The Maqāṣid as a Means for a Contemporary, Ethically Based Muslim Thought: A Comparison of the Views of Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Ṭaha Jābir al-ʿAlwānī

Abstract

The modern debate on the maqāṣid has become very diverse and includes numerous suggestions on how the maqāṣid are supposed to reform Muslim (legal) thought. For an illustration of this diversity, the approaches of two very different intellectuals are compared with each other. One scholar is the philosopher Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (b. 1944), whose reflections are contrasted with those of the jurist Ṭaha Jābir al-ʿAlwānī (d. 2016). This research shows that they share some similarities in their premises regarding the ability of the maqāṣid to reform Muslim thought; however, differences can be noticed regarding the content of their maqāṣid concepts and how their concepts should be applied in practice. While al-ʿAlwānī presents concrete suggestions for practical applications, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān understands his contributions as a theoretical basis that is supposed to be used by Muslim jurists in order to re-establish Islamic law on an ethical basis.

1. Introduction1

Major changes in the modern era have prompted Muslim intellectuals to look for new approaches to interpreting Islamic sources in order to provide contemporary answers to emerging questions. These questions relate, among other things, to medical ethics and the financial sector or arise from broader social developments—for example, in relation to gender equality. To formulate adequate responses to such complex issues, some Muslim intellectuals argue that the classical methods of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) are no longer sufficient to provide satisfying results (Masud 2018, p. 70). A strictly literalist reading of the primary sources—the Quran and the prophetic tradition—also proves ineffective, as past experiences show that a purely literal interpretation tends to produce a form of law (fiqh) marked by rigidity and conformity (Saeed 2006, p. 55). This approach to the sources and to Islamic law largely overlooks contemporary contexts, allows for little flexibility, and, according to Black et al., thus fails to provide viable options and perspectives for addressing current realities (Black et al. 2013, p. 229).

In light of these developments and discussions, numerous intellectuals—particularly in recent decades—have advocated for the concept of the so-called ‘goals of the Sharia’ (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa) (Kamali 2018, p. 7). This approach seeks to analyze Islam’s primary sources in terms of fundamental ethical principles, in order to provide guidance for addressing contemporary issues. Proponents of the maqāṣid approach argue that it enables direct engagement with Islamic sources and emphasizes the ethical objectives of the texts rather than relying on strictly literal interpretations. Additionally, this method offers interpretative flexibility and supports both the re-evaluation of traditional Islamic legal concepts and the development of responses to new—particularly ethical—questions from an Islamic perspective (Jackson 2006, p. 1470). With the growing interest in maqāṣid in recent years, efforts have also been made to apply the concept in practice across various fields, including Islamic family law, Islamic finance, and constitutional law (Kamali 2012, p. 2).

In modern discourses on the maqāṣid, intellectuals frequently refer to the pre-modern scholar Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), often described as the ‘architect of the maqāṣid theory’ (Nassery 2018, p. 78).2 According to Mahmoud Bassiouni (2024, pp. 164–65), developments in recent years indicate that al-Ghazali’s maqāṣid model is either being reinterpreted or expanded by contemporary scholars. However, this article presents another trend, namely proposals for a complete revision of al-Ghazālī’s conceptualization of the maqāṣid. This trend is illustrated by the contributions of two Muslim intellectuals. One of them is the leading Moroccan philosopher, ethicist, linguist, and Sufi Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān.3 While ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s primary focus has been the reform of Muslim ethical thought, his engagement with the maqāṣid has gradually increased in recent years, culminating in the 2022 publication of the monograph al-Taʾsīs al-iʾtimānī li-ʿilm al-maqāṣid (The Fiduciarist Foundation of the Discipline of the Higher Objectives). The second scholar under discussion is the Iraqi-born jurist Ṭāhā Jābir al-ʿAlwānī. His main areas of specialization include uṣūl al-fiqh and the maqāṣid. As a reform-oriented intellectual, his contribution to the maqāṣid discourse has been described as “seminal” (ghayr maʾlūf) (Bībars 2020, p. 231).

Both the scholars and their contributions have garnered considerable international attention, leading to numerous publications on their work. In the case of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, his ethical-philosophical thought—particularly his concept of the so-called trusteeship paradigm—has become the subject of intense academic debate. Notable contributions to this discourse include Wael Hallaq’s monograph, Reforming Modernity. While many contributions engage with his approaches to contemporary ethics and philosophy, it is noteworthy that his reflections on the maqāṣid have, thus far, received relatively little attention. One of the earliest discussions of his contributions to the maqāṣid can be found in a 2014 anthology contribution by Ebrahim Moosa, in which he outlines ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s proposal for reforming al-Ghazālī’s maqāṣid concept in just a few pages, see Moosa (2014, pp. 181–87). An examination of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s contributions to the maqāṣid, which also takes into account his aforementioned 2022 monograph, is presented, for example, in Rabīʿ Ruḥūma’s critical analysis entitled al-Abʿād al-akhlāqiyya li-l-dars al-maqāṣidī al-muʿāṣir.

The work of Ṭāhā Jābir al-ʿAlwānī is also explored from various angles by numerous authors—whether in relation to his contributions to the fiqh of Muslim minorities or, more broadly, to the reform of Muslim thought. His specific conception of the maqāṣid is examined, among others, by Abdul Rashid Moten in Varieties of Islamisation, see Moten (2023, pp. 127–42) and by Fathi Malkawi in his monograph Epistemological Integration, see Malkawi (2014, pp. 223–26).

To supplement previous research on these two scholars, this article compares their thoughts, with a particular focus on their specific maqāṣid considerations.

There are several reasons for selecting these particular scholars and for considering a comparison with regard to the maqāṣid as fruitful. Among these is the fact that they share certain fundamental premises, including the recognition of the need for reform in general Muslim thought and law, as well as the attribution of an important role to the maqāṣid in this process. Furthermore, it is interesting to compare their thoughts on the maqāṣid in that, while both recognize the need to reform existing maqāṣid concepts, they hold very different views regarding the formulation of new ones. They also differ in the methods they employ to develop these concepts, as well as in their expectations concerning how their ideas should be applied in practice.

Before undertaking this comparison, it seems important, for reasons of fairness, to note several points. One is that, although the maqāṣid play a significant role in the thoughts of both scholars, the scope of their publications and the intensity with which they discuss the maqāṣid differ considerably. While al-ʿAlwānī has been publishing for decades on the maqāṣid, they are not at the center of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s work to the same extent. By contrast, his primary focus is on his specific ethical paradigm. It should also be noted that the two scholars have markedly different backgrounds. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān is a philosopher and theorist who aspires to develop theoretical concepts for the reform of Muslim thought, viewing the implementation of his proposals as the responsibility of jurists. In contrast, al-ʿAlwānī is not only a theorist and thinker but also a jurist and practitioner, and his concern for the practical applicability of his work is clearly evident.

With the aim of comparing the maqāṣid considerations of the two scholars and thereby contributing to the contemporary maqāṣid debate, this article is structured as follows: The second section—immediately following the introduction—will present the lives and intellectual contributions of both scholars, followed by a comparative analysis of the similarities and differences in their overall thoughts. The third section will examine and contrast their respective interpretations of the maqāṣid. The findings will then be summarized in the conclusion.

2. The Lives of Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Ṭaha Jābir al-ʿAlwānī

2.1. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s Life and Work

Born in 1944 in the city of al-Jadīda, Morocco, Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān earned doctorates in language and logic and philosophy from Sorbonne University, Paris, in 1972 and 1985. He taught philosophy in Morocco until his retirement in 2005 (Hashas 2020, p. 37). According to Mohammed Hashas, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s scholarly work evolved through three phases: initially focusing on logic and argumentation in the 1970s and early 1980; then developing methods to reform Islamic thought through theological philosophical approaches; and since 2000, formulating a theologically grounded ethical theory known as the trusteeship paradigm (al-iʾtimāniyya) (Hashas 2015, p. 73).4 In addition to its theological and philosophical content, this concept is strongly inspired by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s affiliation with the Moroccan Sufi order of the Budshishiyya, as is repeatedly evident in his overall thinking and attitudes on various topics.5 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān integrates this concept into various fields, including Islamic law and more recently the maqāṣid, advocating for a fiqh iʾtimānī—jurisprudence based on these ethical values.

In terms of his publishing activities, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān is very versatile and in addition to his core topic of ethics, he publishes in areas such as politics, media, materialism, Western modernity, and the need for dialogue between civilizations. His more than twenty monographs to date were all published in Arabic (Hashas 2020, pp. 38–39); however, in recent years, the Western English-speaking academic community has been increasingly engaging with ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s contributions.6 Beyond academia, he has appeared on television, notably in Al Jazeera’s al-Sharīʿa wa-l-Ḥayāt (Sharia and life) in 2004.

2.2. Al-ʿAlwānī’s Life and Work

Ṭāhā Jābir al-ʿAlwānī was born in Fallujah (Iraq) in 1935. He studied at al-Azhar University in Egypt, earning his doctorate in 1973 in the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). For several years he taught in Baghdad, then in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he taught fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh at the Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) (Majid 2017, pp. 47–48). In 1983, he moved to the United States, where he lived until his death in 2016 (Moten 2023, p. 128). There, he founded the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS) in Leesburg, Virginia, served for a few years as a member of the Board of Trustees of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), and also served as the president of the Fiqh Council of North America (Moten 2023, p. 129). Among other things, he became known for his efforts to develop the concept of Islamic minority law (fiqh al-aqalliyyāt) (Hellyer 2009, p. 82).

The subjects of his numerous publications include Quranic studies, uṣūl al-fiqh, juristic reasoning (ijtihād) and the maqāṣid, as well as his critical editions of classical works. A central recurring theme in his publications is the intellectual crisis in Muslim thought, which he tries to counteract. He argues that this requires a logical, well-thought-out concept with a solid basis that can be applied in practical terms.

2.3. Similarities and Differences in the General Thoughts of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and al-ʿAlwānī

Something that the two scholars share is their preoccupation with the modern, global context in which Muslim thought currently operates. They view this context very critically and describe it as dominated by Western values, that is, materialism, secularism, and liberalism.7 It is a system that, according to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, separates all areas of human life from religion (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, p. 11) and reduces human beings to their instincts and material needs (Al-ʿAlwānī 2005, p. 40). With its focus on matter (i.e., materialism), this system is unable to offer people anything that fulfills them given their complexity (Al-ʿAlwānī 1981, p. 31) and, according to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, the West with its secular-materialistic character is unable to solve moral-ethical crises (Arḥīla 2016, p. 89). Both scholars argue that in the current global lack of a religious ethical basis for modern life, Muslims in particular are called upon to exemplify beautiful values to people and offer an alternative to the global Western system. However, both also note that Muslims are currently not in a position to take up this responsibility because, according to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, Muslims, and especially many of their intellectuals, have handed over their minds and hearts to the West (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, p. 135),8 and, according to al-ʿAlwānī, Muslims do not even notice their own crisis and backwardness (Al-ʿAlwānī 2003, p. 82). This inability of Muslims is directly related to their inner crises, which, according to al-ʿAlwānī, are multidimensional (Majid 2017, p. 52) and include cultural backwardness and social and economic difficulties. At the core of all these, he maintains, is an intellectual crisis (azma fikriyya) (Al-ʿAlwānī 1989, p. 15). ʿAbd al-Raḥmān seems to take a similar view when he says that he has no hope of renewal with regard to current Islamic Arab thought (Hashas 2015, p. 104). Al-ʿAlwānī argues that Muslims currently possess little more than their religious and cultural heritage (Al-ʿAlwānī 2005, p. 45) and they fall short in having a clear vision regarding a renewal of thinking and regarding the goals of this renewal (Al-ʿAlwānī 1989, p. 15). Both scholars contend that there is a lack of clear, well-thought-out methods needed to reform Muslim thinking (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1997, p. 9; Al-ʿAlwānī 1989, p. 15).

In the course of their discussions and problematizations, the two scholars address a special group that is affected by the crisis itself but also contributes to its worsening, namely, Muslim jurists (fuqahāʾ, sing. faqīh). Al-ʿAlwānī suggests that the current intellectual crisis affects jurists and their work to the extent that they are unable to think in comprehensive terms. Instead, they focus on details, while the lack of a comprehensive view has an adverse effect on how solutions are thought about, which in turn has negative consequences for fiqh and the production of fatwas (Al-ʿAlwānī 2003, p. 65). Al-ʿAlwānī continues that this could happen because many jurists treat fiqh as separate from a comprehensive Islamic understanding (ruʾya kulliyya islāmiyya) (Al-ʿAlwānī 2003, p. 11). Similar points of criticism can be found in the works of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, who argues that jurists focus on legal aspects of the Sharia and neglect spirituality and morality (Hashas 2020, p. 41), reducing the Quran to a code of law (kitāb at-tashrīʿ) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, pp. 82–83). ʿAbd al-Raḥmān goes even further in his criticism of jurists, whereby his Sufi orientation becomes evident. He argues that jurists ignore the importance of intention (ikhlāṣ) and, with their focus on merely the lawful and prohibited, they fail to discover the core of the actual values of these rules (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, p. 85). He refers to such a jurist as al-faqīh al-iʾtimārī (derived from amr, command), meaning one who thinks in an extremely materialistic and worldly way and strives for dominance over people (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, p. 84) and control (tasalluṭ) over the religious texts (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, p. 502). At this point one could assume that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān is talking about a fringe group of extreme literalists. However, he is referring to any scholar who does not base his understanding on ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s theory of al-iʾtimāniyya and who therefore fails to be a faqīh iʾtimānī. This faqīh iʾtimānī, in contrast to the faqīh iʾtimārī, is not concerned with control and domination but serves as a personal educator (murabbī) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, p. 23) of the people who consult with him, seeing to their ethical and spiritual development (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, p. 17).9

Both scholars are of the opinion that the solution to the current Muslim intellectual crisis requires a well-thought-out concept. While for ʿAbd al-Raḥmān this requirement is fulfilled by his paradigm of al-iʾtimāniyya, for Al-ʿAlwānī it is achieved by his specific maqāṣid concept.

3. The Maqāṣid in the Thoughts of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and al-ʿAlwānī

3.1. The Maqāṣid in the Thoughts of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s preoccupation with the maqāṣid began in his early publications, but the scope and content of these are very limited. One such example is his Tajdīd al-minhāj fī taqwīm al-thurāth from 1993, in which he discusses the maqāṣid from a linguistic and philosophical perspective in just a few pages. His preoccupation with the maqāṣid increased in the following years until his aforementioned al-Taʾsīs was published in 2022. In this work, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān builds on earlier reflections and supplements them with spiritual, theological and methodological considerations.

In all his discussions of the maqāṣid over the years, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s background as a linguist and ethical philosopher is evident time and again. This becomes clear, for example, in his attempt to define the maqāṣid. He says that the maqāṣid comprise “akhlāqī knowledge [i.e., knowledge of good character] whose theme is the righteousness of humans (al-ṣalāḥ al-insānī).” With the centrality of excellence of character (akhlāq) at the heart of the maqāṣid, according to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, it is also accurate to refer to the maqāṣid as a “discipline of good character” (ʿilm al-akhlāq) and a “discipline of righteousness” (ʿilm al-ṣalāḥ). He also argues that the maqāṣid are concerned with the following questions: How can humans be virtuous or righteous? How can humans do good? (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2015, pp. 73–74). According to the philosopher, the highest goal of the maqāṣid is the worship of God (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2015, pp. 94–95).

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s reflections on the maqāṣid are often connected with his general criticisms of jurists’ understanding of Islam, which he further specifies using the example of scholars’ treatment of the maqāṣid. According to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, their superficial understanding of religion and neglect of ethics have a direct impact on their definition of the maqāṣid and on their categorization (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2015, p. 85). The philosopher posits that the superficial, materialistic view of jurists has led them to emphasize the instincts and natural needs of humans and to define the maqāṣid accordingly, which is why ʿAbd al-Raḥmān also refers to the classical five maqāṣid as “instinctive values” (al-maṣāliḥ al-gharāʾiziyya) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, p. 504). Furthermore, he also considers their categorization into necessities (ḍarūriyyāt), needs (ḥājjiyyāt) and embellishments (taḥsīniyyāt) and the respective values assigned to them as altogether wrong. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān argues that while the “instinctive values” (religion, life, reason, offspring, and property) were assigned to the highest rank, namely, al-ḍarūriyyāt, despite their centrality, good character and its purification were assigned to the least relevant category, namely, al-taḥsīniyyāt (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993, p. 112). According to this ranking, good character is understood at most as something desirable and not necessarily required by Islam. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān suggests that a reform of the maqāṣid is necessary, among other reasons, so that humans may rise above the materialistic aspects of their life and overcome them, as is envisaged by Sharia (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, p. 420).

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s Proposals for an Ethics-Based Interpretation of the Maqāṣid

In his attempt for a redefinition and ethical justification of the maqāṣid, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān argues that the maqāṣid even indicate linguistically that they are based on ethics (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993, p. 107). Analyzing the term maqṣid, he proposes that the term has different ethical connotations that must be taken into account when discussing the maqāṣid (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993, p. 107). He suggests that among the linguistic meanings of this term are sincerity of intention (ikhlāṣ) and moral behavior.10

In addition to a linguistic-ethical approach, he also presents a new proposal for the categorization of maqāṣid, namely, a three-level classification based on certain values. The first category comprises the values of benefit and harm (qiyam al-nafʿ wa-l-ḍarar). These can be identified by sensations such as pleasure (ladhdha) when benefit is experienced or pain when harm is experienced (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993, p. 113). The second category comprises the values of good and bad (qiyam al-ḥasan wa-l-qubḥ). Feelings with which these can be identified include joy (faraḥ) when something positive is experienced or sadness, for example, in the case of loss (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993, pp. 113–14). The third category comprises the values of righteousness and corruption (qiyam al-ṣalāḥ wa-l-fasād). These can be identified with emotions such as joy or sorrow. Emotions that belong to these values are spiritual aspects of religion such as mercy and love (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993, p. 114). According to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, the advantage of this categorization over others is that it leads to an increase of values (takāthur al-qiyam) and a juridical judgment no longer has to be based on only one value or only one benefit (maṣlaḥa). Moreover, with the use of this system, all (legal) judgments are based on spiritual values and justified by them and not, as was previously the case, on “life-values” (qiyam ḥayawiyya) such as life and offspring. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān suggests that these spiritual values are now elevated to the highest level of maqāṣid because they are the most capable of forming and shaping good character and they represent the basis for two further value levels, namely, the values of life and reason (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993, p. 114).

In his latest publication on the maqāṣid, the monograph al-Taʾsīs al-iʾtimānī li-ʿilm al-maqāṣid, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān reprises his earlier reflections on the maqāṣid while also enriching them with new considerations. As in his previous works, the focus of this monograph remains on ethics. What makes his latest contribution particularly noteworthy is his attempt to ground the maqāṣid in his concept of iatimānīya. Building on this paradigm, the philosopher regards the following values as fundamental maqāṣid: soul values (al-qiyam al-rūḥiyya), theological values (al-qiyam al-ʿaqdiyya), practical values (al-qiyam al-ʿamaliyya), rational values (al-qiyam al-ʿaqliyya), life values (al-qiyam al-ḥayawiyya), and material values (al-qiyam al-māddiyya) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, p. 477). ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s expectations of these six iatimānīya-based values are ambitious: they are intended to contribute to a reform of the current conception of the human being and, in the long term, to be developed into a universal science that will be indispensable on a global scale (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, p. 479).

3.2. The Maqāṣid in al-ʿAlwānī’s Thought

Despite the thematic diversity in al-ʿAlwānī’s publications, Mokhtar Hosseini (2022, p. 164) says that the maqāṣid can be noticed in his thinking and publications since the beginning of his scholarly activities. Al-ʿAlwānī writes specifically on the maqāṣid in different books, sometimes devoting an entire work to the topic, as is the case in his Maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, or he integrates his discussions on the maqāṣid into the larger debate on the reform of Muslim thought, such as in the monograph Naḥwa al-tajdīd wa-l-ijtihād. Some of his discussions on the maqāṣid can also be found on his website (alwani.org). The jurist explains that his study of the maqāṣid had two phases. In the first phase, he studied the interpretation of the maqāṣid by classical and modern scholars. As a conclusion of this phase, he explains that the scholars endeavored to fathom and explain the wisdom of Sharia;11 however, the maqāṣid were marginalized and not conceptualized for centuries, which had serious consequences for the correctness of Islamic (legal) thought (Al-ʿAlwānī 2001, p. 129). In the second phase, Al-ʿAlwānī developed a maqāṣid concept that is intended to bring Muslim (legal) thought out of its current crisis and provide a basis for developing adequate solutions and answers to new circumstances and questions. He refers to this concept as “the highest-governing Quranic purposes” (al-maqāṣid al-qurʾāniyya al-ʿulyā al-ḥākima).12

Al-ʿAlwānī’s Concept of “the Highest-Governing Quranic Purposes” (al-maqāṣid al-qurʾāniyya al-ʿulyā al-ḥākima)

Al-ʿAlwānī explains that in developing his concept, he identified the most significant ethical values by engaging with the Quran and the prophetic tradition (2006–2007, p. 16).13 Additionally, Al-ʿAlwānī also uses the method of the so-called unification of the two readings (al-jamʿ bayn al-qirāʾatayn).14 The first “reading” concerns the Quran, the revealed book of God (kitāb munazzal matlū). Al-ʿAlwānī assumes that God in His revelation has given people guidance and directions so that they can find happiness in this world and in the hereafter. The second “reading” concerns God’s creation, the so-called created, open book (kitāb makhlūq maftūḥ). Creation is meant to be contemplated by people drawing knowledge from it and developing related sciences (Al-ʿAlwānī 2006, p. 20). Since God is the source of both “books,” revelation and creation complement each other and neither of them should be neglected during the search for knowledge.15 Using these methods, al-ʿAlwānī developed the following three maqāṣid: monotheism (al-tawḥīd), purification (al-tazkiya), and civilization (al-ʿumrān). Al-ʿAlwānī (2006–2007, p. 16) says about these three maqāṣid that they represent the essential values and messages of all prophets sent by God and they constitute the goals and basic contents of all divine messages, even though some juristic details may differ between them.16

The first and most important maqṣid is that of tawḥīd (Al-ʿAlwānī and al-ʿAlwānī 2012, p. 23). Al-ʿAlwānī states that tawḥīd is the foundation of the entire religion (Al-ʿAlwānī 2003, p. 13), and its centrality is demonstrated by the fact that most of the chapters of the Quran and the majority of its verses revolve around tawḥīd (Al-ʿAlwānī 2006, p. 37). This maqṣid explains the relationship of God with His creation and vice versa, and it also includes the Islamic teachings about human life, both in this world and in the hereafter (Al-ʿAlwānī and al-ʿAlwānī 2012, p. 23). Tawḥīd presents a comprehensive view of the universe and informs humans of their special role in creation (Al-ʿAlwānī 2003, p. 65).

The second maqṣid is that of purification (al-tazkiya). Al-ʿAlwānī explains that Islam places great importance on the purification and spiritual growth of humans. This maqṣid includes the Islamic conviction that people are obliged to orient themselves to God’s will and orders in this life, to strive for good, and to ward off harm (Al-ʿAlwānī and al-ʿAlwānī 2012, p. 24). Just as the first maqṣid, tawḥīd, is connected to the other two values, the maqṣid of tazkiya, by reminding people to live and act ethically and responsibly, leads directly to the third maqṣid, “civilization” (ʿumrān) (Al-ʿAlwānī 2006, p. 37). The maqṣid of ʿumrān stands for the human responsibility demanded by God to build a prosperous life17 and the management and use of creation according to God’s will (Al-ʿAlwānī and al-ʿAlwānī 2012, pp. 24–25).18 According to Abdul Rashid Moten, this maqṣid also means that people are responsible for creating harmony between humanity and creation. Thus, this maqṣid intends “to develop a value-based civilization” (Moten 2023, p. 133) and means that creation is used responsibly without exploiting and destroying it.19

Summarizing these three maqāṣid, al-ʿAlwānī says that the first is the right of God over humans, the second is the right of humans over themselves, and the third is the right of the universe over humans.20 Since this concept is based on the revelation and creation of the one and only God, and if the three maqāṣid are understood and implemented correctly, then, according to al-ʿAlwānī, the correct implementation of this system leads to a comprehensive worship of God that encompasses all areas of human life and activity (Al-ʿAlwānī and al-ʿAlwānī 2012, pp. 13–14).

These three values represent the basis and the primary values of al-ʿAlwānī’s maqāṣid concept. However, the jurist adds another level, the so-called secondary maqāṣid. These include values such as equality, justice, and freedom. The secondary maqāṣid are followed by the tertiary maqāṣid, which are the well-known classical ḍarūriyyāt, ḥājjiyyāt, and taḥsīniyyāt. As for the current question of adding more maqāṣid, Al-ʿAlwānī says that, with the hoped-for future interest of scholars in his concept, this will necessarily be the case (Al-ʿAlwānī 2012, pp. 15–16).21

3.3. Comparison of the Maqāṣid Conceptualizations of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Al-ʿAlwānī

3.3.1. Premises of the Maqāṣid Considerations of the Two Scholars

There are some similarities in the premises of their respective maqāṣid considerations. Both scholars regard ethics as the basis of a new maqāṣid theory and both understand their respective concept as the key to solving fundamental problems in Muslim (legal) thought. Their shared views also include the fact that they understand maqāṣid as an independent discipline and not, for example, subordinate to the uṣūl al-fiqh.22 When the two scholars discuss previous contributors to the maqāṣid discussion, they also cite the same names in their publications. For the premodern period this is al-Shāṭibī in particular and for the modern period, al-Ṭāhir b. ʿĀshūr, ʿAllāl al-Fāsī (d. 1974), and others. However, the two scholars do not refer to each other in their publications. Another thing they have in common is that they are critical of scholars’ previous engagement with the maqāṣid. They condemn the previous marginalization of the maqāṣid,23 which, according to al-ʿAlwānī, led to a stagnation of Muslim intellectual activities and to major mistakes in Muslim (legal) thought (Al-ʿAlwānī 2001, p. 129). Another common criticism is that jurists have so far failed to reflect comprehensively on the Quran in order to derive certain values. According to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, however, this is important for the work of the uṣūl al-fiqh scholars because, in contrast to the limited values of the materialistically thinking jurists, the law should be based on the numerous ethical values of the Quran (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, p. 384).

Both scholars argue that, in response to what they perceive as a flawed treatment of the maqāṣid, entirely new concepts are necessary. Moreover, both advocate for new methodologies by which additional maqāṣid—or ‘values,’ as they alternatively term them24—can be discovered. They also concur that the maqāṣid should not be confined to a predetermined number; rather, they should remain open to expansion.25

3.3.2. Contents of Their Maqāṣid Concepts and Their Approach to the Classical Maqāṣid Model

Regarding the structure of their maqāṣid models, al-ʿAlwānī’s concept is succinctly organized and therefore readily comprehensible. His foundational maqāṣid consist of the values tawḥīd, tazkiyah, and ʿumrān, each derived directly from the Quran and the prophetic tradition. In contrast, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s maqāṣid framework is comparatively elusive, since the values he proposes vary over time. This raises a critical question: which specific values should Islamic jurists employ to establish a value-based Islamic law? Does ʿAbd al-Raḥmān endorse the six values introduced in his al-Taʾsīs? If so, what implications does this have for the values he cited in his earlier publications?

In their approach to premodern maqāṣid frameworks, both scholars adopt a critical stance, particularly toward al-Ghazālī’s famous model. Al-ʿAlwānī regards al-Ghazālī’s well-known classification of maqāṣid into necessities (ḍarūrāt), needs (ḥājāt), and luxuries (taḥsīnāt) (Al-Ghazālī 2008, p. 275) as inadequate for contemporary contexts. However, rather than dismissing it entirely, he repositions these traditional categories as tertiary objectives within his own schema. In contrast, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān presents a more comprehensive critique of al-Ghazālī’s treatment, not only rejecting the tripartite classification (Section 3.1 above), but also calling for a restructuring of the five primary maqāṣid, the ḍarūrāt (namely the protection of religion, life, intellect, family, and property). He contends that equating all five under the same rank misrepresents their varying significance; he asserts that religion (dīn) deserves its own independent status, as it is broader and more comprehensive, and should therefore take precedence over the others (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, p. 406). Furthermore, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān suggests elsewhere that these five classical maqāṣid could be reduced to two overarching categories. In this revised taxonomy, the Sharia’s primary aims are the preservation of religion or creed (ʿaqīda) and the preservation of practice (ʿamal)26; the remaining three maqāṣid are subordinated under these two categories (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, pp. 415–16).

3.3.3. The Methods Used for Deriving the Maqāṣid

The two scholars exhibit major differences in their methodologies for identifying the maqāṣid. Al-ʿAlwānī adheres to the traditional method of induction (istiqrāʾ), systematically analyzing primary Islamic texts to extract the foundational values or principles embedded within them. Additionally, he applies his method of “unification of the two readings”. Employing both methods, he establishes the key values of his maqāṣid framework.

In contrast, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān is a strong critic of istiqrāʾ. In his al-Taʾsīs, he contends that this inductive method leads jurists to derive erroneous maqāṣid—namely, the ḍarūrāt. According to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, these maqāṣid are flawed because they are confined to human material needs and grounded in the lowest human instincts (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, p. 504) rather than in religious ethical values (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, p. 450). At this stage, a scholarly exchange between the two scholars would prove illuminating. Because although al-ʿAlwānī employs the method criticized by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān as ‘false,’ al-ʿAlwānī nonetheless genuinely uncovers ethical values through its use. Therefore, it would be valuable to know how ʿAbd al-Raḥmān responds to al-ʿAlwānī’s employment of istiqrāʾ for such purposes.

As an alternative to istiqrāʾ, the philosopher proposes a method called “non-inferential knowledge” (al-istidlāl al-fiṭrī) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, p. 399). This method builds upon the Islamic religious premise that every human possesses a God-given natural disposition (fiṭra), within which, according to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, resides the “most beautiful names of God” (asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā). This implies that humans are innately acquainted with these divine names and values. The fiṭra is not static, but active and dynamic, and it allows these most beautiful names to interact with each other (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, p. 166) and to generate new moral values from them.27 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān argues that, in contrast with istiqrāʾ, al-istidlāl al-fiṭrī offers multiple advantages. First, it uncovers values that align more genuinely with Islamic ethics than those grounded in basic human instincts. Second, it enables the generation of unlimited moral values, whereas istiqrāʾ restricts the discovery to a finite set of values (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, pp. 401–2).28

3.3.4. Expectations of the Two Scholars for Their Maqāṣid Considerations

In the course of comparing the concepts of the two scholars, the question arises as to their expectations for these concepts. Al-ʿAlwānī views his elaborations as a means of bringing Muslim thought out of its current intellectual crisis and, more specifically, to reform Muslim legal thought (Al-ʿAlwānī 2001, p. 129). Furthermore, because his concept is based on the values of the last divine revelation to mankind, according to al-ʿAlwānī, it is able to serve as the basis for a new global ethical way of thinking, acting, and living together (Al-ʿAlwānī 2001, p. 148). Additionally, the jurist argues that this concept contributes to a global common culture (thaqāfa ʿālamiyya mushtaraka) (Al-ʿAlwānī 2006–2007, p. 17).29 Although ʿAbd al-Raḥmān does not share these comprehensive expectations for his own maqāṣid considerations, al-ʿAlwānī’s (global) expectations from his concept are indeed reminiscent of those of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān from his paradigm of al-iʾtimāniyya, which is also intended to renew Muslim thinking and to achieve global value-based coexistence.

As for the claim to reform Islamic law with the maqāṣid, meaning that the law will be built on an ethical basis, similarities can be found in the understanding of these two scholars. They both mention particular values that the law should be based on. Among those that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān mentions are sincerity (ikhlāṣ), moral behavior and righteousness.30 Al-ʿAlwānī (2001, pp. 142–43) points out that while previous characteristics of law have been harshness and severity, future characteristics should be relief (takhfīf) and compassion (raḥma). The jurist argues that, overall, a value base should be created that, with its logical system, should help to establish a law that corresponds to the characteristics and objectives of Sharia (Al-ʿAlwānī 2001, p. 167).

3.3.5. (How) Are the Theoretical Elaborations of the Scholars Supposed to Be Applied in Practice?

Discussing the reflections of these two scholars directly raises the question of whether they envisage a practical application of their maqāṣid proposals. On this point, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān receives some criticism—even from authors who principally admire his thinking and praise his intellectual achievements. They contend that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s suggestions remain exclusively theoretical and questions of what his theoretical considerations could mean in practice remain unanswered. They also argue that the alternative method ʿAbd al-Raḥmān proposes to reform the maqāṣid is speculative, fluid (Abdelnour 2023, p. 6), and exclusively abstract (Ruḥūma 2023, p. 22). And when the philosopher proposes an alternative ordering of al-Ghazālī’s five values, he does not explain how the protection of ʿaqīda and ʿamal is to be ensured (Abdelnour 2023, p. 55). It is easy to agree with these points of criticism when one thinks, for example, of the varying values that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān proposes in different publications, where he does not even come close to mentioning what a practical application of his maqāṣid might look like. One reviewer of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s book therefore notes that if ʿAbd al-Raḥmān argues against the method of istiqrāʾ for discovering the maqāṣid, ironically it is precisely istiqrāʾ that could help to concretize his suggestions (Abdelnour 2023, p. 6). Others also contend that there is an obvious need to develop a concrete application of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s approaches to the maqāṣid in order to realize the fiqh iʾtimānī that he advocates (Ruḥūma 2023, pp. 22–23).

The criticisms leveled against ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s ideas, that they lack practical applications, are legitimate. However, it must also be noted that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān does not see himself as a practitioner, but as a theorist. Thus, when Ebrahim Moosa (2014, p. 187) assumes that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān leaves it to other scholars to apply his theoretical explanations in practical terms, this seems to be exactly ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s intent. For as he says himself, his intention with his elaborations is to correct mistakes made by previous jurists when they defined the maqāṣid and to create a theoretical ethical foundation on which the law with its rules (aḥkām) can be built by future scholars (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2022, p. 479).

Contrary to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, al-ʿAlwānī is more specific when it comes to the implementation of his maqāṣid concept and he is keen to ensure that his framework is directly applicable in practice. To this end, he provides practical examples illustrating the application of his “highest-governing Quranic purposes” concept in the form of fatwas on Islamic international law and family law (see Al-ʿAlwānī and al-ʿAlwānī 2012, pp. 29–60). His idea for its practical application is very comprehensive and includes, among other things, the reform of educational institutions and education systems (Al-ʿAlwānī and al-ʿAlwānī 2012, p. 27).31 A direct application of this aspiration is his founding of the GSISS, whose methods are based on his maqāṣid concept (Bībars 2020, p. 184). Al-ʿAlwānī understands all his elaborations on the maqāṣid to date as a basis, recognizing that a great deal of research and the cooperation of theologians and natural and social scientists is needed so that the concept can be applied in different areas (Al-ʿAlwānī and al-ʿAlwānī 2012, p. 26).32

As a critical remark, it must be noted that further research and elaboration of al-ʿAlwānī’s proposal will indeed be necessary. Even though al-ʿAlwānī aims to present a coherent, source-based maqāṣid concept and identifies specific values as its primary objectives, questions remain regarding the implementation and practical viability of several aspects of his model. These concerns arise, for example, when, in his booklet Taṭawwur al-manhaj al-maqāṣidī ʿinda al-muʿāṣirīn, the scholar attempts to apply his concept to contemporary issues—such as family and commercial law. His responses, however, are often quite general, possibly because the questions themselves are broadly framed, yet they leave the impression that more detailed development is required if his framework is to offer sophisticated solutions to complex modern challenges. This critique concerns al-ʿAlwānī’s model of “highest-governing Quranic purposes” as a whole. Additionally, his categorization of maqāṣid into primary, secondary, and tertiary levels remains unclear. It is ambiguous which objectives qualify as secondary or tertiary, who determines them, and how jurists are expected to employ this hierarchical structure in the law-finding process.

4. Conclusions

This study shows that the philosopher Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and the jurist Ṭāhā Jābir al-ʿAlwānī, despite their differing academic backgrounds, share several premises regarding the reform of Muslim (legal) thought and the role of the maqāṣid in that process. A closer comparison, however, reveals some differences between the two scholars, both in terms of their methods for discovering the maqāṣid and the content of their concepts. The comparison further reveals that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān remains purely theoretical in his approach, whereas al-ʿAlwānī strives for practical applicability of his theoretical reflections. Practical usability is particularly important to the jurist because, as he notes with regard to previous modern maqāṣid concepts (Al-ʿAlwānī 2001, p. 126), these often prove to be too abstract to be effectively implemented. His observation carries a certain irony, as an examination of his own fatwas gives the impression of a certain superficiality in the application of his model. Moreover, several essential questions remain unanswered in his writings. However, al-ʿAlwānī demonstrates a degree of self-criticism, noting that his intention is to lay a foundation aimed at practical application—one that still requires significant further development through collaborative scholarly research. The comparison of the very different maqāṣid models proposed by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and al-ʿAlwānī raises the question of whether, given that the two scholars share certain underlying premises, a combination of their approaches might be possible. Due to the significant differences in the aims, methodologies, and substantive structures of their respective concepts, a synthesis appears unlikely. However, the juxtaposition of these two markedly different individuals provides valuable insights into the diversity of the contemporary maqāṣid discourse and thus offers a compelling glimpse into modern Islamic intellectual history as a whole.