A Preservationist Christian Sexual Ethic: Verifying and Vindicating a Contested Perspective

Abstract

A preservationist Christian sexual ethic affirms heterosexuality as the only normal and natural expression of wholeness in human intimacy, relationships, and lifestyle. However, revisionist critics would maintain that the central problem of the preservationist perspective is the perceived lack of a compelling verifier. A revisionist Christian ethic embraces homosexuality as an alternative form of wholeness in human relationships and lifestyle. Preservationist critics would maintain that the central problem of the revisionist perspective is the perceived lack of a compelling verifier. They would also identify an additional problem for the revisionist position, namely, the perceived problem of self-contradiction. It may seem to some that problems alleged for a particular side cannot be leveraged to the advantage of the opposing side in this debate. Moreover, even the external judgment that a problem exists for a perspective is disputed within that perspective. This may seem to lead to stalemate between the opposing perspectives. However, it may be that a verifier or vindicator exists for one of these perspectives that would commend that perspective as more acceptable than the other. A vindicator for a perspective need only to reinforce that perspective, while a verifier must be an empirically attested ground for the perspective. In this article, I will compare verifiers and vindicators on each side of the debate and inquire whether there is an ace to be found in any of these arenas. I find that a preservationist Christian sexual ethic speaks for itself when its vehicles of verification and vindication are addressed in dialogue with a revisionist perspective. My aim is to increase the possibility of moving the discussion forward in the debate over normative human sexuality.

1. Introduction

A preservationist Christian sexual ethic speaks for itself when its vehicles of verification and vindication are addressed in dialogue with a revisionist perspective.1 Pursuing this thesis may only be a small step toward re-vivifying the preservationist perspective given the adversarial context in which it occurs, but it would be forward movement nevertheless. A vindicator for the preservationist Christian ethical perspective need only to reinforce the perspective, but a verifier for the perspective must be an empirically attested ground for the perspective. For our purposes, a verifier is an empirically attested phenomenon whose support for a perspective can only be denied at the sacrifice of reason. Alvin Plantinga does not speak specifically of a Christian ethic of human sexuality, but he does speak of the conditions under which a perspective is defeated. Plantinga speaks of this situation in terms of defeaters that make it impossible for someone to rationally hold a belief. He says, “Defeaters of this kind are rationality defeaters; given belief in the defeating proposition, you can retain belief in the defeated proposition only at the cost of irrationality. There are also warrant defeaters that are not rationality defeaters” (Plantinga 2000, p. 359). A warrant defeater is a circumstance that undermines belief in a proposition, while a rationality defeater is actual evidence against the proposition. Plantinga’s terms “rationality defeaters” and “warrant defeaters” respectively correspond to my terms, “verifiers” and “vindicators.”

This article is written for the inquirer who seeks ground for choosing between the preservationist and revisionist perspectives; however, it is written from the preservationist perspective. My method is to broadly describe the verifiers and vindicators that undergird the preservationist perspective, on the one hand, and the revisionist perspective on the other, and then ask about the potential for honoring the former perspective above the other.

To speak of a verifier for a preservationist Christian ethic may have faint echoes of logical positivism and its verifiability principle, but no more than faint echoes. Logical positivism has long fallen out of favor for the most part, but the idea that propositions must be verified by experience remains commonplace. Moore and Bruder say, “Today few philosophers would call themselves logical positivists. But most philosophers would still maintain that empirical or factual propositions must in some sense and to some extent be verifiable by experience” (Moore and Bruder 1999, p. 425).

In more nuanced treatments, moral intuitions themselves must be verified by experience. Kevin Jung speaks of intuitions as moral beliefs and, more specifically, as prima facie justified beliefs. “This means that intuitions must have experiential grounds, though the normativity of intuitions is not reducible to the latter. Experience serves as a necessary source of intuitions but does not justify them. What justifies the intuitions is the rationally apprehended self-evidence of intuited moral beliefs” (Jung 2015, p. 70). Jung shares a programmatic perspective on the role of nature in verifying moral belief. He says, “Natural facts provide us with evidential data necessary for us to form justified moral beliefs. More importantly, natural facts are publicly accessible and intelligible” (Jung 2015, p. 165). We are interested then in one or more verifiers (i.e., natural facts) as an empirical base for preservationist moral belief about normative human sexuality.

The terms “warrant” and “evidences” are also used in the sense that I use verifier. Plantinga described a warrant as that “quality or quantity…which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief.” He says, “a belief has warrant only if it is produced by cognitive faculties that are functioning properly” (Plantinga 2000, p. 153). In his study of Plantinga, Pieter de Vries observes that “‘Warrant’ means that a person who has knowledge can furnish ‘evidences’. However, it is not necessary that everyone can verify these ‘evidences’; doing so requires a properly functioning knowledge-producing capacity or faculty” (de Vries 2024, p. 81). Given the use of “a properly functioning knowledge-producing capacity or faculty,” an ethical perspective can be warranted by empirically attested phenomena. This also means that an ethical perspective can be cognitively grounded or based upon knowledge (Plantinga 2000, p. 335).

We are also interested in a vindicator for preservationist Christian ethics. A vindicator is a vehicle or occurrence that can be referenced in support of a perspective, although it may not be a ground for the perspective. The terms “warrant,” “authorization,” and “justification” have sometimes been used in the way I use “vindicator” (Gustafson 1975, pp. 123, 169).2

Jung says, “Cognitive science involves a non-normative concept of sensory evidence, whereas epistemology requires a normative concept of evidence. It is one thing to use the former kind of evidence in support of the latter but quite another to replace the latter with the former” (Jung 2015, p. 104). My use of the terms verifier and vindicator corresponds, respectively, to Jung’s “normative concept of evidence” and “non-normative concept of sensory evidence.” A vindicator supports a verifier but does not replace it.

I use the terms verifier and vindicator to indicate what a process, event, structure, experience, text, statement, or other vehicle does within an ethical perspective. A vehicle may not be accepted as a fulfiller of either of these functions by those who disavow the perspective, but that does not make the vehicle go away. At the very least, one’s credibility in a community of inquiry would require some engagement with the vehicle. A vindicator for the preservationist Christian sexual ethic directly or indirectly depends upon the verifier for its relevance. It is the verifier that serves as evidence for the perspective. Jung draws a distinction between “the state of being justified” and “the activity of justifying” (italics in the original). He says, “The two senses of justification―one normative and the other descriptive and explanatory―can be made compatible with each other only if we use the activity of justifying in the service of the state of being justified” (Jung 2015, p. 73). Jung’s state of being justified and activity of justifying, respectively, correspond to my terms, “verifier” and “vindicator,” or to the activities indicated by these vehicles.

2. The Meanings of Normal and Natural

In this presentation, the term preservationist Christian ethics includes a sexual ethic that holds heterosexuality as the exclusively normative form of intimate human relationships that unfold in the sequence of courtship, marriage, childbirth, and family. In a preservationist perspective, the term “normative” is inclusive of both terms “normal” and “natural.” This use of the term “normative” seems to be typical (Lerner and Hofman 2011, p. 405). When preservationists speak of something being normal, they usually mean that it conforms to social convention and to established patterns of behavior, human experience, corporate expectation, and the regularity of those patterns over time. They also mean that it conforms to nature and that it bears the trait of congruency. When preservationists speak of something being natural, they mean that it too conforms to nature and that it bears the trait of congruency. It is significant in preservationist thought that the meanings of both “normal” and “natural” include conforming to nature and bearing the trait of congruency. Nature itself is the simultaneous external and internal ordering of all that materially exists with all of its particular appearances. These are observations that preservationists partially owe to Aristotle (Physics 8). He said, “If then it is both by nature and for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web, and the plant grows leaves for the sake of the fruit and send their roots down (not up) for the sake of nourishment, it is plain that this kind of cause is operative in things which come to be and are by nature” (Barnes 1984, p. 340). It is normal for a swallow to build a nest. It is also natural. Nest-building is an extension of what it means to be a swallow. Stephen Pope said, “Aristotle’s conception of nature included a strongly normative component, and this is the basis, for example, of the famous axiom that we are to live ‘according to nature’ (kata physin or secundum naturam)” (Pope 1997, p. 92).

3. The Meaning of Congruency

When we speak of “congruency” in the shared meaning of normal and natural, we are referring to the circumstance in which particular purposes and functions are the extension of universal ones. Heterosexuality, for example, is the extension of the more universal purpose of species propagation. Heterosexuality is congruent with the universal purpose of species propagation.

Congruence is spoken of in different contexts. Paul Wendland speaks of the “congruence” between nature and Scripture when addressing the subject of transgenderism. However, he only uses the term “congruence” once. He says, “I am also inclined to believe that there will at least be some congruence between what we see in the world and God’s creative will expressed in Scripture” (Wendland 2020, p. 15). He then shifts to arguments from commonsense and natural law for the congruence between “gender identity, physiology, anatomy, chromosomes, and DNA” (Wendland 2020, pp. 15, 17).

The term “congruency” and its cognates do not occur in all discussions of the relationship between normal and natural. Nevertheless, the idea of congruency between normal and natural can still be expressed or alluded to in these discussions in other terms.

David Jones referred to congruence when he spoke of “a conceptual relationship” between the normal social and cultural expression of gender and the basis of that expression in biology. He says, “There is a conceptual relationship between sex and gender, in that gender is the social and cultural expression of a sexual identity that is given biologically” (Jones 2020, p. 13). This would make gender both social and biological.

Henrik Lerner and Bjørn Hofman speak of the congruence between normal and natural in terms of “overlaps.” They say, “Moreover, there are overlaps between some notions of normal and natural” (Lerner and Hofman 2011, p. 403). They speak of several understandings of “natural,” but one is “the normative conception of natural,” which “sees natural behavior as relative to human norms and values” (Lerner and Hofman 2011, p. 405). This would mean that some theorists at least recognize a genetic connection between the normal and the natural.

Ted Peters uses other expressions for congruency between the normal and natural when he explores multiple meanings of nature. Three of these meanings are nature as comprehensive cosmos, essence, and guide. These three meanings are closely related. Regarding the first meaning, Peters says, “Because Homo sapiens are a product of both cosmic and biological evolution, we are natural.” He continues saying that realizing this “may become a moral imperative.” As essence, nature refers to both the “basic characteristics” and “the transcendental characteristics of an entity or species.” As guide, nature is “the inspiration for directing moral affairs.” Peters feels that these three meanings constitute the “religious naturalist’s worldview” (Peters 2017, pp. 305–6).

I am not suggesting anything regarding how Peters would assess my argument in this article, nor am I indicating any judgment regarding his theory of evolution. Nevertheless, I find Peters’ idea of nature as “minimalist” essence (the basic characteristics of something) and “sublime” essence (the transcendental characteristics of something) very instructive for how a preservationist understanding of the relationship between normal and natural can be described. I also find his strongly implied link between the “minimalist” and “sublime” levels of nature instructive for a preservationist understanding of congruence. In different terms, he implies a link between the “biological” and “cosmic,” or between the “basic” and the “transcendental.” I call this link “congruence.” The minimalist, biological, and basic aspect of nature is what preservationists take as normal. The sublime, cosmic, and transcendental aspect of nature is what preservationists take as natural. They see a link between the two. Part of what normal means is to be conformed to nature. To the point, congruence between gender role, gender identity, and gender morphology is normal. It is also natural.

On the other hand, Judith Butler denies the idea of congruency between gender expression and biology. She says, “When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man and masculine might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and woman and feminine a male body as easily as a female one” (Butler 1999, p. 10). For Butler, there is nothing natural about the connection between masculinity and maleness, nor that between femininity and femaleness. Whether or not Butler should be described as a revisionist, her thought has been embraced by revisionist thinkers.

4. Aims and Problems

In the preservationist perspective, heterosexuality serves the ultimate goals of procreation, child raising, and child development. Despite variations in how heterosexuality is practiced and affirmed across cultures, the ultimate purposes of procreation, child raising, and child development remain universal (Labuschagne 2021, p. 4). Heterosexuality, in this perspective, is, therefore, exclusively normal and natural—in a word, normative.

Moreover, in the preservationist perspective, procreation is the ultimate aim of heterosexual morphology, biology, and activity, although not their only aim. Heterosexuality also has the aims of love, bonding, companionship, security, fulfillment, pleasure, comfort, contentment, and completion. These other aims, however, are not necessarily what makes heterosexuality exclusively normative. Heterosexuality is exclusively normative because it is prerequisite for the survival of the species—in a phrase, necessary for procreation—and this is whether procreation occurs in a particular heterosexual union or not (Davis 2004, p. 121). Procreation occurs in enough heterosexual unions to fulfill the mandate for the survival of the human species, making it unnecessary for the mandate to be fulfilled in every single union. This is collective compensation for those singular situations in which the mandate for species survival is for whatever reason not fulfilled, and it is the heterosexual collectivity, or at least heterosexual activity, that accomplishes this compensation. This is enough to establish heterosexuality per se as exclusively natural and normal from where the preservationist stands.

However, revisionist critics would still maintain that the central problem of the argument for heterosexual normativity is the perceived lack of a compelling verifier. This criticism is implied in the response of Philippa Evans to the Church of England’s statement on human sexuality. She says:

Firstly, the mode of thinking employed here, namely an appeal to

natural law, sees a prescriptive statement arise from a descriptive

statement about the world. They are moving from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’.

The authors of Issues are moving from statements which they present as

fact―that children may result from sexual intercourse or that male/female

anatomy fits together for procreation―to arguing that this prescribes

appropriate moral action, namely heterosexual union. This would be

considered an illogical transition to a different type of statement.

(Evans 2024, p. 255)

Preservationists would instead see the transition that Evans describes as both logical procedure and standard practice. There is congruency between “what is” and “what ought to be.” The argument rejecting the move from “is” to “ought” would be a strange, meritless one from the preservationist perspective. Moreover, revisionists who oppose an argument from “is” to “ought” fail to show how their arguments from “is not” to “ought” are more adequate.

Heterosexual morphology, reproductive biology, and procreation are taken in preservationist thinking as empirically attested phenomena whose verification of the exclusive normativity of heterosexuality can only be denied at the sacrifice of reason (Ramsey Colloquium 2006, pp. 128–29; Levin 2006, pp. 132–33). Preservationists, moreover, understand that these verifiers have an absolute reference point. Peters is again helpful at this point. His “basic” or “biological” aspects of nature refer to “cosmic” or “transcendental” aspects of nature (Peters 2017, pp. 305–6). Those who deny that certain “basic” or “biological” aspects of nature verify that heterosexuality is exclusively normative must also necessarily maintain that “cosmic” or “transcendental” grounds for these aspects of nature do not exist. This denial frequently takes the more generic form of arguing that there are no absolutes or that truth does not exist. Jung addresses this denial in the context of moral belief. He does not explicitly and directly speak of a preservationist Christian sexual ethic but refers in a general way to the challenge the preservationist perspective faces. He says:

Works by Foucault, MacIntyre, Milbank, and Stout have been

influential among many religious thinkers. Common to these

genealogists in the conviction that there is no objective way of

justifying moral beliefs. They argue that the picture of morality

obtained by their genealogies is not one of a movement toward a

single, universal morality that is intelligible and valid for all, but of

a fragmented conceptual world in which there are rival moral

traditions that vie for self-legitimation and power.

(Jung 2015, p. 20)

When Jung refers to “genealogists” he means those who choose historical, socially conditioned explanations of morality, in contrast to those who describe an “ahistorical foundation” for moral knowledge (Jung 2015, p. 19). This genealogical approach to ethics leads to the denial that one or more verifiers exist for a preservationist Christian sexual ethic.

Critics of revisionism have, in turn, maintained that it is really the revisionist Christian sexual ethic that lacks a verifier, particularly for its embrace of homosexuality as an alternative form of wholeness in human relationships and lifestyle. This criticism has been expressed at a conciliar level:

We cannot settle the dispute about the roots―genetic or environmental―of

homosexual orientation. When some scientific evidence suggests a genetic

predisposition for homosexual orientation, the case is not significantly different

from evidence of predisposition toward other traits―for example, alcoholism

or violence. In each instance we must still ask whether such a predisposition

should be acted upon or whether it should be resisted.

(Ramsey Colloquium 2006, p. 129)

We should not ignore the word “dispute” as a descriptor for this issue.

However, preservationist critics also see that this perceived problem of an absent verifier is accompanied by yet another problem for homosexual apologetics. That is the perceived problem of self-contradiction. When revisionists deny that there are verifiers for the exclusive normativity of heterosexuality, they do so on the premise that there is no external or absolute grounding for any perspective. This means that there are also no verifiers for the alternative normativity of homosexuality. Yet revisionists nevertheless argue for the normativity and acceptability of homosexuality based on human autonomy, freedom, human or civil rights, happiness, love, genetics, God’s will, intersex physiology, and other external principles, circumstances, and influences. Since they base their perspective upon absolutes after arguing that there are no absolutes, their arguments are invariably self-contradictory.

Mary Ford frames the revisionist problem within the broader context of postmodernism and ethical relativism and the challenge these movements pose. She says:

Particularly, important for our topic is the Postmodernist belief

that ‘all, or nearly all, aspects of human psychology are completely

socially determined’ (Duignan 2019), which implies that one can

choose to ‘determine’ things quite differently from the way those

coming before you have done without any detrimental effects.3 This

also implies that there is no such thing as human nature. Second, this

implies the denial that there are any ‘objective, or absolute, moral

values”—a belief also known as ethical relativism. Postmodernists

argue that because cultures have differing ethical values, none of them

can be ‘absolute,’ and no ethical values can be said to be better than others.

This is all related to the Postmodernist belief that we cannot know

anything with absolute certainty—although they perhaps hope that no one

realizes this means that their own system is just as uncertain as any other,

so why should anyone bother to accept it?

(Ford 2020, p. 301)

Ford then exposes the further problem of self-contradiction in postmodern revisionism and relativism when she observes how the way they act and speak is contrary to the claims they make. She cites their care for “the victim” as an implicit contradiction. She says:

However, Postmodernists do not really act, or promote their ideas as,

though there were no moral absolutes (this tendency to be contradictory

is characteristic). One of the major ways they obtain people’s sympathies

for their causes is to highlight the sole moral value that they do treat as an

absolute. That moral value is concern for the victim, the marginalized, the

one who has not had a voice, and/or who has been oppressed (here is one

of the important connections of Postmodernism with Marxism and the

Marxist reading of the philosopher Hegel).

(Ford 2020, p. 302)

I think that there are other moral values besides concern for the victim that revisionists or postmodernists treat as absolutes (e.g., autonomy, acceptance, tolerance, and freedom), but Ford’s indication of inconsistency between their words and actions remains a valid point.

David Detmer also addresses the perceived problem of self-contradiction in revisionist thinking when he refers to their embrace of relativism and social constructionism. He says, “The first point to be made about this form of relativism is that it appears to be self-referentially inconsistent.” He continues, saying, “to put the point another way, social constructionism seems to be an incoherent doctrine: it asserts what it denies and denies what it asserts and thus fails to communicate any clear meaning at all” (Detmer 2003, pp. 37, 38). Despite revisionists’ denial of engaging in self-contradiction, preservationists insist that they are, and revisionists have not been able to argue them into silence.

5. The Question of Truth

Since the question of truth lurks in the background of this discussion, it should be addressed more directly. Plantinga defines “truth” as “the way things are” (emphasis original) (Plantinga 2000, p. 425). He certainly rejects postmodernist claims that there is no truth and “that there are no ‘objective’ moral standards” (Plantinga 2000, p. 424). Plantinga particularly rejects Rorty’s assertion that “truth cannot be out there” because “sentences cannot so exist, or be out there” (Plantinga 2000, p. 434).4 In summary form, Rorty contended that truths are sentences, sentences are human creations and, therefore, truths are human creations (Plantinga 2000, p. 434). Plantinga’s objections to Rorty are (1) that sentences are not the only things that are true or false, “Beliefs are also true or false” (emphasis original) (Plantinga 2000, p. 434), and (2) for a sentence to be true (i.e., ‘there were once dinosaurs’), there must have been something “out there” that we did not create (i.e., dinosaurs) (Plantinga 2000, p. 435). This is a correspondence theory of truth. Although Plantinga is not in this context discussing preservationist Christian sexual ethics, such ethics are based upon this understanding of truth. Social constructivism, an opposing take on the truth, has emerged in revisionist thinking.

6. The Constructivist Theme

Butler maintains that the norms that undergird heterosexuality, masculinity, femininity, and even gender and sexual differences are socially constructed. That is, they are not grounded in a fixed, external rule like nature, biology, anatomy, or morphology, but they are constructed by a shifting network of politically invested humans. In her words, a norm is a “socially produced and variable framework” (Butler 2015, p. 46). Masculinity, for example, is a “fragile and fallible construct” (Butler 2015, p. 90). By implication, the same is true of femininity. She had earlier referred to these norms as “fictions” and “hallucinatory” (Butler 1999, pp. xv, 6, 44). She refers to the manufacturers of these norms in various ways, as “juridical systems of power,” “the state,” “the cultural matrix of power relations,” “structures that support normalcy,” and “various social supports” (Butler 1999, p. 4, 2015, pp. 90, 95, 116).

A problem for Butler is that she recognizes the need for norms, such as when we hold criminals accountable for breaking the law. However, if norms have no grounding outside of a social matrix, how do we justify them even for subjecting criminals to “normalizing procedure”? Butler seems to settle on “collective contexts” in which we agree on “modes of deliberation and reflection” as the only grounding available (Butler 2015, p. 36). Butler’s forum of justification, therefore, seems normatively if not morally equivalent to “the state” or “cultural matrix of power relations,” which she critiques.

Still, she says, “Through recourse to norms, the sphere of the humanly intelligible is circumscribed, and this circumscription is consequential for any ethics and any conception of social transformation” (Butler 2015, p. 36). She calls this “the doubleness of the norm” (Butler 2015, p. 206). Butler contends for the inclusion of homosexuality, transsexuality, “queer-crossings,” and non-monogamous “kinship” arrangements in “the sphere of the humanly intelligible” (Butler 2015, pp. 6, 80, 115). She means that these practices should be considered “normal” and that those involved in these practices should be “recognized” and treated as humans (Butler 2015, pp. 2, 336). But for Butler, the acts of “recognition” and “humanization” cannot happen without “normalizing.” Butler also includes intersex persons in this sphere (Butler 2015, p. 4), although intersexuality is an anatomical matter and not a sexual practice or behavior (Wendland 2020, p. 10).

Butler struggles to argue for the norms of self-determination, social transformation, the human, freedom, a livable life, autonomy, intelligibility, and recognition for homosexual persons and others “who live at some distance from gender norms” (Butler 2015, pp. 7, 13, 21, 22, 31, 33, 39, 117, 207), but seemingly she has no grounds for doing so beyond a “collective context” to make her case. In other words, by virtue of her own argument, these notions as well as her notions of “the state,” “homosexual normalcy,” and “multiple genders,” appear just as “variable,” “socially produced,” “fictive,” “free-floating,” and “hallucinatory” as the gender binary, heterosexual norms she rejects (Butler 2015, p. 31). Under these circumstances, there can be no verifier for either a preservationist or revisionist sexual ethic.

Yet Butler and others argue as if homosexuality is normative and that there are absolute grounds for this normativity. Regarding a previous work, Butler says, “My effort was to combat forms of essentialism which claimed that gender is a truth that is somehow there, interior to the body, as a core or as an internal essence, something that we cannot deny, something which, natural or not, is treated as given” (Butler 2015, p. 212). It seems that Butler thinks that she was telling the truth when she denied that “gender is a truth that is somehow there.” It seems that she believes that she is telling the truth when she characterizes norms like heterosexuality and gender as social constructs. If she is doing what she seems to be doing, it is hard to see how she is not implicitly contradicting herself. She seems to be presupposing an external, objective standpoint to say that there are no external, objective standpoints.

We can see that each side of the debate has its own problems. Normally, a problem on one side would provide an advantage for the opposing side. From a hypothetically disinterested point of view, that does not seem to be the case in this debate. From this view, it would seem that evidence does not matter as much as politics, and truth does not matter as much as ideology in this particular cultural climate, and in the clash between preservationist and revisionist Christian sexual ethics.

7. The Preservationist Resistance

Preservationists nevertheless insist that there is external verification for the exclusive normativity of heterosexuality. The different but complementary morphology of male and female bodies is baseline confirmation of exclusive heterosexual normativity. Reproductive biology has nothing other than a heterosexual form in the human species and, for that matter, most other species. From these phenomena and processes, the exclusive normativity of heterosexuality is more than obvious to some, it is axiomatic.

The preservationist Christian sexual ethic is not the natural law argument, an argument originally informed by medieval science, medieval social perspective, medieval ecclesial tradition, and medieval biblical interpretation, but like natural law, the preservationist perspective recognizes the foundational significance of nature as a guide for normative behavior. In that regard, it may be considered an heir of natural law. Jung acknowledged that any comparison between intuitionism (commonsense morality) and natural law is complicated by the variety of natural law interpretations and the disagreements between them, yet there is, generally speaking, convergence between natural law and intuitionism on the shared belief that “natural facts” have “ethical significance” and that most human beings are rationally able to discern moral truth by reflecting upon nature (Jung 2015, p. 134).

Thomas Aquinas held that the natural law includes all that to which human beings are naturally inclined, especially the inclination to self-preservation, doing good, and acting according to reason. Aquinas said:

Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in

accordance with the nature which he has in common with all

substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation

of its own being, according to nature: and by reason of this inclination,

whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its

obstacles, belongs to the natural law.

(Aquinas 2006, Summa Theologica 2A. Q94. Art.2)

Aquinas drew upon Aristotle (Phys 2.1) to explain the meaning of natural. “We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord with nature” (2A. Q31. Art.7). Aquinas referred to preservation of the species through sexual intercourse alongside preservation of the body through food, drink, and sleep as natural (2A. Q31. Art.7). The union of male and female is natural and is required by nature to procreate (1. Q98. Art.2).

Homosexuality is against reason and against nature (2A. Q94. Art. 3). Whether male with male or female with female, as the Apostle describes in Rom 1:27, homosexuality is against right, reason, and nature (2B. Q154. Art 11). The prohibitions against homosexuality and bestiality would occur by natural reason (commonsense) even if they were not included in the Mosaic Law–Lev 18:22–23 (2A. Q100. Art 11).

Paul Gondreau maintains that Aquinas is of highest importance for us because “his position on sexual difference adheres closely at all points to human biology.” Aquinas is invaluable for recovery of an “old” and “saner philosophy of sexuality” (Gondreau 2021, p. 179). Gondreau acknowledges that Aquinas’ understanding of sexual difference is based upon Aristotle’s outdated biology (i.e., the idea that women are “vir occasionatus”) (Gondreau 2021, pp. 180, 181).5 Nevertheless, Gondreau says, “By insisting that the differences between male and female, man and woman, are grounded au fond in human biology (even a faulty biology), Thomas Aquinas aligns himself with the position that today we would consider a truly scientific one.” Gondreau bases his views upon recent breakthroughs in “neurobiology and genomics” that “unequivocally confirm the biological basis of binary sexual difference” (Gondreau 2021, p. 180).

For his neurobiological and genomic discussion, Gondreau draws upon Geary (2021), Cahill (2017), Sax (2017), and Murray (2020) (Gondreau 2021, pp. 189 n47, 190 n48). Gondreau provides details about differences in male/female brain size, in cellular structures within male/female brains that are connected to brain functioning and sensory response, and in “hardwired biological adaptations for parenting” in girls that are missing in boys and men, although these differences lessen with age (Gondreau 2021, p. 190). He moreover calls attention to differences in “wiring” between the hemispheres of male/female brains that determine levels of “left-brain” or “left-right brained” thinking (Gondreau 2021, pp. 190–91). He also discusses hormonal differences (testosterone vs. oxytocin) that shape sexuality and interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, he affirms that these differences between male and female brains are complementary and originate in the prenatal period (Gondreau 2021, p. 192). Gondreau, like others, shows that advocation of the exclusive normativity of heterosexuality is not just based on casual pedestrian observations, but on extensive, scientific studies. These studies, by extension, become verifiers of heterosexual normativity.

8. Genetics and Homosexuality

Revisionists have tried to answer these scientific observations with their own biological or genetic reasons for homosexuality. Despite revisionist claims about the conclusiveness of the scientific evidence, preservationists and others have found these claims untenable. Pieter Labuschagne, for example, draws upon McHugh and Mayer to challenge these claims. He says:

McHugh and Mayer (2016, pp. 8, 86) point out that the born-that-way

hypothesis—sexual identity is biologically determined—is an

oversimplification of the matter and is not supported by scientific

evidence. An opposing view of born-that-way is that sexual

orientation is a free choice.

(Labuschagne 2021, p. 3)

Jeffrey Satinover brings science and theology into dialogue on the issue of homosexuality, but it may be that his most compelling arguments have to do with genetic science. He observes that genetic traits are coded in the body by genes, which are “divided into twenty-three pairs of matched, physically distinct structures called chromosomes” (Satinover 1996, p. 72). These genetic pairings are the basis of inherited genetic traits, but not all innate traits are genetic. Behavioral traits can be influenced by genetics, but that does not mean that the traits themselves are genetic. Satinover provides the examples of “when tall athletic individuals become basketball players or when short athletic people become jockeys” (Satinover 1996, p. 75). Satinover makes the distinction between genetic and behavioral traits to show what it would really take to prove the existence of “a gay gene.” In short, it would take years of work, millions of dollars, and the testing of human subjects numbering in the tens of thousands to prove the existence of a “gay gene.” No study of homosexuality has even come close to meeting these requirements (Satinover 1996, p. 76).6 However, a good beginning would be “identical twin studies.” The procedure that Satinover projects is too complicated and variable to rehearse here, but he does have what I would call a “bottom line.” He says:

If ‘homosexuality is genetic,’ as activists and their media

supporters repeatedly claim, the concordance rate between

identical twins―that is, the incidence of the two twins either

both being homosexual or both being heterosexual―will be

100 percent. There would never be a discordant pair―a pair

with one homosexual twin and one heterosexual twin.

(Satinover 1996, p. 83)

The results of the few identical twin studies that have allegedly proven a genetic basis for homosexuality have had concordance rates of less than 50 percent (Satinover 1996, p. 84). After comparing other studies, Satinover arrives at another “bottom line.” The concordance rates that emerge, however small they are, are better understood as indicators of environmental and social–cultural influences (Satinover 1996, pp. 89, 93). Satinover does not rule out the possibility of “biologic,” “innate,” or “genetic” contributors to homosexuality (analogous to how height and athleticism may predispose someone to playing basketball), but states that it is choice and environment, not genetics, that determines homosexual behavior (Satinover 1996, p. 117).

Satinover calls attention to the practical implications of these investigations. He notably highlights the documented, but suppressed, evidence that homosexuality can sometimes be “healed.” He acknowledges the educational loss that results from this censorship. He observes, “Since the professional normalization of homosexuality, we no longer hear of the many successful programs that continue to ‘cure’ homosexuality nor of the deeply moving stories of those who have successfully negotiated this difficult passage” (Satinover 1996, pp. 169–70). Satinover is especially committed to addressing the spiritual dimension of healing in the treatment of homosexuality. While “secular” approaches to therapy have a significant success rate, he attributes the most effective treatments to faith-based programs because of their focus upon spirituality (Satinover 1996, pp. 196–97).

Neurobiological, genetic, and other scientific data serve as verifiers for the preservationist position on human sexuality, but the natural law argument would be a vindicator. There are other vindicators for the preservationist perspective as well, such as Scripture and commonsense.

9. Scripture as Battlefield and Vindicator

Preservationist Christian ethics is richly informed by the Bible. Scriptures like Gen 2:23–24; 19:1–11; Lev 18:22; 20:13; Deut 22:5; Rom 1:24–27; 1 Cor 6:9, and 1 Tim 1:10 are frequently referred to as touchstones in the development of a biblical position on human sexuality. Preservationists find that the Scriptures certainly convey an overwhelmingly negative view of homosexuality. Revisionists have responded to this situation. One procedure is to sacralize references to homosexuality in Scripture. The Levitical texts are particularly said to refer not to unadorned homosexuality, but to sexual acts that occur in the context of idolatrous worship or temple prostitution (Boswell 1981, pp. 100–2). The goal is to draw a distinction between the “sacred” homosexuality of ancient times and homosexuality in the alleged contemporary context of loving relationship between two consenting adults.

Another type of argument delimits references to homosexuality in the Scripture. The Pauline texts are particularly said to refer not to homosexuality but to “homosexual acts committed by heterosexual persons” (Boswell 1981, p. 109), or to specific cases like pederasty (Scroggs 1983, pp. 116, 120). Much is also made of the circumstance that the biblical writers know nothing of sexual orientation, and allegedly this alone makes their references to homosexuality irrelevant for homosexual relations today (Brownson 2013, pp. 229, 255). However, preservationist Christian ethicists would maintain that there is no evidence that these references to homosexuality refer only to homosexual acts in specific contexts like idolatrous worship, temple prostitution, or pederastic relationships. Even if they did, there is no justification for believing that the Bible drives a wedge between unadorned homosexuality and these more specialized homosexual expressions (Gagnon 2003, p. 204; McQuilkin 1995, p. 250). Preservationists maintain that even if the biblical writers were fully versed in the idea of homosexual orientation, it would make no difference in their assessment of homosexuality (Davis 2004, p. 130; McQuilkin 1995, p. 253).

Preservationists note those who make much of the non-occurrence of the word “homosexual” in the Bible (Boswell 1981, p. 92). They see this as an attempt to obscure the occurrence in the Bible of the idea or concept that we today call “homosexuality.” The Greek terms malakoi and arsenokoitai (1 Cor 6:9; 1 Tim 1:10) are clear references to homosexuality (McQuilkin 1995, p. 252; Davis 2004, pp. 127–28). Preservationists also criticize what they perceive as attempts to evade the evidence. For example, it is argued that the people of Sodom in Gen 19:1–11 were not condemned for their homosexuality, but for their lack of hospitality (Boswell 1981, pp. 91–94). However, the threat of homosexual rape (Gen 19:5) is strongly implied in the text (Otey 2024, p. 33; McQuilkin 1995, p. 251; Davis 2004, pp. 122–23).7

Preservationist Christian ethicists acknowledge that Jesus did not speak directly about homosexuality (Grenz 1998, pp. 60–61). They make this acknowledgement in response to revisionists who take this to mean that Jesus would not have disapproved of homosexuality. Jesus did not speak directly about homosexuality because the status of both heterosexuality and homosexuality were unquestioned axioms in his culture (Gagnon 2000, pp. 207–8; Grenz 1998, p. 61). All of Jesus’s references to sexuality and marriage presuppose the exclusive normativity of heterosexuality (Matt 19:1–9; Mark 10:2–9; John 4:16–18).

Preservationists nevertheless surmise that Jesus’s response to homosexuality and homosexual persons would have been no different than his response to everyone else. That response was unconditional acceptance with an invitation to transformation. As the saying goes, “Jesus accepts us as we are, but Jesus does not leave us as we are” (Lucado [1998] 2003, pp. 4, 174; Waters 1998, p. 5).8

The prohibitions of Leviticus 18:22; 20:13 and exclusive normativity of heterosexuality were never questioned by Jesus, nor the culture that surrounded him (McQuilkin 1995, p. 251). The same could be said about Paul the Apostle and his formative culture (1 Cor 9:5; Eph 5:21–33; 1 Tim 3:2; Titus 1:6; 2:4).9 All of Paul’s references to sexuality and marriage also presupposed the exclusive normativity of heterosexuality (1 Cor 7:1–16; Eph 5:21–33). However, unlike Jesus, Paul travelled the Roman Empire, and in these travels, he became aware of sexual practices that were “against nature” (Rom 1:27). Paul, therefore, spoke directly of homosexuality, and not merely of homosexuality as a component of idolatrous worship, temple prostitution, or pederasty (Rom 1:24–27; 1 Cor 6:9; 1 Tim 1:10). He spoke of homosexuality as an unqualified, undifferentiated phenomenon (Gagnon 2000, p. 204; McQuilkin 1995, pp. 252–53). Moreover, Paul’s teaching in Gal 3:28 does not call for the erasure of ethnic and gender identity, although it requires the erasure of social hierarchy and, therefore, slavery. Paul here speaks of our unity and equality in Christ, not the erasure of ethnic and gender identity.

10. Commonsense as Vindicator

Preservationists also see mainstream commonsense as a vindicator of their perspective.10 This is not a recent stance. Decades ago, Ruth Tiffany Barnhouse made the commonsense observation, “while it is true that sexuality is not reducible to its biological aspects, it is inarguable that the heterosexual disposition is that which biology dictates, and unless there is an inhibiting disturbance in the acculturation process, people do not become fixed in an adult homosexual adaptation” (Barnhouse 1977, p. 156).

Commonsense is a set of inherited, widely affirmed communal notions and convictions. Commonsense is frequently characterized in revisionist thinking as a non-reflective, non-critical, unquestioned legacy (Clifton-Soderstrom 2017, p. 108). Preservationists reject this characterization. They seize upon history and social science to show that commonsense is the culmination of a long, arduous process of dialogue, reflection, trial and error, and critique (Neuhaus 1991). In their view, commonsense is shaped, vindicated, and validated by generations of experience. It is the shared depository of history and inherited tradition. It is tested by time. It is self-critical and self-correcting. It is proven by its results. Commonsense, characterized as a mainstream attribute, is another source of reliable knowledge.

However, there are more refined views of commonsense that are acknowledged. William Hathaway uses the terms “common sense,” “moral sense,” “natural moral sense,” and “common sense moral realism” interchangeably. He holds that “the moral sense, like the other senses, involve a God given ability to perceive a true aspect of the external world” (Hathaway 2001, p. 245). Hathaway is helpful in disavowing the notion that commonsense is consensus. The natural moral sense can produce beliefs that are “not widely held” (Hathaway 2001, p. 241). Hathaway’s treatment of commonsense establishes it as a valid means of knowledge and moral guidance.

Jung also upholds a refined view of commonsense as a base of knowledge and moral guidance. He argues, “that there exists a morality that can be known to all rationally capable human beings and that is true of all cultures and societies. I shall call this morality ‘commonsense morality’” (Jung 2012, p. 560). Jung further argues, “commonsense morality holds that there are some self-evident moral truths that are knowable a priori. It is these moral truths that ought to play a central role in the justification of other moral beliefs” (Jung 2012, p. 565–66). Jung refers to the theory behind commonsense morality as “ethical intuitionism” or simply “intuitionism” (Jung 2012, p. 560).

In his more comprehensive work, Jung expounds upon foundationalism as the view “that there are some basic beliefs whose justification does not depend upon other beliefs, and that every justified belief depends directly or indirectly for its justification on these basic beliefs” (Jung 2015, p. 15). Jung acknowledges that most philosophers writing in the postmodern continental tradition have “assailed” foundationalism (Jung 2015, p. 15). Jung, however, argues that foundationalism is a viable theory of ethical knowledge and the most widely accepted method of defending objective, justifiable belief (Jung 2015, p. 41).

Contrary to the critics, contemporary foundationalist thought does not claim to be infallible nor free from error (Jung 2015, pp. 31–32). Foundationalists can accept that some beliefs are socially constructed without denying that other beliefs are cognitively non-inferential (Jung 2015, p. 36). Foundationalism is based on a “moral realism” that is not grounded in Wittgensteinian “language games” or the Christian’s social world (Jung 2015, pp. 49, 54), but in “the existence of moral properties independent of human attitudes.” For Jung, these properties are “perceived,” and not merely “conceived” (Jung 2015, p. 63).

Jung criticizes the notions that morality is the fruit of emotions (Jung 2015, pp. 78, 87). He contends that moral intuitions are “intellectual perceptions” (Jung 2015, p. 88). He also criticizes ethical naturalism, the idea that moral beliefs and practices can be explained by reference to a “naturalistic worldview” or “empirically explainable phenomena” (Jung 2015, pp. 98–99). For cognitive naturalists, these phenomena are natural properties existing in the natural world; for non-cognitive naturalists, these phenomena exist in human attitudes (Jung 2015, pp. 105, 110). The former fail to satisfactorily answer the question of “ought.” The latter are practically indistinguishable from social constructivists (Jung 2015, p. 107).

Jung defends intuitionism as a viable alternative to ethical naturalism (Jung 2015, p. 112). Moral intuitions are “evidential grounds for moral knowledge.” They are “intellectual perceptions” that involve “rational reflection.” Jung says, “intuitionists believe that moral facts supervene upon natural facts” (Jung 2015, p. 110).

Jung argues for “a universal, objective morality” that does not depend upon someone’s moral tradition, social practice, or linguistic context, a morality that is “more congruent with how most ordinary people come to make basic moral judgments,” “a morality which all human beings share by virtue of being human.” Jung calls this stance “commonsense morality.” Intuitionism is the ethical bedrock of this morality (Jung 2015, pp. 117–18).

Jung holds that “commonsense knowledge” is comprised of propositions that can be received as true based on intuitions (Jung 2015, p. 120). Jung defines these intuitions as “initial appearances of things to our consciousness.” They could be understood as “direct apprehension” of a concept, property, or relation, or as the property of “intuitiveness” in propositions, arguments, and “other intellectual phenomena” (Jung 2015, pp. 118–19). Intuitions are non-inferential and non-propositional beliefs, and as such, they are evidence for “some basic moral truths” (Jung 2015, pp. 119, 125). Within these theoretical parameters, preservationists affirm commonsense as a reliable guide for moral belief and normative sexual practice.

Preservationist Christian ethicists clearly dispute both the claim that they lack a verifier for the exclusive normativity of heterosexuality and that they have no vindicators for their thought. Their challenge, however, is to persuade the general population, mostly in North America and Europe, that the preservationist view of human sexuality is our most accurate and defensible account of human sexuality as it should be.

11. The Revisionist Perspective

On the other hand, revisionists insist that their arguments for homosexuality as an alternative form of normative sexuality are sound, coherent, and consistent. These arguments are countercultural, anti-authoritarian, and revolutionary. They reflect the spirit of the times. They appeal to a new generation. They break new ground and require unconventional ways of expression. We can see these sentiments implied in the way Vicki Kirby defends Butler against harsh criticism:

Not surprisingly, the reception of Butler’s prolific contribution

to theoretical and political life depends on the importance attributed

to such concerns. However, for those who appreciate the associated

difficulties that must attend it—the sometimes awkward expression, the

tendency toward ambiguity and open-ended conclusions, the technical

terms and so on—there is a readiness to perceive the business of

interpretation as a working opportunity to redefine the field of value and

possibility. For others, however, the difficulty can be put down to

‘bad writing’, and Butler is routinely accused of this by those who

denigrate certain styles of political and theoretical criticism, and by

other academics, often on the left, who regard the use of ‘alienating

language’ as an abrogation of social responsibility.

(Kirby 2006, p. 130)

What appears then to be “bad writing” is only an appearance in this case. Those who look deeper see otherwise.

Revisionists will further argue that homosexuality exists in nature, therefore, homosexuality is natural. On the other hand, whether something is normal is an arbitrary matter of social convention (Gould 2007, p. 534). It has little or nothing to do with nature.

James Gould comments on one definition of “natural” as “based upon the operations of the physical world.” He argues, “If this is the case, then homosexuality is not unnatural, for animals are part of the physical world, and such mammals as mountain goats are well known for their homosexual behavior, as are other creatures” (Gould 2007, p. 534). This would seem to be a bedrock justification for homosexuality in past and present culture.

In recent times, there has been interest in establishing a genetic basis for homosexuality. Apparently, it is felt that this would prove once and for all that homosexuality is not a matter of choice, but a predetermined orientation. Julia Smith is representative of the case made for homosexual orientation based on biology and genetics. She says, “While sexual orientation has no single or simple causation, a considerable body of research has established that orientation is affected by genetic, hormonal, and even epigenetic processes” (J. Smith 2021b, p. 299).

Smith refers to the findings of Bailey et al. (2016), Roselli (2018), and five others to support her statement. She names correlates that indicate biological factors for homosexual orientation, such as fraternal birth order, ratio of index to ring finger (similar to straight women in gay men and to straight men in gay women), prenatal hormones with slight variations in androgen/estrogen levels, “maternal immune response,” “maternal stress during gestation,” and “prenatal exposure of synthetic chemicals” (J. Smith 2021b, p. 299). She concludes that “Biological processes effect sexual orientation even from the earliest weeks of human life. While not ruling out a potential role for cultural factors, such findings suggest that same-sex orientation is a given and not a choice” (J. Smith 2021b, p. 300). Smith’s observations are significant because a genetic basis for homosexuality would serve as a verifier for homosexual orientation.

Moreover, Scripture has not been abandoned in revisionist ethics. Interpreters have tried to vindicate the revisionist perspective by uncovering homosexual and other alterity models in Scripture. This comes under the heading of “queer readings” of the Bible (Vorster 2012, p. 607). Using a “hermeneutic of cispicion,” Georgia Day suggests that Jesus was an intersex transman (Day 2023, p. 175). Eric Smith uses a form of “queer reading” to argue that 1 Cor 11:17–31 is Paul’s rebuke of a Corinthian congregation who abandoned the “queer meal” practice that Paul himself advocated (E. C. Smith 2021a, p. 121). Clarissa Breu interprets the metaphor of female seed in Rev 12:17 as biblical support for “queer kinship,” in accordance with Butler’s idea of the imaginary phallus and its reterritorialization (Breu 2022, pp. 98, 100). Revisionists, therefore, claim verifiers of their own in genetic science, with Scripture as a vindicator.

Revisionists do not seem to have a comparable role for commonsense in their deliberations. Usually, when they refer to commonsense, they do so in adversarial terms. Michelle Clifton-Soderstrom, for example, disavows “commonsense assumptions around gender and sexuality that exclusively privilege dominant voices” (Clifton-Soderstrom 2017, p. 102). She especially rejects “three commonsense assumptions,” namely, that “Gender is binary, sex is primarily for procreation, and Christian marriage is between a man and a woman” (Clifton-Soderstrom 2017, p. 108). In this context, Clifton-Soderstrom and other revisionists seem to be referring to a mainstream understanding of commonsense, and not to the more refined understanding we encounter in intuitionist Christian ethics. However, it appears that revisionists would also reject the more refined intuitionist understanding of commonsense as well.

12. A Way Forward, Maybe

As someone who is convinced by the way preservationists frame their understanding of normative human sexuality, I am also convinced that this perspective is sufficiently verified by nature and science, and sufficiently vindicated by Scripture, natural law theory, and commonsense. My reference to nature and science includes medical, biological, neurological, genetic, and psychological studies. However, I also realize that there are at least some in the revisionist camp who will not be persuaded by preservationist arguments, just as there are at least some in the preservationist camp who will not be persuaded by revisionist arguments. Nevertheless, I am still interested in finding a way past the deadlock, however small the step might be.

It may be that a way forward lies not in a verifier, but in a vindicator. I am not speaking of a way forward in proving the truth of preservationist sexual morality. That can only be accomplished by apprehending a verifier, and I think this has been accomplished despite the denials. I am speaking of a way forward in gaining more support for the preservationist perspective. That might be accomplished by calling attention to a vindicator.

In more recent times, relative to this article, we have opportunity to ponder a vindicator like the results of the November 2024 presidential election in the United States.11 In this election there were both preservationists and revisionists on the winning side, and both preservationists and revisionists on the losing side. The divide between preservationists and revisionists does not occur along political party lines (de la Fuente and Erickson 2024). Nevertheless, the narrow majority vote and political commentary in the aftermath seem to indicate a rejection of revisionist thinking.

Like other commentators, Shane Goldmacher addressed this situation diplomatically in terms of the Democratic Party being “out of touch.” He said that “Evidence abounds that the party’s brand is seen as out of touch with the country’s concerns. Voters in a recent New York Times and Ipsos poll said they believed the two most important issues to the Democratic Party were abortion and L.G.B.T.Q. policy―neither of which were among the five most important issues to voters overall” (Goldmacher 2025, p. A1). This kind of evidence also explains low Democratic voter turnout in 2024 (Battistoni et al. 2025, p. 47).

Matthew Continetti also suggested a public disavowal of the revisionist perspective, which he described as “doubling down on identity politics.” He said:

The Democrats’ polls are dismal, too. According to CNN,

48 percent of Americans hold an unfavorable view of the Democrats.

According to Qunnipiac, that number is 57 percent. YouGov’s

tracking polls put Democratic unfavorables at 59 percent.

Yet numbers don’t capture the full extent of the problem.

Democratic elites are doubling down on identity politics

at precisely the moment when the public is telling them to stop.

(Continetti 2025, p. 10)

When Continetti called attention to a New York Times poll, he further clarified his reference to “identity politics”:

The poll asked Americans to name Democratic party

priorities. Voters replied that the Democrats stand for

abortion rights and LGBTQ rights, and oppose climate

change―which is a fair summary of what Democratic

elected officials and their media chorus talk about daily.

(Continetti 2025, p. 10)

Notably, this slight shift in American politics appears to be part of a global populist movement, as acknowledged by commentators like Jonah Goldberg. He said, “For instance, another important factor is that MAGA is part of a larger global phenomenon. Populism and nationalism have been on the rise in Europe, Latin America, and India” (Goldberg 2025).

This circumstance of possible preservationist resurgence should not be overstated. The shoe has been on the other foot. A rejection of preservationist thinking occurred a decade earlier in the United States. On 26 June 2015, when the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in favor of the plaintiff in the landmark case Obergefell v. Hodges and legalized “same-sex marriage” nationwide, we saw widespread affirmation of revisionist thinking. There have been other events at the center of political and ideological shifts in the United States relating to human sexuality, such as the Stonewall Inn Uprising in New York City’s Greenwich Village on 28 June 1969 and the American Psychiatric Association’s removal of homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders list of personality disorders in December 1973. Preservationists should also not ignore the possibility that the results of the 2024 presidential election may portend future developments in both domestic and foreign policy that are unwanted by majorities in both preservationist and revisionist circles.

In any case, a small political and ideological shift occurred leading up to the 2024 presidential election in America and elections in other countries. This may show that the arena for establishing a prevailing perspective on human sexuality may not be that of empirical evidence and truth, but that of politics and ideology, at least for the time being. I am not implying that this is a satisfactory or favorable possibility. That is because this would seem to be yielding to unstable political and ideological shifts as the ground for moral guidance and education. Nevertheless, as unsatisfactory and unfavorable as this appears, it may be all we can have at this time.

In the meantime, we can still hope that in the future there will be a more cognitively grounded shift toward the preservationist perspective (this pivotal occurrence may even become a verifier). Ethical engagement with the issue of normative human sexuality must continue with this hope before us if for no other reason than because grassroots cognitive stability on an ethical issue is preferable to unstable political and ideological shifts. In this case, grassroots cognitive stability only requires a critical mass of popular consent and support. Since achieving a critical mass of popular consent and support may be possible, Christian ethicists are obligated to keep trying to achieve it.

13. Conclusions

In this article, I have tried to let the preservationist perspective on Christian sexual ethics speak for itself, but in dialogue with the revisionist perspective. I have done so by drawing out the broad contours of preservationist thought as illustrated by insights from selected panelists. Those insights are the congruency between the normal and the natural, the exclusively heterosexual prerequisite for human procreation; heterosexual morphology, reproductive biology, and again procreation as clear verifiers for the preservationist view of human sexuality; the specialized insights of the physical, psychological, and medical sciences as verifiers, and the vindicating support of Scripture, natural law theory, and commonsense. Even though I do not claim to be impartial, I have also tried to give the revisionist side a hearing as well. Revisionists make the case for the socially constructed character of gender, gender roles, and gender behavior, the existence of homosexuality in nature, a genetic basis for homosexuality, and homosexual and other alternate sexual models in Scripture. They openly reject what they consider to be mainstream commonsense assumptions about gender, sexuality, and marriage.

The problem of the preservationist perspective is the perceived elusiveness of a verifier that would totally deflate the revisionist position. The revisionist position also has its problems, such as the perceived lack of a verifier for its claims as well as the perceived recurrence of inconsistency and self-contradiction. From a hypothetically disinterested point of view, none of these problems have put their respective sides at an overwhelming disadvantage. The two sides appear to be at a stalemate in the current cultural climate. Yet politically and ideologically speaking, there may have been a slight majority shift in 2024 toward rejection of the revisionist perspective. If this was in fact the case, this would mean the emergence of a vindicator for preservationists in the form of a political event. At least some preservationists might wish for more substantial progress at the grassroots cognitive level. For the time being, a fickle change in the political climate may be the best we can have. But this is no reason to abandon the quest for more widespread cognitive consent to a preservationist Christian ethic of human sexuality.