Integral Ecology as a Call to Responsibility: Approximations Between Hans Jonas and Pope Francis

Abstract

This article aims to examine the concept of responsibility through the lens of the “integral ecology” proposed by Pope Francis in Laudato Si’. The objective is to demonstrate how the ethics of responsibility developed by Hans Jonas in his seminal 1979 work aligns with Pope Francis’s concerns and simultaneously offers a complementary theoretical–philosophical framework. To this end, we begin by showing how responsibility occupies a central place in the papal encyclical, assuming a multidimensional perspective. From there, we analyze how the understanding of responsibility transitions from ontology (Jonas) and anthropology (Francis) to ethics, taking the biosphere as a new object of responsibility in light of the threats posed by the unchecked advance of technological powers against nature. This investigation is based on a comparative and conceptual analysis of primary texts by Hans Jonas and Pope Francis. This shift also entails the recognition of nature’s intrinsic rights and an understanding of species extinction as both an impoverishment (Jonas) and a mutilation (Francis) of creation. We conclude by demonstrating how the call for integral ecology becomes an urgent task for the present generations in the context of catastrophe prevention. In this way, integral ecology attains its radical meaning when understood as demanding two fundamental transformations: a change in consciousness and a change in lifestyle—from consumerism to frugality.

1. Introduction

The concept of responsibility is one of the most central themes in Pope Francis’s encyclical Laudato Si’ (Francis 2015)1. The term appears at least seventeen times in the document, published in May 2015 to wide international acclaim, solidifying Pope Francis’s position as one of the most prominent voices in ecological advocacy. For Pope Francis, responsibility is tied to the cultivation of the common good (LS, 229) and to a deep awareness of our belonging to nature. This perspective stands in direct opposition to the anthropocentrism2 prevailing in modernity, and even to certain theological currents3 that regarded the human being as the “lord” over all things—entitled to act without responsibility, respect, or care.

In this sense, responsibility takes a central place in the notion of integral ecology, which Francis defines as an ecology that opposes what he calls “false or superficial ecology” (LS, 59) insofar as it requires deep changes in both consciousness and lifestyle. As suggested by Meier (2024, p. 112), the concept of integral ecology is a kind of “new paradigma”. For him, “the concept of integral ecology can augment and strengthen a destination’s moral-ethical compass as it offers concrete moral standards and implications for treating others and nature” and “can support the positive formation of an inner compass and can give more substance to it by bringing in strong moral and ethical reference standards”. This perspective, as we intend to demonstrate below, closely aligns with the theses of the Jewish–German philosopher Hans Jonas, for whom responsibility must lie at the heart of an “ethics for the technological civilization,” as he proposes in the subtitle of his magnum opus from 1979. Although Jonas did not employ the term integral ecology, his theses—as we aim to show in this study—complement those defended by Francis, who adopts an ecology grounded in convivialism, in which human beings and other creatures coexist in balanced relationships within the environment, conceived as a “common home.” As Anyanwu (2024, p. 56) recalls, the idea of “human ecology involves good integration within the environment, using it as a point of contact to foster fraternal communion and relationality”. As Francis insists—and as Jonas’s writings illustrate—such an ecology cannot be conceived apart from an anthropology (LS, 118) or even an ontology4. It is, at once, a critique of both “misguided anthropocentrism” and of mere biocentrism (LS, 118): in both cases, the human being is removed from nature—either because he feels no commitment to the natural world or because he is no longer considered part of it. For Francis, only an integral ecology—one that includes the human being alongside all other living beings—is capable of addressing the environmental crisis: “Human beings cannot be expected to feel responsibility for the world unless, at the same time, their unique capacities of knowledge, will, freedom and responsibility are recognized and valued” (LS, 118). Because it is integral, this ecology encompasses various dimensions, environmental, economic, social, and cultural, closely aligned with everyday actions and the common good and attentive to intergenerational and environmental justice. For Jonas, in turn, this perspective would be grounded in a new type of humanism, which Frogneux (2012, p. 438), in proposing an anthropological reading of The Imperative of Responsibility, characterized as a “non-anthropocentric humanism” or even a “decentered humanism” (Frogneux 2012, p. 439), in which the human being participates but does not claim exclusivity.

From this concept of integral ecology, we thus propose to analyze the different dimensions of responsibility through a comparative study between the central theses of Pope Francis (notably in Laudato Si’ and Laudate Deum (Francis 2023)5]) and those developed by Hans Jonas (particularly in The Imperative of Responsibility (Jonas 1979, 1984)). This is not, of course, an attempt to erase the differences between the two perspectives—which begin with the simple fact that Jonas was a philosopher of the Jewish–German tradition, while Francis is a Pope—but rather to highlight the “common task” (Souza et al. 2023) that both have taken on as part of their concern for the continuity of life on planet Earth. What “cements this task is the ethical expression of the problem and its urgency, detected by both in their own writings” (Souza et al. 2023, p. 9).

This shared commitment becomes especially evident when we look at the lives and legacies of both voices. Just as Jonas dedicated himself to this task until his final days—as evidenced by his last lecture, The Outcry of the Mute Things (Jonas 1996), delivered on 30 January 1993, in Udine, Italy, just six days before his death—Pope Francis has likewise proven to be a tireless advocate for this same mission. He published the Apostolic Exhortation Laudate Deum after recognizing that “our responses have not been adequate, while the world in which we live is collapsing and may be nearing the breaking point” (LD, 2) and because “the situation is now even more pressing” (LD, 4). With this new exhortation, he sought to “clarify and complete” (LD, 4) what he had set forth eight years earlier in Laudato Si’.

The perceptions of these restless and vigilant men, whose reflections inspire us precisely because they express the magnitude of the mission they chose to embrace, can be succinctly summarized in Integral Ecology as a Call to Responsibility, as we will explore in this work. For Jonas, responsibility “is an ethical principle founded ontologically, that is, rooted in the very meaning of human existence, the only one capable of opening itself to the horizon of the urgent care of nature, considered by him as the novum of ethics,” since “none of the traditional ethics (to the extent that they are limited to the anthropocentric horizon of the present) have had to face such a difficult task—including non-human life and future generations as part of ethical obligations”. For Francis, “it is a responsibility for creation, which must be cared for by the one who recognizes the greatness of the gift and, consequently, the prohibition of plundering it at will” (Souza et al. 2023, pp. 9–10). In this context, praising (Laudato Si’ and Laudate Deum) is also an act of resistance against destruction. Moreover, by reminding Catholic faithful and encouraging “brothers and sisters of other religions,” Francis emphasizes the importance of the “motivations born of their faith” (LD, 61). This required change to transform human behavior toward creation demands nothing less than a complete spiritual conversion, because “we know that authentic faith not only gives strength to the human heart, but also transforms life, transfigures our goals, and sheds light on our relationship to others and with creation as a whole” (LD, 61).

Moreover, Pope Francis’s eco-theological thought and Hans Jonas’s eco-philosophical reflections converge around the idea that life, in all its forms, possesses an intrinsic value that demands ethical responsibility from human beings, who are thus called to stewardship. Drawing from the Christian tradition, Francis conceives creation as a gift from God, which bestows upon every creature its own dignity and calls for care and respect. He proposes an “integral ecology” that recognizes the profound interdependence between human beings and the environment, emphasizing that the ecological crisis demands a deep conversion of both human consciousness and action in the world. Similarly, Hans Jonas develops an ethics of responsibility based on an acute awareness of humanity’s impact on planetary life. Grounded in a biological understanding of evolution, Jonas argues that the survival of life depends on prudent and responsible use of technological power, with an eye to safeguarding the existence of future generations. Although they approach the issue from different paths—one theological, the other philosophical–secular—both denounce the logic of consumerism and advocate for the urgent need for a radical ethical transformation to ensure the continuity and dignity of life on Earth.

2. A Multidimensional Responsibility

There are at least five distinct senses in which the concept of responsibility is employed in Laudato Si’, and these categories reveal that the notion of responsibility in the encyclical must be understood as multidimensional—encompassing everything from public policy to personal decision-making, always with an emphasis on justice, the recognition of the value of all forms of life, sustainability, and care for our common home.

The first sense (LS, 193, 194, and 206) emphasizes personal responsibility, related to a consumerist lifestyle6 and to the individual’s capacity for choice and action, particularly concerning the urgency of conscious and sustainable consumption. The second (LS, 138, 229, and 220) refers to ethical and moral responsibility associated with environmental justice—not only in terms of access to and use of natural resources but also in the fair distribution of responsibilities and the principle that those who cause harm should bear the cost. A third approach is reflected in the Pope’s concerns with collective and communal responsibility—that is, the shared dimension of environmental responsibility, which involves all individuals and territories and cannot be seen as a solitary duty. In this regard, the Pope speaks of territorial responsibility (LS, 42) and of the idea of a community as an ecological subject (LS, 219) and even presents responsibility as a collective virtue (LS, 180). From this notion, a fourth perspective (LS 16, 182, 183, 196, and 197) emerges, which conceives responsibility from a political and institutional point of view7, as the Pope refers to the duty of governments, institutions, and political systems to promote the common good, ensure environmental justice, and combat corruption and inertia. Finally, a fifth sense regards responsibility from an existential and intergenerational perspective, related to the commitment to future generations (LS, 161) and the awareness that human existence (LS, 160) involves the preservation of the planet—something presented as both an educational (LS, 162) and spiritual task (LS, 216).

Across these various usages, the term responsibility is embraced in its original etymological sense: to be responsible is to have the capacity to “respond, to promise, and to guarantee” (from the Latin respondere, derived from spondere, to promise, to commit, preceded by the intensifier re-, meaning “again”). To speak of responsabilis is to speak of someone who can be called to answer for something—or, more precisely, to answer for their actions (before the law, society, or even the divine). The idea of responsibility, therefore, implies the ability to respond to commitments undertaken or actions committed. For this reason, it only makes sense in the human case since only the human being can answer for his actions and fulfill the commitment he assumes when he enters the human community—or, in ecological terms, when he becomes part of the community of life on planet Earth. The concept of responsibility, however, bears a second meaning: as a “capacity” (the human being can take responsibility), responsibility becomes an obligation—a moral duty: if the human being can take responsibility (and, even more, if only he can), then he must assume it, lest he fail to fully realize himself as a human being. Theologically speaking, we might say that if God has endowed man with this capacity as “God-given abilities” (LS, 78), then he must fulfill it in order to be fully realized as part of Creation.

3. Onto-Anthropological Perspective and the Ethics of Responsibility

It is precisely at this point that Pope Francis’s use of the concept of responsibility intersects with the conceptions of the thinker known as the philosopher of responsibility, the Jewish–German philosopher Hans Jonas. Author of Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, published in German in 1979 and translated into English by the author himself in 1984 as The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age8, Hans Jonas draws attention to the transition from “capacity” to “obligation”. For him, this implies a special theoretical stance, assumed as a kind of contravention to one of the most well-established “dogmas” of contemporary philosophy: “no ‘ought’ can be derived from ‘being’” (IR, 44), or in other words, no ethics could be founded upon an ontology. By affirming that responsibility must first be thought of as a “capacity,” Jonas draws attention to its ontological foundation (and clearly also anthropological). Then, by emphasizing that such a capacity must be recognized as power and as a duty, he transitions into the field of ethics.

This perspective, in a similar way—though marked by a religious structure—underlies the ideas of Pope Francis himself, who states that the “human ecology” he advocates implies a “relationship between human life and the moral law, which is inscribed in our nature” (LS, 155). In other words, it is in the domain of ontology (nature) that the moral law (ethics) by which human action should be guided is found. Citing Benedict XVI, Francis recalls that this occurs for a self-evident reason: the human being is also nature insofar as “our body itself establishes us in a direct relationship with the environment and with other living beings” (LS, 155). Through our body, which shares the needs common to all living things and is sustained through the metabolism present in all other organisms, there emerges a sense of human belonging that leads to the idea of the common good.

The passage from ontology to ethics, or from nature to morality, would be legitimized, for Jonas, by what he considers the first imperative of responsibility: “that humanity shall exist” (IR, 42), both now and especially in the future9. And it is precisely this imperative that must guide human action in daily life: “the first rule for the mandatory quality can solely be gained from the imperative of existence,” and “all further rules are subject to its criterion” (IR, 43). Thus, because humanity must exist, it must use its capacity to be responsible as an ethical instrument to control everything that threatens its existence. In this way, Jonas draws attention to a central element of his work—as well as that of Laudato Si’: the problem of technology. For the philosopher, the advancement of technological powers—especially from the seventeenth century onward, with particular emphasis on the past two centuries—has placed human existence itself at risk. The initial diagnosis of his work appears in the preface to the German edition of the book: “The starting thesis of this book is that the promise of modern technology has turned into a threat or has become indissolubly bound up with it” (PV, 710). In other words, technology has become an ethical problem to the extent that its exercise has assumed an unprecedented magnitude in terms of its impact—something that, combined with the ambivalence of its effects, lends it a truly apocalyptic potential11. This is the same position taken by Francis, who addresses the “new forms of power structures based on the techno-economic paradigm” (LS, 53) and criticizes the subjugation of technology to the interests of the market, profit, and finance (LS, 54), following the logic that turns it from a form of “creativity” into an exercise of “power” (LS, 102), extending into fields as novel as biotechnology and nanotechnology. Neither Francis nor Jonas, however, maintains a technophobic stance: for them, it is necessary to limit the reach of these powers, reorienting them toward the common good—a task that falls precisely to an ethics grounded in responsibility. The issue is not only the development of technology itself but also the fact that “our immense technological development has not been accompanied by a development in human responsibility, values, and conscience” (LD 24), which would ensure its proper use. Stating that “science and technology are not neutral; from the beginning to the end of a process, various intentions and possibilities are in play and can take on distinct shapes” (LS, 114), Pope Francis concurs with Jonas: if technology is not neutral, it can be reoriented in the service of the common good, which in this case means ensuring the survival conditions of humanity itself in the future.

4. The Biosphere as a (New) Object of Responsibility

Here is a second important point that brings together the thesis of responsibility advocated by Jonas and that defended by Pope Francis: both consider that human existence cannot be conceived separately from the existence of other forms of life. Both speak of a “delicate balance” (LS, 38) and a “symbiotic balance” (IR, 137) that must be recognized—and that technology itself has increasingly threatened as a source of risk and “disruption” (IR, 137). In other words, the human presence in the world, through the advancement of technology, has come to represent a dangerous presence to the extent that it disturbs this balance. For Jonas, this is due to a change in the very nature of human action provoked by technology: “Through the effects, [technology] that the nature of human action has de facto been changed, and that an object of an entirely new order—no less than the whole biosphere of the planet—has been added to what we must be responsible for because of our power over it.” (IR, 7). For Jonas, since technology is the cause of imbalance, ethics must assume nature itself as its object—and this is a great novelty in the recent history of ethics since traditional ethical systems were not prepared for this task. They were formulated in different contexts and in response to challenges of another age when the harmful consequences of technology were not yet detectable. The shift in today’s scenario thus demands a corresponding transformation in ethics itself: “And of what surpassing importance an object, dwarfing all previous objects of active man! Nature as a human responsibility is surely a novum to be pondered in ethical theory.” (IR, 7). In this way, the concept of responsibility must encompass this new conception of nature as an ethical object precisely because human action, through technology, now poses an unprecedented threat.

This idea of the biosphere as under human responsibility also implies the inclusion of all forms of life as part of the criteria for the preservation of human life itself. For Jonas, as for Francis, no ethics can rightly consider the good of the human being without considering the good of all other creatures with whom human life is shared on this planet. In a 1982 essay published as the second chapter of Technology, Medicine, and Ethics: On the Practice of the Principle of Responsibility (released in German in 1985), Jonas clearly shows how his position closely aligns with what would later be characterized by Pope Francis as “integral ecology,” in that it rejects both the merely instrumental use of other forms of life and anthropocentrism itself, by linking the human good with the good of all other living beings, as we can read in Technik, Medizin und Ethik12: “Properly understood, the inclusion of the very existence of diversity [of life] in the human good—and therefore the inclusion of its preservation in man’s duty—goes beyond the utilitarian and any anthropocentric point of view. This broadened vision ties the human good to the total cause of its life, rather than setting it in hostile opposition, and grants extra-human life its own right. Its recognition means that every arbitrary and unnecessary extinction of species becomes a crime in itself, wholly apart from the same advice of enlightened self-interest; and it becomes a transcendent duty of man to protect the least renewable and most irreplaceable of all ‘resources’: the unimaginably rich genetic pool formed over eons of evolution. It is the excess of power that imposes this duty on men; and precisely against this power—therefore, against man himself—its protection is imperative. Thus, it happens that technology, this coldly pragmatic work of human cleverness, places man in a role that only religion has at times attributed to him: that of steward and guardian of creation. By increasing its power to a point where it palpably endangers the whole scheme of things, technology extends man’s responsibility to the future of life on Earth, which now stands defenseless before the misuse of that power.” (TME, 46–47).

Note, in this passage, how Jonas seeks to demonstrate that it is precisely the expansion of technology beyond the human sphere—its effects on the equilibrium of the entire biosphere—that gives rise to the ethical obligation of preservation under the principle of responsibility. The ontological and ethical foundation of this claim, as laid out in the passage above, is the recognition of an inherent “right” of all living organisms upon which human life itself depends. In other words, to speak of a human good that is existence itself—recognized as the primary object of the imperative of responsibility —necessarily implies recognizing the intrinsic good and value of all creatures: “now the entire biosphere of the planet, with all its abundance of species, in its newly-revealed vulnerability before the excessive interventions of man, claims its share of the respect owed to all that is an end in itself—that is, to all living beings,” writes Jonas in the same passage from Technology, Medicine, and Ethics (TME, 46).

5. A Right Proper to Nature

This idea of a “moral right proper to nature” appears in The Imperative of Responsibility, where Jonas examines precisely the “new dimensions of responsibility” (IR, 7). For him, the action of technology, in contrast with the vulnerability of nature, demands that we consider not only human interests (which would limit the challenge to the anthropocentric aspect of traditional ethics): “the biosphere as a whole and in its parts, now subject to our power, has become a human trust and has something of a moral claim” (IR, 8). According to Jonas, this issue involves a revision of one of the most central theses of modern science and philosophy, namely, the denial of purpose in nature—something that, in his view, arose from the invention of the idea of pure matter, that is, devoid of any purpose and, therefore, of value. Modernity is marked, as such, by an indifference toward nature, precisely by the fact that it “denies us all conceptual means to think of Nature as something to be honored” (IR, 8). Instead, the task of modernity has been the task of exploitation, and this necessitated the categorical denial of any recognition of right. Modernity reduced nature “to the indifference of necessity and accident and divested it of any dignity of ends” (IR, 8).

To rearticulate—along the lines inaugurated by Aristotle—end and value imply the recognition of the good and, consequently, of duty: if living beings have an end in themselves (for Jonas, associated with their self-affirmative character), then this requires that humans recognize their value, as a good to be preserved—and this is the task that must be assumed as part of responsibility. Thus, “extend the recognition of ‘ends in themselves’ beyond the sphere of man and make the human good include the care for them” (IR, 8) appears as a central task of the ethics of responsibility. Reflecting on the community of creatures, Jonas states, “a silent plea for its integrity seems to issue from the threatened plenitude of the living world” (IR, 8), and “should we heed this plea, should we recognize its claim as morally binding” (IR, 8). For the philosopher, this would entail a critique of the conception of science practiced throughout modernity, grounded—practically—in technicism and the exploitation of natural goods, and—theoretically—in a misunderstanding of the phenomenon of life, a victim of a mechanistic and reductionist interpretation. He writes, “we should keep ourselves open to the thought that natural sciences may not tell the whole story about Nature” (PR, 42)—a task that could be complemented, for example, by philosophy or theology.

A similar position is assumed by Pope Francis, who states, for example, that “all creatures are connected, each must be cherished with love and respect, for all of us as living creatures are dependent on one another” (LS, 42). This view is characteristic of “integral humanism,” which evokes the affective value of love and admiration as part of the recognition of the worth of all creatures. In one of the most striking passages on this theme, Francis declares, “We can add yet another argument for rejecting every tyrannical and irresponsible domination of human beings over other creatures. The ultimate purpose of other creatures is not to be found in us. Rather, all creatures are moving forward with us and through us towards a common point of arrival, which is God, in that transcendent fullness where the risen Christ embraces and illuminates all things” (LS, 83). One should note the reference to a finality that transcends the merely instrumental use of creatures by human beings and, at the same time, the theological recovery of the interweaving of human destiny with that of all other creatures, which, in religious language, are advancing together toward God. Far from diminishing the value of the human being, such a position highlights his unique dignity, recognized through his responsibility toward all creatures. In other words, it is only by acknowledging this co-belonging that the human being can, ultimately, assume his responsibility before nature. Responsibility thus entails “a loving awareness that we are not disconnected from the rest of creatures but joined in a splendid universal communion” (LS, 220). In these terms, both Jonas and Pope Francis hold that all natural beings possess a dignity that demands absolute respect as creatures of God endowed with specific identity and purpose. The Pope, for instance, speaks of the “intrinsic value of each creature” (LS, 16) and insists that we owe affection and admiration to all creatures because of their inherent worth (LS, 42) and their significance (LS, 76), each having its own proper end (LS, 83), for ultimately, “each creature reflects something of God” (LS, 221). Jonas, for his part, by reintegrating the human being into the realm of nature, affirms these same characteristics and speaks of a proper right of nature (IR, 8).

In this case, the Pope adopts the perspective that it is the very idea of ontological differences among beings that must be recognized as the foundation for respect and responsibility: it is from the diversity of life forms that the human being may come to recognize his own value as the guardian of the whole. In defending the role of researchers working on environmental issues, Francis emphasizes that “ongoing research should also give us a better understanding of how different creatures relate to one another in making up the larger units which today we term ‘ecosystems’” (LS, 140). Ecosystems are, therefore, formations of diversity of biodiversity, which also include human presence. Any impoverishment of this diversity is likewise an impoverishment of humanity itself, as Jonas also affirmed: for him, the preservation of “generic diversity” is an ethical task of utmost importance, “whose preservation is certainly a good compared to the alternative of annihilation or impoverishment” (IR, 81), since “extra-human life, impoverished nature, also means impoverished human life” (TME, 47).

For Francis, the recognition of the inherent value and rightful claim of all living beings depends on an ability to transcend oneself, to break free from the egoism and individualism that characterize our culture. Without such capacity, the Pope argues, one cannot recognize the value of other creatures, feel moved to care for them or impose limits to avoid their suffering or the degradation of the surrounding world (LS, 208). This is the same position held by Jonas through the concept of “solidarity of interest with the organic world” (IR, 138): it is a matter of recognizing “the solidarity of fate” (IR, 104) that binds all creatures, and, furthermore, that “the care must obviously include care for the future of all nature on this planet as a necessary condition of man’s own,” especially considering, as we have seen, that “man has become dangerous not only to himself but to the whole biosphere” (IR, 136). In recovering the value of solidarity, Jonas does not do so in a romantic or abstract manner: on the contrary, for him, it is the “egoism of each species” (IR, 137) that makes the planet’s symbiotic balance possible—and it is precisely the denial of the self-interest inherent in all organisms to continue living (that is, their egoism—a biologically rooted egoism, therefore) that disrupts this balance.

6. The Extinction of Species as Impoverishment and Mutilation

The disturbance of balance, as we know, has led to an unprecedented wave of extinction in the history of life on planet Earth. For Jonas, in provoking such a process, humanity is doing nothing other than killing the “goose that lays the golden eggs” and sawing “off the branch on which we sit” (IR, 7). In his famous lecture On Suffering13, delivered on September 30, 1988, at the Hastings Center (under the number HJ 17-20-2) and first published in 200014, Jonas analyzes the problem of animal species extinction as one that compromises the cosmic balance, before which humankind should marvel: “This is the way life is. The spider is to be admired, its web is to be admired, the fly is to be admired because it can fly, which the spider cannot. It is all wonderful.” (OS, 29). Jonas draws on Heraclitus to argue that “who regard a more of manifoldness of wealth in the tableau of creation as better than a less of it, and therefore feel now responsible, having acquired the degree of dangerous power over it which we have, feel responsible for maintaining it, of assuming a certain stewardship for it. It has accrued to us by the mere possession of our power.” (OS, 29). For the philosopher, this means that we should no longer remain “on the defensive against nature” (OS, 29) since, unlike in earlier times, “we are now the aggressors, on the offensive, our incursions are deep, we are impoverishing the richness of life on Earth at a terrible rate” (OS, 29)15. Jonas expresses concern over extinction rates because they represent the impoverishment of diversity and ecosystems to the detriment of humankind itself: “That’s happening. I have certain numbers, how many species per year become extinct owing to civilization, to human activity and so on. And so, it is not so much a moral duty, it is really a metaphysical or ontological duty.” (OS, 29).

In Laudato Si’, Pope Francis likewise expresses profound concern over the extinction of life forms. Speaking of global warming, he refers to the “vicious cycle” of carbon, which contributes to the destruction of living conditions, provoking “the extinction of part of the planet’s biodiversity” (LS, 24). The Pope does not hesitate to show how the supposed progress of civilization has brought about such impoverishment of species: “Highways, new plantations, the facing-off of certain areas, the damming of water sources, and similar developments, crowd out natural habitats and, at times, break them up in such a way that animal populations can no longer migrate or roam freely. As a result, some species face extinction.” (LS, 35). Echoing a passage from Evangelii Gaudium16, the Pope is emphatic: “I would reiterate that ‘God has joined us so closely to the world around us that we can feel the desertification of the soil almost as a physical aliment, and the extinction of a species as a painful disfigurement’” (LS, 89). Extinction must therefore be regarded as a mutilation of creation: mutilated, the biosphere is impoverished, and the right of living beings to exist is denied. This concern, the Pope warns, should not be limited to large animals but must also extend to those less “visible” creatures that sustain the great cosmic balance: “It may well disturb us to learn of the extinction of mammals or birds, since they are more visible. But the good functioning of ecosystems also requires fungi, algae, worms, insects, reptiles and the innumerable variety of microorganisms” (LS, 34).

7. Responsibility as Prevention

For Jonas, the principle of responsibility is the ethical mode of acting in favor of the preservation of life conditions on the planet by limiting the advance of technological powers and expanding the idea of the dignity of ends beyond the human. At this point, his theory conceives responsibility not merely as “causal attribution of deeds done” (IR, 90) but, above all, as a “prediction from analytical-causal knowledge” (IR, 113)—that is, an anticipatory awareness of the negative and dangerous effects of scientific progress. For Jonas, prediction must be considered the central value of the ethics of responsibility, and it is intrinsically linked to the capacity to foretell, that is, to foresee future events. This idea is captured in the concepts of “comparative futurology” and the “heuristics of fear” (IR, 26), which he proposes as critical alternatives to the utopia of technological progress. While the latter demands the continuation of technological evolution based on the belief that the future will be produced by present actions and that it will be better than the present, Jonas’ concepts favor a futurology that prioritizes negative prognoses on the grounds that fear may awaken the “feeling of responsibility” (IR, 87).

In this sense, responsibility appeals to foresight and precaution rather than to recklessness or risk-taking. For him, “the existence of ‘man’ must never be put at stake” (IR, 37). Thus, the ethics of responsibility rests on the notion of “voluntary reins” (PV, 7) that prevent mortgaging the future for the sake of the supposed needs of the present: “We are mortgaging future life in exchange for short-term gains and current needs—most often, in fact, for self-created needs” (TME, 45). This, after all, is the irresponsible stance: “The gambler who puts his whole fortune at stake acts recklessly; when it is not his but another’s, then criminally; but when a family depends on him, then irresponsibly, even with ownership disputed, and no matter whether he loses or wins.” (IR, 93). Instead of a rule that fosters continual risk-taking, speculative hypotheses, and the unrestrained advance of humankind’s “will to unlimited power” (TME, 23), Jonas advocates for precaution: “For the community (...) given the enormous magnitude of what is at stake and the price our descendants will one day have to pay, precaution becomes the supreme virtue—before which the value of boldness must retreat and which, indeed, casts boldness among the demerits of irresponsibility” (TME, 67). It is as this “supreme virtue” that Jonas’ ethics embraces the urgency of prevention and precaution—guiding not only individual conduct, but also public policy and governmental action—thereby becoming a political virtue par excellence: “Prevention ranks foremost of the two, as the prediction in the sense of warning is naturally and rightly a stronger motive for the exertions of statecraft, surely a more compelling command to responsibility, then the call of promise.” (IR, 120).

By speaking of responsibility as prediction and prevention, Jonas contrasts it with the notion of responsibility as mere accountability for something already done—that is, ex post facto responsibility (IR, 80). Given the gravity of what is at stake, it falls to humanity to anticipate—to foretell and foresee—the consequences of its actions even before they occur so as to alter the unwanted outcomes embedded in present decisions.

In this light, responsibility requires values such as “modesty” (TME, 67; 71), “continence” (TME, 67), “temperance” (TME, 67), “precaution” (TME, 67), “parsimony” (TME, 67), “moderation” (TME, 69), and above all, “frugality” (TME, 67). The latter is highlighted by Jonas as an ancient yet urgent virtue to be revived specifically as an alternative to excessive consumerism, which is fueled by a new value: “gluttony,” which induces compulsive consumption. According to Jonas, “frugality is required for the sake of preserving our earthly dwelling and thus constitutes a facet of the ethics of responsibility toward the future” (TME, 67). Its urgency grows in tandem with the “coercions and incentives” that create a “general climate of indulgence” characteristic of consumer societies and their attachment to material possession. To speak of frugality, for Jonas, is to reject the value of “gluttony”—even when it is recommended as a “socioeconomic duty” by certain exploitative economic models. Against this, it is necessary to “issue a still novel appeal in favor of frugality, a renewed frugality” (TME, 68). And this must be done now, through a “voluntary consensus” (TME, 68), before it becomes necessary to impose it by “legal coercion” (TME, 68). Jonas ultimately notes that this is a “most important educational task” (TME, 72) and that education must commit itself to the world of tomorrow.

No reader of Laudato Si’ would find such arguments surprising. On the contrary, they sound strikingly familiar since Pope Francis repeatedly expresses concern about consumerism and emphasizes the urgency of frugality as a central value in his theological, economic, and educational proposal. For the Pope, “a constant flood of new consumer goods can baffle the heart and prevent us from cherishing each thing and each moment” (LS, 222), and according to Christian tradition, the encounter with oneself and with God takes place in an atmosphere of “moderation”, which enables one to “be happy with little” (LS, 222). This sentiment—rooted in Christian spirituality—can be attained through “a return to that simplicity which allows us to stop and appreciate the small things, to be grateful for the opportunities which life affords us, to be spiritually detached from what we possess, and not to succumb to sadness for what we lack. This implies avoiding the dynamic of domination and the mere accumulation of pleasures.” (LS, 222).

8. Changing Awareness to Change Lifestyle: From Consumerism to Frugality

Francis emphasizes the importance of a change in awareness and lifestyle. Early in the encyclical, he states that “humanity is called to recognize the need for change lifestyle, production and consumption, in order to combat this warming or at least the human causes which produce or aggravate it” (LS, 23). On the one hand, he leaves no doubt regarding human responsibility in the production of the environmental crisis, rejecting any denialist perspective on the problem; on the other, he embraces the task of contributing to the two changes he calls for: a change in awareness and a change in lifestyle. If the first of these refers to the theoretical task of the human being in understanding their place in the cosmos, the second concerns their practical—indeed, ethical—task: it is necessary to abandon consumerism, which induces unrestrained production, the exhaustion of natural resources, and the disposal of waste that clutters the planet. Regarding the change in awareness, Francis insists that the root of the crisis lies in a lack of awareness of “a common origin, of our mutual belonging, and of a future to be shared with everyone,” and he adds, “this basic awareness would enable the development of new convictions, attitudes and forms of life” (LS, 202). In other words, the change in awareness is the foundation from which new lifestyles emerge in favor of a simpler and more frugal existence. At this point, his perspective aligns with that of Jonas, who states, “To stop the plundering, the impoverishment of species, and the pollution of the planet, which are visibly advancing, to prevent the exhaustion of its reserves, including an insane man-made shift in the global climate, a new frugality in our habits of consumption is necessary.” (TME, 67).

For Francis, caring for the planet also means letting go of the consumerism that marks a certain luxurious lifestyle promoted as the only path to a full life. For him, responsibility requires a significant shift in the course of civilization: “every effort to improve our world entails profound change in ‘lifestyles, models of production and consumption, and the established structures of power which today govern societies’” (LS, 5). For the Pope, no human progress makes sense unless it is supported by moral progress—that is, precisely, a new awareness and a new everyday lifestyle. Integral ecology, in this sense, stands in opposition to what he terms “false or superficial ecology” (LS, 59) precisely because it demands such changes, while the latter is used merely to justify evasive behavior, which “serves as a license to carry on our present lifestyles and models of production and consumption” without any real change (LS, 59). This leads us to the very heart of the task assumed by the Pope under the banner of “integral ecology”: it requires a change in awareness and a change in lifestyle. It is, therefore, a task of sacrifice, as opposed to initiatives that either deny or obscure the problem. For this reason, integral ecology is supported by a new “ecological culture” that “need to be a different way of looking at things, a way of thinking, policies, an educational programme, a lifestyle and a spirituality which together generate resistance to the assault of the technocratic paradigm” (LS, 111). The Pope could not be clearer nor more complete in describing the task of integral ecology: it is a radical transformation that begins as a matter of thought and daily living but soon becomes a political task and an educational program. Without this, he says, “even the best ecological initiatives can find themselves caught up in the same globalized logic” (LS, 111), which is rooted in the technological paradigm that, in political terms, is a technocratic paradigm—one governed by the interests of the large corporations that hold technological power.

When speaking of a “lifestyle,” Francis does not fail to point out that the first step is to question the “singularity” of the current model. In other words, he insists that it is not possible to speak of a single lifestyle; on the contrary, it is necessary to acknowledge different ways of living. This is because “the imposition of a dominant lifestyle linked to a single form of production can be just as harmful as altering ecosystems” (LS, 145), as we have seen over recent decades around the world, where the capitalist model of consumption ends up harming the environment and causing the catastrophic effects of the climate crisis, while at the same time discrediting and subjugating other ways of life, such as those of traditional communities in many parts of the world. Drawing on themes from climate justice debates—especially regarding who participates in decision-making about the direction of the crisis—the Pope asserts that “special care for indigenous communities and their cultural traditions”, stressing that they should become “principal dialogue partners,” (LS, 146), especially in cases where civilizational projects threaten the continuity of life on the planet.

It is important to recall, in this regard, that Hans Jonas’s theses on the care for nature and human responsibility are closely connected to the principles of respect for nature and for future generations that form part of the wisdom of the so-called Indigenous peoples. This is also the position of Pope Francis, for whom confronting the environmental crisis must involve the recognition of this ancestral wisdom. During his visit to Canada, for example, he asked forgiveness of Indigenous peoples “for the ways in which, sadly, many Christians supported the colonizing mentality of the powers that oppressed Indigenous peoples.” “I am deeply sorry,” said the Pope, affirming that “in the face of this deplorable evil, the Church kneels before God and implores forgiveness for the sins of her children.”17 Furthermore, in the apostolic exhortation Querida Amazonia, he emphasized, “wisdom of the original peoples of the Amazon region ‘inspires care and respect for creation, with a clear consciousness of its limits, and prohibits its abuse. To abuse nature is to abuse our ancestors, our brothers and sisters, creation and the Creator, and to mortgage the future’.” Moreover, according to the Pope, “the indigenous peoples ‘remain on their land, they themselves care for it best’, provided that they do not let themselves be taken in by the siren songs and the self-serving proposals of power groups.” (Francis 2020, §42).

It is no coincidence that the Pope underscores how “a change in lifestyle could bring healthy pressure to bear on those who wield political, economic and social power” (LS, 206) insofar as new choices regarding consumption, for example, may prompt corporations to redefine the products they offer. The same could be said for electoral choices: candidates and parties with no commitment to the climate crisis could be pressured to revise their positions under pressure from voters. It is not by chance that the Pope calls attention to the “social responsibility on the part of consumers” (LS, 206); in continuity, we could also call attention to the “social responsibility of voters” and so on.

Recognizing the central role of education in this process, the Pope affirms that this too is an educational task. “It is wonderful,” he says, “how education can bring about real changes in lifestyle” (LS, 211). But it is also a task of spirituality, which must propose “an alternative understanding of the quality of life and encourages of deep enjoyment free of the obsession with consumption” (LS, 222). Demonstrating that this is a demand rooted in “integral ecology,” the Pope writes, “an integral ecology includes taking time to recover a serene harmony with creation, reflecting on our lifestyle and our ideals” (LS, 225). At its core, integral ecology is a call to responsibility insofar as the heart of this appeal is a practical attitude of lifestyle change—one capable of rejecting consumerism in favor of frugality, which is also an attitude of respect and responsibility toward all living beings. For the Pope, therefore, “care for nature is part of a lifestyle which includes the capacity for living together and communion” (LS, 228).

Lastly, we must not forget that, in a political sense, the change in lifestyle must lead to a radical critique of the idea of progress. This is the case for both Jonas and Francis. For Jonas, the notion of “progress with precaution” (PV, 337) appears as an alternative path that could lead civilization toward a process of degrowth18, in which wealthy countries would voluntarily impose limits on their development, allowing space for poorer countries to attain a degree of advancement that might reduce the vast inequalities to which they have been historically subjected. This is also Francis’ view: for him, “that is why the time has come to accept decreased growth in some parts of the world, in order to provide resources for other places to experience healthy growth” (LS, 193). Quoting once again Benedict XVI, Francis emphasizes that technologically advanced societies should be willing “to encourage more sober lifestyles, while reducing their energy consumption and improving its efficiency” (LS, 193).

9. Conclusions

As we have demonstrated, the convergence between the ideas of Hans Jonas and Pope Francis reveals that the ethics of responsibility, in its deepest sense, transcends the boundaries of anthropocentric morality, extending to the recognition of the intrinsic value of all forms of life and of the biosphere itself. The “integral ecology” proposed by Francis, aligned with the ontology of responsibility advocated by Jonas, shows that caring for creation requires not only individual actions and structural reforms but also a new philosophical and spiritual sensitivity rooted in a transformation of consciousness and lifestyle. As we have seen, this sensitivity acknowledges humanity’s belonging to the community of life and understands that human survival is inextricably linked to the preservation of biological diversity, the limitation of technological powers, and the cultivation of lifestyles grounded in frugality and solidarity.

In this context, responsibility emerges as a key category for reflecting on the present and the future of life on the planet, both for Pope Francis and for the philosopher Hans Jonas. No longer confined to the attribution of blame for harm already done, responsibility takes shape as a preventive and anticipatory virtue, capable of guiding political decisions, individual choices, and models of development. By proposing ethics grounded in responsibility, both Jonas and Francis call upon humanity to acknowledge its role as guardian of creation, aware of the dangers of unrestrained progress and committed to building a new culture—ethical, spiritual, ecological, and political—that fosters care, balance, and justice for all forms of life. Ultimately, it is a matter of rising to the challenge of our time: to ensure a dignified future for the Earth and for those yet to come. This is an all the more formidable task when we consider the challenges posed by the current global political landscape, in which permissiveness, degradation, and deregulation are embraced by politicians aligned with billionaires who remain indifferent to the urgency of the environmental crisis.

The contrast to this, politics of destruction is found, both by the Pope and by the philosopher, in the figure of Saint Francis of Assisi. On the one hand, the Pope retrieves the figure of Saint Francis as someone who embodied the paradigm of a sustainable way of life, embracing voluntary material and spiritual poverty and fighting against unjust forms of deprivation caused by humanity. As a kind of supreme symbol of integral ecology, Saint Francis stands as the defender both of humanity (especially its most vulnerable members) and of all other creatures, through a life of simplicity. On the other hand, this is also Jonas’s view, who, despite being Jewish, refers to Saint Francis twice in The Imperative of Responsibility: first, as a defender of humanity and one of the “great atoners” of this cause (IR, 99); and second (in a passage not found in the English translation, but only in the original German edition—Jonas 1979, p. 387), as one of those considered “unsurpassable” in greatness (a list that includes, along with Francis, Socrates, Sophocles, Shakespeare, Buddha, Leonardo da Vinci, Rembrandt, Euclid, and Newton), whose “splendor in history” nourishes hope for the emergence of future human beings—integral and responsible like him. The same recognition of Saint Francis’s moral greatness and superiority appears in Technik, Medizin und Ethik (Jonas 1985, p. 127). Jonas would therefore agree with the Pope when he affirms that Saint Francis is an “attractive and compelling figure” and an “example par excellence of care for the vulnerable and of an integral ecology lived out joyfully and authentically” (LS, 10).