The Muslim Vote Campaign in the UK: Expanding Social Movement Theory

Abstract

This article aims to understand Muslim voting trends in the United Kingdom through a study of the movement that called itself The Muslim Vote. Drawing on interviews and other publicly available primary material, it uses Social Movement Theory to analyse the movement that emerged in the post-7 October 2023 landscape. It argues that voter fatigue with both the Labour and Conservative Parties, due to their failure to address acute economic issues in the UK, as well as both parties’ support for Israel, created opportunities for TMV to emerge. Consequently, TMV mobilised resources, including decades of political experience and a new emerging group of politically educated youth, to help power its campaign. It also demonstrates how TMV used common frames of reference for Muslims, such as the Ummah, aided by social media apps, shining light on Israel’s actions in Palestine to engage Muslims across the UK. In highlighting some of the nascent successes of TMV’s efforts in co-ordination with local Muslim groups, whereby independent candidates came to power, it demonstrates that TMV has the latent ability to reshape Muslim political identity if it were to continue its momentum. Through this enquiry, it finally lends itself to the literature that examines Muslim voting trends in the UK and Europe.

1. Introduction

In the British general elections of 2024, the Labour Party soared to power with more than 400 seats across the UK. However, despite this thumping win at the national level, much of its victory was marred by the fact that it obtained the lowest vote share (33% approximately) than any other winning party in the post-World War era (Kirk et al. 2024). While many reasons contributed towards this pyrrhic victory, one major aspect that played a role was the decrease in Muslims voting for the Labour party and the issue of Israel–Palestinian conflict. While many experts and UN officials described Israeli action in Palestine as a genocide perpetrated by Israel, the Labour Party was quite supportive of Israel, with the Labour Party voting against a ceasefire in Israel in November 2023.1 These actions and apathy towards Palestinians enraged many Muslim voters and activists, leading a new campaign to consolidate Muslim votes in the July 2024 elections called The Muslim Vote campaign (TMV).

Launched in December 2023, TMV represents a significant shift in British Muslim political engagement in the elections. A tangible result of the campaign has been the victory of six different independents and the slashing of majorities for Labour candidates in several constituencies previously considered safe seats for the Labour Party. This is unprecedented given that the number of independent candidates that won in the general elections of 2024 was more than the total number of independents who won in all general elections since 1945 (Bale 2019).

In this paper, I aim to analyse TMV through the framework of Social Movement Theory, providing insights into its emergence, strategies, and potential impact on UK politics. The key research questions that it focuses on are two-fold: What factors contributed to the rise and influence of The Muslim Vote (TMV) as a political mobilisation movement in the UK? I plan to analyse this rise using Social Movement Theory (SMT). Secondly, how has TMV reshaped Muslim political engagement in the UK?

This paper employed a mixed-methods approach to analyse The Muslim Vote campaign from a top-down perspective. My research began with a qualitative analysis of TMV campaign materials, including websites, social media content, and press releases. This allowed me to understand the movement’s messaging, strategies, and self-presentation. I complemented this with a quantitative analysis of TMV-endorsed candidates who won elections, providing insights into the strategy of selecting candidates. Much of this was dependent on datasets that were provided to me by the organisers of TMV.

To gain deeper insights into the movement’s organisation and goals, I conducted open-ended semi-structured interviews with various members associated with TMV. A total of about 10 interviews were conducted, which included repeated interviews with those involved with conceptualising the campaign and organising it. Community leaders, including members of Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) and other such organisations that were closely affiliated with TMV were also interviewed. In addition, I also spoke to volunteers involved in the campaign as well as observers of the campaign who were politically active. These included members of the political establishment as well as activists who did not engage with The Muslim Vote campaign. This multifaceted approach enabled me to conduct a comprehensive examination of TMV through the lens of Social Movement Theory, which is explained below.

Some limitations, however, remain. Firstly, due to time and resource constraints, I was unable to analyse how voters felt about the movement and what prompted them to engage with independent candidates. In addition, I was also unable to go constituency-wise and understand specific Muslim voting patterns since the available data needed far more analysis. Indeed, as pointed out by popular polling organisation ‘More in Common’, it is not easily possible to identify Muslim voting patterns in the UK (More in Common 2024).

Given these limitations and the scope of the paper being limited to the movement’s leadership alone, 10 interviews were deemed sufficient since they engaged with the main architects, co-ordinators, and volunteers associated with the movement. Moreover, since SMT looks at resources, framing, and opportunities, interviews with leaders helped satisfactorily explain these factors, also justifying the selection of these individuals as interviewees. However, not engaging with ordinary members of these movements is a limitation and contributes to the elite leadership bias within SMT studies. While it would have been useful to do so, time and resource constraints prevented me from doing so. Nonetheless, there is much more scope to analyse this issue from many other angles that this paper has not been able to address.

From a reflexivity perspective, my interest in the issue of TMV began in 2024, roughly more than a year after I shifted to the United Kingdom for my PhD (September 2022). I began to work on it before the general elections, by mapping out the movement in February 2024, for which I conducted a few interviews. Accordingly, I am considered an outsider when it comes to British (Muslim) politics, having never lived in the UK or having not engaged as a volunteer or contributor towards TMV. However, due to my engagements with the Muslim community, I was provided some level of access to data, especially since there was not much analytical work performed on the movement during the time I began researching this paper.

1.1. Structure

I begin by discussing the literature, looking at Social Movement Theory to explain its importance in analysing this movement. I then provide some preface to the Muslim community in the UK, including its political stances throughout the year. This also covers the formation of the Respect Party in 2004, which was headed by Muslim politicians in alliance with other members of the left. I then explain the general voting trends in the UK in the last few decades, charting out the main key themes and trends in these voting patterns.

Moving on, I discuss how 7 October and Israel’s responses to this event marked a seminal moment in Muslim consciousness and politics globally, with implications seen in the UK as well. This also provides some understanding of the background to The Muslim Vote campaign in the UK. From there, I discuss how The Muslim Vote campaign took place across the country, discussing the various resources, manpower, and modes of communication used to campaign for different candidates.

I then break down the impact of TMV in the elections, discussing not just the candidates that won but also some of the independent candidates that almost unseated important Labour Party candidates in their constituencies. Throughout this paper, I use Social Movement Theory to provide a theoretical framework from which to analyse the outsized impact of the campaign. Finally, I end the paper by explaining the current situation of The Muslim Vote campaign, its chances for longevity based on SMT, as well as the implications for future Muslim voting trends in the UK.

1.2. Social Movement Theory

Social Movement Theory (SMT) is a body of literature that looks at movements and how they engage in activism. It is well-suited for analysing The Muslim Vote (TMV) campaign due to its focus on understanding how collective action is organised, mobilised, and sustained. TMV can be viewed as a social movement aiming to address political and social grievances within the Muslim community, and SMT provides the tools to unpack its strategies and impact. These theoretical tools thus provide a comprehensive framework for analysing TMV’s organisation, strategies, and potential for success. By applying these concepts, I intend to gain a deeper understanding of how TMV operates as a social movement and its potential impact on British politics.

Social Movement Theory (SMT) offers a multifaceted approach to understanding collective action and social change based on grievances. For this analysis, I focus on three key components of SMT. First, Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) emphasises the importance of resources (human, financial, organisational) in movement success. This aspect of SMT helps me understand how TMV leveraged various resources within the Muslim community to build and sustain its campaign, including armies of volunteers across the whole of the UK, ranging from Wales to Scotland. Second, I consider Political Opportunity Structures (POSs), which examine how political context influences movement emergence and strategies. This factor will cover Middle Eastern politics with reference to the Israel–Palestine conflict and its impact on local British politics. Lastly, I explore framing processes, which focus on how movements construct and disseminate meaning to mobilise supporters and achieve goals. This component is crucial in understanding how TMV communicates its message and motivates participation among British Muslims, given that it uses the frame of Ummah (global Muslim community), Justice for Palestine, and anti-colonial language to frame itself (Wiktorowicz 2003, pp. 1–24).

A few concerns remain about SMT, which this article will propose to address. Looking at the history of how SMT began to be used, the theory began to be popularised in the 1960s in the backdrop of protests taking place in Western nations, signifying deep displeasure with the political status quo of that era. Scholars such as Tilly then analysed these movements, proving that they were not just spontaneous movements that erupted without any structure but rather organised movements with rational objectives and choices (Tilly 1978).

SMT’s engagement with Islamic movements, however, was not well-nuanced, as pointed out by scholars like Arndt, especially in the 1990s (Emmerich 2020). By 2003, when Wiktorowicz produced the first major work on SMT applied to Islamic movements, most of the analysis was focused on either Jihadist groups such as the GIA or Islamist groups that were involved in violence (Wiktorowicz 2003, pp. 1–24). The use of SMT to engage with violent Muslim groups was a trend that persisted in the literature of SMT and Islamic groups well into the 2020s. Arndt Emerich, in his analysis, pointed out that in fact, SMT was often intertwined within terrorism studies scholarship, thereby obfuscating some of the broader potential of using this analysis to groups outside of proscribed terrorist groups. His article looked at quietist Salafism and the potential of SMT to analyse it, thereby eliminating violence as one of the dynamics within the study of such groups (Emmerich 2020).

This specific article aims to expand this analysis beyond Salafists and looks at British Muslims as a whole. Studying how political protests turn into actual electoral shifts is a natural process within political spheres. However, this shift within Muslim communities has not been analysed within the literature that has used SMT, and this paper argues that it is a significant gap in analyses of SMT.

2. Muslims in the UK

The British Muslim population is among the most diverse in the world, with Muslims from almost every country in the world forming a part of the British Muslim community. While the community is internally divided by ethnic and theological lines, the largest wave of migration came from South Asia during the 1960s, with later arrivals including Libyans, Somalis, Afghans, and others fleeing conflict. Religious diversity within the UK Muslim population spans Sunnis, Shias, Sufis, Salafis, Deobandis, Jamaat-e-Islami, and more (Elshayyal 2015). Despite these internal distinctions, common religious practices such as mosque attendance, halal food consumption, and Ramadan observance unite many. Meanwhile, external pressures like Islamophobia, intensified after 9/11 and 7/7, compelled communities to organise publicly. While early generations were largely defensive, younger generations are more assertive in expressing their British Muslim identity, even as challenges persist. Economic mobility, political representation, and a growing professional class alongside contributions of over GBP 70 billion to the UK economy demonstrate the community’s increasing influence (Siyech and Shah 2024).

These factors shape political engagement as well. While religious identity remains important, ethnic identity also shapes political leanings, and Islamophobia, especially following the August 2024 riots, has politicised many Muslims. As Elshayyal and others argue, anti-Muslim sentiment has defined how Muslims engage politically. Historically, Muslims aligned with Labour due to its grassroots connections with ethnic minorities, anti-discrimination stance, and use of clan-based strategies to consolidate votes (Ibid.). As a result, most Muslim MPs have been from Labour, while Conservative ties to Islamophobic rhetoric—from Enoch Powell to contemporary support for Israel—have repelled many Muslim voters. However, Labour’s support cannot be taken for granted, as shown in 2004, when the Iraq War spurred a significant defection to the Respect Party, which attracted Muslim and left-wing support, particularly under the leadership of George Galloway (Akhtar 2024).

The Respect Party’s initial success and eventual decline (triggered by internal splits and controversy) illustrates how Muslim loyalty to Labour is conditional. Its rise proved that Muslims would rally behind alternative platforms when politically energised. Less than a decade after Respect’s decline, The Muslim Vote campaign revived this energy, channelling community outrage over Gaza and Palestine into electoral mobilisation, demonstrating once again the potency of a politically conscious Muslim electorate.2

By the 2024 elections, widespread dissatisfaction with the Conservative government after 14 years in power had created a fertile political opening. Brexit, seen by many as a political misstep, was followed by compounding crises in the NHS (Prickett 2024), housing, energy, and transport sectors. Rising inflation, stagnant wages, and public service breakdowns triggered strikes and voter frustration across the country. While the Labour Party was widely expected to capitalise on this discontent, its failure to offer a compelling alternative—beyond rhetoric on immigration—left many voters disillusioned (Siyech 2024). This environment of economic fatigue and weak political options contributed to a unique opening that campaigns like The Muslim Vote (TMV) were able to capitalise on.

In the current literature on Muslims in the UK (and broadly Muslims in Europe), there is much scholarship written on voting patterns within the community. One of the key findings that has been replicated repeatedly over many different studies is that Muslims often vote as a group when they face increased marginalisation and discrimination. In fact, several studies have shown that Muslims (among other minority groups in Europe with immigrant backgrounds) vote consistently left due to right-wing parties calling for decreased immigration (Bergh and Bjørklund 2011; Bird et al. 2010). For example, Oshri and Itzkovitch-Malka (2025) argue that right-wing parties that profess anti-immigration and anti-Muslim stances spur Muslims to vote further left. Other research on Turkish-background Muslims in Europe (and Turkey) demonstrates that their voting behaviour is often predicated not on ideology alone but on self-interests too (Baysu and Swyngedouw 2020). While this literature forms an important part of understanding Muslim voting patterns in the UK, there is always scope to nuance this research and cover these patterns in more detail. For example, in Oshri and Itzkovitch-Malka’s work published in 2025, while there was discussion on Muslim voting patterns in the UK, there was no coverage of TMV and how it could have played a role in solidifying religious identity-based voting or how it could have shifted patterns. On the latter point, TMV offers a unique discussion point due to what I discuss below, which is its employment of dual logics that have both a moral and a strategic aspect, thereby leading it to (on occasion) endorse even right-wing parties such as the Conservative Party. Thus, this paper hopes to shed light on this new trend in Muslim voting patterns in Europe via TMV in the UK. Moreover, as the next section demonstrates, using Social Movement Theory is an important addition to help further examine these voting patterns. This is especially the case because many of the papers above do not examine whether groups or representative bodies in European nations call for organised voting. TMV breaks this mould by being among the first groups that try to represent Muslims in the UK and streamline voting patterns despite the various theological, geographical, and ethnic differences.

3. Social Movement Theory and TMV

A clear way of analysing TMV is through the lens of Social Movement Theory. SMT has developed a robust literature over years of work analysing how different movements gain momentum and mobilise people for action. Works by authors like Tilly, Snow, and others have been pioneering in terms of analysing different right-wing and left-wing movements from political perspectives (Snow 2013, see also Tilly 2004). Quintan Wictorowicz took this work forward by analysing the Islamic movement as well as exploring various common themes pertaining to movements in the Muslim world. He defined Islamic activism as ‘the mobilisation of contention to support Muslim causes’, purposely keeping the definition broad to encompass the various types of organisations that exist in the Muslim world (Wiktorowicz 2003, pp. 1–12). As argued in the previous section, despite Wictorowicz keeping the definition broad, a majority of SMT analysing Islamic movements have mainly been incorporated within the terrorism studies literature. Yet, The Muslim Vote (TMV) campaign very much fits into this broad definition, given its desire to build on Muslim contentions of their Western leaders’ reluctance to support the cause of Palestine (which is also perceived as a Muslim issue by many Muslims) and make Muslim votes matter.

According to Wictorowicz, three different aspects play a role in mobilising Muslims for Islamic activism: Resources (under the blanket title Resource Mobilisation Theory), political opportunities, and framing. RMT refers to the idea that Muslim movements often mobilise through various social and physical structures, including the mosque, social and familial networks, as well as professional organisations that Muslims are a part of. Political opportunities refer to the idea that Muslim movements often respond to changes in the political environment and insert themselves into the respective ecosystem based on whether they see some sort of opportunity for themselves there. Lastly, frames represent the interpretative mechanism via which Islamic movements are able to help followers view the world and ideologically convince people to become engaged in their mission. This follows a three-step process whereby they (1) contextualise a specific issue as a problem, (2) provide a solution for the problem, and (3) convince followers as to why it is important to follow this solution (Ibid., pp. 18–35). My analysis uses all aspects of this theory to understand TMV.

In the case of the aforementioned Respect Party, SMT can be easily applied to understand how the party grew. Specifically, it capitalised on the political opportunity that was present in the form of Tony Blair’s involvement in the US invasion of Iraq, leading to massive protests around the UK’s engagement in it. In addition, the presence of ex-Labour Party members such as George Galloway, who were trying to stitch together a wide coalition of members from the left-wing, Muslim, and anti-war constituencies, accounted for the Resource Mobilisation (Theory) since these wide coalitions were able to mobilise a significant amount of funding and volunteers to help with their campaign (Peace 2012). While the party was not run solely by Muslims, it did tap into Muslim discontent with the Iraq war and used anti-war messaging as one of its frames from that time.

However, even at its peak in 2006/2007, it was only able to place one MP into Parliament (being George Galloway), who won due to his own personal presence and charisma rather than his presence in the Respect Party (Bowcott 2010). Internal splits ensued later on, which led to the socialist faction within the party breaking out in 2007/2008 (Gowthorpe 2016). Around this time, the group also began to lose salience due to the decreasing relevance of the Iraqi invasion. Later on, even its co-founder, Salma Yaqoob, resigned from the party due to issues with Galloway’s stances on several issues pertaining to women. Several schisms and electoral defeats later, the party voluntarily de-registered in 2016, signifying its end (Runnymade Trust 2024; Peace 2012).

Applying SMT, it is possible to state that a lack of innovation and the ability to transform from a one-issue political party (that of a foreign war) to one grounded in local politics was one of its main reasons for failure. As Tilly and Wood have previously argued, for a social movement to be sustained beyond the initial burst of energy, it has to transform itself and innovate (Tilly and Wood 2013). Apart from this, there is a lack of internal cohesion due to there being so many different groups within the movement. Peters, for instance, has discussed the importance of actors cooperating continuously despite differing visions and objectives to ensure the continuity of a social movement (Peters 2018). These factors have played a strong role in reducing the potency of the Respect Party and ultimately leading to its dismantling over time. Yet, as the next section demonstrates, many of the lessons learned that came with the Respect Party were then passed on to TMV.

3.1. Origin and Emergence of TMV

TMV, as the project is known, is not an organisation or a political party but a movement with many different organisations supporting it. The backdrop of the movement is set in the events of 7 October 2023, where Hamas engaged in a military offensive that led to the deaths of more than 1000 Israeli citizens and armed forces. In retaliation, Israel began to engage in a brutal response that has long been termed a genocide by scholars studying the subject, as well as international bodies like the United Nations (Asem 2025). By the end of 2023, the death toll in Gaza had incensed both Muslims and non-Muslims around the world, leading to mass protests (Al Jazeera 2024). In the UK, various cities such as Birmingham, Edinburgh, Cardiff, Manchester, and others witnessed protests, with London engaging the highest amount of protesters, numbering almost a million people on some days (Sara 2023).

Alongside protests, various intellectual and community responses also began or were strengthened in the United Kingdom (and the rest of the world, too). One example of this was the podcast, The Thinking Muslim, which saw its viewership increase in the post-7 October context. Its initial episodes on YouTube saw an average of 200 viewers or so during the first few months of 2021. By the end of 2021, however, it regularly drew in approximately 10,000 viewers. In the aftermath of the Gaza war, the channel began to run many special episodes on Gaza that led to even higher numbers, with some videos seeing as many as 700,000 viewers and many others regularly garnering over 100,000 viewers. As of 2024 December, the page now has around 290,000 subscribers, a relatively high number for a YouTube podcast.3

The founder of the show, Mohammed Jalal, first popularised the idea of Muslims mobilising to punish the two political parties, the Conservatives and especially the Labour Party, for not taking Muslims seriously. Jalal noted that he first called for data scientists to come forward and identify all the constituencies where Muslims constitute at least 10% of the total population towards the end of 2023. This was performed due to the perceived futility of protests that were being undertaken and the fact that the Labour Party seemed far too comfortable in discarding support for Muslims, given that they expected to win the popular vote in the 2024 elections.4 Jalal’s calls for action were also being reflected by local figures and organisations in different cities across the UK.

The intervention of Jalal and other political figures within the British Muslim community demonstrates the first plan of SMT being political opportunities. To begin with, voter fatigue due to poor economic conditions and deteriorating infrastructure, experienced by various voters across the country, created a strong opening for TMV to endorse candidates. This fatigue was especially accentuated within the Muslim community, which felt that neither of the two main parties cared for their preferences when it came to the issues pertaining to Israel and Palestine. While Tory antagonism towards Muslims was known, Labour, which was a favourite of the Muslims for decades, was also seen as betraying Muslim interests. Brutalities in Gaza then became the spark upon which TMV began its campaign and mobilised Muslim voters.

This did not mean that the organisation was in charge of selecting candidates or setting up Muslim candidates. Rather, as one of the workers stressed to me, TMV often arranged meetings with the local Muslim community of various cities and constituencies and constituencies to provide guiding principles for selecting candidates and then agreed with community leaders over whom best to endorse and support.5 This was because of a few reasons: Firstly, they did not have the resources to engage in many constituencies. Secondly, they also wanted to respect the knowledge of local Muslim leaders, and thirdly, they wanted to invigorate Muslim communities across the UK so that they could participate in local and national politics. Consequently, as further sections illustrate, candidates who were endorsed included people from many parties, ethnicities, and faiths.

This demonstrates the second plank of SMT, which is resource mobilisation. TMV demonstrated effective resource mobilisation by leveraging existing Muslim community networks and organisations. The campaign utilised volunteer networks for grassroots campaigning and employed technology for voter outreach and data analysis.

Additionally, TMV secured pro bono legal and technical support, further enhancing its resource base. The fact that there are many Muslim students now studying subjects like political science and other social science subjects also created pools of resources and potential expertise from which TMV could engage. For example, figures like Jalal, Celsabeel, and many of the workers and volunteers I spoke to all had degrees in political science.6 In speaking to one volunteer, for example, I was told that her main motivation was to contribute to the community but also to sharpen her understanding of engaging in politics and polish her own research skills.7 This was a common motivation for many young British Muslim students who felt that the available avenues for political research often served immoral causes, including what they felt were Zionist allied think tanks. Engaging in TMV was thus one good avenue for learning and contributing.8

In conversations with many of the architects of the movement, I was told that the objective of the campaign would not be achieved over one election cycle but over five elections, whereby they expected at least 25 representatives to form a bloc of independent MPs in the government out of a total of 600 MPs (approximately). This could help exert significant policy power in the government for Muslim issues, which are often seen as irrelevant for the Labour Party.9 However, at least one other organiser maintained that the objective was to ensure that the Labour Party would receive the message that Muslim votes are not to be ignored in this election and did not subscribe fully to the idea of having a set number of elected independent MPs over five election cycles.

The campaign was powered by several organisations that were involved in advocacy, such as Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND), Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), and other Muslim media, tech, and NGOs. As mentioned in the podcast of TMV, there were many other organisations involved as well, with volunteers from these organisations stepping in to help design the structure and plans for the group. Jalal himself stopped officially associating with the organisation after some amount of time but continued to engage with it and hold it accountable based on his understanding of the goals of the organisation. According to workers from within the movement, it started out as a fully volunteer-based movement from which one initial full-time employee emerged—Abubakr Nanabawa—and expanded to more employees and volunteers over time.10

3.2. Goals and Logics of Choosing Candidates

The main goal of the campaign in the short term though was to ensure that the Labour Party would not take Muslims lightly when it came to politics. In identifying the constituencies where Muslims formed a good proportion, they mapped out whether the incumbent MP’s opposed the indiscriminate killings of Palestinians, making it one of the major reasons to vote in or vote out a candidate. The other major plank is also whether the candidate has a record of Islamophobia, followed by other local issues such as infrastructure, poverty alleviation, education provision, and many others. As one worker within the movement put it, while the movement was triggered due to issues in Gaza, it aims to deal with long-standing issues within the Muslim community by registering voters, educating them about their options, and mobilising them to act as pressure groups.11

Here though, a slight divergence emerged in the strategies of the movement. While the campaign initially chose to support any candidate that supported Palestine, it became divided over one issue: Should the Muslims back any candidate from the Labour Party, even though its leader, Keir Starmer, had given his full support to Israel to kill Palestinians and even cut down electricity and water for Gazans? (McShane 2023) According to Jalal, this was unacceptable, and supporting Labour meant supporting genocide, even though some Muslim members of the Labour Party were stridently pro-Palestine in their campaigns. On the other hand, other notable organisers noted that this was not a good move since it would alienate the few Labour Party MPs who were amenable to their goals, and this would ultimately reduce the influence of the movement in Westminster.12 A general feeling of apprehension of Muslim organisers across the country led to a roll back of support for the pro-Palestinian Labour Party candidates, effectively resulting in no Labour candidates being endorsed by The Muslim Vote despite the original intentions of some of the organisers.13

Nonetheless, despite being termed ‘The Muslim Vote’, the aim was not to endorse or facilitate the victory of only Muslim politicians. It was to ensure that, strategically, the best candidates positioned to defeat the Labour party were chosen. Thus, as one organiser put it, we wanted to name it ‘The Muslim Vote’ because we wanted Muslims in the UK to understand that their voices and votes also mattered and could make a difference in the political landscape of the nation.14 Accordingly, as

Table 1. Various parties endorsed by The Muslim Vote across the UK. Data obtained from TMV organisers.

Party Name	Country of Operation	Number of Candidates
Green Party of England and Wales	England and Wales	58
Independent Candidates	Various	52
Scottish National Party	Scotland	51
Liberal Democrats	United Kingdom	41
Workers Party of Britain	United Kingdom	32
Plaid Cymru	Wales	9
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland	Northern Ireland	9
Sinn Féin	Northern Ireland	7
Alba Party	Scotland	2
People Before Profit	Northern Ireland	1
Social Democratic and Labour Party	Northern Ireland	1
Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition	United Kingdom	1
Total		264

below shows, representatives of about 12 different parties, including the Scottish National Party in Scotland, Plaid Cymru in Wales, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, and others such as the Green Party and the Workers Party working within England, were endorsed. Here too, some differences did occur within the thinking of the organisers. One worker within the movement that I spoke to mentioned that he was quite apologetic to many British Arab voters for endorsing the Workers Party, which is headed by George Galloway.15 Galloway, who is an anti-war campaigner from the Iraq war of the 2000s to the Israel–Palestine war, has also been a supporter of Bashar al Assad as well as Russia and Iran. This has often clashed with many Muslims who are opposed to Assad for his authoritarian rule in Syria. These divisions became much sharper in the aftermath of Assad being ousted by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in December 2024, when Muslims became much more aware of the ostensible contradiction of being pro-Palestine but also pro-Assadist. However, because this was not clearer in the run-up to the general election of July 2024, there was far more tolerance of endorsing Galloway and his party. This was despite the fact that Muhammad Jalal had publicly disparaged Galloway for his pro-Assad sentiments.16

Nonetheless, as mentioned by a key Muslim leader in an interview for The Muslim Vote’s podcast: ‘Strong parties are like Alsatians in a game, we can’t put our money on the poodle (acceptable but weaker parties) even if it is soft and sweet and expect it to win against the Alsatian. The nature of politics is that we must back the winning candidate and also expect that candidates respond to voter sentiments. So, if we can pressurize them enough, they will mould to our wishes and without an intentional push, we won’t be able to make those changes.’17

From the intentions, goals, and endorsements of the candidates mentioned above, a few things become clear. Firstly, attaching the term ‘Muslim’ to the name of the organisation was not meant to insert Muslim political candidates into the system but rather to motivate Muslims to come together and vote collectively to pressurise the political structures in power. Indeed, the total number of Muslim candidates numbered up to around 22, which represents less than 10% of the total candidates endorsed by the organisation.18 Secondly, while one pillar of support was afforded to those who voted in support of ceasefires in Palestine, the second pillar was about the ability of candidates to win an election. If they were not able to, they would not be extended endorsements, demonstrating a strategic calculus in choosing the candidates. Thirdly, the split within the organisation demonstrated that the relative inexperience of the movement played a role in defining the principles of choosing candidates, especially if they belonged to the Labour Party. Moreover, it also showed that at least some of the organisers within TMV were intent on choosing Labour Party candidates, demonstrating further pragmatism in the thought process of the movement.

From an SMT perspective, this is a new angle that takes place, i.e., specifically the issue of strategically choosing actors to represent the will of TMV. Choosing such politicians despite the fact that they were not Muslim and, in some cases, even opposed to some of the main views of TMV organisers (such as George Galloway’s support of Bashar Al Asad).

This seems to represent a tension within the literature on Social Movement Theory. While the framing process often looks at Muslim causes, it is often expected that the actors chosen to represent the movement would be Muslims as well, aligning with their own moral and spiritual worldview. However, in TMV’s decision to endorse Worker Party candidates and also (initially at least) to endorse Labour Party candidates as well, there is a clear choice to engage with two types of logics: moral reasoning (choosing candidates that were opposed to Israeli action in Gaza) and consequentialist reasoning (choosing candidates who had the highest chances of winning).

4. How TMV Employed Frames to Increase Support

TMV’s framing processes are particularly noteworthy. The campaign employed strategic framing by emphasising Muslim unity and collective political power, effectively mobilising community members. Voting was framed not just as a civic duty but also as a religious obligation that resonates deeply with the target audience. TMV even linked local issues such as housing and NHS funding with foreign policy concerns, particularly the situation in Gaza.19 This approach broadened the campaign’s appeal and relevance. Furthermore, by presenting itself as a long-term movement for political empowerment, TMV aimed to sustain engagement beyond a single election cycle. The movement’s sophisticated understanding of electoral dynamics and strategic use of community resources set it apart from previous Muslim political engagement efforts in the UK. TMV’s willingness to endorse independent candidates in certain constituencies challenged traditional party loyalties and potentially reshaped local political landscapes.

Here, it is also important to point out the role of social media in shaping the broader political attitude of Muslim communities in the United Kingdom. Globally, many segments of society were enraged by Israel’s actions in Gaza and mobilised heavily to protest, culminating in the International Criminal Court issuing arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu in 2024. Thus, over the last year, many people-led movements were started across the world. Among these, the importance of overwhelming social media algorithms became a big discussion point among many pro-Palestine protesters. The number of people posting pro-Palestine content on social media apps such as Instagram and TikTok became so numerous that companies like TikTok were falsely accused of harbouring antisemitic posts through their algorithms (Jennings 2023).

One particularly compelling logic, of course, was the discourse around Ummah and global Muslim solidarity. Based on a saying of the Prophet Mohammed that said that all the Muslims are one body, and if any one part gets hurt, the entire body feels the pain, Muslims are often passionate about Muslim populations that are often oppressed or dominated (Hassan 2018). The case of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, when Muslims from all over the world came to join the anti-Soviet rebels (in the 1980s), or in Syria, where Muslims from across the world joined violent non-state actors such as Hayat Tahrir al Shaam to fight against Bashar al Assad are examples of this concern. Beyond physical action though, Muslims often invoked issues pertaining to other Muslims in places like Xinjiang (China), Kashmir (India), and many other places to demonstrate solidarity with them. Gaza and Palestine are among the strongest of these focuses and have been a concern for Muslims and especially for Arab nations in the last century (though Arab rulers are often not concerned with demonstrating support to Palestine in the modern day) (Ahmad 2019).

Discourse around the Ummah, while conceptual and international in nature, also has a compelling logic for local and national politics. The process of thinking goes that, if a potential Prime Minister (then Keir Starmer) was not going to stop a genocide due to corporate interests, then this person would likely not care about less harmful but equally severe problems, such as the cost of living and poverty crises. This was a logic that was particularly strong if connected with the fact that corporate interests kept the cost of products high and salaries low, and the Prime Minister would not take steps to alleviate the problems of society for the sake of maintaining corporate interests. Such logics, coupled with the fact that Labour’s dismissal of pro-Palestinian demands was seen as the party betraying its Muslim voters, created further narratives on social media that fuelled Muslim irritation at Labour.

These narratives helped set up the larger stage for British Muslims (and non-Muslims) who were also sharing social media posts significantly in support of Gaza. The Thinking Muslim Podcast was thus an important part of this debate (among others), where it helped engage British Muslim voters who were already sharing pro-Palestine content frequently on these platforms.

Thus, the role of social media in TMV’s mobilisation efforts cannot be understated. Platforms like Instagram, TikTok, and Twitter became both battlegrounds for narratives and tools for mobilisation, amplifying the grievances of British Muslims regarding Gaza and broader issues. Social media algorithms, often accused of bias, inadvertently propelled pro-Palestinian posts into prominence due to the sheer volume, creating a digital echo chamber that reinforced solidarity and urgency. TMV harnessed this organic momentum by crafting targeted messages that tied local electoral outcomes to global justice issues, thereby bridging the gap between the virtual and physical realms. This strategic use of social media not only expanded TMV’s reach but also allowed the campaign to position voting as a direct act of resistance and empowerment. By framing electoral participation as an extension of digital activism, TMV tapped into an already engaged audience, ensuring that the online fervour translated into tangible political action at the polls.

5. Parsing the Results of the July 2024 Elections: Whither TMV?

The result of the elections in the UK was an expected one, with Labour winning about 400 seats out of around 625 seats. With Labour adding more than 200 seats to its 2019 numbers, its victory was more pyrrhic in nature. Voter turnout across the UK had reduced from 67% in 2019 to about 60% in the 2024 election, the lowest since 2001 (59%), and generally among the lowest since World War II (>80%) (Statista 2025). In real terms, the Labour Party had only won about 9 million votes in this election, as opposed to about 10 million votes in the 2019 elections, when it lost to the Conservatives and won only 200 seats across the UK. Thus, in most of the seats that it won, it only managed to win narrowly, demonstrating a lack of confidence in its abilities (Kirk et al. 2024).

These numbers can be explained generally by the concept of voter fatigue, referring to voters experiencing disillusionment with both of the mainstream parties in place. This is a common phenomenon when both parties in a two-party system of elections are seen as corrupt or not serving the needs of the people. In these scenarios, voting in favour of populist parties or independents becomes more common as a way of expressing dissatisfaction with the system. This is apart from lower turnouts in elections, as seen through the numbers explained above (Garmann 2017).

In the case of the UK, while the reasons for dissatisfaction with the Conservatives were explained above, there was also a significant lack of confidence in the Labour Party. According to polling performed before the elections in June 2024, almost half of the UK’s population noted that they had no confidence in either of the two parties in the UK. Reasons for shunning Labour were multi-fold; while many voters had become disenfranchised by the entire system and the fact that poverty and rates of living had increased significantly, others were specifically upset with Keir Starmer (then head of the Labour Party) and the party (Lister 2024).

Dissatisfaction with Labour and Starmer stemmed from the fact that the party had not presented any solid economic alternative plan to help improve the economy and help with alleviating the living situation of British citizens. Starmer in particular was seen as uncharismatic compared to his predecessors, such as Jeremy Corbyn and Tony Blair. Moreover, criticism levelled at Starmer, often from the left wing within his party, spilled over into the public domain, signalling a lack of coherence within the party. In addition, parts of the country, such as Wales, which were governed by Labour, had faced underwhelming measures of governance. These reasons were why many commentators noted that the results were not a win for Labour but rather an indictment of the Conservatives (Barlow 2024). The Labour Party just happened to be the most solid opposition. As the theoretical analysis explains, this voter fatigue presented a political opportunity which TMV capitalised on to engage in politics.

These changes were reflected in two ways. First, as mentioned above, voter turnout was low, and Labour saw many of its majorities slashed in key constituencies across the UK. The second was the rise in support for both the Reform Party as well as independent candidates. The Reform Party, led by Nigel Farage, the most strident pro-Brexit campaigner of the mid-2010s, is a far-right political party that has criticised the Conservative Party for not being strict on several issues, such as immigration, among others. The Reform Party, while new, was able to win about five seats across the UK, unseating mostly Conservative candidates within the different constituencies that they won in (Forsyth 2024). While there is much to parse about these results, it remains out of the scope of this paper.

Of consequence to our paper, however, is the fact that six independent candidates won different constituencies. This marked some significant change, given that since 1945, no more than 15 independent candidates had won elections (national or local). At least five of the winning candidates listed in

Table 2. List of independent candidates who won in the elections.

Candidate Name	Constituency	Majority	Unseated Candidate	Notable Details
Jeremy Corbyn	Islington North	8412	Mike Tapp (Labour)	Former Labour leader re-elected as independent after expulsion from the Labour Party.
Alex Easton	North Down	3254	Stephen Farry (Alliance Party)	Independent Unionist, defeated Alliance Party incumbent Stephen Farry.
Ayoub Khan	Birmingham Perry Barr	2150	Khalid Mahmood (Labour)	Gained significant support from the Muslim community; won against Labour.
Adnan Hussain	Blackburn	1987	Kate Hollern (Labour)	Capitalized on local voter dissatisfaction with Labour’s stance on the Gaza conflict.
Iqbal Mohamed	Dewsbury and Batley	1734	Paula Sherriff (Labour)	Independent candidate, focused on local community issues and Labour criticism.
Shockat Adam	Leicester South	1543	Jon Ashworth (Labour)	Won with strong support from minority communities, unseating a Labour candidate.

below, barring Alex Easton from Northern Ireland, had been endorsed by The Muslim Vote. One significant candidate was Shockat Adam, who won the Leicester South constituency, unseating Jonathan Ashworth, a significant candidate within Labour. Wes Streeting, the current Health Minister, attributed Ashworth’s loss to Labour’s position on Gaza, demonstrating some impact of The Muslim Vote (Stacey 2024). While it is unclear how much people within policy circles think about TMV, at least one civil servant mentioned that there is some discussion on its effectiveness, and it is now on the radar, though it is not a major concern for the Labour government in all areas.20

Apart from these five independent candidates endorsed or set up by The Muslim Vote, it also endorsed 45 other winning candidates, including those from the Liberal Democrats, the Green Party, and many others, as seen in

Table 3. List of all TMV-endorsed candidates who won the first three places, arranged by party.

	Independents	Lib Dems	Green Party	Workers Party	SNP	Sinn Fein	Plaid Cymru	Alliance North	Alba	SDLP	Total
Endorsed candidates won	5	22	3	0	9	7	2	1	0	1	50
Endorsed candidates came in 2nd place	10	2	14	3	42	0	2	4	0	0	77
Endorsed candidates came in 3rd place	6	8	9	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	25
Total of endorsed candidates in top 3 places	21	32	26	4	51	7	4	6	0	1	152

below. This is not to say that they were instrumental in making these candidates win, but rather, it demonstrates their interest in choosing credible alternatives to either of the two parties in power. Additionally, TMV’s other endorsed candidates also won second and third places in many other constituencies. Thus, in total, 152 candidates out of 264 candidates endorsed by TMV won either the first, second, or third place across the UK.

In addition, as political analyst Parveen Akhthar noted, ‘In the 21 seats where more than 30% of the population is Muslim, Labour’s share dropped by 29 percentage points from an average 65% in 2019 to 36% in 2024’ (Akhtar 2024). This suggests that Muslim voters expressed significant dissatisfaction with the Labour Party. As pointed out by TMV co-ordinator Abubakr Nanabawa in an online interview, the fact that TMV managed to muster some opposition to both parties and unseat some of the major Labour Party seats was seen as a victory for the efforts of the movement (Islamic Perspectives 2024).

One particularly strong candidate was Leanne Mohammed, a 23-year-old Palestinian candidate who ran in the Ilford North constituency as an independent candidate. Despite her relatively young age and a short period in which to launch her campaign, she almost unseated Wes Streeting (see

Table 4. Ilford North constituency results in the general elections of 2024 (BBC 2024).

Candidate	Party	Votes	Percentage	Change from 2019
Wes Streeting	Labour	15,647	33.4%	−20.8 pp
Leanne Mohamad	Independent	15,119	32.2%	+32.2 pp
Kaz Rizvi	Conservative	9619	20.5%	−16.2 pp
Alex Wilson	Reform UK	3621	7.7%	+5.9 pp
Rachel Collinson	Green	1794	3.8%	+2.5 pp
Fraser Coppin	Lib Dem	1088	2.3%	−1.7 pp

below), who was touted as the rising star of the Labour Party. Streeting, who is now the Health Minister of the UK government, has been named as one of the future leaders of the Labour Party and a likely PM for the UK in the future. Despite his high profile, Streeting won the elections with a narrow margin of just five hundred votes more than Leanne (Mulla 2024).

Several reasons could explain the narrow loss she faced, despite a strong amount of vigour within her election campaign. Firstly, Wes Streeting had a well-known national profile due to his engagements with the Labour Party. Additionally, while Leanne did discuss local issues such as healthcare and housing, her youth and relative lack of experience (given that she was 23 at the time of running this campaign) were among the other reasons that some voters may have voted for Labour with its established experience. Secondly, given that the Labour Party was already in power, preferences for an incumbent party may have swayed voters towards Labour. Thirdly, a good portion of votes went to the Conservative Party MP Kaz Rizvi. This would include Muslim votes as well, given that Rizvi was from a Muslim background. In this regard, several voters would likely have felt that there was no benefit to actually voting for Leanne, given that most votes were divided between either the Labour Party or the Conservatives. Lastly, Ilford North registered a vote share of 59.6%, which was just slightly lower than the average vote share of 60%—among the lowest in Britain’s general elections (Ibid.). There was a good chance that even a slightly higher voter turnout would have led to Leanne’s victory.

Thus, against this backdrop, TMV did play a role in effectively helping increase her vote share from 0 to 30%+. However, this was also backed by her own strengths, public profile, and campaign, and her victory was hampered by a few other factors.

Importantly, a couple of interesting points stand out. Firstly, as noted in the introduction to TMV, the goal of the organisation was not to (1) campaign for different candidates, (2) select only Muslim candidates, or (3) set up independent candidates. Rather, they often tried to point the Muslim communities in the direction of pro-Palestinian candidates who were most likely to win the elections. This was why many of the candidates they selected were not Muslims or independents but belonged to other third-party candidates. The good performance of many of these third-party candidates also lent credence to the voter fatigue sentiments across the UK.

Secondly, although this election did not demonstrate it clearly, TMV’s endorsements appear to transcend conventional left–right political affiliations. While a good portion of the candidates endorsed were left-wing candidates, the group is not opposed to choosing the right wing if they were morally aligned with Muslim causes. This was clarified in subsequent online interviews with contributors to TMV, such as Iqbal Nasim.21 Both of them noted that Muslims neither had left-wing nor right-wing tendencies and should be able to engage with politicians from both ends of the spectrum to meet their needs. This has been pointed out by other British Muslim scholars like Abdullah Al Andalusi, who noted that while Muslims often tilted left on issues like economy, treatment of minorities, and immigration, they skewed right on issues like family values, sexuality, and other social issues (Blogging Theology 2024).

Thirdly, there were several candidates that TMV did not endorse—who still won elections—further entrenching the fact that it was a loss of faith in two-party politics that helped TMV secure success rather than just the credentials of the independent candidates who won. The electoral wins of five Reform candidates in different constituencies across the UK in the general elections underscore how voters were so disillusioned with the Conservatives and Labour that they voted for the far right. Rupert Lowe from Reform, who defeated Labour Party candidate Keir Cozens in the Great Yarmouth seat, is one example of a politician not endorsed by TMV who won. Lowe’s consistent anti-immigration stance, his engagement with the local football club (giving him a public profile), and the loss of confidence in both the Labour Party and Conservatives helped boost him to victory (UK Politics 2025). In fact, a year later in local elections, out of the roughly 1600 council seats across the UK, Reform won about 677 seats (41% of all seats) (Curtice 2025), further illustrating that TMV’s victories were also due in part to the political opportunities that it obtained access to in the 2024 elections.

6. Changing Muslim Identities and Future Trajectories

Political scientists have long debated the idea of even using the idea of a ‘Muslim vote’, claiming that it would homogenise the many ethnic and sub-religious identities of the communities (Peace 2015). However, with the increased amount of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism heaped on the community, the identity of the community has sharpened and solidified over the last decade or so. As pointed out by politicians like Sayeeda Warsi, Muslims were among the most attacked minority in the country (Warsi 2024). The fact that TMV used Muslim in its name was intentional. Rather than using a term like ‘Ethical Vote’, it purposely chose to use ‘Muslim’ to demonstrate the strength of the community.

According to Timothy Peace and Khadija Alshayyal, Muslim politics went through different phases, whereby its identity sharpened in the UK. The Muslim Council of Britain played an important role in mobilising these campaigns and shaping the identity. Events like the 1997 Salman Rushdie affair, the post-9/11 era, as well as the Iraq war were instrumental in mobilising second-generation British citizens to engage in Muslim politics, leading to the formation of the Respect Party in the aftermath of the Iraq war of 2003 (Elshayyal 2015).

TMV is a continuation of this long line of Muslim political engagement in the UK. A few salient factors stand out in this campaign. Firstly, the Muslim population has both increased and strengthened significantly since the 2000s, when the Respect Party formed. With about 4 million people across the UK, some reports have even pointed out that Muslims have immense economic strength to the tune of about 70 billion pounds (conservatively), which was flexed in supporting the different aspects of this election. Secondly, as mentioned by co-ordinators of TMV, it was built on the backs of at least two decades’ worth of political campaigns, including insights from organisations like the Muslim Association of Britian (MAB), as well as politicians like Salma Yaqoob, who was instrumental in setting up the Respect Party in the aftermath of the Iraq war (Neil 2024).

Thirdly, in my own observations, these grassroots awareness campaigns and political lobbying efforts were also complemented by a rise in the number of Muslim students studying subjects related to political science, which was not as common in the previous generations. This allowed for a fresh explosion of ideas and talent and led to the further shaping of the Muslim political identity in the 2020s. Fourthly, at least temporarily, the anti-democratic politics of groups such as the Hizb ut Tahrir were not prominent in this election due to their banning in 202322 and the fact that new generations of British Muslims were far more comfortable in registering their votes. Fifthly, as mentioned by one interviewee, there were indeed many Muslims who dismissed the efforts of TMV, but the resultant victories of independent candidates could possibly inspire more confidence in further Muslim voters who could see more alternatives in future elections.23

Does this mean that TMV managed to inspire a new revolution in Muslim politics that is nationally pervasive? It is too early to make that argument so far. The statistics from the 2024 elections showed that almost 600,000 Muslims abstained from voting in the elections compared to 2019 due to their concerns about politics. This was a particular concern for TMV, whose co-ordinator mentioned that the one major aspect of their work included increasing voter presence among Muslims. Some Muslims that I interviewed were also not appreciative of engaging in electoral politics due to the futility of reforming the system via voting when it was particularly skewed towards the power of the nation-state.24

Provided this level of mobilisation, organisers of TMV were now involved in two major branches. Firstly, it wants to engage in future elections, including local elections taking place in 2026. In discussion with co-ordinators of TMV in England and Scotland, I was told that there is a concerted push to engage the Muslim population to build consensus in further elections and to make independent groups that are able to make political decisions for their areas. The other branch is the online efforts, whereby it is now building its social media presence on apps like Instagram and YouTube. While the results are slow, it seems to be picking up some momentum. In addition, one interviewee also mentioned that TMV was interested in acquiring expertise on data tools since these were particularly useful in helping parse information.25

In all these efforts then, TMV is now both an effort in mobilising Muslims politically while also building the British Muslim political identity in a way that is representative of the community, ensuring that it is not overly exclusive or antagonistic to the system.

7. Assessing the Longevity of TMV Using SMT Insights

Social Movement Theory offers some tools to predict the trajectory of movements and its longevity. Scholars like Tilly and Tarrow note that the longevity of a movement depends on how a movement can convert itself from one based on spontaneous issues to a more grounded presence (McAdam et al. 2001). In the case of TMV, it is clear that the movement emerged in the aftermath of events in Gaza. However, the amount of effort that TMV puts into giving the movement a longer and more grounded presence will help provide some insights into its durability.

A second aspect is the external political structures that an SMT can take advantage of to present itself. For TMV, two aspects presented this political opportunity: the Gaza issue and the various social and economic crises in the UK. These allowed it to become one of the major movements championing political alternatives for different constituencies in the UK. With the rise in right-wing alternatives such as the Reform Party and the emergence of a new left-wing party headed by Jeremy Corbyn and, ostensibly, Zarah Sultana, a former Labour Party MP, other alternatives seemed to be emerging. It is possible that if the new left-wing party were to overcome its internal confusions (Zarah Sultana was supposed to lead the party with Corbyn—however, the latter did not acknowledge her as a co-leader) and build a strong base (Jones 2025), TMV would go on to support candidates within this party. TMV’s role as a representative and guiding body for Muslims means that new parties would not necessarily lead to it being disbanded but just give it more options to suggest for Muslims in the UK.

Lastly, Tilly and Wood argue that movements manage to stay relevant if they keep innovating both the scope of the issue they are championing and the tactics that they use (Tilly and Wood 2013). In this regard, while TMV has looked at issues beyond Palestine and discussed issues such as housing and infrastructure, there is still some scope for it to be perceived as beyond a Palestine-related voting campaign. To this end, the stated actions of building its social media presence and focusing on local elections will also play a role in predicting its longevity.

A small note on the comparison between TMV and the Respect Party is also pertinent here. With Respect having ended its presence 12 years after it first emerged due to the American invasion of Iraq, there are parallels with TMV, which emerged in the post-October 2023 landscape. A few interesting differences do exist that could help predict a completely different trajectory. Unlike the Respect Party, TMV is not a political party but rather a guiding body to help Muslims vote for pre-existing political candidates. Thus, it does not have the pressures of actually winning elections but rather needs only to ensure its presence is felt among the Muslim population in the UK and that mainstream political parties take note of its agenda issues. Moreover, because TMV is led only by Muslims (even though it does suggest voting for non-Muslims), there is slightly less scope for internal splits, given that its organising members are still all Muslim. This does not mean that there is no scope for divisions, since Muslim organisations often endure internal schisms themselves, but the range of issues on which disagreement may take place would likely be limited. Nonetheless, without sustained actions and innovations, there is still scope for TMV to witness a dip over time.

8. Implications for Social Movement Theory

The case study of The Muslim Vote (TMV) raises key implications for the application of Social Movement Theory (SMT). These implications concern both the scope of SMT’s usage and specific elements within SMT frameworks.

Firstly, regarding the scope of SMT, the case of TMV demonstrates that SMT can be fruitfully applied beyond the usual focus on Islamist or terrorist actors. As Emmerich as well as other scholars such as Bosi and Malthener point out, there is a persistent bias in SMT toward these types of Muslim movements (Emmerich 2020, see also Bosi and Malthaner 2015). TMV shows that Muslim-led mobilisation in democratic, electoral contexts—especially those that do not involve violence or formal Islamist agendas—also merit analysis within SMT. This has broader implications: for instance, a similar “Muslim vote” initiative has emerged in Australia, and applying SMT in such contexts highlights the wider relevance of the theory for diverse Muslim political expressions globally (Al Nashar and Hanarahan 2025).

Secondly, regarding the internal components of SMT, this case invites a deeper reflection on Rational Choice Theory (RCT), one of SMT’s foundational strands. While RCT often explains economic behaviour, scholars have long explored its application to collective action. Critics such as Deiter-opp (Opp 2013) have argued that while RCT can help explain why individuals join movements, it fails to account for cultural, faith-based, or moral frameworks. Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler address this by showing how spiritual incentives, like salvation, can function as rational motivators for participation in radical Islamic groups (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler 2016).

Applying this lens to TMV, we observe a hybrid logic. While there is a growing literature (outside SMT) on the strategic pragmatism of Muslim movements—such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Mårtensson 2015) or Hamas in Palestine (Luck 2025)—this has not been consistently integrated into SMT frameworks. TMV’s rationale appears grounded in moral/spiritual rationality, such as supporting politicians critical of Israeli policies in Palestine. This was a dominant logic. Yet, TMV also demonstrated strategic rationality, backing non-Muslim candidates they believed had a realistic chance of winning. Their endorsement of Workers Party candidates—despite disagreements over Syria—illustrates a willingness to compromise moral alignment in favour of political effectiveness.

In some ways, there are some similarities in TMV’s approach to other groups such as Muslim organisations in India. For instance, Emericht writes about how the Jamaat e-Islam Hind and the Popular Front of India, both of which he classifies as Islamist groups, engage in coalitions with other non-Muslim left-wing parties/movements, such as the Dalits in India (traditionally oppressed classes within the current structure of Hinduism). These coalitions often helped boost the strength of Muslim organisations in the political sphere due to the small size of the Muslim population and the ability of non-Muslim organisations to mobilise more voters (Emmerich 2023). Here too, Muslims tend to be both moral and strategic in their approach, i.e., they choose their own religious leaders and engage according to frameworks set within the religion while also being strategic and engaging with non-Muslim groups for more power.

Thus, TMV case shows that social movements may operate through dual rationalities: an overarching moral logic (e.g., pro-Palestinian solidarity) and a secondary strategic logic (e.g., winnability and political impact). These logics were sometimes in tension, as seen in internal divisions over whether to support pro-Palestine Labour candidates or reject Labour altogether. These tensions reveal that movement decisions rarely follow neat ideological lines; instead, they emerge from interacting layers of rationality that combine values, beliefs, and political calculation.

9. Conclusions

The genocidal action of Israel in Palestine has become a political powder keg for Muslims across the world. The Muslim Vote is one such example of the political impact of this phenomenon based in the Middle East. Studying The Muslim Vote campaign offers valuable insights into the evolving nature of faith-based political mobilisation. Two levels of analysis were seen in this paper.

Primarily, by applying Social Movement Theory, I demonstrated how minority religious groups leveraged community resources, including concerned and political science-educated Muslims, who responded to political opportunities such as voter fatigue, and framed their message around Ummah (among other narratives), using social media to achieve political influence. The usage of Social Movement Theory for this case study also exposes some gaps in the general use and application of SMT, as discussed above. Mainly, most SMT has often been used with a bias that often looks only at Islamist groups or terrorist groups. However, using SMT on a religiously motivated group such as TMV with no proclaimed objective other than to mobilise better at the ballot boxes demonstrates that there is a strong potential to expand the very scope of SMT analysis itself beyond traditional groups normally analysed within the literature.

On a secondary level, this analysis of TMV helped understand how Muslim identity politics in the UK have evolved from the post-Rushdie affairs to the Gaza genocide. The paper demonstrated that TMV, while not fully representative of Muslims across the UK, has been a significant new trend with potential political implications over the next decade or so if it manages to maintain its momentum. Specifically, this paper contributes to the literature on Muslim voting patterns in Europe, providing one case study to understand evolving trends. The paper is of course limited, with more scope for analysis and granular data collection. However, it is a starting point for future researchers to work with, especially on TMV’s sustained presence in the next decade or so.

The future of the movement and its impact beyond some parameters (such as voter endorsement) is not fully clear and may not be clarified for at least another election cycle or so. If the organisers are able to keep up the effort and engage Muslims across the UK, then the first signs will probably be seen in local elections in 2026, as mentioned by its organisers, before it is seen in the next general elections of 2029. While TMV did provide some space for Muslims to express their frustration with the Labour Party, it is still to be seen how much they can actually change the identity of the Muslim population. Nonetheless, new openings in the political landscape have now been created with the formation of TMV.