Relationship Between Science and Religion in Wittgenstein’s Collection of Nonsense

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Overall, this is an interesting, helpful discussion about the relationship between science and religion from a Wittgensteinian perspective.

I do, though, have some minor suggestions and one significant concern.

1. It’s unclear from the Abstract and Introduction what the author intends to establish. In the Abstract, the intent is three-fold:

• • Using interpretations of the concept of nonsense given by McGuinness, the author will demonstrate why two items in the collection are nonsensical.
  • The author will show that these two items fit perfectly into different ideas of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion proposed by Pichler, Schönbaumsfeld, Somavilla, and Sunday Greve.
  • The author will note historical and modern cases showing a dysfunctional relationship between science and religion.

However, in the Introduction, the number of items to be considered is different, one goal is not mentioned (historical/modern cases), and a new goal is added (Wittgenstein’s rejection of some science/religion relationships).

• • The author will present three items in NC that concern both science and religion and discuss why they might be nonsensical, relying on McGuinness’s interpretation of nonsense.
  • The author will consider concepts of “Wittgensteinian” philosophy of religion that can be found by Alois Pichler, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, Ilse Somavilla, and Sebastian Sunday Greve, and see how these concepts can shed light on these items in NC.
  • The author’s main aim is to show that Wittgenstein rejected different conceptions of relationships between science and religion, i.e., how the relationship between science and religion should not be.

Moreover, the author then adds ​what I see as another key goal (pp. 12-13):

• • To point out the “intellectual obligations” ​one must fulfill if one holds both science and religious belief to be important in one’s life, and the impact of this on society as a whole.

 

Finally, there is no conclusion that summarizes the key points established. It would be very helpful for the author to clarify in the Abstract, Introduction, and a Conclusion exactly what the author intends to/has established.

2. While the Appendix is interesting, I’m not seeing how it advances the discussion on any of the key goals.  I would suggest removing it.  On a related note, while listing all 127 items in the NC is interesting, I think listing only those that touch on religion, science, or both would be sufficient.

3. A final, more concerning comment.  It is clear that the author favors Wittgenstein’s rejection of trying to make religion reasonable as one makes the sciences reasonable.  That is the author’s prerogative.  However, there are a number of highly respected philosophers (and some theologians) who have written extensively about the compatibility of religion and science. These thinkers generally argue that science and religion are not inherently in conflict, using the same criteria for reasonable belief. Some notable examples are Ian Barbour, Alvin Plantinga, John Polkinghorne, Nancey Murphy, Arthur Peacocke. It would be good for the author to at least acknowledge this fact.

Author Response

Thank you very much for your very helpful comments.

Ad 1):

The problem was that I was not quite clear on my focus when I have written the abstract. And in due course I simply did not have the strength to correct them all. But the abstract, introduction and the conclusion will be improved.

Ad 2):

While not contributing to the main argumentation, the appendix serves as making the sources transparent that not every one has access to. As for the list of items in NC, I will remove items that have nothing to do with neither science nor religion.

Ad 3):

I have only hintted on one philosopher (Otto Muck) whose approache I am very familiar of and that one is -- at least to my understanding -- not touched by Wittgenstein's analysis. Schönbaumsfeld has already critized Plantiga (and other reformed epistemologists) from a Wittgensteinian view; and I am not sure how the critique also affects other philosophers and theologians proposals. 

Nevertheless, I fully acknowledge that if I open up the bottole of the "compatibility" of science and religion, I really should acknowledge these philosophies. I will hint on more philosophers and theologians.

Thank you very much for the very helpful review!

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This paper constitutes a significant and original contribution to scholarship on the Wittgenstein papers. It sheds light on a relatively overlooked source with precision and insight. The argumentation is rigorous, the structure clear and the engagement with both primary and secondary materials effective. I am happy to recommend it for publication.

Author Response

Thank you very much!

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The text is very interesting and mkes an excellent contribution to the literature on Wittgenstein.

Author Response

Thank you very much!

Reviewer 4 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The article aims to provide evidence of significant historical resources and presents them in an ordered and analytical manner, at first stage. However, the plain presentation of the historical resources of the box that Wittegestein kept, should not be taken as correct in the way it is given. 
The contents of the box do not relate exclusively to religion and spiritualism.
Furthermore, the meaning of the classification of nonsense by Wittgenstein remains unclear, since it comes from positivism, but contains also connexions to other labels such as "rubbish." It seems that Wittgenstein took rubbish as even more problematic and more unwanted than nonsense.
The author yet, in the first two parts of the article, simply transmitts historical informations about Wittgenstein's nonsense-box, without introducing a critical eye or an analytical view to the activity related to the nonsense-box. We get the impression that Wittgenstein did not have a systematical way to collect items for that box.

The three items that author selects to comment more analytically relate to science and religion simultaneously and they are regarded as nonsensical, with a preference to McGuiness' explanation of nonsense. Unfortunately, the author does not explain why McGuiness should have more significance on this analysis. The priority is given, yet, on the narrative and the innocent presentation of the contents of the three nonsensical items. 

In part 3 the author starts the discussion of the meaning of nonsense and refers to opinions expressed by other authors. In part 4 the author finds out that Wittgenstein did not have a clear-cut definition of scientific and religious nonsense, although he tended to agree with other positivits that religion should not be easily blamed and rejected for nonsense. However, the author seems to avoid any reference and relation to preexisting or contemporary positivist acoounts of nonsense. He does not relate them to Wittgenstein, although Wittgenstein was surely influenced by them.

The real fact is that Wittgenstein was even more strict and absolute against any kind of idealism and populism, not firstly to religion. This anti-idealism was obvious in the Tractatus. Nevertheless, the author neglects to mention Wittgenstein's rejection of idealism and how this connects to populism.

At a first stage one should examine religion, science, ideology and nonsense, from the viewpoint of Wittgenstein's preference to linguistic philosophy and the role of language in the borderline between reason and virtue, betwen nature and freedom. The domain of language allows for a certain analysis of nonsense, something that really matters, not only in Tractatus but also later. 

However, the author does not compare accounts of language with those of nonsense, as other philosophers did.

In fact, the relation between religion and science is mediated by language. 

Finally, I recognize that the historical information provided is rich and important, but the analysis of this information is not so complete and so fruitful, as it could be.

Author Response

Comment to:

The article aims to provide evidence of significant historical resources and presents them in an ordered and analytical manner, at first stage. However, the plain presentation of the historical resources of the box that Wittegestein kept, should not be taken as correct in the way it is given. 
The contents of the box do not relate exclusively to religion and spiritualism.
Furthermore, the meaning of the classification of nonsense by Wittgenstein remains unclear, since it comes from positivism, but contains also connexions to other labels such as "rubbish." It seems that Wittgenstein took rubbish as even more problematic and more unwanted than nonsense.
The author yet, in the first two parts of the article, simply transmitts historical informations about Wittgenstein's nonsense-box, without introducing a critical eye or an analytical view to the activity related to the nonsense-box. We get the impression that Wittgenstein did not have a systematical way to collect items for that box.

I fully agree that the contents in Nonsense Collection is unsystematic and does not relate only to religion and science. In fact, there are items on music, on literature, on philosophy etc. that really showed Wittgenstein just collected these items more of less "out of the blue", as is stated in the article. NC was never meant as a "philosophical project" of collecting nonsensical items in the world, but rather it is meant as collection of jokes. And some of them have philosophical impacts.

 

The three items that author selects to comment more analytically relate to science and religion simultaneously and they are regarded as nonsensical, with a preference to McGuiness' explanation of nonsense. Unfortunately, the author does not explain why McGuiness should have more significance on this analysis. The priority is given, yet, on the narrative and the innocent presentation of the contents of the three nonsensical items. 

This wasn't intended, I do not think that McGuinness would have given these items a priority over others. In fact, in MacGuinness 2006 he was more concentrated on the "joke side" of the items. I am sorry for the confusion and will try to make it more clear.

 

In part 3 the author starts the discussion of the meaning of nonsense and refers to opinions expressed by other authors. In part 4 the author finds out that Wittgenstein did not have a clear-cut definition of scientific and religious nonsense, although he tended to agree with other positivits that religion should not be easily blamed and rejected for nonsense. However, the author seems to avoid any reference and relation to preexisting or contemporary positivist acoounts of nonsense. He does not relate them to Wittgenstein, although Wittgenstein was surely influenced by them.

As the paper is more on the fact that items that Wittgenstein considered nonsensical would also appear to be nonsensical accordign to Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion, I did not consider taking other Wittgensteinian notions of nonsense into account. I wanted to stick to the philosophy of religion part. And the philosophical analysis of the concept of nonsense in Wittgenstein's work is something that really belongs to another paper. It should also be emphasized that NC is not a scientific or philosophical endeavour. Also the connection between Wittgenstein to other contemporary positivists is something that in my opinion should be investigated. However, I afraid these analyses will go beyond the scope of this paper. However, I will try to hint on these connections in the paper.

 

The real fact is that Wittgenstein was even more strict and absolute against any kind of idealism and populism, not firstly to religion. This anti-idealism was obvious in the Tractatus. Nevertheless, the author neglects to mention Wittgenstein's rejection of idealism and how this connects to populism.

At a first stage one should examine religion, science, ideology and nonsense, from the viewpoint of Wittgenstein's preference to linguistic philosophy and the role of language in the borderline between reason and virtue, betwen nature and freedom. The domain of language allows for a certain analysis of nonsense, something that really matters, not only in Tractatus but also later. 

However, the author does not compare accounts of language with those of nonsense, as other philosophers did.

If I understand this comment correctly, dealing with idealism, populism, virtue / reason, nature / freedom should be important tasks in this paper. This is clearly missing in the current paper, however, I don't think adding them can make the point of paper more clear. I do acknowledge that the paper's focus can be made clearer, though.

 

In fact, the relation between religion and science is mediated by language. 

For sure, this is true for Wittgensteinian philosophers!

 

Finally, I recognize that the historical information provided is rich and important, but the analysis of this information is not so complete and so fruitful, as it could be.

I am unable to offer the complete analysis in this matter in this paper. In fact, many of the aspects that are addressed in the comments are certainly subjects in other papers in this special volume.

I thank you very much for your review and I am afraid that I will not be able to comply all the points. The main focus of the paper must be made clearer to avoid misunderstandings.

 

 

Round 2

Reviewer 4 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I understand that the article is further revised and updated. I also know that the research provided is important and precious. I recommend the publication of the improved version.