On the Margins of an Unrealized Church Schism: On the Two Interpretations of the Concept of Church Among the Reformed in Transcarpathia After the Change of Power in 1944

Abstract

This study examines the responses of Reformed Christians living in the Carpathian Basin to ecclesiastical challenges that emerged after 1944. Focusing on the example of Reformed pastors in Transcarpathia, it explores the impact of the post-World War II transition on their communities—a shift not only in direction, but also in governance and national affiliation. The paper investigates a myth-forming episode within the collective memory of Reformed Christians, who found themselves in a unique borderland context. From a narrower perspective, the analysis reveals the relational and mental frameworks of pastoral groups, their differing interpretative coordinates, and the various ways they embodied their faith. These differences led to divergent understandings of the Church’s identity and mission, exposing internal mental fault lines. The fragmentation of group identity, brought to light during the 1947 conflict between the traditional national Church and the Eastern Friendship Circle, raised the possibility of schism. Intriguingly, atheist Soviet officials played a decisive role in preventing this split on two separate occasions.

1. Introduction

This study explores one of the key responses to contemporary ecclesiastical challenges among Reformed pastors in the Carpathian Basin following the Second World War, with a particular focus on Transcarpathia—annexed by the Soviet Union in 1946. Our objective is to investigate the relational and mental frameworks behind the formation of two pastoral groups among Reformed Christians in Transcarpathia during the transitional period between 1944 and 1947. These groups articulated divergent theological interpretations and developed distinct formulations for living out their faith. This divergence is examined from two vantage points: firstly, in terms of its visible and traceable consequences; and secondly, through the historical evolution of ecclesiological identity and mission within the Church. All this is conducted within the framework of perceived and evaluated historical context. The two groups under study are the folk-church—historically legitimate within Hungarian Reformed identity—and the Eastern Friendship Circle (hereinafter—EFC), an internal mission movement that challenged the authenticity of contemporary confessional frameworks.

The significance of the topic can be approached from two aspects, as on the one hand it reveals a myth-forming—but so far very vague—and therefore most characteristically identity-forming slice of the collective past of Reformed Christians who lived in this particular region. On the other hand, its residual traces continue to influence contemporary religious life 80 years later, and there are hardly any of us left who know the original story. Without authentic historical knowledge, all this often causes confusion in everyday Reformed Christian life and in the religious life of communities.

The state of research on this issue is ambivalent, because while it does not appear at all at the international level, only the myth itself is mentioned in Hungarian church history writing, but its explanation or discussion has so far been neglected. However, it occasionally features in Ukrainian historiography, mainly in relation to Soviet church policy. Noteworthy contributions include works by Igor Salamaha (2001), Larisa Кapitan (2013), Inna Sherstiuk (2012), Oksana Leshko (2002a, 2002b, 2003) and Viktor Voinalovich (2005). Yet these studies only marginally address the fragmentation of group identity among Reformed Christians, or mention it in passing alongside other topics. See, for example, the existence of the Eastern Friendship Circle (Sherstiuk 2012, p. 86), which is placed in a schematic historical context (Voinalovich 2005, pp. 650–51). However, a comprehensive examination of the two groups’ actions and motivations has yet to be undertaken.

This study applies a dual methodological approach: while providing a microhistorical background, it refrains from focusing solely on fact-finding and instead prioritises reinterpretation of sources. This approach uncovers a causal framework encompassing individual and interdisciplinary dimensions, offering a cohesive hermeneutic interpretation of the sources and exposing motivational preconceptions. In order to present the full extent of historical embeddedness, we paid special attention to the personal and social factors, elements and trends that shaped the situation and were reinforced by the current shift in power, thereby intensifying personal and collective opposition.

Our inquiry centres on the effects of the 1944 shift in power on the traditional churches in the region (including the Reformed churches), tracing how the two groups—mainstream and alternative—interpreted the Church and responded to unfolding historical developments. This makes them both typical and unique, as well as shapes their relationship with each other. We also address the emergence of clergy motivations shaped within a shifting political arena, culminating in two critical episodes in 1947. The first issue arose in connection with the Transcarpathian Reformed Church (hereinafter—TRC), which was forced to become independent again, as well as with its regional representative, who had maintained relations with the Soviet state. The second issue became apparent during negotiations on potential integration into the Evangelical Christian Baptist (hereinafter—ECB) umbrella organisation.

2. The Situation of Churches in Transcarpathia After the Change of Power in 1944

By the end of October 1944, Soviet forces had secured control over the Carpathian region. Historically, it is evident that the Soviet 4th Ukrainian Front did not breach the Árpád Line, which had defended the Carpathian Basin (Rakaczki 2025), but instead occupied the abandoned positions left by the retreating Hungarian 1st Army, which had withdrawn due to the threat of encirclement (Szabó 2006, p. 118; Niehorster 2010, p. 132). Thus, the Soviet armies encountered military resistance only in the town of Chop, while there was no civilian resistance anywhere else. Nevertheless, after annexing the territory (Molnár D. 2022, p. 17), Soviet troops initiated mass deportations in late November 1944 (Molnár D. 2014, pp. 326–39), which were not transfer-type deportations (Brubaker et al. 2006, pp. 51–52). The priests of the historical churches were exempt from deportation orders. This was not the case for the congregants, however, tens of thousands of whom were deported. As a result of deportation to forced labour camps, membership of Reformed congregations fell by 20–25% (MRE ZSL-1 n.d., pp. 1, 3).

Until the autumn of 1944, the region was part of the Kingdom of Hungary, where churches enjoyed autonomy, operated educational and social institutions, and engaged in economic activities. Between 28 October 1944 and 22 January 1946, the region lived under the authority of the transitional state of Zakarpatska Ukraina (Transcarpathian Ukraine), which professed the same atheistic ideology as the Soviet regime. The suppression of the traditional church in the region was immediately sensed by the faithful who remained in the area. The first decree affecting churches during the transition period was the Narodna Rada Zakarpatszkoji Ukrajini (People’s Rada of Transcarpathian Ukraine) decree of 5 December 1944, which initiated widespread secularization: separating the church from the state and schools from the church (Vehesh and Fedynets 2010, p. 331). This was followed by three more decrees in 1945: “On the Free Choice of Religion” (Vistnik/1 1945, p. 90), “On the Use of Church Property” (Vistnik/2 1945, p. 113), and finally “On the Nationalization of Schools” (Vistnik/2 1945, p. 115). As a result of the latter, denominational schools became state property; religious education was removed from schools and then completely banned at the end of 1945. Parish property was declared public property, and churches became state property. However, the People’s Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine clearly supported the Orthodox Church, which was one of the smallest in the region at the time. One manifestation of this was that, with the help of Soviet troops, they began to redirect Greek Catholic believers to the Orthodox Church as early as December 1944 (Danylets 2010, p. 45).1 The first phase of the anti-church process ended when, on 22 January 1946, the Soviet Union officially annexed what had been Podkarpatia (Subcarpathia), which from then on was called Zakarpattia (Transcarpathia) from Moscow’s perspective. This meant that the decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of Soviet Russia of 20 January (2 February), 1918, on freedom of conscience, church and religious communities came into force (Dekrety 1957, pp. 373–74).

After the region became part of the Soviet Union de jure in early 1946, a new phase in church policy began, which undoubtedly had atheistic and anti-church characteristics. However, this church policy demonstrably applied double standards to the traditional churches found in Transcarpathia. As in the time of Zakarpatska Ukraina, the Orthodox Church continued to enjoy a privileged position, as it was not only legalized but also spectacularly supported by the Soviet authorities. The state church office initially attempted to classify the other traditional churches in the region within the framework they had known until then. Along these lines, in February 1946, the Baptists of Transcarpathia were automatically incorporated into the Evangelical Christian Baptists (ECB) organization. A few weeks later, smaller free churches suffered the same fate, as the ECB, which had been legalized in 1944, was by then working closely with the state authorities, as a result of which it had become an instrument of Soviet policy (Beliakova 2019, p. 427).

The presence of tens of thousands of Roman Catholics in the region also caused considerable trouble for the Soviet authorities (TsDAVOU-2 n.d.). What irritated them most was that this denomination was under the direct control of the Pope in Rome. In 1946, the authorities saw the possibility of breaking away from Rome by establishing an autocephalous (independent) bishopric in Carpathian Ruthenia that would not be dependent on anyone. To this end, they thoroughly studied the personalities of the parish priests, looking for a priest who would be willing to publicly distance himself from Rome. To this end, in early 1947, they granted the Roman Catholics a state operating license relatively quickly, and then first approached the bishop’s vicar with the above offer (TsDAVOU-3 n.d.). When he refused to listen, he was arrested on trumped-up charges and sentenced to 25 years of forced labour in Siberia.

Among the churches of Transcarpathia, the transitional period had the most tragic impact on the local Greek Catholics, whom the authorities wanted to persuade to reunite or return to the Orthodox Church. When this failed, a press campaign was launched against the Greek Catholics, which ultimately led to the assassination of Bishop Tódor Romzsa by the KGB on 31 October 1947 (Serhiichuk et al. 2019). Bishop Romzsa’s death paved the way for the Soviet authorities to begin the process of liquidating the Greek Catholic Church (Maroshi 2025, p. 184).

By 1947, the Soviet Union had merged most Protestant churches into the ECB, including Free Christians, Pentecostals, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Baptists, Evangelical Christians according to Apostolic teaching, and finally the Mennonites (Beliakova and Dobson 2015, p. 23).

The Situation of the Reformed Church After the Change of Power

The situation of the Reformed Church in 1945, after the war, was similar, yet unique, as its church organization had barely recovered. “It is true that our leaders’ lack of action is not so much their own choice as it is a result of helplessness and external circumstances. They are under constant surveillance and are frequently intimidated. Pastors are not usually allowed to congregate. They did not allow the diocesan assembly to take place” (MRE ZSL-1 n.d., p. 2). However, the war caused minimal external damage, with only the Reformed church in Chop being destroyed during the fighting (Király 2024). After the region was annexed to the Soviet Union, church policy was also brought under the control of the Soviet church councils.2 Despite numerous legislative documents regulating church-state relations in the Soviet Union, the document “On religious associations” defined the foundational legal framework (Beliakova and Kliueva 2023). In other words, the state had already established the criteria for obtaining the right to operate by 1929.

This was when Calvinist Reformed Christians first came under Soviet rule, and as a result, government officials knew very little about them. In late February 1946, Petro Viljhovij, head of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults in Kyiv, issued the following directive to his subordinate in Transcarpathia: “Members of the Reformed Church served in the Hungarian army during the war, therefore their organisations cannot be registered by the state” (TsDAVOVU-1 n.d.). This could have caused quite a problem for the Reformed Church, as those who were not registered or were denied registration were considered enemies of the state and categorised as sectarian. However, those who were granted registration were generally considered safe and even useful in the Soviet Union (Morton 2020).

After 1944, the group identity of Reformed pastors in the region visibly fractured, with two distinct currents emerging. One group retained loyalty to previous state structures (the First Czechoslovak Republic and the Kingdom of Hungary), while the other was a group of pastors formed in 1936 who identified as the ‘Eastern Friendship Circle’ from 1944 onwards (Galo 2017, p. 6).

The processes that took place within the Reformed community between 1945 and 1947 were not exclusive to Transcarpathia (Colijn 1992); similar ones could be observed among the Hungarian Reformed community in the Carpathian Basin during this period (Tömösközi and Csűrüs 2024). As Füsti-Molnár has observed, these tensions reflected differing responses to contemporary ecclesiastical questions (Füsti-Molnár 2008, p. 139). In Transcarpathia, the conservative group aimed to preserve the Reformed Church’s status as a national institution, whereas the revivalist faction, the Friendship Circle, prioritised adaptation to the new social order—a position rooted in pre-WWII pietism. These developments attest to the centrality of the Reformed Church’s role in society at a time when tensions between traditional leadership and revivalist movements had reached their peak (Füsti-Molnár 2008, p. 138).

3. The Two Reformed Pastoral Groups’ Interpretation of the Church

All levels of the Transcarpathian Reformed Church accepted its doctrinal foundation in Holy Scripture and the Reformed confessions—the Heidelberg Catechism and the Second Helvetic Confession. Therefore, the Church’s biblical-theological and doctrinal definitions (such as tradutum: Ecclesia, Corpus Christi, Familia Dei, Domus Dei, etc.) were not contested. This is evidenced by the fact that Béla Szabó, a pastor from Khust (at that time: Huszt) and founder of the Eastern Friendship Circle, compiled the confirmation catechism still in use today in TRC in 1937–38, based on the Heidelberg Catechism, for the purpose of religious education. This can be seen as both a statement of faith in the historical past of the Church and a commitment to the Reformed principles in the face of the current challenges of Church and doctrinal history. Within the confines of Reformed doctrine and identity, the catechism uniquely combines pietism, which emphasises individualistic treatment of sin, with orthodoxy, which establishes the contours of Protestant theology. In addition, the text also reflects 20th-century ecumenism, which urges transcending religious orthodoxy, and perfectionism, which emphasises human achievement in salvation.

Even if the Church’s theoretical interpretation did not contain irreconcilable differences between the Friendship Circle (which had more unified characteristics) and the popular church (which was not organised within the Church), the contradictions were all the more evident in the Church’s current manifestations (such as traditio, which defines itself through its current mission and challenges). While the form mechanism of the folk-church is the undertaking of history-making, the history-maker has, therefore, always focused on central norms. Meanwhile, the form mechanism of the Friendship Circle was aimed at withdrawing and separating, at the perfection (perfecting) of the individual and—emphasized in order to define themselves against the mainstream—at the fringes/fringe service. In the end, it can be concluded that the folk church emphasized central norms and historical responsibility, while the Friendship Circle promoted marginal roles aimed at withdrawal, spiritual purity, and self-determination.

The cohesive character of the Friendship Circle, which is typical of community manifestations, was contradictory. On the surface, communal identity seemed to be above all else, influencing even the most personal matters of the community and its members, including family life, partner selection, and economic activities (Czirók 2025). However, deep down, it provided space for the embodiment of individual motivations (the individual compensated for a lack of subordination to the community by balancing it out).

The Friendship Circle (hereinafter—FC) had—de facto—two leaders: Zimányi József and Horkay Barna. The two pastors’ perception of the Church also reflected this duality, and they discovered an environment in which they could flourish as individuals within the FC spirit. Consequently, the characteristics of the FC—such as ambivalence, one-dimensional contradictions and indirect, hidden associations of multidimensional mental phenomena—demonstrate that FC can be interpreted much more from a psychological perspective than a theological one. The key concepts that emerged were compensation, insecurity and clinging. They were caused by an identity crisis affecting individuals, the Church, the national community, and the value system. The fact of the social shaping role of these phenomena, as well as the criticism of the official Churches. In other words, the fact that these key concepts have developed empirically and persisted in Hungarian Reformed society testifies not only to the shortcomings of the official and traditional church bodies in providing a secure framework for development, but also to their inability to respond and narrate in a way that fits in with current thinking and trends. Experiencing these phenomena as deficiencies created a vacuum that sucked in alternative and self-affirming organisations. However, interpreting it as a deficiency also proves the existence of a necessity: namely, that the Church’s exclusive role in guiding and developing individuals and society until the mid-20th century was challenged (after that, the state, rather than the Church, organised education, culture, the economy and science).

The position of TRC as a social organiser had already been significantly undermined in the First Czechoslovak Republic (Tömösközi 2020, p. 134), so the leadership viewed the Friendship Circle as an ecclesiastical alternative and showed cautious openness towards it. Given the Soviet regime’s limitation of the Church’s societal role, the development of the Friendship Circle—an ideological formation that interpreted the Church’s role without considering its social organisation—did not encounter significant internal resistance from the Church. Surprisingly, Soviet authorities showed greater tolerance toward the Friendship Circle than the national church. The reason for this was that certain common factors could be detected between the Friendship Circle and the Soviet regime. For example, Soviet ideology defined itself in opposition to earlier national and historical values. Similarly, the Friendship Circle’s perception of the Church was devoid of social activity compared to the folk-church, and its alternative image-building activities within the Church were also based on a model of separation. Thus, all this was opposed by the folk-church movement, which appeared (not directly) as the legal successor representing local, national and historical continuity. In contrast to the folk-church line, this was further strengthened by the fact that the Friendship Circle’s members, who had been accepted by the authorities (de facto), had been in Soviet camps and then returned home to resume their church services. This gave them an air of initiation and experience. This idea is supported by clear phenomena, whether passive or active, which manifest state power and favour the return of members of the Friendship Circle to their churches, as opposed to other church personnel. For instance, Barna Horkay became an advisor to Bishop Béla Gencsy in the summer following his return from captivity in 1956. Similarly, József Zimányi and his family were granted permission to emigrate to Hungary at the height of the Soviet dictatorship, when this was completely unthinkable for the average Soviet citizen.

4. The Differences of Opinion Among Pastoral Groups and the Mental Fault Lines They Reveal

The first major dispute between the two groups arose in early 1946–47, when Soviet authorities requested a representative from the TRC to act as their representative (regional representative) in matters concerning the Reformed Church’s dealings with the state. The Friendship Circle attempted to assert influence over this selection (Szamborovszky-Nagy 2022, p. 84). The national church leaders also considered István Györke, whom they had nominated, to be suitable for the position, thus ensuring their support for the Eastern Friendship Circle candidates. However, following the February 1947 elections, the Circle redefined the representative’s role as akin to that of a bishop in TRC, triggering conflict. Consequently, church leaders who supported the national church turned against them. The radical disagreement stemmed from the fact that the leaders of the national church saw the territorial commissioner as merely an administrator liaising with the state authorities, rather than the supreme authority of the church in Transcarpathia (DAZO n.d., p. 7). The Friendship Circle interpreted the position of regional representative as being synonymous with the highest authority of the Church. This disagreement was the first clear indication of the divergent ecclesiastical views since 1944 and raised the idea of a schism. It was in this situation that the possibility first arose that those intending to take over the leadership of the church might tear Transcarpathian Reformed Christianity away from the traditional framework of the unified Reformed Church. In May 1947, the Committee for State Security (hereinafter—KGB) classified the EFC as an anti-Soviet, fanatical and sectarian group, providing unexpected assistance to the folk-church, which can also be interpreted as Divine Providence. Consequently, its representative, István Györke, was not accepted as a regional representative (or bishop), and the EFC was ordered to dissolve (Szamborovszky-Nagy and Chasar 2022, p. 132).

Another significant disagreement emerged in the same year, almost as a continuation of the previous one, concerning the merger of the Reformed Christians of Transcarpathia with the Evangelical Christian Baptist umbrella organisation.3 The Hungarian Reformed Church initiated the connection through the Southern Baptist Convention in the US (MRE ZSL-2 n.d., p. 2), which the Soviet Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults did not oppose and even thought was worth supporting. Initiated in March 1947, this proposal divided the church leadership. In June, the church leaders met with the two initiatives that had been launched from different directions, seeking a way out of the difficult situation of the Transcarpathian Reformed Church. Once again, the traditional church leadership and the Eastern Friendship Circle found themselves in strong opposition in this situation, because the national church pastors, represented by Gyula Bary, saw joining the ECB Association as abandoning their Reformed identity, so they opposed it (Szamborovszky-Nagy 2022). In contrast, the Eastern Friendship Circle saw an opportunity in it. According to one of their leading pastors, there were several million registered Baptists across the Soviet Union, whereas the number of Reformed Church members was negligible by comparison. Zimányi (2023) suggests that being part of such a large community would have been preferable.

Contemporary sources do not support the claim that the members of the Eastern Friendship Circle were opposed to joining the Evangelical Christian-Baptist Union (Orbán 2009, p. 241). This myth, which emerged later, is not supported by any contemporary sources; in fact, the evidence suggests the opposite (Voinalovich 2005, p. 652). The myth of the Eastern Friendship Circle’s anti-unification stance arose only in post-Soviet reminiscences (Horkay 1998, p. 112). The accession was again thwarted by the Lord of the Church in the person of the KGB, and the TRC became the only Reformed (Calvinist) church of the vast Soviet state, located in the westernmost corner of the Soviet Union.

The Eastern Friendship Circle had become a religious phenomenon typical of modernity, rooted in the spirit of denial and the search for religious and intellectual renewal that characterised the 20th century. It was similar to the accumulation of reformist and elitist communities within the Church during this period (Colijn 2001, pp. 428–60). The Friendship Circle emerged from the ideological and historical experiments of the 20th century, as well as the harmonisation of mental needs from multiple sources.

• Its modern mechanism:4 in the modern era of anthropocentrism, as opposed to theocentrism, the implementation of a denial mechanism was considered core evidence. This tendency to organise identity groups dominated the social narrative space with such religious fanaticism and aggressive exclusivity that it forced oppositional groups into the framework of Christianity.
• Theological tendencies: From the authorities’ point of view, the leading theological movements (mainly in German-speaking countries) between the two world wars operated on the margins, forming a pattern of opposition (McGrath 2016).5 This image of sacrifice contains a strong analogy with the historical social psychology of Central and Eastern Europe. It reflects the progressive attitude that emerged from the stance taken against the German authorities at the time. This was enthusiastically emulated by the ambitious members of the Hungarian Reformed Church, which had undergone multiple repressions over the centuries.
• Experienced phenomena of power: The Reformed Church in Transcarpathia has continuously experienced hostility from the Soviet authorities, who have enforced direct and indirect forms of humiliation as a permanent means of mental poisoning. In parallel with this, they have settled members of foreign ethnic groups in Hungarian and Reformed areas with the aim of disrupting the Hungarian Reformed nation.

The characteristics of this historical and intellectual period6 were supported from many sides and in many different directions. Ethnic manipulation and church marginalisation created fertile ground for the Circle’s oppositional identity. Within this complex environment, the Circle rejected national church norms while ironically reproducing similar patterns of exclusivity.

4.

The idea of identity groups organised as circles of friends evokes an attitude of opposition, which is assumed to be necessary for the legitimisation of ideas in modern times. This attitude was evident in both the official Reformed Church and the official state system that opposed it.7

5.

Since more direct contact is established with the Church, the identity factor of opposition must be stronger in relation to the Church. To reinforce this negative definition, it must be aligned with the state’s tendencies towards the Church. For example, this can be seen in the characteristics of small state-supported churches, as was evident in the Soviet system during the process of merging into the Evangelical Christian Baptist umbrella organisation.8

6.

Following the arrival of Soviet power in 1944, the anti-Church environment that shaped the Friendship Circle’s critical self-perception of the Church became an even more pronounced reality. As a result, the Friendship Circle, interpreting the power challenges experienced at that time as confirmation of its own spirit (brought from the past and struggling with a persistent legalisation crisis), became a significant factor in some areas of the TRC. The EFC community’s self-image and behaviour, which included exclusivity and closedness, did not allow for a circular effect to radiate outwards and show the process; only a strongly domineering spirit within its own boundaries was evident.

7.

The members of the Friendship Circle found their area of development in suffering.9 The idea that suffering is an integral part of this career path is reinforced by the fact that it is accepted as such. In this context, suffering serves as a means of advancing one’s career. The members of the Friendship Circle experienced the possibility of advancement in their careers despite suffering in the expected long-term establishment of structures created by the Soviet regime against the Church. In other words, the condition for the survival of the church under the Soviet system was to accept and endure defiant suffering. Within the Church, circles of friends had the most experience with this form of defiant suffering. Therefore, if the members can accept the form of suffering endorsed by the new emerging system (as veterans of suffering), they will have the opportunity to represent the Transcarpathian Reformed Church, which is forced to endure suffering. Thus, they become martyrs and mythical figures embodying the community’s way of life. The Soviet regime’s method of authenticating suffering was to accredit it: they were deported to forced labour camps.10

The Eastern Friendship Circle, as a critical and marginal phenomenon, was not unique within the Reformed Church in the Carpathian Basin. During the same period, several organisations were established with the aim of meeting identity needs that could be traced back to the same set of internal and external factors. These protest organisations lost their critical edge in the shadow of Soviet power (not only due to direct persecution by the authorities). One reason for this dissolution was that the socialist governments of the Carpathian Basin after 1945 (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) left in place a certain system of institutions and structures (schools, social institutions, administration), legalised by the authorities, even after the restrictions, which was significant in terms of the social and religious proportions there. This church structure was sufficient for those who had compromised with the state to secure positions within the system. The most prominent figures of the revival movements were given the opportunity to take up positions in the state-approved church structure, which meant that they moved from the margins to the centre. However, compared to neighbouring states, the Soviet regime radically dismantled the Transcarpathian Reformed Church’s structural system. Consequently, power integration within the Church could not develop positively (not even in the form of compromise). This harsh, restrictive form of Soviet radicalism (particularly given its imperial proportions) prevented critical movements, such as the Friendship Circle, from developing within the framework of the TRC. Thus, as a religious and ideological experiment, the Friendship Circle came to a standstill. This formal and technical stagnation, adopted as a survival strategy, was reinforced by the local consolidation of hostile Soviet power.

5. Conclusions

The mark of divine sovereignty lies in God’s ability to use even hostile forces for His purposes, and everything must serve God’s cause without exception. This principle is illustrated by the events of 1947, when—unexpectedly—officials of the atheist Soviet regime intervened twice to prevent a schism in the Transcarpathian Reformed Church.11 Therefore, when facing a challenging situation that can only be overcome through suffering, it is crucial for the community that creates and selects myths to pass on a myth based on a life of suffering. This is what the Friendship Circle did with TRC. The Transcarpathia Reformed Church, which underwent changes in form but experienced constant pressure from the authorities, was to adopt suffering as a central component of its identity.

The significance of the Eastern Friendship Circle in Church history was that it provided a model of survival for the TRC, which was forced into the grip of the Soviet system: through unity, acceptance of suffering, independence from society, re-evaluation of suffering, and mutual support with the goal of ensuring the continuity of the Church by following the example set by the Friendship Circle. Therefore, the mission of the Friendship Circle is instrumental and episodic. It can be dangerous if the episodic role becomes stuck and becomes an identity factor, thus becoming permanent, because then it wants to maintain itself. In order to maintain this self-preservation, it seeks or creates factors that justify and legitimise its identity format, regardless of the indirect effects of these factors or how they are judged. So, the response form becomes the target form, even if it is in a state of stagnation. Furthermore, additional danger may arise if a form of stagnation rises to the level of myth, because it will produce new phenomena of stagnation.

The Friendship Circle likened its experience to that of early Christians, asserting spiritual authority from its marginalisation (Colijn 2012). Yet marginality is not, in itself, proof of truth. Theology reminds us that the preacher is secondary to the Word he proclaims.

Ultimately, one side (the Eastern Friendship Circle) was eliminated by the Soviet Committee for State Security forces (KGB), while the other side (the official TRC) was made a prisoner of the Soviet atheist state through its religious laws. Nevertheless, in 1947, the Transcarpathian Reformed Church was freed from the shadow of schism.