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Article

Healing Through Letting Go: On the Maturation of a Certain Conception of Medicine in Indian Buddhism

by
Eviatar Shulman
Department for Comparative Religion, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 9190500, Israel
Religions 2025, 16(5), 633; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050633
Submission received: 6 March 2025 / Revised: 24 April 2025 / Accepted: 13 May 2025 / Published: 16 May 2025

Abstract

:
“Illness itself is emptiness”, says Vīmalakīrti, in a statement that appears to reflect on the nature of sickness and disease. However, Vimalakīrti’s approach of non-duality may not satisfy the rising interest in Buddhist medicine, for which philosophical ideas of emptiness seem too far removed from practical interventions with real people’s pain. Nevertheless, there may be more in Vimalakīrti’s ideas than mere sophistry, and the vision he expresses can connect to realistic practices of healing. In this article, I pursue one potent formulaic passage that appears in a number of early discourses preserved in Pāli (but not in Chinese), in order to examine some of the earlier antecedents of the idea that illness is a mental construction, and that the mind can contribute to recovery. The early discourses provide a more sober definition of the position expressed by Vimalakīrti, by showing how a variety of practitioners let go of their illness, through a change in attitude that was informed by Buddhist insight. With this these texts highlight an understanding regarding the powers of the mind over matter, which traces physical events to their mental apprehension. Not only monks, but also householders, can heal through letting go of the the inner causes that contribute to the disease. While such an understanding need not be generalized as a comprehensive statement on Buddhist medicine, it helps us understand the views and cogency of Buddhist doctrine in this context.

“Illness itself is emptiness”, says Vīmalakīrti, within a sequence of arguments on non-duality.1 Non-duality is the heart of the philosophical teaching of the dazzling Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa (VkN),2 a classic and in some ways representative early Mahāyāna scripture in the way it weaves together a variety of philosophical notions, without deciding whether it inclines to any particular brand of scholastic Buddhist philosophy: ideas of emptiness and of the powers of the mind, suspicion of verbal designation, together with its valorization when it reveals the view of the Mahāyāna,3 blend with magical performances by the Buddha or his followers’, thereby attesting to reality’s completely phantasmagoric nature, fully dependent on its conceptualization, perception, and mental construction. This is the magic of words and vision, generated through the inspired eloquence (pratibhāṇa) of the realized Buddhist adept, who controls reality by knowing its utter lack of objectivity.4 Illness here is a mere stratagem,5 and healing no more real than any other illusion, remaining a change in understanding that dispenses with the illusion of illness. Much like suffering, which in Mahāyāna rhetoric is empty of inherent nature,6 so is illness. When emptiness has been internalized into every pore of this illusory, bodily existence, illness will spontaneously vanish.
Can we take this approach as one that seriously relates to medicine? Would the idea that sickness is emptiness have any power to heal? Is this position more than a pretentious, even condescending, smack in the face of real people’s veritable pain? In recent years, there has been a growing interest in Buddhist medicine, which aimed to go beyond the idealized philosophical and doctrinal conceptions one finds in the texts and to examine concrete practices of treatment and healing in Buddhist societies (Salguero 2014, 2017, 2019, 2022; Gyatso 2015; Triplett 2020). The field of Buddhist studies seems to be calling for a more realistic assessment of Buddhist medical practices, which would not remain content with the fairytale-truths of the VkN. Nevertheless, it may still be true that the attitudes revealed by the VkN have more healing potency in them than mere word-play and aesthetic impact. Although the philosophical positions of the Mahāyāna can be taken seriously in the pursuit after the nature of reality and of physical existence,7 we need not go so far. Here, a more modest and reasonable insight is available, which is that the positions adopted by the VkN emerge from a understanding regarding the powers of the mind and its ability to generate healing through a change in mental attitude. Simply, good “placebos” are hard to come by,8 and ones that are ingrained in dominant cultural and religious paradigms would have an advantage in generating processes of healing. The effort of this article is thus to better understand what these mental healing powers might be like and why they were thought to be effective in their own historical contexts, while remaining open to the possibility that they touch upon real potentials of mind and reality. That is to say, when science is able to explain just how matter and mind relate to each other and co-exist in the same ontological domain, the powers of the mind may be granted more respect than they command today.
My effort is thus to advance the understanding of the doctrinal positions of Buddhism with respect to healing, and to see how Vimalakīrti’s claim that “illness is emptiness” came into being. Salguero (2017, p. xxi), in his introduction to a volume within a series of game-changing publications regarding the practices of Buddhist medicine, makes the intriguing statement that “mainstream Buddhist doctrine seeks to mitigate the suffering of illness by stressing the illusory nature of the human body, the nonexistence of the separate self, and the possibility of radical transcendence of Buddhist practice”.9 Here, I aim to refine this statement in a number of ways. First, I will suggest that although ideas of the healing powers of the mind are deeply ingrained in Buddhism, the idea of the body, and reality more generally, as an illusion, grew and intensified with time (Shulman 2008), while the earlier canonical antecedents of this notion are much more subtle. The full-fledged position of the VkN thus emerged from a method of philosophizing that can be thought to make psychological sense, and one that does not rely on the notion of illusion. Simply, early Buddhism identifies the potential of the mind to both generate and alleviate sickness, so that a change in attitude can be helpful in allowing one to heal. This means, in turn, that the Buddhist practices that contribute to healing are not so much those involved in “radical transcendence”, but rather ones of radical immanence, that is, in improved pathways of heart and mind. Finally, while these ideas can be seen to relate broadly to notions of selflessness, the latter need not be over-emphasized in interpreting the healing powers of the consciousness, as healing would be necessary also for people, including advanced practitioners and affiliated laymen, who have not yet reached such a realization. Moreover, ideas of selflessness may again be finer than the manner in which they are normally constructed in modern scholarship,10 so that, again, the working powers of Buddhist insight need not be seen as something that is beyond the world, but as related to improved ways of being within it. Working with Collins (2020, esp. ch. 2), who draws on Hadot and Foucault, we may suggest that Buddhist practices, or “technologies of the self”, are pregnant with healing potential, so that cultivation of Buddhist insight is a positive endeavor, and not just one that negates the conceptual construct of the self.
That is, for early Buddhism, and despite certain available interpretations, the notion of selflessness does not mean that all is lost. The middle-way position avoids both eternalism (sassta), the existence of a permanent self that retains its identity over time, and annihilation (uccheda), which denies continuity and moral desert. Even without an agentive Self, individuals still experience the fruits of their karma and are ethically responsible. They are also still very much alive, at least as conditioned and changing streams of experience. Indeed, early Buddhist practice, for both laypeople and monastics, takes the fact of experience very seriously, so much so that one is encouraged to cultivate the mind and change the structures of experience for the better, perhaps most distinctly by attenuating attachment to a permanent personal Self. When ideas of selflessness mature in the Mahāyāna, as in the VkN, and when the notion of selflessness becomes comprehensive emptiness, a position like Vimalakīrti’s that illness is emptiness, and therefore an illusion, becomes feasible. The notion that nothing is real; however, or that everything is mere fantastic play, does not reflect the early Buddhism approach to reality, even if it does catch some of its more extreme potential philosophical implications.
Elsewhere, Salguero (2022, p. 17) suggests that “Illness lies at the very foundation of the story Buddhism tells about itself”, referring to the Buddha’s choice to pursue the religious path after facing the realities of old age, sickness, and death. The four noble truths are also commonly presented as being based on a medical model, according to which desire gives rise to suffering (e.g., Gethin 1998, pp. 63–64; Triplett 2020, p. 44). In a certain sense, my discussion will be designed to bring out some of the powers behind this idea, showing how in the early Buddhist discourses, the understanding is developed that pain—severe sickness included—arises through grasping, and that such realities can be altered once the mental causes that give rise to them are treated. This does not mean, however, that grasping is necessarily seen as the one and only cause of illness in early Buddhism, and the degree to which sickness is mind-dependent can vary. However, in the sources we will analyze, it seems that at least in certain situations, deep control of the mind, relaxation of grasping and anxiety, and evocation of positive mental potencies, can help one heal even in the face of severe illness in which one may be even close to death. This idea is then intensified to reach its full-blown expression in the VkN, which suggests that even the subtlest forms of mental construction are themselves painful, and that these densify into seemingly objective realities such as sickness. In both cases, sickness is not distinct from the mind and depends on its causal roles.
The discussion will proceed as follows. First, I will shortly examine the mature conception of the emptiness of illness presented in the VkN. Then, we will search for its earlier origins in early Buddhist teachings, and specifically in the discourses that contain one formula on emergence from sickness in the Pāli Nikāyas, allowingus to identify this sequence of development.

1. Sickness, or Emptiness, in the Vimalakīrti-Nirdeśa

A key feature of the VkN is that it sees magical performances as evidence for the illusory nature of reality.11 The text speaks of non-duality in a plethora of contexts, but ultimately in order to suggest that reality is in no way distinct from the manner in which it is known and constructed in perception.12 While the performative and literary nature of the text suggests that these ideas are no less an aesthetic feeling than a philosophical argument,13 so long as we wish to explore the text as one that makes a statement in the context of Buddhist medicine, its argument must be defined. Roughly, the point is that sickness, much like anything else, is nothing more than a mental construction. It has reality only so long as one considers it real, and so long as the mental conditioning that has brought it into being remains intact. Reality, the text pleads again and again, is completely malleable and responds directly to the commands of the master who knows emptiness. In fact, Vimalakīrti manifests an illness in order to provide an occasion to speak eloquently, that is, through pratibhāṇa, about the lack of duality. There is, in fact, no body, as there is no matter, no mind, nothing objective or subjective, no inner and outer, no sickness and healing. Understanding this, and relying on upāya-kauśalya, a master like Vimalakīrti can pretend to be sick, so that people who inquire into his health may hear him speak of such ideas.
Lamotte ([1994] 1976, p. vi) succinctly described the philosophy of the VkN almost half a century ago—
“For Vimalakirti mind objects, from the most concrete to the most abstract, arise from false imagination (abhūta-parikalpa); false imaginations rest on a total baselessness (apratiṣṭhāna), and this itself, in turn, has no root (VI, §6). From this it results that things, with no exception whatever, are, in the etymological sense of the word, acintya ‘not to be thought of’, and it is within this radical inconceivability that they lead to sameness (samatā) or, to be more exact, non-duality (advaya)”.
Here, we will focus on one sequence in chapter 4 that leads up to the statement with which we opened that “Illness is itself Emptiness”, aiming to see how the text understands sickness. Thus, Vimalakīrti argues in Section 4.11—
“[A] bodhisattva who is ill should train his mind to reflect in the following manner: This illness has arisen due to the effects of past deeds resulting from misperceiving things that are not true; it has arisen due to defilements resulting from imagining things that are not real. From the point of view of ultimate truth, moreover, one cannot apprehend any real thing here which has this illness”.14
The non-dualistic philosophy of the Vimalakīrti, like most non-dual philosophies, must play a double game of affirmation and negation—on the one hand, anything that has arisen is unreal; on the other hand, it has somehow arisen. Here, the concern is with illness (vyādhi), which is explained to result from past karma, which itself “results from misperceiving things that are not true”. In fact, the point made by the text here is more specific, as the compound the text employs explains that the illness has arisen (samutthito) from the manifestation (samutthāna) of karma that results from mistaken perception (asadviparyāsa)15 with respect to an earlier limit (pūrvānta; to read—pūrvāntāsadviparyāsa-karma-samutthāna-samutthito). This means that the arising of the misperception, is one that perceives a moment of arising. Pūrvānta—earlier limit, the opposite of a later limit—aparānta, is well-known already from early texts like the Brahmajāla-sutta as referring to a mistaken assumption that something arises ex nihilo, so that it is completely new to the world as an entity that is distinguished from its causes and conditions. While in earlier texts the focus is more on personal existence, in the Mahāyāna, the term is generalized to speak of any object or event. Here, the statement leads us to the perplexing understanding that the manifestation of karma is an event of non-arising, since any distinction between earlier stages of a thing and its conditioning would be an imputation of an earlier limit (and, in effect, a later limit, a view of destruction, uccheda, to the conditions).16 Again, the world play is tantalizing, and seems unphilosophical and self-contradictory, but is designed to explain that the arising is only an event of perception, which itself appears, but has no objective reality to it. Furthermore, this act of arising, which is real as an illusion, is also the result of defilements (kleśa) that derive from and are based on conceptual construction (parikalpa).17 “Ultimately”, Vimalakīrti concludes this statement, “there is no thing (dharma) for whom this illness can be perceived”.
The text now continues to dwell on its complicated message, aware at the same time that there is a physical body that is at least seemingly sick, but that any sickness is a mental construction. Explaining the ending of the last quote, which raises the idea of selflessness by suggesting that there is no owner of the illness, Vimalakīrti provides a more realistic explanation of the nature of the body, defining it as one that arises from the four great elements. At the same time, they have no owner—
This body consists of the four elements, and these elements have no master, nor any one that sets them in motion, because this body lacks a self. The so-called ‘illness’ cannot be apprehended from the point of view of ultimate truth, except as a result of obsession with self. Let us remain then unobsessed with the self and fully cognizant of the roots of illness. Having thus dispensed with the idea of a self, we should entertain the idea of dharmas. This body is a collection of dharmas. It’s only dharmas arising when they arise, only dharmas ceasing when they cease. But those dharmas are not aware of each other nor do they know one another. As they arise they do not think, “We are arising,’ as they cease they do not think, ‘We are ceasing.’18
This section begins in a realistic vein, saying that “the body consists of the four great elements”. Yet because it is such an accumulation, a physical form (samucchraya) that is not constituted by itself, Mahāyāna insight takes it to be a mere conceptual construction, a product of words and mental imputation. As we see in a similar sequence in chapter 2, the concrete description of the body as impermanent, feeble, and ailing quickly leads to the notion that it is “like a magical illusion, arising from misperception; like a dream, appearing other than it is”.19 This recommends that this imputation does not take place in empty space, so to speak, but is a mental construction of something that has at least a degree of reality. There is no owner (svāmin), no gravitational center, no true agent to this complex. One should be “fully cognizant of the roots of illness”, Vimalakīrti says, meaning that what holds such material elements together is a mental construction that takes itself as real. The body is, in a way, a “real illusion”.20
The end of this passage moves to a different kind of argument, as if what seems like a body is only a series or combination of more basic units of dharmas, which have no agency and mechanistically combine to become what appear to our mistaken perception as things or selves. This idea is problematic, however, as a Buddhist view of the kind advocated by the VkN would not want to rely on the understanding that such basic units are ultimately real, as is attributed to Abhidharma systems.21 Thus, Vimalakīrti says that one should make an effort to understand that “Even this idea of dharmas is a misperception as well, and misperception is a serious illness. I ought to be free of illness and I must make an effort to eliminate illness”. Vimalakīrti is thus suggesting that there are no ultimately substantial units that analysis can rely on, and that such a reliance is itself an illness, i.e., the illness that takes illness to be objectively real. Moving to a sequence on non-duality, Vimalakīrti asks—
What then is the elimination of illness? It is the elimination of me and mine. And what is the elimination of me and mine? It is the cessation of duality. What then is the cessation of duality? It is non-involvement with oneself and what is external to one’s self. What then is non-involvement with oneself and what is external to one’s self? It is being unmoved and undisturbed because of sameness. And what is sameness? It is the sameness of final release together with the sameness of the self. Why? Both of these are empty, the self and final release. What are they empty of? They are empty as verbal designations. Both of them are not ultimately real, the self and final release. Seeing things as the same, he should not take illness as one thing as emptiness as another. Illness is itself emptiness”.
Vimalakīrti is eager to deconstruct any duality we may conceive of. Here, he focuses on that between self and other, or self and objectivity, represented by the classic denial of I and mine. There is thus no internal and external, and all becomes equal, a mere verbal designation. The final emptiness is the crucial one, between illness and emptiness. It, too, is a mere mental construction, which comes into manifestation due to the mistake of mental construction itself. It is the reality of the unreal, and as such, one can cause it to vanish if one ceases to construct it in this way.
These are powerful ideas, and a strong case could be made for them philosophically. However, for the way we conceive of sickness and health in a modern episteme, this seems fantastic. I thus suggest that we examine what, in this view, is faithful to the earlier Buddhist tradition, as this can be accessed through the discourses preserved in Pāli.22 Within this strand of the tradition, we seldom find any resonance with the extreme metaphysics of non-duality.23 Indeed, the philosophical tone of this tradition is more realistic and less inclined to see reality as an illusion.24 Nonetheless, we can identify interesting antecedents of the views advocated by Vimalakīrti.

2. Sick Monks and Their Powers of Healing

My approach will be to take one particularly potent and expressive formula on healing that is preserved in the Pāli Nikāyas, and examine it in its different manifestations.25 This method of studying the texts relies on the methodological approach of “The Play of Formulas”, which takes oral formulas as a key to understanding the early Buddhist textual tradition (Shulman 2021). These formulas provide dense articulations of insight, which can be carefully unpacked in order to understand the ideology and world view of early Buddhism.26 The idea is that formulas were used creatively—at times in storytelling, preaching events, or other performances, in other contexts in recitation of passages or of full discourses for study or for merit27—so that the texts we find in the Tipiṭaka today are ones that became canonical with time, through complex processes we do not yet fully understand, which eventually incorporated writing (Collins 1990). The practices of textual composition and transmission that this understanding helps us to perceive, according to which texts are not recordings of events but creative expression and exegesis within traditional models, reflect some of the literary and performative contexts that were also part of the transition to the literature and thought world of early Mahāyāna. This dynamic literary perspective thus helps us situate the philosophical developments that are our main focus, and which inform us of conceptions of medicine and healing, within their broader textual context, so that the two come to reflect each other. Further attention to these literary details is provided in Appendix A.
In the present case, the analysis will focus on what can be identified as the main statement in the Pāli Nikāyas on spontaneous healing—emerging from sickness through a subjective letting go of it—which I will suggest anticipates the position of the VkN. The texts in which this formula appears are mostly well-known, and one of them has received a fair amount of attention. However, the key statement of the formula has not been defined clearly enough.
The paradigmatic textual example for the formula on spontaneous healing appears in two short discourses from the Bojjhaṅga-saṃyutta, chapter two of Book V of the Saṃyutta-nikāya. In the first of these texts, the Buddha hears that Mahākassapa is gravely ill and suffering (ābādhiko dukkhito bāḷhagilāno); the second text is an exact replica of this one, only that the sick monk is Mahāmoggalāna. I take these texts, and the other ones that will be discussed below, as idealized presentations of the theme of spontaneous healing, rather than as attempts to convey historical events. The Buddha thus arrives to visit the sick monk and asks him through the “sickness inquiry formula”:
“Are you enduring? Are you holding out? Are the painful feelings you experience receding, rather than increasing, so that their complete recession is apparent, not their increase?”
kacci te khamanīyaṃ kacci yāpanīyaṃ; kacci te dukkhā vedanā paṭikkamanti no abhikkamanti patikomsānaṃ paññāyati no abhikkamo’ti28
To this, the monk replies, in accord with the formulaic structure of this exchange—
“I am not enduring, sir, not holding out; my intense, painful feelings are on the rise, not receding, so that their complete increase is apparent, not their recession”.
na me bhante khamanīyaṃ na yāpanīyaṃ; baḷhā me dukkhā vedanā abhikkamanti no paṭikkamanti abhikkamosānaṃ paññāyati no paṭikkamo’ti
This formulaic exchange appears over a dozen times in the Nikāyas, with further related texts scattered in the different canonical collections.29 It is used to structure a thematic sequence in which the Buddha or one of his leading disciples goes to visit a sick monk or householder, usually on the latter’s deathbed.30 He then inquires about the sick person’s health, only to learn that his condition is deteriorating, so that heprovides a teaching that helps the sick man recover, or that allows him to die a good Buddhist death. The occasion that the text is depicting is thus that Kasspa is gravely ill, maybe even in a life-threatening situation, and that he receives a visit from the Buddha, the ultimate doctor who has penetrated the secrets of human pain, and who has thereby become an embodiment of cosmic truth and blessing. The fact that this text is used as a paritta—and was probably even designed as a paritta to begin with—a text for protective chanting, reminds us that the words are considered to carry a mantric quality, and that they are imbued with a thick religious significance, which itself derives from the unique power that the words of the fully realized being are thought to be pervaded by.31 As Salguero (2022, p. 28) says of the Buddha’s healing powers—“the Buddha usually does not resort to conventional medicines or procedures… More typically, it is his glance, his touch, his fragrance, his ability to summon protective spirits, the transformative power of his wisdom, or other such wondrous factors that heal the patient”.
In the simplified formulaic sequence of the sickness-inquiry formula, the Buddha (or the monk inquiring) now provides a teaching, which initiates a rapid recovery. In the present case, he recites the formula on the seven factors of awakening (bojjhaṅga)—
“There are, Kassapa, these seven factors of awakening which have been well-taught by me, [so that when they are] cultivated and developed, lead to understanding (abhiñña), awakening (sambodha), utter calm (nibbāna).32 Which seven?
The awakening factor of mindfulness, indeed, oh Kassapa, has been well-taught by me, [so that when it is] cultivated and developed, it leads to understanding (abhiñña), awakening (sambodha), utter calm (nibbāna). The awakening factor of analysis (of events, dhammavicaya) of energy (vīriya) of bliss (pīti) of tranquility (passaddhi) of meditative concentration (samādhi)… The awakening factor of equanimity (upekkhā) has been well-taught by me, [so that when it is] cultivated and developed, it leads to understanding, awakening, utter calm.33
This is an extremely potent sequence of liberative understandings, qualities, and potentials of the mind, which relates to the entrance into samādhi states that in other collections can be defined as jhāna.34 Commenting on this passage, Anālayo (2017, p. 13) speaks of “the healing potential of these mental qualities”. Since this recitation helps heal these two advanced students, followed by the Buddha himself healing from illness in the following discourse, thanks to the recitation of this same passage by the monk Cunda, Anālayo suggests that “In all of these cases, it seems that the recitation helps the diseased person to recollect the qualities that led to his awakening. Such reliving of the condition of the mind at the time of awakening apparently has such a strong effect that the body emerges from its sick condition”. The force of the healing thus lies, for Anālayo, in the experience of awakening that these monks underwent, so bringing its qualities to mind is curative. “Whatever may be the last word on the psycho-physical dynamics involved”, he concludes, “there can be little doubt that this is a depiction of employing purely mental means to affect a physical healing process”.35
Anālayo’s focus is on the relation between the qualities encapsulated in the seven limbs of enlightenment and the events of awakening. However, as we will see, similar healing effects are said to take place also for monks and householders who clearly did not reach awakening. In these cases, the emphasis seems to be on the understanding with which Anālayo ends his statement—“that this is a depiction of employing purely mental means to affect a physical healing process”. As Salguero (2022, p. 31) says, “The account of the healing powers of hearing the Awakening Factors certainly suggests that mental agitation was thought to be closely linked to physical illness and that positive mental states were thought to be able to reverse the condition”. This understanding can be advanced by viewing the main formula with which the text itself explains the process of healing experienced by Mahākassapa and Mahāmoggalāna:
This is what the Bhagavān said. Venerable Mahākassapa was pleased and delighted in the Bhagavān’s words. And the Venerable Mahākassapa rose from that sickness, as that sickness of Venerable Mahākassapa was thereby let go of.
SN V.80.15–18: idam avoca bhagavā. attamano āyasmā mahākassapa bhagavato bhāsitaṃ abhinandi. vuṭṭhahi cāyasmā mahākassapo tamhā ābādhā tathā pahīno36 cāyasmato mahākassapassa so ābādho ahosī ti.
Hitherto, the philosophy expressed by this passage has not been appreciated well enough, since translators normally miss the subtlety of the statement that Mahākassapa and Mahāmoggalāna let go of their illness.37 The text could also be interpreted more lightly as a statement that the illness was “eliminated”, pahīna, but since pahīna is a past participle of pajahati—“to give up, renounce, forsake, abandon, eliminate, let go, get rid of”,38 the idea seems to be that the illness was subjectively and probably even consciously released, abandoned and done away with. In fact, the genitive in āyasmato mahākassapassa could even be read to mean that the illness was let go of by Mahākassapa. In my interpretation, the idea related by the formula is therefore that the illness was, to begin with, upheld by modes of grasping and subjective determination, which can potentially be undone. Illness, in this view, is not a plain objective, material condition that cannot be affected by the mind, but rather one that is dependent on it. In the idealized setting of the discourse—a creative textual statement on the potential powers of the subjective mental states—the idea is that an advanced disciple can alter the nature of physical illness through a change in attitude, even when he is about to die.39
Notice that here, in a manner that is quite distinct from Vimalakīrti, the Buddha does not tell Mahākassapa that his sickness is unreal, or that his understanding of sickness relies on a duality of sickness of health, self and dharmas, self and liberation, or matter and mind. The sickness, rather, seems to be acknowledged as a real-life condition, which would reflect the way it is experienced by regular human beings. At the same time, the idea expressed through the formula is that sickness, as an objective and material reality that occurs in a real “physical body made from the four great elements, coming into being from mother and father, supported by rice and gruel” (kāyo rūpī cārumahābhūtiko mātāpettikasambhavo odanakummāsupacayo),40 is conditioned, and can be controlled, by the mind. If one is able to alter the underlying subjective attitudes, one can heal.
The question is now what caused these students to let go, and thereby heal from their intense sickness. In the present text, we find (a) the Buddha himself, (b) reciting, (c) the formulaic sequence of the seven factors of enlightenment. Furthermore, the recitation is directed (d) to very advanced students who are apparently familiar with the practices described. We may ask if it is the teaching itself that produced the effect, the Buddha’s inspiring presence, or perhaps the recitation of such potent words and ideas through the physical voice of a living Buddha. Must the practitioners who hear the recitation be so advanced, perhaps even liberated as Anālayo suggests? Are all these factors necessary, is one of them the dominant one, or is transformation produced in their interrelation?
This discourse may lead us to believe that it is the sequence of the seven factors itself that holds the key to this effective healing. The practices included in the list form together a comprehensive movement along the advanced stages of the Buddhist path. Without entering into an intricate discussion,41 the items on this list include vipassana-oriented practices of mindfulness and “analysis of phenomena”, which lead into samādhi-oriented qualities like pīti, samādhi, and upekkhā. The latter, final element on the list of equanimity is especially significant as a powerful expression of Buddhist insight, which blends together ethical, meditative, and philosophical aspects of the path. Specifically, upekkhā appears as a central aspect of some of the most advanced meditative states, included in this sequence of the 7 limbs of enlightenment, in the final state among the four Brahma-vihāra meditations, and as a defining feature of the 4th jhāna. Steering well away from any question of how these theories of meditation relate to each other and if anyone of them is more “original” than the others, for the present discussion it suffices to notice that the idea of upekkhā, which here relates a fully embodied reality that has been realized in the practitioner’s mind, would serve as an elegant demonstration of the mental quality of letting go that the Buddha directs his student’s mind to. Kassapa and Moggalāna would both be advanced practitioners for whom such a quality has been cultivated and developed (bhāvitā bahulīkatā), so that the recitation directs them to experience the mental state, and not only to think of it in a theoretical manner. The practice is so effective that the Buddha has Mahā-Cunda recite the bojjhaṅgas for him when he himself is sick in the following discourse, thereby facilitating his own recovery.42
However, when we examine another appearance of this formula on spontaneous healing from the Aṅguttara Nikāya, we see that spontaneous healing does not depend on the seven limbs of enlightenment. Here, the Venerable Ānanda informs the Buddha that the monk Girimānanda is very sick.43 The Buddha instructs Ānanda to recite a series of ten perceptions (saññā) to the sick monk, so that he may recover. The Buddha recites the sequence himself, with formulaic definitions for perceptions of impermanence, selflessness, filth, danger, relinquishing, dispassion, cessation, finding no joy in all worlds, having no desire toward all conditioned things, and mindfulness of breathing (aniccasaññā, anattasaññā, asubhasaññā, ādīnavasaññā, pahānasaññā, virāgasaññā, nirodhasaññā, sabbaloke anabhiratasaññā, sabbasaṅkhāresu anicchāsaññā, ānāpānassati).44 Ānanda then proceeds to visit Girimānanda, recites the list of perceptions, and Girimānanda “rose from that illness, as that sickness of Venerable Girimānanda was thereby let go of”. This resolution implies that neither the presence of the Buddha, nor the formula on the seven limbs of enlightenment (or the practices behind it), are necessary for this kind of spontaneous healing.
The sequence of the ten perceptions is in itself a remarkably powerful, condensed articulation of Buddhist teachings, which contains many well-known formulaic elements that join to present the full analytic vision of early Buddhism. In this sequence, central Buddhist ideas are carefully defined with prevalent formulas, as when impermanence is described through a perception of the rising and falling of the five aggregates; selflessness through seeing the senses and their object as devoid of self; filth (asubha) through the reflection on the 32 bodily elements that is found in the Sati-paṭṭhāna-sutta; or both dispassion (virāga) and cessation (nirodha) are defined with the same intriguing formula on nibbāna that “this is peaceful, this is subtle, that which is the quieting of all formations, the letting go of all material sustenance, the cessation of thirst, dispassion/cessation, nibbāna” (etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhippaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nibbāna’nti).45
It thus becomes clear that what produces the healing in the cases we have examined is not any one of these teachings, but rather, their impact on the mind. It is probably the practitioners’ advanced state of mental cultivation that allows them to let go in this way, while it could very well be that Girimānanda was a practitioner more oriented to vipassanā-style analytic practice, while Mahākassapa and Mahāmoggallāna were practitioners more devoted to samādhi. Thus, the Buddha tailored the formula that was being recited to each student’s particular trainings, which was itself probably attuned to their natural psychological inclinations. Potentially, the Buddha could have caused other students to heal through other parts of his well-taught (svākkhāto) dharma, but these have not been preserved in the textual record.
Since it is Ānanda that recites the sequence of the ten perceptions to Girimānanda, rather than the Buddha, it is also evident that it is not necessary for the Buddha himself to recite the formulas in order for healing to take place. Rather, healing ensues from the direct impact of the teaching on the minds of disciples, which helps them reach the mental state of letting go. Two points seem clear: First, that the Buddha’s teachings, perhaps even his eloquently defined, formulaic, oral encapsulations of the teaching, can be healing. And at the same time, that sickness was, to begin with, dependent on the mind, not objectively present as a state the monks cannot influence, but malleable and responsive to the way it is conceived.

3. Spontaneous Healing of Laymen

The next appearance of the formula on healing by letting go is surprising. It appears in the Book of 6s of the Aṅguttara Nikāya,46 and the person who undergoes the healing is a householder, while his recovery occurs without him receiving any direct Buddhist teaching. This event will help us pinpoint the message of this specific textual trope.
Nakulapitā—the father of Nakula—is dying. His wife, Nakulamātā—Nakula’s mother—is concerned that he will die with an unquiet mind, worried (sāpekho), as such a death would be not only painful (dukkha), but has been said to be contemptible by the Buddha.47 Nakulamātā’s care for her husband and their close relationship is attested in another discourse in the Aṅguttara,48 while in the Book of 1s the teacher defines them as the most trustworthy among his students (or perhaps the ones with greatest trust in him; aggaṃ vissāsakānaṃ/vissāsikānaṃ).49 This last quote is picked up by the commentary to the Saṃyutta-nikāya, which opens its third Book with a rich discourse in which Nakulapitā requests instruction from the Buddha before he dies.50 This reference in the Aṭṭhakathā suggests that there were more stories circulating about this couple as exemplars of Buddhist faith than are included in the surviving textual record. That we are dealing with a particular literary representation that once had wider appeal is also suggested by the inclusion of this couple in the list of students who are the best among this or that quality in Book 1 of the Aṅguttara, which is evidently meant to facilitate the recollection of further stories. In fact, the commentary to Aṅguttara 4.55 tells us that Nakulapitā was the Buddha’s father, grandfather, and “small-father” (cūḷa-pitā, apparently meaning paternal-uncle) for five hundred rebirths each, the same being true for Nakulamātā, who was his mother, grandmother, and “small-mother” (cūḷa-mātā). For this reason, “upon their first sight of the Buddha [in this lifetime], they experienced care for a son [saying] ‘hello sweetie’, much like the care of a cow for her young calf. Seeing him for the first time, they [thus] became stream-enterers”.51 In the discourse itself (Aṅguttara 4.55), their special status is highlighted as the Buddha comes to visit the couple, to hear both husband and wife each disclose their utter faithfulness to the other and express their will to continue together in future lives. The Buddha explains that if such an outcome is desired, they must share the same morality, faith, generosity, and understanding, concluding his exposition with a verse. We see again that much like the construction of the paritta texts with Mahākassapa and Mahāmoggalāna,52 these are exemplary figures that suit the role of the ideal householders, who now can heal from sickness by letting go. We again observe the high literary quality of such texts and their idealized storytelling.53
Nakulapitā and Nakulamātā are thus thick characters, and their exchange when the father of the household is about to die is exemplary of attitudes that householders should adopt. The true heroine of the story here is the wife, who is able to produce a sense of assurance in Nakulapitā, which would have allowed him to die in peace, but is so forceful that he rises from his illness by letting go. In this case, the positive state of mind produced by her questioning is enough to heal him.
As this is the Aṅguttara Book of 6s, Nakulamātā must calm her beloved husband’s heart in six ways. The first, quite naturally, is his worry about her ability to sustain the household, which she appeases by reminding him of her dexterity in weaving cotton and knitting wool. If he is worried that she will go to the house of another, she reminds him of her 16 years of sexual abstinence, even as a householder. If he is concerned that after he dies, she will not want to go see the Buddha, she assures him that she will want to see him even more. If he worries that she will not keep her Buddhist ethics (sīla, she says that she is among the women who ardently do so, and suggests that he question the Buddha about this directly, as he should for another worry, whether she can reach inner, calm states of mind (labhinī ajjhattaṃ cetosamathassa). Finally, if he has any doubt in her complete faith in the Buddha, the Buddha would vouch for her in this case as well. Then, we are told that—
“On account of that admonition by the householder Nakulamātā, that sickness of the householder Nakulapitā subsided. And the householder Nakulapitā rose from that sickness, as that sickness of the householder Nakulapitā was thereby let go of”.54
This discourse with the householder heroes Nakulapitā and Nakulamāta helps us penetrate the logic of this textual cycle. In order to experience spontaneous healing, first, it is best to be a highly devoted person, whether a householder or a monk. Such a person does not need to hear the direct words of the Buddha, although trust in the Buddha is surely of great value in generating healthy, curative states of mind. One also does not necessarily need to hear a dense encapsulation of doctrine chanted by the Buddha or one of his prime disciples. In fact, the healing vision here is not only one produced by Buddhist philosophy or meditative technique, although these will obviously be helpful as well. One does not even need to be a monk in order to reach the deep transformation of the mind that allows one to overcome sickness. However, a change of heart can cause one to abandon illness, an option open to householders and monks alike.

4. Summary

The understandings of non-duality advocated by Vimalakīrti and his ideas on illusion and emptiness, are generally alien to the early Buddhist notion of reality. However, we can identify an intriguing antecedent of this position and its bold assertion that sickness is a mere mental construction in texts where Buddhist disciples heal from illness through a spontaneous process of letting go. In the Saṃyutta-nikāya the Buddha recites the formula on the seven limbs of enlightenment (bojjhaṅga) to Mahākassapa and Mahāmoggalāna, who are gravely ill, so that they quit the illness and heal. Even though the Buddha also heals in the same way in another text, it seems that the cure does not result from a recitation of the formula on the bojjhaṅgas, since in another text, the monk Girimānanda is said to heal by hearing a series of powerful Buddhist philosophical formulations. It is also not the chanting of Buddhist texts or the Buddha’s presence that produces the impact, as it is Ānanda who recites to Giramānanda, while the householder Nakulapitā, who was on the verge of death, heals when his wife helps him reach a state of complete trust in her and in her ability to take care of herself and of their household, both physically and spiritually. This last example allows us to pinpoint the focus of this doctrine—physical health is dependent upon the mind, and sickness is maintained by grasping; when one reaches a truly equanimous mental state, health is made accessible. Vimalakīrti’s position may take this mode of thinking a step further, framing the early Buddhist thought on the powers of the mind within a metaphysic of non-duality.55
Salguero (2022, p. 31) questions whether early Buddhism developed “a coherent viewpoint on health and healing”, suggesting that monks “would not have thought of themselves as medical specialists”. While monks may not have necessarily been medicine men, and despite the recurrent prohibition against monks acting as medical specialists, it does appear that the Buddhist path of practice crystallized a compelling statement on the healing potentials of consciousness, which could be made to generate health and well-being in face of adverse conditioning so long as mental construction of the event quit negative attitudes. The idealized settings of the texts may not offer a fine-grained analysis of how change is effected through letting go, but they do recommend that mental apprehension is part of what produces and maintains disease, and that such conditions can potentially be altered, if only one develops the right state of mind.

Funding

The research included in this article was supported by Israel Science Foundation grant 796/21 on “Methods for the Creation of Buddhist Scripture”.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data was created in this research.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Appendix A

In an appendix to his article on the VkN, Silk (2014) raises the possibility that the Citta-saṃyutta of the Saṃyutta-nikāya could have served as an inspiration for the authors of the VkN. This suggestion is valuable, yet it can be refined in a manner that can help us observe the processes of transition that Buddhist texts and ideas underwent from the world of early Buddhism to that of early Mahāyāna. Surely, the Citta-saṃyutta provides ideas that could have made their way, after many permutations, into the VkN. However, a closer look at the developments involved suggest that we need to assume not only processes of textual “transmission” that were active in the dissemination of the texts, but more so of telling and re-telling, in the folkloric sense defined by Ramanujan for the Rāmāyāna (Rāmanujan ([1991] 1994)). Such events in which stories were told anew re-worked ideas and concepts, as well as literary figures, themes, motives, and designs, in a manner that must have related to oral modes of discourse that were not based on fixed texts that were only recited. The Citta-saṃyutta itself can be seen as a frozen specimen of such live processes, a written version encrusted into fixed shape, much like the beautiful but lifeless artifacts in a museum of natural history reflect a much more vibrant reality that was once filled with a diversity of particulars. Understanding that this particular “collection” or chapter in the Saṃyutta-nikāya behaves in such a manner, and that such practices continued to be active over long expanses of time and space, helps us see the “dependent-origination” of the VkN and its philosophy: a new vision and insight re-appropriating traditional modes.
I provide here only a condensed description of the contents of the ten discourses that compose this chapter of the Saṃyutta, as there is no need to go into extensive detail. The point is not to argue that a certain literary or textual element of this chapter was a direct, analytically reliable, antecedent of this or that element of the VkN. Rather, the idea is that the general themes show continuity, and that the philosophy and figures active in one text are echoed in another. Although Silk believes that “this portrayal of Citra [Sanskrit for Citta] inspired the author of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa to create the character Vimalakīrti”, it would seem that it is rather the miracle-monks that are active in this collection, and who Citta worships, who could have served as the inspiration for the Mahāyāna master. Or, these figures may have fused with the householder Citta in the imagination of performers and authors. This fusion is precisely where we can best observe the practices of storytelling that are behind the transition between the texts we read today, in events that remodeled the materials we find in the Chapter: there are many stories to be told between the textual remnants we possess.
Citta is indeed a householder who, at times, teaches monks, and who posseses a remarkable personality and a significant realization of Buddhist doctrine. He is also an adept in jhāna, who questions the monks about the state of nirodha, apparently since he pursues the attainment of this practice. Furthermore, he is presented in the final text in the collection as a rich householder who is gravely ill, which is why Silk thinks he is the precursor of Vimalakīrti. However, Citta’s role as the sick householder is far removed from that of Vimalakīrti: Citta is about to die, and certain tree-deities approach him, recommending that he make an aspiration to be reborn as a great king. Given his realization of Buddhist doctrine, Citta is uninterested in such ephemeral accomplishments and says so out loud. His friends and family hear his response, so he is forced to explain, after which they ask for his instruction. Citta then gives a teaching on maintaining faith in the Buddha-dhamma-saṅgha, and passes away. His sickness was surely not illusory.
This story in itself hints at the storytelling practices that were active in the shaping of the Pāli texts: we can assume, for example, that the authors of the text could provide little testimony for the exchange between Citta and the tree deities, and that the whole story is a creative invention. The story could also be told in many ways. The same would be true for the other “discourses” of the collection. The Citta-saṃyutta is the 7th chapter of the Saṃyutta’s Book IV. A Saṃyutta like this necessarily includes 10 discourses, which here can be seen as a non-exhaustive list of 10 illustrations of stories that could be told with the figure of Citta. While the similarities between Citta and Vimalakīrti are intriguing, the differences are even more so (the same is true for the relations between Vimalakīrti and the householders Nakulapītā and Nakulāmātā). Citta is not nearly as impressive a character as Vimalakīrti—he possesses remarkable understanding, which at times is superior to that of certain monks. In other cases, though, he is taught by monks, and if anyone produces miracles—Vimalakīrti’s main claim to fame, together with his eloquence—it is a newly ordained, fantastic Buddhist monk who exits the scene enigmatically at the end of discourse #4. There are cases in which Citta is presented as an adept in Buddhist doctrine and practice: in discourses #1, #5, and #7, he teaches monks; in #8 he faces Jain ascetics, including Nigaṇṭha himself, and ridicules him; in #9 he faces a naked ascetic whom he leads to ordain and then reach liberation, after revealing his freedom in attaining the four jhānas; in #10 he is on his deathbed, and chooses a good Buddhist death instead of a possible rebirth as a great king. All these texts are adaptations of the trope of Citta the householder within the theoretical and aesthetic trends that are popular in the Pāli Nikāyas.
Significantly, in four significant texts of the collection (#2, #3, #4, #6), monks show their unique understanding, in a way that makes a powerful impact on the householder. Citta then declares he will provide for them (#2, #3, #4), as he does for the naked ascetic Kassapa, his old friend, when the latter becomes a Buddhist monk (#9). These stories thus reflect Citta’s subservience to the monks, an emphasis the would be important to Theravāda storytelling that was preserved in the Sutta-piṭaka. The acme of this sequence is in discourse #4, in which a young monk named Mahaka causes winds to blow and rain to pour on a scorching summer day, when the monks were slowly returning to the monastery after a heavy meal provided by Citta. Mahaka then produces an even more marvelous miracle at the monastery upon Citta’s request, causing fire to enter through the keyhole and consume the grass placed on Citta’s cloak, without burning the cloak itself. Citta then announces that he will provide for the monk, but Mahaka leaves the place without returning, leaving an intriguing impression of a miracle man. The same resolution is reached in #3, when the young monk Isidatta gives a teaching that exemplifies a comprehensive grasp of Buddhist doctrine, after which he leaves with no return.
Perhaps, more of the VkN should be read between the lines of these texts. We can suggest that the subtle motif of the monk disappearing, or Citta providing for monks a a householder, fit the narrartive versions of texts that were deemed suitable to be called a discourse, Sutta, a well-exclaimed, authoritative Buddhist utterance. Then, perhaps, we could read more into the heavy meal that Citta provided for the monks, which may have been done to make a point and create the occasion for a teaching, much like Vimalakīrti’s feigned sickness. However, in interpreting the texts in this way, we act as storytellers would, filling in the blanks and teasing out narrative potentials. This storytelling, these practices of the imagination, these movements of heart and mind that the stories propel, were a real part of the tradition, and part of what propelled it to refashion itself, and to continually be creative, in a manner that eventually allowed the VkN to emerge, together with many other good stories along the way, which are lost to history.
Looking at these stories, we see that the closer characters to Vimalakīrti in the Citta-saṃyutta are the miraculous monks, who possess such a unique understanding. Their appearance in a literary sequence with a householder, who is himself a Buddhist adept, suggests a flexible narrative trope that probably found many expressions, while it should not surprise us that the way these stories were preserved in the Theravādin canon reflects more conservative trends. At the same time, an important point of this literary sequence is that a householder can possess a realization of doctrine and can, at times, be superior to the monks. However, ff the figure of Vimalakīrti was motivated by this collection, this thereby emphasizes that Vimalakīrti is very much a householder, despite Silk’s attempt to argue to the contrary, as if Vimalakīrti’s achievements are only possible for a monk. Surely, Vimalakīrti is an irregular householder, as is Citta. But the very point of their character is that they remain householders, and as such can command Buddhist truth. This is a natural and relevant point to be made within the Buddhist social and philosophical context.
Readers can decide for themselves how close the characters are, and which one of them is behind the figure of Vimalakīrti. More instructive is to observe the manner in which these characters emerge from the world of Buddhist storytelling, in both cases playing the role of the accomplished householder. While the literary quality of a Mahāyāna sutra like the VkN is widely accepted,56 scholars of early Buddhism are less accustomed to picking up on the literary construction of a Chapter like the Citta-saṃyutta. What should be clear, however, is that there is no original story here, and very little historical fact behind the narrative. There may have once been a householder named Citta who supported the Buddha and even practiced meditation, but his constructed literary figure is legendary, aimed to incite the imagination of the faithful. The stories in the Citta-saṃyutta, as well as their correspondences with their Chinese parallels in the Saṃyukta-āgama, build on the character of the inspired laymen to generate stories that fit the ideological and narrative world of early Buddhism. Ultimately, this comparison shows the rich narrative techniques at play in composing a Chapter in the Saṃyutta, which betray storytelling practices that evolved into tales that seem to have contributed to the shaping of the VkN. The development of ideas between the textual traditions proves to be paralleled by textual ones, in a vibrant world of imaginative Buddhist literature and performance. Vimalakīrti reminds us that this kind of Buddhist storytelling is headed toward the discovery of illusion, even though it did not necessarily begin there.

Notes

1
See Gomez and Harrison (2022, p. 54). Translations from the VkN are taken from this new, pleasing translation. Comments on the translation will be discussed.
2
O’Leary (2015, p. 63) speaks of “the power of the sutra’s repetitions, which in meditative recitation track down substantializing and dualistic notions to their last hiding-place”. Silk (2014, p. 175): “it is clear that the doctrine of non-duality, advaya, is central to the text, being not only the subject of its eighth chapter but, according to my understanding, underlying the entire philosophical viewpoint of the sūtra as a whole”. Richter (2020, p. 61): “the Vimalakīrti Sūtra is also a demonstration of how to enter the gate of nonduality in narrative”. See also Vihan (2024).
3
Beyond the well-known self-eulogies most famous from the Saddharmapuṇḍarikā- (“Lotus”-) or the Vajracchedikā-(“Diamond”-) sūtras, there is a finer point in the eloquent speech of the Buddha being a veritable body of the Buddha. This body of speech is internalized by listeners to transform their own bodies, which themselves are somewhere between real and illusory. See Gummer’s (2022a) captivating analysis.
4
Praṭibhāna is a key concept in the VkN: this inspiration is what the śrāvaka students admit they lack in ch. 3, in face of Vimalakīrti’s compelling expression of nonduality, as when Maudgalyāyana and Subhūti end their narration in Sections 3.9 and 3.20, respectively, by saying that they “remained eloquentless” in face of Vimalakīrti’s rhetoric—ahaṃ va niṣpratibhāṇo bhūva/bhūvan; Gomez and Harrison: “I could think of nothing to say”). At a critical moment in chapter 6, Sāriputra also questions the goddess about her pratibhāṇa—“What have you attained, what have you realized, to have such inspired eloquence” (Gomez and Harrison, p. 75; kiṃ tvayā prāptaṃ kiṃ vā sakṣātkṛtaṃ yasyāste īdṛśaṃ pratibhānaṃ).
5
Hamlin (1988) emphasizes upāya-kauśalya as a key to interpreting the VKN.
6
See paradigmatically in chapters 12 and 24 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. More generally, I assume that readers are aware of Mahāyāna, and especially Madhyamaka dialectic, which shows how anything conditioned, causal, changing, and relational, i.e., anything in existence—has no abiding nature of its own, no svabhāva, and is thus empty of inherent existence and of objective reality. For introductory expositions of this idea, see J. L. Garfield (1995). For more intricate discussion that spans some of the conceptual tensions that are embedded in Madhyamaka dialectic and that are resonated in the VkN, see Huntington (2007), J. Garfield (2008), and Shulman (2007).
7
I will not take up here the deep metaphysical questions regarding the naturalistic framework and materialistic interpretations of contemporary science, which incline to see the mind and consciousness as byproducts, or emergent properties of the brain; eliminativist positions are still more deeply ingrained in the way science thinks than is commonly understood, as consciousness remains epiphenomenal and devoid of causal powers, so long as the explanatory framework is materialist; see for examples in Baars (1997) or Seth (2021). Once science is able to truly connect between matter and mind within one ontological framework—call it what you like—more room will become available for identifying the powers of the mental. Steps in this direction are evident in the work of Koch (2012, 2019), as well as in the IIT framework suggested by Tononi e.g., (Tononi et al. 2016).
8
On placebo, see Harrington (2008).
9
More than an echo of this approach finds expression in the way Triplett (2020, p. 45) draws on the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann to say that “the system of medicine in functionally differentiated societies is solely concerned with healing humans and animals from physical and mental ailments whereas the system of religion focuses on a form of ultimate healing. Luhmann claims that it is quite different to think from illness (Krankheit) to health (Gesundheit) than to think from suffering (Leid) to salvation (Heil)”. My argument is that such stark distinction between the religious and medical systems is a conceptual myth, and indeed that they conjoin in the manner in which the mental can impact disease. While Triplett is clearly aware that these distinctions do not hold in traditional societies and in the figure of the medicine man, in fact, these two “systems” are more closely interrelated than such definitions suggest. The question of why Buddhist practitioners continued to employ worldly medical techniques into the modern period, despite the perception of the religion as other-worldly (pp. 46–47), thus, seems chimerical.
10
For a compelling, recent discussion, see J. L. Garfield (2024). However, it is not clear that the whole only breaks down to its parts, as pudgalavāda doctrines suggest; see Carpenter (2015). While pudgalavāda raises its own problems, the attempt toward a positive articulation of the human that remains despite the deconstructive logic of selflessness is intriguing. See also Collins’ (2020) emphasis on narrative approaches to such ideas, and on his contribution to the understanding of consensual (normally called—conventional) truth. More generally, Collins argues that philosophical logic should be seen to determine narrative logic, which is no less valuable in understanding Buddhist society’s driving vision.
11
Gómez (2012) discusses the narrative potency of the Mahāyāna use of miracles. Fiordalis (2012, p. 119) says, while addressing the employment of miracles in the Vimalakīrti: “These examples of the wondrous demonstration of magical creation and transformation demonstrate the flexibility of the metaphor of magical illusion. It can convey the insubstantiality and the substantive appearance of reality, an ontological status between the real and the unreal. Buddhas and bodhisattvas combine their application of superhuman powers with their transcendence of the mundane realm through their wondrous display of magical creation and transformation”. Fiordalis further speaks of the text collapsing the distinction between natural and supernatural causes (esp. p. 122). See also Hamlin (1988), who emphasizes the concept of upāya, and Holloway (2023). This makes clear that the nature of nonduality in the text does not only remain in the realms of language, as Vihan (2024) seems to suggest.
12
I have no ambition here to provide a comprehensive discussion of nonduality and ontology in the text. How exactly these ideas were understood across different cultural spheres, and especially in China, where the Vimalakīrti was especially popular, is less than evident. See Greene (2022), as well as Fan Muyou (2016).
13
For the VkN, discussion of philosophy cannot be carried out without taking into consideration the narrative movement of the text. In a recent study, Natalie Gummer (2022a) suggested that the acme of the text is in chapter 11, when Vimalakīrti brings a Buddha from a distant Buddha land into the palm of his hand. Holloway (2023) identifies the key moment of the text as the adoption of silence by Vimalakīrti in chapter 9, as an expression of nonduality. Silk (2014), who is well aware of the literary quality of the text, suggests that it is constituted by at least two story-lines—the frame story in which the Buddha appears, and the middle chapters in which the “plot”, his key term, develops much like in Aristotelian theory. While these readings are intriguing, I would place the acme of the text in chapter 6, with the Goddess’s transformation of Śariputra into a woman, and then back into a man, thereby providing the ultimate demonstration of non-duality, not only between male and female, but between matter and perceptual form. This continues the point developed especially in chapter 5, according to which the objective nature of material reality is shown to be completely malleable, as when Vimalakīrti claims he can place Mount Meru and anything that lives or grows on it inside a mustard seed, or pour all oceans and beings within them through a hole the size of the pore of skin, without any of these beings noticing. In the narrative arc of the text, the escalation toward, and the resolution of, the key moment in chapter(s 5 and) 6 are represented by chapters three and four with teachings to śrāvakas and to the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, which offer an exciting plethora of non-dual thinking, and then with Chapter 8 that addresses non-duality directly. My point is not to argue that my understanding is more correct, but only to say that from a philosophical perspective at least, it is legitimate. Gummer (2022b) has also insightfully discussed the inspiration of the Mahāyāna-bhāṇaka (preacher), in a manner that reflects the dense powers inherent in his speech, another theme that is highly relevant to understanding the philosophy of the VkN.
More generally, my approach draws on the insights developed in the volume edited by Stepien (2020), who speaks in his introduction of the “interplay of literary medium and philosophical message”.
14
VkN 4.11: bodhisatvena glānenaivam svacittaṃ nidhyāpayitavyaṃ pūrvāntāsadviparyāsakarmasamutthānasamutthito ‘yaṃ vyādhir abhūt parikalpakleśasamutthitaḥ / na punar atra kaścit paramārthato dharma upalabhyate yasyaiṣa vyādhiḥ. I thank Paul Harrison for sharing with me the 2006 edited version of the Sanskrit text, which is quoted here, and which corrects the manuscript that can be found in the 2004 publication (Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2006). I should add that although the edited version is more correct grammatically, and although there are obvious mistakes in the Sanskrit manuscript, it remains a genuine version.
15
Viparyāsa is itself an error or misapprehension; according to MMK 23, it is interchangeable with viparyaya. It is an unreal error with respect to the earlier limit, pūrvānta-asad-viparyāsa, or perhaps an error that perceives an unreal earlier limit.
16
For more elaboration on this argument, see MMK chs. 1,11,7.
17
Thus, Gomez and Harrisontranslate parikalpakleśasamutthitaḥ as “arisen due to the defilements resulting from imagining things that are not real”, which is imprecise. They read parikalpa—mental construction, as abhūtaparikalpa (Lamotte called this “false imagination” above). Any mental construction is false, but then it also has generative aspects that adepts like Vimalakīrti can make use of. Again, the echo of MMK 23 seems significant.
18
caturmahābhautiko ‘yaṃ samucchrayaḥ/na caiṣāṃ dhātūnāṃ kaścit svāmī na samutthāpayitā/anatmā hi ayaṃ samucchrayaḥ/yo ‘yaṃ vyādhir nāma nāyaṃ paramarthata upalabhyate anyatrātmābhiniveśāt/uta nātamnyabhiniviṣṭā vihariṣyāmo vyadhimūlaparijñātāvinaḥ/tenātmasaṃjñāṃ viṣṭāpya dharmasaṃjnotpādayitavyā/dharmasaṃghāto ‘yaṃ kāyaḥ/dharmmā evotpadyamānā utpadyante/dharma eva nirudhyamānā nirudhyante/te ca dharmāḥ parasparaṃ ne cetayanti na jānanti / na ca teṣām utpadyamānānām evaṃ bhavaty utpadyāmaha iti / na nirudhyamānānām evaṃ bhavaty nirudhyāmaha iti/.
19
Gomez and Harrisonp. 20; 2004: māyopamo (‘)yaṃ kayo viparyāsasaṃbhūtaḥ svapnopamo (‘)yaṃ kayo vitathadarśanaḥ.
20
Shulman (2007). This dual description of the body, as both realistically ingrained in material substance and as a product of mental construction, reflects certain Buddhist ideas on the nature of material form (rūpa). For example, the Therevāda Abhidhamma compendium of the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha from the 11th century defines matter as having four causes, two of which seem physical that arise from temperature (utu) and nutriment (āhāra), and two of which are ingrained in the mental, born of karma (kamma) or intention (cetanā) and born of consciousness (citta). Further explorations of this theme and the manner in which this discussion devlops earlier Abhidhamma tradition is necessary.
21
As in Siderits (2007: ch. 6), as well as Carpenter (2015).
22
In the present case, there is little need to raise the prospects of comparing the texts under analysis to other extant versions, as none exist for the main texts we study. Anālayo (2015) discusses one of the texts that relates to the ones I discuss here, but which does not include the main formula I focus on. In Anālayo (2016, ch. 12), he provides a translation from the Tibetan translation of the Giramānanda-sutta, which is faithful to the Pāli text. Skilling (1993) discusses the nature of the Tibetan translation of the group of 13 texts in which this discourse is included. The question regarding the omission of these texts from the Chinese canon, when 3 of them were important enough to become parittas in Theravāda, meaning protective texts that are relatively widely used and distributed (Shulman 2019), is itself of interest and worthy of discussion. The argument could be made that the fact that these texts are not extant in other languages means that they are later. Such an interpretation would be doubtful, however, since the fact that this formula was reused means that it was important to Theravāda authors. Even if this is a later interpretation, it is interesting as such.
23
Irregular expressions of resonant views appear in Udāna 8.1–3. and 8.3, but these are more depictions of a state of mind than a philosophical argument.
24
In the early texts, such as the classic the Pheṇapiṇḍūpamasutta at SN III.140, things can be said to be like an illusion in the sense of being impermanent, not unreal. See Shulman (2008).
25
See Jones (2017) for further relevant sources on healing in Early Buddhism. My approach here is more philosophical.
26
The importance of formulas was acknowledged first by Allon (1997), although here the emphasis on their thick doctrinal expression is amplified. McGovern (2024) suggests that it would be valuable to compare formulas preserved in different languages by different Buddhist schools, rather than comparing full texts, as is practiced widely in scholarship, most classically in the work of e.g., B. Anālayo (2011, 2017). Such a mode of comparison may indeed help bridge some of the gap between the different textual traditions. Given the diverse performative contexts of the early texts, it is often unclear whether a Chinese text is a translation, an event of preaching, a recitation, or a creative exposition inspired by the text; see (Zacchetti 2021).
27
Gethin (2025) advances the Parry-Lord approach to early oral Buddhist scripture, first suggested by Cousins (1983) and supported by McGovern (2019). Yet there were different contexts for the performance of scripture, and some related also to written texts, as is clear in Allon (2021, ch. 5). See Shulman (2024).
28
E.g., SN IV.46.19–24. Quotes from Pāli generally follow the Chaṭṭa saṅgāyana edition of the Vippasanā Research Institute (VRI), while consulting the editions of the Pali Text Society (PTS). Any significant divergence between the editions is marked, and I often introduce changes, mainly in punctuation marks, which are heavily overused in all editions, and in not employing any capital letters. All translations from Pāli are my own. References employ page numbers for PTS editions, and when relevant, include discourse numbers in VRI.
29
See further Shulman (forthcoming).
30
While the commentary does not elaborate on the formula here, in other cases, it explains that the illness is severe and even nearing death. For example, the commentary on the discourse to Vakkhali in the Khanda-saṃyutta (SN III #87) explains bāḷhagilāno as adhimattagilāno. The Aṭṭhakathā for the discourse to Anāthapiṇḍīka in the Majjhima (no. 143) reads—bāḷhagilāno adhimattagilāno maraṇaseyyaṃ upagato, saying that he is very sick, on his death-bed. The Ṭīkā for the same text explains—adhimattagilānoti adhikāya mattāya maraṇassa āsannatāya ativiya gilāno attho—“the meaning is that he is exceedingly sick, to the degree that is nearing death.
31
For the understanding of paritta, see Shulman (2019). Salguero (2022, p. 30) suggests that “The logic behind the use of this text as a paritta is that by hearing this story chanted aloud, patients may also experience spontaneous healing”. Yet the power of the recitation would result from the dense truth that is thought to reverberate within the sound, the inner powers of reality that the Buddha realized.
32
I translate nirvāṇa/nibbāna as “utter calm”, intending that it may not necessarily be thought of as a specific and final state, but more as a process or quality. Thus, nibbāna is not necessarily the final end of mental cultivation in Buddhism, but one of its most significant potentials.
33
SN V.80 [VRI V.14]: sattime, kassapa, bojjhaṅgā mayā sammadakkhātā bhāvitā bahulīkatā abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattanti. katame satta? satisambojjhaṅgo kho, kassapa, mayā sammadakkhāto bhāvito bahulīkato abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattati…pe… upekkhāsambojjhaṅgo kho, kassapa, mayā sammadakkhāto bhāvito bahulīkato abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattati. Ime kho, kassapa, satta bojjhaṅgā mayā sammadakkhātā bhāvitā bahulīkatā abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattantī’’ti
34
For the bojjhaṅgas and jhāna, see Arbel (2017, ch. 5), Gethin ([1992] 2001, ch. 3), and Shulman (2014, ch. 3).
35
Focusing on the Chinese parallel from the Saṃyukta-āgama to the third text in this sequence in the Pāli, in which the Buddha heals through this recitation, Anālayo (2015) emphasizes the impact of “effort” (vīriya translated here as “energy”) and of mindfulness in facilitating the recovery. I see this interpretation by whoever put this text together (i.e., any reciter/preacher/performer/translator(s) along the long way to China) as interesting, but one that does not necessarily explain the ideas that are active in the Pāli texts.
36
The VRI edition reads tathāpahīno, which suits the reading I offer here even more clearly, that the illness was “thereby/in this way let go of”. However, the reading tathā pahīno, as in PTS and in the corresponding Aṅguttara texts, may be more grammatical, eventhough including tathā within the compound would not be too irregular in pāli, in which almost anything can be a first idem in a compound, as in, for example, kiṃlakkhaṇo.
37
Bodhi (2000, p. 1581) translates—“And the Venerable Mahakassapa recovered from that illness. In such a way the Venerable Mahakassapa was cured of his illness”. Similarly, Piyadassi (1975), in his edition of the main book of Sinhalese paritta chants, translates—“Thereupon the Venerable Kassapa recovered from that affliction, and that affliction of the Venerable Kassapa disappeared”. Sujato (2018) translates—“And that’s how he recovered from that illness”. However, such translations miss the punch—the point is that “this illness”, so ābādho, was given up, renounced, forsaken, abandoned, let go of, as pahīna is the past participle of pajahati. Harvery (2015, p. 15) ignores the tathā, but is nonetheless closer when he reads—“his illness was abandoned (pahīno … so ābādho ahosīti)’”. Bodhi’s (2012, p. 873) translation of the Aṅguttara is closer to the latter, but influenced by the Aṅguttara’s reading tathā pahīno—“Nakulapitā recovered from that illness, and that is how his illness was abandoned”.
38
As defined by the Pāli-English Dictionary of Rhys Davids and Stede (retrieved online, 3 January 2025). The new dictionary by Margaret Cone reads similarly—“gives up, abandons; leaves; shuns; lets go, gets rid of” (retrieved online, 3 January 2025).
39
This statement echoes the Buddha’s claim in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta that he can remain alive until the end of the eon or for a full eon longer, while Ānanda fails to grasp the thick hint and request him to do so. The Buddha there and then fixes the time of his death as 3 months away, having “let go of the life-complex” (āyu-saṃkhāraṃ ossaji; DN II.106; the full episode occupies most of the third recitation section of the text, beginning at DN II.102).
40
E.g., Majjhima I.500.
41
For more details, see Thanissaro (1996), Gethin ([1992] 2001).
42
SN V.81, VRI V.197. This request by the Buddha is occasioned by another, very interesting formula, which may not always refer to recitation, although here the result is that Mahācunda recites the formula on the seven factors of awakening. The Buddha says to him– paṭibhantu taṃ Cunda bojjhaṅgā’ti (SN V.81)—literally “may the factors of enlightenment inspire you”. Perhaps this offers a clue to the manner in which recitation of a densely packed and finely tuned doctrinal formula was itself thought to produce profound mental change.
43
In Anālayo (2016, ch. 12), a translation of the Tibetan version of the text is presented, which was apparently brought to Tibet by monks from Sri Lanka. In the conclusion to this work, he offers an interesting and detailed presentation of how this text may be put into practice.
44
AN V. 109, VRI V.60.
45
AN V. 110–111. Compare the classic expressions of this formula in Majjhima 26 (MN I.167) and Dīgha 14 (DN II.36), where the formula begins slightly differently, perhaps due to the following verse that is quoted, idaṃ pi kho ṭhānaṃ duddasaṃ yadidam... There also the spelling also appears as sabbūpadhipiṭinissaggo (with one ‘p’).
46
AN 6.16, III.295–298.
47
AN III.295: mā kho tvaṃ gahapati sāpekho kalam akāsi. dukkhā gahapati sāpekkhassa kālakiriyā garahitā ca bhagavatā sāpekhassa kālakiriyā. The point surely relates to the impact that the moment of death is thought to have upon the process of rebirth, on which see Langer (2007).
48
AN 4.55, at AN II.61–62.
49
Should references like this not be placed inside the texts?
50
See further discussion of this fascinating discourse in Shulman (forthcoming).
51
te satthu diṭṭhakālato paṭṭhāya puttasinehaṃ paṭilabhitvā ‘‘hantāta, hantātā’’ti vacchakaṃ disvā vacchagiddhinī gāvī viya viravamānā upasaṅkamitvā paṭhamadassaneneva sotāpannā jātā.
52
The text with Girmiānanda is a paritta as well, perhaps due to its similarity with these discourses.
53
For the storytelling behind such geyya texts that end in a verse, see Shulman (2023).
54
AN V.297: atha kho nakulapituno gahapatissa nakulamātarā gahapatāniyā iminā ovādena ovadiyamānassa so ābādho ṭhānaso paṭippassambhi. vuṭṭhahi ca nakulapitā gahapati tamhā ābādhā tathā pahīno ca pana nakulapituno gahapatissa so ābādho ahosi.
55
Vimalakīrti’s act of feigning illness recalls the Buddha’s letting go of his life-force (āyu-saṅkhāra) in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta: he could—tradition recommends we believe—have done otherwise.
56
E.g., Fiordalis (2012), Silk (2014), Richter (2020), as well as note 16 above.

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Shulman, E. Healing Through Letting Go: On the Maturation of a Certain Conception of Medicine in Indian Buddhism. Religions 2025, 16, 633. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050633

AMA Style

Shulman E. Healing Through Letting Go: On the Maturation of a Certain Conception of Medicine in Indian Buddhism. Religions. 2025; 16(5):633. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050633

Chicago/Turabian Style

Shulman, Eviatar. 2025. "Healing Through Letting Go: On the Maturation of a Certain Conception of Medicine in Indian Buddhism" Religions 16, no. 5: 633. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050633

APA Style

Shulman, E. (2025). Healing Through Letting Go: On the Maturation of a Certain Conception of Medicine in Indian Buddhism. Religions, 16(5), 633. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050633

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