Healing Through Letting Go: On the Maturation of a Certain Conception of Medicine in Indian Buddhism
Abstract
:1. Sickness, or Emptiness, in the Vimalakīrti-Nirdeśa
Here, we will focus on one sequence in chapter 4 that leads up to the statement with which we opened that “Illness is itself Emptiness”, aiming to see how the text understands sickness. Thus, Vimalakīrti argues in Section 4.11—“For Vimalakirti mind objects, from the most concrete to the most abstract, arise from false imagination (abhūta-parikalpa); false imaginations rest on a total baselessness (apratiṣṭhāna), and this itself, in turn, has no root (VI, §6). From this it results that things, with no exception whatever, are, in the etymological sense of the word, acintya ‘not to be thought of’, and it is within this radical inconceivability that they lead to sameness (samatā) or, to be more exact, non-duality (advaya)”.
The non-dualistic philosophy of the Vimalakīrti, like most non-dual philosophies, must play a double game of affirmation and negation—on the one hand, anything that has arisen is unreal; on the other hand, it has somehow arisen. Here, the concern is with illness (vyādhi), which is explained to result from past karma, which itself “results from misperceiving things that are not true”. In fact, the point made by the text here is more specific, as the compound the text employs explains that the illness has arisen (samutthito) from the manifestation (samutthāna) of karma that results from mistaken perception (asadviparyāsa)15 with respect to an earlier limit (pūrvānta; to read—pūrvāntāsadviparyāsa-karma-samutthāna-samutthito). This means that the arising of the misperception, is one that perceives a moment of arising. Pūrvānta—earlier limit, the opposite of a later limit—aparānta, is well-known already from early texts like the Brahmajāla-sutta as referring to a mistaken assumption that something arises ex nihilo, so that it is completely new to the world as an entity that is distinguished from its causes and conditions. While in earlier texts the focus is more on personal existence, in the Mahāyāna, the term is generalized to speak of any object or event. Here, the statement leads us to the perplexing understanding that the manifestation of karma is an event of non-arising, since any distinction between earlier stages of a thing and its conditioning would be an imputation of an earlier limit (and, in effect, a later limit, a view of destruction, uccheda, to the conditions).16 Again, the world play is tantalizing, and seems unphilosophical and self-contradictory, but is designed to explain that the arising is only an event of perception, which itself appears, but has no objective reality to it. Furthermore, this act of arising, which is real as an illusion, is also the result of defilements (kleśa) that derive from and are based on conceptual construction (parikalpa).17 “Ultimately”, Vimalakīrti concludes this statement, “there is no thing (dharma) for whom this illness can be perceived”.“[A] bodhisattva who is ill should train his mind to reflect in the following manner: This illness has arisen due to the effects of past deeds resulting from misperceiving things that are not true; it has arisen due to defilements resulting from imagining things that are not real. From the point of view of ultimate truth, moreover, one cannot apprehend any real thing here which has this illness”.14
This section begins in a realistic vein, saying that “the body consists of the four great elements”. Yet because it is such an accumulation, a physical form (samucchraya) that is not constituted by itself, Mahāyāna insight takes it to be a mere conceptual construction, a product of words and mental imputation. As we see in a similar sequence in chapter 2, the concrete description of the body as impermanent, feeble, and ailing quickly leads to the notion that it is “like a magical illusion, arising from misperception; like a dream, appearing other than it is”.19 This recommends that this imputation does not take place in empty space, so to speak, but is a mental construction of something that has at least a degree of reality. There is no owner (svāmin), no gravitational center, no true agent to this complex. One should be “fully cognizant of the roots of illness”, Vimalakīrti says, meaning that what holds such material elements together is a mental construction that takes itself as real. The body is, in a way, a “real illusion”.20This body consists of the four elements, and these elements have no master, nor any one that sets them in motion, because this body lacks a self. The so-called ‘illness’ cannot be apprehended from the point of view of ultimate truth, except as a result of obsession with self. Let us remain then unobsessed with the self and fully cognizant of the roots of illness. Having thus dispensed with the idea of a self, we should entertain the idea of dharmas. This body is a collection of dharmas. It’s only dharmas arising when they arise, only dharmas ceasing when they cease. But those dharmas are not aware of each other nor do they know one another. As they arise they do not think, “We are arising,’ as they cease they do not think, ‘We are ceasing.’18
Vimalakīrti is eager to deconstruct any duality we may conceive of. Here, he focuses on that between self and other, or self and objectivity, represented by the classic denial of I and mine. There is thus no internal and external, and all becomes equal, a mere verbal designation. The final emptiness is the crucial one, between illness and emptiness. It, too, is a mere mental construction, which comes into manifestation due to the mistake of mental construction itself. It is the reality of the unreal, and as such, one can cause it to vanish if one ceases to construct it in this way.What then is the elimination of illness? It is the elimination of me and mine. And what is the elimination of me and mine? It is the cessation of duality. What then is the cessation of duality? It is non-involvement with oneself and what is external to one’s self. What then is non-involvement with oneself and what is external to one’s self? It is being unmoved and undisturbed because of sameness. And what is sameness? It is the sameness of final release together with the sameness of the self. Why? Both of these are empty, the self and final release. What are they empty of? They are empty as verbal designations. Both of them are not ultimately real, the self and final release. Seeing things as the same, he should not take illness as one thing as emptiness as another. Illness is itself emptiness”.
2. Sick Monks and Their Powers of Healing
“Are you enduring? Are you holding out? Are the painful feelings you experience receding, rather than increasing, so that their complete recession is apparent, not their increase?”
To this, the monk replies, in accord with the formulaic structure of this exchange—kacci te khamanīyaṃ kacci yāpanīyaṃ; kacci te dukkhā vedanā paṭikkamanti no abhikkamanti patikomsānaṃ paññāyati no abhikkamo’ti28
“I am not enduring, sir, not holding out; my intense, painful feelings are on the rise, not receding, so that their complete increase is apparent, not their recession”.
This formulaic exchange appears over a dozen times in the Nikāyas, with further related texts scattered in the different canonical collections.29 It is used to structure a thematic sequence in which the Buddha or one of his leading disciples goes to visit a sick monk or householder, usually on the latter’s deathbed.30 He then inquires about the sick person’s health, only to learn that his condition is deteriorating, so that heprovides a teaching that helps the sick man recover, or that allows him to die a good Buddhist death. The occasion that the text is depicting is thus that Kasspa is gravely ill, maybe even in a life-threatening situation, and that he receives a visit from the Buddha, the ultimate doctor who has penetrated the secrets of human pain, and who has thereby become an embodiment of cosmic truth and blessing. The fact that this text is used as a paritta—and was probably even designed as a paritta to begin with—a text for protective chanting, reminds us that the words are considered to carry a mantric quality, and that they are imbued with a thick religious significance, which itself derives from the unique power that the words of the fully realized being are thought to be pervaded by.31 As Salguero (2022, p. 28) says of the Buddha’s healing powers—“the Buddha usually does not resort to conventional medicines or procedures… More typically, it is his glance, his touch, his fragrance, his ability to summon protective spirits, the transformative power of his wisdom, or other such wondrous factors that heal the patient”.na me bhante khamanīyaṃ na yāpanīyaṃ; baḷhā me dukkhā vedanā abhikkamanti no paṭikkamanti abhikkamosānaṃ paññāyati no paṭikkamo’ti
“There are, Kassapa, these seven factors of awakening which have been well-taught by me, [so that when they are] cultivated and developed, lead to understanding (abhiñña), awakening (sambodha), utter calm (nibbāna).32 Which seven?
This is an extremely potent sequence of liberative understandings, qualities, and potentials of the mind, which relates to the entrance into samādhi states that in other collections can be defined as jhāna.34 Commenting on this passage, Anālayo (2017, p. 13) speaks of “the healing potential of these mental qualities”. Since this recitation helps heal these two advanced students, followed by the Buddha himself healing from illness in the following discourse, thanks to the recitation of this same passage by the monk Cunda, Anālayo suggests that “In all of these cases, it seems that the recitation helps the diseased person to recollect the qualities that led to his awakening. Such reliving of the condition of the mind at the time of awakening apparently has such a strong effect that the body emerges from its sick condition”. The force of the healing thus lies, for Anālayo, in the experience of awakening that these monks underwent, so bringing its qualities to mind is curative. “Whatever may be the last word on the psycho-physical dynamics involved”, he concludes, “there can be little doubt that this is a depiction of employing purely mental means to affect a physical healing process”.35The awakening factor of mindfulness, indeed, oh Kassapa, has been well-taught by me, [so that when it is] cultivated and developed, it leads to understanding (abhiñña), awakening (sambodha), utter calm (nibbāna). The awakening factor of analysis (of events, dhammavicaya)… of energy (vīriya)… of bliss (pīti)… of tranquility (passaddhi)… of meditative concentration (samādhi)… The awakening factor of equanimity (upekkhā) has been well-taught by me, [so that when it is] cultivated and developed, it leads to understanding, awakening, utter calm.33”
This is what the Bhagavān said. Venerable Mahākassapa was pleased and delighted in the Bhagavān’s words. And the Venerable Mahākassapa rose from that sickness, as that sickness of Venerable Mahākassapa was thereby let go of.
Hitherto, the philosophy expressed by this passage has not been appreciated well enough, since translators normally miss the subtlety of the statement that Mahākassapa and Mahāmoggalāna let go of their illness.37 The text could also be interpreted more lightly as a statement that the illness was “eliminated”, pahīna, but since pahīna is a past participle of pajahati—“to give up, renounce, forsake, abandon, eliminate, let go, get rid of”,38 the idea seems to be that the illness was subjectively and probably even consciously released, abandoned and done away with. In fact, the genitive in āyasmato mahākassapassa could even be read to mean that the illness was let go of by Mahākassapa. In my interpretation, the idea related by the formula is therefore that the illness was, to begin with, upheld by modes of grasping and subjective determination, which can potentially be undone. Illness, in this view, is not a plain objective, material condition that cannot be affected by the mind, but rather one that is dependent on it. In the idealized setting of the discourse—a creative textual statement on the potential powers of the subjective mental states—the idea is that an advanced disciple can alter the nature of physical illness through a change in attitude, even when he is about to die.39SN V.80.15–18: idam avoca bhagavā. attamano āyasmā mahākassapa bhagavato bhāsitaṃ abhinandi. vuṭṭhahi cāyasmā mahākassapo tamhā ābādhā tathā pahīno36 cāyasmato mahākassapassa so ābādho ahosī ti.
3. Spontaneous Healing of Laymen
“On account of that admonition by the householder Nakulamātā, that sickness of the householder Nakulapitā subsided. And the householder Nakulapitā rose from that sickness, as that sickness of the householder Nakulapitā was thereby let go of”.54
4. Summary
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Appendix A
1 | See Gomez and Harrison (2022, p. 54). Translations from the VkN are taken from this new, pleasing translation. Comments on the translation will be discussed. |
2 | O’Leary (2015, p. 63) speaks of “the power of the sutra’s repetitions, which in meditative recitation track down substantializing and dualistic notions to their last hiding-place”. Silk (2014, p. 175): “it is clear that the doctrine of non-duality, advaya, is central to the text, being not only the subject of its eighth chapter but, according to my understanding, underlying the entire philosophical viewpoint of the sūtra as a whole”. Richter (2020, p. 61): “the Vimalakīrti Sūtra is also a demonstration of how to enter the gate of nonduality in narrative”. See also Vihan (2024). |
3 | Beyond the well-known self-eulogies most famous from the Saddharmapuṇḍarikā- (“Lotus”-) or the Vajracchedikā-(“Diamond”-) sūtras, there is a finer point in the eloquent speech of the Buddha being a veritable body of the Buddha. This body of speech is internalized by listeners to transform their own bodies, which themselves are somewhere between real and illusory. See Gummer’s (2022a) captivating analysis. |
4 | Praṭibhāna is a key concept in the VkN: this inspiration is what the śrāvaka students admit they lack in ch. 3, in face of Vimalakīrti’s compelling expression of nonduality, as when Maudgalyāyana and Subhūti end their narration in Sections 3.9 and 3.20, respectively, by saying that they “remained eloquentless” in face of Vimalakīrti’s rhetoric—ahaṃ va niṣpratibhāṇo bhūva/bhūvan; Gomez and Harrison: “I could think of nothing to say”). At a critical moment in chapter 6, Sāriputra also questions the goddess about her pratibhāṇa—“What have you attained, what have you realized, to have such inspired eloquence” (Gomez and Harrison, p. 75; kiṃ tvayā prāptaṃ kiṃ vā sakṣātkṛtaṃ yasyāste īdṛśaṃ pratibhānaṃ). |
5 | |
6 | See paradigmatically in chapters 12 and 24 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. More generally, I assume that readers are aware of Mahāyāna, and especially Madhyamaka dialectic, which shows how anything conditioned, causal, changing, and relational, i.e., anything in existence—has no abiding nature of its own, no svabhāva, and is thus empty of inherent existence and of objective reality. For introductory expositions of this idea, see J. L. Garfield (1995). For more intricate discussion that spans some of the conceptual tensions that are embedded in Madhyamaka dialectic and that are resonated in the VkN, see Huntington (2007), J. Garfield (2008), and Shulman (2007). |
7 | I will not take up here the deep metaphysical questions regarding the naturalistic framework and materialistic interpretations of contemporary science, which incline to see the mind and consciousness as byproducts, or emergent properties of the brain; eliminativist positions are still more deeply ingrained in the way science thinks than is commonly understood, as consciousness remains epiphenomenal and devoid of causal powers, so long as the explanatory framework is materialist; see for examples in Baars (1997) or Seth (2021). Once science is able to truly connect between matter and mind within one ontological framework—call it what you like—more room will become available for identifying the powers of the mental. Steps in this direction are evident in the work of Koch (2012, 2019), as well as in the IIT framework suggested by Tononi e.g., (Tononi et al. 2016). |
8 | On placebo, see Harrington (2008). |
9 | More than an echo of this approach finds expression in the way Triplett (2020, p. 45) draws on the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann to say that “the system of medicine in functionally differentiated societies is solely concerned with healing humans and animals from physical and mental ailments whereas the system of religion focuses on a form of ultimate healing. Luhmann claims that it is quite different to think from illness (Krankheit) to health (Gesundheit) than to think from suffering (Leid) to salvation (Heil)”. My argument is that such stark distinction between the religious and medical systems is a conceptual myth, and indeed that they conjoin in the manner in which the mental can impact disease. While Triplett is clearly aware that these distinctions do not hold in traditional societies and in the figure of the medicine man, in fact, these two “systems” are more closely interrelated than such definitions suggest. The question of why Buddhist practitioners continued to employ worldly medical techniques into the modern period, despite the perception of the religion as other-worldly (pp. 46–47), thus, seems chimerical. |
10 | For a compelling, recent discussion, see J. L. Garfield (2024). However, it is not clear that the whole only breaks down to its parts, as pudgalavāda doctrines suggest; see Carpenter (2015). While pudgalavāda raises its own problems, the attempt toward a positive articulation of the human that remains despite the deconstructive logic of selflessness is intriguing. See also Collins’ (2020) emphasis on narrative approaches to such ideas, and on his contribution to the understanding of consensual (normally called—conventional) truth. More generally, Collins argues that philosophical logic should be seen to determine narrative logic, which is no less valuable in understanding Buddhist society’s driving vision. |
11 | Gómez (2012) discusses the narrative potency of the Mahāyāna use of miracles. Fiordalis (2012, p. 119) says, while addressing the employment of miracles in the Vimalakīrti: “These examples of the wondrous demonstration of magical creation and transformation demonstrate the flexibility of the metaphor of magical illusion. It can convey the insubstantiality and the substantive appearance of reality, an ontological status between the real and the unreal. Buddhas and bodhisattvas combine their application of superhuman powers with their transcendence of the mundane realm through their wondrous display of magical creation and transformation”. Fiordalis further speaks of the text collapsing the distinction between natural and supernatural causes (esp. p. 122). See also Hamlin (1988), who emphasizes the concept of upāya, and Holloway (2023). This makes clear that the nature of nonduality in the text does not only remain in the realms of language, as Vihan (2024) seems to suggest. |
12 | I have no ambition here to provide a comprehensive discussion of nonduality and ontology in the text. How exactly these ideas were understood across different cultural spheres, and especially in China, where the Vimalakīrti was especially popular, is less than evident. See Greene (2022), as well as Fan Muyou (2016). |
13 | For the VkN, discussion of philosophy cannot be carried out without taking into consideration the narrative movement of the text. In a recent study, Natalie Gummer (2022a) suggested that the acme of the text is in chapter 11, when Vimalakīrti brings a Buddha from a distant Buddha land into the palm of his hand. Holloway (2023) identifies the key moment of the text as the adoption of silence by Vimalakīrti in chapter 9, as an expression of nonduality. Silk (2014), who is well aware of the literary quality of the text, suggests that it is constituted by at least two story-lines—the frame story in which the Buddha appears, and the middle chapters in which the “plot”, his key term, develops much like in Aristotelian theory. While these readings are intriguing, I would place the acme of the text in chapter 6, with the Goddess’s transformation of Śariputra into a woman, and then back into a man, thereby providing the ultimate demonstration of non-duality, not only between male and female, but between matter and perceptual form. This continues the point developed especially in chapter 5, according to which the objective nature of material reality is shown to be completely malleable, as when Vimalakīrti claims he can place Mount Meru and anything that lives or grows on it inside a mustard seed, or pour all oceans and beings within them through a hole the size of the pore of skin, without any of these beings noticing. In the narrative arc of the text, the escalation toward, and the resolution of, the key moment in chapter(s 5 and) 6 are represented by chapters three and four with teachings to śrāvakas and to the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, which offer an exciting plethora of non-dual thinking, and then with Chapter 8 that addresses non-duality directly. My point is not to argue that my understanding is more correct, but only to say that from a philosophical perspective at least, it is legitimate. Gummer (2022b) has also insightfully discussed the inspiration of the Mahāyāna-bhāṇaka (preacher), in a manner that reflects the dense powers inherent in his speech, another theme that is highly relevant to understanding the philosophy of the VkN. |
14 | VkN 4.11: bodhisatvena glānenaivam svacittaṃ nidhyāpayitavyaṃ pūrvāntāsadviparyāsakarmasamutthānasamutthito ‘yaṃ vyādhir abhūt parikalpakleśasamutthitaḥ / na punar atra kaścit paramārthato dharma upalabhyate yasyaiṣa vyādhiḥ. I thank Paul Harrison for sharing with me the 2006 edited version of the Sanskrit text, which is quoted here, and which corrects the manuscript that can be found in the 2004 publication (Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2006). I should add that although the edited version is more correct grammatically, and although there are obvious mistakes in the Sanskrit manuscript, it remains a genuine version. |
15 | Viparyāsa is itself an error or misapprehension; according to MMK 23, it is interchangeable with viparyaya. It is an unreal error with respect to the earlier limit, pūrvānta-asad-viparyāsa, or perhaps an error that perceives an unreal earlier limit. |
16 | For more elaboration on this argument, see MMK chs. 1,11,7. |
17 | Thus, Gomez and Harrisontranslate parikalpakleśasamutthitaḥ as “arisen due to the defilements resulting from imagining things that are not real”, which is imprecise. They read parikalpa—mental construction, as abhūtaparikalpa (Lamotte called this “false imagination” above). Any mental construction is false, but then it also has generative aspects that adepts like Vimalakīrti can make use of. Again, the echo of MMK 23 seems significant. |
18 | caturmahābhautiko ‘yaṃ samucchrayaḥ/na caiṣāṃ dhātūnāṃ kaścit svāmī na samutthāpayitā/anatmā hi ayaṃ samucchrayaḥ/yo ‘yaṃ vyādhir nāma nāyaṃ paramarthata upalabhyate anyatrātmābhiniveśāt/uta nātamnyabhiniviṣṭā vihariṣyāmo vyadhimūlaparijñātāvinaḥ/tenātmasaṃjñāṃ viṣṭāpya dharmasaṃjnotpādayitavyā/dharmasaṃghāto ‘yaṃ kāyaḥ/dharmmā evotpadyamānā utpadyante/dharma eva nirudhyamānā nirudhyante/te ca dharmāḥ parasparaṃ ne cetayanti na jānanti / na ca teṣām utpadyamānānām evaṃ bhavaty utpadyāmaha iti / na nirudhyamānānām evaṃ bhavaty nirudhyāmaha iti/. |
19 | Gomez and Harrisonp. 20; 2004: māyopamo (‘)yaṃ kayo viparyāsasaṃbhūtaḥ svapnopamo (‘)yaṃ kayo vitathadarśanaḥ. |
20 | Shulman (2007). This dual description of the body, as both realistically ingrained in material substance and as a product of mental construction, reflects certain Buddhist ideas on the nature of material form (rūpa). For example, the Therevāda Abhidhamma compendium of the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha from the 11th century defines matter as having four causes, two of which seem physical that arise from temperature (utu) and nutriment (āhāra), and two of which are ingrained in the mental, born of karma (kamma) or intention (cetanā) and born of consciousness (citta). Further explorations of this theme and the manner in which this discussion devlops earlier Abhidhamma tradition is necessary. |
21 | |
22 | In the present case, there is little need to raise the prospects of comparing the texts under analysis to other extant versions, as none exist for the main texts we study. Anālayo (2015) discusses one of the texts that relates to the ones I discuss here, but which does not include the main formula I focus on. In Anālayo (2016, ch. 12), he provides a translation from the Tibetan translation of the Giramānanda-sutta, which is faithful to the Pāli text. Skilling (1993) discusses the nature of the Tibetan translation of the group of 13 texts in which this discourse is included. The question regarding the omission of these texts from the Chinese canon, when 3 of them were important enough to become parittas in Theravāda, meaning protective texts that are relatively widely used and distributed (Shulman 2019), is itself of interest and worthy of discussion. The argument could be made that the fact that these texts are not extant in other languages means that they are later. Such an interpretation would be doubtful, however, since the fact that this formula was reused means that it was important to Theravāda authors. Even if this is a later interpretation, it is interesting as such. |
23 | Irregular expressions of resonant views appear in Udāna 8.1–3. and 8.3, but these are more depictions of a state of mind than a philosophical argument. |
24 | |
25 | |
26 | The importance of formulas was acknowledged first by Allon (1997), although here the emphasis on their thick doctrinal expression is amplified. McGovern (2024) suggests that it would be valuable to compare formulas preserved in different languages by different Buddhist schools, rather than comparing full texts, as is practiced widely in scholarship, most classically in the work of e.g., B. Anālayo (2011, 2017). Such a mode of comparison may indeed help bridge some of the gap between the different textual traditions. Given the diverse performative contexts of the early texts, it is often unclear whether a Chinese text is a translation, an event of preaching, a recitation, or a creative exposition inspired by the text; see (Zacchetti 2021). |
27 | Gethin (2025) advances the Parry-Lord approach to early oral Buddhist scripture, first suggested by Cousins (1983) and supported by McGovern (2019). Yet there were different contexts for the performance of scripture, and some related also to written texts, as is clear in Allon (2021, ch. 5). See Shulman (2024). |
28 | E.g., SN IV.46.19–24. Quotes from Pāli generally follow the Chaṭṭa saṅgāyana edition of the Vippasanā Research Institute (VRI), while consulting the editions of the Pali Text Society (PTS). Any significant divergence between the editions is marked, and I often introduce changes, mainly in punctuation marks, which are heavily overused in all editions, and in not employing any capital letters. All translations from Pāli are my own. References employ page numbers for PTS editions, and when relevant, include discourse numbers in VRI. |
29 | See further Shulman (forthcoming). |
30 | While the commentary does not elaborate on the formula here, in other cases, it explains that the illness is severe and even nearing death. For example, the commentary on the discourse to Vakkhali in the Khanda-saṃyutta (SN III #87) explains bāḷhagilāno as adhimattagilāno. The Aṭṭhakathā for the discourse to Anāthapiṇḍīka in the Majjhima (no. 143) reads—bāḷhagilāno adhimattagilāno maraṇaseyyaṃ upagato, saying that he is very sick, on his death-bed. The Ṭīkā for the same text explains—adhimattagilānoti adhikāya mattāya maraṇassa āsannatāya ativiya gilāno attho—“the meaning is that he is exceedingly sick, to the degree that is nearing death. |
31 | For the understanding of paritta, see Shulman (2019). Salguero (2022, p. 30) suggests that “The logic behind the use of this text as a paritta is that by hearing this story chanted aloud, patients may also experience spontaneous healing”. Yet the power of the recitation would result from the dense truth that is thought to reverberate within the sound, the inner powers of reality that the Buddha realized. |
32 | I translate nirvāṇa/nibbāna as “utter calm”, intending that it may not necessarily be thought of as a specific and final state, but more as a process or quality. Thus, nibbāna is not necessarily the final end of mental cultivation in Buddhism, but one of its most significant potentials. |
33 | SN V.80 [VRI V.14]: sattime, kassapa, bojjhaṅgā mayā sammadakkhātā bhāvitā bahulīkatā abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattanti. katame satta? satisambojjhaṅgo kho, kassapa, mayā sammadakkhāto bhāvito bahulīkato abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattati…pe… upekkhāsambojjhaṅgo kho, kassapa, mayā sammadakkhāto bhāvito bahulīkato abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattati. Ime kho, kassapa, satta bojjhaṅgā mayā sammadakkhātā bhāvitā bahulīkatā abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattantī’’ti |
34 | For the bojjhaṅgas and jhāna, see Arbel (2017, ch. 5), Gethin ([1992] 2001, ch. 3), and Shulman (2014, ch. 3). |
35 | Focusing on the Chinese parallel from the Saṃyukta-āgama to the third text in this sequence in the Pāli, in which the Buddha heals through this recitation, Anālayo (2015) emphasizes the impact of “effort” (vīriya translated here as “energy”) and of mindfulness in facilitating the recovery. I see this interpretation by whoever put this text together (i.e., any reciter/preacher/performer/translator(s) along the long way to China) as interesting, but one that does not necessarily explain the ideas that are active in the Pāli texts. |
36 | The VRI edition reads tathāpahīno, which suits the reading I offer here even more clearly, that the illness was “thereby/in this way let go of”. However, the reading tathā pahīno, as in PTS and in the corresponding Aṅguttara texts, may be more grammatical, eventhough including tathā within the compound would not be too irregular in pāli, in which almost anything can be a first idem in a compound, as in, for example, kiṃlakkhaṇo. |
37 | Bodhi (2000, p. 1581) translates—“And the Venerable Mahakassapa recovered from that illness. In such a way the Venerable Mahakassapa was cured of his illness”. Similarly, Piyadassi (1975), in his edition of the main book of Sinhalese paritta chants, translates—“Thereupon the Venerable Kassapa recovered from that affliction, and that affliction of the Venerable Kassapa disappeared”. Sujato (2018) translates—“And that’s how he recovered from that illness”. However, such translations miss the punch—the point is that “this illness”, so ābādho, was given up, renounced, forsaken, abandoned, let go of, as pahīna is the past participle of pajahati. Harvery (2015, p. 15) ignores the tathā, but is nonetheless closer when he reads—“his illness was abandoned (pahīno … so ābādho ahosīti)’”. Bodhi’s (2012, p. 873) translation of the Aṅguttara is closer to the latter, but influenced by the Aṅguttara’s reading tathā pahīno—“Nakulapitā recovered from that illness, and that is how his illness was abandoned”. |
38 | As defined by the Pāli-English Dictionary of Rhys Davids and Stede (retrieved online, 3 January 2025). The new dictionary by Margaret Cone reads similarly—“gives up, abandons; leaves; shuns; lets go, gets rid of” (retrieved online, 3 January 2025). |
39 | This statement echoes the Buddha’s claim in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta that he can remain alive until the end of the eon or for a full eon longer, while Ānanda fails to grasp the thick hint and request him to do so. The Buddha there and then fixes the time of his death as 3 months away, having “let go of the life-complex” (āyu-saṃkhāraṃ ossaji; DN II.106; the full episode occupies most of the third recitation section of the text, beginning at DN II.102). |
40 | E.g., Majjhima I.500. |
41 | |
42 | SN V.81, VRI V.197. This request by the Buddha is occasioned by another, very interesting formula, which may not always refer to recitation, although here the result is that Mahācunda recites the formula on the seven factors of awakening. The Buddha says to him– paṭibhantu taṃ Cunda bojjhaṅgā’ti (SN V.81)—literally “may the factors of enlightenment inspire you”. Perhaps this offers a clue to the manner in which recitation of a densely packed and finely tuned doctrinal formula was itself thought to produce profound mental change. |
43 | In Anālayo (2016, ch. 12), a translation of the Tibetan version of the text is presented, which was apparently brought to Tibet by monks from Sri Lanka. In the conclusion to this work, he offers an interesting and detailed presentation of how this text may be put into practice. |
44 | AN V. 109, VRI V.60. |
45 | AN V. 110–111. Compare the classic expressions of this formula in Majjhima 26 (MN I.167) and Dīgha 14 (DN II.36), where the formula begins slightly differently, perhaps due to the following verse that is quoted, idaṃ pi kho ṭhānaṃ duddasaṃ yadidam... There also the spelling also appears as sabbūpadhipiṭinissaggo (with one ‘p’). |
46 | AN 6.16, III.295–298. |
47 | |
48 | AN 4.55, at AN II.61–62. |
49 | Should references like this not be placed inside the texts? |
50 | See further discussion of this fascinating discourse in Shulman (forthcoming). |
51 | te satthu diṭṭhakālato paṭṭhāya puttasinehaṃ paṭilabhitvā ‘‘hantāta, hantātā’’ti vacchakaṃ disvā vacchagiddhinī gāvī viya viravamānā upasaṅkamitvā paṭhamadassaneneva sotāpannā jātā. |
52 | The text with Girmiānanda is a paritta as well, perhaps due to its similarity with these discourses. |
53 | |
54 | AN V.297: atha kho nakulapituno gahapatissa nakulamātarā gahapatāniyā iminā ovādena ovadiyamānassa so ābādho ṭhānaso paṭippassambhi. vuṭṭhahi ca nakulapitā gahapati tamhā ābādhā tathā pahīno ca pana nakulapituno gahapatissa so ābādho ahosi. |
55 | Vimalakīrti’s act of feigning illness recalls the Buddha’s letting go of his life-force (āyu-saṅkhāra) in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta: he could—tradition recommends we believe—have done otherwise. |
56 |
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Shulman, E. Healing Through Letting Go: On the Maturation of a Certain Conception of Medicine in Indian Buddhism. Religions 2025, 16, 633. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050633
Shulman E. Healing Through Letting Go: On the Maturation of a Certain Conception of Medicine in Indian Buddhism. Religions. 2025; 16(5):633. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050633
Chicago/Turabian StyleShulman, Eviatar. 2025. "Healing Through Letting Go: On the Maturation of a Certain Conception of Medicine in Indian Buddhism" Religions 16, no. 5: 633. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050633
APA StyleShulman, E. (2025). Healing Through Letting Go: On the Maturation of a Certain Conception of Medicine in Indian Buddhism. Religions, 16(5), 633. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050633