. (世間事理，有則真有，無則實無，未有岐於兩端。又說有，又說無，如汝禪宗之見也。)

(Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 515)

Zhang acutely pointed out that the Buddhist evasion—“one can say it exists, one can also say it does not exist”—was simply a sophistic cover for theoretical flaws, intended “to describe the invisibility of the human mind by saying it does not exist, and to describe its actual existence in the mind by saying it exists” (Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 515). If hell were merely a “mind-created” illusion, the most egregious evildoers could easily escape righteous punishment by forcibly “gathering their mind” or applying meditative techniques before death. This epistemic loophole, Zhang argued, would precipitate the total collapse of human law and cosmic justice. Within this ontological horizon, Zhang’s “refutation” transcended a superficial desire to eradicate popular superstition; it was a foundational ontological defense of “Sacred Reality,” fought at the very bedrock of intellectual logic to establish the absolute objectivity of the universe and the reality of moral order. Analyzing this eschatological debate, Liu Jingjing noted that while the early Catholic strategy of “replacing Buddhism to complement Confucianism” seemingly restricted the inter-religious relationship to pure opposition, this textual conflict and theological disputation objectively functioned as a vital channel for cross-religious dialogue (J. Liu 2007, p. 133)11.

It is worth noting that while Zhang Xingyao deconstructed Puren Jieliu’s conceptualization of hell and heaven as relativistic illusions of “mind-only creation”, he contemporaneously affirmed the Catholic Heaven and Hell as two distinct states of existence forged by the Creator (Zhang and Hong 2003, pp. 518–20).

Furthermore, Zhang Xingyao’s reduction of the ‘mind-only’ doctrine to a mere relativistic illusion appears to betray a specific polemical configuration. Viewed from a historical perspective, as scholar Chün-fang Yü elucidates, late Ming eminent monks such as Yunqi Zhuhong effectively synthesized Chan meditative rigor with Pure Land devotionalism. Within this context, they utilized the recitation of the Buddha’s name (nianfo) as a profound cognitive tool, functioning akin to a gong’an to shatter illusions and instantly sever discursive thoughts, thereby facilitating a non-dualistic awakening (Yü 2020, pp. 39–45). By seemingly flattening this dynamic syncretism into a monolithic target of subjective nihilism, Zhang’s forensic deconstruction reveals certain inherent ideological constraints: his presentation of Buddhist doctrine was arguably subordinated, in a structural sense, to the theological necessity of establishing a Catholic substance ontology.

2.2. Defending “Divine Punishment”: The Uncompromising Nature of Universal Righteousness

Having ontologically established hell as an absolute entity, a severe challenge immediately followed: Puren Jieliu’s moral indictment against the Lord of Heaven. In the polemic, Puren Jieliu attacked Catholicism directly:

Consider the Lord of Heaven, who intentionally creates a hell to torment the souls of the dead. If people do not worship him, they are eternally imprisoned. Throughout all future ages, even if they harbor the desire to repent and reform, they are forever denied repentance. Even if they possess great virtue and miraculous power, they are forever denied rescue. Such a Lord of Heaven is the most evil of all evils. If such a person existed in the world, he would surely incur public wrath. Moreover, what of the God’s love for life? Is it reasonable that he is cruel and tyrannical, hundreds of thousands of millions of times worse than the tyrants Jie and Zhou? (只如天主，有意設出地獄，困苦冥魂。若人不奉彼者，即永遠拘禁。盡未來際，雖有改過遷善之心，永不許懺悔。雖有盛德神通之力，永不許救援。如是天主，即是惡中之惡。世有此人，必為眾所共怒矣。且上帝好生之謂何？而乃殘忍暴厲，過於桀紂百千億倍，有是理乎？)

(Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 517)

This accusation directly struck at one of the most profound and difficult propositions of Western Catholic theodicy: Why does an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God permit the existence of evil and endless suffering (such as eternal hellfire)? Confronted with this transgressive charge that equated the Sacred Creator with a secular tyrant, Zhang provided a systematic defense of remarkable theological tension and speculative depth in the second section of his work (“Refuting the Fallacy that Establishing Hell is Cruel”). Rejecting gentle emotional persuasion, he demonstrated the inseparability of “perfect benevolence” (quanren) and “perfect justice” (quanyi) within the divine nature, leaving behind a historically weighty assertion in early Qing apologetic literature:

The Lord of Heaven rewards good people by raising them up; this is His benevolence. He punishes evil people with hell; this is His justice. The two virtues of benevolence and justice cannot be partially neglected. (天主賞善人以上升，是其仁也；罰惡人以地獄，是其義也。仁義二德，不容偏廢。)

(Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 520)

Zhang recognized that if God were to exercise a bottomless “indulgent benevolence” toward the unrepentant wicked, completely blurring the ultimate boundary between good and evil, it would spell the true destruction of cosmic justice—“desiring perfect benevolence, but inadvertently destroying justice” (“欲以全仁，而適以害義”) (Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 521). He coldly retorted: “There is no such foolish king in the secular world, so how could the great true Lord of the universe be so foolish?” (Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 521). Disrespecting the Creator and remaining obdurate in wickedness was equated to the unpardonable secular crimes of “betraying one’s lord and disobeying one’s father” (Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 518). If secular rebellion warrants the ultimate penalty of death by a thousand cuts, how much more so the betrayal of the Supreme God who bestowed all reason and existence? Therefore, the eternal damnation of those who turn away from God is “justice, the natural order of things” (Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 518). This rigorous theodicy effectively neutralized Puren Jieliu’s moral indictment, successfully re-framing hell not as a symbol of cruelty, but as the indispensable transcendent cornerstone for maintaining absolute moral order and manifesting God’s supreme righteousness.

2.3. Anti-Utilitarian Ethical Debates and the Sociological Deconstruction of Soteriology

Having secured the reality of hell and God’s absolute judgment, Zhang and Hong turned their critical blade toward the operative mechanism of Buddhist salvation in folk society: “breaking hell through Dharma power.” Puren Jieliu claimed:

In the Yoga teachings, the Buddha has a decree of great compassionate rescue. When holy masters recite mantras, form secret mudras, and exercise wondrous contemplation, all three simultaneously emit a red light illuminating the hell, instantly destroying it. Moreover, since hell is fundamentally empty and illusory, it can be destroyed. Formed in the past by the evil perception of the three karmas, it is now broken by the illuminating wisdom of the three karmas; how could it not be broken? If hell can be destroyed by Dharma power, why can’t souls be delivered by Dharma power? (佛於瑜珈教中，大悲拔濟敕。諸賢聖師，口誦真言，手結密印，心運妙觀，三處同放赤色光照觸彼獄，頓令破壞也。況地獄從本是空，本是虛妄，故可破壞。昔因三業惡感而成，今以三業智照而破，焉有不破之理？獄既可以法力破壞，魂獨不可以法力超脫乎？)

(Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 522)

This deeply mystical and somewhat magical view of salvation faced a dual refutation from Zhang, utilizing both modern empirical logic and penetrating sociological critique. Physically, Zhang debunked the limitation of the supposed “light”:

As for your claim that hands, mouth, and mind simultaneously emit a red light illuminating hell, instantly destroying it, this statement is utterly absurd. Light can illuminate objects, but it cannot destroy them. Saying light can break hell is already preposterous. (至汝言手口心，三處同放赤色光，照觸彼獄，頓令破壞，此語殊屬無稽。蓋光能照物，不能破物。言光能破獄，已為荒誕。)

(Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 523)

Applying the law of non-contradiction, Zhang forced Puren Jieliu into a logical dilemma: If Buddhism claims hell is “fundamentally illusory,” then the void cannot be destroyed; if Buddhist magic truly destroys hell, it inadvertently proves hell’s objective existence.

Furthermore, imbued with the distinct moral integrity of a traditional Confucian intellectual, Zhang acutely detected the severe utilitarian malady latent within Buddhist penitential rituals. During the late Ming and early Qing periods, sacred religious rituals meant for saving souls often devolved into purely economic transactions, directly equating ultimate divine salvation with secular financial almsgiving. Zhang ruthlessly tore away this veil of hypocrisy, pointing directly to the underlying economic motives:

You further state that if hell can be broken by Dharma power, why cannot souls be delivered by it? Examining your statement closely, if they can be delivered, it is not actually by Dharma power, but by financial power. Why? Because if they do not offer you wealth, you would not be willing to freely dispense your Dharma power to them. Is this not exactly as Lord Xu Wending 徐文定公 [Xu Guangqi 徐光启] said: those with wealth live, and those without wealth die? (汝又言獄可以法力破壞，魂獨不可以法力超脫乎？詳汝是言，設能超脫，亦非法力，實財力也。何則？使彼不施財利於汝，汝亦不肯漫施法力於彼矣。豈非如徐文定公言，有財者生，無財者死乎？)

(Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 524)

This soul-piercing ethical interrogation deconstructed the sacred facade of Buddhist rituals. Despite his early study of Buddhist sutras, Zhang levied a severe ethical critique against this commodification of divine salvation, condemning it for engendering severe class inequality and a collapse of justice—namely, that “the rich can attain salvation, while the poor cannot” (Xiao 2024, p. 17). In his preface to The Explicit Arguments on the Teaching of Heaven, he left a famous historical soliloquy: “I regret spending time studying Buddhist sutras” (X. Zhang 2013, p. 8)12. Hong Ji added with agonizing clarity in the preface that this hypocritical doctrine was essentially “a secret method of demons to ease the hearts of evildoers, allowing them to act tyrannically with resolve” (”鬼魔寬解為惡之心，使之毅然橫行之秘法”) (Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 509). If wicked men believed they could instantly break hell merely by accumulating wealth and hiring monks to chant posthumously, social morality would collapse.

The greedy and unrighteous would rely on these mad words, lacking all vigilance, and thus act tyrannically; few would not become completely unscrupulous villains! How then could the declining morality of the people be salvaged, when would strife cease, and how could the world achieve peace? The path to greatly corrupting human hearts surely lies in allowing the monk Jie’s theories to flourish. (則見利忘義之徒，恃此狂言，全無警戒，由是猛力橫行，有不盡成肆無忌憚之小人者幾希矣！然則日流而下之人心，何從挽回，爭奪何日是已，天下何由治平？大亂人心之道，必截沙門之說，使之昌熾也。)

(Zhang and Hong 2003, p. 522)

This multidimensional critique dismantled the legitimacy of Buddhism in civilizing society, highlighting the moral superiority of Catholic eschatology, which judges solely on mortal deeds and tolerates no financial bribery. Regarding this utilitarian conception of liberation or salvation, Li Tiangang 李天纲 observes that Zhang’s comprehension exhibits a certain degree of asymmetry; rather than apprehending the panoramic entirety of the religion, his focus remained largely confined to localized incidents of utilitarian transactions. Zhang’s forensic critique of Buddhist economic corruption ironically overlooks the historical reality that the pre-Reformation Roman Catholic practices of penance and indulgences harbored analogous risks of utilitarianism and institutional commodification. While Buddhism during the late Ming and early Qing indeed experienced an era of institutional decay characterized by temple corruption and wealth accumulation, the broader historical landscape also featured eminent monks whose profound spiritual cultivation and erudition possessed sufficient intellectual magnetism to attract the literati (Li 1998, p. 234)13.

2.4. Extensions of the Contemporary Concept of Hell

Stepping beyond the historical confines of Zhang Xingyao’s seventeenth- and eighteenth-century penal framework of hell, the concept of “hell” within the eschatological constructs of contemporary comparative religion and systematic theology has undergone a profound hermeneutical reconstruction. Such a diachronic contrast effectively illuminates the inherent limitations of early modern apologetics. The academic community has progressively dismantled the medieval penal imagery—one characterized by intense spatialization, physical torment, and authoritarian retributive undertones—in favor of a “metaphysics of relation” to redefine ultimate redemption and perdition. Under this scholarly paradigm, three principal theoretical trajectories have crystallized within Christianity, forging a highly charged cross-textual dialogue with the cosmology of Eastern Buddhism.

To supplant the historically fraught notion of “infinite punishment,” the official magisterium of the Catholic Church has firmly established the paradigm of definitive self-exclusion. Promulgated in 1992, the Catechism of the Catholic Church (nos. 1033–1037) delineates hell as a state wherein a creature, through the deliberate abuse of absolute free will, willfully and definitively “excludes itself from communion with God and the saints” (Catholic Church 1997, pp. 269–70). Probing deeper into its anthropological and ontological underpinnings, Joseph Ratzinger elucidated that hell is by no means an external torture actively inflicted by the Creator. Rather, it constitutes an ontological isolation into which individuals plunge following an irreversible rejection of sacred truth; it is the lost themselves who draw the boundary separating them from salvation, opting for radical self-enclosure (Ratzinger 1988, pp. 205–6). Viewed through this conceptual lens, eternal damnation is not an act of divine sadism, but rather an expression of extreme respect for, and tragic acceptance of, the creature’s ultimate free choice14.

In an endeavor to alleviate the profound theodicean tension between “finite sin” and “infinite divine love,” Annihilationism and Conditional Immortality have emerged as prevalent and rigorous academic alternatives15. Grounded in biblical texts and etymological examinations, contemporary Evangelical luminary John Stott argued that the ultimate function of hellfire is best interpreted as “eternal consumption” rather than “eternal torment.” Consequently, the final destiny of the unrepentant is understood as the total deprivation and extinction of their existence (Stott and Edwards 1988, pp. 313–20). Deducing from a corollary relational ontology, Catholic theologian Luis Gutheinz (Gu Hansong 谷寒松) posited that human existence is intrinsically sustained by an affectionate relationship with the Holy Trinity. When an individual radically and freely severs this communion, God profoundly respects and accepts this freedom, to the point of “allowing humans to freely annihilate themselves,” causing them to regress into absolute nothingness. From the vantage point of fairness and justice, this existential self-dissolution inherently constitutes a form of punishment (Gu 2012, pp. 283–85).

A further highly dialectical theological proposition is articulated through Hopeful Universalism. Hans Urs von Balthasar advanced a provocative assertion: while hell must exist as a theoretical “possibility” to safeguard absolute human free will, believers are theologically “obligated” to hope for the ultimate salvation of all, grounded in the universal redemptive power of Christ’s cross. Repudiating attacks from conservatives who equated this with heresy, he profoundly noted that in the face of unfathomable divine judgment, one must never arrogantly elevate the “hope” of anticipation into a dogmatic certainty (Balthasar 1988, pp. 129–35)16.

Shifting the gaze to a cross-religious comparative horizon, the Mahayana Buddhist notion of temporary karmic exhaustion offers a starkly divergent cosmological mirror. In his dissection of the Mahayana tradition, Paul Williams noted that the Buddhist “Naraka” (hell) is not an eternal destination established by a Creator, but a temporary purgative realm governed entirely by the impersonal law of cause and effect (karman). Given that all conditioned phenomena are subject to the law of impermanence, the ultimate mechanism of hell lies solely in exhausting evil karma to clear the karmic load for future reincarnations. Ontologically, this fundamentally precludes the spatial capacity for a transcendent deity to execute eternal punishment (Williams and Tribe 2000, pp. 74–81)17.

Fundamentally, the contemporary controversies surrounding the concept of hell represent an extreme exploration of the boundaries between divine justice, sacred love, and the free will of the creature. Despite their disparate exegetical pathways and theological presuppositions, the three major Christian perspectives—whether Ratzinger’s “relational rupture and self-enclosure,” Stott and Gu’s “existential dissolution,” or Balthasar’s “hope for ultimate reconciliation”—unanimously concur on one critical point: the divine’s profound respect for human subjectivity has extended to permitting absolute ontological choices. The imagery of hell has been comprehensively internalized from an external authoritarian penalty into a tragic reflection of absolutized free will. Such internalization not only forcefully responds to the challenges posed by modern secularism against traditional theodicy, but also re-establishes the agency of the believing subject within salvation history. In stark contrast, Buddhist karmic theory exhibits a cosmic ethics grounded in “dependent origination and emptiness”. By radically suspending the personal dimension of a “Sacred Judge,” it directly dissolves the ethical quandary of eternal torment through the impermanent law of causality and the doctrine of “non-self”. Within the Buddhist visual field, hell is not a top-down sanction imposed by sacred law, but rather the natural manifestation of the continuum of individual consciousness and karma, deeply imbued with a purgative significance oriented toward ultimate enlightenment.

The academic friction between these two religious traditions collectively signifies that contemporary discourses on comparative theology and eschatology have transitioned from classical fear-driven paradigms to profound philosophical dialectics concerning the redemption of suffering, compassionate justice, and the existential meaning of life. Whether it is the ultimate free choice before the “Absolute Other” in Christianity or the thorough purification and transcendence within “karmic transmigration” in Buddhism, both profoundly illuminate humanity’s eternal gaze toward the highest good and truth when confronting the finality of existence.

3. Refuting Buddhism and Daoism, and Assisting State Administration in the Buhoubian 补后编

During the cataclysmic transition from the Ming to the Qing dynasty, the Chinese literati class encountered profound political disorder alongside an ensuing spiritual crisis. Situated within this tumultuous shift in intellectual history, Catholicism was appropriated by certain Jiangnan Confucian scholars not merely as an exotic theology but as a vital intellectual resource to rebuild moral order and purge the institutional malpractices of Buddhism and Daoism. Compiled over several decades, Zhang Xingyao’s buhoubian 补后编 stands as a quintessential artifact of this zeitgeist. Completed in 1690—the twenty-ninth year of the Kangxi reign—following his Pi lueshuo tiaobo 辟略说条驳, this monumental manuscript significantly deepened his apologetic agenda of “refuting Buddhism and Daoism.” Currently, this unprinted draft—comprising over fifty volumes and 1700 pages—survives entirely only in the Jiayetang collection previously owned by Liu Chenggan 刘承干, which is now held in the Sir Robert Ho Tung Library in Macau, bound in forty volumes, making it an exceedingly rare and precious manuscript18. Aside from a seven-volume fragment at the Beitang Library in Beijing and a transcription by Maurus Fang Hao 方豪, the title page of A Brief Biography of Xu Guangqi (BnF Courant 1023) held in the Bibliothèque nationale de France also bears an appended volume of Zhang’s Tong jian ji shi ben mo bu fu bian juan 通鉴纪事本末补附编卷 subtitled An Examination of Chinese Catholic Monks, providing critical textual clues for studying early Qing Buddhist–Christian debates19.

As contemporary scholarship has astutely observed, the fifty-volume manuscript housed in Macau is by no means a one-dimensional compilation of historical data; rather, it is an apologetic masterpiece imbued with strong enlightenment connotations and disenchantment features (Wu and Chen 2011, pp. 134–41). Zhang incisively recognized that traditional official histories often recorded religious events disparately within treatises and biographies, lacking systematic categorization, which ultimately prevented future monarchs from perceiving their deep-seated destructive impact on political evolution. Consequently, he invented the unprecedented “topical arrangement of religious history” (zongjiao jishi benmo ti), meticulously compiling facts of prophetic occultism and Buddhist–Daoist political interference that had historically precipitated state chaos. This unique historiographical innovation pioneered by Zhang objectively constituted a groundbreaking endeavor in the history of Chinese historiography20. Further archival tracking and textual excavation reveal that compiling this vast opus was not Zhang’s solitary pursuit; it coalesced the collective will and academic network of the entire Jiangnan Catholic literati class. Explicit evidence demonstrates that, under Zhang’s organization, up to 68 Jiangnan intellectuals—including a broad array of disciples and family members—participated in the collection and proofreading of the data (Wu and Chen 2011, pp. 134–36). Utilizing the theory of “in-betweenness” proposed by Nicolas Standaert concerning Sino-Western cultural exchange (Standaert 2015, pp. 95–99) to examine Zhang’s apologetic network reveals that these “Confucian Christians”—caught in the interstices of Chinese and Western cultures—skillfully harmonized the dual identity tension between Catholic faith and Confucian orthodoxy. By marshaling concrete historical records, they legally framed Buddhism and Daoism as illegitimate usurpers of orthodox Chinese political ethics, thereby executing a fusion of true Confucianism and Catholicism within this “in-between” space. Nevertheless, even the elastic framework of “in-betweenness” sometimes struggles to entirely explain the highly combative, essentialist exclusionary critiques against Buddhism that Zhang and his contemporaries expressed in these apologetic texts.

A close reading of the remarkably rich historiographical commentaries (anyu) in the Buhoubian 补后编 reveals that Zhang Xingyao covertly and systematically embedded the Catholic faith system as a critical instrument. The dynamic interaction of “Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity” presented in this text is fundamentally a fraught classical reshaping: Zhang attempted to utilize divine revelation to “complement” and transcend traditional Confucianism, while simultaneously executing a comprehensive philosophical deconstruction of Buddhism. The ensuing sections will dissect how Zhang interrogated the foundational logic of Buddhism across ontological, epistemological, cultivational, and socio-ethical dimensions, ultimately constructing theological statecraft designed to “refute Buddhism and Daoism and assist state administration.”

3.1. The Debate on Ultimate Reality: The Ontological Collision Between the Creator and the World-Honored One

In probing the supreme philosophical propositions regarding the origin of the universe and “ultimate reality,” Zhang adopted a narrative strategy of “structural isomorphism between Christianity and Confucianism.” He deeply mapped the Catholic “Creator” (Deus) onto the “God” (Shangdi 上帝, the transcendent Supreme Sovereign) of pre-Qin Confucian classics, aiming to refute the sacred legitimacy of the “World-Honored One” (the Buddha) from the very source of the “First Cause.” Zhang astutely perceived that the Buddhist doctrine of “dependent origination and emptiness” essentially suspended the absolute sovereignty of the Creator—an irreconcilable crisis within its theological architecture. In Volume 5 of the Buhoubian 补后编, “The Rebellions of Buddhists in Successive Dynasties,” Zhang wielded the dual-edged sword of Confucian filial piety and divine creationism to sharply falsify the Buddhist myth that the newborn Buddha pointed to heaven and earth, took several steps, and declared, “In the heavens above and the earth below, I alone am the honored one” (X. Zhang 2016, p. 47). He launched a piercing falsification:

Furthermore, after pointing to heaven and earth, I do not know what ultimately happened. Did he not rely on being embraced and nurtured? Did he not rely on being taught and guided? If he indeed possessed such abilities, he would be akin to the monstrously rapid-growing man of Zaoyang in the Yuan dynasty. If he did not possess such abilities, then his walking and speaking at that moment must have been possessed by demonic entities, rather than the power of a Buddha—much like the talking stone in the Jin dynasty. These are all demonic and bizarre anomalies. Moreover, heaven, earth, and the myriad things are our parents; the Supreme Sovereign imparts our innate goodness, thus bestowing upon us our nature. The sovereign acts as the parent of the people, thus governing our bodies. Those who rely on and support me are my parents, thus giving birth to my body. Heaven, earth, the sovereign, and parents—certainly, no one dares to exclude them. (且指天指地之後，吾不知作何究竟也。將不藉懷抱與？不藉訓迪與？使果能之，則類於元朝棗陽男子之暴長也。如其不能，則此刻之行與言，必有鬼物憑之，非佛之能也。如石言於晋是也。皆為妖為異也。且天地萬物父母，維皇降衷，所以畀吾之性也。元后作民父母，所以治吾之身也。怙恃我者為父母，所以生吾之身也。天地君親，固無一人而敢外也。)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 47)

The argumentative logic of this commentary is exceptionally rigorous: Zhang not only stripped the Buddha’s birth anomaly of its sacred cloak, denouncing it as a demonic possession, but he also directly invoked the creative will of the Creator. He argued that the theological purpose of endowing humans with a fragile and lengthy infancy (requiring embrace and guidance) was to accentuate the nurturing grace of parents. This assertion drove a sacred wedge into the ontology of Confucian filial piety (xiao). Conversely, the legend of a Buddha speaking and walking upon birth not only violated the laws of natural theology but exposed a profoundly arrogant transgression that ignored “heaven, earth, the sovereign, and parents.”

Pushing this logical trajectory further, Zhang mercilessly deconstructed the honorific title “World-Honored One,” secularizing it entirely:

The Buddha rebelled against his parents, abandoned his royal throne and refused to occupy it; his body is merely that of a human born of the God. His departure from home to avoid the secular world ranks him no higher than the recluses Changju and Jieni. How could one possibly honor him? How could the world honor him? (佛叛父母，棄王位而不居，其身亦上帝所生之一人。其出家避俗，不過沮溺一流，顧安得而尊之？安得而世尊之？)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 49)

Within Zhang’s ontological landscape, the sole master of the universe is the “God”. Regardless of the Buddha’s spiritual cultivation, his essential nature is permanently confined to being “merely a human born of the God.” In the coordinate system of Confucian active worldly engagement, his retreat into monasticism equated him merely to political and familial escapists like Changju and Jieni, entirely disqualifying him from usurping the title of “World-Honored One.”

To irrevocably cement this critique, Zhang directly appealed to Aristotelian First Cause logic in Volume 6 of the Buhoubian 补后编, “The Fallacies of Buddhist Doctrines and Principles,” utilizing the Creator’s creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing) to shatter the cyclical cosmology of Buddhism:

If one considers that I am born into a temporal order where Heaven, Earth, and all things already exist, tracing back to the state preceding their existence, it logically follows that there must be a beginningless Lord who created Heaven, Earth, and all things, thereby enabling my own generation. Consequently, I, along with Heaven, Earth, and all things, possess a temporal beginning. Only the Lord of Creation remains beginningless; this constitutes the generation of existence out of nothingness (creatio ex nihilo). (如吾生當既有天地萬物之時，追溯夫未有天地萬物之前，必有無始之主造此天地萬物者，而後吾得以生，是吾與天地萬物，皆有始也。惟造物之主為無始，此從無而生有也。)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 67)

Having established this absolute ontology, he explicitly delineated the divine origin of human nature, naturally uprooting the foundation of Buddhist theories of human nature:

Little do they know that the God is the Creator who bestows nature upon humanity. Since the Buddha was born after heaven and earth, he is merely one of the human beings created by the God. (不知上帝者造物主也，畀性於人者也。佛生於天地之後，則爲上帝所生之一人。)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 247)

3.2. The Epistemological Disenchantment of Religious Rituals: Prayers, Mantras, and Zen Meditation

When the debate descended from ontology to the epistemological dimension of religious rituals, Zhang’s critique displayed an anti-intellectualist critical logic deeply inspired by Catholic Scholasticism. He contended that the myriad illusory rituals of Buddhism were essentially smoke-screens severing the cognitive bond between humanity and the Creator.

Bearing the brunt of this attack were the mantras and incantations of Esoteric Buddhism. In Volume 6 of the Buhoubian 补后编, Zhang stripped away the mystical camouflage of sutras and incantations, reducing them via historical empiricism to linguistic fallacies in cross-cultural exchange:

It is popularly rumored that when Lamaist monks recite sutras and mantras before the dead, they can cause the hands and feet of the deceased to move automatically, which people consider miraculous. Yet at their utmost capability, they amount to no more than this; they cannot bring the dead immediately back to life. Thus, the efficacy of these sutras and mantras is apparent. Today, when monks chant the sutras and mantras translated in China, even the effect of the dead moving automatically is hard to witness. This is because they are speaking barbarian tongues and obscure words; the Central Kingdom and the Western Rong lack mutual linguistic comprehension, leaving no way to verify the texts, making them unworthy of observation. (俗傳喇嘛諸僧誦經咒于死者之前，能令死者手足自動，人以為奇。夫極其伎倆，不過若此，非能令死者即生也。則經咒之效，亦可見矣。今中國所譯經咒，諸僧誦之，并死者自動之效，亦難觀矣。蓋由胡言黑語，中夏西戎，言語不通，無從考證，不足觀也。)

(X. Zhang 2016, pp. 60–61)

Regarding the contemporary trend of praying to Buddha statues to absolve sins without cultivating moral virtue, Zhang pierced the moral evasion underlying this practice in Volume 11. By quoting the ancient Confucian maxim “offending Heaven,” he restored “Heaven” to a personal God with absolute will:

Today, the practice of praying for blessings is rampant! How many people genuinely seek to be illuminated and free from doubt, like Emperor Wen of Han? Those who do not understand the principle that ‘he who offends Heaven has none to whom he can pray,’ and vainly engage in prayers to avert calamities, are already wrong. How much more so when praying to the Buddha? This is truly a mistake among mistakes. Therefore, I have compiled the sayings of various schools to rectify this. (今日祈禱之風盛矣！欲求灼然不惑，如漢文帝者幾人？夫不知獲罪于天無所禱也之理，而徒事祈禳，固已非矣。況祈禳于佛乎？此真誤中之誤。吾故集諸家之說以正之。)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 146)

In terms of epistemology and cultivation theory, Zhang’s assault on the Zen (Chan) Buddhist concepts of “not relying on words and letters” and “illuminating the mind and seeing the nature” reflected his staunch defense of rational cognition. He argued that the Creator bestowed sensory organs upon humanity precisely to explore the objective laws of the universe; Zen meditation’s forcible suppression of sensory perception was tantamount to a blatant desecration of a divine gift:

The God bestowed upon me a spiritual nature, and also bestowed upon me ears and eyes. The ears and eyes are the instruments of the spiritual nature, serving its efficacy. The marvel of righteous principles is contained within the mind, while the capacity to see and hear is entrusted to the ears and eyes. If one gallops wildly in pursuit of desires, the mind and spirit will be perturbed, rendering one unable to respond properly to affairs and objects. If one can be tranquil, the original substance will be pure and bright, and righteous principles will be manifest. Therefore, the tranquility of sages and worthies consists of eliminating desires and preserving principles; it is not akin to dead wood and cold ashes. Fixing the mind and thoughtful reflection is the learning of clarity. Choosing the good and holding fast to it is the effort of sincerity. Governing oneself and others are all good, and reverence is the pivot holding them together. Now, the tranquility of Buddhist monks neither acknowledges the existence of principles, nor seeks to block both hearing and seeing, tethering the mind to a huatou (koan phrase), severing past and future. How is this any different from being deaf, blind, and a wooden idol? (夫上帝予我以靈性，又予我以耳目。耳目者，靈性之用，而為功于靈性者也。義理之妙具於心，見聞之資任于耳目。若馳逐奔管，則心神紛擾，固不可以應事接物。能寧靜，則本體精明、義理昭著，故聖賢之靜，去欲而存理也，非槁木死灰也。定靜安慮，明之學也。擇善固執，誠之功也。治己治人胥善也，握其樞者敬也。今釋子之靜，既不知有理，且欲并明聰而塞之，繫心話頭，前後際斷，與聾聵木偶何異？)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 109)

Following this trajectory, the so-called “sudden enlightenment” of Zen was, in Zhang’s eyes, merely a pretext for nihilists to evade social and ethical responsibilities:

All those who do not engage in broad learning and restraining themselves with propriety, yet use pacifying the mind as an excuse, are nothing but arrogant and delusional individuals. (凡不從事于博文約禮而藉口安心者，皆狂妄之徒耳。)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 112)

Authentic religious cultivation, he maintained, must manifest the shared glory of God and humanity strictly within the daily human relations of “broad learning and restraining oneself with propriety.”

3.3. The Defense of Social Ethics: Vegetarianism, Temple Almsgiving, and Funerary Customs

Zhang Xingyao’s critique did not hover in the realm of metaphysical speculation; it incisively pivoted toward concrete social and ethical practices. Forging a synthesis of Confucian statecraft and Catholic natural theology, he executed a thorough reckoning of the specific manifestations of Buddhism eroding the daily customs of the late Ming and early Qing society.

Targeting the Buddhist practices of “abstaining from killing and releasing life” and “vegetarianism”—which flaunted moral superiority—Zhang invalidated their rationality from the power logic of creation theology:

Among the myriad things in the world, meat is nourishing while vegetables are not; among the flavors of the world, meat is delicious while vegetables are not. If my merits and virtues are truly exalted, even feasting grandly on meat is no transgression; if my merits and virtues are truly inferior, even eating simple vegetarian fare is a sin. The Buddhists do not know that Heaven created living things inherently for human consumption, and eating them is no sin. Instead, they establish teachings of vegetarian fasting. In reality, how many can truly maintain this fast? (天下之物，葷補而素則否；天下之味，葷美而素又否。我之功德誠隆，雖大烹鼎養非過也；我之功德誠劣，即簞食豆羹亦罪也。釋氏不知天之生物本為人而生，食之非罪，乃為持齋之教，其實持齋者能有幾人？)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 122)

The phrase “Heaven created living things inherently for human consumption” is fundamentally a Sinicized articulation of the theological mandate in Genesis, wherein God entrusts humanity with dominion over all creation. To rip away the hypocritical mask of the monastic class, he appended a local scandal from the Lingyin Temple in Hangzhou to his commentary:

During the Kangxi reign, monks of the Lingyin Temple in Hangzhou engaged in litigation… Bones of chickens and ducks forming stones were uncovered in the Zen abbot’s quarters. From this, the practices of Zen monks elsewhere can be deduced. Such deceit is far worse than eating meat openly without deception. (康熙年間，杭州靈隱寺諸僧許訟……於禪僧方丈中搜出鷄鴨骨成石，則他處禪僧可知矣。欺詐如此，反不如明啖之為不欺也。)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 122)

In criticizing the Buddhist ritual of “releasing life” (fangsheng), he anchored his arguments firmly in people’s livelihood, economics, and the political teachings of ancient kings:

Releasing them today, only to capture them tomorrow; treacherous people use this to line their own pockets, while those who pay the ransom are deceived without realizing it. Furthermore, once birds, beasts, fish, and turtles have been captured, they are frightened, disturbed, and exhausted; their vitality is diminished, and they will ultimately perish. Calling it ‘releasing them’ is, in reality, killing them. How does this compare to implementing the governance of the sages—taking them in due season and using them according to propriety, so as to benefit both humans and creatures equally? (今日放之，明日取之，奸徒借此以管私，贖者不察而被誑。且鳥獸魚鱉既已取之，則驚擾困苦，生意不靈，終必致斃。名曰放之，實則殺之。何如行聖人之政，取之以時，用之以禮，為人物均利也與？)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 69)

In Volume 11 of the Buhoubian 补后编, when assailing the specific fasts Buddhists observed according to the lunar calendar, Zhang stepped outside traditional ethical boundaries and mobilized common knowledge from Western astronomy and spatial geography:

Moreover, the Chinese calendar follows the moon, hence there are new moons, full moons, and quarter moons, with the new moon marking the first day. The foreign calendar follows the sun, and although new moons, full moons, and quarter moons have their timing, it is not necessary to mark the new moon as the first day. Furthermore, the phases of the moon are merely how humans on the ground view the sky. The earth has different distances from the poles, so what this place considers the first day, that place might consider the last. Even calculating the new moon by the moon, it need not align with the Chinese new moon; it could be another country’s new moon. Let alone above the heavens, where the moon is always bright and devoid of phases. (況中國之曆從月，故有晦朔弦望，以朔為初一也。外國之曆從日，雖晦朔弦望有候，不必以朔為初一是也。且晦朔弦望，人在地上之視天云耳。地有去極遠近之不同，故此地以為朔，或彼地以為晦，即從月論朔，亦不必懂中國之朔；即為他國之朔，況天之上，月固長明，並無晦朔弦望也。)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 149)

Zhang maintained that this pathway of deconstructing religious praxis via the natural sciences of Western learning proved that Chinese Buddhist rules—reliant on local lunar calendars—entirely forfeited their claim to universality when confronted with the objective physical laws of the vast cosmos.

Regarding the Buddhist practice of exhorting believers to exhaust their family wealth to construct “stupas and temples,” Zhang’s critique was fraught with deep anxieties over national economic decline. He characterized almsgiving predicated on karmic retribution as a selfish, exploitative vice:

Almsgiving is a noble deed; however, almsgiving to Buddhists is an evil virtue. Why? In the era of the ancient kings, neighborhoods possessed policies of mutual aid and relief, and Confucian scholars practiced the benevolence of establishing and advancing others. Without erecting the name of ‘almsgiving,’ the goodness of almsgiving was already manifest. What they practiced was for the public good, not for selfish benefit… The Buddha has the Sutra of the Causes and Effects of the Wise and the Foolish… various absurd and delusional tales that cannot be fully recounted. Ignorant people believe them because they are found in Buddhist sutras; it is not that rogue monks fabricated these doctrines themselves. (布施，美事也；布施釋氏，惡德也。何則？先王之世，比里有相賙相恤之政，儒者有立人達人之仁，不立布施之名，而布施之善已見矣。其所行者公也，非自私自利也。……佛有《賢愚因緣經》……種種荒唐誕妄之言，不可殫述。愚人信之，佛經有之，非妄僧之能自立説也。)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 117)

In funerary ethics, the custom of “cremation” (jhāpita) introduced by Buddhism was viewed by Zhang as a human tragedy that obliterated heavenly principles. Mourning an incident in which a destitute commoner mistakenly cremated his mother, who still possessed breath, he unleashed a wrathful interrogation in Volume 10:

The tragedy of burning corpses originated from the Western Regions’ doctrine of jhāpita (cremation). Ultimately, those who are burned are limited to poor monks, those defrauded into giving alms, and destitute commoners unable to afford a burial, who, yearning for the permanence of the communal stupa, willingly burn themselves… It is the original heart of any benevolent and filial person to not want the corpses of their relatives exposed. Now, having expended wealth, yet still unable to avoid water and fire, how is this a better calculation than using the funds for the communal stupa to build a grave mound? (焚尸之慘，起於西域荼毗之說。究之所焚者，止諸貧僧及詐為布施者，并貧民無力以葬，歆慕普同塔之久遠，而甘心自焚者。……凡仁孝之人不欲使親戚尸體暴露者，其本心也。今既出財，而水火仍不免，何如以入普同之資，塍之豢冢為得算哉！)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 137)

Within the theological framework of creationism, Zhang believed that the human flesh is not merely the crystallization of parental endowment but the sacred vessel forged by God. Subjecting the body to flames was not only an ethical transgression but an outrageous usurpation of the ultimate existential order. Methodologically, Zhang’s critique extends beyond the parameters of mere ethical reproach; it arguably operates as a deliberate sociological strategy aimed at supplanting the Buddhist “meaning system” of karmic retribution with the Catholic “meaning system” anchored in creationist ontology.

3.4. Critiquing the “Unity of the Three Teachings” and Rectifying Intellectual Orthodoxy

Since the late Ming period, the social currents of “The Three Teachings share the same origin” and the “Unity of the Three Teachings” had gained significant traction within the networks of Jiangnan literati. To seize the high ground of legitimate lineage, certain Buddhists even fabricated genealogies in forged sutras claiming Confucius was an incarnation of a Bodhisattva. As an uncompromising defender of the faith, Zhang mounted an unyielding attack against such syncretic heresies in Volume 12 of the Buhoubian 补后编. Confronting the absurdity of texts like the Sutra of the Creation of Heaven and Earth and the Sutra of Pure Dharma Practice—which demoted Fuxi 伏羲, Laozi 老子, and Confucius 孔子 to mere Bodhisattva incarnations (X. Zhang 2016, p. 157)—Zhang issued a searing rebuke:

He is merely Confucius, and these treacherous monks are insolent. Some consider him Rutong, others Jingguang, sufficiently demonstrating their absurdity. For them to claim the ox as the Bodhisattva of Great Strength is them willingly debasing themselves to the level of beasts, which is barely worth disputing. But to claim Confucius is an incarnation of their Bodhisattva is something that makes Confucian scholars gnash their teeth, compelling them to beat the drum and attack it. (一孔子耳，奸僧無狀。或以為儒童，或以為淨光，足見其誕妄矣。夫以牛為大力菩薩，此彼自甘居下為畜類，固不足辨。若以孔子為彼菩薩所化，則儒者所切齒，不得不鳴鼓攻之矣。)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 158)

Witnessing weak-kneed Confucian scholars who, rather than defending the orthodox lineage, indulged in Buddhist–Daoist idol worship (such as Wenchang and Kuixing), Zhang’s rhetoric intensified, demanding the resolute expulsion of heretical idols from academies:

If Confucian scholars possessed any conscience, how could their hair not stand on end and their eyes not split with rage?... If scholars fail to debate the ultimate principles with them, fear their threats of misfortune and promises of fortune, and instead follow and echo them—outwardly Confucian yet inwardly Buddhist to protect and uphold them—how could they not be sinners against our Master Confucius! (儒者苟有人心，寧不發指眦裂乎？……儒者不與之折衷至理，怵其禍福，反從而附和之，反陽儒陰佛以護持之，寧不為吾夫子之罪人哉！)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 158)

He further invoked the absolute purity of pre-Qin classics to sever any logical possibility of the “Unity of the Three Teachings”:

Confucius said: ‘There are but two ways: benevolence and malevolence.’ Mencius said: ‘The way is but one.’ Judging from the words of Confucius and Mencius, how could the way be two? How could there possibly be three? Tang and Yu spoke of being refined and undivided; the Master spoke of a single thread binding all. The sages across millennia never possessed divergent ways. Since the emergence of the Buddhists, the methods of the Way have been thrown into chaos. Laozi left the pass and formed the teachings of the Futu (Buddhists); subsequently, the fangshi (alchemists) stole the dregs of the Buddhists and fabricated scriptures, planting myriad baseless claims. (孔子曰：‘道二，仁與不仁而已矣。’孟子曰：‘夫道一而已矣。’由孔孟之言觀之，道安得有二？更安得有三？唐虞言精一，夫子言一貫。千古聖人未嘗有异道也。自佛氏出，道術亂矣。老子出關為浮屠之學，其後方士竊佛氏之唾餘，撰為經典，種種不根。)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 232)

Regarding those syncretists who sought to appease all sides, his judgment was absolute:

Investigating thoroughly, [Buddhism] is as distant from Confucianism and Daoism as heaven is from the abyss. Yet people of this world constantly claim the Three Teachings share the same principle, with some even elevating Shakyamuni above our Master Confucius; such people are truly devoid of heart and conscience. (往復詳求，與儒道延隔天淵，乃世之人動輒云三教一理，甚有尊釋迦于吾夫子之上者，此其人真無心肝者也。)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 109)

Crucially, the thrust of Zhang’s critique naturally pierced the Neo-Confucian School of Mind (Xinxue), which had been deeply saturated by Zen thought. In appraising Wang Yangming 王阳明’s system, he acutely pinpointed its ideological underbelly as “outwardly Confucian yet inwardly Buddhist”:

Wang Yangming promoted innate knowledge (liangzhi), yet claimed that Su Qin and Zhang Yi also glimpsed its wondrous function. Thus, what he calls innate knowledge refers merely to the function of this spiritual awareness (lingjue). This is precisely Gaozi’s claim that ‘what is inborn is called nature,’ not Mencius’s innate goodness of love and reverence. Therefore, it is identical to the theories of the Buddhists and alien to the principles of our Confucianism. (陽明提良知，而以蘇秦、張儀也窥見良知妙用為言。是其所謂良知者，指此靈覺之用而言，正告子所謂生之謂性之説，非孟子所謂愛敬之良也。故與佛氏之説同，與吾儒之理異。)

(X. Zhang 2016, p. 375)

Zhang astutely recognized that the internal “spiritual awareness” championed by the School of Mind—divorced from reverence for the “Creator”—could effortlessly slide into ethical relativism, ultimately resulting in a total collapse of both moral and political baselines. Zhang Xingyao sought to integrate relevant ideological resources from both Confucianism and Catholicism in order to defend truth and orthodoxy. While Chinese Christian scholars attempted to establish the legitimacy of their faith by accommodating Confucianism, late Ming Buddhist leaders similarly incorporated Confucian ethical norms into their own discourse. As Chün-fang Yü points out, Buddhist narratives of that period actively assimilated traditional virtues such as filial piety to sustain their socio-political relevance (Yü 2020, pp. 71–75). Viewed from this perspective, Zhang’s rejection of the “Unity of the Three Teachings” appeared to constitute a symmetric yet antagonistic form of academic engagement. As Xiuping Hong’s analysis suggests, this may have echoed a broader cultural impulse of the time, namely, the endeavor to harmonize transcendent religious claims with the indigenous Confucian tradition of statecraft through ideological integration (Hong 2024, pp. 152–63).

3.5. From “Trojan Horse” to “Theological Statecraft”

A reassessment of Zhang Xingyao’s colossal historiographical undertaking has provoked sustained debate within international sinology concerning his deeper motivations. Focusing on Zhang’s apologetic strategies, David E. Mungello labeled the Buhoubian 补后编 a “Trojan Horse” implanted into Chinese culture, concluding that Zhang merely utilized Confucianism as camouflage to shelter Catholicism (Mungello 1994, p. 147). However, this research premise, possessing a latent Eurocentric tint, is currently being dismantled by empirical historical research situated within a contemporary global history framework. To reduce the fifty-volume Buhoubian 补后编 to a utilitarian evangelistic tool severely underestimates the authentic spiritual agony and political concern of early Qing literati. Partially rejecting the “instrumentalism” assumption, Xiao Qinghe emphasizes that Zhang intellectually equated “true Confucianism” with Catholicism at a profound level. Within this context, “Our Way” (Wudao) subsumes both Confucianism and Christianity; to defend Confucianism is inherently to defend Catholicism, negating any dichotomy of host and guest or necessity for camouflage (Xiao 2015, pp. lxxxv–lxxxvi). Zhang’s confession in the preface to the Buhoubian 补后编 authentically corroborates this profound sense of cultural crisis:

When the methods of the Way are unclear, heterodoxies and false doctrines manage to infiltrate. The Three Bonds collapse, the Five Constants are ruined, seeping in gradually until it is beyond remedy… so that people may know that Our Way and the two teachings [Buddhism and Daoism] are as distinct as black and white, perhaps then the hearts of the people and the state of the world might recover? (道術不明，異端邪說得而入之。三綱淪，五常斁，浸淫漬漸，不可救療矣。……俾知吾道之與二氏判然若黑白之不相淆，庶人心世道其有瘳乎？)

(X. Zhang 2016, pp. 1–2)

For Zhang, thoroughly steeped in Confucian political ethics, his meticulously curated historical narrative was far more than an instrument to defend Catholic theological purity; it was the poignant, tragic continuation of the Confucian literati’s ideal of “statecraft” (jingshi zhiyong) following the dynastic upheaval. Wu Qing distilled Zhang’s core political philosophy buried within the historical records into a single maxim: “Refuting Buddhism and Daoism to assist state administration” (Wu 2016a, p. 522)21. Zhang enumerated the myriad political catastrophes—from “ruining the state and disrupting governance” to “depleting the national treasury”—caused by the imperial infatuation with Buddhism and the pursuit of immortality since Emperor Ming of Han 汉明帝 dispatched envoys to seek the Dharma. Through this bloody chronicle of dynastic rises and falls, he proved a fundamental rule to the world: When religions lacking the constraint of God’s transcendent justice intervene in worldly politics, they inevitably devolve into lethal sources of chaos that disintegrate secular political rationality and accelerate dynastic collapse. Clearly, reflecting on the lessons of the Ming downfall and defending secular moral norms served as the direct impetus for his historiography. Zhang firmly believed that “the Heavenly Teaching is true Confucianism.” While “refuting Buddhism” served as a pragmatic intervention to eradicate heterodoxy and salvage societal morality, “the Teaching of Jesus” (Catholicism) represented the ultimate return to the pre-Qin Confucian tradition of revering Heaven. Within Zhang’s framework of “Our Way,” history and theology achieved exquisite self-consistency.

Surveying the historiographical constructs of the Buhoubian 补后编, Zhang wielded the traditional “topical arrangement” (jishi benmo) genre as a scalpel to execute a cross-cultural theological defense. Leveraging Western natural views and Catholic creationism, Zhang deconstructed the self-sufficiency of Buddhism across theological statecraft, cosmology, and ontology. Simultaneously, by reshaping the Confucian “theory of principle and material force” (liqi lun), he seamlessly sutured the Catholic concept of the soul into traditional Chinese discourse. This intellectual praxis not only shatters the one-dimensional interpretation of Mungello’s “Trojan Horse” hypothesis, but it also serves as a potent rebuttal to Gernet’s skepticism regarding the “incommensurability” of Sino-Western ontologies, furnishing a highly nuanced textual specimen for understanding the complex tensions of inter-religious dialogue during the late Ming and early Qing.

4. Conclusions: Transcending the Paradigm of Contemporary Comparative Theology

Contextualized within the intellectual collisions between China and the West during the late Ming and early Qing, Zhang Xingyao exhibited extraordinary academic subjectivity. He was by no means a passive megaphone for Western missionaries in the East, but rather an indigenous intellectual giant striving to reconstruct spiritual order and moral ethics amidst ideological ruins. As eminent sinologists like Nicolas Standaert and Liam M. Brockey have repeatedly emphasized when examining the late Ming and early Qing cross-cultural contacts, native Chinese intellectuals consistently maintained a formidable capacity for cultural filtration and classical reinvention when embracing the Catholic faith. Deeply inheriting the accommodation strategies of Jesuits like Matteo Ricci 利玛窦 and Giulio Aleni 艾儒略, Zhang ingeniously grafted the Catholic concept of a soul created by God onto the traditional Confucian “nature ordained by Heaven,” actively deploying this synthesis to combat and negate the Buddhist ontology of an uncreated “Buddha-nature” inherent in all sentient beings22. Devoting his life to “The Explicit Arguments on the Teaching of Heaven,” he identified the Catholic faith as true Confucianism. The core motive driving his refutation of Buddhism was to forge absolutely exclusionary doctrinal boundaries in exchange for the legitimacy and orthodoxy of Catholicism within a Confucian society. Pushing even further, Zhang boldly and incisively indicted the “omissions” (shulue) of Confucius himself regarding transcendental matters of life and death, thereby completing a majestic theological reconstruction that evolved from “harmonizing with Confucianism” and “complementing Confucianism” to ultimately “transcending Confucianism,” securing an absolute truth status for Catholicism in China that presided above the Three Teachings (W. Liu 2023)23.

Elevating Zhang’s perspectives on Catholicism and Buddhism into the broader contemporary matrix of international academic networks and cross-religious dialogues affords the critical distance necessary to transcend time and reflect upon the essentialist limitations inherent in his seventeenth-century apologetic writings. The early encounters between Chinese Buddhism and Christianity during the late Ming and early Qing were characterized by an intensely fierce “mutual rejection and competition.” This stands in stark historical contrast to the subsequent Republican-era shifts, where figures like Zhang Chunyi 张纯一 utilized the wisdom of emptiness to deconstruct essentialism into “Buddhist Christianity,” or where Xu Dishan 许地山 advocated an “aesthetic pluralism” anchored in ethical co-construction (Lai 2008, pp. 197–296)24. Stepping outside the specific historical theater of dynastic shifts and sectarian skirmishes of the late Ming and early Qing, and applying the methodologies of contemporary Comparative Theology, academia has thoroughly deconstructed that early mode of exclusionary Buddhist–Christian dialogue—a mode defined by monopolizing absolute truth and aiming to entirely annihilate the theological logic of the religious “other.” Renowned comparative theologian Francis X. Clooney, S.J., argues that forcibly using one’s own theology as a “microscope” to dissect the other without the prerequisite of profound empathy and sufficient understanding essentially exposes a coercive inclination to discipline competing faiths (Fredericks 1999, pp. 139–69).

In a highly globalized contemporary philosophy of religion that prizes inclusivity, the international theological community no longer seeks to pronounce a death sentence upon heterodoxy through draconian “dilemmas.” Genuine cross-religious dialogue demands the suspension of absolute metaphysical antagonisms. Instead, it must follow comparative theology’s humble path of “faith seeking understanding,” compelling dialogic subjects to view the religious “other” as a hidden mirror reflecting their own belief systems. Zhang Shiying 张仕颖 proposes that, as an interactive cross-religious paradigm, comparative theology advocates a complete trajectory: stepping “out of the self,” plunging “deeply into the other,” and ultimately “returning to the self.” In the practical context of Buddhist–Christian dialogue, both traditions can fluidly alternate in assuming the theoretical positions of “self” and “other.” By unconditionally embracing the otherness and heterogeneity of their counterpart, and rigorously utilizing each other as intellectual mirrors for self-reflection, both parties in the Buddhist–Christian dialogue will eventually incubate breakthrough self-discoveries. Consequently, while reaffirming their core doctrines, they achieve a comprehensive sublimation of their own self-articulation (S. Zhang 2024, pp. 1–12)25. Examined through this lens, Zhang Xingyao’s deployment of exclusionary anti-Buddhist rhetoric to validate his defense of “transcending Confucianism” undoubtedly showcased the apologetic brilliance and pragmatic societal responsibility of a seventeenth-century Chinese literatus at its absolute zenith. Yet, constrained by a lack of ultimate empathy for heterogeneous faiths, he fell short of realizing true civilizational mutual enlightenment in the abyssal depths of ontology. To a certain extent, this essentialist-driven apologetic piety erected a barricade preventing Chinese and Western faiths from achieving reciprocal understanding and appropriation at a deeper spiritual dimension. While we certainly cannot fault historical figures for lacking postmodern pluralistic religious perspectives, this very historical limitation provides a stark, illuminating mirror of reflection for contemporary Buddhist–Christian dialogue.

Although examined through the prism of contemporary comparative theology and pluralistic religious dialogue, Zhang Xingyao’s theoretical attempt to remedy the lack of external transcendence in Chinese philosophy using Catholic transcendent entities engendered an unbridgeable ontological tension between Catholicism and Buddhism. Nevertheless, the voluminous manuscripts and speculative heritage he left behind continue to serve as an immortal textual beacon, radiating with dual philosophical and historiographical brilliance. This substantial corpus grants us unparalleled insight into how indigenous Chinese Christians, caught in the throes of violent dynastic transitions and spiritual crises, navigated existential survival by actively reconstructing their “meaning systems”. Within this cross-cultural dialogue spanning centuries, Zhang’s texts cease to be mere instruments of sectarian apologetics; rather, they reverberate as a profound, resilient, and intellectually highly charged historical echo of Chinese civilization colliding head-on with a heterogeneous absolute truth on the eve of modernity.