Violence and Organized Crime Among Palestinians in Israel: Searching for a Savior

Abstract

This article explores the rise of organized crime and violence within the Palestinian community in Israel, focusing on the past two decades. It examines the internal fragmentation of the community, Israeli policies that exacerbated these divisions, and the impact of these factors on the surge in criminal activity. The article further analyzes community responses, highlighting faith-based initiatives like the Committee for Spreading Peace (CSP), led by Sheikh Raed Salah. This initiative, although limited in resources, seeks to address the cycle of violence through prevention, mediation, and collaboration with local authorities in Israel. However, the CSP faces significant challenges, including distrust in Israeli government efforts and the deep-rooted involvement of criminal organizations in local politics. The article concludes that while initiatives like CSP offer hope, a more comprehensive and collaborative approach is needed to effectively combat organized crime and restore community cohesion. Such approaches will also have implications for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and possible future community-based initiatives.

1. Introduction

Many studies captured the role of religious institutions in enhancing informal social control and reducing community-based violence by fostering social cohesion through after-school programming, violence reduction skills and seminars, and reentry programs for former offenders (Clear et al. 2001). The religious agencies in such efforts deploy their moral, social, and institutional dimensions of religious influence to counter community-based violence and to organize (Garcia-Ruiz and Torralba 2018). Such studies identified religious leaders as moral regulators, role models of leadership and character-building, and social cohesion facilitators. In some examples, Columbian Catholic priests directly confronted drug cartel leaders and operators in their local communities (Leech 2009).

Cases of effective initiatives in confronting organized crime and community-based violence are well documented around the world, especially the many intervention programs targeting urban gang violence (Dodson et al. 2011). For example, in early 2010, the Chicago project and Columbus, Ohio, faith-based intervention reported a significant drop in homicide among youth after the local religious leaders stepped in and offered to host such intervention initiatives. Deanna Wilkinson (2020), a Professor at Ohio State University, evaluated such faith-based programs and concluded the following:

“Urban gun violence is an entrenched but not intractable problem, evidence shows. Since the 1990s, community anti-violence initiatives—many of them run out of churches—have reduced crime locally, at least temporarily, by “interrupting” potential violence before it happens”.

(Wilkinson 2020)1

The main principle in such programs is building the commitment of local community leaders to stand up and invest their efforts into stopping the violence in their community, with the support of certain credible religious or moral authorities. Another principle of Cure Violence (previously called Chicago CeaseFire and established in 1999) is strong support from the local authorities. When such support was weak, such programs could not be sustained.

Variations of the above program, “CeaseFire”, were also run by law enforcement, public health experts, and hospitals in New York, Boston, and Cincinnati. Such programs have also been substantially reduced. These successful initiatives, including Chicago CeaseFire, were ultimately scaled back or terminated due to a lack of sustained funding (Wilkinson 2020).

According to Johnson (2001), African American churches had a moderating effect in reducing serious crime among Black youth. Religious involvement of youth was found to have a significant buffering effect on serious crime, particularly in high-disorder neighborhoods, where Black youth with higher religious involvement reported lower levels of serious crime. This moderating effect was not observed for minor crimes. Overall, religious involvement appears to mitigate the impact of neighborhood disorder on serious crime but does not have the same effect on general or minor crime. Nevertheless, according to Johnson (2001), African American churches should not be overlooked as a preventive and protective factor against serious youth crime.

In another report on the work of a Christian priest in the Caribbean who organized his community to confront youth community-based violence, his intervention is described by Maguire and Gordon (2015) as follows: “The faith community constitutes a vital resource with the potential to contribute in unique ways to preventing or reducing gang violence” (p. 310). “Faith leaders are often unique in their ability to navigate the community in ways most people simply cannot. They often hold a special place in the hearts of community residents by their important role as spiritual advisors and their key role in the community’s most intimate rituals” (p. 312).

Similar recognition of the effect of faith-based intervention is reported by Milam et al. (2018), who conducted a study of two neighborhoods in Baltimore City, Maryland, USA. They indicated that “The Safe Streets Program is being implemented in several neighborhoods in Baltimore… We suspect that changes in attitudes about violence and subsequent shifts in community norms around violence will account for overall reductions in shootings and homicides” (p. 3827).

The effect of faith-based intervention is also captured in the prison system.2 “Faith-based prison programs reduce recidivism by instilling spiritual responsibility and lasting moral influence on prisoners within prison culture. These programs transform prison culture from a space that encourages the continuation of criminal conduct to one that promotes positive change” (p. 2). “Research suggests that regular visits to prisoners from clergy were correlated with lowering the rate of reconviction by 24%. Faith-based programs provide mentorship, moral guidance, and spiritual renewal, which helps inmates reintegrate into society and reduce recidivism” (p. 12).

Faith-based interventions to counter violence have even developed manuals and tool kits to counter community-based violence, such as “Faith and Communities in Action: A Resource Guide for Increasing Partnership Opportunities to Prevent Crime and Violence”. The main assumption underlying these tools is that faith-based organizations and community groups bring a unique set of skills and assets to the table, such as spiritual authority, convening power, and the ability to connect with disconnected and marginalized individuals. Faith-based stakeholders serve as vital bridges between the community and law enforcement, offering a neutral ground for conflict resolution and restorative justice initiatives. These agencies’ effectiveness is in providing critical services, such as mentoring, job training, and crisis intervention. In addition, the faith community is recognized for its role in organizing peace marches, street outreach, and safe zones for children. These interventions not only reduce immediate violence but also foster long-term community resilience and social cohesion.

Many limitations and factors determine and shape the effectiveness of any community-based intervention; thus, the faith community and its various agencies alone cannot prevent or counter urban community violence or organized crime violence. Nevertheless, it is essential to explore and highlight the potential role that such community-based initiatives can play in responding to this type of violence.

This challenge has faced the Palestinian community in Israel in the past two decades, and countering organized crime and community-based violence has emerged as the priority facing this community. There have been many attempts to address this type of internal Palestinian structural violence. This article is an attempt to shed more light on the root causes of this issue and analyze a unique faith-based initiative developed by religious leaders in this community with the support of the Palestinian political leadership in Israel. The article focuses on addressing several main questions, such as the following: to what extent can religious leaders play a role in countering organized crime in Arab communities in Israel? What are the types of intervention strategies being deployed by these religious leaders to engage communities in their efforts? What are the challenges facing religious leaders in their efforts to counter the effects of organized crime in their communities?

The primary hypothesis behind these questions includes the following: first, the voices of religious leaders are necessary for the process of countering organized crime; second, the role and function of the religious leaders in responding to organized crime in the Arab community in Israel remain on the educational and preventive level, rather than direct and actual confrontation of the perpetrators of the organized crimes; third, religious leaders’ community-based intervention is a complementary step to necessary much-needed governmental agency intervention.

The analysis of such a case from a faith-based framework of community peacebuilding can contribute to the much-needed community-based interfaith reconciliation between Arabs and Jews in Palestinian and Israeli Jewish Communities, too.

This research is based on both secondary and primary sources that have been collected during the author’s multiple visits to Israel between May 2022 and 2024 (summer and fall 2022, summer 2023, and summer 2024). In addition to the analysis of multiple surveys on the Arab community’s perceptions of organized crime and its daily impact on people, the author also conducted an extended interview with Sheikh Raed Salah in Shifamr, 2023. An additional informal and non-structured interview was conducted with Mansour Abbas, head of the southern Islamic movement in Israel and a member of the Israeli Knesset. During the above period, the author held several informal discussions with local Arab community leaders regarding their views on ways to counter organized crime in their community. In addition, the topic of organized crime is discussed daily among community members, especially behind closed family doors.

The author’s positionality, personal and professional experience as a Palestinian from Israel and a veteran Arab and Muslim peacemaker, has also been an important motive behind this research. His community has been directly affected by organized crime. He also utilized his three decades of experience in interreligious dialogue and peacebuilding to gain access to and trust from community leaders to discuss these issues and break their silence.

2. Palestinian Community in Israel Between Fragmentation and Civic Integration

With the establishment of Israel in 1948 as the Jewish state, the 156,000 Palestinians who managed to remain in their land have struggled to maintain their national, cultural, and religious identities. Israeli Zionist governments launched many policies to restrict national, religious, or cultural expressions by members of this Palestinian community. Starting with a military administrative system, between 1948 and 1966, this limited their mobility and prohibited any expression of their national identity or sympathy and solidarity with the remaining segments of the Palestinian people in the West Bank, Gaza, and diaspora. This was followed by a set of policies of cooptation and segmentation to ensure control over the new generation born under Israeli control (Lustick 1982). The fragmentation of this community has been a priority in all the policies imposed by various Israeli government agencies since 1948 (Abu-Nimer 1999). The Zionist government’s narrative divided the Palestinians into various categories and invested resources in deepening these divisions, utilizing them as a security tool to ensure political loyalty.

Some of these major divisions included the following:

Family and clan (Hamuleh) system: the majority of the Palestinians who survived the Nakbah and remained in 1948 were from rural areas. Their traditional social and familial structures served as the primary system to organize social and interpersonal relationships. The majority of the Palestinian elites and residents in major urban cities were expelled or left early for neighboring Arab countries. Israeli government agencies and security services (Shabak) used this traditional system of relationships to penetrate the community, prohibit political protest against the newly established state, encourage processes of Israelization, and achieve complete control over the land and properties of Palestinian refugees and internally displaced communities.

Religious sectarianism is another tool used by government agencies to establish their internal control system over the Palestinian community. The community was divided into Muslims (often referred to by the Israeli government narrative as Arabs), Christians, Druze, and Bedouin. Leaders from each of these Palestinian sub-communities were groomed by Israeli agencies to accept such division, and various Israeli governmental agencies allocated resources to reward those who implemented these policies. For example, the Ministry of Education created a system of Druze education and implemented it in 16 different Druze villages. This included Math for the Druze, Chemistry for the Druze, Hebrew for the Druze, etc. (Halabi 2014).

A third division was manufactured around political ideology between “radical nationalists” (communists and other national leaders who spoke against the policies of Israelization and “pro-Zionist” ideology) and those who endorsed governmental agencies and joined Jewish Zionist political parties. This division was especially manifested during the local councils and Knesset (Israeli parliament) elections in the Arab towns, in which Israeli security services manipulated the process and community divisions to block the election of candidates who opposed or did not belong to the various national camps.

A fourth dividing tool that contributed to the fragmentation of the Palestinian community in Israel is military service. The Israeli government managed to impose mandatory military service on members of the Druze community as early as 1956, and some Bedouin tribal leaders agreed to join army services in the early 1950s as well.3 In addition to the polarization and fragmentation that the enlistment of Palestinians in the Israeli army caused, it also resulted in the arming and weaponization of these communities. Small arms and various small military tools became a normal part of the daily lives of Druze and Bedouin communities who served in the different security forces.

These four major internal divisions continued to be utilized by Israeli security services and political agencies to curb political and social movements calling for structural changes in the Jewish state and challenging the governmental policies of discrimination in all areas affecting the existence and lives of Palestinians in Israel (Cohen 2010). These divisions were exploited by Israeli security and other agencies to pave the way for the increase in organized crime, providing a fertile ground for its penetration into the community.

Violence and organized crime in the Palestinian community in Israel have grown exponentially since 2000 (Maital 2023). This surge manifested and was mainly felt after a bloody confrontation between Israeli police forces and protestors who took to the streets in solidarity with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. These protests were triggered by the visit of Ariel Sharon to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, an event that catalyzed the Second Palestinian Intifada.

Two decades later, violence from uncontrolled organized criminal activities and internal familial and clan disputes has become the main concern of the Palestinian community and their leaders in Israel (Siegel 2023; Elran et al. 2021).

3. Frightened Community: Internal Terror

When examining the responses of the various surveys that tried to measure the extent of internal forms of violence and their impact on the community, the scope and scale of the violence relative to the small size of the community are shocking.4 The following is only a summary of the results of two surveys that were conducted among members of this community.

“The proportion of Arab citizens who felt a sense of personal insecurity in the community where they live reached 60.5% in 2019, compared to just 12.8% of Jewish citizens. The phenomena of most concern to Arab citizens are crime and violence (83.9% and 83.7%, respectively). These issues are of greater concern to Arab citizens than questions relating to civil status, such as racist legislation, inequality between Jews and Arabs, and the stalemate in the peace process. Returning to different aspects of violence and crime: 82.1% of Arab respondents are worried or very worried about shootings and the use of firearms, and 70.2% are worried or very worried about property offenses” (Ali et al. 2020). The threat and fear of crime are affecting women more than men. “70.4% of Arab women are worried or very worried about violence against women (almost identical to the figure for 2018), compared to just 55.7% of men”. Also, there is a significant gap between Arab and Jewish fears of organized crime. Specifically, 19.3% of Jewish citizens are afraid that they or their family will be affected by violent offenses, compared to 73.1% of Arab citizens. Arab homes and neighborhoods are often perceived as the last resort (I think this phrase needs to be qualified—why specifically homes and neighborhoods are considered a “last resort” in the Palestinian community) for seeking security and safety. However, this sense of security has been undermined by the fear of organized crime. In total, 42.2% of respondents stated that they feel very threatened in their home community.

This fear of organized crime stems from concrete cases of direct violence against the average person on the street. Some 15% of Arab respondents reported that they or their acquaintances were victims of cold weapons or firearms (an increase from 11% in 2018), compared to just 1% among Jews. In many cases, the attacks are carried out by individuals who are known to the victims; 64.5% stated that they were familiar with the attacker or the person making the threats. In 31.3% of cases, the attackers or intimidators were neighbors, friends, or acquaintances; in 26.9% of cases, they were workmates; in 16% of cases, they were relatives; and 26.9% of respondents stated that the attacker or person making the threat did not belong to any of these categories.

At least half of the Arab community is ready to take part in the fight against organized crime. Specifically, 48.5% are willing or very willing to participate in the struggle against violence in their locale, while 28.4% are moderately willing to do so. This finding shows that a considerable proportion (76.9%) of Arab citizens are willing to help in the struggle against the phenomenon.

When asked about the various bodies and functions involved in the struggle against violence, the family was mentioned most often (63.2% of Arab respondents stated that they were satisfied or very satisfied with its response). Religious institutions are perceived as relatively effective in the struggle against violence among half of Arab citizens (49.5%, an increase from 45.1% in 2018). The education system also enjoys a relatively high level of satisfaction: 49.1% of Palestinian citizens are satisfied or very satisfied with its functioning. However, this figure is down from 54.7% in 2018. The perception of the leadership of Arab society in this context has risen sharply: 37.1% expressed satisfaction with its response to the phenomenon in 2019, compared to 24.8% in 2018. Conversely, the Israel police, the Knesset, and the government are all regarded as showing limited effectiveness in reducing violence in Israel. Only 16.7% of Arab respondents expressed satisfaction with the function of the police, 16.1% with that of the Knesset, and 9.5% with that of the government. As indicated before, there is very little trust in the police: only 45.2% of Arab citizens who experienced violence stated that they submitted a complaint to the police about the incident. Availability of firearms is perceived by 92.9% of Arabs as a strong factor that influences the frequency of crime, as is the case for 73.5% of Jewish respondents. A high proportion of Arab respondents (86.4%) believe that the ready availability of firearms has a strong influence on the violent use of firearms, compared to 53% in Jewish society. In this context, it is important to note that the limited police presence is also regarded as a factor that encourages the violent use of firearms (78.8% of Arab respondents and 59.4% of Jews agree with this) (Ali et al. 2020).

The above results for the survey were also confirmed by the survey conducted by the Galilee Center in 2017–2018. However, this report has also added several dimensions concerning the internal dynamics of the community. For example, 75% of males versus 86.6% of females believe that the parents of the killed person have the right to take revenge. A total 78% believe that using firearms in disputes has become a normal behavior. A percentage of 75.9% believe that the state is interested in spreading violence among the Arab citizens of Israel. Moreover, 41% did not know about the initiative of cities without violence, and 55.7% believed it would not succeed. In addition, 43.3% believe that there is no protection as long as organized crime exists in their communities. Only a third of the respondents believe that opening police branches in the community will reduce crime. By contrast, 80% believe that the police always arrive too late to the scene of the crime. A total 75% of respondents in all areas believe that the police do not take organized crime cases seriously. Moreover, 72.2% believe that the courts do not issue harsh punishments in the case of organized crime. Only nineteen firearms were confiscated by the police from approximately half a million pieces in the Arab community in Israel. Furthermore, only 47% of the budget allocated for the police to fight crime in the Arab community was used (Makhoul 2023).

The statistics regarding the involvement of the youth and neglect of the police are staggering. The 1948 Palestinians constitute two million, about 20% of the total population of Israel. However, they represent 50% of the criminal prisoners in Israel and 94% of those who are involved in using firearms. However, only 4% of them are subject to criminal investigations. A total 40% of those who are involved in cases of money protection are Arabs. Murder cases among Arabs are 9.76% for every 100,000, while among Jews in Israel, the statistic is only 0.5% for every 100,000. According to the Israeli State Comptroller report, 57,000 Arab young people who are between 18 and 24 are outside any educational or professional framework, and many are widely involved in criminal acts (Makhoul 2023).

Although these surveys were conducted in 2018 and 2019, nevertheless, the rate of criminal actions has increased significantly in the past few years. According to the Abraham Initiative report, the year 2023 is the bloodiest year on record in terms of victims; 244 people were killed as a result of this internal violence in the Arab community (The Jerusalem Post 2023). Similar reports were also issued in 2024, indicating a higher crime rate (Avichai Chaim 2024).

Reports on organized crime after 7 October 2023 and the war in Gaza have also shown an increase in both the crime rate and severity. As Deiaa Haj Yahia describes it in a special article in Haaretz newspaper:

“Experts say this is a natural development of criminality, and what happens when sensitivity toward victims is blunted further. Attorney Reda Jaber, a legal scholar and former director of the Aman Center—the Arab Center for a Safe Society-says, “The escalation is part of the natural development of criminality. When conflicts between criminals reach high levels of violence, the level of sensitivity towards the victims goes down significantly. Each organization is trying to send the other organization a clear message that it has increased its level of ‘performance’ and brutality, as a way of instilling deterrence. Not only does this create competition between the criminals, but it also directly affects the entire community”.

(Yahia 2024)

4. Government and Community Secular Responses to the Violence

There have been many reports and statements by Israeli government officials expressing their intentions to deal with the violence in the Arab community. However, in reality, very few practical steps have been made to counter organized crime agencies in the communities. Arab leaders and their affiliate organizations, such as the Local Councils Committee, Upper National Committee, and all Arab political parties, have demanded and organized many protests to stop organized crime and urged the government to intervene and allocate the necessary resources.

In 2021, the Bennett–Lapid government budgeted some NIS 2.5 billion for the task and drew up a holistic approach to tackle the issue. However, the fate of these funds was debated by the new right-wing government elected in 2023. Only a small portion of the allocated funds made their way to Arab local municipalities. The utilization of the funds was also questioned by various analysts who argued that organized crime itself benefited from some of these funds. In addition, there were accusations of corruption in spending or a lack of spending of these funds by the local municipalities. Moreover, the distrust of the government plans deepened when a tape of Police Commissioner Kobi Shabtai emerged of him telling Ben-Gvir, “Mr. Minister, nothing can be done. They murder each other. It’s their nature. It’s the mentality of the Arabs” (The Jerusalem Post 2023).

The distrust can also be further understood via the various analysts who make a direct link between organized crime and the Israeli security forces (Yahia 2025; Khoury 2024). A factor that has been identified in explaining the depth and complexity of the issue is related to the fact that Israeli authorities provided shelter and protection programs for thousands of Palestinian collaborators who were moved to Israel and lived in mixed Arab Jewish cities, Arab towns, or Jewish Israeli towns. These have become leading actors in organized crime and have institutional links to the Israeli security forces, too.5

There have been many critiques of the government’s policies in the dealing or lack of dealing with this issue in the Arab community. In addition to the above recent formal government initiative, other local initiatives are funded by various governmental agencies or external donors. However, these were limited in their scope by addressing one sector— for example, the school, the informal education sector, etc. None of these can be described as having organically emerged from the community or its leadership. On the contrary, the crime rate has doubled under the authority of the current government and its minister Ben Gvir (Breiner 2024).

In a recent study, Siegel (2023) identifies five factors in the analysis of the root causes of the emergence of and increase in Arab organized crime in Israel. The diagnostics and recommendations confirm the following: the governmental agencies’ initial denial of the issues and lack of responsibility in effectively responding; the collaboration with Jewish organized crime; the clan-based structure of Arab organized crime; and the internal challenges facing the Israeli police authority in gaining the trust of the community. However, the author neglects the role of religious agencies in such communities.

Thus, the remainder of this article will mainly focus on community-led initiatives that the Arab leadership has sponsored and adopted as their own in dealing with the issue of violence in their communities.

5. Ifshaa al-Salam (Committee for Spreading Peace-CSP): A Community Faith-Based Initiative

Several governmental and non-governmental initiatives have been launched to respond to the increasing violence in the Arab community in Israel. Also, there have been some community and civil society-led initiatives, too. However, few of these have gained wide recognition or visibility. The following section will examine the nature of and challenges associated with one of these community initiatives.

The CSP is a unique case that was initiated and sponsored by the Higher Council of the Follow-Up Committee, which is a forum created in the late 1970s to represent Palestinian Arabs in Israel and to be an umbrella organization for their concerns.

This has emerged as the primary community initiative, and it is led by Sheikh Raed Salah, who has been imprisoned by the Israeli authorities on various occasions for his advocacy campaign to protect Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. He is also the head of the northern Islamic movement, which boycotts the Israeli elections and does not see parliamentary efforts as a venue to solve the problems of the Palestinians in Israel. Despite his imprisonment and continuous restrictions on his mobility and solidarity campaigns to protect Al-Aqsa Mosque from the extreme Israeli Jewish settlers’ activities, he expressed his commitment to nonviolent and civic resistance actions. He called everyone, especially religious leaders, to end violence in Gaza: “I call on everyone to demand the spread of peace, and to say no to demolishing mosques, no to demolishing churches, no to demolishing synagogues (Jewish synagogues), no to demolishing prayers and businesses. Raise your voices and say stop the war, and say no to killing fetuses and infants, no to killing children, no to killing innocent men. And women, the elderly, and old women”.6

Throughout the war in Gaza, the Sheik repeated his position of calls to stop the war and save innocent Palestinians from starvation and suffering. He also called for the release of all Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, and he was quick to endorse the second ceasefire between the Israeli government and Hamas on 19 January 20257.

According to his statements throughout his political campaigns, he has been careful and systematic in emphasizing the need for civic resistance against Israeli policies of persecution and discrimination.

Nevertheless, his movement rejects direct political engagement in the Israeli Knesset (parliament); this is in direct contrast to the southern Islamic movement, which adopted a pragmatic ideology, and its leader Mansour Abbas, who has broken the political taboo among Arab national political parties in Israel and declared his willingness to support the Zionist right-wing government of Netanyahu and Bennet.

The Committee for Spreading Peace (CSP) was launched in early 2022 to capitalize on his community-based solidarity campaigns, such as the protection of Al-Aqsa Mosque, reclaiming the Muslim cemeteries and mosques in destroyed Palestinian villages inside Israel, and preserving and protecting mosques in Israeli Jewish cities that have been destroyed, damaged, or converted into other usages.8

From its inception, the CSP has identified several principles for its operation:

• To establish local diverse committees in all Arab towns and villages, composed of all the religious, ethnic, and sectarian groups in the town. The mayor or the head council’s approval of such a committee is essential for its operation. Local members and institutions of the Follow-Up Committee should also be included in each local committee.
• The Arab community in Israel was divided into nine regions. Each region includes several towns and villages. The head of each CSP will be a member of the regional committee.
• The executive and administrative committee will be headed by a person appointed by the Follow-Up Committee.
• A youth CSP committee will be created in each town, and this will act as an intergenerational link between the youth and the CSP committee in town.
• A CSP committee will also be created in every middle and high school in the Arab community.
• A multi-faith CSP committee will be created to promote the campaign against violence and for peace in places of worship.
• A local constitution will be written by each committee to create a sense of commitment.
• A national covenant for community peace will be written to guide the struggle against violence.
• A special covenant for mediation and reconciliation will be written as a reference for the work to lead to security and righteousness.
• An advisory expert council will be created to professionally support its operation.

The intervention strategy of the CSP is based on three major approaches: first, prevention, which constitutes a significant portion of the activities. Sheikh Raed Salah described this as Wiqaya (prevention) and cited the Arabic cultural saying that Derham Wiqaya Khair min Qintar Ilaj (an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure). Thus, they emphasize activities that aim at spreading messages of tolerance, acceptance, and intrafaith and interfaith peaceful co-existence and nonviolence. Second is a curative approach aimed at responding and intervening to settle conflicts within and between clans and families in the towns and villages. Such an act of Sulh is central to Islamic belief, and Sheikh Raed cited several Quranic verses, AL Anfal 61, 63; 46, in support of this approach. The unity of the community in its capacity to confront its internal and external challenges was a primary motivation for the leader of CSP.

“And obey Allah and His Messenger, and do not dispute, lest you falter and lose your courage. And be patient; Allah is with the patient”.

(al Anfal 8:46)

“He brought their hearts together. Had you spent all the riches in the earth, you could not have united their hearts. But Allah has united them. Indeed, He is Almighty, All-Wise”.

(Anfal 8:63)

“If the enemy is inclined towards peace, make peace with them. And put your trust in Allah. Indeed, He ˹ ˹alone˺ is the All-Hearing, All-Knowing”.

Anfal 61 (8:61)

Special committees for Sulha (reconciliation) and arbitration are often formed and are supported by the local CSP in every town. These mediation and arbitration committees do not replace the already existing Sulha committees. In supporting this strategic step of relying on internal agencies to be fully engaged in the process of reconciliation, religious Muslims cited the Prophet’s saying based on Anfal 8:1, “Islah Dhat al Bayn”: to reconcile among you is even more virtuous than fasting and praying.

For the committee members and their Sheikhs, direct intervention to reconcile and engage in peacemaking is perceived as an act of faith. “If two groups of the faithful fight one another, make peace between them. But if one party aggresses against the other, fight the one that aggresses until it returns to Allah’s ordinance. Then, if it returns, make peace between them fairly, and do justice. Indeed Allah loves the just”(Quran: 49:9).

Muslim religious peacemakers repeatedly mention the following Quranic verse:

“They ask you, ˹O Prophet˺, regarding the spoils of war. Say, “Their distribution is decided by Allah and His Messenger. So be mindful of Allah, settle your affairs, and obey Allah and His Messenger if you are ˹true˺ believers”.

Third, the deterrence approach aims to collaborate between the Arab Follow-Up Committee and all authorities to advocate for a stronger and more effective intervention by the Israeli police, security forces, and government agencies to prevent further violence in Arab towns. Although the CSP documents and leaders refer to this stage as deterrence, it is clear to them as well as the community that they have limited capacity and leverage to influence Israeli authorities to forcefully and effectively put an end to the organized crime disputes in the community. Nevertheless, the incorporation of the strategy to collectively advocate for more direct intervention by the Israeli police authority is a clear sign that the CSP does not see itself as capable of putting an end to such a type of crime.

Finally, the CSP holds an annual conference to reflect on its efforts, including achievements and obstacles in achieving its stated goals.

The CSP has been in operation for the past two years. Despite its limited resources, it has managed to carry out many activities within its preventive and curative strategic approach. However, the CSP has encountered major obstacles when trying to operationalize the third strategic principle, which involved persuading Israeli government agencies to perform their jobs and responsibilities in countering the violence in the Arab towns.9

Launching campaigns that raise awareness and send messages against violence is certainly easier than the other two strategic levels proclaimed or adopted by the CSP. “We have managed to accomplish a great deal in the past year and a half of our operation because we are connected to the communities. People are hungry for such a narrative against violence”.10

The CSP managed to organize hundreds of meetings, seminars, and campaigns at the local level and engage communities in certain schools and towns. Their creative approach has allowed them to expand the concept of community peace education. According to their leaders, they had to initiate special activities that allowed them to reach the youth, though not necessarily through religious or interreligious traditional types of activities. For example, they organized a horse-riding campaign to attract the attention of the youth; they have presented their campaign in football games in various villages and towns with the most well-known teams, such as “Sons of Sakhnin”. According to their leaders, people were surprised that the CSP was sponsoring such a type of intervention.

In various villages and towns in which major clashes between families resulted in the killing of tens of young victims (Deir Al Sada, Tamra, Kofr Manda, etc.), the local Sulh and arbitration committee intervened and participated in the local efforts to put an end to the Hamuleh (clan) revenge cycle.11 Testimonies of their intervention were reported in the Sulh ceremonies, in which a ceasefire or actual agreement was signed between the various disputing families.12

6. Religious Affiliations of CSP

Based on its documentation and the overall composition of its active leaders and followers, there is no doubt that the CSP is dominated by the narrative of its prominent Muslim leadership. However, when these Muslim leaders were asked about the CSP’s spiritual and religious affiliation, their leader, Sheikh Raed Salah, stated that “CSP is not an Islamic initiative, it has an interreligious component”. Nevertheless, when asked about the values that underlie or guide the work of the CSP, Sheikh Raed Salah reverted to the core Islamic values and principles of reconciliation (Sulh), forgiveness (Afo), and peacemaking (Salam).13

He immediately cited Quranic verses such as the following:

“And if they incline to peace, then you should incline to it; and put your trust in God; He is the All-hearing, the All-knowing”

(Q 8:61)

“It may be that God will grant love [and friendship] between you and those whom ye [now] hold as enemies. For God is Oft-Forgiving, Most-Merciful”

(Q: 60:70)

“When they are told, ‘Do not spread corruption in the land,’ they reply, ‘We are only peace-makers!’”

(Q 2:11)

In addition to Quranic verses, Sheikh Salah emphasized that the whole premise of Islam is to spread peace, and thus it is not strange for him and his leadership council to take the lead on an initiative such as CSP. One of the main rewards of faithful Muslims in heaven is “Therein they will hear no abusive speech, nor any talk of sin, only the saying, ‘Peace, Peace’” (Q 56:25–26).

Leaders of the CSP, including Sheikh Salah, shared several stories from the Prophet Muhammad’s life and sayings in support of the notion that the CSP methodology and strategy applied are fully in coherence and sync with Islamic values and beliefs.

For example, they shared the story of the Prophet being a mediator in Mecca when he was called by the three powerful Meccan tribes to resolve the dispute over which tribe would be in charge of moving the holy stone. The Prophet suggested that they place the stone on his cloak and that all three tribes be involved when each would hold one of his cloaks.

A second story was related to the famous example in which the Prophet, after the conquest of Mecca (after being in exile for 8 years) and entering it victorious, granted forgiveness to the Meccan leaders. His forgiveness extended to those who tortured and conspired and fought against him.

Maintaining community harmony and cohesion was another major Islamic principle that guided the leaders of CSP in their devotion to this initiative. The degree of fragmentation that has been caused by the Israeli policies of discrimination and divide and rule was cited as a main cause of the need for a narrative of unity and social cohesion. Such values are also an integral part of the Islamic faith, according to Sheikh Salah:

“And do not kill the soul which Allah has forbidden, except by right”

(Q 17:33)

Also, the example of the Medina Charter was cited repeatedly by Sheik Salah in his speech in Shafamr at the second annual celebration of the launching of CSP. The Charter is often recalled by Muslims as the first interfaith covenant between Muslims, Christians, and Jews. The Prophet signed it as an agreement to keep interreligious peace and harmony in Medina when Muslims ruled after they migrated from Mecca.14

7. Responding to Obstacles

Despite its success in launching many activities to reach out to the various segments of the community in towns and villages, there are major obstacles facing the operation of the CSP, nevertheless. Some of these obstacles are structural, while others are to do with the type of leadership and other issues about the context of operation.

First, the head of the initiative is politically affiliated with an Islamic movement. Sheikh Raed Salah is a prominent leader for certain segments of the Muslim and secular nationalist groups. His leadership of the CSP has contributed a great deal of recognition and credibility among these constituencies. However, other constituencies in the Palestinian communities in Israel will not engage or associate with the Sheikh for being “too radical politically” or “having strict religious beliefs”. Regardless of the reason for refusing to associate with the Sheikh, this reduces its capacity to reach out to local councils. There have been several local council mayors who declined to endorse the work of the CSP in their villages due to their fear of being associated with Sheikh Raed Salah. There are local leaders and their followers in the Arab community who are fearful of being associated with Sheikh Raed Salah and are threatened by his strategy of resistance and the ideology behind it. Such constituencies will not join the CSP campaign against violence.15 The affiliation of CSP with Sheikh Raed Salah is certainly a challenge for many in the Palestinian community in Israel, and it also can jeopardize the entire initiative if the Sheikh is banned from public activities by Israeli police.

The Israeli authorities and security apparatus campaign against Raed Salah in 2015 outlawed and banned his movement as a “terrorist organization”. The Israeli authority also banned him from travel on 1 September 2022, and on 14 February 2023, Israel’s Ministry of the Interior renewed the travel ban imposed on Palestinian citizen of Israel Sheikh Raed Salah under claims that he is a “danger to the state’s security”. He was also sentenced to 28 months in prison for the accusation of incitement of terrorism by an Israeli court on 10 February 2020. Sheikh Salah described these actions as an “incitement against him” as head of the Spreading Peace Committee—an offshoot of the High Follow-Up for the Arab Community. He accused the Israeli government of undermining the efforts of his committee to keep violence among the Arabs from rising (Middle East Monitor 2023).

Second, fear of confronting the families involved in organized crime: there is a high level of fear and reluctance to take a public stand against those forces who terrorize the community, extract protection money, and have a wide influence within various local institutions. Various surveys have indicated that 65% of people expressed fear and anxiety about organized crime in their communities.

Third, many local councils are already under the influence of organized crime groups. Thus, they are unable to take concrete steps to counter these groups. Criminal organizations have intervened in local elections and have threatened many candidates who refused to pledge their allegiance to them. There were at least 20 shootings against candidates in local elections in October 2023. There is an unspoken agreement not to discuss these issues and reveal the depth of the involvement of criminal organizations with the local councils, especially regarding the competition and awarding of contracts. “I am guessing that every one of the local council leaders in Israel is subject to these pressures, and some of them were supported by these criminal organizations”.16

These views were also confirmed by a report in Haaretz newspaper on 17 July 2023: “The Israeli Cities Taken Hostage by Organized Crime, Crime groups have their people sit in on city council meetings, threaten competing contractors and get their hands on funds for vital services. Murders aren’t the Israeli Arab community’s only problem” (Yahia 2023). In fact, in August 2023, the Israeli security services (Shin Beit) leader met with the Arab mayors to discuss their complaints about threats and even shootings against candidates for the election of October 2023 (Toi Staff 2023).

The dynamics and involvement in local elections and councils are clearly articulated by Haddad in the +972 Magazine report. “Take for example the elections to the local councils… Criminal organizations prepare themselves ahead of time and sell a lot of arms to families that are [local] election rivals—sometimes for NIS 5–6 million per election campaign. They feed off elections and the brawls and quarrels in the villages. If you fight with your neighbor, you buy a weapon and hide it for fear that he will attack you” (Arraf 2020). Thabet Abu Ras, co-director of the Abraham Fund, confirms this observation based on talks with heads of local councils and candidates who are afraid to speak openly about this issue.

Fourth, the Israeli ultra-national right-wing government is seen as unfit to deal with this issue systematically and seriously. The Israeli government agencies are perceived to be enablers of these criminal organizations and have manipulated them in the past in implementing its policy of divide and conquer or fragmentation of the Arab community in Israel. Many argued that there had been no major arrests for hundreds of publicly committed crimes. Conversely, when there is a minor incident or attack against an Israeli Jewish person, the police are quick to identify and arrest the perpetrators.17

Such views are deeply ingrained in the minds and hearts of the majority of Arabs in Israel. The lack of trust in government agencies is expressed in every survey of Arab community members’ attitudes.18

Moreover, there have been fewer reports directly linking the Israeli authority with organized crime activities. “Killings in the Arab community occur regularly, with Israeli officials failing to do their jobs and eradicate organized crime, which may indicate Israeli security services’ complicity in such crimes or their support for criminal organizations.” “It does not take much thought to notice the difference between Israeli security’s behavior in investigating violent crimes in the Arab community and its behavior in investigating incidents involving nationally motivated attacks; the results speak for themselves”, said Ramy Abdu, Chairman of Euro-Med Monitor (WAFA Agency 2023).

Fifth is lack of security infrastructure in the community; the police stations that the government opened in 2015 are insufficient and underfunded. In 2015, the government decided to establish eleven new stations in Palestinian towns, alongside others that have opened since 2010; seven of these planned stations have been opened so far. The “miracle cure” offered by the Israeli government—to open more police stations in Palestinian communities—has not been effective. The opposite may even be true: in most of the localities where a police station was recently opened, the number of homicides has risen, not decreased (Arraf 2020).

According to analysts and experts on organized crime, there is a link between the decline in Jewish organized crime and its monitoring by Israeli authorities. Dr. Walid Haddad, a criminologist at Western Galilee College and, until recently, a national inspector in the program to combat violence, drugs, and alcohol at the Public Security Ministry, adds that before the collapse of the large criminal organizations in the Jewish sector, Arab criminal organizations acted as their subcontractors. “They were the executors of crime,” says Haddad. “The Arabs were sent to shoot at a target under the orders of the Jewish organizations. The Arab criminal organizations did not have a hierarchy, orderliness, or operational capacity. Once they stopped being the subcontractors of the Jewish organizations, they developed the business” (Arraf 2020).

There is also the weaponization of criminals: “Arab kill Arab” has emerged as a slogan to convey the message that the Israeli authorities care less about the violence in the Arab community. Thus, the weaponization of organized crime and its members is not a concern for the authorities, except when there is an Israeli Jewish victim. Leaving such a large number of weapons in the hands of Arab criminal organizations and their affiliates is certainly a danger that has been detected by several Israeli officials and analysts.

Sixth is the security collaborators who were planted or given haven in the Arab community. Many are from the West Bank, Gaza, and Lebanon. These individuals have been armed and protected by the Israeli security services. Witnesses and experts have confirmed such relations in several reports. These individuals have emerged as a significant force in several criminal activities.

Jewish police officers do not deny the role of former collaborators in crime. “These collaborators—God help us,” says retired Police Commander Ephraim Ehrlich, whose duties included various command positions in the Central Unit in Tel Aviv. “They are enormous trouble. They were brought to neighborhoods in south Tel Aviv and Jaffa, and they thought that because they were collaborators, they could do anything. Some of the members of their families became criminals. You cannot talk to them; in some cases, they have weapons. They are sure their back is covered” (Arraf 2020). Also, many reports and experts place greater responsibility on the police forces and their failure to act against organized crime groups and their networks (Khoury 2024; Yahia 2023; Elran et al. 2021).

Another factor highlighted by some interviewees and throughout informal discussions regarding the role of CSP and its religious affiliation is related to the fact that organized crime among Arabs in Israel is not related to their religious affiliation. None of the families or their followers involved in the organized crime network adopted a religious narrative in justifying their activities. The nature of the violent crimes has no religious reasoning or framing. As one local council stated, “Islam has nothing to do with criminal activities among Arabs. Those criminals are not motivated by faith but by greed”.19

8. CSP Organizational Challenges

In addition to the above structural issues, CSP activities, outreach, and capacity to grow are further hindered by its infrastructure. The committee lacks professional resources, and it primarily relies on the traditional leaders and affiliates of the northern Islamic movement. Its professional advisory group is inactive and has limited input in the planning of activities.

The lack of professional planning for the various campaigns is visible in the reporting, documentation, and public outreach of the CSP. Despite its relative success and achievement in reaching out to a wide segment of the community, the committee members are still limited in their ability to provide capacity-building training for their youth or compose concrete and well-articulated steps for their three strategic levels or approaches.

Internal leadership structure: Sheikh Raed Salah is a charismatic and well-known figure in local and even regional Arab and Muslim politics. He has a wide base of support outside the Arab community in Israel as well. His involvement in this campaign and his sponsorship have certainly provided credibility and legitimacy among many constituencies.

However, the CSP structure and operation are solely dependent on his leadership. His involvement in micro- and macro-level operations obstructs the fluidity and growth of the campaign. His authoritative leadership style limits the involvement of younger generations in the campaign, too.20

An additional internal challenge for CSP is its strong affiliation with Sheikh Raed Salah, which has placed the initiative under ongoing security scrutiny due to the repeated imprisonment of Salah by Israeli police for his fierce advocacy for Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The threat to rearrest or suspend Salah’s nonviolent advocacy to protect Al-Aqsa Mosque certainly jeopardizes the capacity of CSP to continue its operation among Arabs in Israel.

Gender Engagement: Women in the Arab community are victims of organized crime and violence. Their voices have been heard in many protest groups and on many occasions. Alas, the CSP structure does not actively engage women in the leadership or the strategic operation of the local committee. In addition, when they are symbolically invited to take part in the activities, they are subjected to the Islamic rules of gender separation. This limits the active participation of women who are not Muslims or secular women in general.

Recognizing the role of women in the campaign against violence in the Arab community is a crucial step and aspect of any intervention plan. Many of those who are involved in crime are teenagers and youth who are still in their homes and have direct relationships with their families. Moreover, women have been victims of many violent incidents.

9. Follow-Up Committee Affiliation, Structure, and Resources

The CSP is under the umbrella of the High Follow-Up Committee, which itself faces major structural issues and lacks resources and capacity to operate on the ground. The internal crisis of the Follow-Up Committee is often discussed by various Arab community activists.

On the one hand, the sponsorship and ownership of the CSP campaign are strengthened by the highest representation of the Arabs in Israel. Since 1982, this committee has struggled to represent all the Arabs in Israel despite their diverse constituencies. Israeli governments have opposed its leadership and have attempted to delegitimize it and even to legally banish it.

The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel, the non-governmental body regarded as the national representative of Israel’s two million Palestinian citizens, has long faced criticism from within the community. But in the face of new efforts by the Israeli right to outlaw it, there is a broad consensus among the Palestinian public that recent attacks on the committee reflect an aggressive attempt to eliminate the community’s ability to organize politically.

(Arraf 2020)

One of the unique aspects of this initiative is certainly its formal affiliation and sponsorship by the HFC. However, this formal link constitutes a challenge for many heads of town and political leaders who reject the leadership of the HFC due to its political role. Such local leaders often affiliate themselves with Zionist political parties and are often afraid of being labeled as members of the national camp. Such a reality limits the capacity of the Ifshaa al-Salam initiative in such towns.

In addition, the HFC itself has limited resources and organizational capacities; thus, it is unable to provide systematic support to the initiative and its leadership. Due to the political role that the HFC played in the 1948 Palestinian community, the Israeli government has limited its access to foreign international funds and donors, especially from Arab and Muslim countries.

10. Conclusions

Based on the above analysis, the spread of organized crime in the past two decades among Palestinians in Israel is, without a doubt, a direct result of the discriminatory policies implemented by the various Israeli governments since 1948. Introducing and allowing small weapons to be used in such crimes, consistently failing to prosecute perpetrators, and ignoring organized crime’s active role in corruption in local councils are a few of the existing pieces of evidence being reported on the security role in this problem. Due to the lack of community trust in the police and security forces, as well as fear of retaliation from organized crime agencies, people are often hesitant to cooperate with external police investigations. This factor has been repeatedly highlighted by different police reports and other governmental agencies.

There are internal factors that facilitate the spread of organized crime in this community, including its political fragmentation, lack of educational programs, and weakening of social, cultural, and religious value systems that support social cohesion. The 1948 Palestinians have been subject to severe policies of internal colonization that especially affected many youths, who found organized crime as a pathway out of poverty and political oppression.

It is clear to most community members that the Israeli police and security forces are not willing or interested in effectively responding to organized crime in this community. On the contrary, it has been utilized as part of the internal control mechanisms to keep the community preoccupied with its internal criminal issues. As a result, there is a need for internal community initiatives and responses to these crimes. Protest, press conferences, reports, academic research, educational materials, and social media campaigns are all necessary tools to counter this phenomenon.

In addition, there is a need for initiatives at the level of local communities and neighborhoods and even at street level. Such initiatives are still limited. The study confirmed that the case of CSP (Ifshaa al-Salam), as a local community initiative responding to the tragic high rate of criminal activities among 1948 Palestinians, provides some hope that the local leadership can play a role in countering this destructive phenomenon. Although the group has only been operating for three years, nevertheless, it has managed to reach out to a relatively wide audience. They have also been able to directly intervene and contribute to the settlements of specific disputes. However, as was hypothesized earlier, due to their composition, structure, and leadership, they face serious obstacles in massively mobilizing Palestinian citizens of Israel to engage in their call for action. Thus, it is clear that their role remains limited to prevention and raising awareness of the need to stop such criminal activities and resort to peaceful solutions to their internal conflicts. Also, it is confirmed that they cannot be a substitute for much-needed governmental intervention to counter and confront actual criminals or perpetrators. Such a program can be complementary to direct and intentional governmental policies to reduce and end organized crime among Palestinian Arabs in Israel.

As for their intervention strategy and theory of change, the CSP approach adopted is a typical community-based education program and initiatives to promote social cohesion among youth and reemphasize the discourse of the need for peaceful resolution of interpersonal and family-based conflicts. The group reported on a few successful mediation and reconciliation efforts in several local communities. However, such direct mediation action remained limited in its effect at reducing the crime rate and the spread of violence in other areas.

Although CSP has managed to achieve a certain level of success as a community-based intervention, unfortunately, as reported above by the CSP leadership, since its launch, no Israeli government agency has approached CSP or expressed interest in cooperating with it. On the contrary, Israeli security agencies repeatedly investigated their leaders and threatened to ban their operations.

Such an antagonistic relationship between the CSP leaders and formal governmental agencies is also related to the tension around the representation of the Arab minority in Israel. The CSP and the Higher Follow-Up Committee have been assuming such a role and offering protective representation. On the other hand, Israeli governmental agencies have refused to formally acknowledge such representation.

Regardless of the above politics of representation, the CSP offered no input or vision on how to engage the larger Israeli public, especially those grassroots organizations who might be open to allying with them to confront organized crime in the Arab community. This strategy of minority religious and political leaders seeks to guard and protect their groups by building cross-ethnic and religious partnerships with grassroots organizations and movements from the dominant majority agencies, as captured by Emmerich (2020, 2023) in the Muslim Indian minority context. It is important to note that CSP has used the “Commodity of Protection” in its strategy (Emmerich 2020, pp. 89–92) (offering itself as the protector of its own community’s values and religious tradition); however, it stayed away from the strategy of “Offering Protection” (Emmerich 2023, pp. 605–6), which requires engagement with the Israeli Jewish majority’s organization and agencies who might be willing to form coalitions or partnerships with the CSP. In fact, CSP leadership clearly stated throughout the various interviews that their initiative is strictly focusing on intra-community dynamics.

Despite these limitations and challenges, this initiative, according to its followers and leadership, emphasizes moral and spiritual codes and values, which Arab and Muslim communities continuously bring up in their efforts to build internal social cohesion. Such a message is in sync with the general function of many religious institutions, which are seen as moral anchors while offering normative guidance and social support.

CSP can also provide an example for other actors to launch more community-based initiatives to prevent and counter the effects of organized crime and violence in their community. Finally, the success of such locally supported initiatives can also have positive implications on the capacity and willingness of Palestinians in Israel to engage in similar community-based programs aimed at bridging the gap between Arabs and Jews in Israel, too. This is a type of intervention that is much needed in the current reality of highly polarized and segregated Arab–Jewish relations in Israel as a result of the War on Gaza and the October 7th attacks.