The Political Activities of a Catholic Church Leader During the Period of Secularization in Hungary

Abstract

In the Kingdom of Hungary, the process of secularization started rather late. After 1867, the country was led by liberal political forces but, despite this, the separation of church and state continued for a long time. Some ecclesiastical dignitaries were members of the upper house by virtue of their position, which obviously slowed down the process of secularization. By the 1890s, there were still many legal institutions in which public power was exercised by the churches instead of the state. The most important of these was the area of marriage law. Civil marriage was introduced by the Marriage Act passed in 1894, the adoption of which was preceded by sharp parliamentary debates. This was the culmination of the first wave of discourse on secularization in the country, which ended with the adoption of the law. Károly Hornig was appointed bishop of Veszprém by the pope in 1888 and, as a result of his position, he became a member of the upper house. Assessing Hornig’s parliamentary activities is more difficult. Joining the spirit of Rerum Novarum, he spoke, for example, in favor of the prohibition of industrial workers from working on Sundays. On the other hand, in the debates about secularization, he advocated positions that would have hindered it, although he eventually withdrew several of his proposals due to counterarguments. In my work, with the help of Hornig’s example, I would like to present an important stage of the process of secularization in Hungary.

1. Introduction

Hungary’s leading political forces had held liberal views since the so-called “reform era” began in the early 19th century. The short-lived responsible government of the 1848–49 revolution was formed from among them, as were the Hungarian governments that operated after the 1867 Compromise. By Hungarian traditions, the main political dividing line was not ideological but constitutional: the parties’ attitudes toward the Compromise. However, by the end of the century, an important issue, secularization, attitudes toward it, and the re-regulation of matters common to the state and the church had somewhat redrawn this picture. In a state with a strong Roman Catholic majority, the church existed as a quasi-state church, whose status was revoked by Article XX of the 1848 law entitled “On Matters of Religion,” which was adopted during the revolution, putting the so-called established denominations on an equal footing. (In Hungary, even though the rulers were Roman Catholics, followers of the more common Protestant denominations and certain Orthodox churches were free to practice their religion. The state-recognized denominations were the so-called established ones. With this law, the Unitarian Church also became established.) However, in the matters to be discussed later, the problem of secularization and the debate surrounding it still primarily concerned the Catholic Church.

This was, of course, not a Hungarian peculiarity. In the newly unified German Empire, which was seen as an important point of reference in Hungary, a so-called culture war (German: Kulturkampf) raged from the 1870s between Catholic politicians, church leaders, and their opponents fighting for secularization. As a consequence, many authors have been keen to refer to the political debates between Hungarian liberals and Catholic leaders as a culture war (Salacz 1938). Although others consider this parallel to be an exaggeration (Csorba 1999; Rada 2017), it is a fact that secularization also triggered heated political debates in Hungary at the time.

Just as important was the new approach of Pope Leo XIII, elected in 1878, which brought about a radical change in the policy of the Roman Catholic Church. The Vatican had previously rigidly rejected changes related to the development of modern civil society and capitalism, but this did not lead to any results. They recognized that the Church could not remain an outsider if they wanted to preserve their prestige and influence. The Vatican developed a new strategy: by actively understanding and shaping the challenges of the age, they wanted to put the Church back at the center. Their goal was for the Catholic Church to remain an influential player within the framework of modern society, both morally and socially.

The first step in this process was to redefine the relationship between the state and the church. According to Leo XIII, cooperation is based on a community of interests; secular power alone is incapable of dealing with social problems, so it needs the moral guidance of the church. The state ensures civil welfare, while the church ensures spiritual welfare. The church does not interfere directly in politics but provides guidance through its moral standards. In this view, the supremacy of the church is moral in nature but has secular consequences; divine law stands above human law (Murray 1953).

The secularization process in Hungary can also be interpreted through the lens of Charles Taylor’s concept of the immanent frame—a social space where belief in the transcendent is no longer axiomatic but one option among many. In this context, the pluralization of religious choice, even within a predominantly Catholic society, reshaped the meaning of religious affiliation and eroded the taken-for-granted authority of the church. Applying this framework helps to better understand how the political and legal transformations of the 1890s did not simply restrict institutional religion but also redefined the conditions under which religious belief could be held.

However, the Pope did not only deal with issues related to the state but also recognized the need for the church to reflect on the spreading of new political ideologies. He expressed his most important social critiques and reform ideas in two famous and important encyclicals, Quod Apostolici Numeris, published in 1878, and Rerum Novarum, published in 1891. On the one hand, he turned against individualism (liberalism) because, in his view, it excluded moral considerations and treated people merely as rivals. The Pope did not reject competition, but he wanted to limit it through moral norms. On the other hand, he criticized collectivism (socialism and communism), which he believed threatened individual rights, especially the right to private property. In doing so, he responded to the challenges of secularization and modern society in a way that was unusual in ecclesiastical circles at the time, offering not only a reactionary but also a constructive response (Taylor 2007). The Pope rejected the dissolution of the individual in the community and saw individual property as the key to progress. Leo XIII believed that solving real social problems did not require a radical change in the social system but rather an improvement in distribution ratios, the creation of a class of small property owners, and action against the excessive use of capital. He wanted to achieve all this through behavior based on Christian morality.

In my article, I use the Hungarian example to examine what solutions the new intellectual trends of the second half of the 19th century and the resulting secularization efforts brought about, what conflicts they gave birth to, and what new questions they raised in the relationship between the state and the church. The main figure of my investigation is a bishop, Baron Károly Hornig, who, due to his multiple roles, clearly illustrates the key issues of the problem.

This study is based primarily on the close reading and analysis of parliamentary records from the House of Magnates (Főrendi Ház) between 1890 and 1895, published in the official parliamentary journals (Országgyűlés 1893, 1895). These records serve as key primary sources for reconstructing Bishop Hornig’s political activity and rhetorical strategies. Additional archival sources include episcopal circulars, public speeches, and correspondence preserved in contemporary Catholic periodicals and compilations. While some secondary literature is cited for context or historiographical framing, the analysis deliberately prioritizes contemporary documents to assess the performative and ideological functions of Hornig’s interventions. This methodology aims to situate Hornig’s role within the institutional and symbolic structure of late 19th-century Hungarian political Catholicism.

2. Results

2.1. The Baptism Debate

The first conflict between Hungarian politics and the Catholic Church, although seemingly concerned with a specific administrative measure, was rooted in conflicts surrounding the issue of secularization. It was triggered by the issue of so-called “baptism”. In mixed marriages, children were traditionally baptized as Catholics by the Catholic Church, a practice that was opposed by other denominations. The independent Hungarian legislature, which had resumed functioning after the Compromise of 1867, wanted to settle the dispute very quickly. Based on a proposal by the Ministry of Religion and Public Education, led by Baron József Eötvös, one of the great figures of the Hungarian liberal elite during the reform era, Act LIII of 1868 on the reciprocity of legally recognized Christian denominations was already passed the following year (Márkus 1896). In addition to confirming the provision on denominational equality in Act XX of 1848 (Márkus 1896), Article 12 of this law stipulated that children born of mixed marriages should follow the religion of their parents according to their gender. Despite the legal provision, the Catholic Church sought to keep children born of mixed marriages in the Catholic faith. The main tool for this was the so-called reversalis, a declaration in which the parties (usually the non-Catholic party) committed themselves to have their children baptized as Catholics.

The situation remained unchanged, so nearly two decades after the law was enacted, in 1884, Ágoston Trefort, Minister of Religion and Public Education (who was also a member of the liberal political elite of 1848), issued a decree obliging priests to hand over baptism certificates to the competent pastors. As this remained ineffective, Albin Csáky issued another “baptism” decree in February 1890 (Fazekas 2008), under which refusal to issue a certificate was considered a misdemeanor and was punishable by a fine of between HUF 5 and 10 in the basic case but up to HUF 100 for repeated offenses. (Since there were not many priests who only married one couple, the latter was obviously much more common).

2.2. The Hungarian “Culture War”

In fact, it was the debate surrounding baptism that triggered the Hungarian “culture war”. The Catholic Church found itself in a very difficult position on this issue. It is important to note that secularization is not a one-way process; it does not only mean the separation of the church from the state but also the reverse. Based on the supreme right of patronage (Latin: ius supremi patronatus), the Hungarian Catholic Church was not independent of the state, and the ruler could exercise certain rights over it. This meant that, as in the present case, secular authorities also could interfere to purely religious matters, since, according to the law and teachings of the Catholic Church, efforts had to be made to keep the faithful in the “true faith”. This was confirmed by Pope Leo XIII himself in his encyclical, which was issued in response to the decree and is described below. He stated explicitly that the decree obliged his priests to “hand over” the souls of their followers to heretics (Paksy 2023). Thus, Csáky’s legislation placed great pressure on the conscientiousness of the Catholic clergy; their civic duty was to respect the legal order of their country, but it also interfered with purely religious matters, so they could only comply with all its provisions by denying their faith.

Leo XIII himself intervened in the struggle. The Pope was careful at first with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, because it was important for him to keep good relations with one of the biggest Catholic countries in Europe and its traditionally devoted Catholic royal family. In fact, he broke with the issue of mixed marriages in Hungary and the prominence of the so-called church policy laws when he openly intervened in the debate. On 22 August 1886, on the bicentennial anniversary of the recapture of Buda Castle, he issued his encyclical Quod multum dique. In this, the Pope expressed his satisfaction with the efforts of the Hungarian episcopate, who remained loyal to the Holy See and bravely stood up for the interests of the church. He acknowledged the past merits of the Hungarian Church; in his opinion, Hungary had always been a strong bastion of Catholicism.

However, he expressed his concern about religious liberalism and state interference. He emphasized that, in his opinion, the ideas of liberalism posed a threat to the church’s doctrinal and institutional autonomy. He criticized legislative efforts that limited the rights of the church, for example, in matters of church education or marriage. He rejected the principle that religion is a private matter and that the state should remain neutral. In this context, he believed that special emphasis should be placed on the Christian education of young people. Finally, he asked the Hungarian bishops not to retreat and to continue to stand firm in defense of the freedom of the Church.

Thanks to the open call in the encyclical, individual protests by the lower clergy against the above-mentioned law and the related decree became increasingly common. Thus, the issuance of the second decree on rebaptism in 1890 can also be interpreted as a response to this encyclical. In response, the Pope issued his encyclical Constanti Hungarorum in September 1893, in which he expressed the need to go beyond traditional political tactics (Szabó 1977). Although he had previously disagreed with the legitimacy of Catholic parties, by encouraging people to vote only for representatives who would put in writing that they opposed the government’s church policy, in addition to traditional legislative actions, he actually steered the process in this direction. As a new task, he also set out to organize Catholic associations and reading circles and to coordinate their activities. The encyclical also mentions the importance of the Catholic press and the development of Catholic literature as a counterweight to liberal literature (Chadwick 1990).

2.3. The Ecclesistical Articles of Law

All this caused the debate to quickly expand beyond the issue of baptism and ultimately led to the creation of five pieces of legislation, which became the most significant step in the process of secularization in Hungary at that time. These were (in order of importance) as follows. First, the National Assembly passed Act XXXI of 1894 on marriage law (Márkus 1897b), which removed marriage from the jurisdiction of canon law, thus making it a civil law institution. The next was Article XXXII of the 1894 law on the religion of children (Márkus 1897b), which re-regulated the issue of baptism. This was an important step forward in terms of denominational autonomy, as its first section stated that “marrying couples belonging to different established or legally recognized religious denominations may agree once and for all before entering into marriage that all their children shall follow the religion of the father or mother, or be raised in that religion”. As can be seen, this provision resolved the main conflict of more than a quarter of a century of debate, although, as we shall see, it did not completely eliminate the secular legal effect of the issue and was therefore still criticized by Catholics. Finally, the series of three consecutive ecclesiastical laws ended with Act XXXIII of 1894 (Márkus 1897b), which introduced state civil registration.

The other two relevant laws were Act XLII of 1895, which declared Judaism an established religion (Márkus 1897b; Schweitzer 2019), and Act XLIII of 1895 on the free practice of religion (Márkus 1897a). With these two laws, the number of established religions rose to nine, but the significance of this category also changed. The first section of the latter law stated that “Everyone is free to profess and follow any faith or religion, and may express and practice it outwardly within the limits of the laws of the country and the requirements of public morality. No one shall be prevented from practicing religious rites that do not conflict with the law or public morality, nor shall anyone be forced to perform religious acts that are not in accordance with their beliefs”.

Thus, from the point of view of individual religious practice, the status of established religion became essentially irrelevant. The remaining sections of the first chapter contained very important provisions relating to secularization. “§ 2. The ability to exercise civil and political rights is completely independent of religious belief. § 3. No one may be exempted from fulfilling any duty prescribed by law based on their religious beliefs or ecclesiastical rules. § 4. Ecclesiastical penalties may not be imposed on anyone for having fulfilled a civil duty prescribed by law, for not having committed an act prohibited by law, or for having freely exercised their civil rights permitted by law. 5. § Everyone is free to leave a religious denomination or join a religious denomination under the conditions established by law”.

2.4. The Founding of the Catholic People’s Party

During the parliamentary debate on the adoption of these laws, Hungarian political life underwent a major transformation, bringing new conflicts to the surface that were no longer centered on the previously dominant issue of public law but were instead defined by liberalism and neoconservatism, as well as the strengthening of the socialist labor movement. This political realignment created new fronts that caused tension even within the 48 and 67 movements. Two significant organized movements best embodied the anti-liberal trend: the agrarian movement, which was institutionalized in 1896 with the formation of the Hungarian Economic Association, and political Catholicism, which took political form with the creation of the People’s Party in 1895 (Szabó 1977).

At the beginning of his papacy, Leo XIII recognized the importance of secular Catholic movements, but he also saw dangers in them, as he believed they could easily become independent and come into conflict with the church hierarchy. He held this view, particularly about the highest levels of political organization, namely political parties. Later, based on individual considerations, he loosened his rigid stance, making his support for a given party dependent on the political situation in a given country, the circumstances surrounding the formation of the party, and the founders’ relationship with the church. Fearing that the faithful might become alienated from the church for political reasons, he did not support the direct political participation of the clergy (Chadwick 1990).

The conservative Catholic members of the House of Magnates, including Nándor Zichy, Miklós Móric Esterházy, and Géza Szapáry, firmly opposed the ecclesiastical reforms. Zichy, for example, interpreted the institution of civil marriage as a change that undermined the moral foundations of society, and he explained this in detail in an article published in Katholikus Szemle [Catholic Review]. The initial goal of the Catholic opposition was not to create a formal party organization but to form ad hoc alliances around certain controversial issues, primarily within the politics of the House of Magnates. Their main tool was the holding of rural assemblies, where they could voice their views before large audiences (Gárdonyi 2022).

A turning point came with the 1893 budget vote, which will be discussed in detail later. In this vote, Géza Szapáry and Aurél Dessewffy delivered a clear message to the government that they did not support the continuation of the church policy program and even made the approval of the budget contingent on this. The success of the action and the surprisingly tight vote (81:57) clearly showed that this was a pre-planned and conscious protest, prepared jointly by the episcopate and the secular nobility. By this time, it was clear that the two poles of the opposition to church policy—the episcopate and the activist group of secular dignitaries—had begun to cooperate, but they had not yet gone beyond the framework of traditional political forms (Rada 2024).

The opposition did not only take action within the parliamentary framework but also outside it. The episcopate mobilized its followers in circular letters, and the clergy was called upon to support only those candidates who opposed the church policy laws during the elections. Bishops György Schopper and Lőrinc Schlauch, for example, took action in this direction. This type of political mobilization gradually became institutionalized; the reorganization of the Saint Stephen Society, the publication of the Katholikus Szemle, and the establishment of the Saint Imre Association and the Saint Thomas Aquinas Society all served this purpose.

The movement aimed to organize the Catholic middle classes, especially the educated classes. In addition, the young men’s association movement, which took place with the cooperation of the lower clergy, aimed to mobilize the broader masses. The expansion of the Budapest Catholic Circle to the countryside began in 1892 under the leadership of Esterházy. The aim was to establish a nationwide network of Catholic circles that could mobilize the Catholic population for political purposes if necessary (Szabó 1977).

After that, the movement wanted to take it to the next level and started organizing national events and big gatherings. At first, the bishops were not too supportive of this, but they slowly started to open up to the idea. Leo XIII’s actions regarding Hungarian affairs also contributed to this. The Catholic Congress held in Budapest on 16 January 1894 already included both wings of the Catholic movement—the secular members of the House of Magnates and the bishops. The resolutions announced at the meeting urged the strengthening of the Catholic press, the revitalization of Catholic public life, and the organization of large gatherings in rural areas. They also reiterated the points made in Rožňava, including the demand that voters only vote for candidates who are committed to defending Catholic principles. As the culmination of this process, on 29 January 1895, after a two-day meeting at the Esterházy Palace in Budapest, the formation of the People’s Party was announced (Szabó 1978).

Although Hornig was not the most active participant in the debates on the legislative proposals—on behalf of the episcopate, Lőrinc Schlauch spoke five times, Vaszary three times, Károly Hornig twice, and Fülöp Steiner once—he nevertheless became the focus of attention due to the circumstances described below (Szabó 1977). For all these reasons, a description of his political actions is perfectly suited to shedding light on the circumstances surrounding the processes.

2.5. The Career of Baron Károly Hornig

Baron Károly Hornig of Hornburg was born in Buda in 1840. (At that time, the predecessors of today’s Hungarian capital still existed as several separate settlements, one of which was Buda. The capital at that time was Pozsony, now known as Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia.) His family was of Silesian origin and belonged to the German-speaking bourgeoisie. His father, Antal Hornig, was an engineer. During his childhood, the family moved several times following his father’s work, and Károly attended elementary school in Lajtafalu. He attended three different secondary schools: the first four years at the Piarist school in Vienna, the next two years at the Royal Catholic Secondary School in Buda, and the last two years at the archbishop’s secondary school in Nagyszombat as a minor cleric of the Archdiocese of Esztergom. After graduating from high school in 1858, he became a student at the Central Seminary and was ordained a priest four years later. He learned Hungarian at the latter institution. After his ordination, he became a student at the Augustineum, founded by Emperor Francis in Vienna, which provided a kind of “talent management” by giving outstanding seminarians from Austria and Hungary access to the theological faculty in Vienna.

Accordingly, he demonstrated outstanding academic progress early in his career, becoming the academic supervisor (prefect) of the Central Seminary in Budapest at the age of 26 and then earning a doctorate in theology in 1869. The following year, he became a full professor at the Faculty of Theology in Budapest and then dean there in 1874–1875 and 1877–1878.

The Catholic Church also employed its similarly prominent priests in church administration, and Hornig held the position of papal chamberlain and was also office manager to the prince-primate. In this role, he participated alongside Prince Primate János Simor in the First Vatican Council, where he was deeply impressed by the debate between liberalism and ultramontanism. He maintained close ties with Simor even outside of work, and their circle viewed the archbishop as an important supporter of Hornig. In 1882, his church delegated him to the Ministry of Culture, where he first came into contact with politics. Here, he participated in the drafting of Trefort’s aforementioned decree (Karlinszky 2023).

2.6. The Bishopric of Hornig

Prince Primate Simor appointed Hornig as bishop of Veszprém on 17 April 1888. Hornig, who had previously been mainly involved in administrative rather than pastoral activities, approached his episcopal duties primarily from an organizational perspective. This was due not only to his personality but also to the fact that his predecessor, Zsigmond Kovács, had been ill at the end of his life and had been unable to perform his duties properly, resulting in the neglect of his diocese. Hornig undertook significant construction projects throughout his diocese, but it is mainly the town of Veszprém, the seat of his diocese, that is still defined by the many new buildings he had constructed. In addition to church construction—notably the neo-Romanesque reconstruction of the cathedral and the Church of the Resurrection, commonly referred to as St. Charles’ Church—he also built a large number of official buildings and schools (the most significant of these being the ornate building of the Episcopal Administration, now a library). All this naturally required him to put the finances of his diocese in order, and its income was settled at the beginning of his term of office.

In addition, he was a very significant patron of the arts. The educated bishop, who was also involved in scientific activities, not only raised the standard of seminary education in his diocese to a high level but also contributed to the establishment of the Veszprém Museum and supported the careers of local artists. He also supported scientific works, some of which were published under his name with the collaboration of others. At his expense, József Lukcsics, a priest of his diocese, conducted research in the Vatican, spending a decade compiling the Monumenta Romana Episcopatus Vesprimiensis, the Roman document archive of the Veszprém bishopric, which was, of course, published by Hornig. Seeing a kind of predecessor in the great bishop of Veszprém during the Counter-Reformation, Márton Padányi Biró (indeed, both were known for their uncompromising nature and determination, and the “rebuilding” of the diocese was also the task of both), Hornig published the diary of his great predecessor, but he also edited a publication discussing the past and present of his seat, Veszprém.

His perception of his role as bishop was quite interesting; one could even say that it was anachronistic for the time. He paid great attention to ceremonial matters and never appeared on foot, for example, without a suitable escort. He even took a carriage to the cathedral, which was less than 50 m from his palace. He always dressed appropriately for the occasion and expected the same from those around him. He did not receive people who were not dressed appropriately. He was particularly strict with his priests in this regard, often reprimanding them for appearing in “civilian” clothes or smoking in public (Karlinszky 2011).

During his bishopric, three historical events took place that fit well with his perception of his role. Firstly, in 1912, he was the first bishop of Veszprém to be made a cardinal by the pope. Secondly (although this was not known at the time), on 30 December 1916, he was the last bishop of Veszprém to perform the traditional public duty of crowning the queen. Thirdly, also due to the traditional duties of the bishops of Veszprém, he played an important role in the funeral ceremony of Elizabeth in 1889 (Schreck 2002). With these achievements, he rose above his fellow bishops at the end of his career.

In addition to his main pastoral activities, he continued to perform (even secular) public duties. He was president of the first national Catholic teachers’ congress convened in 1896 and then patron of the Catholic Education Council established in 1899 following the congress. From 1912, he was a member of the board of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and, in 1915, he became a founding member of the First Class of the St. Stephen Academy (Karlinszky 2023).

2.7. Hornig’s Political Role

2.7.1. Social Proposals

As Emile Perreau-Saussine notes, modern Catholic political thought has long grappled with the challenge of reconciling religious authority with democratic legitimacy (Perreau-Saussine 2023). This tension is evident in the Hungarian case, where bishops like Hornig were not only defenders of ecclesiastical interests but also actors in a modern constitutional system. His cautious and formalistic approach in the Upper House reflects the broader ambivalence within Catholicism toward liberal parliamentary politics.

The bishop appointed in 1888 became a member of the House of Magnates by virtue of his office. The heated debates that preceded the adoption of the above-mentioned ecclesiastical laws had hardly “warmed up” in Parliament. Hornig’s first contribution was not yet related to these but was made in the debate on Article XV of the 1891 Act on infant care (Márkus 1897a). Section 22 of the draft law provided for the composition of the body supervising the infant schools, and the bishop proposed changes to the draft. In his opinion, the draft did not take into account kindergartens that were not founded and maintained by religious communities but by private persons (Catholic lords and priests). The draft would have entrusted the management of these to communal committees, which would have been inappropriate because the communes had done nothing to establish or operate the institutions in question. Thus, if the municipal supervisory committees had had a say in the operation of the institution, this could have led to confusion and friction, ultimately jeopardizing existing institutions and discouraging the creation of new kindergartens.

In order to avoid this, he proposed that the supervisory board of the infant schools thus established should be appointed by the founder, with the state also having general supervision over them. Albin Csáky’s reply was brief, saying that the wording of the passage did not apply to privately founded institutions, which did not have to be subject to a municipal supervisory committee (Országgyűlés 1893). He also proposed an amendment to section 39 of the same proposal. It provided for the presence of ministerial commissioners at the end-of-year examinations of infant school teachers, which Hornig, referring to his “pedagogical experience”, wanted to have thrown out, saying that the presence of powerful persons “makes the candidates freeze up”. Csáky did not comment on the motion, which was voted down by a large majority (Országgyűlés 1893).

His next speech was related to a much more important draft law, which was eventually adopted as Article XIII of the 1891 Act on the Sunday Suspension of Industrial Work (Márkus 1897a). According to Christian teachings, Sunday is the Lord’s holy day and had therefore been subject to a work ban for a very long time. This prohibition was confirmed by the secular authorities in Hungary from the very beginning, already in the law codes of the first king, Saint Stephen I. The draft law, by comparison, applied only to work in industry, which might seem like a step backwards but, as Gábor Baross, the minister responsible for trade, explained in the explanatory memorandum to the law, it was, in fact, this one economic segment where the general ban on work seemed to be threatened by the wild capitalist conditions (Prepuk 2011). Under the draft law, home-based sole proprietors were exempt from the general ban. Hornig would have added that, in addition to these, they do so as self-employed. As he explained, the practice in Germany of some companies outsourcing production to private houses instead of running factories was also widespread in Hungary. Without this addition, this form of evisceration would have continued. This proposal was eventually withdrawn, as the Minister had reassured him that there would be adequate safeguards in the implementing decree to exclude such abuse (Márkus 1897a).

2.7.2. Church Debates

For a solid two years afterward, Hornig had no say in the debates in the House of Magnates. His next speech, however, was far more significant, making him a central figure in the struggle over secularization, the “culture war” (Rada 2024). The occasion for his speech in the 1893 budget debate was his support for Count Géza Szapáry’s earlier proposal that the House of Magnates should support the budget but also express its disagreement with the government’s church policy. The majority of the speeches in the debate dealt with Act LIII of 1868 on mixed marriages and religious education and the related decrees already mentioned. According to Catholic speakers, this law had been enacted in such a way as to serve the interests of Protestants and to the disadvantage of Catholics. Nevertheless, Catholic priests tried to cooperate with the law from a peaceful (“propter bonum pacis”) point of view, often at the cost of a conflict of conscience. In practice, however, the application of the law was controversial according to these opinions. The Catholic bishops often interpreted the law as meaning that, if the law did not force parents to do so, they could use their discretion to allow children born of mixed marriages to be raised Catholic. This compromised practice persisted for a long time until a new decree by the Minister of Culture Trefort in 1884 radically changed the situation (Salacz 1938).

In his powerful speech, Károly Hornig sharply criticized Albin Csáky, the Minister of Culture, mainly because of his decree of February 1893, which, as we have seen, transferred the matter of baptisms after mixed marriages to the administrative authorities. In Hornig’s view, this decree seriously violated the rights of the Catholic Church, humiliated priests, and led back to a situation of “state terror”. In his criticism, he explained that the decree of former Minister of Culture, Ágoston Trefort, was much more balanced, did not create such tension, and allowed the judge to decide on disputes—not the state administration. Ironically, he notes that Catholic priests are called “revolutionaries” when they are acting purely according to their own faith and conscience.

Hornig also highlighted the fact that the decree deprived the Catholic registers of their status as public documents, even though they had been public documents since 1827. This change is a serious setback not only from an ecclesiastical but also from a legal point of view. He cited a complex case as an example, in which a child was transferred several times to different denominational registers, which could have had serious consequences in the case of inheritance or military service.

The bishop argued that the dogmatic attitude of the government (“Tel est mon plaisir”—”it is my wish”) is not acceptable. In particular, he criticized the argument that “the authority of the State does not allow” the decree to be revoked. He pointed out that a number of ministerial decrees had already been revoked (for example, the one concerning the celebration of St Stephen’s Day), so the precedent was set.

He also pointed out that the ministerial decree is not legally binding because it has not been published in the official Collection of Regulations, which makes its legal effect questionable. He also referred to personal circumstances. In the past, when a bishop released a Protestant child from the Catholic registry, it was often out of courtesy to the minister, rather than based on theological conviction. He criticized this practice because bishops who granted “favors” were compromised when the Minister of Culture made the relevant correspondence public (Országgyűlés 1893).

Csáky was similarly sharp in his response to Hornig’s remarks. As an introduction, he noted that he had become used to attacks on his person during his time as minister, and therefore he did not want to make this debate personal. However, statements were made that demanded a factual rebuttal. He gave very detailed data comparing his own decree with Trefort’s. While Trefort’s decree allowed the baptism of a child born of mixed marriages but prohibited its registration, Csáky’s allowed the registration and its use for ecclesiastical purposes but only required that the baptismal certificate be handed over to the competent authorities within 8 days. He argued that this system was much more favorable to the church, as it did not deprive the civil register of its validity for religious purposes and was, therefore, in his view, less open to ecclesiastical challenge. With this, Csáky also pointed out an important problem. Until the birth registration was placed on a state basis by the law just adopted in this context, church registers also had a secular administrative function, and, therefore, the separation of church and state power was impossible until such and similar connections were eliminated.

Csáky then made an astonishing argument, pointing out that Károly Hornig was the author of the actual text of the Trefort decree when he was still a department councilor. According to him, the original manuscript is also available in his handwriting. He also claimed that, in 1887, three years after the decree had been issued, Hornig had signed the decree himself, ordering its strict application in a specific case. Hornig reacted immediately, acknowledged this, but emphasized that he had acted on the instructions of a minister and that, as a departmental councilor, he was not responsible for the substantive decision.

Asked about Hornig’s argument that his decree was necessary because the courts had regularly issued acquittals based on the Trefort decree, he said that the new legislation was necessary not because of that but because the original one was not executable.

Csáky also brought another sensitive issue for Hornig into the debate. He revived the unpublicized information that, at a bishops’ conference, Prince Primate Simor had already been inclined to accept his arguments on the government decree but changed his mind under pressure from Hornig. Since Csáky was able to prove this and the wording of the decree with documents, Hornig could do nothing but object to the disclosure of the documents (Országgyűlés 1893).

Given the subject matter and the importance of the debate, it was closed by a contribution from Sándor Wekerle. In a wide-ranging speech, Wekerle gave a detailed account of the history of the church policy debates over a quarter of a century and tried to respond in detail to all the criticisms made. Nevertheless, in a roll-call vote on a parliamentary motion, the members of the House of Magnates won by 81–56 in favor of Szapáry, supporting the budget but condemning the government’s church policy in their resolution (Országgyűlés 1893).

Hornig’s next speech, which again had to wait more than a year, was made in the debate on the draft of the 1895 XLIII Article on the free exercise of religion. Its second chapter was originally entitled “On religious denominations to be legally recognised”, to which Hornig wanted to add the words “in the future”. He argued that this was necessary because, without it, it was feared that section 11, which states that “the formation of a parish must be notified to the first officer of the jurisdiction”, might also have the effect that, in places where there was no recognized religious denomination, it might not have been possible to form a new parish. Count Nándor Zichy proposed to delete the entire second chapter from the law, so Hornig’s proposal was only voted on when it was decided that the chapter would remain in the draft at all. Perhaps as a gesture to the Catholics, Prime Minister Wekerle himself proposed the change of title, and it was easily passed by the House (Országgyűlés 1895).

Hornig’s next and last activity in the House of Magnates was related to the debate on Article XXXII of 1894 on the religion of children, which actually aimed to settle the “baptismal” debate that had triggered the whole church–political struggle. The proposal would have abolished the rigid mandatory rule that sons should follow the religion of their father and daughters of their mother, a rule which the spouses were free to agree on. However, in order to prevent such an agreement from being the subject of a dispute, it would have been subject to strict formalities and would have been valid only before a royal notary, a royal magistrate, a mayor, or a chief magistrate. Hornig, on the other hand, proposed that they could do so in the presence of witnesses before their priest. According to his perfectly logical reasoning, this would have been justified not only on the grounds of religious autonomy but also because it would have been much easier for the Hungarian inhabitants, who, at that time, were still overwhelmingly rural, to go to their priests locally than to travel to a town to visit one of the offices listed by law (Országgyűlés 1895).

The response of Baron Lóránd Eötvös, Minister of Religion and Education, is of particular relevance to our topic. He said that the reason why he does not accept the seemingly irrelevant amendment proposal is that the draft ecclesiastical laws were intended to separate the state and the church and to stop the mixing of powers and functions. The rest of his argument seems a little one-sided. He explained that it was important for the state to monitor the denominational affiliation of children because it was important in school education to know which pupils belonged to which denomination. (Although Eötvös is referring to religious education, in Hungary at the time, the basic arena of primary education was in any case denominational schools.) The Minister of Justice, Dezső Szilágyi, who supported Eötvös, added that he did not consider the motion supportable because it would not eliminate the Protestant argument that, in the past, Catholic priests had often abused their local power to prevent children from being baptized by other denominations (Országgyűlés 1895).

3. Discussion

Another fruitful theoretical perspective is provided by José Casanova’s notion of the “deprivatization” of religion, which suggests that religious institutions have increasingly sought to re-enter public discourse in modern societies. This helps to explain how the Hungarian Catholic Church, through figures like Hornig, did not passively retreat in the face of state secularization but rather actively mobilized and sought to shape political processes. Seen in this light, the emergence of the Catholic People’s Party and the Church’s public opposition to legislation take on greater significance as efforts to reclaim a voice in the modern public sphere.

As José Casanova has argued, one of the key dynamics of modernity is the “deprivatization” of religion, whereby religious actors re-enter the public sphere and attempt to shape political discourse (Casanova 1994). This perspective is particularly relevant to the Hungarian case, where figures like Hornig did not simply retreat in response to secular legislation but sought new means of influence, both within and beyond formal parliamentary settings.

Although Károly Hornig remained a member of the House of Magnates for another two decades, he no longer contributed to the debates. His active period of just under three and a half years, which included amendments, was mainly triggered by the debate on the epoch-making Church Laws. The two proposals he did not make on these highlighted his social sensitivity, although it is interesting to note that he did not contribute to the debate on similar legislation in subsequent decades. Despite being sharply criticized for this in the pro-government and Protestant press, he was not really a central figure in the debates. His comments were limited to detailed issues or merely supportive of some of the key speakers on the subject. His sharp parliamentary debate with Minister Csáky was largely due to his personal attacks, but his style in the House of Magnates was rather smooth. It is worth comparing his role with that of one or two members of the House of Magnates in a similar role who took a different view in the debate.

It is not surprising that the Reformed bishop Károly Szász, for example, had a very different opinion on the subject. In the 1893 budget debate, he explained his opinion in detail, partly in response to Hornig’s suggestions. As he said, as a Reformed church leader, he fully approved of the government’s church policy. Catholic marriages could not be dissolved, so, if someone wanted a divorce, he was forced to convert to a denomination that allowed divorce. The introduction of civil marriage ended this legally. One of Saxony’s major arguments for the adoption of the new legislation was precisely this hypocritical practice, which mocked the practice of religion on spiritual grounds. He also pointed out, however, that the divorces thus obtained could only be considered as existing under Protestant rules, which created legal uncertainty both as regards possible bigamy and the legitimacy of the children. He also criticized, of course, the legal uncertainty surrounding baptism, illustrating it with concrete examples (Országgyűlés 1893).

As Madeley and Enyedi argue, the notion of “state neutrality” in matters of religion is often more rhetorical than real, especially in post-confessional or multi-denominational societies (Madeley and Enyedi 2003). In this light, Hungary’s church legislation of the 1890s—though framed as secularizing—can also be read as an attempt to redefine, rather than entirely withdraw, the state’s role in religious affairs. This perspective helps contextualize both the formal laws and the informal political strategies deployed by figures like Hornig.

Building on this, Talal Asad has emphasized that secularism is not merely the withdrawal of religion from public life but a specific mode of power that redefines the boundaries between religion and the state (Asad 2003). This insight is useful for understanding the Hungarian case, where certain state interventions—such as regulating religious education or controlling baptismal records—did not simply neutralize religion but actively reshaped its institutional and discursive space.

More interesting is the comparison of Hornig’s views with those of another Catholic prelate, József Samassa, Archbishop of Eger, described by some authors as liberal. Samassa did not contribute to the debates in the House of Lords. However, when, on 12 April 1890, following the publication of Csáky’s decree, the Conference of Hungarian Bishops met for the first time to discuss the new situation, the two prelates came into sharp conflict. The clash was caused by Samassa’s urging for the adoption and proclamation of the new decree and his denunciation of Hornig’s former role in the Ministry of Culture. Of course, more important than their personal differences was the fundamental difference in their opinions; Samassa’s efforts were aimed at maintaining good relations with the government, while Hornig, as we have seen, was not afraid to engage in open confrontation with the Minister of Culture and the liberal government forces in general (Klestenitz 2013). The dispute was heard in Rome and this was the main reason why, after the death of Archbishop Simor, Leo XIII did not appoint Samassa as head of the Hungarian Catholic Church. Samassa only took a different position from the church leadership in internal forums and, according to the records, he always voted with his fellow bishops in the House of Magnates.

4. Conclusions

As Hugh McLeod has shown, the secularization of Western Europe between 1848 and 1914 was far from uniform and often involved intense local struggles over education, marriage, and clerical privileges (McLeod 2000). Hungary’s experience fits within this broader pattern, where state-driven reforms provoked both institutional resistance and ideological realignment within the church. Hornig’s interventions can thus be seen not only as a national reaction but also as part of a wider European process of negotiating religious authority under modern conditions.

Church and state have long cooperated in Europe. Until the development of the modern civil state, certain state functions were traditionally performed by the church, filling its missing organs. This was particularly the case in the area of certain family law institutions (such as marriage) or education. However, as public administration became more modern and, thanks to the Enlightenment, people wanted to break away from the traditional way of life, this interdependence became more and more burdensome. The need for separation of church and state was first expressed and then implemented in a growing number of states.

In Hungary, the process culminated in the enactment of the ecclesiastical law. The question is, however, to what extent secularization can be achieved in a modern state in a multi-denominational environment. According to Timothy Snediker, this was achieved with the post-Enlightenment transformation of Christianity (Snediker 2014). It can be said that, with the legislation of 1894, the influence of the church in areas traditionally classified as matters of state power was also removed in Hungary. From then on, the church, supported by legislation, could no longer influence the lives of citizens, and its power became purely spiritual. The citizen, if he was a believer, could obey the rules of the church, but there was nothing beyond his conscience to force him to do so.

The opposite was different. As we have seen, the baptismal debate that triggered the “culture wars” was also triggered by the state’s desire to interfere in purely religious matters. Although it is true that this (the denominational status of children) also had public law implications at the time. However, these were largely abolished by the Church Acts. Despite this, several sections of Act XLIII of 1895 contained rules that made secularization seemingly unilateral, taking a clear religious stance. Such was the case, for example, of the third section, which stated that “No person’s religious belief or church rule shall exempt him from the performance of any duty imposed by law.” This is a basic principle of secularization, but it should be noted that there are denominations that, for example, prohibit their members from bearing arms, thus bringing them into conflict with the state through military service (DiPippa 2014; Fiala 2022), or, as Emily R. Gill points out, polygamy as a rule in a denomination causes a similar problem. On these issues, as she argues through numerous examples, restrictions on religious freedom are permissible in the public interest (Gill 2020).

But the next section of the article is the inverse of the previous one: “Ecclesiastical punishment shall not be imposed on any person for having fulfilled a civil duty prescribed by law, or for not having performed an act prohibited by law, or for having freely exercised his civil rights permitted by law.” This raises questions in several respects. On the one hand, once the Church has lost its secular legal functions, ecclesiastical sanctions have no secular legal effect and can be treated as a purely conscientious matter. On the other hand, this is a clear interference in the internal rules of the churches, so it can be said that it points in the direction of placing the state above the church rather than separating church and state. This raises further legal questions for an international organization such as the Roman Catholic Church. In light of the above, further research on this topic is both necessary and promising. For instance, it remains to be explored whether—and for how long—ecclesiastical norms retained any secular legal effect after the adoption of the Church Laws. It is also important to assess the extent to which the emerging civil state affected ecclesiastical sovereignty in practice. While the Hornig debate and the resulting legislation represent a major milestone in Hungary’s secularization process, the precise scope and long-term implications of this transformation still require clarification.