What Is Sensory Consciousness in the Early Yogācāra? A Hermeneutical Analysis of the Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi

Abstract

The Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi (PBh), the opening chapter of the Basic Section (*Maulī Bhūmi) of the Yogācārabhūmi, presents a distinctive fivefold schema for analyzing the structure of “the group of five [sensory] consciousnesses” (pañcavijñānakāya). This schema comprises the following five categories: (1) nature (svabhāva), (2) basis (āśraya), (3) cognitive object (ālambana), (4) co-operating factors (sahāyas), and (5) activity (karma). Each category articulates a specific aspect of the five types of sensory consciousness: their intrinsic characteristics, conditions of arising, intentional objects, associated mental factors, and cognitive functions. Within the PBh, visual consciousness (cakṣurvijñāna), corresponding to the act of seeing, is presented as a representative instance of this group. Accordingly, this paper offers a detailed examination of visual consciousness as structured by the fivefold schema, with the aim of clarifying its cognitive content within the context of early Yogācāra thought.

1. Introduction

In the Buddhist tradition, perception is frequently described as involving two levels of cognitive processing. The first level initiates direct engagement with the object, while the second encompasses more complex mental operations such as comparison, judgment, and imagination. The first level corresponds to the five sensory consciousnesses—visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile—collectively referred to as the “group of five [sensory] consciousnesses” (pañcavijñānakāya, 五識身). The second level pertains to mental consciousness (manovijñāna).

Whereas mental consciousness is capable of conceptual elaboration and functions across a wide range of cognitive domains, the sensory consciousnesses are more narrowly defined. Each is bound to a specific sense faculty and limited to apprehending a corresponding type of object. This contrast raises important questions about the cognitive content of the five sensory consciousnesses within the broader cognitive process.

To explore this issue further, we must first clarify the cognitive content of sensory consciousness itself. This requires addressing several foundational questions: What kinds of objects do the sensory consciousnesses apprehend? Under what conditions do they arise? And to what extent do they function autonomously? Addressing these questions is essential to understanding how early Yogācāra school conceptualizes the cognitive content of sensory consciousness within the overall structure of cognition.

Significantly, the opening chapter of the Basic Section (*Maulī Bhūmi) of the Yogācārabhūmi—titled Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmiḥ (hereafter PBh), or “The Ground Associated with the Group of Five [Sensory] Consciousnesses”—offers a systematic account of the structure and function of these five sensory consciousnesses. This analysis is particularly valuable in light of the foregoing questions, as it provides a coherent framework through which the specific operations, conditions, and roles of each sensory consciousness can be articulated and examined.

The fivefold schema consists of (1) nature (svabhāva), (2) basis (āśraya), (3) cognitive object (ālambana), (4) co-operating factors (sahāyas), and (5) activity (karma). Each category explicates a specific condition necessary for the arising and operation of the five sensory consciousnesses.

Accordingly, this study focuses on visual consciousness (cakṣurvijñāna) as presented in the PBh, in order to examine how its structure is articulated through the fivefold schema and, ultimately, to clarify its cognitive content in early Yogācāra thought.

2. The Fivefold Schema in the Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmiḥ

2.1. Nature (Svabhāva)

The analysis of the fivefold schema begins with the nature of visual consciousness. Asaṅga (ca. 4th century) defines it as follows:

“What is visual consciousness? It is cognizing (prativijñapti) form (rūpa) based on the eye.”1

Asaṅga offers a precise definition of the nature of visual consciousness, identifying its cognitive function as “cognizing” (prativijñapti). A similar statement can also be found in a passage of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (hereafter AKBh), where consciousness is described as prativijñapti.2 However, this term does not sufficiently distinguish visual consciousness from other types of consciousness. As Waldron (2003, pp. 51–52) has noted, prativijñapti implies a general act of discernment, a function common to all six types of consciousness. This suggests that the use of prativijñapti in the PBh as a definition of visual consciousness should be understood as a general characterization of consciousness common to all six types, rather than as a distinctive feature to visual consciousness.

However, the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (hereafter VinŚ) elaborates on it as encompassing three forms of discrimination: (1) the discrimination of receiving (領受差別), (2) the discrimination of object-grasping (採境差別), and (3) the discrimination of phases (分位差別).3

Dunlun (遁倫)’s 7th-century commentary on this provides further insights into these forms of discrimination. He explains that:

• Discrimination of Receiving: it aligns with consciousnesses associated with the three types of feelings—pleasure (樂), pain (苦), and neither-pain-nor-pleasure (不苦不樂). This aspect describes how feelings arise in response to sensory contact, illustrating the affective dimension of visual consciousness.
• Discrimination of Object-Grasping: it involves conceptualization (想), which enables the identification of objects corresponding to the six types of consciousness. This highlights the role of the mind (心) in conceptualizing sensory data and categorizing objects based on visual consciousness.
• Discrimination of Phases: it refers to the temporal nature of consciousness, which can follow feelings or volition across different phases (past, present, and future) or manifest in three types of natures.4

These three forms of discrimination—receiving (領受), object-grasping (採境), and phasic differentiation (分位)—demonstrate that the nature of visual consciousness cannot be fully explained by the general term prativijñapti alone. While prativijñapti denotes the act of discernment common to all types of consciousness, the VinŚ and Dunlun’s commentary offer a more detailed account of how visual consciousness operates specifically in sensory, conceptual, and temporal dimensions. This suggests that the nature of visual consciousness is not monolithic but is structured through multiple, interacting dimensions of discrimination. A more detailed discussion of how this structure is constituted will follow in the subsequent section.

2.2. Basis (Āśraya)

Next, the second corresponding category is the basis. Asaṅga introduces three types of bases for visual consciousness. To summarize,

• The eye is the co-existent basis (sahabhūr āśraya).
• The mental faculty (manas) is the similar-immediate basis (samanantarāśraya).
• The seed-basis (bījāśraya) is the ālayavijñāna classified as the possessor of all seeds (sarvabījaka), maturing (vipāka) [the seeds] as the appropriator of the basis (āśrayopādātṛ).5

Asaṅga assigns distinct temporal dimensions to each basis. First, the coexistent basis, identified as the eye, serves as the physical substrate for present visual consciousness. Secondly, the mental faculty functions as the uninterrupted causal antecedent, representing the immediate past that conditions the arising of consciousness. It provides the causal continuity necessary for the arising of visual consciousness. Finally, the ālayavijñāna functions as the latent repository of seeds (bīja), causing them to arise in the future. Each of these bases serves distinct yet interrelated roles in the cognitive process.

In this context, the second basis and the third basis further address the two mutually conditioning processes between the manifest cognitive consciousness and the ālayavijñāna. The mental faculty, manas, here does not refer to mental consciousness (manovijñāna) but signifies the continuous stream of the citta, which is intimately connected with the ālayavijñāna as the foundation for all future cognitive activity. In the Manobhūmi (hereafter MBh), Asaṅga explains that the citta refers to the ālayavijñāna, which includes the basis of all seeds (bījāśraya).6 This continuous flow of citta is essential for the emergence of the six types of manifest cognitive consciousness (pravṛttivijñāna). On the other hand, the ālayavijñāna emphasizes a distinct cognitive aspect. As possessor of all seeds and as possessing the maturing force, it is infused with impressions (vāsanā) from the present visual consciousness, facilitating the growth and maturation of seeds that will produce future karmic activities. Waldron (2003, p. 116) argues that this dynamic reflects the Yogācāra model of mind described as “arising by means of reciprocal conditionality” (anyonyapratyayatāpravṛttivyavasthāna) principle of dependent origination but applied specifically to cognitive and karmic continuity.

These three bases are further divided into two groups: rūpī (with form) and arūpī (without form). The eye, categorized as rūpī, provides the pure material condition (rūpaprasāda) for visual consciousness. In contrast, the mental faculty and the ālayavijñāna are arūpī, representing immaterial yet indispensable conditions for the emergence of cognitive functions.7 Lusthaus (2013) interprets this classification as emphasizing the inherent purity of sense faculty and their objects, challenging philosophical views that regard sensory experiences as inherently corrupt. Instead, distortions are attributed to mental overlays, distinguishing pure sensory input from karmically influenced mental interpretations.8

In addition to the three primary bases, Asaṅga introduces the following conditions for the arising of visual consciousness:

“When the eye is unimpaired (aparibhinna), the form appears [to consciousness], and the attention (manaskāra) that arises from [the form] is present, visual consciousness arises from that.”9

That is to say, for visual consciousness to arise, three conditions are necessary: an unimpaired eye, the appearance of form, and the presence of attention. As the first condition has already been examined above and the third condition will be discussed in the latter part (4), the following discussion focuses on the second condition.

The second condition reflects the Yogācāra’s departure from earlier Abhidharma models, particularly concerning the condition qua object-support (ālambanapratyaya). In classical Abhidharma, four types of conditions (pratyaya) are generally required for the arising of consciousness. While the first three conditions in the Abhidharma framework correspond to the three bases identified in the PBh, the ālambanapratyaya is conspicuously omitted.10 In this view, visual consciousness does not directly perceive external objects; rather, as a mirror reflects an image, it constructs its objects internally.

Taken together, visual consciousness does not arise in isolation but depends on a complex set of causal and circumstantial factors, including the sense faculty, its object, and accompanying mental factors. Importantly, it does not rely on external objects that exist independently of consciousness. This reflects the early Yogācāra position, which departs from the realist assumptions of the Sarvāstivāda school.11 Furthermore, the reason behind the VinŚ and Dunlyun’s differentiation of the nature of visual consciousness into three forms of discrimination can be confirmed here through the bases of its arising, which shows that visual consciousness is not a unitary entity, but a complex structure shaped and mediated by multiple conditions. The following section will examine in more detail what it is that visual consciousness apprehends.

2.3. Cognitive Object (Ālambana)

The third corresponding category is the objective support. Asaṅga systematically categorizes it into three types for visual consciousness: color (varṇa), shape (saṃsthāna), and transition (vijñapti) as follows:

“What is the cognitive object of visual consciousness? It is form (rūpa) that is visible and physically obstructive (sanidarśanaṃ sapratighaṃ). Additionally, it is manifold. To summarize, color (varṇa), shape (saṃsthāna), and transition (vijñapti).”12

Asaṅga proceeds to examine the three types of form with a specific example. For example, he illustrates ‘color’ as hues (e.g., blue, yellow, red) but also light, shadow, and atmospheric conditions, ‘shape’ as length, breadth, and roundness and ‘transition’ as bending, sitting, or walking.13 To further clarify these concepts, Asaṅga introduces the term paryāya to describe related and overlapping phenomena.14 Then, three forms can be summarized as follows: ‘color’ is a kind of color and appearance; ‘shape’ is a kind of the aggregation of forms with specific attributes such as length, breadth, and shape; and ‘transition’ is a kind of actions, movements, and transformations.15

The first two types—color and shape—are also regarded as a type of form in the Sarvāstivāda school.16 This overlap suggests that early Yogācāra does not entirely reject the Sarvāstivādin account of rūpa. However, the PBh’s introduction of vijñapti as a distinct cognitive object demonstrates a significant conceptual expansion. But what exactly does vijñapti entail? The PBh provides the following explanation:

“What is vijñapti? It is called vijñapti, (a) not arising at the place where [it has to] arise due to a cause of obstruction when the aggregated form is arising and ceasing, and (b) arising at another place from that whether having interval or not, or near or far. Or [it is also called transition] arising through a change (vikṛta) at the place where [it has to] arise.”17

This passage delineates two kinds of vijñapti: (a) not arising at the original place and (b) arising at the original place. Each of them can be clarified through the following examples. Case (a) can be illustrated by moving train. When stationary at a particular location (deśa), one perceives its blue color and elongated shape. However, when the train moves from one point to another, one perceives its motion, registering changes in position, distance, and speed. This movement of train exemplifies vijñapti. Case (b) illustrates a situation where the transition occurs at a fixed location, such as a traffic light changing from red to green. The change in traffic color exemplifies vijñapti. Taken together, these descriptions suggest that the notion of vijñapti in the PBh can be understood as ‘transition’ since it covers various forms of perceptible change. This indicates a shift from a static ontology of forms to a dynamic, process-oriented model of visual consciousness, which is not commonly emphasized in Sarvāstivāda discussions. In this respect, the PBh rearticulates existing perceptual categories in a uniquely Yogācāra manner, especially by integrating movement and change as integral features of how objects are cognized.

Asaṅga then illustrates how these three forms are mentally constructed. He defines varṇa as a form manifested (nibha) in the cognitive sphere (gocara) of visual consciousness, and saṃsthāna as an aggregated mental image (paricchedākāra) as long and so forth. In his definition, the terms nibha and paricchedākāra demonstrate that the mind does not directly apprehend external reality but reconstructs it based on sensory input.18

From a different angle, Asaṅga proceeds to use three Sanskrit terms—gocara, viṣaya, and ālambana—to underscore the cognitive aspect of objective support. He says that all of them are objects of the eye, visual consciousness, and mental consciousness.19 Although they appear synonymous, they reflect nuanced roles in the process of visual consciousness. Gocara and viṣaya delineate the sensory domains of specific sense faculty—for example, the eye perceives only physical forms.20 In contrast, ālambana serves as the internalized experience of consciousness, rather than an independent, external entity from the mind. In Asaṅga’s framework, this concept bridges external stimuli and internal cognition. This interpretation aligns with Asaṅga’s final assertion that all kinds of objective support of visual consciousness are represented as ‘color.’21

These descriptions indicate that color, shape, and transition are not independently existing physical properties but mental reconstructions shaped by visual consciousness. For instance, when looking at a painting, the eyes register variations in pigment and light on a flat surface. However, what is apprehended is not merely the physical paint but a meaningful image—perhaps a landscape, a figure, or a gesture—that arises through the mind’s interpretive act. In this way, visual consciousness does not passively mirror external reality but actively constitutes it as a structured and intelligible appearance.

2.4. Co-Operating Factors (Sahāyas)

The fourth category in the fivefold schema is co-operating factors. The PBh begins by defining this as follows:

“What are co-operating factors? They are the subordinate mental factors (caitasā dharmāḥ) co-existent (sahabhū) and associated with (saṃprayukta) the [visual consciousness] (tat). For example, attention (manaskāra), contact (sparśa), feeling (vedanā), conceptualization (saṃjñā), and volition (cetanā).”22

The co-operating factors of visual consciousness are identified as the mental factors (caitasikā dharmāḥ) that co-occur and are associated with it. These include the five always operating (sarvatraga) factors. Here, the two terms sahabhū and saṃprayukta refer to two distinctive types of connections between visual consciousness and its associated factors. Sahabhū refers to those factors that co-exist with visual consciousness, while saṃprayukta refers to factors that are associated with it but are not necessarily present at all times.23

Asaṅga further suggests that while these co-operating factors are co-existent with visual consciousness, they do not form a single image (ākāra). Rather, they have a single objective support but perform their functions individually:

“Additionally, other [mental factors] being co-existent and associated [with visual consciousness] are having the same cognitive object (ālambana) but not having the same image (ākāra), are co-existent [with the visual consciousness], and perform their function individually.”24

This passage clarifies that although multiple factors may arise simultaneously with visual consciousness and be directed toward the same cognitive object, they do not share the same image. This distinction arises from the differing cognitive roles of each factor.25

For example, when one perceives an apple, both visual consciousness and co-operating factors apprehend the same object—the apple. Visual consciousness may represent the red and round image of the apple itself; the mental factor of conceptualization (saṃjñā) may generate an image that categorizes it as red and roundness; volition (cetanā) may give rise to an image that evaluates it as desirable; and feeling (vedanā) may generate an image that registers it as pleasant.26 While all are directed toward the same cognitive object, each mental factor produces a distinct cognitive image due to its specific function.

Finally, Asaṅga states that each co-operating factor arises from its “own seed” and is associated with visual consciousness through shared characteristics:

“Moreover, all [mental factors] arise from their own seed (svabīja), [which are] associated with [visual consciousness] and having the image, having the cognitive object, and having the basis.”27

This passage suggests that mental factors arise from their own respective seeds. Just as, each consciousness arises from the ālayavijñāna, each mental factor originates from its own svabīja, just as each consciousness arises from the ālayavijñāna.28

Because each mental factor arises from its own unique seed, it bears a distinct cognitive image. Nevertheless, these factors are oriented toward the same cognitive object, thereby constituting a single, integrated cognitive episode despite their differentiated functions and representations. For example, the perception of an apple.

Although each factor—such as attention, contact, or conceptualization—performs a distinct cognitive role and produces a distinct representation, they operate together with visual consciousness, all directed toward the same object. This exemplifies how a unified perceptual event emerges from the joint operation of multiple distinct but co-functioning components.

This collaborative functioning of visual consciousness and its co-operating factors illustrates that visual consciousness does not operate in isolation, but rather participates in a complex perceptual process composed of multiple, functionally distinct yet coordinated modes of cognition. Each mental factor contributes a unique aspect to the overall experience—be it attention, feeling, categorization, or evaluation—thereby enriching and structuring the perceptual event as a whole. Through their simultaneity, shared orientation toward the same cognitive object, and differentiated representations, these components collectively constitute an integrated episode of seeing.

2.5. Activity (Karma)

As the last category, Asaṅga categorizes the activity of visual consciousness into six distinct types:

• It cognizes its object (svaviṣaya) as one’s cognitive object (ālambana).
• It cognizes a particular (svalakṣaṇa).
• It cognizes the present time.
• It cognizes a single moment.
• It arises following mental consciousness in two ways: according to the wholesome or unwholesome (kuśalakliṣṭa) [state], and according to the activity produced.
• It is taking of desirable and undesirable (iṣṭāniṣṭa) results.29

These six categories illustrate both the perceptual and ethical dimensions of visual consciousness within Yogācāra philosophy. The first four activities highlight the momentariness of visual consciousness. The concept of particular refers to a specific, unique characteristic of an object apprehended within a single moment. Katsura (1984) explains the particulars as akin to a “seed in a moment,” in contrast to universals or general characteristics that extend across multiple moments in a continuum. The Yogācāra emphasis on the object of sensory consciousness as momentary and distinct closely aligns with the Sarvāstivādin account.30 Within this framework, the objective support of visual consciousness is not understood as a general class of objects, but rather as a singular, momentary one.

However, the fifth and sixth activities move beyond the perceptual aspect of visual consciousness, illustrating its involvement in karmic outcomes. As the passage explains, visual consciousness arises in conjunction with mental consciousness. Whether the visual consciousness is karmically wholesome (kuśala) or unwholesome (kliṣṭa), and the specific karmic consequences it entails, are determined only once mental consciousness operates. This relationship underscores that, while visual consciousness provides the raw sensory data, it is the operation of mental consciousness, in conjunction with its co-operating factors, that ultimately shapes the outcome, resulting in either desirable or undesirable karmic consequences.

3. What Is the Cognitive Content of Sensory Consciousness?

What, then, is the cognitive content of sensory consciousness? In general terms, the cognitive content of a given sensory consciousness refers to what is apprehended in a specific sensory experience. That is, it concerns the representational structure—what is presented as being seen, heard, or otherwise sensed. In the context of Yogācāra Buddhism, particularly the PBh, this question is explored through the analysis of visual consciousness as a representative case.

The PBh describes the basic function of visual consciousness as prativijñapti, or “cognizing.” However, this term merely denotes a general function common to all types of consciousness and thus fails to account for what is specific to visual cognition. Instead, the PBh clarifies the unique cognitive content of visual consciousness through its distinct mode of engagement with its object. According to the text, visual consciousness apprehends three types of visible form (rūpa): color (varṇa), shape (saṃsthāna), and transition (vijñapti). Yet, it also acknowledges that mental consciousness can take these same features as its object, which raises an important question: if both visual and mental consciousness are directed toward the same object (ālambana), how do their cognitive results differ?

The PBh answers this by distinguishing between their respective ākāras—the cognitive images or modes of appearance. It explicitly states that although visual consciousness and its co-operating factors may share the same object, the cognitive contents they generate are not identical. Just as visual consciousness and its co-operating mental factors can be directed toward the same object while generating distinct cognitive images, the same is true of the relationship between mental consciousness and its co-operating factors.31

The same holds true for the relationship between visual and mental consciousness. Although both may be oriented toward the same cognitive object, they have distinct cognitive images. Visual consciousness grasps a non-conceptual (avikalpa) image, whereas mental consciousness grasps a conceptual (vikalpa) image. This difference results from their respective operational dimensions: visual consciousness apprehends the object immediately and spontaneously, while mental consciousness engages in higher-order cognitive activities such as classification, evaluation, and interpretation of what was previously perceived.32

For instance, visual consciousness may apprehend the red color, round shape, and falling motion of an apple as a direct, unelaborated appearance. In contrast, mental consciousness synthesizes this input into a conceptualized representation such as “an apple,” “a fruit,” or “something edible.” In this regard, the Yogācāra account departs from the Sarvāstivāda position, which holds that the five sensory consciousnesses themselves carry an intrinsic capacity for discrimination (svabhāvavikalpa).33

However, within the Yogācāra framework, the non-conceptual nature of sensory consciousness is more sharply emphasized than in the Abhidharma tradition. According to the AKBh, the five types of sensory consciousnesses are accompanied by the mental factors vitarka and vicāra, which gives rise to svabhāvavikalpa.34 The Yogācārabhūmi, by contrast, restricts vitarka and vicāra to linguistic cognition and associates svabhāvavikalpa primarily with mental consciousness, not with sensory consciousness. Moreover, it assigns sanimittavikalpa (discrimination involving images) exclusively to mental consciousness, thereby affirming the non-conceptual character of the sensory domain.35

This leads to a further question: if visual consciousness is non-conceptual, how can it be involved in ethically meaningful or karmically consequential experiences? The PBh addresses this by emphasizing the indispensable role of co-operating factors. Although visual consciousness itself neither conceptualizes nor evaluates, it never arises in isolation. It is always accompanied by various mental factors that provide the cognitive and affective basis for conceptual elaboration and ethical response.

Take the perception of an apple as an example again. Visual consciousness simply apprehends the sensory data—its color, shape, and motion. The mental factor saṃjñā (conceptualization) recognizes it as an “apple,” linking it to linguistic memory and prior experience. Meanwhile, cetanā (volition) determines the ethical orientation toward the object—whether it is desirable, undesirable, or neutral. These additional mental functions supplement the basic perceptual content, enriching it with evaluative and ethical dimensions.

Through these co-operating factors, a non-conceptual perception is transformed into a fully structured cognitive episode with ethical significance. Both the Yogācārabhūmi and the Cheng weishi lun emphasize the role of prajñā and cetanā in this transformation. Prajñā discerns whether an experience or action is wholesome or unwholesome, while cetanā initiates volitional response, thereby setting the karmic direction of behavior.36 In this way, even non-conceptual visual consciousness participates in the moral life of the subject through its interaction with these mental factors.

Still, the ethical function of visual consciousness becomes fully effective only in relation to mental consciousness. As stated in the Yogācārabhūmi, “There is the arising of wholesome or unwholesome dharma in visual consciousness, etc., which is immediately after mental consciousness, because of being led by wholesome or unwholesome mental consciousness, not because of conceptualization by visual consciousness itself.”37 This indicates that the moral and cognitive integration of sensory experience is achieved only through the coordination between visual and mental consciousness.

Thus, the PBh presents a distinct Yogācāra model in which sensory consciousness—while non-conceptual and momentary—plays a vital role in ethical and cognitive dimensions through its structural integration with mental consciousness and co-arising mental factors. This framework differs significantly from the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika accounts. For the Sarvāstivādins, only one consciousness can arise in a single moment; hence, visual consciousness cannot co-arise with mental consciousness, though it may occur together with ten universal mental factors. The Sautrāntikas, by contrast, hold not only that a single consciousness can arise within a single moment, but also deny that consciousness can co-arise with any mental factors whatsoever.38 In light of this, the PBh describes perception not merely as a passive reception of sensory data, but as a structured, ethically significant process grounded in the simultaneity and interdependence of consciousness, mental factors, and representational images.

4. Concluding Remarks

This paper has examined the structural and functional account of sensory consciousness in the Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi (PBh). By analyzing its fivefold schema—nature (svabhāva), basis (āśraya), cognitive object (ālambana), co-operating factors (sahāyas), and activity (karma)—this paper has demonstrated how visual consciousness operates as a representative case of sensory consciousness, revealing a complex structure that integrates causality, intentionality, and ethical relevance.

The PBh defines the function of visual consciousness as prativijñapti (cognizing), but its specific cognitive content is determined by the ākāra produced in conjunction with co-operating mental factors. Even when directed toward the same cognitive object, visual consciousness grasps a non-conceptual (avikalpa) image, whereas mental consciousness grasps a conceptual (vikalpa) one. Each mental factor—such as attention, volition, and conceptualization—contributes a distinct function and image, operating simultaneously with visual consciousness to form an integrated perceptual episode.

Although visual consciousness does not engage in ethical or conceptual judgment on its own, it plays a critical role in moral cognition by structurally integrating with mental consciousness and its co-operating factors. In this way, the PBh departs from the Abhidharma model of passive, ethically neutral sensory functions and instead articulates a uniquely Yogācāra view: sensory consciousness, while momentary and non-conceptual, is ethically charged through its integration within the broader cognitive system of consciousness.