Science as Divine Signs: Al-Sanūsī’s Framework of Legal (sharʿī), Nomic (ʿādī), and Rational (ʿaqlī) Judgements

Abstract

This article examines the Ashʿarī theological framework of Imam Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 1490) and its potential for shaping contemporary Muslim engagement with science. At the heart of al-Sanūsī’s thought is a tripartite typology of judgements—legal (ḥukm sharʿī), nomic (ḥukm ʿādī), and rational (ḥukm ʿaqlī)—as articulated in The Preliminaries of Theology (al-Muqaddimāt). This classification distinguishes between rulings grounded in revelation, patterns observed in nature, and conclusions drawn from reason. Unlike other theological approaches, al-Sanūsī’s model integrates core Ashʿarī doctrines such as radical contingency, occasionalism, and divine command theory, offering a coherent synthesis of metaphysics, empirical inquiry, and ethics. Building on recent scholarship that re-engages with Ashʿarī theology in the context of Islam and science, this article argues that al-Sanūsī’s schema offers a meta-framework—one that positions science not merely as an object of analysis but as a locus for theology.

1. Introduction

The relationship between science and theology remains one of the most compelling areas of inquiry in contemporary thought. In an age dominated by scientific advancement, questions concerning the metaphysical, ethical, and epistemological implications of the natural sciences are not only relevant but urgent. How do religious traditions engage with scientific paradigms? Can theological frameworks provide unique insights into the nature of scientific knowledge and its implications? These questions have gained prominence in discussions around science and religion, yet much of the scholarship has been shaped by Christian philosophical and theological paradigms (Koons et al. 2018; Silva 2021; Kopf 2023; Tabaczek 2023). There remains a pressing need to explore non-Christian traditions that offer alternative, yet equally rigorous, perspectives on these issues (Guessoum 2011a; Alkemade et al. 2024). Islamic theology, with its rich history of engagement with reason and revelation, presents a fertile ground for such inquiry (Griffel 2009; Jackson 2009; El-Tobgui 2020; Hassan 2020; Griffel 2021).

The field of Islam and Science is rapidly developing, with scholars exploring a range of inquiries such as quantum mechanics, evolution, psychology, artificial intelligence, and extraterrestrial life, to name a few (Jalajel 2009; Altaie 2016, 2023; Rassool 2018; Koca 2020; Malik 2021b, 2024a; Lazzari 2024). While some areas of investigation are marked by significant agreement, others are hotly contested, e.g., evolution (Malik 2023). A key point of contention lies in the methodological approach to understanding the relationship between Islamic theology and science. Some scholars engage with scientific ideas by drawing directly from the Islamic intellectual tradition, either by adhering strictly to its classical frameworks or by adapting and modifying them to address contemporary issues (Jalajel 2009; Malik 2021b, 2024a, 2024b). Others argue that while tradition is a vital foundation, it is necessary to develop new frameworks that better address the epistemological and methodological challenges posed by modern scientific advancements (Taji-Farouki 2006; Guessoum 2011a).

This article aligns with the first approach, which seeks to engage with modern scientific ideas by drawing directly on the Islamic intellectual tradition. It explores the potential of an underutilised yet richly developed framework developed by Imam Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 1490, a prominent post-classical theologian (the meaning of “post-classical” will be expanded upon shortly)).

1.1. Al-Sanūsī, Kalām, and His Legacy

Imam al-Sanūsī was a prominent Maghrebi Ashʿarī theologian and jurist of the post-classical Islamic period. Born in Tlemcen, in present-day Algeria, he became renowned for his contributions to the Islamic sciences, particularly kalām.

The term kalām—literally meaning “speech” or “discourse”—refers to a discipline that emerged in the early Islamic period as a means of defending and articulating Islamic beliefs through rational argumentation. Kalām developed in dialogue with the debate culture of Late Antiquity, particularly influenced by the Christological and philosophical discussions of the Arab Christian milieu in Syria and Iraq, as well as internal disagreements on various theological points (Wolfson 1976; Frank 2005, 2007, 2008). This historical and intellectual context gave kalām its distinctive character, blending Islamic theology with dialectical reasoning and, later, elements of Greek philosophy. While English terms like “theology”, “philosophical theology”, “scholastic theology”, or “dialectical theology” offer partial parallels, they fail to fully capture the scope and methodology of kalām, which integrates metaphysics, logic, and scriptural interpretation in ways unique to the Islamic tradition (Frank 2007, 2008; Treiger 2014; Bulgen 2021). For this reason, the Arabic term kalām will be retained throughout this discussion.

Al-Sanūsī is best known for his prolific output in kalām, authoring a series of texts that are pedagogically structured to guide students through progressively advanced levels of theological learning (al-Sanūsī 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e). His major works include the following (see the introductory notes in (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 25–27; Olson 2020, p. 108):

• The Preliminaries of Theology (al-Muqaddimāt);
• The Most Concise Theology (Ṣughrā al-Ṣughrā);
• The Concise Theology (al-ʿAqīda al-Ṣughrā);
• The Intermediate Theology (al-ʿAqīda al-Wusṭā);
• The Advanced Theology (al-ʿAqīda al-Kubrā).

Among these works, The Concise Theology is especially significant, often referred to as The Mother of Proofs (Umm al-Barāhīn), as it has received extensive attention over the centuries, inspiring numerous commentaries and super-commentaries that reflect its enduring significance in the Islamic tradition (Karagöz 2018). Designed to present core theological principles in a succinct and accessible manner, The Mother of Proofs has been a cornerstone of theological education in Muslim seminaries.

What makes these texts particularly interesting is that al-Sanūsī not only authored the texts (mutūn) himself, but he also wrote their accompanying commentaries (shurūḥ). This dual authorship ensured that each text was not only concise and precise but also thoroughly explained and contextualised for learners. These works were meticulously designed as a pedagogical series to guide students in building their theological understanding, progressing from foundational concepts to more complex and advanced ideas. Al-Sanūsī’s approach reflects a clear emphasis on systematic learning, ensuring clarity and accessibility at every stage of intellectual development (Olson 2020, pp. 107–8).

Al-Sanūsī is an especially significant figure for examining the relationship between Islamic theology and science in modern contexts. As mentioned earlier, kalām emerged as a discipline aimed at defending Islamic beliefs using reasoned arguments in response to internal and external philosophical and theological challenges. Over time, this tradition engaged with falsafa (Islamic philosophy), which was heavily shaped by the works of philosophers such as al-Kindī (d. 873), al-Fārābī (d. 950), Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, d. 1037), and Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198). In particular, Avicenna’s ideas profoundly impacted kalām. By the post-classical period (roughly spanning the 12th and onwards), kalām entered a new phase where Ashʿarī scholars, like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), integrated Avicenna’s philosophical insights into the theological discourse (Shihadeh 2005; Shihadeh 2006; Shihadeh 2015). This synthesis resulted in a more systematic and sophisticated approach within kalām to address theological, epistemic, and metaphysical questions (Hassan 2020; Griffel 2021; al-Rāzī 2024). Writing in the 15th century, al-Sanūsī’s work reflects this advanced stage of kalām, marked by the intimate interactions and porosity between kalām and falsafa. This is what makes him a post-classical theologian.

Among al-Sanūsī’s works, The Preliminaries of Theology (hereafter referred to as The Preliminaries) holds a significant position as an introduction to his broader theological system. This text provides a concise and systematic presentation of foundational concepts, making it particularly suited for this study (Al-Saraqusṭī 2019; Fawda 2019). A defining feature of al-Sanūsī’s thought is his categorisation of judgements (aḥkām), which he classifies into the following three domains: legal (sharʿī), nomic (ʿādī), and rational (ʿaqlī). These distinctions form the systematic presentation of his theological framework, offering a structured approach to understanding the relationship between reason, revelation, and the empirical world.

Although al-Sanūsī remains an underexplored figure in contemporary discussions, his structured model of judgements offers a distinctive and methodologically rigorous framework for engaging with the relationship between Islamic theology and science. Unlike the broader metaphysical approaches often found in Muʿtazilī or Thomistic traditions, al-Sanūsī’s tripartite classification—legal, nomic, and rational—aligns theological, empirical, and logical dimensions in a systematic manner. By systematically analysing his presentation, this study shows how his framework provides a coherent and historically grounded approach to positioning science as a locus for Islamic theology. Furthermore, engaging with al-Sanūsī’s insights presents an opportunity to advance discussions not only within Islam and science but also in the broader field of Islamic intellectual history.

1.2. Caveats and Qualifications

It is important to clarify that Islamic theology is not a unified or monolithic tradition. Rather, it comprises several theological schools, including the Atharī, Māturīdī, Muʿtazilī, Falāsifa, Ithnā ʿAsharī, Zaydī, and Ismāʿīlī traditions, each with its own metaphysical assumptions and internal logic regarding causality, divine action, and the role of reason and revelation (Ibn Qudāma 2012; Daftary 2007; Hoover 2007; Frank 1978, 2007, 2008; Winter 2008; El-Rouayheb and Schmidtke 2016; Schmidtke 2016; Abdulsater 2017; Harvey 2021; Price 2024; Suleiman 2024). These differences are not trivial: they shape how each tradition conceptualises the natural world, the structure of knowledge, and the very possibility of integrating science and theology.

This article focuses specifically on the Ashʿarī tradition. This is not merely due to its historical prominence but because Ashʿarism has become increasingly relevant in recent conversations at the intersection of Islam and science. Recent scholarship has employed Ashʿarī theological principles to engage contemporary topics such as quantum indeterminacy, evolutionary contingency, divine command theory, and even discussions of extraterrestrial intelligence (Malik 2021a, 2021b, 2024a; Salim and Malik 2021). These discussions reflect a growing recognition that Ashʿarism offers conceptual tools that can address the epistemological and metaphysical challenges posed by modern science.

As we will come to see in the course of this article, what makes Ashʿarism distinct in this regard is its integration of three tightly interwoven commitments: the radical metaphysical contingency of creation based on divine, occasionalism, and divine command theory (Malik 2021a; Malik and Muhtaroglu 2022). Together, these allow the Ashʿarī tradition to affirm the full dependence of the natural world on God’s will while still recognising empirical regularities as meaningful patterns sustained by divine volition. Natural laws are not understood as fixed necessities but as contingent habits, constantly upheld by God’s choice. Within this worldview, miracles do not violate an inviolable order but rather reflect the same volitional freedom through which regularities are maintained.

This approach stands in marked contrast to that of the Falāsifa (Muslim Peripatetic philosophers), for instance, who operate within a necessitarian metaphysical scheme rooted in Neoplatonic emanationism. For them, God acts not through will but by necessity; creation flows in a hierarchical and immutable chain of being (Hassan 2020; Moad 2023). Divine action, in this model, is tightly constrained, and the natural world operates through intelligible causal laws that reflect this hierarchical necessity. Consequently, miracles, contingency, and the volitional disruption of natural processes are either reinterpreted or rendered problematic.

The sharp metaphysical divergence between just these two schools already makes it clear that it is untenable to speak of a single, unified Islamic theological framework for engaging with science. Each tradition offers a distinct conception of God, creation, and causality, resulting in fundamentally different ways of interpreting the natural world (Jackson 2009; Koca 2020). This article, therefore, does not aim to provide a universal Islamic perspective on science. Rather, it focuses specifically on the Ashʿarī tradition—not to dismiss others, but because of its growing relevance in contemporary discussions in Islam and science. Building on this emerging body of scholarship, the present study proposes a systematic meta-framework for theological engagement with science, using al-Sanūsī’s tripartite categorisation of legal, nomic, and rational judgements as a basis for conceptual clarity and methodological coherence.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 elaborates on al-Sanūsī’s tripartite framework and its internal logic. Section 3 explores how this model enables a principled theological engagement with contemporary science and why it offers a particularly coherent method for such dialogue within the Sunni tradition.

2. Judgements and Their Varieties

The Preliminaries is divided into eight sections, each addressing foundational concepts central to al-Sanūsī’s framework. This article focuses on the first preliminary, which introduces and elaborates upon the different types of judgements briefly mentioned in the Introduction. To provide clarity and structure, the discussion of this preliminary is organised into four sections: the first explains the distinction between concept (taṣawwur; pl. taṣawwurāt) and judgement (ḥukm or taṣdīq; pl. aḥkām or taṣdīqāt); the second examines legal judgements (ḥukm sharʿī; pl. aḥkām sharʿiyya); the third explores nomic judgements (ḥukm ʿādī; pl. aḥkām ʿādiyya); and the fourth delves into rational judgements (ḥukm ʿaqlī; pl. aḥkām ʿaqliyya).

It should be noted that these ideas were developed prior to al-Sanūsī. For instance, al-Farābī wrote extensively on concepts and judgements (Forcada 2012). Additionally, earlier Ashʿarī scholars such as Abū Bakr al-Baqillānī (d. 1013), Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī (d. 1085), Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), and al-Rāzī also discussed various types of judgements. However, al-Sanūsī’s organisation and use of these ideas as the introduction to kalām introduces a distinction that sets his kalām work apart from his predecessors.1

2.1. Concepts and Judgements

Al-Sanūsī begins the first preliminary by distinguishing between two foundational aspects of human cognition: concepts (taṣawwurāt) and judgements (aḥkām or taṣdīqāt). This distinction is critical for framing his subsequent categorisations of legal, nomic, and rational judgements, as it clarifies the cognitive processes underlying how humans engage with ideas and propositions (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 111–12).

Concepts refer to the meaning or essence of an idea, independent of any assertion about its truth or existence. For example, the concept of “a cat” includes its characteristics as a small, furry animal with whiskers and a tail, while the concept of “a car” encompasses its function as a vehicle designed for transportation. Concepts define and encapsulate the essence of a thing, serving as foundational elements for further reasoning. However, they remain neutral in terms of truth, applicability, or existence—concepts do not assert whether the entity they describe exists or how it relates to other entities.

Judgements, by contrast, involve making a claim about the truth or falsehood of a proposition. This step builds on concepts by either affirming (ithbāt) or negating (nafī) a specific relationship or state of affairs. For instance, after forming the concept of a cat, one might make a judgement such as “My neighbour has a cat” (affirmation) or “My neighbour does not have a cat” (negation). Similarly, after grasping the concept of a car, one could judge, “This car is red” (affirmation) or “This car is not red” (negation). In this way, judgements extend beyond mere comprehension to evaluate and assert relationships or states of being, grounding rational and systematic thought.

Having distinguished between concepts and judgements—whether affirming or negating something—al-Sanūsī emphasises that judgements always pertain to specific domains. This observation serves as the foundation for his systematic exploration of the three types of judgements: legal, nomic, and rational.

2.2. Legal Judgement (Ḥukm Sharʿī)

In Islamic theology, revelation is understood to consist of two types of divine speech: declarative (khabar) and performative (inshāʾ). Declarative statements are truth-bearing, as they describe reality and can be evaluated as true or false. Examples include affirmations about God’s attributes, historical events, or eschatological outcomes. Performative statements, by contrast, are non-truth-bearing; they do not describe what is or is not the case but instead enact obligations, prohibitions, and permissions. These performative statements provide prescriptive guidance for human behaviour and form the foundation for legal judgements (ḥukm sharʿī) (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 115–16, 262–68).

Legal judgements derive their authority from performative statements in revelation, directly linking divine will to human responsibility. According to Ashʿarī theology, as articulated by Al-Sanūsī and others, morality and law are exclusively determined by God’s will. Ashʿarīs uphold a divine command theory (DCT) framework, asserting that human reason alone is insufficient to determine the moral value of actions (Malik 2021a). Actions are not intrinsically good or bad but acquire their moral value solely through divine designation communicated in revelation. This understanding underscores the central role of God’s speech as the basis for all moral and legal directives.

Al-Sanūsī categorises legal judgements into two primary types: defining law (ḥukm taklīfī) and declaratory law (ḥukm waḍʿī). Defining law prescribes specific moral and religious obligations. Declaratory law, on the other hand, identifies the contextual framework that determines when and how these obligations come into effect. The remainder of this section explores these two categories in detail.

2.2.1. Defining Law (Ḥukm Taklīfī)

This category focuses on prescriptive rulings that govern the moral and religious responsibilities of morally responsible individuals (mukallaf). There are five types, each reflecting a specific relationship between divine command and human action (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 118–21). This category of law is organised around three overarching considerations: actions that are obligatory to perform or avoid, actions that are recommended but not mandatory, and actions that are neutral. Five specific types of declaratory law emerge from this arrangement: obligatory (wājib), prohibited (ḥarām), recommended (mandūb), discouraged (makrūh), and permissible (mubāḥ).

Obligatory actions (wājib) are those that must be performed, with rewards for compliance and punishment for neglect. For instance, performing the five daily prayers is a clear example of an obligatory act. In contrast, prohibited actions (ḥarām) are those that must be avoided, such as consuming alcohol, which is explicitly forbidden in Islam. Recommended actions (mandūb) are encouraged but not mandatory; performing them earns a reward while neglecting them carries no punishment. An example is giving extra charity (ṣadaqah) beyond the obligatory almsgiving (zakāt). Discouraged actions (makrūh) are better avoided but not sinful if performed, such as eating garlic before attending communal prayer, as it may cause discomfort to others. Finally, permissible actions (mubāḥ) are neutral, neither commanded nor prohibited, such as choosing to eat regular foods like apples or oranges. All five categories are summarised in

Table 1. The spectrum of the defining law.

Obliged to Avoid (ḥarām)	Recommended to Avoid (makrūh)	Neutral (mubāḥ)	Recommended to Perform (mandūb)	Obliged to Perform (wājib)
Drinking alcohol	Eating garlic before prayer	Eating apples and oranges	Giving extra charity	Praying five times a day

.

2.2.2. Declaratory Law (Ḥukm Waḍʿī)

While defining law addresses direct moral and religious obligations, declaratory law focuses on the contextual framework that determines the applicability of these obligations and prohibitions. In other words, declaratory law identifies the conditions and circumstances under which the defining law comes into effect, ensuring that rulings are applied appropriately (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 121–22).

The term “waḍʿī” in Arabic carries the meaning of being “placed” or “established”, which is semantically significant in understanding this category of rulings. It reflects how these laws, though mandated by divine revelation, are inherently tied to the natural order and the observable patterns of creation. This alignment indicates the intentional design of Islamic rulings to function within the framework of the created universe. For instance, the timing of daily prayers is determined by the position of the sun, while the obligation to fast in Ramadan is linked to the sighting of the crescent moon. Such examples highlight the interplay between divine guidance and empirical realities, underscoring the harmony between revelation and creation that characterises declaratory law.

Declaratory law is further divided into three subcategories: cause (sabab), condition (sharṭ), and impediment (māniʿ) (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 122–23). These divisions clarify the various factors that dictate when and how obligations and prohibitions come into effect. Before delving into these subcategories, it is essential to first distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions. This distinction is foundational to understanding the role of cause, condition, and impediment within declaratory law.

A necessary condition is something that must be in place for an outcome to occur, but on its own, it does not guarantee the outcome. For example, think about needing a passport to travel internationally. Having a passport is a necessary condition—you cannot board a flight to another country without it. However, simply possessing a passport does not guarantee that you will actually travel; you also need a plane ticket, a valid visa, and other factors. The passport is required for travel, but it is not enough by itself to ensure the trip happens.

A sufficient condition, by contrast, is something that, if met, guarantees the outcome. For example, consider a key for a locked door. In a scenario where the lock is functioning correctly, using the key to unlock the door is a sufficient condition for the door to open. As long as the key is the correct one, turning it in the lock will always result in the door opening, ensuring the outcome happens. The key guarantees the desired result.

Sometimes, multiple necessary conditions come together to form a sufficient condition for an outcome. For example, a meat patty is necessary for a burger, but it is not sufficient on its own. You also need burger buns, condiments, and other ingredients. When all of these necessary conditions are present together—the meat patty, buns, condiments, and vegetables—they become sufficient to create a burger. In this case, each individual ingredient is necessary to make a burger, but only when all of them are combined do you have something that fully satisfies the condition of being a burger. This illustrates how multiple necessary conditions can combine to ensure the desired outcome.

These distinctions between necessary and sufficient conditions are crucial for understanding how declaratory law operates, as it often relies on similar principles to define when and how specific rulings come into effect.

A cause (sabab) is a factor that directly and sufficiently brings a ruling into effect, acting as the definitive trigger for the application of a legal obligation or prohibition. It establishes a clear and direct link between a specific event or condition and the enactment of the ruling, ensuring that obligations or prohibitions are tied to observable realities (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 123–24).

For instance, the arrival of the designated time for prayer (ṣalāh) serves as the cause for the obligation to perform it. When the sun reaches past its zenith, it becomes the cause that renders the noon (ẓuhr) prayer obligatory. Similarly, the sighting of the crescent moon marks the beginning of Ramadan and serves as the cause for the obligation to fast during the sacred month. In both cases, the presence of the cause directly initiates the relevant legal ruling, creating a systematic connection between divine command and the natural world.

Conversely, the absence of a cause negates the ruling entirely, as the sufficient trigger for its application is missing. For example, the obligation to pray the noon prayer does not arise until the sun has reached past its zenith, as the cause for the prayer has not yet occurred. Similarly, fasting during Ramadan does not become obligatory unless the crescent moon is sighted; without this cause, the ruling remains inapplicable.

A condition (sharṭ) is a factor that is necessary for a ruling to come into effect. Its presence is a prerequisite for the validity of the ruling, meaning that without it, the ruling cannot be enforced. However, a condition alone does not suffice to enforce the ruling; it is just one of several requirements that must align for the ruling to take effect. As seen with the earlier burger example, a condition sets the stage but does not, on its own, cause the ruling to be implemented (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 123–27).

For example, consider ritual purity (ṭahārah) in the context of prayer. Ritual purity is a condition for the validity of prayer. If a person does not achieve ritual purity through ablution (wuḍūʾ), their prayer is invalid—this illustrates the necessity of the condition. However, being in a state of ritual purity does not automatically validate a prayer, as it also depends on other factors, such as the arrival of the correct time of prayer, i.e., one cannot pray the morning prayer in the evening. This highlights that while ritual purity is necessary, it is insufficient by itself to enforce the prayer’s validity.

The absence of a condition, on the other hand, is sufficient to prevent the ruling from being enforced. Returning to the example of ritual purity, if a person has not performed ablution, their prayer cannot be valid, regardless of other factors present. Thus, the absence of the condition (ritual purity) is sufficient to negate the ruling.

This distinction clarifies the dual role of a condition: it is a necessary prerequisite that enables a ruling but does not independently cause it, while its absence alone is sufficient to negate the ruling entirely.

An impediment (māniʿ) functions in contrast to a condition (sharṭ). While a condition enables a ruling by its presence, an impediment blocks a ruling from taking effect. In this sense, the presence of an impediment is sufficient to negate the ruling, regardless of the alignment of other factors. However, the absence of an impediment, although necessary for the ruling to be applied, is not sufficient on its own to enforce the ruling. For the ruling to take effect, the absence of the impediment must work in conjunction with the presence of the necessary conditions and the cause (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 127–29).

For example, consider the case of debt in relation to zakāt (the obligatory almsgiving in Islam, which is typically a specific percentage of one’s wealth given to the poor). Debt acts as an impediment to the obligation of zakāt. The presence of debt prevents the full ownership of wealth, which is the foundation for the zakāt obligation. Since zakāt is based on the principle of owning wealth in full, debt negates the requirement to give zakāt, even if other conditions—such as possessing the minimum taxable amount (niṣāb)—are met. The debt is sufficient to prevent the obligation, regardless of the amount of wealth one possesses.

On the other hand, the absence of debt does not automatically oblige zakāt. Other factors, such as the possession of the minimum taxable amount and the passage of one lunar year, must also be in place for the obligation of zakāt to be enforced. Thus, while the presence of an impediment like debt is sufficient to negate the ruling, its absence is merely a prerequisite that enables the possibility of the ruling when combined with other necessary elements.

This distinction highlights the dual role of an impediment: its presence is sufficient to block the enforcement of a ruling, ensuring that the circumstances that contradict the applicability of the ruling are accounted for. However, its absence is necessary for the ruling to take effect.

These three ideas in declaratory law—cause (sabab), condition (sharṭ), and impediment (māniʿ)—are summarised in

Table 2. A summary of declaratory law.

Term	Its Presence Is …	Its Absence Is…	Example
Cause (sabab)	Sufficient for the ruling to take effect	Sufficient for the ruling to not take effect	A cause guarantees the ruling when present (e.g., prayer time obligates prayer); its absence ensures no ruling applies
Condition (sharṭ)	Necessary for the ruling to take effect	Sufficient for the ruling to not take effect	A condition must be present for the ruling to apply (e.g., ritual purity for the validity of prayer); its absence invalidates the ruling
Impediment (māniʿ)	Sufficient to prevent the ruling	Necessary for the ruling to take effect	An impediment blocks the ruling (e.g., debt prevents zakāt); its absence allows other factors to enable the ruling

.

2.3. Nomic Judgement (Ḥukm ʿĀdī)

To understand nomic judgements, it is helpful to begin with the divine action model that Ashʿarī theology espouses. Ashʿarīs adopts occasionalism, asserting that God is the sole and direct cause of all events in the universe (Malik and Muhtaroglu 2022). In this view, created entities do not possess any intrinsic causal powers. Instead, all causal relationships are directly created by God’s will, which operates continuously in an ongoing manner (ʿāda). Observable phenomena, such as fire burning paper or water quenching thirst, are not outcomes of inherent properties within those entities but are contingent upon God’s active will, created whenever these events occur.

In occasionalism, the regularities we observe in the natural world, often referred to as “laws of nature”, are not the result of intrinsic qualities of objects. Rather, these regularities reflect the consistent will of God. For instance, when fire burns paper, it is not because fire inherently has the power to burn or because paper inherently has the vulnerability to be burned. Rather, God wills the outcome of burning whenever fire and paper are present on this specific occasion. These patterns, which we observe and label as natural laws, occur because God consistently chooses to create them in this manner, and their occurrence is entirely dependent on God’s ongoing will.

The term “ʿādī” in ḥukm ʿādī is telling. Derived from ʿāda, meaning “custom” or “habit”, it highlights the contingent and habitual nature of these patterns. Al-Sanūsī defines nomic judgements as affirmations of habitual connections (takarrur) between two phenomena, whether in their presence or absence (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 130–33; these terms will be unpacked shortly—see

Table 3. All possible nomic relations.

Type	Description	Example
Presence–presence	The presence of one phenomenon habitually aligns with the presence of another	Eating (presence) is consistently followed by satiety (presence), establishing a regular pattern
Absence–absence	The absence of one phenomenon habitually coincides with the absence of another	The lack of rain (absence) habitually corresponds to no vegetation growth (absence)
Presence–absence	The presence of one phenomenon habitually coincides with the absence of another	Hunger (presence) aligns with a lack of satiety (absence) when no food is consumed
Absence–presence	The absence of one phenomenon aligns with the presence of another	The lack of rain (absence) coincides with the occurrence of drought (presence)

). These connections form the observable regularities of the natural world and are identified through repeated experience. For example, the act of eating is habitually followed by satiety, while refraining from eating leads to hunger. Such patterns are not based on intrinsic necessity but on divine volition, which is discernible through consistent observation.

Importantly, nomic judgements encompass not only everyday observable patterns, like the association of eating with satiety, but also scientific laws, which can be broadly categorised as deterministic or probabilistic (Plantinga 2011, pp. 65–128; Koperski 2020, pp. 39–68, 109–28). While al-Sanūsī himself does not explicitly distinguish between these two categories, this study clarifies how his framework can accommodate both. Deterministic laws, such as Newton’s laws of motion or the laws of thermodynamics, describe natural phenomena with fixed regularities, ensuring that under identical conditions, the same outcome always follows. These laws provide a structured, predictable understanding of the physical world, from planetary motion to energy conservation. In contrast, probabilistic laws, particularly in quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, and evolutionary biology, operate on tendencies rather than certainties. For example, while Newtonian physics allows precise predictions of macroscopic motion, quantum mechanics governs subatomic particles in terms of probability distributions rather than fixed trajectories. Likewise, natural selection in biology follows probabilistic patterns based on genetic variation and environmental pressures. Within al-Sanūsī’s framework, both deterministic and probabilistic laws can be understood as expressions of divine will—regular patterns that God has established in creation, whether in fixed, predictable forms or through dynamic, statistically governed processes (Malik 2021b, pp. 179–211). This perspective accommodates the full spectrum of scientific inquiry, positioning both certainty and contingency within a God-centred metaphysical framework.

Al-Sanūsī exhausts all logical possibilities for habitual connections, framing them in terms of presence and absence and systematically exploring how the interplay between phenomena can be understood. Before delving into these possibilities, it is helpful to consider the nuanced relationship between presence and absence as it applies to the dualities observed in creation (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 134–36).

Dualities—such as light and darkness, hunger and satiety, or life and death—are often understood in binary terms. However, the notions of presence and absence can be attributed to either side of these dualities, depending on perspective. For instance, darkness is commonly regarded as the absence of light, defined by a lack of illumination. Yet, it can also be framed as the presence of a distinct state characterised by qualities such as shadow or dimness. Similarly, hunger is frequently described as the absence of nourishment, but it can equally be understood as the presence of a physical sensation resulting from a lack of food. Recognising this flexibility is crucial for grasping the exhaustive logical possibilities that al-Sanūsī outlines, which are summarised in Table 3.

The concept of miracles finds a natural place within al-Sanūsī’s framework of nomic judgements and habitual connections. Since regularities in the natural world are contingent expressions of divine will, they are not fixed or inviolable. What humans perceive as laws of nature are descriptive accounts of God’s habitual actions, discerned through observation, but they do not constrain His omnipotence. This understanding provides a theological basis for miracles as extraordinary events that deviate from these regular patterns without contradicting them.

In this context, miracles are not violations of natural laws but temporary suspensions or alterations of divine custom (ʿāda). The same will that establishes the habitual associations governing the natural world can override or modify them at any moment. This flexibility underscores God’s complete sovereignty over creation and His ability to intervene in ways that serve specific purposes, such as affirming prophethood or providing signs of His power.

Within the framework of occasionalism, miracles are particularly significant. Since occasionalism posits that God is the sole and direct cause of all events, what humans observe as regularities—such as fire burning paper—are entirely contingent on His will. This same principle explains how God can produce extraordinary events without contradicting His established patterns. In both nomic and miraculous occurrences, God remains the only true agent. Miracles, therefore, are not exceptions to a rule imposed by nature but expressions of the same divine volition that sustains the observed regularities. By suspending or altering the customary patterns, miracles highlight the ultimate contingency of the natural order and the unfettered power of the Creator.

2.4. Rational Judgement (Ḥukm ʿAqlī)

In al-Sanūsī’s framework, rational judgements (ḥukm ʿaqlī) refer to conclusions reached solely through reason, without reliance on sensory experience or divine revelation. Fundamentally, these judgements are grounded in the law of non-contradiction (LNC), which serves as the basis for determining coherence and validity in rational thought. They are divided into three types: necessity (wujūb), impossibility (istiḥāla), and possibility (jawāz). This tripartite division provides a clear structure for understanding what must exist, what cannot exist, and what may exist, forming a key component of Islamic theological reasoning (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 138–39).

Necessity (wujūb) is the judgement that refers to something that must exist or be true because its negation leads to a logical contradiction (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 140–41). This necessity arises from the intrinsic nature of the thing itself, making it inconceivable for reason to conceive of it being otherwise. Necessary judgements form the foundation of rational thought, as they are principles that are either self-evident or derived through logical reasoning. For example, the mathematical proposition “1 + 1 = 2” is a necessary judgement. Its truth is intrinsic to the fundamental operations of arithmetic and denying it would render the entire framework of mathematics incoherent. Another example is the geometric assertion that “the internal angles of a triangle in Euclidean geometry always sum to 180 degrees”. This judgement is necessary because it arises directly from the axioms of Euclidean space; to deny it would contradict those foundational principles. Similarly, the proposition that “a whole is greater than any of its parts” exemplifies necessity, as its denial would violate the basic logic underlying part–whole relationships. These examples illustrate that necessary judgements are those with negation that fundamentally disrupt rational coherence.

Impossibility (istiḥāla) is a judgement that refers to something that cannot exist or be true because its affirmation entails a logical contradiction (al-Sanūsī 2019d, p. 142). This impossibility is rooted in the intrinsic nature of the thing, and the thing’s existence is rationally inconceivable. For instance, the concept of a “square circle” is impossible because the defining characteristics of a square (four equal sides and right angles) are fundamentally incompatible with those of a circle (a continuous curve with no angles). Affirming such an entity would violate the principle of non-contradiction. Another example is the claim that “a body can exist and not exist simultaneously.” The notions of existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive, and their simultaneous affirmation would render reason incoherent. Similarly, the assertion that “a triangle can have four sides” is impossible because it directly contradicts the definition of a triangle, which inherently possesses three sides. Impossible judgements, therefore, are those with an affirmation that is not only rationally untenable but also irreconcilable with the logical structure of reality.

Possibility (jawāz) is a judgement that refers to something that can either exist or not exist without entailing a logical contradiction (al-Sanūsī 2019d, pp. 143–46). Unlike necessary or impossible judgements, which are fixed by their intrinsic nature, possibilities do not intrinsically entail a logical contradiction. Possibilities are fundamental to understanding the variability and contingency of the created world, allowing for a range of outcomes that reason deems conceivable.

For instance, the existence of a specific tree in a forest is possible because it lacks intrinsic necessity or impossibility. The tree could exist, or it might not, depending entirely on external factors such as whether it was planted, sustained, or cut down. Additionally, the tree’s characteristics—its height, leaf colour, or even species—are not fixed by necessity. It could grow taller, remain stunted, or even fail to exist altogether, demonstrating that it is not bound by logical necessity. Similarly, extraterrestrials could exist or not exist, and if they were to exist, they could have all kinds of possible features; there is nothing intrinsically contradictory in any of these options.

On a larger scale, the universe and its constituents exemplify the nature of possibility. The arrangement of stars and galaxies, the presence of particular elements, or the existence of specific planetary systems are all possible; they could have been different or simply not have existed at all. For instance, the composition of the Earth’s atmosphere—primarily nitrogen and oxygen—could have been vastly different if external factors, such as the planet’s formation and subsequent chemical processes, had varied. Similarly, the universe itself could have been structured differently or might not have existed at all, emphasising its lack of intrinsic necessity. Possibility, therefore, encompasses entities and phenomena that do not impose any logical contradiction, whether they exist or not.

Al-Sanūsī further categorises possibilities into three subcategories to provide a more nuanced understanding of their scope (al-Sanūsī 2019d, p. 143): established or actualised possibilities, negated or unactualised possibilities, and uncertain possibilities.

Established or actualised possibilities (al-jāʾiz al-maqṭūʿ bi-wujūdihi) are events or outcomes that have occurred or exist in the present, confirmed by reason or evidence. For instance, the development of vaccines or the widespread use of electricity as a power source are actualised possibilities. These were once possible ideas, but through specific actions, circumstances, and discoveries, they have been actualised. In a religious context, the resurrection of the dead in the eschaton and the existence of heaven and hell are established possibilities, affirmed through divine revelation, and are consistent with logical possibilities.

Negated or unactualised possibilities (al-jāʾiz al-maqṭūʿ bi-ʿadamihi) refer to things that are logically possible but did not occur, given what we know. For example, it was logically possible for Albert Einstein to win the Nobel Prize in biology, but in reality, this did not happen. This is an example of an unactualised possibility—something that could have happened but was not actualised due to the course of events or circumstances (in light of God’s will). In a theological context, the salvation of Pharaoh and Abū Lahab, both of whom are historical figures mentioned in the Qurʾān, are examples of negated possibilities. Their eternal punishment in hell is explicitly affirmed in divine revelation, making their salvation impossible despite being theoretically conceivable. For example, Abū Lahab’s fate is mentioned in Q. 111:3: “He will [enter to] burn in a Fire of [blazing] flame”, while Pharaoh’s condemnation is affirmed in Q. 28:41–42: “And We made them leaders inviting to the Fire, and on the Day of Resurrection, they will not be helped. And We caused a curse to follow them in this world, and on the Day of Resurrection, they will be of the despised.”

Uncertain possibilities (al-jāʾiz al-muḥtamal li-l-wujūd wa-l-ʿadam) are scenarios with an outcome that remains unknown and contingent on future events or conditions. For instance, whether a new technology will succeed in the market or whether a scientific theory will be proven correct or not are uncertain possibilities. These outcomes depend on factors that have yet to unfold. In theology, the question of whether an individual will attain salvation or face punishment in the afterlife is an uncertain possibility, as it depends on the individual’s choices and God’s will. The outcome is not determined until the relevant conditions are fulfilled.

Building on this framework, we can now explore how it underpins the entire Ashʿarī theological system. Ashʿarī theologians articulated arguments for the existence of God that hinged on the necessity of a necessary being (wājib al-wujūd) to account for the contingent nature of creation. Central to this effort were two foundational arguments: the contingency argument (dalīl al-imkān) and the kalām cosmological argument (dalīl al-ḥudūth) (al-Rāzī 2024, vol. 1, pp. 65–328).2 While these arguments differ in their methodological emphases, both point to the same conclusion—that all contingent beings ultimately require a necessary being to explain their existence.

The contingency argument focuses on the inherent dependence of possible beings (al-jāʾizāt). As articulated in the framework of rational judgements, possible beings lack intrinsic necessity or impossibility; their existence or nonexistence depends entirely on external causes. For instance, the existence of a tree in a forest or the configuration of stars in the universe is contingent upon prior conditions, such as the processes that led to their formation. These contingent realities cannot explain their own existence; they demand an external cause. However, if this chain of contingent causes regresses infinitely, no ultimate explanation is possible. To resolve this, the contingency argument posits the existence of a necessary being whose existence is not contingent but self-sufficient, providing the ultimate foundation for all other beings (al-Rāzī 2024, vol. 1, pp. 65–172).

The kalām cosmological argument, by contrast, highlights the temporal nature of the universe. It begins with the premise that the universe had a beginning (ḥudūth), which is a state confirmed by the impossibility of an infinite regress of past events. Since everything that begins to exist must have a cause, the universe’s existence points to an external cause beyond itself. This cause, Ashʿarī theologians argue, must be a necessary being—eternal, uncaused, and the originator of all contingent realities (al-Rāzī 2024, vol. 1, pp. 271–86).

In both arguments, the concepts of necessity (wujūb) and possibility (jawāz) play critical roles. The necessary being is defined as one whose existence is not dependent on anything else and whose negation would entail a logical contradiction. In contrast, the contingent beings that populate the universe—trees, stars, atoms, and even time itself—are marked by their dependence on external causes for their existence. The rational judgement of impossibility (istiḥāla) ensures that the concept of infinite regress occurs—whether ontological in the case of the contingency argument or temporal in the case of the kalām cosmological argument—where a self-caused contingent being is dismissed as logically incoherent, reinforcing the conclusion that a necessary being must exist (al-Rāzī 2024, vol. 1, pp. 181–200).

Thus, the rational judgements outlined by al-Sanūsī serve as the philosophical underpinnings for these theological arguments. They provide a systematic basis for distinguishing between what must exist (the necessary being), what cannot exist (logically impossible scenarios, such as a square circle), and what may exist (contingent realities that populate creation). Through these arguments, Ashʿarī theologians establish that rational thought leads inexorably to the affirmation of a necessary being who underpins all contingent realities. These logical judgements are summarised in

Table 4. Logical categories.

Necessity (wujūb)	Impossibility (istiḥāla)	Possiblity (jawāz)
A judgement that something must exist or be true, as its negation leads to a logical contradiction	A judgement that something cannot exist or be true, as its affirmation would lead to a logical contradiction	A judgement that something can exist or not exist, without implying any logical contradiction

.

3. Reflecting on al-Sanūsī’s Framework

This section is structured to provide a detailed reflection on al-Sanūsī’s framework and its implications for Islamic theology and science. Section 3.1 explores the God-centric nature of the three types of judgements—legal (ḥukm sharʿī), nomic (ḥukm ʿādī), and rational (ḥukm ʿaqlī)—demonstrating how each is inherently grounded in divine authority and action. Section 3.2 examines the hierarchical relationship and scope of these judgements, illustrating how the rational sphere underpins the nomic and legal domains, forming a coherent framework for understanding the world and human responsibility. Section 3.3 focuses on science as a locus for theological reflection and inquiry, showcasing how al-Sanūsī’s framework integrates empirical observations with ethical and theological principles, making it highly relevant for contemporary discussions on Islam and science. Together, these sections offer a comprehensive analysis of how al-Sanūsī’s insights can bridge traditional theology and modern scientific discourse.

3.1. God-Centric Framework

Al-Sanūsī’s presentation makes it clear how each kind of judgement is inherently God-centric, with each type of judgement providing a distinct yet interconnected foundation for understanding the centrality of God in all aspects of existence and reasoning. This God-centric orientation is evident in how each category of judgement is ultimately grounded in divine authority, action, or necessity.

Within legal judgements, morality and law are exclusively derived from God’s will, as revealed through divine commands. This reflects the principle of DCT, where actions are not intrinsically good or bad but acquire their moral value through God’s explicit designation. The prescriptive nature of these judgements—whether obligations, prohibitions, or permissions—underscores the dependence of ethical and legal systems on divine authority. This approach ensures that all moral and legal obligations are tethered to divine will, highlighting God’s role as the ultimate arbiter of human action (Malik 2021a).

In the realm of nomic judgements, observable regularities in the natural world are framed not as independent, inherent properties of objects but as manifestations of God’s habitual will (ʿāda). The Ashʿarī doctrine of occasionalism denies the intrinsic causal power needed to create entities, asserting instead that all causes and effects are directly enacted by God. This view reinforces the idea that the cosmos operates through divine volition, with every event and natural regularity being a direct expression of God’s continuous action. Thus, nomic judgements situate God as the sustaining force behind the natural order (Malik and Muhtaroglu 2022).

Rational judgements, which deal with necessity, impossibility, and possibility, provide a philosophical framework for understanding the contingent nature of creation. Through the principles of possibility and necessity, rational judgements lead inevitably to the affirmation of a necessary being (wājib al-wujūd). Ashʿarī theologians employ this framework to argue that all contingent realities ultimately depend on a self-sufficient, necessary being—God (Malik and Muhtaroglu 2022).

3.2. The Hierarchy and Scope of the Three Spheres

Al-Sanūsī’s framework presents a systematic hierarchy of the rational, nomic, and legal spheres, each distinguished by its scope and epistemic basis. This structure reflects how pure reason, observable regularities in nature, and divine revelation interact to underpin the theological and practical dimensions of human understanding and action.

The rational sphere, grounded in pure reason, is the broadest in scope. It encompasses all conceivable possibilities within the bounds of logical coherence, establishing the parameters of necessity, impossibility, and possibility. This sphere forms the epistemic foundation for all other domains, as it determines what can or cannot exist or occur in principle. Without the rational sphere, neither the actualised patterns of the natural world nor the ethical and legal guidelines derived from revelation can be meaningfully conceptualised.

The nomic sphere, rooted in observable regularities, constitutes a subset of the rational sphere. It is defined by those possibilities that God has actualised in creation, forming the patterns and phenomena that are consistently observed in nature. These regularities provide stability and predictability, enabling humans to engage with their environment and understand the world through empirical observation and scientific study. The nomic sphere links the broader rational domain with the tangible realities of existence. It serves as the foundation for practical human activity, including the ethical guidelines prescribed in the legal sphere. Without the regularities of the nomic domain, ethical and legal prescriptions would lack the stable framework necessary for their application (Malik 2021a).

The Ashʿarī framework’s distinction between the rational and nomic spheres inherently allows for phenomena that fall outside of the boundaries of empirical science. Nomic irregularities, such as miracles, uphold divine omnipotence by suspending or altering the regular patterns of the natural world while maintaining logical coherence. This distinction highlights the limitations of scientism and materialism, which reduce reality to what can be empirically observed and measured. The Ashʿarī perspective rejects such reductionism, recognising that the natural laws governing the nomic sphere are contingent expressions of God’s will and are not exhaustive of all that exists (Malik 2023). By affirming the broader scope of the rational sphere, the Ashʿarī framework integrates science into a more expansive theological worldview, where empirical observation is one pathway among many for understanding the complexities of creation.

The legal sphere, the narrowest in scope, derives its epistemic basis from divine revelation. It prescribes human behaviour within the constraints of the actualised nomic world, offering a framework for ethical and religious obligations. Legal rulings presuppose the stability and predictability provided by the nomic sphere; for example, obligations such as daily prayers or fasting rely on consistent natural phenomena, such as the movement of celestial bodies or the passage of time. Revelation guides human conduct in alignment with the established regularities of the natural world, ensuring that ethical imperatives are both grounded and actionable. It is important to note, however, that this alignment does not have to be inherent; it is solely due to God’s grace that such an alignment exists in the first place (Malik 2021a, p. 568).

This connection to revelation also underscores the intelligibility and importance of prophethood within Ashʿarī theology. Prophets act as divinely appointed intermediaries between God and humanity, with their authority being validated through miracles. However, it is crucial to note that miracles in this context do not imply “divine intervention” in the common contemporary sense (Lazzari 2024). In Ashʿarī theology, particularly in the framework of occasionalism, God does not intervene in His own actions. Instead, miracles are understood as extraordinary events that manifest within the established natural regularities of the nomic sphere. These regularities provide a stable backdrop, allowing miracles to be perceived as exceptional precisely because they deviate from the norm. Without the predictability of the nomic world, miracles would lack the contrast necessary for them to be recognised as extraordinary, thus establishing an important solidifying link between the nomic and legal domains (Jalajel and Malik 2025).

In this sense, prophethood is the critical contact point between the natural order and divine guidance. Miracles validate the prophet’s claim to convey revelation, acting as a definitive sign of divine endorsement and bridging the rational and nomic spheres with the legal domain. The prophetic message transforms the regularities of the natural world into actionable legal and ethical frameworks, ensuring that human conduct aligns with the rational order of creation and the ultimate purposes of divine will. Through this connection, natural theology, which discerns God’s attributes through reason and observation, is seamlessly integrated with systematic theology, which incorporates the knowledge revealed to provide a comprehensive guide for human life (Feser 2017, pp. 238–46).

This hierarchical structure underscores a clear interdependence among the spheres. The rational sphere, which is the broadest, provides the foundation for all conceivable possibilities. The nomic sphere narrows this scope to the actualised patterns willed by God, while the legal sphere is further refined and articulates specific divine prescriptions for human conduct. Each sphere builds on the broader domain that precedes it: the legal depends on the nomic, and the nomic relies on the rational. This is summarised in Figure 1.

Al-Sanūsī’s prioritisation of the legal sphere in his presentation, despite its narrower scope, reflects the honour given to divine revelation in Islamic thought. Revelation, as the direct expression of divine will, holds a central place in guiding human conduct. By beginning with the legal sphere, al-Sanūsī underscores its practical importance while also acknowledging its dependence on the underlying rational and nomic structures. This integrated hierarchy illustrates how reason, natural regularities, and divine command converge to create a coherent framework for understanding existence and guiding human action.

3.3. Science as a Locus of Theological Reflection and Inquiry

Science, within the Ashʿarī framework, has historically been pursued as a means of exploring the manifestations of divine will, fulfilling ethical responsibilities, and reflecting upon the contingency of creation (Kara-Ali 2014; Brentjes 2018; Stearns 2021). This approach inherently ties scientific inquiry to theological ends, grounding it within the three domains of legal, nomic, and rational.

At its core, science, as the study of the laws of nature, aligns most directly with nomic judgements. It investigates the regularities and patterns that God has willed into existence through His customary actions. For Ashʿarī thinkers, these patterns are not intrinsic to the objects themselves but are expressions of divine volition. The pursuit of science, then, becomes an exploration of God’s design, revealing His wisdom and the intricate systems He has placed into creation. Historically, this perspective has motivated Muslim scientists to seek knowledge of the natural world, not merely for its own sake but as a means of uncovering divine wisdom embedded in creation (Malik et al. 2022).

Science also intersects with legal judgements, particularly when defining law (ḥukm waḍʿī), by providing tools and insights to better fulfil ethical and religious obligations. Historically, this was evident during the Islamic Golden Age, when scientific pursuits were closely tied to religious practices and ethical mandates. For instance, astronomy was developed to refine the precision of prayer timings, fasting schedules, and the determination of the lunar calendar (King 1996; Morrison 2013). Similarly, medicine was advanced not merely as a pursuit of knowledge but as a practical means to preserve health and well-being, aligning with the ethical responsibility to protect life and alleviate suffering (Ullmann 1978; Pormann and Savage-Smith 2007; Stearns 2011; Ragab 2018).

It is also important to highlight that the relationship between legal reasoning and empirical knowledge in classical Islamic jurisprudence has not been one-sided. Legal scholars actively incorporated available empirical knowledge into their deliberations, reflecting the scientific understanding of their time. A notable example is found in classical Islamic law, where Shāfiʿī scholars ruled that using water heated by the sun in metal containers, such as copper or iron, was disliked (makrūh) because they believed exposure to sunlight could release harmful substances (zuhūma) that could cause leprosy (baraṣ). An exception was made for gold and silver containers, which were believed to be pure in substance and, thus, did not cause leprosy (al-Shirbīnī 1997, vol. 1, p. 47). While modern science shows that leprosy is caused by bacteria, not metals or sunlight, this ruling was based on the best scientific understanding available at the time, rooted in alchemy.

Another example is the classical Islamic legal debate on the maximum duration of pregnancy. Scholars debated this issue based on documented cases of extended pregnancies, with some considering the possibility of pregnancies lasting beyond the typical nine months. Influenced by theories such as the “sleeping foetus”, some legal scholars even suggested that pregnancies could last for up to four years or longer (Serrano-Ruano 2023).

While they reveal the limitations of knowledge from a contemporary perspective, both examples highlight how classical scholars engaged with the empirical sciences of their time to make informed legal judgements. This practice has continued into the modern context, where the role of scientific knowledge in shaping legal deliberations has evolved. Biomedical scientists equipped with expertise in contemporary medical advancements are now increasingly participating in religious deliberations, especially when modern medical knowledge challenges traditional views. For instance, discussions around the plausibility of extremely prolonged pregnancies or the ethical considerations of organ transplants have become integral to Islamic legal reasoning. These scientists now play an essential role in “informing” and even “co-authoring” religious edicts, working alongside theologians in collective independent legal reasoning (ijtihād). This shift has transformed some biomedical scientists from mere informants into key contributors in the religious decision-making process, reflecting the growing integration of scientific input into Islamic jurisprudence (Ghaly 2022).

Medical research and biotechnology continue to challenge and shape ethical reasoning within Islamic law. Innovations such as ectogenesis, euthanasia, organ transplantation, and sex reassignment surgeries compel religious scholars to reconsider traditional legal frameworks (Ali 2020; Afifi and Padela 2021; Padela 2021; Jaffer et al. 2022; Ghaly 2024). These modern technologies test the boundaries of Islamic ethics, prompting nuanced legal rulings that account for the latest scientific realities. For example, ectogenesis raises questions about the sanctity of life and parental responsibility, while organ transplantation introduces ethical concerns regarding prioritisation and the permissibility of using human-derived materials. Similarly, advances in regenerative medicine challenge Islamic values concerning the sanctity of life and the body’s integrity. All of these discussions require ongoing (re-)evaluations within Islamic jurisprudence (Padela 2024).

Alongside these medical advancements, the broader realm of environmental science also plays a critical role in shaping contemporary Islamic bioethics. The ethical mandate of stewardship over the Earth (khilāfa) is increasingly relevant in the context of climate change and environmental degradation (Salimi Turkamani 2023). Climate science, in particular, provides critical tools for understanding the ecological crises facing the world today, urging action to conserve resources and mitigate harm in accordance with Islamic ethical principles (Koehrsen 2021; Sobirin and Khasanah 2023).

This dynamic relationship between scientific discovery and ethical imperatives underscores the evolving nature of Islamic jurisprudence. As new challenges emerge, the natural world—through its observable patterns and underlying complexities—acts as both a source of inquiry and a testing ground for ethical reasoning. Scientific inquiry, therefore, is not merely a tool for refining precision in established practices but a dynamic process that continually shapes and is shaped by Islamic jurisprudence. Through this interaction, modern science serves as a vital means for furthering ethical values, fostering a constant dialogue between the realities of the natural world and the divine objectives of Islamic law (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa) (Padela 2024).

Furthermore, rational judgement links scientific discovery to theological reflection by framing the natural world as a collection of contingent phenomena that point to the existence of a necessary being. For Ashʿarīs, every discovery—whether the fine-tuning of the cosmos, the complexity of ecosystems, or the intricacies of molecular biology—reinforces the contingent nature of creation, leading back to God as the ultimate cause. Thus, the study of science was never viewed as separate from theology but as a means of affirming divine existence and attributes and the contingency of the created order (Malik et al. 2022; Malik and Muhtaroglu 2022).

In light of this, new phenomena discovered by science should not be perceived as threatening to Islamic theology. So long as these discoveries do not contradict core principles derived from revelation, they are not only acceptable but also welcomed as extensions of human understanding (Malik et al. 2022).3 The Ashʿarī framework, with its grounding in rationality and contingency, provides an epistemological basis for integrating new knowledge. For example, theories of the multiverse or the existence of extraterrestrial life raise fascinating questions about the scope and diversity of creation, yet they remain within the bounds of contingency and point to the creative power of God (Malik 2024b). Similarly, advancements in quantum mechanics or the discovery of new subatomic particles further illustrate the intricate systems that God has willed into existence (Salim and Malik 2021). By framing scientific inquiry as a process of uncovering God’s will in creation, this perspective alleviates the fear of the unknown and encourages Muslims to approach new discoveries—whether terrestrial, cosmic, or even beyond the cosmos—with confidence and curiosity rather than suspicion or apprehension.

This integrated view of science within Ashʿarism offers modern Muslim scientists a foundation for approaching their fields with a sense of continuity and purpose. While the methods and contexts of contemporary science may differ, the core principle remains the same: science is a tool for uncovering what God has manifested in the natural world.

Thus, it is hoped that this presentation of al-Sanūsī’s framework can provide a positive theological outlook, encouraging Muslims to view science not as a threat but as an opportunity to deepen their understanding of the Divine. Whether it serves to reveal divine wisdom, aid in fulfilling ethical and religious duties, or reflect upon the metaphysical realities of contingency and necessity, the scientific inquiry remains, and will never cease to be, a locus for (engaging with) Islamic theology (also see Abdelnour 2023, 2024).4

4. Conclusions

This article has examined how Imam al-Sanūsī’s theological framework provides a structured model for understanding the relationship between Islam and science. His tripartite categorisation of judgements—legal (ḥukm sharʿī), nomic (ḥukm ʿādī), and rational (ḥukm ʿaqlī)—integrates revelation, reason, and empirical observation, offering a coherent way to engage with scientific inquiry while upholding core theological principles. At its core, al-Sanūsī’s framework is deeply God-centric. Legal judgements establish morality based on divine command; nomic judgements explain natural laws as manifestations of the divine will; and rational judgements affirm the necessity of a transcendent Creator.

It is important to recognise, however, that Islamic theology is not monolithic. Across Islamic intellectual history, different traditions—including Muʿtazilī, Māturīdī, Atharī, and Falāsifa schools, among others—have developed distinct perspectives on reason, causality, and divine action. Against this broader landscape, this article presents one articulation of the Islamic perspective: Ashʿarism as developed by al-Sanūsī. It will be interesting to see how other theological models and expressions engage with contemporary discussions on Islam and science, highlighting areas of agreement and divergence in future scholarship.

More broadly, this study exhibits the continued relevance of classical Islamic theology in modern discussions of Islam and science. By illustrating how a structured theological framework can accommodate scientific advancements, this article underscores the enduring value of Ashʿarī kalām as a dynamic and evolving intellectual tradition. As new scientific discoveries raise complex questions—from the nature of causality in quantum mechanics to the theological implications of extraterrestrial life—al-Sanūsī’s model will serve not merely as a historical construct but as a living methodology that allows for engagement with modern science without compromising theological integrity.

Ultimately, this framework challenges the perceived divide between science and theology. By recognising scientific discoveries as contingent expressions of God’s will and spaces for ethical deliberations, theological engagement with the natural world is encouraged. This perspective positions science not merely as an empirical discipline but as a vital locus for theological reflection—one that deepens our understanding of divine wisdom, strengthens intellectual inquiry, and reaffirms the interconnectedness of knowledge, faith, and reason.