Trinitarian Ontology of Freedom: David C. Schindler’s Philosophy and Theology of Freedom and Its Political Implications

Abstract

Trinitarian ontology represents a dynamic and fast-evolving field of research in the scope of philosophical theology with a focus on the influence of Trinitarian doctrine on the development of the Western philosophical tradition. Within this framework, this article aims to make a probe into the specific question of freedom within the Christian tradition and Trinitarian teaching. For this purpose, it examines the notion of freedom as it is presented in the work of American philosopher and theologian David C. Schindler. It pursues two lines of argumentation. Firstly, it analyses Schindler’s notion of Christian freedom (as presented in Freedom from Reality and Retrieving Freedom) and brings them into dialogue with other authors grounded in Trinitarian ontology. The key concepts of this part of the paper are the metaphysics of the gift and the primacy of actuality over potency, which both acquire their true meaning in the context of the Trinitarian mystery. The final part of the essay analyses the implications of the Trinitarian ontology of freedom for the life of the political community (as presented in The Politics of the Real and in other texts) and shows how it calls us to the inner of transformation of thought not only at the personal but also at the social level. Here, the full Christian notion of freedom is contrasted with the reductive liberal approach. It analyses the limits of political life based on the autonomy and self-determination of the modern subject and also shows how Schindler’s more original and fuller notion of freedom might contribute to the further development of the project of a Trinitarian ontology and its social and political implications.

1. Introduction

A Trinitarian ontology represents one of the dynamic fields of research in contemporary philosophical theology (Fiedler 2020, pp. 101–23). The main aim of the paper is to make a probe into the notion of freedom in a Trinitarian ontology and bring its conception into dialogue with the work of the American philosopher and theologian David C. Schindler. Schindler’s thought shares in many ways the same metaphysical presupposition as a Trinitarian ontology project, and at the same time, offers a deeper and more systematic treatment of the problem of freedom. Our aim, then, is to look for ways in which Schindler’s work might contribute to the deepening of a Trinitarian ontology of freedom.

Because the main aim of the paper is to bring together a Trinitarian ontology project with Schindler’s own work, it is introduced by the opening section, which overviews the conceptualization of freedom in the work of several important authors in the tradition of a Trinitarian ontology. The paper then proceeds to the analysis of Schindler’s notion of Christian freedom (as presented in his books Freedom from Reality and Retrieving Freedom). The key concepts of this part of the paper are the metaphysics of gift and the primacy of actuality over potency, both of which find their true meaning in the context of the Trinitarian mystery.

The final part of the essay is devoted to the implications of the Trinitarian ontology of freedom for the life of the political community (as presented in Schindler’s The Politics of the Real). Here, the full Christian notion of freedom is contrasted with the reductive liberal approach. It analyses the limits of political life based on the autonomy and self-determination of the modern subject and shows how Schindler’s more original and fuller notion of freedom might contribute to the further development of the project of a Trinitarian ontology and its social and political implications.

So far, Schindler’s work has received a relatively large number of reviews in philosophical and theological journals (Arnold 2019; Foss 2021; Long 2024; Segrest 2019; Spiering 2023; Wells 2018). These reviews generally appreciated the depth of Schindler’s metaphysical thinking that enables him to reconnect political, anthropological, and ontological aspects in his discussion of freedom. Also, the centrality of the categories “symbolical” and “diabolical” for his deconstruction of the modern concept of liberty was perceived as innovative and beneficial for contemporary scholarly debates on freedom. On the other hand, the main objection that has been raised against his conceptualization of freedom concerned its practical application in the situation of (post)modern society. Several reviewers also commented on the supposed limitations of his Neoplatonism, which was found insufficiently deductive. Only one scholarly article has been devoted to Schindler’s work on freedom so far (Macek 2022).

Terminologically, we follow Schindler’s usage of key terms. We use the term “freedom” as a general and comprehensive term, whereas the term “liberty” is used in the context of the modern notion of freedom, as it is almost exclusively used in Schindler’s own texts.

2. Discussion on Freedom in a Trinitarian Ontology

The main aim of the opening section is to propose the argument that a Trinitarian ontology project represents an important framework for analysing and understanding Schindler’s metaphysical notion of freedom. Conversely, it also aims to show certain lacunas in the writing of the authors within a Trinitarian ontology and the possible ways in which Schindler can complement them. So far, a Trinitarian ontology and Schindler’s own work represented rather parallel ways of thinking in contemporary theological philosophy. Yet, they stem from the same theological and philosophical sources, which could and should be put to dialogue. One of these sources is the shared legacy of Hans Urs von Balthasar, to whose philosophy Schindler dedicated his very first book (Schindler 2004).

It was also to Hans Urs von Balthasar that Klaus Hemmerle (1929–1994) dedicated his short treatise, Theses Towards a Trinitarian Ontology. This book launched the Trinitarian ontology project, with its ambitious and yet deeply humble project of renewal of both philosophy and theology from the supposed deadlock of late modernity. The underlying argument of a Trinitarian ontology stipulates that Trinitarian mystery does not determine basic theological principles only but also thoroughly transforms our perception of being, our ontology. And this is precisely what lies at the heart of Schindler’s project of Christian metaphysics of freedom. His ontology of freedom is nourished by this Trinitarian mystery, so we can speak of a genuine Trinitarian ontology of freedom.

One of the core aspects of both a Trinitarian ontology project and Schindler’s work is searching for a proper relation between theology and philosophy. Therefore, this section opens with a discussion on this question. It then presents deliberations on the problem of freedom as we find them in the work of the founder of a Trinitarian ontology, Klaus Hemmerle, and its main contemporary representative, Italian theologian Piero Coda. To them is added John Milbank, who complements their reasoning with a social context of freedom, which is also crucial for Schindler’s project.

2.1. Theology and Philosophy

I would argue that thinking through the mutual relations between theology and philosophy represents a cornerstone of a Trinitarian ontology project. Its fundamental methodological decision is to see those two fields of study not as separated and fully autonomous areas, but as interconnected and mutually enriching ways of relating to fundamental principles of reality, to ontology. Searching for the proper understanding of how we can approach the mystery of being in the light of the Trinitarian mystery furthermore represents the main challenge that Hemmerle faced in his Theses. At the beginning of his treatises, he clearly depicts theology and philosophy as mutually dependent disciplines that are both in need of a renewed Trinitarian ontology, which would enable them to fully grasp their own inner meaning and mission (Hemmerle 2020, pp. 9–13). Similarly, Coda argues that a Trinitarian ontology means reflection of being from a perspective of Christian faith; therefore, in a certain sense it is an introduction of Revelation into philosophical reasoning. Here, theology and philosophy must remain as distinguished and differentiated disciplines, but in such a way that they are open to all sources of reflection of being, including those coming from Revelation (Coda 2012, pp. 165–67). In this manner, the Trinitarian–ontological approach maintains a clear distinction between the language of philosophy and theology, while at the same time remaining aware of the need for a certain relativization of their overconfident autonomy, especially in the sense of a rediscovery of the theological roots of the European philosophical tradition (Bieler 2021, p. 12; Hemmerle 2020, pp. 13–14; Milbank 2006, pp. 1–3).

David C. Schindler takes a similar approach, which also fundamentally shapes his considerations about freedom. In Catholicity of Reason, he notes the close, intrinsic relationship between theology and philosophy, noting that “a proper relationship between philosophy and theology is one in which each opens up to the other in the first place when it is most perfect, a relationship in which philosophy is understood to lie at the heart of theology, and theology to lie in the centre of philosophy.”(Schindler 2013, p. 310). Theology and philosophy are thus two movements of human thought that bring it to fullness and completion, while the fulfilment of the inner meaning of both disciplines also means their free opening to transcendence. In Retrieving Freedom in particular, Schindler concludes that a full understanding of the meaning of freedom not only requires the apparatus of classical metaphysics but must necessarily be supplemented by a theological perspective that goes beyond the often schematic use of the categories of act and potency (Schindler 2022, pp. 7–10). The deepest understanding of freedom, in a sense, the only encounter with freedom as such, is to be found in the Christian elaboration of the classical, ancient tradition.

In the following section, I will depict how the mutual interweaving between philosophy and theology shaped the conception of freedom in a Trinitarian ontology.

2.2. Klaus Hemmerle—Metaphysical Anchoring of Freedom

As already stated, the Trinitarian ontology project was launched by German theologian and philosopher Klaus Hemmerle. He drew inspiration from both the tradition of Christian philosophy in its broad sense and from German idealism and phenomenology. All these sources are reflected in his Theses, which naturally lead him to offer specific reflections of freedom. For our discussion on the relation between a Trinitarian ontology and the work of David C. Schindler, they are particularly important because they claim a clearly metaphysical anchoring of the notion of freedom, yet through a specific Trinitarian transformation of metaphysics. Therefore, we can observe here basic principles such as the conceptualization of freedom through the categories of act and potency, which are further elaborated by Schindler, as well as the key concept of gift as a main precondition for freedom.

Hemmerle’s reflections on freedom proceed from the basic premise of a Trinitarian ontology, which can be formulated as an answer to the question of how “the fundamental human experiences and fundamental understandings of God, the world and human beings altered when faith in Jesus Christ breaks upon them.” (Hemmerle 2020, p. 23). The answer to this question is founded in self-giving—a giving that is the inner rhythm of divine love that establishes God’s relationship to man and also interpersonal human relationships (Hemmerle 2020, p. 35). The rhythm of agape and the actuality of gift, which precede and initiate any free human activity, thus form the basic metaphysical requirements of human freedom.

The cataphatic and apophatic rhythm of Divine Being can be best expressed in a form of analogy, which makes another cornerstone of Hemmerle’s thinking (Hemmerle 2020, pp. 45–49). Thinking through analogy protects our reasoning against any form of unilateral extremes. Obviously, Hemmerle was not the first Catholic thinker who introduced this concept into Catholic theology and philosophy in the 20th century. In this place, we can refer to the legacy of Erich Przywara, who might have contributed in the most significant way to the development of a modern concept of analogy. As Przywara pointed out in Analogia entis, analogy, based on Trinitarian metaphysics, has the power to overcome reductive philosophical conceptions of identity and dialectics—it “transforms defiant isolation into humble self-differentiation and the passionate demand for fusion into loving self-surrender” (Przywara 1962, p. 103).

From this perspective, the approach of a Trinitarian ontology does not appear as a simple appeal to freedom as autonomy and independence without further distinction, as might be suggested in the texts of Piero Coda. On the contrary, a Trinitarian ontology reminds us of the importance of proper differentiation that can prevent us from falling into excessive one-sidedness; from getting stuck, in Pryzwara’s words, in a pure logic of identity or pure dialectics, in overwhelming totality or total separation. And it enables us to conceptualize freedom both as a personal autonomy and metaphysical gift.

Hemmerle does not offer more subtle or nuanced reflections on freedom. But his thought on this point does recall the reflections of one of the great Orthodox theologians of the twentieth century, Sergei Bulgakov, who in his writings on the relationship between created reality and God the Creator clearly emphasises that the tension between freedom and necessity can be discussed only in relation to created being. Whereas in God everything is equally necessary and free, and therefore the distinction between freedom and necessity here tends to obscure the proper understanding of the divine Being (Bulgakov 2004, p. 62; for more detailed discussion on the problem of creaturely freedom in Bulgakov’s thought, cf. Gallaher 2024, pp. 381–408).

It would seem, therefore, that a Trinitarian ontology of freedom cannot be a naive acceptance of the idea of freedom without further differentiation. Rather, what unfolds before us is the drama of the relationship between the finite freedom of created being and the infinite freedom of God. A drama that in many ways transcends the understanding of freedom as pure indeterminacy, as an escape from the constraints of all heteronomously given norms. Freedom in the perspective of a Trinitarian ontology is directed towards transcending the dichotomy between freedom and necessity, between dialectic and identity (Gallaher 2016). The phenomenon of gift and self-giving, which, as we have already noted, lies at the heart of Hemmerle’s reflections on a Trinitarian ontology, radically redraws the split between any dialectical dichotomies and leads us to an understanding of freedom as the discovery of a source of fullness, an actuality that makes possible the realization of the various potentialities of human life.

2.3. Piero Coda—Freedom as Personal Liberation

The problem of freedom lies also at the heart of the theological project of Piero Coda, maybe the most important current representative of a Trinitarian ontology school of thought and the author of Manifesto of a Trinitarian Ontology (Coda 2021). For Coda, the question of freedom is primarily connected with the inner disposition of the human person entering into the mystery of the Triune God. If, along with Coda, a Trinitarian ontology is understood in the broadest sense as a change in the place from which we interpret the reality of the world and the reality of being (Coda 2012, p. 161), or as the adoption of a perspective resulting from the radical newness of the event of Jesus Christ (Coda 2012, p. 165), then we can understand freedom primarily as a transformation of the inner life; that is, as a liberation of our experience and thought from all narrow and binding paradigms and perspectives.

Coda here follows the ideas set out by Pope Francis in his encyclical Laudato si, which calls for an inner experience of transformation of thought not only at the personal but also at the social level: “The human person grows more, matures more and is sanctified more to the extent that he or she enters into relationships, going out from themselves to live in communion with God, with others and with all creatures. In this way, they make their own that Trinitarian dynamism which God imprinted in them when they were created. Everything is interconnected, and this invites us to develop a spirituality of that global solidarity which flows from the mystery of the Trinity.” (Pope Francis 2015, 240). The conversion to freedom pits man against all functionalist, calculating, and technocratic rationality (Coda 2021, p. 42) and teaches him to see and interpret reality in a free, unselfish, and convivial way (Coda 2020b, p. 20). The experience and practice of an open and integral ontology thus leads us to an understanding of freedom that is not primarily a self-affirmation but also a gift of self (Coda 2021, pp. 53–56).

Although Coda emphasises freedom as a personal liberation, he is at the same time well aware that freedom is not just a matter of human subjectivity, but it is an encounter with the reality of being in the world and with the reality of uncreated Being. Coda sums this up succinctly by saying that the Trinity itself is freedom (Coda 2020a, p. 456). Freedom thus does not mean a mere affirmation of the self-sufficiency of substance, but it is intrinsically connected to relationality and self-giving (Ratzinger 1968, pp. 142–44). Freedom is the fundamental act in the Trinity, in which being can be identified with relationality and agape. The freedom of intra-Trinitarian relations then spills over into the relation of God to the world, the free act of creation ex nihilo, and the freedom of Christ (Pospíšil 2019, pp. 105–35). Knowledge and experience of true freedom, therefore, necessarily links human intersubjectivity and reciprocity to the act of Christ’s freedom in the light of the agapic ontology of the Trinity.

2.4. John Milbank—Social Dimension of Freedom

We will conclude this introductory overview with a brief comment on the work of the eminent Anglican theologian John Milbank. Milbank was chosen here to illustrate an ecumenical character of a Trinitarian ontology project. He is also currently, along with Coda, one of the most important senior contributors to this project (Milbank 2025). Apart from that, his insights might be helpful in unfolding another dimension of freedom—its primarily social character.

Like Hemmerle, Milbank consistently develops a metaphysics of the gift as the basic starting point of all Trinitarian metaphysics (Hrabovecký 2024, pp. 10–18; Milbank 1995, 2015). However, another aspect of his thought is also important to our theme of a Trinitarian ontology of freedom. In the conclusion of his seminal book, Theology and Social Theory, he presents a comprehensive view of the Christian understanding of ontology, essentially a counter-ontology based on reflection of the practice of the church and of a Christian counter-ethics that grows out of the Word of God and God’s action in salvation history. In this regard, a Trinitarian ontology is intrinsically reflected in the life of the Church, and it has a fundamentally ecclesial character (Hemmerle 2020, pp. 63–67). In a Christian context, metaphysical thinking can never be a project of individual speculation (Milbank 2006, p. 404). It always has an essentially social dimension, and in this sense, social ontology is both a description and a prescription of the life of the Church (Milbank 2006, p. 429).

Thus, if we want to further develop our reflections on a Trinitarian ontology of freedom, we must always keep in mind its social dimension. In the following sections, we will be concerned not primarily with freedom in the sense of individual independence but with freedom that empowers the community to live in truth, goodness, and beauty. Or, in Milbank’s words, in three basic components of Christian counter-ontology: the priority of the creative giving of existence and thus of difference, the reconciliation of difference with virtue, and the treatment of peace as primary reality along with the denial of an always preceding violence (Milbank 2006, p. 429).

3. Metaphysics of Freedom in the Work of D. C. Schindler

In the preceding account of the relation of Trinitarian ontology to freedom, we have outlined the basic lines of reasoning through which Trinitarian metaphysics approaches the phenomenon of freedom; that is, we have noted the central place that freedom occupies in the intra-divine, Trinitarian relations and in the relation of God to creation. At the same time, we have pointed out that the categories of gift and relationality go beyond the simple dichotomies of freedom and necessity, dialectic and identity, and take the whole problem to a new, deeper level. In the last step, we emphasized that a Trinitarian ontology of freedom is essentially connected to a social ontology. From the perspective of a Trinitarian ontology, freedom is not a matter of individual determination, but of a shared pursuit of the common good as it is manifested par excellence in the life of the Church. However, despite the importance of the individual contributions of the discussed authors, they do not offer a systematic analysis of the outlined issues and problems.

In the central part of our text, we will therefore focus on the contemporary American philosopher and theologian David C. Schindler, who perhaps most consistently develops the framework for the Christian metaphysical interpretation of freedom. We will focus our attention on two comprehensive works, Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty and Retrieving Freedom: The Christian Appropriation of Classical Tradition, which will be supplemented with other texts by Schindler devoted both to the general problem of the relationship between Christian thought, theology, and philosophy and to specific questions of political and social philosophy.

Our exposition of Schindler’s conception of freedom will proceed in two main steps: Firstly, we will situate Schindler’s position within a broader framework of current discussions on freedom, and in this context, we will present his general critique of what he perceives as a modern, liberal conception of freedom. Secondly, we will turn our attention to the problem of potency and act, which represents the core of Schindler’s argument.

The foundation of Schindler’s argument, which runs throughout all of his texts on freedom, is the emphasis on the metaphysical anchoring of freedom. Schindler understands freedom primarily as a human inner capacity to reach the fullness of reality, to grow towards the good. (Schindler 2017, pp. 290–91) This understanding of freedom is evident already in its etymological roots as in the Greek, Latin, and Anglo-Saxon languages. In the discussion of the etymology of eleutheria, libertas, and freó, Schindler emphasises two intertwined levels of meaning. Firstly, these terms originally referred to the origin of man, to his belonging to a people or to a city; in this sense, freedom alludes to growing from the same stock. Secondly, there is a shared reference to flourishing, growth, and abundance. In these etymological considerations, we can observe the basic tendencies of Schindler’s conceptualization of freedom. It is not focused that much on personal autonomy, but rather on the growth to goodness, on flourishing of the human person, which arises from the good that is already given (Schindler 2017, pp. 286–93).

Here, Schindler thus represents a somewhat different perspective from that in which most contemporary discussions on free will are situated. Therefore, before proceeding to present the basic outlines of Schindler’s concept of freedom, we will pause briefly on his relation to current debates and his critique of modern conceptions of freedom.

Contemporary discussion on the freedom of the human will, especially in Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy, is framed in four basic perspectives: determinism, which holds that there is only one physically possible future based on determination by natural laws; compatibilism, which points out that free action and moral responsibility are compatible with a deterministic approach to reality; incompatibilism, which takes the opposite position, that free and ethical action is incompatible with determinism; and finally, libertarianism, which combines the perspective of incompatibilism with the thesis that some people act freely and are morally responsible for what they do (Furlong 2019, pp. 34–59; Inwagen 1983, pp. 55–152; Kane 2005, pp. 12–39; Mele 2006, pp. 3–6).

Schindler’s critique of the libertarian concept of freedom, based primarily on an analysis of the work of John Locke but also of Immanuel Kant and other classics of modern philosophy, shows that the whole discussion of the relationship between compatibilism and libertarianism must be understood within the broader framework of the transformation of metaphysical thought in Enlightenment philosophy. In relation to Locke, Schindler is primarily concerned with an analysis of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. From a comparison of the first and second editions of this work, he concludes that in Locke we can observe not only a shift from the compatibilist position to libertarianism, but above all that the internal logic of Locke’s thought makes it possible to maintain both directions simultaneously. At the heart of Locke’s conception of freedom, which Schindler sees as the paradigmatic formula for the modern understanding of freedom in general, is a tendency towards the suspension and subversion of the self. This is a conception of freedom without an internal metaphysical anchor; that is, it is an understanding of freedom free from any reference to a general, ultimate good, which naturally leads to a conception of freedom as merely the rational control of one’s own actions. Such freedom can therefore no longer be, as in the classical understanding, the unfolding of a given actuality, but only the negation of everything positively given. Here, the power of suspension and the constant revision of all the potentialities of lived reality become the ultimate source of freedom (Schindler 2017, p. 59). Within this framework, then, compatibilism and libertarianism, both of which understand freedom primarily in relation to power, which has no relation to ontological actuality, are but two sides of the same coin.

Act and Potency

The categories of act and potency form the basis of Schindler’s metaphysically anchored concept of freedom. Here, Schindler draws on the Aristotelian categories of dynamis and energeia, but he also shows how the Aristotelian metaphysical system was transformed by Christian influences. In many ways, he follows the analogous thinking of Erich Przywara, who has shown how our understanding of Aristotelian categories is deepened and culminates in and through Christian thought. This is exemplified by Augustine, for whom human potentiality becomes a “free gift from above”, set free to serve freely (Przywara 1962, p. 134). Schindler proceeds along the same lines and in a similar direction.

Schindler argues in favour of the interconnectedness of the classical ancient tradition and the Christian, especially patristic and medieval philosophy, which he contrasts with the legacy of modern philosophy. The turning point, according to him, comes with the nominalism of the High Middle Ages. It is the rejection of the actuality and ontological reality of the created order in nominalism which opens the way to the absolutization of potentiality. It is later fully manifested in the philosophy of the Enlightenment and in the classical liberalism of John Locke (Schindler 2021, p. 27).

To understand the true meaning of the categories of act and potency, we must go back from Locke to classical Aristotelian metaphysics. One of its basic principles states that potentiality and the ability to act is conditioned by prior actuality. Pure, absolute potentiality is therefore rather a perversion or distortion of the order of actuality—a situation which Schindler describes as a diabolical understanding of reality (Schindler 2017, pp. 151–71). Actuality, according to Aristotle, always precedes potency logically and ontologically, and in a sense, chronologically. But actuality not only precedes and enables potency; it is also the final state to which the potency is reduced (Schindler 2017, pp. 325–31). Potency is thus situated between two levels of actuality and cannot be separated from the order of actuality.

The fundamental dependence of potency on the act also reveals another key aspect of the metaphysical understanding of freedom. Any change that underlies free action does not take place only on a horizontal level, as an actualization of our immanent potentiality, but is always based on a prior, fundamental vertical relationship. Change always implies movement in the vertical sense, whether as a descent of actuality into potency or as an ascent of potency to a higher level of actuality. The reality of our world and its mutability is thus never merely the change of one thing into another but always manifests and reveals a higher metaphysical order of reality (Schindler 2017, p. 329; Schindler 2021, pp. xv–xvii).

In the classical tradition, represented in Schindler’s work on Plato and Aristotle, freedom is therefore not understood as a mechanistic process of change, be it in a deterministic or libertarian mode, but is always brought into relation with a prior, higher fullness—the Good. At the same time, freedom is not understood as external independence, the creation of a space of personal autonomy, but rather as a descent into one’s own interiority. Free activity related to the metaphysical good is always at the same time the unfolding of the inner fullness of human life. Truly good and free action is not merely the fulfilment of an external, heteronomous order, but emerges from the fullness of the human soul, which seeks to encounter an external reality different from itself (Schindler 2017, p. 352). The acceptance of the gift of goodness and freedom enables and leads to truly good human action.

4. Freedom in the Christian Tradition

Following his more philosophical exploration in Freedom from Reality, Schindler turns to a dialogue between philosophy and theology in Retrieving Freedom, the second part of his intended trilogy on the problem of freedom. Here, his main task is to demonstrate the transformative power of Christian theology on philosophical conceptions of freedom. Schindler argues that in the genealogical sense, the most fundamental rupture in the Western tradition is not between classical and modern concepts of freedom as shown in Freedom from Reality, but between the Christian tradition that embodies a fullness of freedom and others, which are either a preparation or derivation of it, but are nevertheless always in some way incomplete. Proceeding from his methodological considerations about the relationship between philosophy and theology, he claims that the philosophical searching for freedom comes to its completion only when it encounters theology. It was Christianity that placed the idea of freedom in the very centre of its doctrine, to the extent that Schindler refers to it as “the very essence of Christianity.” (Schindler 2022, p. 3).

Schindler opens his study of the Christian notion of freedom in the moment when the tradition of Neoplatonism, culminating in the philosophy of Plotinus, begins to be transformed in contact with the categories of Christian theological thought as the most important moment of encounter between the classical antique tradition and Christianity (Ivánka 1964). What follows is an extensive commentary that covers the major figures of ancient and medieval Christian thought—Augustine, Maximus Confessor, Pseudo-Dionysius the Aeropagite, Anselm of Canterbury, Bernard of Clairvaux, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus, and Godfrey of Fontaines. Its main aim is to show how the basic categories of theological thought—especially the mystery of the Incarnation and the mystery of the Holy Trinity—fulfil and bring to perfection the inner meaning of the classical metaphysical heritage. In the spirit of Przywara’s analogical thinking (Przywara 1962, pp. 163–202; more specifically analysis of Aquinas’ notion of analogy, pp. 171–73) Schindler maintains that the Christian transformation does not consist in destroying the classical metaphysics grounded in nature, but elevates it above itself: “A basic principle of freedom as taken up and transformed in Christianity is that the excess beyond nature that freedom represents nevertheless always occurs in and through nature.” (Schindler 2022, p. 35).

The twin themes of the relationship between the metaphysical and existential understanding of freedom run through Schindler’s analysis. He thus follows the two main dimensions of freedom that were outlined in the first part of this article—freedom conceptualized as a fruit of a metaphysical order of being and freedom seen as personal liberation. Schindler expands and refines both of these dimensions and offers valuable contributions to the work of the aforementioned authors.

Schindler sees the Christian concept of freedom as a creative synthesis of Greek and Jewish philosophical and religious thought. In his conception of the spiritual history of Europe, these two streams represent the necessary preconditions of Christian Revelation. But it is only in Christianity that the presuppositions implied in these two spiritual traditions are fully realized and completed (Schindler 2022, pp. 7–47). From this point of view, the mystery of the Trinity also represents a certain consummation of the inner tendencies of the Greek and Jewish legacies, represented on the Greek side by the emphasis on the good and the natural and on the Jewish side by the emphasis on covenant, will, and history. Schindler finds in the mystery of the Trinity the union of the two perspectives: the Trinity is “the infinite perfection of self-diffusive goodness and covenantal bond, a matter of being/nature and a matter of personal will”. For this reason, the Trinity forms the heart of the Christian concept of freedom (Schindler 2022, p. 41).

The Trinitarian mystery transforms fundamental questions related to the issue of freedom, usually expressed as the problem of a relation between free human choice and predestination. Following to a certain extent Bulgakov’s argumentation sketched in the first part of the article, Schindler shows how an idea of creation, which is the gift of Trinitarian love, shapes a completely unique comprehension of the concept of choice. Creation, in the Christian understanding, is not merely the realization of potential love, as would be the case if God did not have a beloved and loving Other in Himself. Rather, it is the gift of the whole community of love of the Father, Son, and Spirit, a fullness that in a sense transcends all actuality and potentiality. The Christian understanding of freedom, therefore, confronts us with a certain paradox of “superactuality”, which again reflects Przywara’s understanding of an analogy that is both in and beyond nature.

According to Schindler, it is precisely the term “superactuality” that reflects on the specific contribution of Christianity to the transformation of classical Greek heritage. “Superactuality” might be defined as exceeding any dichotomy between act and potency. In this sense, actuality is not the mere absence of all potency, but it is actuality that transcends this opposition and suggests that God is prior to this distinction. It also conveys the fact that God cannot be understood as a blind power determining the existence of the Universe, but rather as a generous Creator. Therefore, “the freedom that God is is not an empty power to accomplish what it wills, or by contrast the already-completed accomplishment itself, but the perfection of both at once—potent actuality and superactual potency”. (Schindler 2022, p. 74).

The actuality grounded in the Trinitarian mystery stands simultaneously in the actuality of nature but, at the same time, transcends any polarity of act and potency. The reflection of this superpotent actuality, which goes beyond classical Greek metaphysics, places before us a reality of radical magnanimity and generosity. It is in these moments—intelligible only through the mystery of the Trinity and the mystery of the Incarnation—that the deepest sources and fundamental contours of the Christian understanding of freedom are revealed.

The human response to the gift of creation and to God’s love, from which this generosity—the superactuality of God’s gift—springs, can be only a personal response. For, as Schindler notes, only a person can respond to what is offered as a personal gift. At the heart of free choice, then, lies not the possibility of choosing among the different options, but precisely the human personality, his capacity to give a personal response to the revelation of the communion of the persons of God.

In the following section, I will illustrate these general considerations on two examples from the history of Christian tradition. From a number of Christian thinkers Schindler analyses in his book, I have chosen those that most touch on the relationship between the mystery of the Trinity and freedom. Therefore, the Trinitarian dimension of freedom will be explored on the examples of Augustine and Bonaventure.

4.1. Augustine

The impact of the Trinitarian doctrine on the conceptualization of freedom can be well observed by comparing the first two thinkers Schindler discusses in his book—Plotinus and Augustine. Schindler appreciates Plotinus for his treatment of what he calls “the first metaphysics of freedom” and for being the first of the ancient philosophers to reflect explicitly on the First Principle in itself and not merely in its action in relation to the world. But he concludes his assessment of Plotinus with the assertion that we cannot speak of any real, substantive relationality in Plotinus; we do not find love between God and his creatures in the form of a mutual, reciprocal relationship: “The proper end of life is ‘being alone with Alone’”. (Schindler 2022, p. 82).

In contrast, Augustine’s notion of freedom and free will is fully Trinitarian. Whereas for Plotinus, God, who is freedom itself and absolute unoriginality, is also absolute nonreceptivity, Augustine’s Trinitarian thinking leads to the idea that God is indeed absolutely unoriginated, but also begotten. With regard to man, the relationality that lies at the basis of the Trinitarian mystery means above all that love does not have its origin in the human soul, as in Plato, but is offered to the soul as something that is already perfect (Schindler 2022, p. 87). Freedom, therefore, in the Augustinian perspective, is, above all, man’s participation in the relationship of God to his creation. Freedom, in this understanding, is a radically relational category. It cannot, therefore, be understood primarily as a space of personal self-realization, as we find in the libertarian paradigm of Locke and other modern thinkers, but as a participation in a network of reciprocal relationships. Free will is our ability to give a response to the gift of God’s love. This response is also always a personal, intimate relationship to reality, to the actual order of being. One is no longer “alone with the Alone” but always enters into the drama of love with the one in whom the Other is totally Other (Schindler 2022, p. 106).

Here again, we see how the Christian understanding of freedom transcends the modern paradigms of determinism, voluntarism, and libertarianism. Although Augustine anchors the freedom of the human will in relation to God, grounding it in the primacy of God’s gift to man and understanding it as a human response to that gift, he certainly does not deprive man of the ability to dispose of himself. On the contrary, the capacity for free choice is at the heart of Augustine’s thought. However, we must reiterate that it is not primarily a mechanism of choice, but the power to choose well. The capacity to choose is not a choice between good and evil, but the power to choose the good (Schindler 2022, p. 97; in the same vein, Dominican theologian Servais Pinckaers spoke about freedom for excellence, Pinckaers 1995, pp. 354–78). Freedom is thus both a gift from God as well as a personal drama and inner struggle.

4.2. Bonaventure

Schindler finds the most sophisticated Trinitarian ontology of freedom in the work of St. Bonaventure. He considers Bonaventure, along with Thomas Aquinas, to be, in a sense, the supreme thinkers of the Christian tradition, offering “the two most comprehensive interpretations of the universe as seen by Christians.” (Gilson 1938, p. 495, quoted in Schindler 2022, p. 203). While Aquinas is more open in his approach to sources outside his own tradition, first and foremost Aristotle, in Bonaventure we find what Schindler calls the “superabundant self-sufficiency in the Christian tradition”, a radically Trinitarian and Christologically oriented thought.

Bonaventure follows the Augustinian conception of freedom as liberum arbitrium, which proceeds from the requirement of a free human personal response to God’s personal relationship of love towards his creation. In Bonaventure’s conception, however, free will is not just one of the human potencies, a separated force, but the whole of the human soul, which is capable of movement from itself to another. Free choice, then, arises from an integrated whole of the soul that includes both intellect and will. In Bonaventure’s thought, therefore, liberum arbitrium is characterized primarily as the congruence of intellect and will, with great emphasis on the ordered unity of these two powers. In his case, then, it is not mainly a question of the will, but of a broader understanding of freedom that involves the soul as a whole, to the extent that “the self-involvement of the whole soul is the very point of freedom.” (Schindler 2022, p. 217). The meaning and goal of freedom is love, towards which the whole of the human soul is directed; it is an overflowing generosity in which man gives himself in the supreme exchange of love.

Bonaventure’s anthropology, at the heart of which is the doctrine of the human soul and freedom, therefore mirrors his theology. In the depth of human existence, in its orientation towards love, towards a personal relationship with the other, is reflected the mystery of the inner life of God. The unity of the human soul that integrates reason and will analogously reflects the Trinitarian doctrine in which the plurality of God’s persons does not compete with the absolute unity of God. For this reason, we can speak of Bonaventure’s conception of freedom as essentially Trinitarian, a truly Trinitarian ontology of freedom. A consistently Trinitarian understanding of God allows Bonaventure to integrate the primacy he gives to the self-diffusiveness of the good with the personal categories of generosity and liberality. This approach reveals a perfectly free community of God’s persons in which potency (God’s essence) and actuality (hypostasia) are in harmony and mutually conditional. Here again, the superactual and superpotential source of freedom is shown as the internally ordered, absolute expression of the mutual love of the persons of God.

Bonaventure, along with Thomas Aquinas, as some of the greatest thinkers of the Christian tradition, confront us with a complex and often paradoxical concept of human freedom that springs fully from the depths of the Trinitarian mystery. In it, freedom emerges as the central gift that Christianity brings to the whole world. As Schindler notes at the end of his interpretation of the work of Thomas Aquinas, it was only a later development that brought about the disintegration of the original complexity that was able to combine the determinacy of the human person by the goodness based on the “superactuality” of God’s nature with the freedom of human relationships based on love.

5. Christian Freedom and Political Freedom

What are the implications of the fully Christian and Trinitarian understanding of freedom for the political and social reality of the contemporary world? I would like to conclude the article with a few remarks drawn from Schindler’s extensive critique of liberalism. Echoing Milbank’s notion of a Christian social ontology, Schindler underlines the fundamental social essence of freedom. Following Augustine, Schindler notes that a fully Christian vision of human life is not a vision of a solitary human being searching for the ultimate meaning of his or her life but rather a vision of communal conversation—the ascent of the human soul to God is enabled by the existence of a community, a kingdom, by and through the City of God (Schindler 2022, p. 108). This idea has clear political implications that Schindler develops in his profound account of the weakness of liberal political principles in The Politics of the Real.

Firstly, in the context of his discussion on the act and potency, Schindler argues that a community cannot emerge from a simple aggregation of its individual parts. A community does not originate as the sum of individuals but is always a reflection of the prior reality of a greater common good (Schindler 2021, p. 84). In contrast, individual autonomy and liberty constitute fundamental elements of a liberal political theory (Manent 1994, pp. 114–17). For Schindler, this individual, liberal notion of freedom is not sufficient for the creation of a sustainable communal life. Only the idea of freedom that is ultimately bound to the concept of the common good in its fullest possible terms is able to serve as a solid foundation for the life of society. As Schindler notes, the ultimate common good is the Trinitarian God of Christ: “The fullness of freedom and faith defined as belonging to a whole greater than the sum of its part, is possible only by virtue of the reality of God as given actually in Christ.” (Schindler 2021, p. 86). However, this more profound notion of freedom should not be understood as neglect or even destruction of individuality as such. The broad tradition inspired by the social doctrine of the Catholic Church strives to harmonise common good with the dignity of each individual human life. Moreover, the Christian idea of a common good based on faith in the Triune good leads to the conclusion that true individuality requires relationality. Experience of the common good shared in community is then the result of the dynamic of individual freedoms that strengthen each other and bear witness to their common source (Baroš 2025, pp. 363–79).

How could we then imagine an impact of a Trinitarian ontology on social life in more concrete and practical terms? Before anything else, it is crucial to realize that Trinity and the mystery of divine inner life cannot be used as a mechanical or utilitarian model for the organization of social or political life. As Karen Kilby correctly warns, the danger of a projection of our political and social models up to the heavens and the threat of using the mystery of Trinity to justify our own political ideologies is always present (Kilby 2000, pp. 432–45). Therefore, I am convinced that all the reasoning about the importance of shared common good and an ultimate foundation of this common good in the Trinitarian doctrine should not be understood as a concrete model or scheme for the organization of politics and society. I believe that Schindler, in his philosophical project, aims for something more profound. He strives to discover inner metaphysical sources of reality that enable the very existence of social life. Maybe the ultimate lesson he can provide for us is the realization that communal life is not a mere product of human activity or any kind of social construction, but always, in one way or another, a reflection of a gift of reality that is given prior to any action. Therefore, the main aim of this project is not an extrinsic exercise of power of religious authority over the natural political body. On the contrary, it simply observes that in order to bring a natural political order to its perfection, we need to be aware of the supernatural sources of this order. Otherwise, we will end up locked in a world of immanent and utopian political ideologies.

So, what is, finally, the main political implication of Schindler’s project of retrieving the Christian tradition of freedom? I am convinced that it is a realization that freedom in its full sense is not only a means for the empowerment of individual potentialities; on the contrary, it is the end of human life itself, the actual ontological status human beings strive for. Therefore, society needs such a structure of political institutions that enables the realization of this end. As Schindler repeatedly notes, our individual values do not result only from our individual, personal reflections, but they always reflect a common horizon embodied in the structure of political institutions: “Political institutions form the souls of individuals, because they gather them together into a community through defining human good.” (Schindler 2021, p. 192). In order to guarantee this, society must avoid, on the one hand, the danger of relativistic scepticism, which does not recognize the existence of a common good, and, on the other hand, the approach of Catholic integralism, which seeks to create the Christian social order by the extrinsic coercion of social life. I would conclude that the main aim of Schindler’s work is to pursue a third alternative, which would enable society to find the full meaning of freedom in social life while avoiding the dangers of coercive authoritarianism. For Schindler, the way forward lies in recovering the fullness of the Western tradition. First and foremost, this means rediscovering the fullness of Christian freedom, which might be defined as “a liberation from all that would separate us from God, not only in the theological sense of idolatry, or in the moral sense of sin, but also in the philosophical conception of reality that blind us to the original and originating reality of God and in the political sense of a liberation from the institutional organization of our common life premised on a denial of the truth of God.” (Schindler 2021, p. 190).

6. Conclusions

In a few concluding remarks, I would like to address an objection about the practical feasibility of Schindler’s project. Is it not a vision detached from the world, too abstract and distant to have any real implications? We can react to such a reasoning in several ways: it would be, for instance, possible to argue that any new political vison at first seems rather utopian and impractical. But I believe that the real importance of Schindler’s thought, along with the whole Trinitarian ontology project, is different. It does not want to offer instant models and mechanical solutions. It rather points out that renewal of social and political life cannot be based on a pure critique of the existing social systems and the endless expansion of human potential, neither can it be a deterministic application of the actuality of being. Analogical thinking enables us to avoid any one-sided solutions and understandings of freedom as free and non-identical differentiation, and at the same time, a flourishing and completion of intersubjective bonds and relations. It is the connection and co-existence of identity and freedom, actuality and potentiality, which lies at the heart of a Trinitarian ontology, and I am convinced that we are not able to find any other source, at least in our own Western tradition, which could offer such a complex and integrating vision of reality. Therefore, we do not need a Trinitarian ontology as another political ideology or practical political programme, but we need it because it offers, in Schindler’s words, “retrieving freedom”. It brings a vision of ontology that is in a full sense deeply realistic, and at the same time, it represents completion and fulfilment of freedom.