Overcoming Violence in Islamic Ethics: Ṭāhā ʿAbd Al-Raḥmān’s Dialogism and Moral Responsibility

Abstract

Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s Suʼāl al-ʻunf (The Question of Violence) is perhaps the most extensive philosophical-religious critique of violence in Islamic ethics in the last decade. He distinguishes between the notions of violence, force, and struggle, rejecting violence based on Islamic sources and critical ethics. He also suggests dialogism and ethics of trusteeship as viable forms of intellectual confrontation along with a toolkit for engagement with Islamist violent groups. This paper offers first an overview of the current perspectives on non-violence in Islamic ethics. Then, I will explore Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s background and trajectory in order to contextualize his contribution to the ongoing debates on ethics in the Moroccan context. Subsequently, I will discuss his main theses and arguments on Islamist violence as well as the toolkit he offers to overcome it.

1. Introduction

In recent years, academic research has become more interested in Islam’s contribution to ethics of world peace. Researchers have focused on Islamic reformism which emphasized the importance of peaceful struggle in early Islam as an internal fight against one’s wrongdoings; yet, for clear political reasons, the majority of jurists, theologians, and Muslim empires neglected this pacifist tradition in favor of military jihad. These intellectuals include Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905), Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935), Abdul Ghaffar Khan (d. 1988) Wahiduddin Khan (d. 2021) and Jawdat Saʻīd (d. 2022). For them, war is described in the Quran as a last-resort measure to protect the community from outside invasion, making it an exceptional situation rather than the normal course of events. In addition to the Quran, a large number of Muslim official texts (theology, fiqh, Sufi and other ethical teachings) were shown to favor peace over conflict. Throughout the history of Islam, scholars have explored the concepts of peace, salām (God as peace and Islam as finding peace in submission to God), compassion (raḥma), patience (ṣabr), and reconciliation (ṣulḥ) as the cornerstones of inter-personal and intercommunal relationships in Muslim ethics. Modern reformist intellectuals have followed the same route, downplaying the military jihad in favor of a spiritual jihad that highlights tolerance, justice, and charity toward others (Abu-Nimer 2003; Huda 2010; Halverson 2012; Shadi 2017; Afsaruddin 2020; Cole 2021; Mokrani 2022; Woerner-Powell 2025).

One of the most thorough philosophical-religious investigations of Islamic nonviolence ethics was published by the influential Moroccan Sufi thinker Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān in 2017 under the title of Suʼāl al-ʿunf (The Question of Violence) (Ṭāhā 2017); Ṭāhā critically addresses the issue of violence in Islamic thought and the best ways to promote nonviolence. He makes a distinction between the concepts of force, violence, and struggle, condemning violence based on Islamic texts and thought. He also recommends dialogism and trusteeship ethics as methods of resolving political conflicts. Although his ideas are generally well-known to readers of Islamic thought in the Muslim world, they are mostly unknown in the West. This paper endorses a textual analysis method intended to understand Ṭāhā’s criticism of violence and advocacy of non-violence. Besides, I will also engage in the contextualization of his thought on non-violence in the Moroccan political debates and policies against Islamist violence since 2003. Finally, I will also discuss some of the limitations of his perspective on non-violence.

2. Non-Violence in Modern Islamic Ethics

A theology of peace in Islam has been the focus of a number of Muslim thinkers in the modern era, all in very different ways. When it comes to peacemaking activists, probably, the earliest modern Muslim attempt to promote non-violence is the movement initiated by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890–1988) in British India and Pakistan (Kurtz 2011). Al-Salām al-ʿālamῑ wa-l-Islām (World Peace and Islam) by Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966) is the most well-known of them among Islamist intellectuals. Quṭb asserts that in Islam, peace is the rule and conflict is inevitable. Until the divine order on earth is realized, there must be perpetual struggle and people must serve only God as their master. His idea of the connection between Islamic monotheism and peace is frequently found in contemporary Islamist writings on the subject. According to Quṭb, in order to defeat non-Muslim hostility against Islam, war is to be anticipated. He also contends that daʿwa, or call to Islam, is universal and must be permitted to fulfill its purpose. Any action taken to stop it must be viewed as a battle against Islam. When opponents obstruct the call to Islam, as the tribe of Quraysh did with Muḥammad, war must be conducted. For Quṭb, peace represents unity that carries out God’s commandments on freedom, justice, and security. He believed that international peace and worldwide peace are not the same thing. Instead, international peace is the culmination of the levels of peace that each person, family, and community has achieved (Quṭb 1992, pp. 5–37).

Quṭb’s theology of peace serves as an illustration of how Salafists and Islamists see peace. It is a form of imperial peace that was promoted by Eastern and Western ideologues of various ideologies (from liberalism to communism) in the 20th century as peace was believed by many to be the result of an all-out ideological conflict. Although Quṭb makes use of some of the fundamental writings of medieval Muslim exegetes and jurists, his perspective is modern and authoritarian. Overall, Islamists, much like international socialism and neo-liberalism, see imperial peace as the end of history.

Beyond Quṭb, perhaps the most well-known Muslim thinker of non-violence is the Syrian Jawdat Saʿīd (1931–2022). Saʿīd argues that Muslims should always strive for peace and never engage in hostilities themselves. Islam must be preached in a peaceful manner, and an Islamic society must be built on a basis of peace. Violence is only appropriate if society is willing to use it to uphold justice and put an end to persecution. Additionally, violence should only be used in this situation by responsible and rational authorities, and only as needed to end injustice. He holds that justice, democracy, and the advancement of science are all based on peace, which bestows spiritual strength. Saʿīd questioned Muslim attitudes against American hegemony and foreign occupation in terms of international relations. He thinks that only if Muslims make peace the cornerstone of their civilization can there be world peace. He fiercely opposes American hegemony founded on violent policies, but he is more concerned with creating a rationalist and humanist Muslim worldview. He frequently urges using the lessons learned by Japan following the conclusion of World War II to challenge American hegemony by science, democracy, and economic growth rather than through fervor and violence (Sa’id and Jalabi 2001, pp. 83–150; Lohlker 2022; Pizzi 2024; Dragovic 2023; Abdulaev 2024; Moussa 2024; Overbeck 2024).

Asghar Ali Engineer (d. 2013), an Indian Muslim reformist, makes the same plea for peace and the advancement of justice as Saʿīd. In his view, Islam is a religion of peace by nature, and violence is a part of the human condition. He adds that the Quran does not encourage violence. As he sees it, the verses on jihad are about defensive war while the conflicts between Muslim rulers were either a product of Arab society or a consequence of continuous political violence. Islam, in his opinion, is primarily a spiritual practice. His interpretation emphasizes self-mastery as the true jihad and is based on Islamic ideals. Addressing an audience of Muslims in South Asia ravaged by ethnic and religious violence, he exploits a set of pacifist Indian ideas, in particular Hinduism and Buddhism. In addition to Indian influence, his criticisms of power, greed, and domination also attest to his socialist leanings (Engineer 2003, pp. 92–103).

More recently, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, a US-based Palestinian academic and peace activist, draws on elements of Islamic theology and law to formulate an Islamic philosophy for peace. His concern is to transform Islamic teachings into peace-building practice. Muslim rituals such as prayer and fasting serve as opportunities to train for non-violent action. Hunger strikes are forms of struggle that could be undertaken and religious songs could be an avenue for peaceful marches and meetings. This ethical interpretation of Islam is also inspired by various Sufi and Asian philosophies; it selects certain principles from Islamic traditions and avoids the political aspects of the Muslim tradition (Abu-Nimer 2001, pp. 217–65).

3. Ṭāhā ʿAbd Al-Raḥmān: Background and Trajectory

The intellectual career of Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (born in 1944) was greatly influenced by three aspects of his youth. First off, while studying philosophy at the Muḥammad V University in Rabat, which was a hotbed of left-wing ideologies imported from Europe in the 1960s, he was exposed to the concepts and methods of Western philosophy, which he would later criticize (Mashrūḥ 2009, p. 23).1 His studies in the philosophy of language and logic at the Sorbonne University in Paris, which led to two dissertations—one on language and philosophy in 19722 and another on models of reasoning in 19853—formed the second part of his education. His Sufi education as a member of the Moroccan Sufi order Qādiriyya-Būdshīshiyya is a third, equally significant factor. Disappointed by the lack of spirituality in the left-dominated university environment, he turned to Sufism. Unlike most of his Moroccan colleagues attracted by the rationalism of Averroes (d. 1198) or the historicism of Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406), Ṭāhā found refuge in the Sufi tradition (Ṭāhā 2001, pp. 62–64).

From 1970 until his retirement in 2005, Ṭāhā taught logic and philosophy of language at Muḥammad V University in Rabat. In the philosophy department (which played a major role in contemporary Arab-Muslim philosophy), he faced resistance from his colleagues who were under the strong influence of Marxism, including his rival Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī (d. 2010). Over the years, Ṭāhā managed to find a group of students and disciples who subsequently took up positions in several Moroccan universities and schools. Based on this new generation of Sufi-philosophers, in 2002 he founded Muntadā al-ḥikma li-l-mufakkirīn wa-l-bāḥithīn (the Wisdom Forum for Thinkers and Researchers). In addition to his many writings, Ṭāhā is an active lecturer. He became widely known to the Moroccan intellectual public in 1994 with his vigorous, profound and well-crafted critique of Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī’s thought in his book Tajdīd al-manhaj fī taqwīm al-turāth (The Renewal of Method in the Evaluation of the Islamic Heritage) where he sought to undermine his opponent’s project: the critique of Arab reason. The major premise of al-Jābirī that Ṭāhā attempts to discredit is that rationalism should emerge from the critique of Islamic thought as the only Islamic intellectual form adequate for modernity (Ṭāhā 1994).4 Since then, his reputation in Morocco as well as in the Arab-Muslim world has grown stronger (Mashrūḥ 2009, pp. 23–27). He has been invited to give lectures in Arabic-speaking countries where Islamic influence has grown considerably, such as Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Iraq, particularly after the Arab uprisings of 2011.

An important consideration in his career is the sympathy he enjoys in official Moroccan Islam. This dates back to 1985, when Ṭāhā was invited to the cycle of religious lectures given before King Hassan II during the month of Ramadan. Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s invitation was unusual for two reasons; firstly, he is not a religious authority as such, but a philosopher. Second, he lectured on controversy and theology, which is not a theme that fits the context of the month of Ramadan or that of official Moroccan Islam (Ṭāhā 1985, pp. 227–52; 1987). However, in the 1980s, this event was significant. The regime was fighting against the control of Moroccan universities and youth by the left and emerging Islamism. For this reason, it mobilised Muslim scholars and thinkers to defeat its opponents. In 2003, Morocco’s Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs invited him for a second conference, this time before King Muḥammad VI, on the theme of mercy (Ṭāhā 2003, pp. 95–117). Recently, the Moroccan authorities reiterated their official recognition of Ṭāhā by awarding him the Muḥammad VI Prize for Islamic Thought and Studies (2014) issued by King Muḥammad VI. This closeness to the regime does not mean that he sanctions all its policies. However, Ṭāhā strongly supports the tenets of official Moroccan Islam, particularly its Sufi-Sunnite dimension.

To date, Ṭāhā is the author of some 30 books.5 In addition, he has written several chapters and journal articles, all of which display the same rigorous formal argumentation and sophisticated language that underpin his thinking. Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s readership is made up more of students and intellectuals from Islamist, philosophical and Sufi circles, familiar with classical Arabic rhetoric even though over the last ten years or so Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān has agreed to give interviews, including to Aljazeera, to make his ideas more accessible. In fact, he remains a notoriously elitist writer, consciously maintaining his formalist discourse. At the same time, his language and style are dialectical, even polemical, the hallmark of which is undoubtedly the process of Arabic philology known as derivation, ishtiqāq, which enables him to create new terms and concepts capable of expressing his ideas. He also displays a great sense of mastery of rhetoric, argumentation and logic, reminiscent of medieval Arabic, particularly the divisions and counter-arguments of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111). Thus, in his elitism, Ṭāhā meets al-Ghazālī in two modes of thought: logic and Sufism.

In Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s writings, one can clearly distinguish two pillars of his thought: one concerned with logic and the philosophy of language and another around Muslim ethics and Sufism. Yet for the last twenty years or so, his writings have focused mainly on ethics. Al-ʻAmal al-dīnī wa-tajdīd al-ʻaql (Religious Action and the Renewal of Reason), his first book on this subject, dates from 1989 (his fifth book) revealing him as a thinker on Islamic ethics and above all as a leading Sufi moralist philosopher. Unlike his previous books, which require training in the philosophy of language and logic to grasp his thought, this book is relatively accessible. The practical and contemporary turn he takes, writing about society, politics and modernity, is well received in a re-traditionalized environment. In 2000, he published Suʼāl al-akhlāq: musāhama fī l-naqd al-akhlāqī li-l-ḥadātha al-gharbiyya (The Question of Ethics: A Contribution to the Moral Critique of Western Modernity), which is a critique of Western theories of ethics and a contribution to a theory of Islamic ethics. A year later, he gave an inaugural lecture at the Faculty of Human Sciences in Marrakech on Taʿaddudiyyat al-qiyam (The Pluralism of Values) on the plurality of value systems, which he published the same year in 68 pages (Ṭāhā 2001). In 2005, he followed this up with his influential book Rūḥ al-ḥadātha: al-madkhal ilā taʼsīs al-ḥadātha al-Islāmiyya (The Spirit of Modernity: An Introduction to the Foundation of Islamic Modernity) in which he argues for Islamic modernity as the perfect spirit of modernity (rejecting the Western reality of modernity) (Ṭāhā 2004, pp. 83–119; 2005; Hallaq 2019; Widigdo 2024). Next, he extended his theory of modernity to political philosophy, attacking imperialism and despotism with his al-Ḥadātha wa-l-muqāwama (Modernity and Resistance) published in 2007; this is the first book he devotes to political philosophy proper, although he deals with political philosophy in several sections of his work on ethics.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān continued his ethical project by publishing several books. In 2012, he published Suʼāl al-ʿamal: baḥth ʿan al-uṣūl al-ʿamaliyya fī al-fikr wa-l-ʿilm (The Question of Action: A Study on the Practical Principles of Thought and Knowledge), in which he argues for the unity of religious knowledge and practice, and Rūḥ al-dīn: min ḍīq al-ʿilmāniyya ilā saʿat al-iʼtimāniyya (The Spirit of Religion: From the Narrowness of Secularism to the Breadth of Moral Responsibility), a work on the intertwining of religion and politics that forms the first volume of a trilogy. In 2014, this book was followed by Bu’s al-dahrāniyya: al-naqd al-i’timānī li-faṣl al-dīn ʿan al-akhlāq (The Misery of Secularism: A Critique from the Moral Responsibility of Separating Religion from Ethics), an attack on Enlightenment philosophers and French secularism, and Shurūd mā baʿda al-dahrāniyya (The Wandering of Post-Laicism), in which he criticizes atheism and hedonism in Western philosophy and psychoanalysis. In 2017, Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān published another trilogy entitled Dīn al-ḥayāʼ: min al-fiqh al-iʼtimārī ilā l-fiqh al-itimānī (The Religion of Modesty: From the Jurisprudence of Commandments to that of Moral Responsibility), the most extensive philosophical-religious exploration of the ethics of modesty in Islam (Yakin et al. 2023). In the same year he published Suāl al-ʿunf bayna al-iʾtimāniyya wa-l-ḥiwāriyya (The Question of Violence between Trusteeship and Dialogism), an attempt to address the question of violence in Islamic thought and ways of promoting non-violence.

Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān is little known to Western scholars of Islam and Arabic studies.6 This can be inferred from the scarcity of academic publications in European languages devoted to this philosopher. We should highlight two books and three research articles that have been published on his work since 2015. Mohammed Hashas published an article in which he discusses Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s paradigm of moral responsibility as a theory of ethics that overcomes dichotomies such as religion versus politics, the divine versus the secular, physics versus metaphysics (Hashas 2015, pp. 67–105). The second article is an analysis by Samuel Kigar of the debate between Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī over the understanding of the Muslim heritage, and in particular with regard to logic and philosophy (Kigar 2017, pp. 5–33). A third article was published by Harald Viersen in 2023 on Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s critique of modernity (Viersen 2023). Two recent books have helped to analyse Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s project in a profound way: Reforming Modernity: Ethics and the New Human in the Philosophy of Abdurrahman Taha published in 2019 by Wael B. Hallaq (Hallaq 2019) and Islamic Ethics and the Trusteeship Paradigm: Taha Abderrahmane’s Philosophy in Comparative Perspectives (Hashas and al-Khatib 2020), a volume edited by Mohammed Hashas and Mutaz al-Khatib. Hallaq’s work focuses on issues of modernity and rationalism while the volume edited by Mohammed Hashas and Mutaz al-Khatib highlights the ethics of moral responsibility in various ethical issues in Ṭāhā’s thought ranging from theoretical justification to Sufism. Yet, Ṭāhā’s thought on violence and non-violence has not been researched to date. My article takes on this task.

Before discussing in detail his views on violence and non-violence as expressed mainly in his Suāl al-ʿunf, it should be noted that his work was motivated by the Casablanca bombings of 2003, carried out by a Salafi-jihadi terrorist organisation affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). These suicide explosions occurred on 16 May 2003 in Casablanca, Morocco and targeted Jewish and Spanish citizens as well as Moroccan tourism. These terrorist assaults were the bloodiest in the nation’s history, resulting in the deaths of 45 people (33 victims and 12 suicide bombers).7 The Moroccan society was greatly impacted by this incident.

4. Ṭāhā ʿAbd Al-Raḥmān’s Critique of Islamist Violence

Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān begins his argument against violence by claiming that tyranny has taken control of man (ḥubb al-tasalluṭ); that is why he is prone to violence despite many religions, including Islam, urging people to restrain their violent tendencies. Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān thus has a stronger affinity with Hobbes’s perception of man than with Rousseau’s or Plato’s; he uses the Biblical story of Cain and Abel (also quoted in the Quran8) to highlight how deeply ingrained violence is in human nature. Man is so gripped by tyranny that he could justify violence with his own religion (Ṭāhā 2017, pp. 10–11). According to him, all forms of violence are unacceptable because they undermine human dignity and are a result of immorality and evil (though the state’s use of force is a different kind of “violence” because it is governed by the law). While force regulated by the law can save lives, violence only kills people. Thus, the Quranic law of retaliation (lex talionis), or qiṣāṣ, is valid because it is a force applied by the law rather than violence (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 37).

This prompts Ṭāhā to distinguish between ʿunf (violence) and quwwa (force). Violence is fundamentally bad, whereas force can have a positive meaning. However, sometimes when the state uses force to uphold the law and keep the peace, it may violate people’s human rights. States may therefore commit injustice since they might think they have the exclusive right to employ force in all cases (in reference to M. Weber’s generally recognized claim on the legitimate state’s monopoly over the means of violence) (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 38). However, some states abuse the right to monopoly over violence, exhibiting authoritarian and anarchic inclinations. For this reason, the state may only justify the use of force if it seeks to uphold justice. If it veers away from this objective, the state commits violence (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 39). Violence is a psychological and ignorant velocity that corrupts the person and the group, whereas force is a reasonable, spiritual, and disciplined energy that preserves the structure of the individual and the group (since force is, after all, positively recognized in the Quran especially in the Verse (8:60)9 (Ṭāhā 2017, pp. 40–41). As the state stands for both the individual and the group, it should adhere to the same concept, which forbids violence and maintains force as the embodiment of spirit, discipline, and reason (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 41).

In his view, violence is evil because it is unfair and ignorant (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 42). He bases this statement on Eric Weil’s thesis of violence as the absence of discourse as well as Augustine’s and Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between just and unjust war. Violence, then, is a sign of ignorance and moral depravity. Violence, particularly the one justified by Islamism in the name of Islam, is unfair not only to those who suffer as a result of terrorism, but it is also unfair to God in his own realm (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 53). Islamists who use violence often claim to be acting in accordance with God’s will and competing with the Almighty God the Compeller (al-Jabbār), coexisting in dominion with him, persecuting those who do not share their beliefs, and excommunicating them (takfīr) (Ṭāhā 2017, pp. 54–57). By asserting that Islamist terrorism undermines God’s authority and even claims to rule the world on his behalf, Ṭāhā expresses an original viewpoint here. God has chosen for man to play a different role, one of moral responsibility on earth and witnessing the creation of the divine will, which is rather a good deed (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 64).

Ṭāhā argues that there are two issues with radical Islamism: 1. Radical Islamists distort religious scriptures by endorsing their literal meanings and ignoring the lessons and morals they provide. 2. Misinterpreting reality, disregarding societal norms and reasons for action, and trying to effect change without fully comprehending the circumstances (Ṭāhā 2017, pp. 66–67). Both men of political and religious authority who opposed the radical Islamists were enraged, but none of them were able to convince or discourage the radical Islamists to refrain from violence (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 67). According to Ṭāhā, the reason why religious and political institutions failed to stop Islamist violence was because they relied on political and religious commands, which they tried to impose on radical Islamists. He advises the two institutions to teach militant Islamists the moral foundations of Islamic teachings (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 69). Radical Islamists, who are historically the result of religious and political authoritarianism, are strengthened by political and religious mandates based on authoritarianism (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 71). In order to address the causes of terrorism, it is necessary to give priority to moral principles and spirituality (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 72). Radical Islamism is in fact a flawed political psychology because it breeds a hatred of rulers, a desire for retribution (targeting aggression against Muslims), and an obsession and desperation for political change (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 86). He adds that when it comes to radical Islamists, emotions are the primary problem that needs to be resolved. As they deny reality and injustice done to both people and God in the form of terrorism, extreme Islamists nevertheless actively attempt to damage others (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 95).

One may say that Ṭāhā’s fundamental explanation of violence is anthropological, as he attributes violence to Cain’s side of human nature, pointing out that it is ultimately irrational. He calls this irrational state of behavior “Cain sedition” which is responsible for the current wave of violence in the Arab-Muslim world, as it encourages Muslims to kill one another and distorts the definition of jihad (the latter should mean, in his view, prudence, restraint from harming others, and mercy before justice) (Ṭāhā 2018, pp. 196–223). Social sciences dispute whether terrorism is rational or irrational (Hudson et al. 2020) since there are various elements involved in violence. As an ethical philosopher, Ṭāhā tends to view violence as persistent patterns in Islamic history (Sunni-Shia violence, Arab-Israeli conflict) and symptoms of vices that should be dealt with morally by adopting their opposite virtues.

5. The Toolkit of Non-Violence

Ṭāhā maintains that one cannot end violence with more violence because the latter is an emotion that cannot be removed from the violent person’s psychology. States should not use violence to end conflicts, as there are technological, theological, and political considerations involved in the conflicts that need to be addressed properly (Ṭāhā 2017, pp. 135–36). Additionally, violence cannot be eliminated right away because it originates in the destruction of society’s ideals. Reconstructing society requires a lot of time (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 136). While Ṭāhā acknowledges that states should take certain measures to prevent violence, he believes that they should only use legal force to punish violence. This falls short, though, because it only addresses the political aspect of violence, not its ethical layer. In his view, the key dimension in fighting violence should be nonviolence, especially when using the following three tools: 1. Respectful discussion. 2. Admonition 3. Wisdom.10 Let us explore each of these tools in the paragraphs that follow.

The respectful discussion entails challenging the violent person’s conviction that using violence is the best course of action. By displaying ethical, not just scriptural knowledge of Islam, one should engage in open dialogue with aggressive yet rational radical Islamists. He also advises employing charisma to influence aggressive extremists as opposed to only quoting Muslim authoritative scripture. That is to say, one must turn to spiritual and moral figures of authority that showcase the profundity of knowledge of Islamic traditions and incarnate them in their behavior. Thus, the radical person should encounter a man with better moral and religious standing in front of him and whose deeds bear witness to his higher moral standing. In such case, the aggressive individual is made to acknowledge his lowly position in this moral hierarchy (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 141). Ṭāhā therefore seeks to confront violent individuals who made the decision to defy religious and political authority with moral authority. Instead of making the radical Islamists quickly abandon violence, the goal of this type of dialogue is to make them question the morality of their actions (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 142). The aim is to help these people understand how horrible it is to use violence, especially coming from individuals who profess to be religious (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 142). Ṭāhā regrets that most states do not take this stage seriously (of defeating violent persons in the battle of ideas and demonstrating the power of non-violence) although it is crucial to fight this struggle by changing minds since violence begins in the mind of the violent person (Ṭāhā 2017, pp. 142–43).

After the respectful debate, Ṭāhā suggests exhortation as the second most effective non-violent method of combating violence. Exhortation consists in calling attention to the neglected Islamic ethical principles in order to remind individuals of truths that could feed their souls and change their behavior (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 143). He argues that the first lesson that should be taught to violent individuals is to know God the Merciful, whose compassion and mercy cover an entire system of behaving appropriately with other humans (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 144). He asserts that radical Islamists discard mercy from their religious practices. They praise God as being the most merciful and compassionate, but they nevertheless act in the opposite way (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 145). In his capacity as a Sufi and moral philosopher, Ṭāhā emphasizes the names of God as the highest ideals to pursue and impart to violent people. Although exhortation cannot change a person’s propensity for violence, it can at least result in ceasing violence for a specified period of time. Additionally, exhortation can convince a violent person that the Cain decision (violence) he made is dreadful because it disregards the principles of divine commands of mercy that underlie Islamic ethics, and as a result, the violent person should become aware of his flaws (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 149). If we are able to persuade the violent person to conduct moral examination, it may be the final step in influencing him to abandon his previous religious misinterpretation and lean toward an Abelian course of action (nonviolence) (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 149).

The third and last instrument of non-violence is practical wisdom, which consists of a series of actions meant to ethically transform the violent person (knowing that the two prior strategies of discussion and exhortation are building blocks for this third level). While argument and reprimand push the violent to reflect on and reassess his actions, practical wisdom seeks to alter his behavior and uses psychological expertise to work on the violent person’s mind. In particular, work should be done on the desire displayed by the radical individuals to impose one’s will on others, authoritarianism, and the belief that one is in control of his own destiny. This work should aim to persuade the radical Islamists that they are entrusted with the spirit and should fully assume trusteeship and moral responsibility. They should also learn how to be modest since man is a servant of God and has no sovereignty over anyone. Furthermore, the value of human brotherhood should be strengthened by switching from acting as a Muslim toward enemies to acting as a human toward his brothers (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 156). In sum, practical wisdom entails moral education (or rehabilitation) that emphasizes the virtues of moral accountability, altruism, humanity, morality, divine sovereignty, and ego-defeating work (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 162). Hopefully, this approach will help the violent man rediscover his morality. Ṭāhā leaves the door open to other tangible actions that can transform a violent individual; these actions could be individual, collective, governmental, or non-governmental. Although he stresses beginning with the Quran and the Sunna as sources of this moral rejuvenation, the crucial matter is achieving moral gradation (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 163).

Ṭāhā overlooks the context for engaging in this process of discourse, advice, and moral reform of extreme Islamists. As some extreme Islamists preach violence in marginal mosques and online forums, they could be contacted for dialogue, exhortation, and even re-education. Most of the time, however, state and non-state actors cannot have access to and even control over radical Islamists as they are isolated or hidden, unless they are in custody after they have already committed violence. Ṭāhā’s non-violent approach might be put to the test in prison conditions, which favor ideological propaganda as they spread among the imprisoned radical Islamists, relying on victimhood feelings to take hold further with time spent in jail.

As shown by his earliest writings, Ṭāhā’s dialogism stands out among contemporary Muslim thinkers (Ṭāhā 1987). At the start of his book Dialogues for the Future, he writes that “dialogue and only dialogue, and nothing else but dialogue … dialogue is truth” (Ṭāhā 2011, p. 7). In his book al-Ḥiwār ufuqan li-l-tafkīr (Dialogue as a Horizon for Thought), published in 2013 he calls for critical dialogue with Western civilization and a negotiating dialogue with the political violence of this civilization (Ṭāhā 2013, p. 186). His dialogism is influenced by both Western philosophy (which continues Plato’s legacy) and Islamic ethics (which is also marked by Plato’s philosophy to a certain degree although it draws on other sources as well). However, the authoritarianism of religious and political institutions in the Muslim world appears to be a major barrier to the growth of dialogism and the establishment of discourse ethics. While pluralism is a prerequisite for dialogism’s success, most political and religious actors do not admit the diversity of views and endorse exclusivist and rigid stances.

6. Moral Responsibility as the Antidote to Violence

Following Emmanuel Lévinas (1906–1955), Ṭāhā argues that discourse as a covenant is the primary remedy for violence. The covenant is a dialogue that humans have with God according to the Bible and the Quran11, wherein they made a promise not to kill, to worship God, and to take on earthly trusteeship (Ṭāhā 2017, pp. 168–69). However, for Ṭāhā, man is neither given a sacred identity per se nor should be considered as divine in some sort. In fact, since God created man as a spiritual being with a good nature (a non-Hobbesian belief), man’s primary function is to serve as a witness to the covenant with God. Therefore, the belief in God’s transcendence and the Biblical-Quranic covenant with God is the cornerstone of dialogue and the assurance of a constructive dialogue based on moral accountability. Instead of the other way around, God is the path to man. When humans uphold this commitment, their souls are believed to ascend and become blessed. Consequently, man is obliged to assume responsibility since he made the choice to take on trusteeship which implies people should cease killing one another (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 210).

When a country is hit with a terrorist attack, as in the case of the Casablanca attacks in 2003 in Morocco, Ṭāhā believes that the moral responsibility of the attacks belongs to everyone. Ṭāhā claims that these terrorists are impoverished and young people who need to be addressed as both killers (who are instrumentalised by others and zealots) and young, sincere, and helpless individuals (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 214). Only by accepting responsibility for these terrorist attacks as a society and as a government via criticism, open communication, and reform can the nation move ahead (Ṭāhā 2017, p. 215). This demonstrates that, according to Ṭāhā, there are three factors at play in Islamist terrorism: a political aspect, an internal social factor, and a psychological element. However, without singling out any of these factors, he places more focus on the psychological-ethical element although he briefly discusses the political and social response to terrorism, calling for collective accountability.

Ṭāhā has incorporated moral responsibility as a key component of his political and ethical philosophy (Hashas and al-Khatib 2020, p. 14). His publications from the previous ten years make this clear by calling for a sense of accepting responsibility for society and politics to improve the world. For this reason, he decried formalist Islam based on law and theology as well as secularism, which, in his view, both lack emphasis on moral responsibility. In order to overcome religious-political violence, Ṭāhā strives to reintroduce ethics to both the realms of politics and religion. He treated the issue of violence as one that Islamic ethics ought to find answers to, and the absence of which eventually contributes to the growth of violence within individuals and in society.

7. Discussion

Thus far, I have provided an overview of Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s perspective on violence and how to overcome it. In this section, I will highlight some of the limitations and criticisms that could be addressed to his views. First of all, the way Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān frames Islamist terrorism is intra-statist, which means that it does not place the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism into a relational, inter-statist world order that is characterized by a continuous struggle for power on a regional and international level. Joining a terrorist organization is not solely motivated by the ethical-psychological aspect of violence but involves a complex process of recruitment and persuasion by organizations that are typically equipped with media outlets, networks, and financial means that are all mobilized by rational actors to harm specific governments or nations for calculated geopolitical or economic objectives.

Moreover, Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān employs several neologisms and creates a massive number of categories, subcategories, and principles. This pushes his critics, such as Farid Suleiman, to accuse him of making his ideas more complex than they actually are and rendering them unreadable by a larger audience (Suleiman 2021, p. 31). His unique terminology becomes even more noticeable as he discusses political issues of general interest, such as violence. Many young people who still believe that violence is the answer to social and political issues in the Muslim world could benefit from a more accessible, critical, and Islamic discussion of violence. Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s approach to this subject, however, is philosophical in nature and is limited to readers who can comprehend philosophical language in Arabic, as definitions and categories are fundamental to philosophy. Additionally, he attempts to connect his language to the notions of classical Islamic philosophy, which often adds another layer of difficulty for the modern young people who read in Arabic.

Like other advocates of nonviolence, Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān emphasizes dialogue, in all its forms, as the cornerstone of overcoming violence (Birouk 2016; Bevers 2016). He does not, however, promote a liberal and democratic society, which is a prerequisite for modern communicational ethics (Bevers 2017). For the latter to be successful, all people, groups, and individuals, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or identity, should have equal political rights and access to discussion forums. Although dialogue can and has occurred in the Muslim world, ongoing discussions are mostly confrontational between ideologies and doctrines, each of which has developed its own narrative and certain religious justifications and is rarely subject to self-critique or mutual critique in line with a minimum of discourse ethics. Furthermore, although some terrorists can be reached through discussion (as demonstrated by various programs of deradicalization), extreme Islamism has become stronger in recent decades, which signals that its ideology is still effective in persuading a segment of Muslim youth.

Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān clearly underlines the moral responsibility of terrorists as individuals. However, his claim that the society in which a terrorist is born or raised is ethically accountable for inciting violence requires some discussion. The majority of Muslim and non-Muslim societies do not nurture a violent environment or sanction a morally irresponsible set of ideologies that encourage violence. Radical Islamist ideologies have their niches supported by some violent Islamist regimes and militias who are undoubtedly morally responsible for acts of violence committed in the name of Islam. Nevertheless, beyond these places, growing up in Muslim societies, however unjust and uncritical, does not turn violence, committed by certain individuals or groups for political reasons, into a shared moral responsibility.

Another limitation to Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s approach to violence is its paternal-pedagogical understanding of Islamic ethics to be applied in a religious society that is ruled spiritually by God and those in positions of authority who aspire to apply the precepts of the divine. Nonetheless, such a society is ideal, and Muslim cultures today aspire to democracy and are semi-liberal and authoritarian while also sharing with the rest of the world most problems and trends (Obiedat 2022, p. 343). Young people have a strong sense of individualism and constantly challenge authoritarianism and paternal politics. They also display a strong sense of national identity and endorsement of civil laws and institutions while preserving and respecting a layer of Islamic identity that adapts to a globalized modernity. Therefore, beyond Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s conservative Islamic ethics, Muslim thinkers should be able to adapt Islamic ethics to modern nation-states, civil societies, and individualized youth.

Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān has extensively written about reforming or Islamizing modernity (Hallaq 2019). However, his image of society is not all that dissimilar from what moderate Islamist movements envision for Muslim societies. In particular, his opposition to secularism may severely restrict pluralism and individual rights. Islamic ethics cannot continue to recycle the ideological tenets of Islamism as a gentler form of Islamic law and ideology amidst the ongoing serious Muslim crises; instead, Islamic ethics should be post-Islamist and not only a reformed Islamic law and theology (Hakim and Muzammil 2023; Rakhmat 2023; Rohmanu and Rofiah 2023). Currently, Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and many other Muslim intellectuals concentrate on a double critique of radical Islamism and the West. Instead, a triple critique (self-criticism, condemnation of radical Islamist violence, and criticism of imperialist violence that supports and feeds on Islamist violence) should be the foundation of a post-Islamist ethics of nonviolence.

The ethical shift in Islamic thought over the past 20 years or more, of which Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān is arguably one of the most prominent voices, was essential and important in freeing Islamic thought from strict legal regulations and religious absolutism, allowing for a more liberal and individualistic approach to spirituality. The new Muslim ethos, which has been articulated in the majority of Muslim societies as an aspiration toward freedom, individualism, democracy, and secularism, must also be taken into account in the field of Islamic ethics. The Islamic ethical turn should thus take a more pronounced critical stance toward concepts that are taken for granted, such as Islamic society, Islamic state, Islamic community, or Muslim personality, since these ideas are Islamist political myths born in a certain age to react to specific political challenges.

8. Conclusions

As he ascribes violence to Cain’s side of human nature and emphasizes that it is ultimately irrational, one may conclude that Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s core explanation of violence is anthropological. The current surge of violence in the Arab-Muslim world, according to him, is the result of this irrational condition of behavior known as “Cain sedition.” He believes that nonviolence should be the primary strategy in the battle against violence, especially when combined with the following three tools: 1. Respectful dialogue. 2. Ethical admonition 3. Practical wisdom. This solution to religious-political violence consists, thus, in ethical dialogism combined with a sense of assuming responsibility for society and politics.