Conceptualizing Psychedelic Pure Consciousness

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Thank you to the author for their article on psychedelic pure consciousness experiences. I found this paper quite enjoyable and the issue on perennialism in regards to meditation and psychedelic pure awareness experiences is particularly topical and well worth exploring. The historical overview provided was also valuable. The most significant aspect of the paper for me was the use of first-person reports of psychedelic experiences in section 2 in support of the argument for Soft Perennialism.

This being said, I thought that the definitions used in the paper needed some tightening up. Some definitions of key concepts were also missing. Please see my comments below:

1. It would be helpful if the introduction provided a roadmap of what the article is going to argue.
2. On page 1, pure consciousness is defined as:

Consciousness that lacks particular phenomenal qualities and concrete intentional contents, that is, consciousness that is first and foremost awareness as such. The description can be extended to include further aspects: in pure consciousness there is no sensory perception, no conceptuality, no spatio-temporality, no bodily self-awareness, no separation of world and ego. In other words, pure consciousness is beyond first-person experience, and is instead a fully decentred, asubjective and objectless zero-person perspective. 

“Lacks particular phenomenal qualities” (above) and later “absence of specific phenomenal qualities” (p. 11) seemed too vague. Which phenomenal properties does this conscious state specifically lack? Which concrete intentional contents does it specifically lack? This phrasing also struck me as unclear as it suggests that there are possible phenomenal qualities and intentional contents which it could include?

There is a concern that if this is the key definition then there are indeed possible ways in which pure consciousness experiences can vary between individuals and so weak perennialism would not follow.

Relatedly, throughout the article, lists of necessary features of pure consciousness were included in brackets such as in the abstract (unstructuredness, maximal simplicity, selflessness, awareness as such, zero-perspective, absence of specific phenomenal qualities, etc).

This is a minor issue, but I found the “etc.” in these bracketed lists of necessary features to be a bit problematic. It suggests that there are purposefully unstated features and so the list is not exhaustive. Generally speaking definitive necessary features are also complete (so the “etc.” would then be omitted)? Otherwise, the reader is left wondering what has not been included in the list. How important are these unstated features?

Alternatively, I suggest that the “etc.” could be replaced by the phrases such as “core features of pure consciousness include..” or “core features of pure consciousness such as..” to indicate that the list of features is representative/typical but also open (i.e., not strictly definitive).

3. What does it mean for these experiences to be free of empirical content? (e.g. p.7, 8) Please provide examples of empirical content.
4. p. 4 “Lundborg also confronts the overestimation of ego-death”. What is his argument or claim about ego-death?
5. What is the difference between the “zero-person perspective” and “zero perspective”? Are these phrases being used interchangeably?
6. Is ‘selflessness’ essential to pure consciousness experiences? Some theorists/traditions hold that pure awareness is the essential nature of the subject itself (e.g., Jonathan Shear, Arthur Deikman).
7. Relatedly, it would be worthwhile citing Jonathan Shear’s work in the context of this paper. His 1994 article ‘On Mystical Experiences as Support for the Perennial Philosophy’ seems particularly relevant to the present arguments on phenomenal perennialism.
8. p. 7. Typo? Session 2 = Section 2
9. p. 8. “There are even more reasons to believe that hard constructivism, according to which all experience is conceptually mediated, is not true”. Provide sources – e.g., Forman (1999). What are the key problems with this view?
10. ‘Hard’ and ‘soft’ perennialism need to be defined.

Author Response

My response to the first reviewer:

1. As the reviewer quotes my article, I argue that there are no particular phenomenal qualities / specific phenomenal qualities, and that only one property remains – the experience of awareness of such (the luminosity or bliss of this metaphor are actually metaphors of this). I tried to make the paragraph defining pure consciousness even clearer. Later I explained with examples what empirical contents I mean. I deleted "etc." because it could be misleading.

One more comment. It's important that when I list the qualities of pure consciousness (unstructuredness, maximal simplicity, selflessness, awareness as such, zero-perspective, absence of specific phenomenal qualities), I have, in line with this, only one positive quality: awareness as such. The others are merely negative descriptions, emphasizing the differences from everyday consciousness.

2.

“Is ‘selflessness’ essential to pure consciousness experiences? Some theorists/traditions hold that pure awareness is the essential nature of the subject itself (e.g., Jonathan Shear, Arthur Deikman).”

This is purely a question of terminology. You can argue that subjectivity lacks the personal self, but you can still call it subjectivity in a very specific sense, since it is consciousness. That doesn't change the point. I think the other conceptual terminology is more accurate: that consciousness itself is non-dual, i.e. it is a field in which, at certain derivative levels, subjective or objective contents are possible.

3.

“Relatedly, it would be worthwhile citing Jonathan Shear’s work in the context of this paper. His 1994 article ‘On Mystical Experiences as Support for the Perennial Philosophy’ seems particularly relevant to the present arguments on phenomenal perennialism.”

I know Shear's work well. In many of his works he writes about pure consciousness, mysticism and perennialism (“Pure Consciousness: Scientific Exploration of Meditation Techniques’, “The Experience of Pure Consciousness. A New Perspective for Theories of Self”, “The Inner Dimension. Philosophy and the Experience of Consciousness”, „Mysticism and Scientific Naturalism”, “The Experience of Meditation: Experts Introduce Major Traditions”).  However, for me, Shear's research was not useful, I think research today makes better arguments than he once did.

Thank you very much for the other suggestions, I integrated them into the article! Thank you very much!

 

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The article provides a highly detailed and thoughtful analysis of existing literature on psychedelic experiences, personal reports, and the broader phenomenon of pure consciousness. The author presents a compelling argument for the relevance of psychedelics in facilitating experiences of pure consciousness.  

However, one aspect that stands out as somewhat problematic is the insistence on the "naturalness" of psychedelic experiences, particularly in comparison to those achieved through meditation. While it is clear that the author seeks to position themselves in opposition to established authorities like Metzger, the claim that drug-induced experiences are more natural than meditative ones seems unnecessary for the article's purpose and is difficult to justify. Moreover, this stance contradicts the views of some of the most authoritative figures in the psychedelic community, such as Ram Dass, who have expressed the opposite perspective.  

A more philosophically significant issue is the treatment of perennialism. The author addresses objections to the idea that different kinds of pure consciousness experiences are fundamentally the same. However, these objections often stem from an implicit assumption that such experiences are purely psychological, shaped by tradition and personal history, rather than reflective of a trans-subjective reality. For the sameness of these experiences to hold philosophical weight, it must be grounded not in contingent similarities of neurophysiology or psychology but in a single, fundamental reality that one accesses, rather than merely "experiences in one's head." If pure consciousness experiences pertain to something ontologically fundamental rather than being extravagant illusions, discussing them in terms of empirical mechanisms seems misguided and philosophically irrelevant. Perennialism, by contrast, posits a shared reality that is universal and independent of the empirical processes that enable access to it.  

The author frequently cites Letheby's work, but as Kuravsky critiques in *Phenomenology of Psychedelic Experiences* (*Sophia*), Letheby's cognitivist approach often relies on a confused use of terms, assigning meanings to concepts like "unity," "self," and "mind" that diverge significantly from what is actually reported in psychedelic experiences.  

The article also touches on the epistemological challenges of interpreting psychedelic experiences in religious terms. However, the examples provided (including Metzger's) are themselves metaphysically loaded, relying on specific epistemological assumptions about concepts like "knowledge," "experience," and the relationship between the subject and the world. The so-called "phenomenological fallacy" appears to be little more than an a priori commitment to naturalistic dogmatism. In contrast, the experiences discussed in the article could serve as empirical support for non-naturalistic traditions, such as those of Plotinus, which offer detailed logical arguments for why the phenomena revealed in psychedelic states are necessary conditions for conscious experience and for the intelligibility of reality itself. While the author need not delve deeply into these doctrines, they should be cautious about uncritically adopting the "cautiousness trend" of contemporary cognitivist epistemology, which often rests on unexamined assumptions.  

If one critically examines the claims of scholars like Letheby, it becomes evident that their "parsimonious" naturalistic explanations often dissolve under scrutiny, revealing speculative assumptions that verge on science fiction.  

Beyond critiquing naturalistic interpretations of concepts like "God," one might also consider why naturalists are so defensive of their metaphysical framework. This defensiveness persists even when their assumptions are ungrounded, and rejecting them would not necessarily require adherence to any traditional religion or belief system. Instead, it could lead to insights akin to Socrates' recognition of the limits of his own knowledge.  

In conclusion, the author’s discussion would benefit from a more cautious and critical approach, particularly in relation to currently fashionable paradigms. At the very least, the article should conclude with a more explicit acknowledgment of doubts regarding these dominant frameworks.

Author Response

Answers to the second reviwer

 

1. “However, one aspect that stands out as somewhat problematic is the insistence on the "naturalness" of psychedelic experiences, particularly in comparison to those achieved through meditation. While it is clear that the author seeks to position themselves in opposition to established authorities like Metzger, the claim that drug-induced experiences are more natural than meditative ones seems unnecessary for the article's purpose and is difficult to justify. Moreover, this stance contradicts the views of some of the most authoritative figures in the psychedelic community, such as Ram Dass, who have expressed the opposite perspective.”

In my article Is Meditation the Royal Road that Leads to Pure Consciousness?, I strongly criticize Metzinger's view that meditation "the best and most natural candidate" (2024a: 290, cf. XIX) for achieving minimal phenomenal experience and pure consciousness. There are very strong arguments for my thesis. Here it is enough to emphasize what is important in this context. For example, a psychedelic (e.g. 5-Meo-DMT) that is naturally occurring and induces a state of pure consciousness is no less natural than, say, hundreds of hours of meditation. Both are essentially different from everyday experience ("natural attitude" as Husserl called it). Metzinger uses the word “natural” in a completely uncritical way. This is very important because, in line with the theme of the article, it underlines that psychedelics should not be underestimated in this respect either. I am well aware of Ram Dass's teachings, but I know of no argument formulated by him that refutes this. It is true that Ram Dass used contemplative techniques rather than intensive use of psychedelics after 1967 (although he did sometimes use psychedelics in his old age!). However, this has nothing to do with the question of the right (“natural”, “best”) path to pure consciousness.

2. “A more philosophically significant issue is the treatment of perennialism. The author addresses objections to the idea that different kinds of pure consciousness experiences are fundamentally the same. However, these objections often stem from an implicit assumption that such experiences are purely psychological, shaped by tradition and personal history, rather than reflective of a trans-subjective reality. For the sameness of these experiences to hold philosophical weight, it must be grounded not in contingent similarities of neurophysiology or psychology but in a single, fundamental reality that one accesses, rather than merely "experiences in one's head." If pure consciousness experiences pertain to something ontologically fundamental rather than being extravagant illusions, discussing them in terms of empirical mechanisms seems misguided and philosophically irrelevant. Perennialism, by contrast, posits a shared reality that is universal and independent of the empirical processes that enable access to it. “

I think this comment is not relevant. As we can see based on the enormous empirical material and their scientific-philosophical analyzes, these conditions are selfless and non-dual (they do not have a subject or object, no personality), so they cannot be regarded as "psychological". “Unstructuredness, maximal simplicity, selflessness, awareness as such, zero-perspective, and the absence of specific phenomenal qualities” are definitely not contingent similarities of neurophysiology or psychology. It seems that the reviewer mixes metaphysical questions about reality with phenomenological questions. My article emphasizes the difference between the two. My impression is that the reviewer misunderstands scientific perennialism that is about (mystical) experience and has nothing to do with reality itself in general. This is even more true of phenomenological or soft perennialism.

3. “The article also touches on the epistemological challenges of interpreting psychedelic experiences in religious terms. However, the examples provided (including Metzger's) are themselves metaphysically loaded, relying on specific epistemological assumptions about concepts like "knowledge," "experience," and the relationship between the subject and the world. The so-called "phenomenological fallacy" appears to be little more than an a priori commitment to naturalistic dogmatism. In contrast, the experiences discussed in the article could serve as empirical support for non-naturalistic traditions, such as those of Plotinus, which offer detailed logical arguments for why the phenomena revealed in psychedelic states are necessary conditions for conscious experience and for the intelligibility of reality itself. While the author need not delve deeply into these doctrines, they should be cautious about uncritically adopting the "cautiousness trend" of contemporary cognitivist epistemology, which often rests on unexamined assumptions.”

I disagree. The phenomenological fallacy can be pointed out by non-naturalists as well for purely epistemological reasons. Otherwise, however, I have made it quite clear that I think these (naturalism vs non-naturalism) are open questions too, that's what part 6B is about! But a general discussion of naturalism is not, I think, the task of this article.

4. “If one critically examines the claims of scholars like Letheby, it becomes evident that their "parsimonious" naturalistic explanations often dissolve under scrutiny, revealing speculative assumptions that verge on science fiction.”

I disagree. Letheby is very careful in his book to formulate his methodological naturalism (see especially pages 33-38).

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Thank you to the author/s for their revised manuscript. My comments have been sufficiently addressed. This article will make a very nice contribution to the field.

A couple of further minor suggestions:

p.2.  Pure consciousness can be concisely defined as awareness that lacks particular phenomenal qualities and concrete intentional contents—i.e., awareness as such

One suggestion is to add the term ‘in itself’ to make this definition a bit clearer and in particular to allow the possibility that ‘awareness as such’ can also be recognised alongside everyday contentful awareness, as the authors mention directly below. This may help to defuse an apparent tension between these two states.

Pure consciousness can be concisely defined as awareness that in itself lacks particular phenomenal qualities and concrete intentional contents—i.e., awareness as such.

p. 10. “such claims betray a lack of intellectual honesty” – was a bit ambiguous (it sounds a bit like a double negative). It could be re-phrased as “such claims reveal a lack of intellectual honesty”.