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Article
Peer-Review Record

“The One Before the One” in Plato, Dionysius the Areopagite, and Damascius: The Journey to the Ineffable One

Religions 2025, 16(8), 1084; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081084 (registering DOI)
by Konstantinos Laparidis
Reviewer 1: Anonymous
Reviewer 2: Anonymous
Reviewer 3:
Religions 2025, 16(8), 1084; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081084 (registering DOI)
Submission received: 4 July 2025 / Revised: 25 July 2025 / Accepted: 19 August 2025 / Published: 21 August 2025

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This is a very interesting, as well as provocative article. 

I do not espouse all the theses presented, but they are very well connected to one another in order to provoke discussion on some very interesting problems in Neoplatonic metaphysics. 

In general, I believe that the author should be a bit more detailed and clear when presenting the theses of the thinkers who serve as background to Damascius, i.e. Plato, Plotinus, Dionysius and a bit more should be said about Proclus.

The level of English is ok, and where I could I have provided some suggestions/corrections.

For my detailed comments see the attached file. 

In conclusion, I believe that taking into consideration my comments can help toward the improvement of this paper which is alredy of very good scholarship and worth being published.

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

Please see the attachment

Good morning. All the corrections you requested are marked in green. In cases where words or sentences were deleted, I placed a line through the phrases. The other two colors you will see in the text correspond to the other two reviewers.

Strictly speaking, the concept of God is not my concern in this article. If I could limit myself solely to the concept of the One as the supreme principle, I would. The notion of God enters the article somewhat inevitably due to Dionysius. Under no circumstances do I wish to conflate God with the One. The article is concerned with the notion of the One as a general framework, and more specifically with the identification of an entity that precedes the Neoplatonic One and is referred to as the "ineffable One." That is, I advocate for a kind of duality within the overarching unity. Of course, within this realm of the One, we are entirely beyond essence. The One is the non-being. In this article, the ineffable One is simply understood as not even participating in the general One.

Now, in those instances where God or the idea of the Good is involved, these are points that arise as parallels. That is, I am not concerned with whether the One precedes or is subordinate to God.

It is precisely this ineffable One that Damascius offers, and I argue that it surpasses the Plotinian One. Plotinus’ One, although it does not participate in essence, still possesses a self, engages in thought, is the cause of Intellect (Nous), and ultimately, we know it as light. Damascius’ ineffable One has no self, does not think, is the cause of the general One, and most importantly, we do not know why we do not know it. 

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Line 1: as the moment its numerical essence is transcendent (suppress « it ») signifies...

Remarks on the introduction. 

There seems to be a confusion between the One and Being. The One, in Neoplatonist sources (Plotinus but also Damascius) is always beyond Being and beyond the demiurge - Being/Noûs/the demiurge is already subject to division. 

Please explain further the foundations of the distinction between the One-Ineffable and the One beyond it. 

Please rewrite that sentence (unclear): "For example, I do not see because there is no light, or I know that because I comprehend, I do not see the One, which is singular."

Remarks on Part 2. 

The correct and important distinction between the One as Non-Being (beyond Being/the demiurge:Noûs) and Nothingness should be further emphasized and explained. 

 

Remarks on Part 3.

Please standardize the writing of the One (sometimes written « the one »), with capital letters. Also standardize and justify the use of italics. 

Remarks on the Conclusion: 

"What I propose is that this One-before-the One is something that precedes God" same problem as in the Introduction and within the whole paper that I stated before: the author seems to confuse God and the One in Neoplatonism. However, Neoplatonic sources argue, from Plotinus to Iamblichus, Damascius and Proclus, that God (the demiurge) precedes the One and that the One, understood as Non-Being, is absolutely beyond the demiurge and should be distinguished from God. Hence, the One has always been something that precedes God in Neoplatonism.

 

   

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

Please see the attachment

Good morning. All the corrections you requested are marked in light blue. In cases where words or sentences were deleted, I placed a line through the phrases. The other two colors you will see in the text correspond to the other two reviewers.

Strictly speaking, the concept of God is not my concern in this article. If I could limit myself solely to the concept of the One as the supreme principle, I would. The notion of God enters the article somewhat inevitably due to Dionysius. Under no circumstances do I wish to conflate God with the One. The article is concerned with the notion of the One as a general framework, and more specifically with the identification of an entity that precedes the Neoplatonic One and is referred to as the "ineffable One." That is, I advocate for a kind of duality within the overarching unity. Of course, within this realm of the One, we are entirely beyond essence. The One is the non-being. In this article, the ineffable One is simply understood as not even participating in the general One.

Now, in those instances where God or the idea of the Good is involved, these are points that arise as parallels. That is, I am not concerned with whether the One precedes or is subordinate to God.

It is precisely this ineffable One that Damascius offers, and I argue that it surpasses the Plotinian One. Plotinus’ One, although it does not participate in essence, still possesses a self, engages in thought, is the cause of Intellect (Nous), and ultimately, we know it as light. Damascius’ ineffable One has no self, does not think, is the cause of the general One, and most importantly, we do not know why we do not know it.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The paper aims to discuss the One as principle in Damascus and Dionysius Areopagita and does well to start with Plato and Plotinus. But it does not actually explain what the problem of the Plotinian One is. Why Damascus postulates a different kind of One and in what sense is specifically different? The use of terms such "hierarchical One" and "ambiguous One" require explanation. Also explanation require concepts such as "transcendence" which are crucial for the argument of the paper. Do all philosophers discussed in the paper operate with the same notion of transcendence? Some literature on Damascus such as the book of Jonathan Greig is not taken into account.

I recommend revise and resubmit.

Author Response

Please see the attachment

Good morning. All the corrections you requested are marked in grey colour. In cases where words or sentences were deleted, I placed a line through the phrases. The other two colors you will see in the text correspond to the other two reviewers.

It is precisely this ineffable One that Damascius offers, and I argue that it surpasses the Plotinian One. Plotinus’ One, although it does not participate in essence, still possesses a self, engages in thought, is the cause of Intellect (Nous), and ultimately, we know it as light. Damascius’ ineffable One has no self, does not think, is the cause of the general One, and most importantly, we do not know why we do not know it.

Strictly speaking, the concept of God is not my concern in this article. If I could limit myself solely to the concept of the One as the supreme principle, I would. The notion of God enters the article somewhat inevitably due to Dionysius. Under no circumstances do I wish to conflate God with the One. The article is concerned with the notion of the One as a general framework, and more specifically with the identification of an entity that precedes the Neoplatonic One and is referred to as the "ineffable One." That is, I advocate for a kind of duality within the overarching unity. Of course, within this realm of the One, we are entirely beyond essence. The One is the non-being. In this article, the ineffable One is simply understood as not even participating in the general One.

Now, in those instances where God or the idea of the Good is involved, these are points that arise as parallels. That is, I am not concerned with whether the One precedes or is subordinate to God.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Round 2

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The study has been revised according to the comments, it has also been clarified.

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