Between Secularization and Desecularization: Youth Religiosity in Turkey’s Imam Hatip Schools

Abstract

This article examines the trajectory of secularization and desecularization in Turkey through the lens of Imam Hatip high schools, focusing on how religion has been reintroduced into the public sphere and reshaped educational exposure. While secularism in Turkey historically emerged as a state-driven project imposed from above, recent decades have witnessed a marked process of desecularization under the Justice and Development Party, facilitated by institutional reforms in law, education, and bureaucracy. The study draws on qualitative interviews with experts, analyzed through grounded theory, to capture their perceptions of religious schooling and its impact. The analysis is organized into three themes: the persistence of top-down secularism, the institutionalized reintroduction of religion, and the intersection of religionized politics with educational practices. Findings indicate that while family socialization remains a primary source of religious identity, Imam Hatip schools function as a symbolic site of religiosity and political contestation. The study concludes that Turkey’s current desecularization is not merely a grassroots revival but a state-mediated restructuring of the secular–religious balance, with education serving as a central arena for negotiating visibility, autonomy, and identity. At the same time, the legacy of top-down secularism has paradoxically contributed to alienating younger generations from religion, shaping ambivalent attitudes toward faith and schooling.

1. Introduction

The relationship between state and religion has long been a central concern in social studies. Throughout history, this relationship has taken various forms, ranging from cooperation to competition or separation, shaped by political, cultural, and economic factors (Cosgel and Miceli 2009; Fox 2015). This relationship is also reflected in the state’s interaction with religious institutions, including educational institutions. Historically, education has been viewed as crucial for spiritual and moral development (Lumby and Mac Ruairc 2018). In essence, education was born out of religion from the very beginning (Armet 2009; Özorak 1989; Murphy 1968; Leach 1911). Schools were often part of religious institutions, and most educators were religious clerks. However, with the advent of modernity, the influence of religion on the public sphere diminished, and religion became “an epiphenomenal force in society” (Fox 2006, p. 537). States began to separate themselves from religion and took control of education and the information taught in classrooms. Nevertheless, the need for religious education persisted, as organized education was inherently religious for centuries. With the separation of church and state, national governments began to engage in activities traditionally carried out by religious institutions.

RSs are schools with a distinctive religious character (Maussen and Bader 2015) which focus on instilling religious values and identity (Riley et al. 2003). In Turkey, RSs are called Imam Hatip Schools (IHLs). They are primary or secondary schools that teach both academic and religious subjects, prepare students for national exams, employ university graduates as teachers, and offer state-recognized diplomas1. As state-funded institutions, IHLs occupy an ambivalent position: while formally embedded within a secular education system, they are simultaneously tasked with cultivating religious identity.

Religion shapes human behavior and development, and religiosity is both a personal choice and a social phenomenon influenced by broader relational contexts (Adams and Marshall 1996). In this process, religious education, together with the family, plays a central role in forming religious identity (Armet 2009), while religion more broadly underpins state authority and structures social interaction (Mitra 1991). Religious schools (RSs) exemplify the intersection of religion, education, and governance: shaped by and shaping state discourses, they navigate both cooperation and tension as faith-based and educational institutions (Qian and Kong 2018). Consequently, state–religion dynamics decisively influence RSs’ societal roles and often overshadow their core mission.

These trends raise critical questions about the effectiveness of state-supported religious education in countering or reversing broader secularizing dynamics, as evidenced by clear empirical shifts in religiosity at both global and national levels. Globally, surveys show a steady rise in the religiously unaffiliated and a decline in identification, especially among younger generations (Pew Research Center 2025b; Inglehart 2021). Similar patterns are evident in Turkey, where surveys indicate growing numbers of nonbelievers and reduced religious practice (Konda Research and Consultancy 2022). Taken together, these developments foreground a growing tension between expanding state support for religious schooling and declining levels of religiosity. This tension opens broader debates about the political role of RSs and, in the Turkish case, sets the stage for examining how Imam Hatip schools have become central to projects of desecularization.

The political role of IHLs has been increasingly scrutinized. Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, state involvement in religious education has expanded, resulting in a significant increase in both the presence and influence of RSs within the education system (İnal 2004b; Genç 2018). Governments justify this support as a way to address historical inequities, yet critics contend that the underlying aim is to de-secularize the school system in line with political agendas. İnal (2004a) notes that education, curricula, and textbooks often reflect political power and the state’s relationship with civil society. Furthermore, religious school textbooks can convey national identity and ideological messages through hidden curricula (Barišić and Jevtić 2018; Lisovskaya 2016; Profis 2016). Education thus becomes a critical arena where the broader dynamics of secularization and desecularization are most visibly enacted. As states assume responsibility for curricula and institutional structures, religious schooling reflects not only pedagogical concerns but also political projects of shaping collective identity.

Beyond Turkey, comparable patterns of state-led religious education appear in other contexts as well. For example, in India (Ananda and Lall 2022; Flåten 2017), Russia (Lisovskaya and Karpov 2010; Iakimova and Menshikov 2019), and Hungary (Velkey 2022), governments and religious actors have reshaped schooling to advance ideological or religious agendas. These cases underline that the Turkish experience is not exceptional but part of a broader global reconfiguration of religion, education, and state power, highlighting the wider significance of this study.

Yet, despite this expansion, survey data reveal declining religiosity among younger generations, including IHL students. This paradox—state-led desecularization through education alongside diminishing religious commitment—forms the central tension of this study. The article argues that state-led desecularization, when pursued through centralized and politicized forms of religious schooling, may generate outcomes that diverge from its intended objectives, contributing to ambivalence, disengagement, or reconfiguration of religiosity rather than its reinforcement. The guiding question is whether government-led desecularization, pursued through the expansion and transformation of Imam Hatip schools, has effectively reshaped religiosity among their students.

This article derives from a broader doctoral project examining the impacts of religious schooling, and focuses specifically on the Turkish case. The data were collected through expert interviews and analyzed using grounded theory, allowing for an in-depth exploration of how state-led desecularization in education interacts with shifting patterns of youth religiosity.

To situate this question, the next section develops a contextual framework by tracing the historical trajectory of secularization and desecularization in Turkey, with particular attention to the role of education. This is followed by the methodology and analysis, which examine how expert perspectives illuminate the effects of IHLs on student religiosity. Together, these sections provide the foundation for assessing the broader implications of state-led desecularization in contemporary Turkey and for understanding how similar dynamics may resonate beyond the Turkish case.

2. Contextual Framework

The state–religion relationship has been classified in different ways, often emphasizing the degree of state support for religion or religious influence over the state (Ahmed 2017; Mitra 1991). This approximate classification helps to illustrate the diverse and evolving nature of state–religion arrangements across historical and cultural contexts, and this complex relationship also manifests in the field of education (Modood and Sealy 2022). To explain religious change and the role of states in shaping it in the modern world, debates often revolve around two postulates: religion declines when demand diminishes, or it persists when supply remains abundant. Secularization theory, long considered the dominant explanation, argues that modernization reduces the demand for religion as individuals no longer rely on supernatural beliefs. In contrast, desecularization theory offers a newer perspective, suggesting that secularization and religious resurgence can coexist within the same society at different levels (Karpov 2010).

2.1. Theoretical Perspectives on Secularization and Desecularization

Secularization broadly refers to the withdrawal of social, cultural, and institutional spheres from religious authority, initially understood as “the removal of land from religious control” (Reaves 2012). Berger (1967, 1969) conceptualized it as both an institutional process—such as the separation of church and state, the nationalization of religious assets, and the emancipation of education from clerical supervision—and a cultural shift reflected in the declining presence of religious meanings in public life. It also entails a subjective dimension, as individuals increasingly interpret the world without recourse to religious frameworks.

For much of the twentieth century, secularization dominated explanations of religious change, rooted in assumptions that modernization, especially scientific progress, urbanization, and rationalization, would render religion obsolete (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Mills 1959; Wallace 1966). Yet empirical developments complicated this narrative. Observations from contexts like the United States (Tocqueville [1840] 1956) and the global resurgence of religion led Berger himself to reconsider the simplistic decline model, arguing that the world remains “as furiously religious as it ever was” (Berger 1999, p. 2). Critics such as Stark and Iannaccone (1994) contended that the theory was empirically falsified, pointing to revitalization across different settings, including the post-Soviet revival after enforced atheism (Greeley 1994; Stark 1999), and similar patterns in Muslim-majority contexts (Tamney 1979).

Despite these critiques, many scholars argue that secularization remains analytically useful if refined rather than discarded. Norris and Inglehart (2004) note that earlier formulations were overly dependent on Western Christian cases, while Lechner (1991) suggests the theory is “still largely valid” when understood probabilistically. Bruce (2001), analyzing long-term trends in Britain, demonstrates substantial decline in organized Christianity. Broader conceptualizations by Taylor (2007) and Casanova (2007) further expanded the debate, distinguishing between secularization as institutional differentiation, declining belief and practice, and the privatization of religion.

These limitations of secularization theory opened the way for desecularization, first introduced by Peter Berger. Berger, after he retreated from his long-held defense of secularization theory, argued that by the late 1970s it had been empirically falsified and excessively Eurocentric (Berger 1992, 2012). While acknowledging that modernization has secularizing consequences, Berger (1999) emphasized that it simultaneously generates counter-secular forces and that societal secularization does not necessarily correlate with secularization of individual consciousness. He defined desecularization as a form of counter-secularization, visible in the continuing strong presence of religion in the modern world (Berger 2015). Building on Berger’s insight, Karpov (2010) offered the first systematic conceptualization of desecularization, defining it as religious growth only when it develops in reaction to earlier or ongoing secularizing trends. Thus, desecularization presupposes a prior period of secularization and complements rather than refutes secularization theory: neither process is mutually exclusive, and both describe intertwined transformations in the relationship between religion and society.

Karpov (2010), building on Casanova’s (1994) three dimensions of secularization, defines desecularization as inverse tendencies through which religion reasserts social influence: rapprochement between institutions and religious norms, resurgence of beliefs and practices, and the return of religion to the public sphere. These processes are often weakly integrated, as institutional expansion may not mirror individual religiosity, and secularization and desecularization can unfold simultaneously. Their consequences vary: state support for religious education may foster revival or resistance; public visibility of religion may strengthen youth attachment or provoke alienation; and institutional rapprochement may coexist with stagnant mass religiosity. What appears fragmented may instead reflect complex interdependencies between secular and counter-secular forces.

Actors are central to desecularization. Berger (1999) notes that they often mobilize against secular elites, while Karpov (2010) emphasizes that grassroots dissatisfaction requires articulation by activist groups and intellectuals. Desecularizing movements can emerge “from below,” driven by grassroots believers, or “from above,” initiated by religious or secular elites with ideological or political agendas. A desecularized society materializes when three conditions converge: large grassroots movements, organizational capacity, and material or political resources. When these forces gain sufficient momentum, regimes with desecularizing agendas may rise to power.

2.2. Secularization and Desecularization in Turkey

When examined through the lens of state–religion relations, Turkey illustrates how secularization and desecularization are not mutually exclusive but appear with shifting weight across different historical periods. Early Republican reforms imposed a strict secular framework, yet later decades witnessed the gradual reemergence of religious institutions and practices, showing how both dynamics shaped the public role of religion. The trajectory of secularization, however, reaches back to the late Ottoman Empire, where modernization advanced through administrative reforms and exposure to European ideas (Davison 1981; Dönmez 2019; Gözübüyük and Kili 2000). These transformations paved the way for the Republican era, when the new state under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk became the first Muslim-majority country to constitutionally adopt secularism (Işık 1998) and launched comprehensive reforms to redefine state–religion relations in line with a Western-oriented vision.

This state-imposed secularization went beyond a formal separation of religion and politics, functioning as a positivist ideology aimed at constructing a homogenous society (Öztürk 2016; Dressler and Mandair 2011). It was formalized through constitutional changes in the 1920s and 1930s, including the abolition of Islam as the state religion (1928) and the declaration of secularism as a constitutional principle (1937). While these reforms did not eliminate religion, they subordinated it to state authority, confining it largely to the private sphere (Heper and Toktaş 2003). Cultural measures such as abandoning religious attire, promoting Western clothing, and shifting the weekend to Saturday–Sunday further reinforced this process (Uzun 2024).

One of the key spheres shaped by this secularization project was education—particularly religious education—which became a central point of contention since the founding of the Republic (Bayar 2009; Çakır et al. 2004). Secularism was widely regarded as a defining marker of “modern” statehood, and Atatürk’s secularization reforms were closely tied to a broader modernization project aimed at positioning Turkey as a fully modern nation-state. Seeking national development through secularization, the new regime restructured schooling to minimize religious instruction (Karaman 1997). The Tevhid-i Tedrisat Law abolished the pluralistic system and centralized all schools under the Ministry of National Education, where religious courses were permitted but tightly controlled (Çakır et al. 2004). Within this framework, the state aimed to promote a “true version of Islam” (Bayar 2009). Madrasas (i.e., traditional Islamic religious schools providing clerical training) were closed, religious subjects removed from secondary curricula in 1924 and 1927, and all Quran courses discontinued (Karaman 1997; Özgür 2012).

Imam Hatip Schools were first established in 1924 to replace the madrasas and train personnel for religious services such as leading prayers and conducting funerals (Özgür 2012). Initially limited in number, most were shut down by 1929, but reappeared in the 1930s with a curriculum combining standard subjects and additional Islamic courses (Morgul 2016). Their expansion accelerated after the transition to multi-party politics in 1950, and by the 1980s they had become not only vocational institutions but also attractive pathways for conservative families seeking social mobility (Çakır et al. 2004). The 28 February process of 1997 marked a critical turning point: IHL middle schools were closed, and strict university entrance restrictions sharply reduced enrollments, intensifying tensions between secularist state institutions and religiously conservative communities. Despite these constraints, their role in education and politics remained contested (Çakır et al. 2004; Azak 2012), and debates intensified until the AKP era.

Secularism in Turkey has largely been a state-driven project without deep social or historical roots, imposed from above and shaped by external dynamics (Mardin 1991; Kuru 2006; Tekin 2012; Küçükcan 2005). Initially designed to control religion rather than merely separate it, its assertive nature later prompted more liberal interpretations that emphasized democratic notions of separation and freed religion from strict state tutelage (Mohd Nor and Ibrahim 2023). Assertive secularism (Kuru 2009; Axiarlis 2014) paved the way for a form of counter-secularization (Berger 1999), which was likewise guided by the state as a top-down actor (Karpov 2010).

Discussions of state–religion relations in Turkey often highlight the long-standing tension between restrictive secularism and political forms of religious mobilization (Gülalp 2002; Rabasa and Larrabee 2008). The rise of the AKP, an Islamic-oriented political party, in 2002 marked a turning point, initiating a broader process of desecularization. While presenting itself as a conservative democratic actor, the AKP gradually challenged the secularist framework and expanded the public presence of religion, leading to a significant increase in religiosity and its visibility (Toprak 2005, 2007; Başkan 2014; Grigoriadis 2009; Yavuz 2020; Tuğal 2016). The early 2000s were often described as Turkey’s “golden decade,” characterized by modernization and initial praise for the AKP and Erdoğan. Yet by 2007 the trajectory shifted toward authoritarianism (Hermann 2014), with construction-driven growth creating a new Islamist bourgeoisie and secular–religious dynamics beginning to realign (Abramowitz and Barkey 2010).

In the last two decades, Turkey has undergone a marked process of desecularization, largely driven by initiatives under the AKP. Rather than reflecting a simple return of religion from below, this trajectory has been shaped through institutional reforms in law, education, and bureaucracy, which reintroduced religion into the public sphere and legitimized its role in governance (Yavuz and Öztürk 2019; Shlykov 2019). Desecularization is evident in education, politics, and daily life, functioning as a comprehensive political project that encompasses both public and private spheres. The strong emphasis on education demonstrates the intent to make these changes permanent, while the scope of transformation indicates that Turkey is moving beyond reversible policy shifts toward a regime change (Uzun 2024).

Education has been one of the most visible arenas where the shift toward desecularization has materialized. This was evident in the rapid growth of IHLs, the removal of constraints on graduates, and the curricular expansion of religious courses, especially after the 2012 reforms (Butler 2018). During the AKP era, state-supported religious schooling expanded substantially: the number of religious secondary and high schools rose sharply, and by 2021, around 23% of state education funding was allocated to them (İnal 2004a; Genç 2018; Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı 2021). While the government defends this expansion as redressing the restrictions of earlier secular policies, critics argue that it reflects a broader desecularization agenda and political control over the education system (İnal 2004a).

IHLs have undergone a structural transformation over time. Originally designed as vocational schools, they have gradually come to function alongside regular high schools, offering a combination of academic and religious curricula. Within this longer institutional trajectory, the “IHL project schools” initiative, launched in 2014, marked the introduction of a more selective and academically oriented model of Imam Hatip education. These project schools offer specialized tracks, including programs in sports and fine arts, and admit students through competitive examinations such as talent-based selection (ÖNDER 2022a, ÖNDER 2022b). As a result, Imam Hatip schools today resemble mainstream high schools more closely, having lost much of their distinct vocational character.

Religious education has thus become one of the key instruments illustrating the continuity of state-centric control across both secularizing and desecularizing periods. Despite strong political support, however, IHL enrollment declined by 22% between 2020/21 and 2023/24, reflecting changing societal preferences (National Education Statistics, 2020/21–2023/24). Scholarship highlights both reactions to strict secular control—including distancing from religion (Ertit 2018; Evered and Evered 2016)—and cases where increased religious visibility fuels stronger religiosity or intolerance (Yeşilada and Noordijk 2010; Erişen and Erdoğan 2018).

These institutional transformations are mirrored in broader empirical trends, both globally and within Turkey, which provide important context for understanding the paradox of expanding religious education alongside declining religiosity. The number of religiously unaffiliated people worldwide rose by 270 million, reaching 1.9 billion, with ‘nones’ accounting for 24.2% of the global population (Pew Research Center 2025a). This growing unaffiliation, together with increasing religious diversity, adds complexity to debates about the role of RSs, whose impact on social cohesion, integration and religiosity remains limited (Maussen and Bader 2015; D’Agostino and Carozza 2019; Bertram-Troost et al. 2006). Across Europe, surveys indicate a steady decline in religious identification, particularly among younger generations (EVS 2022; World Values Survey Association 2022). Inglehart (2021) notes that secularization has accelerated since 2007, with Nordic countries demonstrating that high trust and equality can persist despite declining religiosity. Broader evidence further links improved living conditions and economic prosperity to reduced reliance on religion for morality and social stability (Pew Research Center 2022).

Similar patterns are evident in Turkey. WIN/Gallup International’s “Religion and Atheism Index” shows that between 2005 and 2012 the main shift was not toward atheism but from self-identifying as “religious” to “not religious” (WIN-Gallup International 2012). Konda surveys conducted in 2011 and 2021 confirm this trend, with nonbelievers rising from 2% to 7% and those identifying as religious dropping from 57% to 50% (Konda Research and Consultancy 2022). The change is especially pronounced among youth: a Generation Z survey found that only 15.7% of respondents under 20 fulfilled religious requirements, while 55.8% did not and 28.5% identified as nonbelievers (Zeyrek 2020). These findings highlight a paradox: while financial and political support for religious schooling has expanded, overall religiosity continues to decline. This tension has sparked broader debates about the public funding and autonomy of faith-based schools, as state support often entails increased regulation and control (Merry 2007; Walford 2001). These debates naturally extend to the political dimension of religious education, where state involvement has shaped the role and reach of RSs.

Taken together, these survey findings reinforce the broader trajectory outlined above: Turkey’s approach to managing religion has alternated between restrictive secularism and politically driven desecularization, each reshaping institutional and societal understandings of religion. These shifting state strategies form the foundation for analyzing how religious schools operate within broader power structures.

3. Methods

3.1. Methodological Approach

This study employed a constructivist Grounded Theory (GT) approach to explore how religious schools influence students’ religiosity, drawing on expert perspectives. Originally developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), GT is a systematic, inductive method designed to generate theory grounded in empirical data. It relies on iterative processes of data collection and analysis, guided by the constant comparative method, theoretical sampling, and memo-writing (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Charmaz 2014). The constructivist version of GT, as elaborated by Charmaz (2000, 2014), recognizes the co-construction of meaning between researcher and participants. Rather than discovering objective truths, it emphasizes how theories emerge through interaction and interpretation. This approach was particularly suited to the present research, as it allowed flexibility to uncover patterns and meanings within an underexplored area.

Data were generated through in-depth expert interviews, which are consistent with the iterative and reflexive logic of grounded theory. The interviews provided the primary data source and were analyzed through coding and memoing to develop a conceptual understanding of the relationship between religious schooling and religiosity.

3.2. Expert Interviews

The expert interview is a form of qualitative inquiry designed for participants with specialized knowledge and positions of influence. Experts are defined not only by professional experience but also by their ability to provide practical insights into a given topic (Döringer 2021 Flick 2014; Bogner and Menz 2009). In this study, experts included academics researching religious schools, teachers, administrators, and public figures engaged in debates on religious education. The definition was broadened to encompass authors, speakers, and individuals with a significant public or social media presence. Within the context of IHLs, this diversity—spanning civil servants, academics, teachers, and principals from varied socio-economic, ideological, and religious backgrounds—was essential to capture the multifaceted nature of the debate.

All interviews were conducted as unstructured conversations, allowing participants to elaborate on their experiences while enabling the researcher to iteratively refine questions in response to emerging analytical categories. This format ensured comparability across interviews while remaining flexible enough to accommodate grounded theory’s inductive logic.

The sampling process followed the iterative logic of grounded theory. Initial purposive sampling identified participants with relevant expertise, while theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss 1967) guided subsequent interviews as categories emerged (Charmaz 2001, 2015). Maximum contrast sampling ensured diverse perspectives across academics, practitioners, and public figures. Recruitment was challenging due to the sensitivity of the topic, so trust was built through direct communication and personal references. Interviews continued until theoretical saturation was reached.

All participants had substantial and long-term engagement with Imam Hatip schools. The least experienced interviewees, current IHL teachers, had a minimum of eight years of teaching experience; in addition, they were themselves IHL graduates and theology faculty alumni, meaning their involvement in the IHL milieu extended well beyond their formal teaching careers.

Academic participants typically combined multiple roles, including former IHL teaching, ongoing academic research, and the training of future IHL teachers. Union representatives had similarly accumulated long-term experience through extended periods as administrators, teachers, or academics within the IHL system. Interviewees identifying as atheist were IHL graduates who had been active for many years in secular or atheist organizations.

Overall, excluding formal schooling years, all participants had been embedded in the IHL context for at least eight years, while the most experienced expert had over four decades of sustained engagement with Imam Hatip education. This depth of experience enabled participants to make informed comparisons across student cohorts and policy periods.

In total, 18 interviews were conducted across multiple cities in Turkey. Most took place in participants’ offices, providing a quiet and focused environment. Questions explored views on the relationship between religion and education, interpretations of the state’s role in shaping religious schooling, and assessments of recent policy changes. Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Szeged (Ref. No. 1/2020), and all participants provided informed consent. Requests for anonymity were respected, and identifying details withheld where necessary.

It is important to note that the study does not include interviews with students themselves. Accordingly, the findings reflect expert interpretations of youth religiosity rather than direct self-identifications by young people, and claims of change or decline are situated within the framework of adult perceptions and institutional observations rather than treated as definitive measures of students’ lived religiosity.

3.3. Data Analysis and Coding

Data were analyzed using Atlas.ti 7, which supports the inductive and iterative nature of grounded theory by allowing simultaneous coding, memo writing, and category development. The analysis followed the classic GT procedures of open, focused, and theoretical coding (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz 2014). Interviews were transcribed, coded line by line, and constantly compared to identify similarities, differences, and emerging categories. Codes were progressively refined and clustered into higher-order concepts through constant comparison, enabling the development of a coherent theoretical framework. Throughout the process, memo writing played a crucial role in documenting analytical insights, theoretical linkages, and reflections (Chun Tie et al. 2019). Memos were written immediately after each interview and during coding sessions, helping to track conceptual development and guide theoretical sampling decisions. This ongoing dialogue between data, codes, and memos allowed theoretical categories to evolve inductively rather than being imposed a priori (Corbin and Strauss 2015). Interview questions served as a flexible guide, focusing on experts’ interpretations of religious schooling, the role of the state, and perceived changes in students’ religiosity. As new insights emerged, questions were refined to probe developing concepts. Analysis continued until theoretical saturation was achieved, when additional data no longer produced new ideas.

Together, these procedures ensured that the analysis remained consistent with grounded theory principles and provided a robust basis for examining the effects of state-led desecularization through Imam Hatip schools.

4. Analysis

Given the contentious nature of the topic and the openness of grounded theory to new concepts, this study generated a broad and multilayered dataset on the influence of IHLs on students’ religiosity. This article concentrates on the relationship between IHLs and religiosity to examine the process and outcomes of government-led desecularization efforts aimed at raising religious youth. The analysis situates this relationship within the broader context of modernization, framed through state–religious school relations and the dynamics of secularization and desecularization.

The interviews revealed a spectrum of views on whether IHLs shape students’ religiosity. Some experts emphasized that IHLs have limited influence, attributing religiosity primarily to family, social environment, and early socialization. Others pointed to gradual disengagement from religious belief and practice, often described as weakening commitment, indifference, or subtle shifts toward secular orientations. In these accounts, modernization and secularization appeared as the underlying forces, while state efforts to promote religiosity through schools were seen as largely ineffective or even counterproductive.

When discussing the influence of IHLs, interviewees inevitably referred to ongoing debates about youth turning toward atheism and deism. These debates reflect how experts interpret students’ questioning of faith rather than direct self-definitions articulated by young people themselves. Discussions centered on students questioning belief, the rise of local deist interpretations, and concerns that many were becoming “religion-weary” despite state investment in religious education. Politicians and public figures also joined these debates, acknowledging deist tendencies among IHL students and warning that such shifts challenged government efforts to raise a religious generation (Akgül 2022; Akyol 2024; Bozan 2018; Diken 2018a, 2018b; Günaydın 2017; Kandemir 2022; Tayfur 2022; M. Uyanık 2018).

A different set of perspectives resisted framing these changes as atheism or deism, stressing instead that what occurs among IHL students is better understood as secularization or lifestyle transformation. Some described students questioning or distancing themselves without adopting explicit labels, while others noted that categories such as deism are often projected by adults rather than claimed by youth themselves. T7 emphasized that students do not engage in an intellectual comparison of philosophical schools and then decide on one of them; rather, they do not reach the point of saying “I have chosen this.”

Several respondents highlighted that atheism and deism often emerge as reactionary stances shaped by political contradictions. They pointed to authoritarian religious language in politics and the inconsistency between rhetoric and practice, which foster disengagement and protest among youth. As one teacher observed, students look at their teachers and the government and ask, “Which one is Islam?”—a question interpreted by this interviewee as signaling disillusionment and erosion of faith, rather than as a neutral theological inquiry.

Some experts, nevertheless, highlighted more explicit tendencies toward atheism and deism. T5, a theology professor with 20 years of IHL experience, described a growing number of students confiding in him about losing faith: “We know there are people in the religious community, such as homosexuals, atheists, deists, and non-believers… They are definitely increasing (kesssinlikle)” (T5). This statement reflects the interviewee’s perception of overlapping categories rather than empirically verified identities claimed by the students themselves. They referred to surveys, family concerns, and students’ confessions of doubt, interpreting these as signs of declining religiosity. T1 described families distressed by youth leaving religion: “This will be the last religious generation they raise… People are gradually moving away from religion… First towards natural religion… and if that doesn’t work, towards atheism.” (T1). Yet even here, the emphasis was less on disbelief as a definitive outcome and more on broader social dynamics that weaken religious influence.

The experts agreed that IHLs do not decisively determine students’ religiosity. Whether described as decline, indifference, or ambiguous transformation, experts consistently highlighted that observed changes are better understood within wider processes of modernization, individualization, and shifting cultural sensibilities. Importantly, the analysis captures expert interpretations of youth religiosity rather than direct evidence of students’ lived religious identities. These findings cannot be separated from the state–religion nexus: the tension between secularization and desecularization, and the political language surrounding religious education, frames the current trajectory of religiosity in Turkey. This provides the backdrop for understanding how participants interpreted these dynamics.

4.1. Top-Down Secularism

Participants who regarded secularization as inevitable strongly opposed desecularization theories. Academic respondents in particular criticized claims that secularization theory is “dead.” As T5 argued, differences in the pace of secularization across societies do not signal its reversal: “The fact that the speed of secularization in a country is less than others does not mean desecularization; there is only slower secularization, and the slowness of secularization does not mean desecularization.” (T5).

Several participants who rejected the atheism–deism framing nonetheless identified the ongoing transformation as secularization. While some struggled to name it, others explicitly described the process as “worldliness” (in Turkish: dünyevileşme) or secularization, emphasizing that modernization inevitably leads societies to distance themselves from religion. For some, this trend was considered even more dangerous than atheism or deism.

T17 noted that religiosity has declined and people have become more secular. T12 defined secularization as becoming worldly: “In the Quran, secularization, that is, becoming worldly, binding everything to the world, accumulating wealth without considering halal or haram… Being worldly means believing that everything ends with death, but living as if it will end.” (T12).

Several participants linked this shift to political and social developments, when the religious segment was perceived to have secularized. T15 described a general dissolution against religion, while T6 argued that society sought more secular interpretations to legitimize this distancing.

Modernization was repeatedly cited as the structural driver. Urbanization and industrialization were seen as producing secularism as a natural outcome. T5 summarized: “Atheism is the extreme point of secularism, its peak. The umbrella title is secularism.” (T5). According to T12, religiosity decreases as access to worldly comforts increases. Despite the increasing visibility of religiosity in the public sphere, there has been no corresponding increase in its depth or quality. “As the rate of benefiting from the world’s blessings increases, religiosity does not increase, it decreases.” (T12).

Participants also emphasized the role of rising welfare of religious people under the AKP government. As prosperity grew, adherence to religious rules weakened. T6 argued: “…this is not atheism or deism. This is drifting towards a looser structure, a search for interpreting halal and haram differently… but not completely distancing from religion. It is a more secular interpretation. … It means that we… need to make a great effort regarding the test of Muslims with money. That is… we need to understand well the people who become distant from religion after getting rich while being religious when they were poor…” (T6). He and T13 both described wealth as a test that many failed, noting that religious people often reinterpreted faith to suit their interests.

Atheist participants similarly highlighted the tension between religion and worldly pleasures. T9 connected this to political power and economic interests: “…the current conservative segment says… do not ask for sharia from me, but you can ask for green dollars from me… When the religious segment gets involved in the economy, what happens… The faith part also slowly starts to change… You are a religious opportunist (dinci), but not pious (dindar).” (T9).

These perspectives underscore that secularization remains a powerful lens for interpreting current transformations, yet the contrasting views on desecularization highlight the need to examine how state-led efforts to reassert religion interact with these dynamics.

4.2. Institutionalized Desecularization

Participants who observed that even the religious segment of society secularized under modernization also pointed to state-led efforts to halt this process, often described as institutional desecularization. The question was whether expanding religious institutions with state support could protect society from secularization. The general answer was no: increasing the number of IHLs does not make students more religious, nor does it prevent them from adopting secular lifestyles.

Interest in religious institutions was interpreted less as genuine religiosity and more as support for the state. T1 and T5 spoke of religiosity intertwined with nationalism, noting that institutional religion strengthens political influence rather than individual faith. In this sense, what appears as desecularization is actually the politicization of religion. As T5 put it: “I am absolutely certain that the most important reason for institutional desecularization is political… The more the number of IHLs increases, the more they become a backyard. But you cannot say that Imam Hatip students do not date… They are all secularizing at an advanced level.” (T5).

Several participants emphasized that IHL students are no different from those in general schools, sharing the same culture, books, and influences. T14 concluded: “There is no longer a school type called Imam Hatip… All schools are the same.” (T14).

Most agreed that expanding institutional religion is ineffective, even counterproductive, especially given the unprecedented access to information through modernization and technology. The internet and alternative sources of knowledge influence individuals more than religious institutions, accelerating secularization. Religious education was seen as largely ineffective in this context.

Interviews consistently rejected claims that increasing religious institutions produces desecularization. Building mosques or expanding IHLs does not translate into stronger religiosity. T5 stressed the political misuse of religion: “We think there is desecularization… but we are foolish. This misleads us.” (T5).

A recurring theme was the failure of social engineering. Participants argued that people cannot be made religious or irreligious by force. Top-down modernization or demodernization does not work; societies change gradually, in their own flow. As T5 noted: “…society gradually secularizes. And once it tastes secularization, once it tastes freedom, it will be hard to turn back.” (T5).

Some warned that state-supported desecularization may even accelerate secularization. Intense exposure to religious education may even contribute to this shift, as young people seek autonomy from imposed religiosity. T1 argued that stronger state pressure leads first to secularization, then to atheism and deism. T18 added: “Top-down religiosity brings deep irreligiosity. Go and look at Iran… Go and look at Saudi Arabia… If Turkey tries to do this from the top, this will be the result.” (T18).

Finally, many participants linked the limits of institutional desecularization directly to modernization and technological transformation. As societies modernize and become wealthier, mobility and communication expand, granting access to alternative lifestyles and ideas—thus deepening secularization. According to T5, the only way to desecularize would be to reverse modernization: “The only way to desecularize is to demodernize… to impoverish people, to make them ignorant, to keep them away from information. Desecularization depends on demodernization. The deterministic result of modernization is secularization. Wherever the agents of modernization enter, it gradually secularizes. The reverse is also true—demodernizing people will desecularize them” (T5).

The interviews revealed diverse views on Imam Hatip high schools, from claims of declining religiosity to skepticism and more ambiguous transformations. Yet participants largely agreed that these shifts were less about atheism or deism and more about secularization, tied to modernization, individualization, and changing cultural sensibilities. They also stressed the limits of institutional interventions, noting that state-supported efforts such as expanding IHLs often fail to counter these dynamics and instead highlight the political dimension of religion in education. These views set the stage for examining the broader state–religion nexus, where the political dimension of desecularization becomes more explicit.

4.3. Religionized Politics and Educational Exposure

This political dimension was most visible in participants’ reflections on the state’s ambition to raise a “pious generation” through religious education. Most argued that the financial, social, and political support given to IHLs is ineffective at best, and in many cases counterproductive, producing resistance rather than religiosity. Even respondents who rejected state intervention in other domains acknowledged the political dimension of this support. Whether IHLs receive more resources than other schools remains contested, yet participants commonly classified such support into categories such as discursive endorsement, economic subsidies, and job opportunities after graduation.

According to T10, with the rise of the AKP in the early 2000s, IHLs began to be seen as a raw material to build society, a “battery.” He noted that Erdoğan frequently referred to IHLs to enhance their prestige: “By stating that he himself is an IHL graduate… an IHL graduate can become the President… he imposes a vision and a historical obligation on it.” (T10). Economic support was debated: while some respondents argued that IHLs did not receive much more funding despite political praise, others pointed to better facilities and positive discrimination. Campaigns offering scholarships reinforced this perception. Yet some emphasized that many IHLs still request financial aid, and that advantages often stem from civil society or alumni associations rather than the state.

Respondents identified vote seeking as one of the reasons for state support to IHLs. Religion’s identity-forming feature was also highlighted as a way to cultivate “ideal citizens” who are Muslim, Turkish, and Sunni. T1 explained: “Imam Hatip means a place where Muslim, Turkish, and Sunni education is given… ready-made soldiers for the state… ready to die for the state… ready to vote for you.” (T1). Another frequently mentioned rationale was preventing radicalization. T7 explained: “State religious education prevents sects from using religion for bad purposes… IHL prevents religious exploitation, especially among young people… because they are very open to manipulation.” (T7).

Government support also affected the number of IHL buildings and students, especially after 2012. Some respondents saw this as a natural process, while others argued that exam systems left families with no alternatives. T17 noted: “The number of IHL students increased significantly… Families with some financial means sent their children to private schools… Those who couldn’t afford it had to send their children to the neighborhood IHL.” (T17). Beyond political purposes, the religionization of institutions was also seen as pushing individuals away from faith. Two religious respondents recounted conversations with atheists who claimed that only 10% had chosen atheism independently, while 90% were driven to it by government religious policies. The increased visibility of religion was described as producing reactive distancing. Excessive religious symbols in the public sphere were perceived as intrusions into private life, prompting some to disengage.

Erdoğan’s statement, “We will raise a pious generation,” was interpreted in various ways. Some saw it as a rationale for the religionization of education, while others doubted IHLs had such capacity. A number of respondents, though finding the statement well-intentioned, argued that its implementation drove people away from religion. T8 claimed that political discourses had counterproductive results, increasing the demand for secularism and freedom of conscience compared to before 2000: “Therefore, this is also the success (!) of the political power; we only understood how essential and needed secularism is. People want what they need. There was no need yesterday, but there is more need today.” (T8). He further alleged that a Ministry of National Education survey found more than 50% of IHL students identified as atheist, though the results were concealed.

Respondents who believed the number of IHLs increased linked this to the rise of atheism-deism in different ways. Some pointed to students’ refusal to engage with religious lessons, while others noted a decline in quality as numbers expanded. T17 explained that intensive exposure to religious knowledge provoked questioning and even abandonment of faith: “If they hadn’t come to an IHL… they might not have encountered something that would challenge and provoke them… But by forcing them to IHL… they have been pushed into questioning. And we end up seeing students who leave IHL and abandon their faith.” (T17). T1 similarly emphasized the negative impact of this exposure, noting that religious knowledge once isolated became mainstream and dominant. T9, an atheist teacher, described students concealing doubts due to institutional pressure: “Many students want to leave the school, and I know I am holding them back! He says, ‘If I stay here, I will become an unbeliever.’” (T9).

Overall, the accounts suggest that political support and the religionization of education not only fail to counter secularization but often accelerate it, either through reactive distancing or through intensified exposure that provokes questioning.

5. Discussion

This section discusses the findings on the interplay between IHLs and student religiosity to assess the trajectory and outcomes of state-led desecularization policies designed to cultivate a “pious generation.” While experts highlight the spread of atheism and deism among IHL students as evidence of secularizing pressures tied to modernization, institutional religiosity continues to be central to these debates, raising questions about the effectiveness of government interventions in shaping authentic religious commitment.

Existing studies highlight a clear non-religious trend among youth, marked by declining prayer practices, greater acceptance of secular authorities, and liberalizing social norms (Küçükural et al. 2023; Ertit 2018, 2024). What makes this shift particularly significant is its visibility within IHLs, where experts report rising atheist and deist tendencies. These developments are closely linked to state-led initiatives aimed at fostering religiosity, yet such efforts are widely perceived as ineffective or even counterproductive, accelerating secularization and disbelief. Respondents emphasized that institutional desecularization, driven by political motives, fails to cultivate genuine faith and instead produces “reactive atheism,” a response to authoritarian religious structures. Beyond the school context, broader social transformations also reinforce these secularizing tendencies.

Broader processes of modernization—rising conservative wealth, urbanization, and technological advancement—were consistently linked to a secular orientation, as individuals prioritized worldly interests over religious obligations. Youth indifference was often described as reactive rather than philosophical, with “deism” functioning more as a label for wider secularization shaped by social pressures. In this politicized context, debates around atheism and deism were seen as exaggerated threats to the AKP’s religious agenda, closely tied to prosperity and state-led religiosity. Institutional efforts to promote faith were therefore perceived as politically motivated, fostering disengagement rather than genuine belief.

The entanglement of state religious policy and youth secularization further illustrates this dynamic. Mosque-centered initiatives and politicized Islamic rhetoric have weakened the credibility of organized religion, pushing some toward deism (Çakır 2018; Beki 2018). Respondents described the AKP’s promotion of IHLs as a “pious generation” project that often backfires, with schools perceived as instruments of Islamizing education rather than nurturing authentic religiosity (Sarfati 2015). This conflation of devotion with political loyalty led many youth to reject religious symbols associated with partisan identity, while inconsistent messaging—such as Quran course expansions or politicized use of the headscarf—was seen to accelerate reactive distancing from religion.

A further dimension of youth disengagement is the perceived hypocrisy of officials who preach religious values while implicated in corruption. This erosion of trust resonates with survey data showing rising non-belief among children of conservative families (Azak 2018), a trend Bilici (2018) attributes to the clash between ideals and political realities. Altınordu (2021) notes that the broader impact of politics on belief remains understudied, underscoring the contradiction between the state’s religious agenda and its social outcomes.

A further source of disengagement lies in the disillusionment with religious leaders, who are expected to embody integrity and compassion (Mardiana et al. 2021; Umami 2018) but are often perceived as compromised by political opportunism. Respondents described the exploitation of religious symbols for personal gain as fueling reactive atheism, with youth judging faith through the failures of its representatives. This erosion of trust reflects a broken covenant, where corruption undermines both devotion and service (Mraczek 2019). Even supportive initiatives such as youth forums (Aprida et al. 2023) cannot offset the collapse of moral authority, resulting in a generational retreat from organized religion as young people reject institutions that preach values they fail to practice. This erosion of trust extends beyond political elites to religious leaders and symbols, deepening youth disengagement.

Youth also described alienation stemming from the persistent co-opting of Islamic symbols by political actors, a dynamic that fosters reactive secularization. Studies confirm that when sacred symbols are mobilized for political purposes, youth engagement with organized religion declines sharply (Isaev and Rumyantseva 2022). Respondents further noted that curricula reflect state priorities and national identity rather than student needs, reinforcing perceptions that religious education serves an ideological agenda rather than cultivating authentic belief. Alongside these political dynamics, technological change has become another decisive factor shaping youth religiosity.

Technological advancements—particularly digital media—emerged as primary drivers of reactive atheism. Social media and internet access expose students to diverse lifestyles, religious interpretations, and atheist perspectives unavailable to earlier generations, intensifying skepticism and confusion (Oruç 2024; Taira 2023). Global communities online normalize atheism and deism, while heavy social media use among Gen Z fosters individualism and weakens ethical and religious values (Tohari 2024; Komala et al. 2024). Interviews confirm that these platforms provide religious knowledge absent in formal curricula, encourage questioning of authority, and hybridize traditions, producing new practices that challenge orthodoxy (Rofidah and Muhid 2022; Mohamad, 2023).

At the same time, research highlights the dual potential of digitalization for religious life. Digital platforms can generate new forms of spiritual engagement beyond traditional institutions (Ballares-Burgos and Avilés-Salvador 2020), sustain participation among highly religious adolescents (Zulkifli et al. 2023), and empower marginalized believers (Taira 2021; Aringo 2024). Historical evidence shows religions have long adapted to technological change, suggesting both risks and opportunities (Adam 2012; Medzhidova 2024). Yet global connectivity also weakens traditional influence by presenting secular alternatives: pop culture increasingly shapes moral views, while automation and AI displace communal practices, correlating with declining religiosity (Jackson et al. 2023). Together, these dynamics reshape youth engagement with religion, balancing new avenues of spiritual expression with intensified exposure to secular and skeptical content.

In this new world, to what extent can religious schooling shape the ways young people believe? Broader research cautions that these dynamics vary across contexts. Religious schooling can shape later religiosity, but studies show that its effect on irreligiosity is neither direct nor uniform; outcomes differ significantly across cultural and educational settings. Family religious socialization and general educational level typically exert a stronger and more consistent influence than school type, meaning that attending a religious school does not reliably predict continued religiosity or prevent later irreligiosity (Wadsworth and Walker 2017; Rosta and Pusztai 2022; Aslan 2018; B. Z. Uyanık 2024).

In contrast to the literature’s general findings, some interviews in Turkey highlighted a paradoxical impact of religious education. While detailed exposure to religious teachings can foster resistance, students with minimal prior exposure sometimes become more religious after attending IHLs. Religious respondents often attributed atheism to distorted Islamic interpretations, particularly fabricated hadiths overshadowing Quranic teachings. Others argued that direct engagement with core texts and prophetic practices itself can provoke disbelief—a dynamic academics describe as “reactive atheism.” This phenomenon emerges when radical believers, disillusioned with authoritarian religious structures, transform into outspoken atheists.

Some respondents also believed that many students turn atheist precisely because they study religion in depth. One compared it to someone who stops believing in magic after learning the tricks. Although these findings cannot be generalized and were described by some respondents as reflecting only a small minority, others emphasized their importance as a significant phenomenon which might become more visible over time. One respondent summarized this paradox with Mark Twain’s remark: “If you want to make an atheist, make him read the Bible.” These observations underscore that the content and implementation of religious education should be handled carefully, as its outcomes are neither predictable nor uniform.

Within the broader theoretical context, secularization can be understood both as the institutional separation of religion from state structures (Berger 1967) and as the decline of religious consciousness in society (Berger 1969). Kuru (2009) emphasizes that the form secularism takes depends on historical trajectories of state–religion relations: while passive secularism (e.g., the United States) permits religion’s visibility in the public sphere, assertive secularism (e.g., France and Turkey) requires the state to actively exclude religion from public life (p. 11).

Turkey’s experience reflects assertive secularization, yet these projects simultaneously prepared the ground for what Karpov (2010) describes as desecularization—religion’s re-emergence in response to earlier secularizing pressures. Berger’s (1999) dialectical perspective is useful here: state-led secularization achieved institutional success, such as curtailing religious education, but failed to transform individual consciousness, thereby opening space for counter-reactions. The AKP’s expansion of religious schools, mosque construction, and normalization of the headscarf exemplify desecularization, though in Turkey this revival has been orchestrated by the state rather than arising organically.

Building on Kuru’s framework, these developments can be distinguished as passive desecularization (emerging visibility of religion) versus assertive desecularization (state-driven imposition). Turkey illustrates the latter: Imam Hatip schools have been elevated as flagship institutions, politically and economically supported due to their perceived transformative role. In this top-down model, religious schools function simultaneously as instruments of desecularization and as mechanisms of political-religious authority. The parallel is striking: just as assertive secularization once mobilized secular schools against religion, assertive desecularization now mobilizes religious schools against secularity.

Yet the findings suggest that state-led desecularization struggles to cultivate authentic religiosity. Students frequently respond with disengagement, underscoring a broader dialectic: attempts to regulate religion—whether through secularization or desecularization—produce unintended consequences at the level of belief. Turkey thus appears to complete a cycle: assertive secularization failed to eradicate faith, and assertive desecularization fails to instill it. Both diminish the credibility of institutional religion while pushing belief into individualized, often oppositional forms.

6. Conclusions

The central question—whether the state’s attempts to desecularize society through IHLs—produces a paradoxical outcome. Instead of nurturing faith, state-supported IHLs frequently generate indifference or even reactive atheism. This pattern is shaped by several interrelated factors: the politicization of Islam, the pressures of modernization, and young people’s digital access to alternative worldviews. While some respondents described complete abandonment of religion, others reported compartmentalizing it. Even those sympathetic to IHLs acknowledged the issue, attributing it to influences such as modernity and secularism.

A key finding is that state sponsorship of IHLs is widely interpreted as a nation-building project rather than a genuine effort to cultivate belief. The AKP era exemplifies how religion has been instrumentalized not only to mobilize conservative constituencies but also to consolidate the ideological dominance of the state (Yavuz 2019). Such instrumentalization accelerates secularizing dynamics by equating religion with political agendas. Respondents stressed that when religion is bound to partisan projects, the harm to young people’s faith is particularly acute, since they perceive the misuse of something sacred more severely than ordinary matters. Attitudes toward IHLs thus closely reflect political alignments, highlighting how partisan divisions shape perceptions of religious education.

Most importantly, religious schooling emerges as dual in character: at once a vehicle for transmitting state ideology and a site of resistance. This paradox compels scholars to reconsider the role of education in the “deprivatization” of religion. As Owens (2015) observes, religion has not vanished but rather transformed, adapting to shifting sociopolitical contexts. Drawing on Asad’s (1993) post-structuralist perspective, rigid boundaries between the religious and the secular give way to fluid categories negotiated within classrooms. Habermas’s notion of a “postsecular society” (in Gorski and Altınordu 2008) further illuminates this complexity: schools become arenas where religious and secular worldviews interact. Altınordu’s work underscores that religiosity must be assessed beyond conventional indicators, recognizing its evolving cultural and discursive forms. In this sense, the classroom becomes a microcosm of ongoing transformation—an essential site for future inquiry.