Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the Existence and Nature of the Jinn

Abstract

This article reconstructs Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 1210) systematic treatment of the jinn in his Great Exegesis (al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr) and his summa The Sublime Objectives in Metaphysics (al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliya min al-ʿIlm al-Ilāhī). In these works, al-Rāzī treats the jinn not as a marginal curiosity but as a test case for probing core metaphysical categories such as substance, embodiment, and divine action. His analysis unfolds through a sequence of guiding questions. Do the jinn exist at all? If not, we arrive at (1) the Denialist View. If they do exist, they must be either immaterial or material. The first yields (2) the Immaterialist View. The second raises the further question of whether bodies differ in essence or share a single essence. If they differ, we arrive at (3) the Non-Essentialist Corporealist View. Notably, these first three views are associated, in different ways, with various figures in the falsafa tradition. If they share a single essence, this produces the Essentialist Corporealist position, which then divides according to whether bodily structure is metaphysically necessary for life and agency. If not necessary, this produces (4) the Essentialist Corporealist—Structural Independence View, associated with the Ashʿarīs. If necessary, it leads to (5) the Essentialist Corporealist—Structural Dependence View, associated with the Muʿtazilīs. Al-Rāzī rejects (1) and (5), but he leaves (2), (3), and (4) as live possibilities. While he shows greater sympathy for (4), his broader purpose is not to settle the matter but to map the full range of theological and philosophical options. Al-Rāzī’s comprehensive exposition reflects the wider dialectic between falsafa, Ashʿarī theology, and Muʿtazilī theology, showcasing a sophisticated willingness to engage and entertain multiple metaphysical possibilities side by side. The result is an exercise in systematic metaphysics, where the question of the jinn, as liminal beings, becomes a means for interrogating broader ontological commitments in Islamic theology and philosophy.

Introduction

Islamic cosmology, as derived from the Qurʾān, traditionally envisions a multilayered creation in which three principal categories of sentient beings coexist under divine governance: humans (ins), jinn, and angels (malāʾika). Each occupies a distinct ontological station, yet all share in some degree of moral responsibility, agency, and interaction with the divine will (MacDonald 1965; Inati 1998; Kassim 2007; Burge 2024). Humans, originally fashioned from clay, serve as terrestrial agents endowed with choice and trial.1 Angels, formed of pure light, are obedient spiritual beings who execute divine commands without deviation.2 Between these two poles stands the category of the jinn, created from smokeless fire (mārij min nār), existing in unseen realms, and endowed with both moral responsibility and freedom of will.3 The jinn thus occupy a unique ontological middle ground: like humans, they are accountable moral agents, yet like angels, they remain largely imperceptible to human senses.4

In contemporary discourse, the jinn may be regarded as “weird,” “irrational,” or peripheral. Yet in classical Islamic thought, they were treated as a serious subject of rational and theological enquiry. Across both Sunnī and Shīʿī traditions, their existence was affirmed and integrated into theological and philosophical systems (Majlisī 1985, p. 259; Ṣadr 2007, p. 229; al-Bājūrī 2016, pp. 87–89; al-Rāzī 2024, vol. 7, pp. 485–508). For mediaeval Muslim thinkers, the jinn were not a marginal curiosity but a central case through which to test and discuss ontological frameworks: What kinds of entities can exist? How should embodiment be conceived? How can liminal beings like jinn or angels interact with humans without compromising divine transcendence? What seems liminal from a modern lens was, in their context, a legitimate object of study within their intellectual frameworks.

It is in this setting that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) provides one of the most systematic treatments of the jinn. In his Great Exegesis (al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr), also known as The Keys to the Unseen (Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb), he takes as his point of departure Sūrat al-Jinn (Q. 72), which begins: “Say: It has been revealed to me that a group of the jinn listened and said, ‘Indeed, we have heard a wondrous Qurʾān’.” The naming of the sūra itself signals the centrality of these beings in the Qurʾānic paradigm, and al-Rāzī treats this verse as an occasion to open up a wide-ranging debate on their reality. In line with the encyclopaedic character of his exegesis (tafsīr), he surveys competing positions drawn from kalām, falsafa, and the scientific theories of his time. Within this discussion, he delineates five possible views: one that denies the existence of the jinn altogether and four others that affirm their existence in different ontological registers. Through this mapping, the question of the jinn becomes a window onto broader metaphysical debates about substance, embodiment, and divine action.

The relevance of these debates extends beyond the mediaeval period. Belief in the jinn continues to shape contemporary Muslim life, particularly through practices and discourses surrounding jinn possession, spiritual healing, and Islamic psychology (Rothenberg 2004; Maarouf 2007; Dein and Illaiee 2013; Doostdar 2018; Rassool 2019; Yosefi 2019; Wessel 2021; Rašić 2024). Furthermore, the discussion of the jinn has also been brought up in modern debates on the theory of evolution (Malik 2023, pp. 768–70). Scholars have also examined the jinn historically, tracing their role across different periods and cultural settings, and thematically, exploring their significance in law, ritual, and cosmology (El-Zein 2009; Moad 2017; al-Shimmari 2021; Nünlist 2021; Olomi 2021; Rašić 2024). What remains absent, however, is a systematic mapping of the jinn in light of the different theological and philosophical commitments that shaped classical debates. This article seeks to fill that gap by reconstructing al-Rāzī’s systematic mapping. In doing so, it offers both a historical recovery of a neglected discussion and a conceptual resource through which present-day interlocutors can think more clearly about the place of liminal beings within theological and scientific reflection.

Historical Context

Before turning to al-Rāzī’s specific positions on the jinn, it is important to situate the discussion within its wider intellectual setting. Questions about the existence and nature of the jinn were not isolated curiosities but part of broader, long-standing debates over the very structure of created reality, debates that developed through centuries of exchange both within and between kalām and falsafa (Wisnovsky 2004; Griffel 2009, 2021; Hassan 2020).

In its classical formative phase, early kalām, especially among the Muʿtazilīs, Ashʿarīs, and Māturīdīs, was grounded in the conviction that all created things are space-occupying (mutaḥayyiz). According to this dominant early view, everything that exists, other than God, falls into one of three fundamental ontological categories (Sabra 2009):

• Substance (jawhar, pl. jawāhir): an indivisible, spatially situated atomic unit.
• Accident (ʿaraḍ, pl. aʿrāḍ): a transient property that inheres in a substance.
• Body (jism, pl. ajsām): any composite of multiple substances arranged together in space.

To exist meant to be located in space and time, whether as an indivisible atom, as a composite body, or as a property inhering in those substances.5 Only God was exempt from this framework, existing as a unique, non-corporeal and uncomposed being.

From within this early kalām perspective, the notion that created beings could exist immaterially, without occupying space, lacking extension, or existing outside of atomic composition, was generally understood as incoherent. Anything resembling such immateriality risked being construed as theomorphic, i.e., too godlike, and thus collapsed into one of two unacceptable outcomes: either being divine, which was impossible, or simply not existing at all (Shihadeh 2012).

Alongside this, the falsafa tradition emerged, drawing on Aristotelian and Neoplatonic sources but developing largely independently of kalām in its early stages.6 Thinkers such as al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) and Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) elaborated a hierarchical metaphysics in which reality was not confined to the spatial and material. Rather, it included a descending chain of immaterial intellects (ʿuqūl), celestial souls, and spiritual substances that were entirely non-bodily yet fully real, active, and causally significant (Ibn Sīnā 2005). Even the human soul (nafs) was treated as an immaterial substance capable of surviving bodily death, exercising cognition and volition independently of material organs (Davidson 1992; Wisnovsky 2003; Ibn Sīnā 2009, 2011).

This alternative ontology directly challenged the early kalām metaphysics. While both traditions agreed that God is non-corporeal, they radically diverged over whether created immaterial entities could exist. For the falāsifa (practitioners of falsafa, singular: faylasūf), immaterial created beings were not only possible but essential to account for cosmology, celestial order, and spiritual realities. For the mutakallimūn (practitioners of kalām, singular: mutakallim), such an idea seemed to threaten their rigid classification of created reality into substances, accidents, and bodies (Gianotti 2001; Shihadeh 2015).7

Over time, however, these two traditions did not remain isolated. As the Islamic intellectual tradition matured, especially from the late eleventh century onwards, kalām and falsafa (mainly Ibn Sīnā’s ideas) began to engage with one another far more substantively than before. Critique and refutation were often the initial points of contact, but these gradually gave way to more nuanced forms of cross-fertilisation. The emergence of a hybrid, philosophically informed kalām is one of the defining features of this later period, with al-Rāzī standing out as a central figure in this transitional period (Wisnovsky 2004; Ibrahim 2020; Hassan 2020; Griffel 2021).

In al-Rāzī’s own work, we observe not a rigid defence of classical kalām ontology but rather a methodological willingness to entertain multiple metaphysical options side by side. In his discussions, the boundaries between philosophical and theological categories become more fluid, as he examines both the kalām commitment to space-occupying entities and the philosophical allowance for immaterial created substances. This intellectual openness allows him to record and analyse a wide spectrum of positions concerning the nature of the jinn, reflecting the rich cross-fertilisation that was unfolding in Islamic metaphysical discourse during his time.8

Sources and Scope

Al-Rāzī discusses the nature of souls (arwāḥ), jinn or otherwise, across several of his works, including The Summative Account on Logic and Philosophy (al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-Manṭiq wa-l-Ḥikma), The Utmost Attainment in the Grasp of the Foundational Principles of Religion (Nihāyat al-ʿUqūl fī Dirāyat al-Uṣūl), The Compendium (al-Muḥaṣṣal), The Book of Forty in the Foundational Principles of Religion (Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn), and The Sublime Objectives in Metaphysics (al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliya min al-ʿIlm al-Ilāhī; hereon referred to as The Sublime Objectives).9 His most sustained reflections, however, appear in two of his mature works: the Great Exegesis, as indicated earlier, and The Sublime Objectives.

Book 7 of The Sublime Objectives analyses different kinds of souls and their attributes, including those of humans, animals (ḥayawān), angels, and the jinn. On the jinn specifically, al-Rāzī presents the denialist position in detail, with two affirmative views only briefly outlined.10 By contrast, the Great Exegesis sets out five distinct positions with greater refinement, though it gives minimal attention to the denialist view. Read together, the two works are complementary: The Sublime Objectives supplies a fuller account of denialism, while the Great Exegesis provides the framework for the remaining four views.11

This study therefore focuses on these two works as the most reflective basis for reconstructing al-Rāzī’s taxonomy of five positions on the jinn, given that they are generally regarded as his final and most mature writings. Accordingly, it does not attempt to catalogue every reference to the jinn across his corpus but draws on his other works, or on comparative voices, only where they clarify or sharpen the analysis. The aim is to demonstrate how seriously al-Rāzī engaged the question of the jinn and to show the continuing value of his models for contemporary debates about metaphysics and liminal beings.

Guiding Questions and Taxonomy

Figure 1 shows how the five positions arise from a sequence of guiding questions. The first question is whether the jinn exist at all. A negative answer gives (1) the Denialist View. If their existence is affirmed, the next question is whether they are immaterial or material. Choosing immaterial yields (2) the Immaterialist View. If they are material, the question becomes whether bodies differ in essence or all share the same essence. If they differ, this leads to (3) the Non-Essentialist Corporealist View. If they share the same essence, we arrive at the Essentialist Corporealist View, which then divides further: do life and agency require structural organisation, or can they exist without it? The first produces (4) the Essentialist Corporealist—Structural Dependence View, the second (5) the Essentialist Corporealist—Structural Independence View.

In what follows, each of the five positions will be examined in turn.

1. The Denialist View

Al-Rāzī begins his exegesis of Sūrat al-Jinn (Q. 72) by noting that throughout Islamic intellectual history, thinkers have disagreed over whether the jinn exist at all. He records that while belief in the jinn was widely affirmed across many religious traditions, many philosophers, particularly within the falsafa school, rejected their real existence. Al-Rāzī cites Ibn Sīnā as a representative of this position. In his Treatise on the Definitions of Things (Risāla fī Ḥudūd al-Ashyāʾ),12 Ibn Sīnā defines the jinn as “airy creatures that take on different forms,” but then immediately qualifies this definition by saying, “this is merely an explanation of the name.” According to al-Rāzī, Ibn Sīnā’s phrasing indicates that this is a linguistic or conceptual clarification of how the term is used, but that no external referent exists in reality (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 457). In other words, he portrays Ibn Sīnā as adopting a nominalist stance toward the jinn.13 Beyond this brief citation, however, al-Rāzī does not linger on the denialist position in his exegesis.

As noted earlier, The Sublime Objectives offers a much fuller engagement with the denialist position, and it is to this that we now turn. He begins by surveying the adherents of religions and sects (arbāb al-milal wa-l-niḥal), who generally affirmed four categories of rational beings: angels, humans, jinn, and devils (shayāṭīn). Although traditions differed on whether jinn and devils are distinct kinds or two aspects of one kind, the broad consensus affirmed their existence in some form.14 Even Magian and dualist cosmologies, with a sharp division between benevolent and malevolent powers, included categories resembling jinn. Against this near-universal affirmation, al-Rāzī distinguishes earlier from later philosophers. Among the earlier figures, Hippocrates, in Airs, Waters, Places (al-Ahwiyah wa-l-Buldān),15 explains alleged encounters in medical-natural terms, for example, linking epilepsy to environmental causes such as stagnant water and contrasting physician-treated cases with those attributed to temple attendants. The later philosophers, however, deny the reality of such beings altogether, which aligns with what al-Rāzī reports in his exegesis when he cites Ibn Sīnā (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, pp. 487–88).

Al-Rāzī then presents five objections advanced by the deniers of the jinn’s existence, followed by his counter-objections. For the sake of clarity and readability, we will treat each objection together with its corresponding response so that the flow of the debate can be followed more easily. The objections can be summarised under the following headings:

 

Objection 1: The Nature of Bodies

Objection 2: The Problem of Retaliation

Objection 3: The Challenge to Prophethood

Objection 4: The Poverty of Practitioners

Objection 5: The Rationality of Jinn

1.1. Objection 1: The Nature of Bodies

The first objection raised by the denialists is that if jinn existed, they would have to be either dense bodies (ajsām kathīfah) or subtle bodies (ajsām laṭīfah), yet both possibilities are impossible. If they were dense bodies, then everyone of sound perception would see them, since dense bodies occupy space and are perceptible to the senses. To claim that such beings could be present around us yet remain entirely unseen would collapse into radical scepticism (safsaṭah), for one could just as well say that towering mountains, blazing suns, or raging storms were beside us without our perceiving them. If, on the other hand, they were subtle bodies, then strong winds would scatter and destroy them. Their lightness and fragility would prevent them from persisting for any meaningful duration. Furthermore, subtle bodies cannot perform strenuous or difficult actions, yet jinn are consistently described as possessing precisely such powers. On these grounds, the denialists conclude that the existence of jinn must be rejected (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, pp. 491–92).

Al-Rāzī responds that the argument is incomplete, for it assumes without proof that if such beings exist, they must be bodies of one kind or another. Why should it not be possible, he asks, that they are immaterial substances (jawāhir mujarradah), self-subsisting in their own essence and neither bodies nor attributes inhering in bodies? Unless the denialists provide a demonstration that rules out this third possibility, their argument does not stand. Even if one were to grant the assumption that they are bodies, further difficulties arise for the denialist case. If they are dense bodies, why could they not be imperceptible to ordinary senses, just as some theologians hold that the essence of the human being is an indivisible particle located in the heart, while the rest of the body serves merely as instruments? And if they are subtle bodies, why could they not be of a kind that, while transparent and colourless to perception, are nonetheless solid in essence and strong in composition so as not to be scattered or dissolved by the winds? In this respect, their continued existence would be no more implausible than the continued existence of the human soul, which persists through the dispersal of the bodily elements it animates. On each of these counts, the denialist objection fails to exclude the possibility of the jinn’s existence (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, pp. 494–95).

1.2. Objection 2: The Problem of Retaliation

The second objection states that Muslims universally curse and revile the devils. If such beings truly existed, they would feel aggrieved and would retaliate. Moreover, if they possessed the capacity to harm, those most devoted to goodness and religion would, by virtue of their constant cursing and opposition, suffer the greatest harm. Since no distinctive or pervasive injury to the pious is observed, and no reliable reports establish such retaliation, the denialists conclude that there is no sound basis for affirming the existence of the jinn (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, p. 492).

Al-Rāzī replies that powers differ in rank and in mode of operation. It is therefore quite possible that even if the jinn possess strength sufficient for difficult acts, they do not have the power to act upon human bodies except when a specific condition is present. When that condition is absent, their ability does not obtain, and thus no effect follows. The lack of widespread harm to the pious is thus no evidence against existence, since the relevant enabling condition may be rare, intermittent, or divinely withheld. In short, variation in capacity and the need for a determining condition undercut the inference from non-retaliation to non-existence (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, p. 495).

1.3. Objection 3: The Challenge to Prophethood

The third objection is that affirming the existence of jinn undermines the very foundation of prophethood (nubuwwāt). The reasoning is that prophets claim miracles (muʿjizāt) as signs of their truthfulness. Yet since we do not know the nature, extent of knowledge, or powers of the jinn, it is conceivable that what appear as prophetic miracles could in fact be feats of the jinn. If that is possible, then there would be no secure proof left for validating the prophetic claim (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, pp. 492–93). To answer that prophets themselves cursed and repudiated the jinn is no solution, for one intent on deception might endure being cursed if it helped him achieve his aim of misguidance.

Al-Rāzī responds that this objection collapses in light of a stronger consideration. The prophets themselves unanimously affirmed the existence of jinn (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, p. 495). Therefore, to deny their existence would itself call prophethood into question. If the objection is pressed further and it is claimed that whether one affirms or denies them, prophecy is equally undermined, Al-Rāzī notes that he has an independent and remarkable method (ṭarīq ʿajīb) for establishing prophecy, which he develops later in his chapter on prophethood. With this method, none of the doubts about miracles being confused with jinnic feats apply (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, 496).16 The objection therefore fails to destabilise the prophetic claim.

1.4. Objections 4 and 5: The Poverty of Practitioners and the Rationality of Jinn

In the fourth objection, the critics point to experience. Those who practise incantations (ʿazāʾim) and astrology (tanjīmāt) are usually seen living in poverty, hunger, and humiliation. If the jinn truly existed and aided them, they would be distinguished by blessings and protection. Since this is not observed, the claim of jinn is rejected (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, p. 493).

The fifth objection reasons from the nature of the jinn. If they lack intellect, then seeking closeness to them is pointless, for the company of the irrational has no benefit. If, however, they do possess intellect and perception, then they should pursue theological and natural sciences and prefer the company of the wise among humans. Yet it is never the rational and grounded who claim contact with jinn, only the naive and the deluded (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, pp. 493–94). This shows that the matter is either deception aimed at the gullible or the product of disordered imaginations.

Al-Rāzī dismisses both of these objections together, treating them as weak persuasive arguments (al-iqnāʿiyyāt al-ḍaʿīfah). He signals this by saying that anyone of sound reason can see through them, and so they carry no serious weight in denying the existence of the jinn (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, p. 496).

1.5. From Neutralisation to Affirmation

Having presented and countered the five objections of the denialists, al-Rāzī makes it clear that his purpose was not merely to neutralise their criticisms but also to open space for affirming the existence of the jinn. The discussion pivots here from a purely defensive exercise into a more constructive one. Al-Rāzī acknowledges at the outset that reason alone cannot yield demonstrative certainty (burhān) regarding the jinn. There is no decisive proof that establishes their existence beyond all doubt, but equally there is no decisive proof for their non-existence. On purely rational grounds, then, he suspends judgement (tawaqquf) (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, p. 497).

Yet al-Rāzī does not leave the matter in suspension. He stresses, echoing his earlier rebuttal to the third objection, that the prophets (anbiyāʾ), without exception, affirmed the existence of the jinn. For him, this testimony carries decisive weight (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, p. 497). Revelation, in his epistemic hierarchy, provides certainty where speculative reasoning cannot. To deny the jinn would therefore undermine prophecy (nubuwwa) itself, since it would amount to rejecting what prophets consistently taught. Once prophetic authority is brought into view, the denialist position is no longer tenable, and affirmation becomes theologically necessary.

Alongside this appeal to revelation, al-Rāzī also points to rational indicators (qarāʾin) that, while not demonstrative, lend credence to the affirmation. He mentions, for example, the phenomenon of solitary visions (mushāhadāt fardiyyah), where individuals report encounters or apparitions that resist easy reduction to natural causes. He also cites the experience of obsessive whisperings (wasāwis) that act upon human thoughts as if from an external agent, suggesting the influence of non-human intelligences.17 In addition, he notes the reports of practitioners who, through incantations or experimental techniques, claim observable results that they attribute to the agency of jinn. Al-Rāzī treats these not as conclusive proofs but as signs (amārāt) that make belief in the jinn reasonable rather than baseless (al-Rāzī 2024, Vol. 7, pp. 497–503).

Taken together, these reflections show why al-Rāzī does not regard the denialist position as weighty. His detailed engagement with the first three objections was meant to show that they could not withstand scrutiny, while his brisk dismissal of the last two underscored their weakness. More importantly, his constructive turn demonstrates that the existence of the jinn is not only defensible against criticism but also positively credible when revelation and rational indicators are considered together.

2. The Immaterialist View

In the previous section, our discussion of the denialist position relied heavily on The Sublime Objectives, since al-Rāzī’s exegesis treats it only briefly. That fuller treatment allowed us to unpack the objections and responses with clarity. By contrast, for the affirming positions, his exegesis itself provides the fuller account, so we now return to his exegesis and follow his presentation directly.

He reports that belief in the jinn is affirmed by many adherents of religion who accept prophetic revelation and that a considerable number of ancient philosophers and practitioners of spiritual disciplines also supported this view. These affirmers classify such beings within a cosmological hierarchy, distinguishing between the “lower spirits” (arwāḥ sufliyya), which are quicker to respond but weaker in power, and the “celestial spirits” (arwāḥ falakiyya), which are slower to respond but stronger (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 457).18 Having set out this general framework, al-Rāzī then turns to present the immaterialist position.19

Al-Rāzī records that some of those who affirm the existence of the jinn maintain that they are neither bodies nor attributes inhering in bodies. Instead, they are self-subsisting substances (jawāhir qāʾima bi-anfusihā) that exist independently of any physical substratum. Importantly, this immateriality does not place them on par with the Divine Essence. Their proponents stress that to describe something as “not a body” is merely to apply a negative attribute (sulūb), which is a privation rather than a positive property, and sharing in such a negation does not imply similarity in essence. Just as different things can all lack a particular feature without thereby becoming identical, so too both God and created immaterial beings may be non-corporeal while remaining utterly distinct in their natures (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 457).

Although these spirits share the condition of immateriality, their essences (māhiyyāt) are said to differ. Al-Rāzī draws an analogy with accidents: all accidents are “non-substantial” by definition, yet they differ essentially even while sharing the common need for a substratum. Similarly, within this class of immaterial beings, some are virtuous and inclined toward goodness, others are wicked and inclined toward corruption, some are noble, and others are base and vile. The precise number and varieties of these beings, al-Rāzī adds, are known only to God. From here, al-Rāzī introduces three possible models that seek to explain the nature of the jinn on the assumption of their immateriality.20

First, their immateriality also does not prevent them from possessing knowledge or the capacity to act. They are capable of hearing, seeing, learning from reports, and performing particular deeds. Since their essences vary, it is not far-fetched that some among them possess extraordinary powers enabling them to perform actions that far exceed human abilities (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 457).

Second, some suggest that this does not prevent them from maintaining a relational link to the physical world. To explain how such a connection might be possible, al-Rāzī reports that these thinkers draw on an analogy from human nature. Physicians, they note, teach that the rational soul (al-nafs al-nāṭiqa), which defines the essence of the human being, does not attach itself directly to the body. Rather, it is joined to the body through the spirit (rūḥ)—a subtle, vapour-like substance generated from the finest elements of blood and formed in the left side of the heart. The soul exercises its influence over the bodily limbs through this rūḥ, as the vapour circulates within them. In a similar way, it is proposed that each jinn is connected to a particular portion of air (hawāʾ), which serves as its primary point of attachment. When this portion of air moves into denser bodies, the jinn thereby gains a derivative connection that allows it to exert influence on those bodies (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, pp. 457–58).21

Third, another model proposes that human rational souls, once separated from their bodies at death, grow stronger and more perfect as they are exposed to the unveiled realities of the spiritual realm. If at some later point a new body arises that resembles the one once inhabited by such a soul, this resemblance may generate a renewed connection between the disembodied soul and the new body. In such a case, the separated soul assists the embodied soul in its actions and governance, since similarity of kind is a cause of union. When the assisting soul is virtuous, it is regarded as an angel and its influence as inspiration (ilhām). When the assisting soul is wicked, it is regarded as a devil and its influence as whispering (waswasa) (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 458).

In presenting these possibilities, al-Rāzī remains non-committal. He does not endorse any single account but records them as possibilities. Having surveyed the immaterialist position in detail, he then turns to the corporealist models.

3. The Non-Essentialist Corporealist View

Within this affirmation of corporeality, a further debate emerges concerning the very nature of bodies. One group maintains that bodies do not all share a single essence. Rather, they may differ fundamentally in their essences, even though they display certain common external characteristics.22 This constitutes the third position.

According to thinkers in this camp, what bodies have in common is limited to descriptive attributes such as occupying space, existing within a specific location and direction, and possessing the dimensions of length, width, and depth (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 458). These are not accidental features in the sense of being incidental, but rather the minimal consequences of being a body. They do not, however, amount to the full essence (māhiyyah) of a body. The fact that bodies share these spatial and dimensional traits does not entail that they share the same essence in their deeper reality. In other words, while bodies must overlap in such structural respects, they may nonetheless belong to entirely distinct essential categories.

The proponents of this view directly challenge an argument often advanced by those who claim that all bodies share one essential reality. That argument asserts that since bodyhood (jismiyyah) has a single definition, namely something that occupies space and possesses dimensions, all bodies must be identical in essence as bodies. Any differentiation, on this view, would only arise from additional accidental features layered upon a single shared essence (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 458).

In response, the Non-Essentialist Corporealists deny that such reasoning is valid. They argue that merely having a common definition based on external characteristics does not establish essential identity. To illustrate this, they draw an analogy to the case of accidents (aʿrāḍ). All accidents share the characteristic that they must inhere in a substrate, yet no rational person would claim that all accidents are identical in essence. Colour, shape, motion, and sound are all accidents, but they are entirely distinct in their essential natures. If their common dependence on a substrate were enough to unify them in essence, then all accidents would belong to a single genus, which would collapse the traditional classification of the nine supreme genera. However, the philosophers maintain that no such unifying genus exists among accidents. They share only the external feature of requiring a subject, not any deeper essential property (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 458).

Extending this analogy to bodies, the proponents argue that bodies too may share contingent features, such as spatial location and dimensionality, without sharing any deeper essential nature. It is entirely plausible, in their view, that bodies could differ completely in their essences while sharing these general external properties. Just as the diversity of accidents is not nullified by their common dependence on a substrate, the diversity of bodies is not nullified by their shared occupation of space (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 458).

Furthermore, they respond to another common argument advanced by their opponents, which states that bodies can be divided into categories such as subtle and dense, or into upper and lower, and that this divisibility implies a shared essence. The Non-Essentialist Corporealists reject this as well. Once again, they appeal to the analogy of accidents: accidents can likewise be divided into different types, such as qualities (kayfiyyāt) and quantities (kammiyyāt), yet this divisibility does not indicate any shared essential genus among accidents. The mere ability to classify bodies into different subcategories does not, therefore, prove that all bodies share a common essence (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 458).

Building on this line of reasoning, the proponents of this view conclude that it is fully plausible that certain subtle, airy bodies (ajsām laṭīfa hawāʾiyya) exist which are entirely distinct in essence from ordinary types of air. These uniquely constituted bodies, by virtue of their own essential natures, may possess faculties for knowledge, perception, and action. Their very essence may entail capacities that enable them to perform extraordinary actions, including feats that surpass human abilities. On this basis, the existence of the jinn becomes entirely conceivable: they are bodily beings whose distinctive essence naturally equips them with knowledge, volition, and the capacity to assume different forms (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, pp. 458–59).

Having outlined the Non-Essentialist Corporealist View, al-Rāzī then turns to a different framework, which likewise affirms that the jinn are bodily beings but insists that all bodies share one and the same essence. This Essentialist Corporealist View holds that there is a single universal nature of bodyhood (jismiyyah) that applies equally to all bodies. Yet within this essentialist framework, two distinct theological positions emerge. On the one hand, the Ashʿarīs maintain that bodily structure is not a necessary condition for life. On the other, the Muʿtazilīs insist that structure is indispensable for life and agency. These two perspectives form the fourth and fifth positions, respectively.

4. The Essentialist Corporealist View—Structural Independence

The fourth position affirms that the jinn are bodily beings and that all bodies share the same essence. Crucially, however, this position holds that bodily structure (binyah) is not a necessary condition for life. The eponym Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī23 (d. 324/936) and the majority of his followers are identified with this view. They argue that God is fully capable of creating life, cognition, and volition directly within a body, even if that body is simple and lacking in complex organisation. In other words, while all bodies share the same essence, life does not require any specific arrangement of bodily parts (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 459).

Al-Rāzī records that the Ashʿarīs support their position with several arguments. First, they reason that if structure were indeed necessary for life, then one of two options must follow: either (a) life inheres as a single quality across the totality of the bodily parts together, or (b) each individual part possesses its own separate life. The first option is impossible, they argue, because it is inconceivable for a single accident, such as life, to simultaneously inhere in multiple distinct loci. The second option is also untenable, because the parts of a body are equal, and any life inhering in one part would be identical to the life inhering in any other. If the life in one part depended on the life of another part, this would generate circular dependence (dawr), which is logically absurd. If, however, such interdependence is denied, then it follows that life can exist independently in a single bodily part without requiring any relation to the other parts. Thus, life, knowledge, volition, and power can in principle be instantiated directly in an individual atomic unit (jawhar fard), without any need for a complex bodily structure (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 459).

Second, al-Rāzī reports that the Ashʿarīs reject the Muʿtazilī argument that structure is necessary based on inductive reasoning (istiqrāʾ). The Muʿtazilīs argue that we observe life ceasing when structure is destroyed and continuing when structure is preserved; therefore, structure must be a necessary condition for life. The Ashʿarīs counter that induction yields no certainty regarding necessity. Observing a correlation between structure and life does not establish that structure is an essential cause of life. Moreover, such reasoning assumes that what is observed must apply universally, which cannot be proven. This argument also collapses for those who affirm the possibility of miracles and breaches of natural norms (kharq al-ʿādāt), as the Ashʿarīs do. If God can suspend natural regularities, then no necessary causal link can be established between structure and life (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 460).

On this basis, the Ashʿarīs conclude that bodily structure is not a necessary condition for life. As stated earlier, God may create knowledge, power, and the capacity for difficult actions even within the smallest indivisible atom. Accordingly, it becomes entirely conceivable that jinn could exist as bodily beings, whether their bodies are subtle or dense, large or small, simple or composite. Their abilities need not be tied to bodily organisation but can be attributed directly to God’s creative power instantiated within even the simplest bodily substrate.

Unsurprisingly, al-Rāzī, coming from the Ashʿarī background himself, presents this position as one that enjoys strong rational support within the Ashʿarī tradition. He then shifts to the opposing perspective among those who also affirm the unity of bodily essence but maintain that life and agency necessarily depend on bodily structure, a view associated with the Muʿtazilīs. It is to this position that we now turn.

5. The Essentialist Corporealist View—Structural Dependence

The fifth position also affirms that the jinn are bodily beings and that all bodies share a single, universal essence. Yet, in contrast to the Ashʿarīs, this view maintains that bodily structure is indeed a necessary condition for life, cognition, and agency. According to the Muʿtazilīs, without a certain solidity, organisation, and complexity in the arrangement of bodily parts, life cannot emerge, nor can the capacities for knowledge and action be realised.24

At this point, al-Rāzī notes that a further issue arises: if a dense, visible body is present, with no obstacles, with the proper conditions of distance and proximity fulfilled, and with the sense organs intact, is it possible that perception nonetheless does not occur? The Muʿtazila insist that this is intellectually impossible, whereas al-Ashʿarī and his followers maintain that it is entirely possible.

Al-Ashʿarī defends his position with both rational and scriptural arguments. Among his rational proofs are two notable ones. First, we observe that large objects appear small when seen from a distance. This is because only some of their parts are perceived while others are not, even though the sense organ and all external conditions apply equally to both. Thus, perception does not necessarily follow from the fulfilment of all conditions. Second, a large body is nothing more than a collection of its constituent parts. If we see a large body from afar, then we must have seen those individual parts. Now, either perceiving one part depends on perceiving another, which would lead to an impossible circularity, or no such dependence exists, in which case perceiving a single atom from a distance should be possible. Yet it is known that an atom, in isolation, cannot be seen. Hence, perception cannot be deemed necessary but only possible, even when all conditions are fulfilled.25

The Muʿtazilīs counter that if this Ashʿarī view were accepted, it would entail absurdities. For example, drums and trumpets could be sounding nearby and yet remain unheard, or visible objects could be present and yet not perceived. But when they are pressed with analogous examples, such as the oceans suddenly becoming gold and silver, or mountains turning to rubies and emeralds, or a thousand suns filling the sky but vanishing the moment one opens one’s eyes, they fail to explain why some cases are judged necessary while others are not. Their appeal to custom (ʿāda) lacks a coherent principle, and thus, according to al-Rāzī, their method collapses into inconsistency. The only consistent options are to hold that perception is always necessary, as the falāsifa do, or always contingent, as al-Ashʿarī maintains (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 460).26

Al-Rāzī then links this debate directly to the question of the jinn. If perception is not guaranteed, then it is possible for dense and solid beings like angels and jinn to be present and yet not be seen. The Qurʾān itself affirms that angels possess great power and agency, yet remain invisible. The noble scribes (al-karām al-kātibūn) are constantly present. Angels are with the dying. They also attended the Prophet during revelation. Yet none of them were visible to bystanders. If dense bodies must necessarily be seen when present, then their invisibility becomes inexplicable. If their presence without visibility is possible, then the Muʿtazilī doctrine is undermined.

For the Muʿtazilīs to argue that angels and jinn are powerful yet lack solidity and density contradicts their own principle that structure is required for agency. And if they claim that these beings are subtle bodies whose fineness prevents them from performing great feats, then they contradict the Qurʾānic testimony that angels and jinn do perform mighty acts.

Al-Rāzī thus concludes that the Muʿtazilī position is both rationally inconsistent and scripturally untenable. He expresses astonishment that they could affirm the Qurʾānic accounts of angels and jinn while holding to such doctrines and remarks that they have not even managed to provide a superficially persuasive argument, let alone a demonstrative proof (walaytahum dhakarū ʿalā ṣiḥḥat madhhabihim shubhatan mukhīlatan faḍlan ʿan ḥujjah mubayyanah) (al-Rāzī 2012, Vol. 15, p. 461).

With this, al-Rāzī completes his systematic exposition of the principal positions advanced concerning the nature of the jinn.

Conclusion

By reading together al-Rāzī’s Great Exegesis and The Sublime Objectives, we can reconstruct a systematic taxonomy of five positions on the ontological status of the jinn. This aggregation brings into focus both the range of views he records and the evaluative stance he adopts toward them. His discussion does not amount to a neutral catalogue but a layered exercise in testing metaphysical possibilities against both reason and revelation.

The (1) Denialist View, represented by Ibn Sīnā and the later philosophers, is explicitly and repeatedly rejected. For al-Rāzī, the denial of the jinn undermines the testimony of prophets and collapses under rational counterarguments. At the other end of the spectrum, the (5) Essentialist Corporealist—Structural Dependence View, which is the position of the Muʿtazilīs, fares no better. Al-Rāzī subjects it to detailed criticism, finding it inconsistent in its logic, incoherent in its appeal to perception, and irreconcilable with the Qurʾānic witness to the power and invisibility of angels and jinn. His astonishment at the Muʿtazilīs’ persistence in holding this doctrine makes clear his judgement that it is untenable.

The remaining three views, the (2) Immaterialist View, the (3) Non-Essentialist Corporealist view, and the (4) Essentialist Corporealist—Structural Independence View, receive a more open treatment. Al-Rāzī records the first two without dismissing them, noting their plausibility as philosophical possibilities even if he does not commit to them. In the case of the Ashʿarī position, he highlights its strong rational defences, especially its capacity to explain life and agency without requiring bodily structure, while leaving room for divine creative freedom. Although he stops short of an explicit endorsement, his presentation suggests respect for its strength and compatibility with his broader theological commitments.

The picture that emerges is one of methodological openness within clear theological boundaries. Al-Rāzī insists that the existence of the jinn cannot be denied, and he decisively rejects views that contradict revelation or collapse logically. Yet within that framework, he entertains multiple metaphysical models, refusing to close down the conversation where certainty is unattainable. In this way, the jinn as liminal beings serve not only as a doctrinal question but also as a site where al-Rāzī explores the thresholds of ontology itself, testing how far reason can go and where revelation must intervene.