Whether God Exists Is Irrelevant to Ethics

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The article is well written, argumentatively correct within the point of view adopted by the author. The author is well acquainted with their subject matter and draws on a wide range of literature on the subject. The author's main thesis, that theism does not ground ethics any better than atheism – and that, in general, neither theism nor atheism can determine whether morality exists – seems as reasonable as possible and worth considering and even accepting. It seems that morality does not have to depend on whether I believe in God or not – I can recognise that my moral good action can be my duty as a human being to other human beings and then there is no need for it to be motivated by any external, out-of-world assumptions.

However, there is a fundamental problem with the way the author justifies their position. The author starts from the assumption that religion/God is in no way necessary for the existence of morality, but their argument is conducted in such a way as to show that religion in principle cannot be the basis of morality because, in short, religion is irrational. However, there seems to be quite a difference between something not being necessary for the existence of something and something not being able to be the basis of something. For example, it does not follow from the fact that a car is not necessary for mobility that a car cannot be a device by which we can be mobile. On the same principle, it does not in any way follow from the fact that religion is not necessary for the existence of morality that religion cannot be the basis of morality. Such a view contradicts the facts, for it is obvious that all religious systems are at the same time moral systems, and that religion explains to believers why they should behave morally.

By this I mean to say that the author exceeds the assumptions of their thesis in their argumentation. In my opinion, the author's argument should be weakened to a weaker version, in which the author would show that religion is not necessary for the existence of morality, but can be one of the possible reference points for the moral system it supports. For it does not yet follow from the fact that a religion presents and supports a moral system that religion is necessary for the possibility of being moral. However, the author puts the issue on a knife-edge and reverses the problem – since radical theists recognise that without accepting the existence of God, morality is impossible, the author adopts the equally radical argument according to which accepting the existence of God cannot rationally ground the moral action of any human being.

And this is a controversial and even problematic path for the realisation of the thesis adopted by the author, since, as is well known, for very many people it is the existence of God that provides the point of support for their moral actions in the world. Not only in Christianity or the other great religions of the world – but perhaps especially in small traditional societies, all morality is based on mythical stories founded on symbols, outside of which, as Paul Ricouer has shown, there is no possibility of telling the moral experience of human beings. The conclusion that follows is that in these cultures it is not possible for morality to exist without religion, although of course this does not mean that religion is necessary for the existence of morality for every person in every culture.

However, the author adopts an extremely rationalist and pragmatic position, from which the author cuts off anything that does not meet the conditions of a rational and simplest possible explanation (see p. 5, when the author gives the objective criteria after Schick). The author recognises that only a rational basis for morality makes sense, that one must be able to give fully rational reasons for given moral actions, because only such moral actions are justified. The author thus does not recognise that faith can be the basis of human moral action. The author recognises that faith is irrational and that what is irrational is wrong in itself. In this way, the author wants morality to be able to be as objective and transparent as the facts expressed in language about the physical states of the world. It may be an interesting idea – but if it were true, and therefore if morality were objectively justifiable, then good and evil would be absolute facts in the world that could not be doubted. As we know, this is not the case and never will be, as best demonstrated by the fact that there is no moral system that is the only true moral system. There are many moral systems because morality is not a field in which one could logically (as in the natural sciences) decide on truthfulness. This can only be done in relation to the physical world, and morality is the domain of consciousness and freedom, not the physical world. This is why morality is so often secured and supported by religion, although this need not always be the case. People's moral action is much more often based on a belief (not necessarily only a belief in God, a belief in various states of fact in the world) in the meaning of their actions than on rational analysis. This point of view is overlooked by the author, and at the same time the author discredits its meaningfulness by denying rationality to a belief understood in any way.

As a result of adopting an extreme rationalist and pragmatic point of view, the author's argumentation is reductive and simplistic, despite being coherent and interesting. Here are some examples:

• On p. 2 the author states: “If God commanding something is the sole determining factor of what makes it good, then anything could be good” (and all further argumentation on this point). Of course, that is how religion works – good is what God considers good for a person, because in religion God is the supreme good. Religion, by definition, is not concerned with the physical world, but with the spiritual world, which includes morality. Thus, it may happen that an command of God is immoral from the point of view of rational logic and yet is spiritually good for a person, for example, when it changes one's understanding of oneself. See Kierkegaard's analysis of the Abrahamic story in “Fear and Trembling”.
• On p. 6 the author states: “(...) if it is true, one would expect there to be no evil in the world (because a perfect being would know how, be able, and willing to eliminate all evil). But there are two reasons this doesn’t mean that the God hypothesis could overcome its adequacy deficit. First, there is evil in the world, thus—even if the God hypothesis is testable—the God hypothesis is not fruitful (it predicts there would be no evil, but there is).” First, Plantinga has shown that the existence of God is not incompatible with the existence of evil in the world, which the author omits to mention in silence. Second, why does the author conclude that an omnipotent being such as God must be graspable in the finite, rational schemes of human logic? Is it necessary to assume that, if there were a God, God would have to create a world in which finite beings can put God into their logical categories without falling into all sorts of logical paradoxes and failing to meet the requirements of the theories with which they try to explain the physical world around them? And if God did not have to create such a world, would it be immoral on God's part to create such a world as we know it and beings like us, incapable of adequately knowing God? Would the creation of such an unequal relation of knowledge show the impossibility of God as an infinitely good being? In other words, do God and religion have to be rational in a logical sense to be credible? I am afraid that if there were any fully objective and logically justifiable religion in this world, it would be impossible not to believe in it....
• On p. 7 the author states: “If Schick is right, and it seems he is, and thus God cannot explain anything, then God cannot explain moral truths.” The author should first of all acknowledge that God cannot explain anything in the human world to someone who does not believe in God. The situation changes completely when someone believes in God. The author argues as if believing in God is a moral wrong, because the thesis of God's existence is irrational.
• On p. 7 below the author states: “(...) regardless of whether the issue at hand regards the world or moral facts, appealing to the divine for an explanation would never be satisfactory.” Again, the question is for whom an appeal to the divine would never be satisfactory? It will not be for someone like the author, who accepts that the thesis of God's existence is irrational. But it will be fully satisfactory for someone who believes in God. Why does the author believe that only their point of view is correct?
• Further on the same page the author states: “Supernatural explanations are never good explanations.” Supernatural explanations are not good for someone like the author, who believes that everything has to be explained rationally, otherwise it is no explanation at all. In many cultures, such explanations were the only good and unquestionable explanations. Does this mean that these people were simply ignorant? Such explanations are always good when you acknowledge that they are true.
• And further: “(…) supernatural explanations are always inferior to their natural counterparts.” This statement is an example of extreme materialism. It is worth reminding the author that materialism is a metaphysical dogma as much as supernaturalism, as Kant already stated in his antinomies of pure reason. Moreover, morality cannot be reduced to the purely natural and physical sphere, since morality, by definition, refers to that which transcends the purely material and natural world – it refers to human actions caused by freedom.
• Further: “Since divine command theory appeals to the supernatural, it cannot satisfactorily do one of the main things that moral theories must do: explain moral facts.” Yet divine command theory seems to explain moral facts perfectly well for anyone who believes that DCT is true. By contrast, of course, it explains nothing for someone like the author who accepts that it is false. To accept or reject DCT is to accept a particular metaphysical position – and there is no reason to think that naturalism is a better metaphysical position than supernaturalism, because no one has yet proved this in an absolute way and probably no one ever will. It is a question of believing in naturalism or supernaturalism. The author clearly believes that supernaturalism is based on faith therefore it is irrational, therefore untrue, and naturalism is based on reason, therefore it is rational, therefore true. However, nothing prevents one from considering the opposite, as, for example, Descartes, Kierkegaard, Plantinga – philosophers from different centuries and completely different traditions – did.
• On p. 7 the author states: “(...) belief in God’s existence (and attributes) requires faith, they must admit that they cannot have moral knowledge.” It is not clear why the author believes that moral knowledge must be based on rational grounds. There are many choices in life that are not rational, but that does not mean that by that fact alone they are meaningless. The question is whether there is such a thing as fully rational moral knowledge at all. If there were, then only one ethical system would be possible, because it would be self-explanatory. Yet human morality seems to be based primarily on beliefs about what is good and what one should do, rather than on logical knowledge. Beliefs are based on certain assumptions about what is considered right and worthwhile. But this is no knowledge in the logical sense.

In general, the entire text is founded on this style of argumentation, with the result that while it is coherent within the framework of the author's adopted point of view, at the same time it rejects everything that disagrees with this point of view, that is, it excludes other points of view on the nature of morality. Such a reductive viewpoint seems to be a kind of intellectual violence and does not support the author's main thesis that: “(...) neither existence nor the non-existence of God has any bearing on whether ethics is possible—on whether there are ethical truths, whether the study of ethics can be done, or (to put it colloquially) whether everything, anything, something, or nothing is permissible.” Contrary to the author's claim, this thesis is not controversial, what is controversial is how the author carries out this thesis and the fact that the author essentially shows not that religion is not necessary for the existence of morality, but that the existence of God cannot be the basis of morality. The author's thesis would be much better supported by the argument that: God is or can be a guarantor of morality for those who believe in God – and God is not a guarantor of morality for those who do not believe in God. So religion can be a justification for morality, but it is not a necessary condition for morality. However, it does not seem at all possible for the author to consider such a position within the worldview the author has adopted.

In order for the author's position to be intellectually fair, the author should change their thesis to fit their argument and clearly declare that their argument is the result of their belief (or conviction) that accepting the existence of God is not only not necessary for the existence of morality, but is in fact not supposed to be the ground of morality, because it significantly undermines the possibility of a rational moral system.

Author Response

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Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

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Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

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Author Response File: Author Response.docx

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Thank you for your detailed explanations. I accept your argumentation as internally consistent and well-founded from your point of view. However, I still see no reason to believe that your point of view is the only possible point of view, because it is only possible within the criteria you have adopted. It is therefore not absolute, which is what you are trying to show it to be. I am glad if my doubts, have allowed you to develop your argument and I hope that they have not thereby made your argument less accurate and concise. In any case, I find your response to my objections sufficiently satisfactory. There is no point in extending the dispute between us, as I do not see any common ground on which we can settle the issue at the level of further detailing your argument for the sake of my doubts. Instead, I congratulate you on the accuracy of your thinking and the coherence of your argument.