Between Democracy and Islam: The Rise of Islamists’ Political Awareness in Jordan Between 2011 to 2024 and Its Effects on Religious, National, and Political Identities

Abstract

This article traces the strengthening of Muslim movements in Jordan, emphasizing the period that marked the beginning of the regional upheaval (2011). It aims to examine whether and how this strengthening affected religious, national, and political identities. The article examines the interrelationships between the Hashemite regime and the Salafi movements in Jordan during and after the Arab Spring. This examination shows that there was a deterioration, aggravation, and erosion in these relations, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, also an understanding on the part of the regime that despite this the Salafis are interested in taking part in the Jordanian political game. In this discourse between the Salafi movements and the regime, we will also examine whether the movements sought to change the regime’s nature and, thus, the nature of society in Jordan from a Hashemite national identity to a Salafi identity. The article is based on secondary and primary sources that unfold a fascinating picture of dialectics and dialog between the ideological extremes of democracy and Islam. The main findings are that these processes, during and after the Arab Spring, tend to contain religious groups that will also participate in politics, out of recognition of the supremacy of the law of the state, which is not necessarily religious.

1. Introduction

This article examines the interrelationships between the Hashemite regime and the Salafi movements in Jordan during and after the Arab Spring. In this discourse between the Salafi movements and the regime, we will also examine whether the movements sought to change the regime’s nature and, thus, the nature of society in Jordan from a Hashemite national identity to one with a Salafi identity.

The Salafi movements in Jordan are considered offshoots of the al-Qaeda organization, which was established by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s with the objective of disseminating their ideology among Muslims throughout the Middle East. The emergence of Salafi groups in Jordan was recognized in the early 1990s, prompting King Hussein to direct his security forces to mitigate the threat they posed to the stability of the kingdom.

The Hashemite regime has exhibited limited tolerance for Salafi ideology, as it diverges significantly from the royal family’s interpretation of Islam. This discussion underscores the regime’s need to address a range of potential threats, including the implications for democratic rights associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the ambitions of the Salafi movements to establish an Islamic caliphate. The activities of these groups within Jordan have been substantially curtailed due to the repressive measures implemented by the kingdom’s security apparatus.

One of the main phenomena that has developed since the regional upheaval in the Middle East began in December 2010 is the rise of Salafi Jihadi Islam. This stream, which led to the establishment of al-Qaeda in 1989, also led to the development of the Salafi Takfiriyya, which was the conceptual basis for the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014–2016. The ideological influences of the Salafi currents did not escape the Hashemites of Jordan either, and their tangible expression was the growth of the Salafi movements in an era when the Hashemite royal house adopted a democratization policy. Therefore, the penetration of Salafist ideas into the kingdom created a domestic security threat to Jordan’s national identity. The Salafi threat—ideological or security-related—was not the only threat to Jordan’s national identity. The Salafist movements demanded far-reaching changes in Jordan (Yom 2013). These groups strived for a radical change in Jordan, i.e., the replacement of monarchical rule with a government with a religious character. In contrast, other more moderate movements sought recognition and political representation in government institutions (Ryan 2008). Part of the activity of those radical movements is to destabilize the moderate movements, some of which (while fighting for audience and support) also have extreme policies. Some of their fans turned toward what they see as a more radical and less integrated opposition—the Salafi movements (Larzillière 2012).

Another threat to the kingdom’s identity was the flow of Syrian refugees, a result of the civil war that broke out in 2011. According to an estimate by the United Nations, the number of refugees from Syria is estimated at 1.3 million, of whom about 70–80 percent live outside the refugee camps in urban and rural areas (Lenner and Schmelter 2016).

In January 2011, protests broke out in Jordan against the country’s prevailing socioeconomic and political conditions, namely high unemployment, inflation, and allegations of governmental corruption. The uprisings of the Arab Spring in Jordan were eventually curbed by the holding of new parliamentary elections and by fear among the population of the spread of the violence and chaos observed in neighboring Syria. The Jordanians became deeply concerned as tens of thousands of Syrians were killed in what turned from hopeful protests into armed clashes and civil war. Despite this, demonstrations in Jordan broke out again in 2012 in the southern city of Ma’an, where black ISIS flags were waved in the streets. At first, it was difficult to distinguish whether, under the cover of the initial chaos, the waving of these flags was part of a broader political game being played above the head of the kingdom or whether they pointed to the infiltration of ISIS into Jordanian society (Speckhard 2017).

The Arab Spring caused three significant threats to the stability of the kingdom and thus to its identity: the rise in power of the Salafist movements; the influx of refugees that colored the country with a foreign population with a different character and identity, even though they are Arabs and speak the Arabic language; and the protests of social movements that were initially painted as protests demonstrating solidarity with those all over the Middle East. Very soon, these protests were directed at the regime, demanding changes and reforms, and some participants even called for the overthrow of the regime and the establishment of a religious regime. Another issue that the regime had to deal with was the refugees from Syria (Adel El Arab and Sagbakken 2018).

Alongside the emerging civil war in Syria and its regional effects, the demonstrations in Jordan (at least, not at the beginning and not overwhelmingly so) did not show a desire to overthrow the monarchy. Secular activists, alongside their religious opponents such as the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood, tried to “repair the system” by declaring their intentions to return to the 1952 constitution, which was closer to a genuine constitutional monarchy. On the other hand, the first protests of the Salafist movement in Jordan were taken in March 2011 in Amman, in which they focused their demands on the application of Islamic law and the release of 300 prisoners who they claimed were ill-treated in Jordanian prisons. The Salafis at that time used the slogan raised by the demonstrators in Egypt and Tunisia to “overthrow the regime”. At this point, the focus of the Jordanian Salafists was still on domestic affairs (Sowell 2015). Even if there was no real intention of the Salafis to overthrow the regime in these calls, they made the regime defensive and anxious.

Despite the informal statements that focused on internal affairs at this stage of the demonstrations, it was still difficult to distinguish between the Salafist movements, who turned to the struggle for internal change and declared a desire for fundamental changes, including the form of government. However, with the strengthening of the jihadist element within these movements, the traditional Salafi movement felt the need to draw a line between legitimate actions and those that are forbidden. For example, Ali al-Halabi, a student of Sheikh Muhammad Nasser al-Din, known as Sheikh al-Albani, the founder of Jordanian Salafism, published a video in which he criticized the protests, describing them as “far from the teachings of Allah” and claimed that those jihadists were interested in material gains. Al-Halabi called for demonstrations against the “ruler’s apostasy” when the demonstrations were for the benefit of the Islamic nation and attributed his opinion to the fact that he saw in the demonstrations in Egypt only chaos and suffering caused by party activists or the Salafi apostates associated with al-Qaeda, or “the Poles” (i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood) (Sowell 2015).

2. Liberalization Processes as a Strategy for Governmental Survival

Rulers know how to use the processes of liberalization and democratization precisely to preserve and fortify their position, including by producing governmental legitimacy that rests on more than one base of support. One of the ways to do this is by granting partial and autonomous independence to social groups to allow them local autonomy and make demands of them that are not far-reaching. Acknowledging the power of the Islamic movements and their inclusion into the political and social space is necessary to reduce their ambition to replace the existing political order (Bellin 2012; Brumberg 2003). Examples of this can be found in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood, which spent decades outside the political sphere, was hunted by the regime (especially during Nasser’s era) but later joined the political arena (El-Ghobashy 2005; Tadros 2012; Vannetzel 2017), and in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, where the Muslim Brotherhood also lived outside of the political sphere but, due to the Arab Spring, found its way into politics (Abu Rumman and Bondokji 2018; Alsoudi 2014).

Previous studies have pointed to the instrumental use of democratization processes by rulers in general, and in the Arab world in particular, to cool social unrest within their country (Abdellatif n.d.). The broad protests that broke out throughout the Arab world in December 2011, which turned into bloody civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, are a case in point via which it is possible to check whether Arab rulers gave democratic incentives in order to suppress the protests. Jordan, which experienced comparatively low-intensity unrest, also required a minor, apparently smooth process of democratization in order to respond to the protests of various sectoral parties—Salafi movements, Syrian refugees, other social movements, and the Muslim Brotherhood (Brumberg 2003; El-Din Haseeb and Sawani 2013).

3. The Religious Aspect of Jordanian Nationalism—The Muslim Brotherhood

The establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan had many factors. This movement, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Bana, found a large audience within the Arab region. Jordan itself, which was established back in 1921, experienced the direct influence of the Muslim Brotherhood only after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 when many Palestinian refugees fled to the Hashemite Kingdom. Under King Hussein (1952–1999), the monarchy was required to be flexible and contain the development of the country’s old and new political elements. Therefore, the King chose an approach aimed at cooperating with the Muslim Brotherhood instead of fighting them. This softer approach allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to continue their charity and da’awa activities, especially after the withdrawal of the British army in 1956, when “the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to continue its charitable work as an association” (Jaber 2017).

By the end of the 1970s, relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite monarchy were solid and stable. However, the first Palestinian intifada of 1987 that broke out in the West Bank widened the political scene within both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Kingdom when Hamas, a new political actor, identified itself as the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. In this context, in 1989, the Kingdom created a national pact with formal legislative elections and the authorization of political organizations. The Islamic Action Front (IAF), a political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, won 22 of 80 seats in the elections and became “a major player on the Jordanian political scene” (Jaber 2017). However, only in 1992 did a law (Muslim Brotherhood 22) regulate the formation of political parties. Until that year, the Muslim Brotherhood was limited to the status of an association (Jaber 2017). The Muslim Brotherhood was initially associated with the Hamas agenda, but at this stage they focused more on local Jordanian goals and maintaining an Islamic identity connected to Jordan.

Analyzing the role and influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan during the 1990s, Linda Shull Adams concludes that the Muslim Brotherhood used its political resources to challenge the Jordanian regime. The Brotherhood’s organizational cohesion and mobilization capabilities enabled it to effectively oppose government policy, especially in peace negotiations with Israel and broader political reforms. In addition, it created alliances with traditional elites and trade unions and took advantage of opportunities to advance its interests and increase its voice in the political arena. Adams highlights the resilience and determination of the Muslim Brotherhood in navigating the evolving landscape of political liberalization and shows its continuing impact on Jordan’s political dynamics (Shull Adams 1996). At this point in the mid-1990s, there are no hints of actions to change or discuss the identity of the Jordanian state. The Muslim Brotherhood saw themselves as an integral part of the Jordanian Kingdom and always sought ways to garner achievements and influence vis à vis the monarchy.

Anne Sofie Roald examines the transitional political strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan as they navigate the complexities of modern governance. She discusses how the Brotherhood has historically been a proponent of an Islamic political framework but has begun incorporating elements of secularization and individual rights in response to changing political landscapes and pressures for democratization. Roald highlights the tension between maintaining their Islamic identity and adapting to democratic norms, suggesting that the Brotherhood’s policies are increasingly influenced by the need to resonate with a broader, more diverse public. She analyzes various socio-political factors contributing to this shift, including regional dynamics, state responses, and the Brotherhood’s internal debates. The article ultimately posits that while the organization is moving toward a more participatory and less theocratic stance, it remains challenged by the complexities of balancing tradition with modernity. Overall, Roald provides a nuanced perspective on the evolving identity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and its implications for democratic development in the region (Roald 2008). This change gives the immediate impression that the Muslim Brotherhood’s direction, at least until the outbreak of the Arab Spring, was to embrace the kingdom’s national identity and hope to find elements that would help it gain strength and influence among the less religious population in the country.

Dhnoon Fawaz Muwaffaq provides a comprehensive analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political activity in Jordan, shedding light on its goals, strategies, and impact on the country’s political landscape. He discusses how the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is deeply rooted in the political system and actively participates in official parliamentary elections as part of their faith in the political process. The movement strives to promote Islamic values, support social reform, and seek a peaceful approach to advance its interests. Its approach includes dealing with various aspects of Jordanian society to influence societal change and shape policy. The article also delves into the challenges and obstacles facing the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, especially in its cautious political conduct and balancing Islamic principles with the government’s demands (Dhnoon 2012). Fawaz’s perspective suggests that the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan adheres to the rules of the political system and aims to exert influence through political channels (such as in parliament), public platforms (such as the media), and social activities (including da’awa). They have been mindful to preserve their religious identity and have not attempted to integrate it as part of the national identity in Jordan, which has religious roots dating back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad.

Exploring the ramifications of the Arab Spring on the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Jacob Amis claims that the movement changed its strategy and political discourse. The Muslim Brotherhood’s public discourse became more assertive, and it increased its demands for constitutional reform aimed at reducing critical aspects of the monarchy’s power. The alignment between the opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood and public opinion was evident when protests escalated throughout the country despite the government’s reform initiatives. The Muslim Brotherhood’s active involvement in organizing frequent demonstrations throughout Jordan and its decision to boycott the parliamentary elections in 2010 as a form of protest against the regime’s moderate reform initiatives emphasize its determination to challenge the status quo and engage in a more confrontational approach toward the monarchy (Amis 2013).

Hassam Barari claims that for the Jordanian authorities it appears that the Muslim Brotherhood’s feeling that it has broad support among the Jordanian public, fueled by the events of the Arab Spring, led it to reveal its true desires to change the nature of the government and hence the identity of the state from being secular to one with a religious identity Barari (2013). However, as of the time of writing (2013), although the Muslim Brotherhood and other Salafi groups in Jordan were taking part in social protests against the kingdom, it was hard for Barari to estimate the exact political aims of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The existing research on the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has not thoroughly explored the leadership’s stance on nationalism in Jordan. There are three potential reasons why this issue has been overlooked. First, the leaders may have viewed the Muslim Brotherhood primarily as a social and religious movement rather than a national one. Second, whenever they did address nationalism, it may have been in the context of the Palestinian question. Third, they considered themselves part of the Jordanian nation-state without confronting its identity.

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1945, has long been Jordan’s most potent Islamist force. It returned to politics in 2016 through its political arm, the IAF (established in 1992). Its establishment was made possible after the publication of the National Charter in 1991, which stated that: “The system of government in the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom is a parliamentary monarchy that is inherited. The adherence of all Jordanians to its legitimacy and respect for the spirit of the constitution and its content will strengthen the union between the people and its leadership. […] Jordan is a democratic state of law” (Nevo 2005: p. 285). Subsequently, its return to politics was made possible after it boycotted the elections in 2010 and 2013 that followed protests against the kingdom at the beginning of the Arab Spring. Changes in Jordan’s election law in 2016 then provided the IAF, along with various Salafi movements, the opportunity to return to politics.

In 2010, the Muslim Brotherhood announced a boycott of the parliamentary elections. Simultaneously, it sought to transfer its demands and slogans to the street, inciting public opinion against governmental and parliamentary bodies. The protests peaked in 2011 and included various member groups of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Salafis. At first, it was opposed to dialog or attempts to cooperate with the authorities (Al-Sharfat 2022). The initial framing of the protest was religious and revolved around the IAF’s Sharia Scholars Committee’s ruling on 20 February 2011, which considered the protests a religious obligation. It was not until 25 November 2012 that the Shura (Council) of the Muslim Brotherhood framed their protest under the slogan “Reform” (Al-Sharfat 2022). This was a call for political changes that did not require the total replacement of the form of government or its nature.

Despite the call for political reform, the IAF boycotted the 2013 parliamentary elections (as they did in 2010). These boycotts showed that even such a decision could be considered a democratic right. However, this time, they claimed that the election system prioritized the regime’s apparent supporters; for example, districts were chosen in favor of tribes and rural areas where the monarchy had strong support. According to them, “the regime failed to meet the reform demands of the Jordanians [that is, for representative and genuine participation], including the Islamist movement” (Timreck 2017). However, as mentioned, the Islamist movements were also not united in their protests against the government since each one saw itself as having a different identity from the others. In 2013, a new party, the National Congress Party (Zamzam), was established by Dr. Rahil al-Gharaibeh, who was also appointed as the chairman of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights. Al-Gharaibeh was previously the president of the political bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (Al-Sharfat 2019).

Despite the split, the Muslim Brotherhood, alongside the Jordanian Popular Movement, continued to harden its rhetoric. The tone of incitement rose in the group’s speeches on various platforms until it began to affect Jordan’s foreign relations. The state responded by arresting the group’s deputy controller general, Zaki Bani Irshaid, in 2014 for insulting the UAE through his social media posts (Al-Sharfat 2019, 2022).

In 2016, the IAF ran as part of the National Coalition for Reform (NCR), which combined Islamists, nationalists, tribal candidates, Christians, and members of minority groups. The NCR adopted a new slogan to reflect its ideology: “The renewal of the homeland, respect for the citizens” (Al-Sharfat 2019, 2022). The NCR’s platform included general reforms such as ending governmental corruption, reforming the judicial system, and strengthening the private sector for economic growth. There was a connection to the broad political agendas of Islamist movements that saw themselves as part of the Jordanian state and enjoyed the potential of being integrated into politics and influencing the country’s social and political agenda. The NCR’s vision, created in 2014, stated “that a national strategy of reform must be adopted that will raise the country to the democratic path based on the foundations of the constitution and the national convention, to create a civil state of democracy based on freedom, justice and respect for human rights, which constitute ‘citizenship’ with constitutional, legal and ethical dimensions at its core” (Al-Sharfat 2019, 2022). This change indicates a substantial shift in the Muslim Brotherhood’s political worldview and reflects its ability to claim citizenship rights from the royal family. Such a liberal reform could indirectly affect Jordan’s national identity.

In February 2017, the IAF and other protest movements participated in a rally in Amman with tribal leadership under the slogan “Enough is enough to destroy the future of the state. [Our] joining the tribes was made possible because even in the power centers of the Kingdom, the child tribes, a protest was formed to change the economic situation and grant additional political rights”. The protest arose in response to government price increases, the increase in taxes, and the increase in unemployment, which caused demonstrations throughout the country (Al-Sharfat 2019; Timreck 2017).

To summarize, it can be said with certainty that, following the Arab Spring, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan demonstrated the extent of its power in the country compared to other opposition organizations; that is, they used the democratization process in Jordan and tried not to break the rules against the King and the security forces. On the other side, the regime, by using the “divide and rule” method toward them and other organizations and parties that split from them or disagreed with their anti-establishment political view, contained the pressure until the point it felt this pressure could destabilize its very existence.

4. The Strengthening of Salafi–Jihadi Islam in Jordan After the Arab Spring and the Calls for Political Change

The emergence of Jabhat al-Nusra, a Salafi–jihadist organization that fought the Syrian regime in 2012 marked a turning point in the path of Jordanian Salafism. Gradually, individual Salafists left Jordan and joined Jabhat al-Nusra. The Jordanian regime realized why those Salafists were leaving and began to prevent their departure out of a real fear that, on their return to Jordan, they would start a jihad against the regime. Although the numbers were insignificant, there was a fear that the spirit of jihad would spill over into the Jordanian Kingdom (Sowell 2015). There were voices within the Salafi movement that called for the recruitment of fighters for the war in Syria and, at the same time, declared that they had no intention of destabilizing the monarchy as long as the country itself did not provoke them (Al-Watan 2014).

Some elements in the kingdom identified the regional upheaval as an Islamic wave sweeping the Middle East and believed that Jordan was not immune to it. From their point of view, the Jordanian Islamist groups were moving toward militancy, extremism, and fundamentalism, and there was great fear that they would also engage in violence against the kingdom. This forecast became a reality when, in April 2014, the Jordanian security forces killed a fundamentalist they were trying to arrest in the city of Ma’an. The protests that followed the event caused road closures and attacks on government buildings and symbols, including military and police buildings. This event marked the opening shot of the struggle between the regime and the fundamentalist movements (Al-Monitor 2014).

Following the events in Ma’an, the Jordanian Parliament approved changes to the definition of terrorism and the laws of the war on terrorism, which included increasing the punishment for violating the new terror law to up to ten years in prison. Many opponents of these changes saw the protest as a legitimate tool to express their religious position and the desire for a political change that would contain their demands. Some saw these changes as an ideological struggle between what the regime represented and what the Salafi movements represented. Other voices claimed that these punishments would only increase terror because they were a temporary solution, not a substantial treatment of the problems that the Salafis raised (Rothe 2015).

The regime was not slow to confront the Salafist movements ideologically and saw in their actions a violent imitation of what happened in Syria, mainly at the hands of ISIS, and a desire to dismantle the country’s political and military framework. The Mufti of the Jordanian Armed Forces, Major General Yahya al-Batoush, claimed that “the bloody acts of terrorism are nothing but religious, moral and human bankruptcy … [and a] deviation from the civilized way of Islam”. Al-Batoush added that extremism is a significant distortion of Islam and noted that Jordan’s leadership role is to present the actual image of Islam (Al-Masri Al-Yum 2015).

In 2015, the conflict between the government and the religious movements escalated and brought up an old ideological debate, which claimed that political circles that follow the regime see the various Islamic groups as “only puppets”, which can be moved to maintain the political balance. Therefore, the government confronted Salafism, which is based on the dream of returning to the days of the Islamic Caliphate. It leaves no Islamic group without some say about the historical dream. The regime also ignored that the Salafi jihad, which threatened the country’s security, grew out of the womb of conservative Salafism. The regime’s fear was that the Islamic movement would harbor fundamentalist sons who were closer in their ideology to ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. However, it should be noted that ISIS’s “Islamic State” dream contradicts “reformist Salafism” (whose spiritual fathers were Muhammad Abduh and Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani) (Al-Jabri 2015; Alami 2016).

The battle between the supporters of a civil, democratic, and secular state and conservative forces, mainly devout religious ones, became the center of public debate in Jordan against the background of violent and terrorist incidents that threatened to polarize the kingdom between direct supporters of the regime identified with the tribes and secular and religious movements of any kind. The religious groups claimed that the kingdom’s secularist front and vision for them were represented by new textbooks introduced to elementary schools from which specific religious references, including Koran verses, were removed. On the other hand, representatives of the kingdom claimed that the Ministry of Education committee rejected the accusations and said that the new textbooks were experimental, should not be compared to the old books, and do not threaten “the religious and national principles of the kingdom” (Al Sharif 2016). Nevertheless, there was no substantive attack in this statement on the claim of the Salafist movements about the nature and content of the books.

On 20 September 2016, Jordan held parliamentary elections. For the first time in its modern history, a list of candidates who openly called for a plan to promote a civil, democratic, and secular state was contested. The Ma’an List brought together Muslim and Christian professionals, including Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who called for equal rights between men and women, equal civil rights, and the separation of religion and politics. The liberal Ma’an List and the Islamic Alliance party won parliamentary seats in the same district, highlighting the conflicting social and cultural currents in this district and Jordanian society. Supporters of the civil state agenda believe that the expected confrontation will be between supporters of a democratic, inclusive, and liberal society and those who defend religious and political authoritarianism (Al Sharif 2016).

The moderate Islamist Hossein al-Ruashda, a columnist for al-Dustur, argues that Jordan is already a civil state. While Islam is the state religion, most of the country’s laws are drawn from civil sources. He also warns that those who call for a civil and secular state are fulfilling a foreign agenda that seeks to distance Jordanians from their national and cultural identity (Al Sharif 2016). Other supporters of the civil state argument, including the former deputy prime minister, Marwan Moasher, claim that the opposite of a civil state is not a religious state but an authoritarian one. In an article in al-Ghad on 21 September 2016, Moasher wrote that there has never been a religious state in Muslim history. The only example is the Wilayat al-Faqih system in today’s Iran. For him, a civil, pluralistic, and democratic state is not against religion because it guarantees freedom of worship but opposes the imposition of religious dogma on society. His argument found an ally in the Islamist Muhammad Abu Roman, who warned against a clash between radical secularists and Islamists. Abu Roman claimed that a status quo should be created and an Islamist, liberal, and secular alliance should be created in Jordanian society (Al Sharif 2016). In other words, a new social order must be established in Jordan, where all social functions contribute to a pluralistic society, particularly in the political arena.

However, others saw the events of the previous years, at least since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, from a different religious and political perspective. For example, the religious movements saw the events of the Arab Spring as a wake-up call for vigorous political activity to advance the goals of Islam in the country, which was interpreted by the state as a call for a change of government. The Arab Spring revolutions not only expressed the need for political regimes to change their approach to dealing with reality but also aimed at different structures and rebuilding the political opposition. As a reformist movement, the Islamic Brotherhood in Jordan cooperated with various political parties and established political alliances with parties or professional unions with liberal and even secular agendas (Ammon News 2017).

Another example of the development of the thought about the political participation of the religious movements and the political thought of the Islamic movement in Jordan was that of Jamil Abu Bakr, the CEO of the al-Sabeel daily (a newspaper affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan). Abu Bakr emphasized that “Jordan is a people, homeland and identity, an inseparable part of the Arab and Islamic people”. He noted that “true patriotism requires that each person act in his country’s interest and be devoted to its services” (Ammon News 2017).

Dr. Musa Alwahsh, a member of the House of Representatives and Assistant Secretary General of the IAF, also summarized the aspirations of the Islamic movement in Jordan for political action and saw it as a series of activities that seek to include the entire spectrum of official political and civil society, who see political participation as taking responsibility for the homeland and increasing trust and communication between the Islamic movement and all elements of political society. He claims that the Islamic movement shows a desire for openness and the building of political partnerships and alliances with political and popular frameworks and national symbols and figures on an inclusive, pragmatic basis rather than an ideological one (Ammon News 2017).

5. The Acclimatization of the Religious Movements in the Renewed Political Space in Jordan After 2016

The 2016 elections marked a historic meeting point connecting the religious movements to the renewed political space and the ability of the central government to contain the religious movements. The religious movements also went through an internal process of reconsolidating their values and political outlook. If, at the beginning of the Arab Spring, they had demonstrated against the government, they are part of it today.

Moreover, because of this, the political agendas also underwent a metamorphosis. In 2017, the Islamic movement in Jordan released a document presenting its religious and political vision. The most prominent and perhaps surprising detail was the document’s emphasis on the national dimension of the movement and its adoption of a modern civil state with freedom, equality, and equal opportunities. It reflects a vision of a civil and pluralistic Jordanian society with the following features:

• Islam will be declared the Kingdom’s official religion;
• Respect for the law and formal institutions;
• Respect for human rights and a view of the people as the source of authority.

The movement also praised the Jordanian Constitution, saying that “it is the first legal document in the country and surpasses any other legal legislation. Everyone, individuals, officials, public bodies, and civil society institutions, must respect it and abide by its principles and rules” (Al-Arab 2019).

Some argue that the presentation of the document was, in fact, a clear signal to the King to normalize relations between the regime and the religious movements on the understanding that there is no substantial connection between the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the Egyptian mother movement due to its neglect of the slogan “Islam is the solution” and understanding that Islam can be set aside from the political solution (Al-Arab 2019).

The document also represents an internal understanding that the Islamic movement in Jordan has concluded that its fundamentalist rhetoric has pushed it into a corner and placed it in a continuous conflict with the regime, which has prevented it from reaching and realizing its political and social goals, and that the time has come for a change, especially since the Jordanian state is showing a desire to reabsorb it in light of its current challenges (Al-Arab 2019). It seems that the Islamic movement is preparing to play a more progressive role in the political arena after a significant decline due to the divisions that befell it after the failure of the Arab Spring in Jordan.

6. The 2022 Local Elections in Jordan: No Hope for Change

The regional turmoil in the Middle East led to social unrest and violent religious protests in Jordan. People within the kingdom identified with the informal religious establishment. In 2014, the kingdom outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and suppressed the religious messages conveyed by religious leaders, whether through their social media or in sermons to their supporters (Yitzhak 2016). From then until 2017, there were attempts by the movements to soften their religious position in order to reach an ideological threshold that would allow them to take part in Jordanian politics. The document mentioned above marked a major ideological step forward for the IAF. However, due to its identification with the Muslim Brotherhood’s parent party, the regime remained suspicious of its true political intentions.

The spring of 2018 marked a renewed rise in protests against the King and the Jordanian government. The National Monitoring Committee, established in October 2018 by 143 retired military personnel and former politicians, published an audit document that included calls to reduce the King’s powers and another document criticizing the King for constantly ignoring their demands for reforms. These documents followed protests that began earlier in 2018 due to the economic situation (Zakharov and Issaev 2022).

Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s partial disregard for the messages of the National Monitoring Committee, it continued criticizing the Jordanian establishment. The movement’s protests came even before the National Monitoring Committee’s creation when, in July 2018, it supported the al-Razzaz government in taking steps that would lead to the transfer of powers to make amendments to the constitution from the hands of the King to the government. Furthermore, it demanded that the government promote political reform (Momani 2020). As we know, these demands still need to be met.

The inevitable tension between the kingdom and the Muslim Brotherhood peaked on 16 July 2020 when the Supreme Court in Jordan issued a ruling disbanding the Muslim Brotherhood movement “because it did not correct its legal status” (Al-Sharfat 2022). In the subsequent parliamentary elections held in November 2020, the Islamists won six seats within the National Alliance for Reform out of the 130 seats that make up the Jordanian parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood suffered a new setback in these elections, failing to register its presence in the 15 parliamentary committees. Thus, it was effectively out of the parliamentary equation. Parliament is the Brotherhood’s only political outlet through the presence of representatives of its political wing, the IAF. However, the situation changed in 2020 and, following these elections, the party had no parliamentary influence, in addition to facing judicial decisions demanding its dissolution (Al-Arab 2022).

In January 2022, the IAF announced the suspension of its participation in the local elections, attributing the matter to “the accumulation of negative methods from the official side, as well as the continuation of the approach of exclusion, restriction, and political targeting, which harm the environment suitable for participation”. The Secretary General of the party, Murad Al-Adayla, claimed that “every political or electoral process must be accompanied by an atmosphere that corresponds to it”. In other words, he is claiming that there is no mutual trust between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Arab 2022).

Amer Bani Amer, CEO of the Rasad Center,1 claimed that “the boycott of the Islamists will not greatly affect the turnout since the turnout of their supporters did not exceed 100,000 voters in the last election”. He believes that “the Brotherhood is waiting for the approval of a comprehensive package of reforms to facilitate their political participation at all levels of the country’s electoral process”. Amer provided valuable insights into the Brotherhood’s boycott strategy, stating that “the decision to suspend their participation comes as the political landscape is being finalized in the coming months. The Brotherhood and their candidates will be adversely affected by the negative trends in the current political climate, making it unlikely for them to achieve significant results that could lead to any meaningful change” (Al-Arab 2022). In other words, the Muslim Brotherhood will refuse to participate in local elections until the regime changes the electoral system and includes them in the process. They interpret the King’s and the government’s refusal to grant equal political rights as a form of oppression.

Table 1. Number of seats won by the IAF in the Jordanian parliament.

Elections	Seats	Proportion of All Seats
1993	17 (out of 80)	21.25%
1997	boycotted the elections
2003	16 (out of 110)	14.5%
2007	6 (out of 110)	5%
2010	boycotted the elections	-
2013	boycotted the elections	-
2016	10 (out of 130)	took part in the National Coalition for Reform
2020	5 (out of 130)	took part in the National Coalition for Reform
2024	31 (out of 138)	22.46%

provides us with some important insights:

• No genuine democratization processes are occurring in Jordan.
• The identity that the King aims to establish in the kingdom differs from the one sought by Islamic groups.
• As long as the security forces remain loyal to the King, significant changes to the kingdom’s identity, the power of religious institutions, and the political landscape (which is centralized around the royal family) are unlikely to occur.
• The return of Islamic movements to national elections, as opposed to municipal ones, reflects two key points—their desire to have a greater influence on the national system than simply on local governance and their recognition that they have no choice but to operate within the framework established by the King. They believe that participating in parliament may provide them with a better opportunity to exert influence.
• However, they not only had faith, but they also achieved remarkable success. In the Jordanian parliamentary elections held on September 10, 2024, the Islamic Action Front Party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, won 31 out of 138 seats, representing 22.5 percent of the parliament. This notable success was largely due to the party’s strong opposition to Israel and its perceived neglect by the Jordanian government. However, the party still lacks political power, as the Jordanian King holds ultimate authority and the parliament’s legislative powers are limited. The other parties in parliament support the monarchy and are unlikely to cooperate with the Islamic Action Front, which means it will remain the largest opposition party without the ability to form a coalition. For context, the Muslim Brotherhood’s most significant achievement was in the 1989 elections, when they won a quarter of the seats and led a united opposition, allowing them considerable political influence (Glock 2024).

7. Conclusions

The struggle for power involves many dimensions, with each regime working to preserve itself and ensure its survival. This ongoing dialectical conflict over power is an inherent aspect of any political system. The impact of the Arab Spring even reached Jordan, threatening the kingdom’s stability and legitimacy. As a result, the King was compelled to respond swiftly. His primary focus has been on maintaining political stability, which in turn protects his position, the royal family’s status, and the support of allied forces. Consequently, demands for greater political diversity and participation—principles based on the freedom of choice and the need for reform to give movements more political power—were addressed only partially. Whenever the King perceived these demands or protests as threats to his regime, he resorted to using force to suppress them.

Despite the growing number of religious political frameworks, the regime’s relations with these movements have not improved. This is primarily due to the royal family’s ongoing fear of political instability, which intensified following the outbreak of regional upheaval. The events of April 2011 exemplify this situation, when Jordan experienced more protests than other monarchies in the Middle East. Some of these protests were driven by Muslim religious groups seeking to change the country’s character and demanding increased rights as part of the democratization process. The Jordanian regime opposed the Salafi movement and adopted a broader policy of repression against anyone who attempted to assert their views.

The identity that the King aims to establish in the kingdom differs from that pursued by Islamic groups. As long as the security forces remain loyal to the King, significant changes to the kingdom’s identity, the influence of religious institutions, or the political landscape—centered around the royal family—are unlikely to occur. Moreover, currently, no genuine processes of democratization are occurring in Jordan.

The regime, for its part, reacted harshly but not with excessive violence, understanding that an escalation in response would lead to the expansion and worsening of the demonstrations against it. Therefore, it acted on the level of immediate political gratification (as did the King of Morocco) in the formulation of political reforms that would show readiness on the part of the kingdom to listen to the calls of the protest movements. The regime was also genuinely concerned about the outbreak of protests in its primary support centers among the tribes.

The religious movements, which initially united under one roof, realized that they were divided among themselves, not only on how to achieve their goals but in their different ideologies: the Muslim Brotherhood, radical Salafi-jihadist and Takfiri movements that call for the domination of an Islamic state, and reformist Salafi movements that seek to be part of the Jordanian state and identity. The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the persistent war of the Shia and Muslim world against ISIS, and the realization that “Islam is the solution” is not entirely the solution led all the movements to recalculate their course.

The second conclusion relates to the religious movement’s decision-making process regarding political participation. Their decision whether to participate in or boycott the elections was taken according to the royal family’s attitude toward them at any given time—that is, at the start of every election campaign. When there were no points of contact between them, the Islamists boycotted the elections (in 2010 and 2013). These boycotts, which were also due to their unwillingness to accept the political structure that the King seeks to preserve, actually caused those same Islamist movements harm. This was reflected in a double trend in the elections in subsequent years: more inclusion on the part of the King and more acceptance of the flexible political game. The return of Islamic movements to national elections, rather than merely standing in municipal elections, highlights two important points: their desire to exert greater influence on the national system and their recognition that they must operate within a framework set by the King. They believe that participation in parliament could provide them with better opportunities to shape policy and decision-making.

Despite their clear Islamic agenda, Islamic movements have adopted models of democratic discourse. Requesting an expansion of the representation of opinions in the content, most of them understand that the political and democratic game allows them both to express their religious opinion and to bring about changes in the political framework, which both contains and cooperates with them, up to a specific limit where the state feels that on the one hand, it contains them as movements, but on the other hand contains only those movements that want to be part of the political process and the Jordanian identity, and not those who, despite the renovated political bedrock, still pose a potential threat to the regime and the exchange of the country’s identity from a state Jordanian identity to an Islamic identity.

The IAF correctly read the political map and understood that continuous dialog with the kingdom and flexibility regarding the strict religious conditions for political integration, as some of the Salafi movements demanded, allowed it to integrate into Jordanian politics. The pragmatism presented by the party strengthened the religious faction’s political representation. However, it is too early to know whether the party’s increasing involvement in the parliamentary elections constitutes an identity change for itself and for Jordanian identity as a whole.

Indeed, those Salafi religious movements that remain outside the political framework see democracy and liberal values as threats to their religious identity. Those movements have not yet gone through the essential process of translating Islamic values into actual political action and have not united themselves under a unifying religious component that presents the political understanding of Islam as one that is adapted to the immediate needs of the kingdom. In the direct and indirect discourse that takes place between the King and the kingdom and those movements, there is a clear statement that the religious elements of the regime represent Islam as the regime understands it and not as those movements understand it. Moreover, as long as those movements do not align with the uniform ideological line of the regime, their inclusion in the political game seems impossible. The major challenges facing them are how to integrate into contemporary liberal modern politics while maintaining their religious identity and, on the other hand, how to influence the political processes in the country without being part of the official political process of the Jordanian state.

The political and religious journey that the Jordanian kingdom, on the one hand, and the Islamic movements in Jordan, on the other, have gone through began even before the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The kingdom has built a political model that allows for parties and tribes that identify with the King but not those that would pose a political, let alone religious, challenge to him. However, with the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the rise of radical Islam throughout the Middle East, including Jordan, the Kingdom faced a double challenge—whether to suppress or integrate the Islamist movements into the political game and, if so, how to do so in a way that would please them and the King at the same time. The minimum that the religious movements sought to receive in the political game did not meet the maximum that the King was (and still is) willing to give, and therefore, only one side remains satisfied—the King’s side, which aims to curb the expansion of Islamist influence within the political system. Furthermore, the political integration trend that the religious movements sought to promote while reshaping the political and religious identity of the kingdom was only partially embraced by the King.