In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Discourse on Democracy and Human Rights in Post-2013 Egypt

Abstract

This article examines the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategic framing of democracy and human rights in Egypt following the 2013 military coup, contributing to scholarship on the movement’s adaptation to repression and political exclusion. Employing framing analysis, this study analyzes official statements from Ikhwanonline from 2015 to 2024, when the old guard regained control over the organization’s messaging, in order to explore how the movement operated to reclaim political legitimacy amid repression, exile, and internal fragmentation. The findings indicate that despite the failure of its strategic commitment to democracy as a pathway to political dominance—culminating in its ousting—the old guard continues to espouse this framework. The movement frames its predicament and struggle as part of the Egyptian people’s broader fight against oppression and authoritarianism. This rhetorical continuity persists despite internal divisions and reformist calls for a more proactive approach, highlighting the movement’s reliance on established discursive strategies not only to confront regime repression but also to avoid engaging with questions of institutional reform.

1. Introduction

The military coup of 3 July 2013 marked a defining moment in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jama’at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) in Egypt. In its aftermath, the Brotherhood faced unprecedented state repression. Following the violent dispersal of sit-ins at Raba‘a al-‘Adawiyya and al-Nahda square, the Egyptian regime designated the movement as a terrorist organization, outlawed its activities, and imprisoned much of its leadership (Willi 2021, pp. 305–12). Operating under severe repression, the Brotherhood was compelled to reassess its political vision, reframe its rhetoric, and recalibrate its engagement with domestic and international audiences.

While the Brotherhood has historically endured cycles of repression and exclusion, the post-2013 crackdown was distinct. It led to significant internal fractures, weakening the leadership’s control over its base (al-Anani 2019; Ardovini and Biagini 2021; Willi 2021; Ardovini 2022). More critically, this wave of repression followed the Brotherhood’s brief but historic ascent to power through democratic elections and forced its leadership and members to confront the collapse of a political project that had long prioritized electoral participation and democratic engagement. The trauma of political failure, compounded by exile and internal discord, deepened a sense of disillusionment and alienation among members (Ardovini and Biagini 2021, p. 426).

The existing scholarship on the Brotherhood’s post-2013 trajectory has primarily focused on its organizational fragmentation, internal ideological debates, and strategic dilemmas. Studies have examined the movement’s factional struggles between the old guard, which sought to preserve its traditional gradualist and non-violent approach, and reformist elements advocating for more confrontational strategies (al-Anani 2019; Ardovini 2022; Ardovini and Biagini 2021; Willi 2021; Affan 2024). Other analyses have explored the movement’s transnational diaspora activism (Magued 2018). However, while studies have documented the Brotherhood’s rhetorical and strategic adaptations (Fulco and Abdelgawad 2024), less attention has been given to how the movement has framed its discourse on democracy and human rights as part of a broader effort to reclaim political legitimacy.

This article seeks to fill this gap by analyzing how the Muslim Brotherhood has framed its discourse on democracy and human rights in the aftermath of the coup. It is important to clarify that this study does not seek to assess the Brotherhood’s ideological commitment to democracy. Rather, it aims to contribute to discussions on the movement’s strategic responses to the challenges it has faced since July 2013. Specifically, it examines the extent to which the Brotherhood continues to frame its objectives through references to democracy and human rights and how this framing reflects its broader strategic vision for the future. By tracing both continuities and shifts in framing strategies before and after 2011—particularly in response to the loss of political power—this study provides insight into how the movement interprets its past and navigates its present challenges. This framing analysis not only reveals how the Brotherhood positions itself in response to external political pressures but also sheds light on its internal power struggles. The study contributes to the broader debate on the movement’s survival strategies, evolving responses to political exclusion, and attempts to reconcile its ideological discourse with the realities of its marginalization. Understanding these dynamics is essential for assessing the Brotherhood’s long-term positioning and the extent to which the democracy and human rights discourse it has been using continues to function as a pragmatic tool for political engagement.

Drawing on framing analysis, and specifically its core framing tasks—diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames (Benford and Snow 2000; Satheesh and Benford 2020)—this article explores the Brotherhood’s use of democracy and human rights discourse as part of its broader efforts to maintain legitimacy and respond to political repression.

The framing analysis of the Brotherhood’s discourse will be conducted through content analysis of the movement’s official statements and declarations as published on its official website, Ikhwanonline.com, since 2015, when the old guard resumed control over the platform as a means of articulating its positions (Mellor 2021, p. 210). The focus on the old guard’s framing approach does not disregard the fact that framing is inherently an active and contested process within the movement (Satheesh and Benford 2020), particularly regarding the interpretation of the root causes of the crisis (diagnostic framing) and the appropriate course of action (prognostic framing). While distinct factions within the Brotherhood diverge in their strategic outlook, research on the post-July 2013 period indicates that these internal divisions have not fundamentally altered the movement’s engagement with democracy and human rights. Even factions that challenge the legitimacy of the traditional leadership and its strategic choices continue to frame their claims within a commitment to these principles (Magued 2018). This suggests that, despite internal discord, democratic and human rights discourse remains a central framing tool across the movement’s ideological and strategic spectrum—both as a rhetorical device and as a means of maintaining political relevance in an increasingly repressive environment.

2. Strategic Framing and Legitimacy

Framing is a process through which individuals construct a specific interpretation of issues or adjust their perspective on them. According to Entman (2009, p. 26), framing “refers to the process of selecting and highlighting some aspects of a perceived reality, and enhancing the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of that reality”. Frames are integral to the discourse of social movements, as they influence how meaning is attributed to significant events and actors. Scholars of social movements employ the concept of strategic framing to analyze how these movements construct narratives that mobilize supporters and shape collective action. As Benford and Snow (2000, p. 624) argue, framing processes are inherently strategic because frames are developed and deployed to achieve a specific purpose—to mobilize potential supporters, secure their backing, and demobilize opponents. Through strategic framing, political actors position themselves within existing ideological and moral frameworks, shaping perceptions of their actions. Rooted in social constructivist principles, the framing perspective posits that social movements do not merely transmit pre-existing ideas, ideologies, and meanings, nor do meanings inherently adhere to events or external conditions. Rather, they emerge through dynamic, interactive interpretive processes (Snow 2004, p. 384; Benford and Snow 2000, p. 628).

Framing plays a crucial role in contentious politics, where actors compete to define the legitimacy of governance, protest, and resistance (Hoffmann and König 2013; Tarrow 2011). Within social movements, frames serve multiple functions. Diagnostic framing is employed to identify grievances and attribute their causes. These frames not only define and describe a given problem but also assign responsibility or blame to specific individuals, organizations, or institutions, which subsequently become the targets of protest. Prognostic framing is used to propose solutions or articulate alternative arrangements to address the identified problems, while motivational framing serves to inspire and mobilize engagement (Benford and Snow 2000, pp. 200–2; Haunss 2007, p. 166).

Framing is not merely a descriptive tool but a strategic process through which social movements seek to establish and maintain their legitimacy. Research on social movements has largely addressed questions of legitimacy only implicitly (Haunss 2007, p. 172). Few studies have directly examined the connection between framing and the processes of legitimation by which political actors justify their authority and actions (Walton 2015; Haunss 2007). While closely related, legitimacy and legitimation are distinct concepts. Legitimacy refers to the perceived rightfulness or acceptability of political authority, typically grounded in shared beliefs and values within a society. Legitimation, by contrast, is the active process through which political actors seek to establish, maintain, or enhance their legitimacy (Lipset 1959, p. 86). Where legitimacy denotes a state or condition, legitimation constitutes a dynamic and ongoing discursive practice involving various strategies aimed at justifying and securing support for a political role (van Dijk 1998).

Social movements, lacking traditional power bases, are critically reliant on public support to achieve their goals. As a result, they must strategically construct their actions and arguments to align with prevailing norms of legitimation and de-legitimation, framing their claims within widely accepted ideological and moral frameworks. This strategic adaptation is essential for mobilizing support and challenging established power structures (Haunss 2007).

The use of democracy and human rights as central themes in framing has been widely examined in political communication studies. Political actors frequently align their discourse with universal democratic values to enhance their legitimacy, particularly in contexts characterized by repression and authoritarianism. By positioning themselves as defenders of democracy, political movements seek to garner both domestic and international support while simultaneously delegitimizing their opponents as anti-democratic or repressive (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

In contexts of political repression and democratic backsliding, framing serves multiple functions, including restorative framing, victimization framing, and normative appeals—each playing a crucial role in shaping the narrative and legitimacy of political movements. Restorative framing positions a political movement as the rightful democratic actor seeking to restore lost democratic principles (Benford and Snow 2000; Tilly 2006). Victimization framing highlights repression and human rights violations to garner sympathy and justify resistance, often through the construction of an “injustice frame” that reflects perceptions of unfairness (Gamson 1992). The role of victimhood in contentious politics has been extensively examined in the framing literature. Studies indicate that political movements portray themselves as victims of state repression or social injustice to generate sympathy, mobilize supporters, and justify their actions, thereby claiming moral legitimacy (Jacoby 2015, pp. 524–25). Moreover, victimhood involves asserting that a group has endured injustices that demand redress. According to Horwitz (2018), marginalized groups increasingly frame their grievances as a morally justified stance, positioning themselves as representatives of broader principles that extend beyond their specific suffering.

Normative appeals invoke international human rights norms to enhance credibility and attract the support of external actors, such as NGOs and international organizations. By framing their struggles within the discourse of democracy and human rights, political actors seek to leverage international pressure against repressive regimes. The effectiveness of these frames depends on their resonance with global norms and the willingness of international actors to respond. When movements successfully align their framing with dominant global discourses, they bolster their legitimacy and increase the likelihood of external intervention—whether through diplomatic pressure, sanctions, or public advocacy (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

However, these processes of legitimation involve complex negotiations both within movements and with various external actors, including other organizations, supporters, and international bodies. As a result, framing disputes may arise within the same organization regarding different interpretations of the root cause of the problem (diagnostic framing), the measures needed to resolve it (prognostic framing), and the extent to which the framing aligns with and resonates with target audiences (Satheesh and Benford 2020). Studies have highlighted a distinct tension between movements’ efforts to establish internal legitimacy and their pursuit of external legitimacy—particularly regarding recognition by Western governments and international human rights organizations (Walton 2015, p. 971).

3. Democracy and Human Rights in the Thought and Practice of the Muslim Brotherhood

The compatibility of Islam and democracy has been widely debated among scholars and observers. At the center of this discourse is the Muslim Brotherhood, which, decades before the January 2011 revolution, aligned itself with secular and liberal opposition groups advocating for genuine parliamentary democracy in Egypt. Under Mubarak’s rule, the movement adopted various strategies to counter state repression and restrictions on its influence. One key approach was leveraging the political openness of the 1980s to expand its participation in the political system. Its involvement in the 1984 and 1987 elections reflected a belief that electoral participation could advance the movement’s objectives. Since the Brotherhood was barred from forming a formal political party, it cooperated with secular, nationalist, and liberal forces despite ideological differences (Pahwa 2013, p. 195; Wickham 2013, pp. 47, 53; Hamid 2014, pp. 67–71). The political gains it achieved, particularly in the 2005 elections—when it secured 20% of parliamentary seats—marked the height of its political engagement and reinforced its legitimacy in the Egyptian public sphere (Willi 2021, p. 206).

The adoption of political pragmatism and electoral participation, a deliberate strategic adaptation to political opportunities, became central to the Brotherhood’s efforts to maintain power and ensure its survival (El-Ghobashy 2005, p. 377). This approach, which established the movement as Egypt’s most influential opposition force for three decades, necessitated a redefinition of key aspects of its political thought. In particular, it prompted the Brotherhood to clarify its stance on the nature of the Islamic state, the relationship between divine and popular sovereignty, and its position on political pluralism (Pahwa 2013, p. 192). The experience of political participation reshaped the movement’s perception of its mission and influenced its public discourse, which increasingly emphasized democracy and incorporated the language of freedoms (El-Ghobashy 2005, pp. 383, 386; al-Anani 2019).

The Muslim Brotherhood was compelled to justify both its rhetoric and actions to its supporters, particularly in terms of their alignment with the movement’s mission and the legitimacy of participating in a “secular” political system (Wickham 2013, p. 48). To its followers, the Brotherhood framed this engagement as a means of Islamizing the political system without corrupting it (Pahwa 2013, pp. 192–93). At the same time, it sought to reassure various political factions in Egypt by addressing concerns over its intentions to establish an Islamic state governed by Shari‘a. As part of this effort, the Brotherhood redefined Shari‘a in identity-based terms, framing Islam as a hegemonic moral reference rather than a coercive force upon the state. From its perspective, Islam was not merely the majority faith but the civilizational and cultural foundation of the entire Egyptian nation, including its minorities, who had historically flourished under it (Pahwa 2013, pp. 196–97; El Fegiery 2016, p. 138). More broadly, the Brotherhood framed its political participation as an acceptance of democratic principles such as pluralism, freedoms, and human rights. This engagement was presented not as a religious project but as a commitment to serving the public good (Pahwa 2013, p. 192).

In the 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood publicly affirmed the religious and civic value of democracy, advocating for its implementation in Egypt. This ideological shift was marked by two official position papers (bayanat), which, according to El-Ghobashy (2005, p. 382), signaled the beginning of the Brotherhood’s revision. In its 1994 statement, the movement asserted the umma as the source of political authority, endorsed a multiparty system, and framed political plurality as divinely ordained (Wickham 2013, p. 69). It also redefined its stance on women, limiting male authority to the family while recognizing women’s right to work and participate in public life. A 1995 statement reaffirmed these ideas and extended them to non-Muslims, advocating full civil rights for Coptic Christians and addressing the relationship between religion, politics, violence, and human rights (Wickham 2013, pp. 69–70).

These documents, along with subsequent statements throughout the 2000s, reflected the Muslim Brotherhood’s evolving political stance. In 2004, it published the Initiative for Political Reform, which later formed the basis of its 2005 electoral platform. Issued in response to American reform initiatives, the document reaffirmed the Brotherhood’s commitment to a parliamentary and democratic system, aligning its position with secular opposition groups and foreign proposals (Wickham 2013, pp. 105–7). Across these documents, the Brotherhood employed a rights-based discourse to justify political participation while emphasizing the freedom to act in accordance with divine will. However, it remained cautious about endorsing unrestricted personal freedoms. By framing Shari‘a as essential to religious, personal, and material well-being, the movement integrated religious and secular values into its discourse (Pahwa 2013, pp. 199–200). This dual framing positioned the Brotherhood as a defender of both Islamic values and democratic principles, allowing it to appeal to multiple audiences, including the state, opposition factions, and its own supporters.

At the core of the Brotherhood’s political thought lies the concept of the civil state, a central framing strategy aimed at reshaping public perception and countering the view that it seeks to establish a purely theocratic state (Tadros 2012, p. 67). This civil state guarantees civil liberties—including freedom of expression, religion, and association—while adhering to the boundaries of Shari‘a law. Although present in the Brotherhood’s discourse since the 1990s, it was only formally incorporated into its official platform in 2005 (Harnisch and Mecham 2009, pp. 197–99; Tadros 2012, pp. 47, 51; Lavie 2017, p. 996). Unlike liberal perspectives that advocate for the separation of religion and politics, the Brotherhood conceptualized the civil state within an Islamic frame of reference (marji‘iyya). The Islamic civil state (dawla madaniyya islamiyya) adopts certain Western democratic principles, such as popular sovereignty and electoral legitimacy, as long as they do not contradict Shari‘a (Harnisch and Mecham 2009, p. 197; Lavie 2021, p. 460). The Brotherhood’s ideological shift was thus limited to accepting popular sovereignty, wherein the nation elects and removes its rulers, while maintaining that divine sovereignty pertains to legislation rather than governance (Lavie 2017, p. 2009).

While the Brotherhood’s leadership publicly endorsed democracy, this did not imply internal consensus. The movement was not monolithic; rather, its commitment to democracy was accompanied by deep internal disagreements (Wickham 2013, pp. 71–73). It encompassed diverse ideological factions with fluid and overlapping boundaries (Tadros 2012, p. 10). For some, framing their objectives within a democratic discourse was a pragmatic compromise to advance broader goals, while for others it signified genuine ideological transformation. During this period, internal divisions reflected an intergenerational struggle between the old guard and a younger, middle generation that viewed political engagement as the most effective path to change. However, despite the Brotherhood’s democratic rhetoric in the national arena, its internal structure remained resistant to democratic reforms, highlighting a paradox between its external discourse and internal governance (Wickham 2013, pp. 152–53).

Through the lens of legitimacy theory, the Brotherhood’s discourse on democracy can be seen as an effort to align its political ambitions with widely accepted governance norms. The Brotherhood’s vision of an Islamic government sought to limit state power, condition its authority on popular consent, and uphold personal freedoms within a civil state. This framework allowed the movement to present itself as legitimate and to challenge the regime, particularly on civil liberties. However, this vision was marked by inconsistencies and contradictions between its democratic rhetoric and the constraints imposed by its Islamic reference (Tadros 2012, p. 67; al-Anani 2018, pp. 33–35). Studies suggest that while the Brotherhood expressed a commitment to reform within an Islamic frame of reference, it lacked clarity on its practical implementation (Wickham 2013, p. 152). Moreover, the civilizational project it proposed as an alternative to Western liberalism remained rooted in Islam and conservative values, yet it has not been subject to in-depth scrutiny or detailed discussion (Hamid 2014, p. 29).

By endorsing democracy within an Islamic frame of reference and equating its political agenda with Islamic imperatives, the Brotherhood positioned itself as religiously and morally superior to its rivals (Wickham 2013, p. 152). This approach was embodied in the concept of the civil state, an attempt to reconcile its aspiration for governance by Islamic law with democratic principles (Lavie 2017, p. 2009). However, as Tadros (2012, p. 66) argues, the notion of a civil state with an Islamic reference is inherently paradoxical, as it restricts the people’s authority to challenge the normative religious framework underpinning governance. The Brotherhood’s vision of individual freedoms within a civil state also imposed significant limitations, underscoring the tension between its commitment to Shari‘a and prevailing human rights norms (Harnisch and Mecham 2009, p. 199). By using Shari‘a as a normative foundation, rights became subject to restrictions, conditions, and criteria that ultimately diluted their essence (Tadros 2012, pp. 156–58).

These limitations were particularly evident in the treatment of non-Muslim minorities. The Islamic civilizational project subordinated their religious identity to an overarching Islamic framework, restricting genuine religious and cultural pluralism. While the imposition of an Islamic marja‘iyya (Islamic reference or authority) created the appearance of formal equality, it effectively established a hierarchy of rights, determining the extent of privileges granted to different groups (Tadros 2012, pp. 103, 114).

The Brotherhood’s attempt to present an Islamic alternative to the universal discourse on minority rights largely adhered to the traditional concept of ahl al-dhimma. Rather than systematically developing a modern conception of citizenship or clarifying the practical implications of Shari‘a for non-Muslims, its discourse primarily focused on rejecting accusations of Islamic intolerance—particularly countering claims made by the Copts (El Fegiery 2016, pp. 136–37). This approach failed to address fundamental issues such as the right to choose or renounce religion (Yefet 2015, p. 176; El Fegiery 2016, p. 139). Similar limitations were evident in the Brotherhood’s stance on gender issues, where women’s right to education, employment, and leadership remained constrained by principles that restrict their freedom of choice (Tadros 2012, p. 154).

Ultimately, the Brotherhood’s framing strategies aimed to balance its commitment to Islamic principles with the pursuit of political legitimacy. By presenting its political project as both democratic and Islamic, the movement sought to navigate the challenges of legitimacy in a landscape shaped by repression and ideological contestation.

4. Democracy on Trial: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Governance Experience

The challenge of Islamic democracy gained renewed significance in the discourse and actions of the Muslim Brotherhood following the wave of uprisings in the Arab world, which led to regime changes in several countries, most notably Egypt. Although the Brotherhood did not initiate these uprisings, it joined them as they gained momentum and took an active role. Initially, the movement sought to downplay its ideological and organizational advantages, recognizing that in a fragile democratization process, perceptions of authoritarianism—even if bolstered by popular support—could undermine its legitimacy. To mitigate these concerns, the Brotherhood presented itself as a responsible political actor, asserting that it did not intend to dominate the political scene or field a candidate in the presidential elections (Mohamed and Mohamed 2016, pp. 74–75). However, this cautious stance stood in stark contrast to the movement’s underlying ambitions. By skillfully navigating the power structures of the old regime and leveraging its stable party organization and broad popular base, the Brotherhood secured a majority in all elections held, culminating in the victory of its representative, Mohamed Morsi, in the June 2012 presidential election (Willi 2021).

After decades of persecution, imprisonment, and bans, the Muslim Brotherhood finally ascended to power through free elections that conferred legitimacy on their governance and vision. However, the movement faced deep political divisions within the Egyptian political landscape and had to navigate the demands of the old establishment—primarily the military—alongside revolutionary forces and various political parties. These tensions surfaced during the transitional period and escalated significantly under President Morsi. The rift between the Brotherhood and other political factions, particularly the secular–liberal camp, grew increasingly pronounced, as the latter scrutinized every move by the Brotherhood to gauge its commitment to democracy and the principles of a civil state (Lavie 2021, pp. 468–69). These disputes culminated in persistent and intense confrontations over the shaping of Egypt’s democratic institutions, most notably the drafting of the constitution.

It is important to note that opposition did not come solely from external forces but also arose within the movement itself. Internal divisions, particularly among younger members, centered on the definition of democracy, challenging the Brotherhood’s longstanding emphasis on unity over pluralism. The appointment processes within its political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (Hizb al-Hurriya wa-l-‘Adala), mirrored the undemocratic practices of the previous repressive regime (Hosni 2018, pp. 24–26). As the Brotherhood consolidated power, members increasingly questioned core values such as secrecy, blind trust, and obedience. Demands for greater transparency grew, eroding the cultural and organizational structures that had long underpinned the legitimacy of the movement’s leadership (Ardovini and Biagini 2021, p. 415).

Egypt’s democratic experiment was characterized by an overwhelming reliance on national elections and referendums rather than a politics of consensus building (Lo 2019, p. 313). The Muslim Brotherhood, eager to assert its authority, struggled to reconcile two competing notions of legitimacy. One perspective, championed by proponents of liberal democracy, linked legitimacy to political freedom, individual liberties, and political pluralism. The opposing view, upheld by the Brotherhood, defined political legitimacy (sharʿiyyah) through a procedural democratic process centered on elections and voting, reinforced by a religious contract between the ruler and the citizens. However, both the liberal and Islamist conceptions of legitimacy remained disconnected from the political realities on the ground (Lo 2019).

The most blatant affront to democracy was Morsi’s constitutional decree of November 22, in which he issued a declaration granting himself sweeping powers to protect the state and the goals of the revolution. This decree vested him with supreme executive and legislative authority, rendering his decisions immune to judicial oversight. Despite widespread protests, he further entrenched his authority by imposing a new constitution through a constituent assembly dominated by Islamists (Willi 2021, pp. 283–91). The first Egyptian constitution after the revolution, approved by referendum in December 2012, failed to provide adequate protections for fundamental rights, including gender equality, freedom of expression, and freedom of conscience and religion. The Brotherhood’s hybrid vision of an Islamic–civil state and its decision to anchor rights, citizenship, civil norms, and national identity in Islamic principles subjected these concepts to the constraints of Islamic jurisprudence (Pahwa 2013, p. 203; El Fegiery 2016, p. 71). The constitution reinforced the widespread political fears about the Brotherhood, particularly regarding the role of religion in Egypt’s legal framework. Notably, Article 219 expanded the interpretation of “the principles of Shari‘a” beyond the limits previously defined by Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court. This provision curtailed popular sovereignty by granting religious scholars greater influence over legislation and legal debates, restricting the enactment of liberal laws unless they were grounded in Islamic texts. The Brotherhood saw this clause as a safeguard for the eventual codification of Shari‘a (Lavie 2017, p. 1006; Pahwa 2013, p. 204).

Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s extensive use of the concept of a civil state, even after Morsi’s election, it refused to incorporate this term into the new constitution as a defining element of Egypt’s identity. Instead, the 2012 constitution had a more pronounced Islamic character than any of its predecessors (Lavie 2021, p. 462). In practice, Morsi’s government prioritized restricting freedom of expression and subordinating it to Islamic values, including reshaping the media and cultural landscape (El Fegiery 2016, p. 81). As Pahwa (2013, p. 189) observed, the Brotherhood’s partial adaptation over three decades to democratic and “secular” political ideas—by reframing them in religious terms—produced a hybrid “secularized Islamism” that ultimately constrained its ability to fully embrace democracy in the post-Mubarak era. al-Anani (2018, pp. 37–40) explains that the Muslim Brotherhood’s limited and ambivalent stance on citizenship rights stems from its operation within a culturally and religiously conservative environment. Rather than expanding rights for women and religious minorities after the 2011 uprising, the Brotherhood reinforced its conservative positions to broaden its popular base, maintain internal cohesion, and accommodate conservative Islamist factions as a counterbalance to the military and state institutions. These alliances led to ideological concessions that damaged the movement’s image and hindered its ability to adopt a more inclusive vision of citizenship.

While a comprehensive analysis of the Brotherhood’s failure and the public backlash against it lies beyond the scope of this article, it is essential to note that the movement’s downfall was not solely due to its reliance on electoral legitimacy in a transitional period lacking explicit or implicit popular consensus (Lo 2019, p. 350), nor was it solely a consequence of its determined efforts to Islamize society in thought and practice. The Brotherhood’s brief tenure in power was marked by governance failures. Morsi’s administration struggled to address escalating economic crises and failed to maintain security. Political violence, terrorist attacks in Sinai, and clashes between Brotherhood supporters and opponents became widespread. Additionally, the Brotherhood failed to establish stable political alliances with opposition forces and the military and judicial establishment, further isolating itself politically (al-Anani 2015, 2016, pp. 156–57; Trager 2016). These shortcomings fueled widespread public dissatisfaction and triggered frequent protests that the military leveraged to overthrow the Brotherhood’s rule.

5. Fractured Leadership: Internal Splits and Strategic Dilemmas

The coup on 3 July 2013, was a defining moment in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Following this development, which ousted President Mohamed Morsi, the Egyptian military regime launched a comprehensive crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization was swiftly designated as a terrorist group, leading to the arrest of over 60,000 individuals associated with the Brotherhood, including its top leadership (Yaghi and Ranko 2023, p. 2). Security forces conducted mass detentions, often accompanied by reports of torture and other human rights abuses. The government also imposed strict prohibitions on the Brotherhood’s activities, seizing assets and shutting down affiliated organizations and media outlets. In response to this severe repression, many Brotherhood members and leaders fled Egypt to escape persecution. While some found refuge in ideologically aligned countries, such as Qatar, and Turkey, significant numbers also sought asylum in Western nations and regions, particularly the United Kingdom and North America. This systematic repression aimed to dismantle the Brotherhood’s organizational structure and diminish its influence within Egyptian society (al-Anani 2019, p. 1333; Dunne and Hamzawy 2019).

The history of the Muslim Brotherhood is marked by periods of repression and exclusion. Since the 1950s, the movement has operated under conditions of illegality, enduring recurrent waves of suppression to the extent that persecution became a defining element of its identity and a means of fostering internal cohesion. However, the unprecedented repression following July 2013 was distinct in that it led to a state of imbalance and a loss of control over its members (Ardovini and Biagini 2021; Ardovini 2022, p. 188). Since 2013, the Brotherhood has experienced multiple splits and internal divisions, hindering its ability to present a unified message and forcing it to focus primarily on maintaining its cohesion and continuity (al-Anani 2019, p. 1329).

Moreover, the repression of this period differed from previous instances because it occurred after the Brotherhood had achieved its long-sought goal of coming to power through democratic elections. Members were forced to confront the failure of the political project they had advanced for decades. These feelings of failure, compounded by exile and internal fragmentation, deepened the sense of disappointment and alienation among members of the movement (Ardovini and Biagini 2021, p. 426). Some have begun to question the scope and viability of the Islamist project, as well as the effectiveness of the Brotherhood’s long-standing principles and hierarchical structures (Ardovini 2022, p. 189).

There is a burgeoning body of scholarship addressing the internal dynamics within the Brotherhood triggered by the military coup (al-Anani 2019; Ardovini 2022; Ardovini and Biagini 2021; Willi 2021; Yaghi and Ranko 2023; Affan 2024). Notably, the broader crisis within the Brotherhood surfaced in early 2014 amid divergent perspectives on how the movement should respond to Egypt’s military regime and the legitimacy of its leadership. This division and fragmentation extend beyond the cross-generational divide between conservatives and reformists. Rather than reflecting ideological differences, these rifts primarily revolve around contrasting approaches to the movement’s strategy and reform (Ardovini and Biagini 2021, p. 425).

At the center of this internal fragmentation stood a faction known as the “young leaders” or the “New Muslim Brotherhood,” opposing the old guard or so-called “historical leadership.” The faction representing the old guard advocated for a continued gradual and non-violent resistance. This survival strategy was shaped by an increasingly hostile international and regional environment and an acknowledgment that the post-coup order was a lasting reality. This traditional, non-revolutionary, and isolationist approach was rejected by the opposing faction, which favored more proactive protest actions and aggressive mobilization tactics (al-Anani 2019, p. 1335; Ardovini 2022, pp. 202–3; Yaghi and Ranko 2023, p. 18; Fulco and Abdelgawad 2024, pp. 12–16). The historical leadership maintained the Brotherhood’s organizational structure and, by 2015, had secured control over its assets. More importantly, it continued to serve as the official face of the movement. However, at this stage, its control over the Brotherhood remained weak and its authority and legitimacy had been damaged (Ardovini 2022, pp. 202–3; Fulco and Abdelgawad 2024, pp. 15–17). In practice, both factions have established separate organizational structures and now compete with each other over the name and legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood (Yaghi and Ranko 2023, p. 3).

The question of democracy was central to this fragmentation, as it was also tied to the lack of democracy within the movement itself. Brotherhood members who supported democratic principles and advocated for internal reforms became increasingly vocal in their criticism of the historical leadership’s centralized and outdated structure. They pushed for internal democracy, transparency, and broader participation. Others, however, refrained from such criticism, believing that the movement was acting correctly in the face of an increasingly authoritarian environment and oppression (Hosni 2018, p. 29; Yaghi and Ranko 2023, p. 14).1

6. Anchoring Legitimacy: The Strategic Framing of Democracy and Human Rights in the Post-2013 Era

After the old guard consolidated its control over the movement’s institutions, it sought to frame its discourse in a way that would advance particular objectives. Primarily, this discourse was directed inward, aiming to maintain internal cohesion and counter efforts by alternative factions within the movement to challenge the authority of the traditional leadership. At the same time, the movement’s discourse was also shaped in response to external forces. It had to confront the Egyptian regime, which continued its campaign of repression against the Brotherhood, and more concretely, address the issue of thousands of its members being imprisoned in Egyptian jails. Moreover, the movement had to contend with the regime’s attempts to associate it with religious extremism and label it as a terrorist organization, thereby stripping it of legitimacy and justifying the legal actions taken against it.

The movement’s messaging also needed to align with the goal of mobilizing opposition political forces that could serve as potential allies in overthrowing the military regime, as well as appealing to the broader public. Additionally, the Brotherhood sought to engage the international community, particularly international organizations and human rights groups. As will be shown, to address these diverse audiences, the movement carefully framed its discourse, emphasizing its legitimacy and, as in the past, grounding its claims in the principles of democracy and human rights. This framing played a crucial role in shaping the movement’s protest and resistance strategies, functioning not merely as a reiteration of pre-existing ideas but as a response deemed by the old guard as the most appropriate adaptation to external conditions.

6.1. Identifying the Problem and Assigning Responsibility

In diagnostic framing, a social movement analyzes the social, political, and economic reality, identifies the core issue for which it is mobilizing, and attributes blame to specific actors responsible for the situation (Benford and Snow 2000, pp. 200–2). In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, diagnostic framing played a critical role in shaping the movement’s narrative regarding the political upheaval, the illegitimacy of the new regime, and the repression directed against it. From this perspective, the Brotherhood consistently framed the issue as one of democratic legitimacy, arguing that it was democratically elected by the people and that the military coup unjustly deprived it of this right (Ikhwanonline 2020d).

The assignment of responsibility and blame reflected a selective interpretation that systematically omitted an internal rethinking regarding the Brotherhood’s political and organizational trajectories during its time in power. Calls from within the movement—particularly from the change current or young leadership—to reassess its policies and positions over recent years, especially since the January 2011 revolution, were largely ignored by the old guard.2 A critical document published by the change current addressed a range of issues, including organizational structure, failures in implementing internal democracy, lack of representation of various groups within the organization, and mismanagement following the events of June 2013. However, even this critique failed to engage meaningfully with the Brotherhood’s democratic governance during its year in power (al-Arabi 2017b).3

The movement broadly acknowledges that mistakes were made by all revolutionary forces and highlights the polarization between political Islam factions and other revolutionary groups as a key factor in the failure.4 However, this public acknowledgment lacks any form of self-criticism. On the contrary, the movement’s interpretation of the democratic experience under the Muslim Brotherhood remains selective and is primarily focused on emphasizing its practical commitment to democratic principles. This narrative underscores the Brotherhood’s efforts to unite various political forces, its initial reluctance to contest the presidential elections, and Morsi’s attempts to involve all factions in the political process. According to the movement, these efforts were ultimately in vain due to the lack of cooperation from other revolutionary forces (Ikhwanonline 2020d, 2021a).

In the movement’s discourse, the primary blame is placed on the military. According to the Brotherhood, the military junta was solely responsible for the brutal and violent coup, executed with regional and international backing, which suppressed Egypt’s first democratic experiment under false pretenses (Ikhwanonline 2020b). This attribution of blame remains narrowly focused on the military and security forces, without extending to broader revolutionary political forces, even those that supported the coup. Given the old guard’s strategic choice to sustain its legitimacy within Egypt, and as will be demonstrated later, to mobilize action, the framing of blame has been deliberately constrained. In its official statements, the movement asserts that “the great Egyptian people, and even many of those who initially supported the coup, have now awakened to the full truth,” portraying them as having come to recognize their mistake due to the regime’s repression (Ikhwanonline 2018b).

Similarly to other movements that portray themselves as victims of state repression or social injustice to garner support and solidify their legitimacy (Jacoby 2015, pp. 524–25), the dominant themes in the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood revolve around repression and victimhood. As al-Anani has argued, the repression of the Brotherhood carries significant symbolic value, enabling the movement to mobilize public support by reinforcing its image as a legitimate opposition force, strengthening internal cohesion and ideological commitment, and avoiding internal change or the need for ideological reassessment. The movement frames perseverance and faith in God as integral components of success (al-Anani 2016, pp. 7–8).

One of the most prominent elements of the Brotherhood’s discourse focuses on the sense of injustice inflicted upon the organization and the national project that was prematurely thwarted. The movement consistently underscores the violent and bloody nature of the military coup, particularly through repeated references to the violent dispersal of the Rab‘a al-‘Adawiyya and al-Nahda Square sit-ins. These events are commemorated both as traumatic massacres in which protesters were brutally killed by the military and as emblematic of the Brotherhood’s enduring willingness to sacrifice for Egypt’s freedom (Ikhwanonline 2018d, 2020b).

Notably, the Brotherhood is careful not to frame its sense of injustice, oppression, and victimhood as exclusive to the movement itself. To counter the perception that the military coup targeted only the Brotherhood, the organization emphasizes that the coup was directed against all forces of the January 2011 revolution, effectively dismantling the democratic experiment that had symbolized a great hope for freedom, justice, and human dignity for the entire region (Ikhwanonline 2020a, 2020b). In this framing, the struggle is not presented as one limited to the Brotherhood but rather as an effort to uphold the will of the people and their democratic choice. According to the movement, the military coup ousted Mohamed Morsi, who was elected in a free and transparent election and whose presidency constituted a social contract with the people. Thus, the Brotherhood claims that it is not fighting to protect an individual leader but rather to defend the very notion of legitimacy (shar‘iyya) (Ikhwanonline 2020d).

6.2. The Democratic Solution

Victimhood is perceived as a condition that necessitates redress (Horwitz 2018). The Muslim Brotherhood frames its proposed remedy to this predicament within a democratic discourse. The movement emphasizes that the January 2011 revolution was not merely a historical event but rather a national project aimed at dismantling the oppressive system, restoring power to the people, and achieving justice and rights, thereby granting the people the ability to choose their rulers. From the Brotherhood’s perspective, the January project remains steadfast in its resistance to tyranny by exposing the failures of the current regime and preventing it from attaining legitimacy. The movement posits that a return to the national project of January 2011 is the only viable solution to the crisis brought about by the military coup (Ikhwanonline 2023a, 2024b). The Brotherhood asserts that preparations for a new revolutionary cycle will continue out of loyalty to the values of freedom and human justice, which were forged in the January revolution and defended by those who sacrificed their lives for them (Ikhwanonline 2018b, 2024b).

According to the Brotherhood, the solution lies in the pursuit of the restoration of freedom through peaceful means and political civil resistance. This motif has been consistently present in the movement’s publications since July 2013, when it condemned acts of violence or terrorism by any party, whether the regime or other groups. The Brotherhood emphasizes that this position reflects the movement’s historical choice and remains unchanged despite the massacres it has suffered and the demonization campaign launched against it by the coup regime’s media (al-Arabi 2015). Specifically, the movement aims to develop a peaceful revolutionary movement on the ground (Ikhwanonline 2016, 2017b), calling on all Egyptians to maintain national unity and work toward liberating the country from oppression while adhering to the values of justice and democracy (al-‘Adala wal-Hurriya, 17 November 2013, p. 8; Ikhwanonline 2017a).

This approach, which reflects the Brotherhood’s traditional stance that silmiyyatuna aqwa min al-rasas (Our peaceful ways are stronger than the bullets), is not only an effort to reinforce the movement’s legitimacy but also serves to clarify the position of the old guard and distinguish it from that of reformist factions within the Brotherhood. While these reformist factions remain committed to democracy, they advocate for a more proactive stance toward the regime (Magued 2018).

In articulating a solution under conditions of repression and democratic backsliding, the Brotherhood employs restorative framing. The movement presents itself as a legitimate democratic actor seeking to restore lost democratic principles. In this context, the restoration is not merely about rehabilitating the movement itself but rather about reclaiming Egypt as a whole. This restoration, according to the Brotherhood, can only be achieved through the inevitable overthrow of the military regime—regardless of how long it may take—and the reinstatement of Egypt’s democratic trajectory. From their perspective, the people, as the rightful owners of the January 2011 revolution, are the sovereign authority and the source of legitimacy. It is they who will ultimately topple the regime through peaceful civil resistance, reclaiming their will and their freedom (al-Arabi 2019a). Within this restorative framing, the Brotherhood emphasizes the restoration of rights and the rehabilitation of victims. It asserts that comprehensive transitional justice must serve as the foundation for holding accountable all those responsible for crimes against the Egyptian people—including the coup leaders, their operatives within the repressive security apparatus, judges complicit in issuing politically motivated rulings, and the state-aligned media that fomented division—along with all the other institutions involved in enabling the regime’s abuses (al-Arabi 2019a).

From the Brotherhood’s standpoint, this envisioned transitional justice system would ensure truth disclosure, redress for victims, accountability for all perpetrators, institutional reform, and social reconciliation (al-Arabi 2016; Ikhwanonline 2020b). Notably, calls for transitional justice were already a component of the Brotherhood’s rhetoric during Morsi’s presidency. However, much like the military, the Brotherhood’s interpretation of transitional justice at the time was instrumental and carefully navigated institutional reform initiatives to avoid direct confrontation with the entrenched military and bureaucratic establishment (Yefet 2024, pp. 10–11)

Similarly to its past experience, the organization published a document outlining its political vision principles, which it claims are intended to restore the people’s will and bring an end to military rule through peaceful means. The stated objective is to reestablish a civilian and democratic government based on a constitutional state, free elections, and a constitution approved by popular consensus. This vision also emphasizes the balance of powers in accordance with the principle of shura (Ikhwanonline 2024a). In this envisioned democratic state, all Egyptian citizens—without exception—are to enjoy freedom, security, justice, and stability (Ikhwanonline 2020b). This discourse largely reproduces the general ideas the movement had advocated in the decades preceding the revolution, emphasizing the establishment of a civilian state with an Islamic frame of reference while highlighting the sovereignty of the people and the limitations on state power (Ikhwanonline 2020d).

To achieve this goal, the movement asserts that the most urgent task is the unification of all national forces to overthrow the military regime and ensure a genuine democratic transition. Consequently, its plans emphasize the commitment to fostering an inclusive national dialog without excluding any political actor, with the aim of formulating a new social contract (Ikhwanonline 2018a, 2018c, 2022a). As part of its political vision for Egypt’s future, the Brotherhood outlines a transitional period consisting of several stages. The first stage involves broad political and social consensus, requiring all political forces in Egypt to set aside their partisan affiliations and make concessions to avoid the divisions that emerged following the events of January 2011. The second stage focuses on power-sharing, including the restoration of state institutions and civil society, the drafting of a temporary constitutional document, and the establishment of mechanisms to guarantee free and fair elections without military or security interference. The third stage envisions an open political competition among all political forces (Ikhwanonline 2022c).

As previously noted, this commitment to democracy and non-violent civil resistance not only reflects the strategic choice of the old guard but also serves as a means of framing the movement’s struggle in direct opposition to the regime’s strategy of portraying it as a terrorist organization. Moreover, this framing of the Brotherhood’s commitment to democracy and civil struggle is designed to generate resistance to the regime and undermine its legitimacy. The movement is focused not only on exposing the regime’s failures—whether economic or security-related—but also on framing its actions against the people in terms of violations of rights and freedoms.

6.3. Mobilization: The People and the International Community

Motivational framing is essential for translating ideas into concrete actions. The Brotherhood, in its efforts to overthrow the regime, seeks to mobilize domestic forces for a popular uprising that would lead to a transitional period toward democracy. The movement is capitalizing on Egypt’s hardships to challenge the legitimacy of military rule, highlighting the regime’s failures, particularly in the economic sphere. As previously noted, it frames the regime’s crimes as crimes against all citizens. However, beyond merely exposing injustices, the Brotherhood emphasizes that this struggle directly affects people’s lives and that their collective action will have a tangible impact. Joint action is portrayed as a prerequisite for establishing a democratic civil state (Ikhwanonline 2018a), and is accompanied by a consistent call for various political forces in Egypt, regardless of their orientation or political affiliation, to come to the negotiating table for dialog and to produce a roadmap aimed at returning the military to its original role of defending the nation’s borders (al-Arabi 2018, 2019a).

The Brotherhood’s motivational framing also extends to a call to action targeting potential supporters in the international arena, particularly international organizations. The movement actively seeks engagement with international human rights organizations, the UN Human Rights Council, UN experts, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to spur concrete action against the military regime (Ikhwanonline 2022b, 2018f).

The effectiveness of these frames depends on their resonance with global norms and the willingness of international actors to respond (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Accordingly, the movement frames its discourse by relying on universal human rights rhetoric and referencing reports from the UN and international human rights organizations (Ikhwanonline 2017c, 2019a). It commemorates International Human Rights Day and the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women to highlight human rights violations against Egyptian citizens, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrests, alongside violations of fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression and press freedom (Ikhwanonline 2018f, 2019b).

When addressing international human rights organizations, the movement’s rhetoric deliberately omits references to its Islamic framework and distinctive interpretations of rights, instead adopting terms that facilitate identification with the movement’s plight and encourage action. It consistently documents ongoing events in Egypt, citing human rights violations and referencing reports from international and local organizations (al-‘Adala wal-Hurriya, 30 November 2013, p. 5). This discourse does not focus solely on the Brotherhood’s victimization but frames human rights violations as crimes against the entire Egyptian people (Ikhwanonline 2020c). Accordingly, its appeal to the international community is framed as a call to reconsider its policies towards the Egyptian people, who will one day rise up and regain their freedom from every usurper (al-Arabi 2018).

A central theme in the Brotherhood’s discourse is the issue of political prisoners (Ikhwanonline 2023c). The movement campaigns to draw attention to the plight of political detainees, seeking to internationalize the issue of the detainees, the forcibly disappeared, and the death penalties (al-Arabi 2019a). These efforts included submitting a formal complaint to international courts, such as the International Criminal Court, to investigate alleged crimes against humanity in Egypt. The aim of submitting such complaints was to attract significant media coverage, thereby raising public awareness and framing the issue as a matter of international criminal concern (ElDeeb 2015, p. 753) Within this framework, the movement presents all legal proceedings against its members as illegitimate and calls on human rights organizations and advocates of freedom worldwide to act to ensure the rights of the Brotherhood’s leaders and all political prisoners. These demands include fair trials and judicial transparency, adequate medical care, and the right to meet with their families and legal representatives (Ikhwanonline 2019a, 2020c, 2023b).

By employing the human rights discourse, the Brotherhood places moral and political responsibility on international actors—whether states, individuals, organizations, or legal and human rights institutions—who, according to the movement, have turned a blind eye to the regime’s crimes (Ikhwanonline 2021b). The movement urges them to “break their silence and act quickly to hold the coup plotters accountable for their crimes and deter them from continuing these crimes by implementing new fabricated sentences, which are full-fledged murders.”5

This strategic use of human rights diplomacy is aimed at undermining and delegitimizing the post-coup order (Fulco and Abdelgawad 2024, p. 11). Simultaneously, it seeks to counter what the movement perceives as a smear campaign by the Egyptian regime against the Brotherhood and its ideology (Ikhwanonline 2018e).

7. Conclusions

The Muslim Brotherhood’s post-2013 discourse has been strategically shaped to maintain cohesion amid internal fragmentation, resist state repression, and appeal to both domestic opposition forces and the international community to reinforce its legitimacy. Although its electoral strategy failed to secure long-term political dominance, the Brotherhood persists in using a democracy and human rights framing both to assert its legitimacy and to systematically challenge the military regime’s authority. This discourse largely reproduces the general ideas the movement had advocated in the decades preceding the revolution, using these principles as a strategic tool to shape its protest and resistance strategies in response to evolving political conditions.

This study highlights three key aspects of the Brotherhood’s post-2013 adaptation: its diagnostic framing of repression, its strategic positioning as a democratic actor, and its mobilization efforts targeting both domestic and international audiences. The Brotherhood’s diagnostic framing presents post-2013 repression as an illegitimate military coup that not only targeted the movement but also dismantled Egypt’s democratic transition. Its discourse primarily attributes blame to the military and security forces, portraying them as the architects of the coup and subsequent repression. This framing strategically avoids assigning responsibility to the broader revolutionary political forces that initially supported the coup and acknowledging the Brotherhood’s own governance failures. As in the past, this framing seeks to depict the Brotherhood as a victim of state oppression while aligning its cause with broader struggles for justice and democracy. In doing so, it increasingly presents its grievances as a morally justified stance, positioning itself as a representative of universal democratic principles. However, this narrative systematically omits internal reflections on the movement’s governance failures or its strategic miscalculations before its removal from power.

The Brotherhood’s prognostic framing outlines its vision for political change, consistently presenting democratic restoration as the only legitimate solution. It advocates for a return to civilian rule through peaceful means and political resistance. The movement’s restorative framing emphasizes that its goal is not merely to rehabilitate itself but to reclaim Egypt as a whole. This framing, which lays out concrete stages for Egypt’s rehabilitation, is designed to enhance the Brotherhood’s legitimacy while also clarifying the position of the old guard in contrast to reformist factions within the movement. By emphasizing democratic restoration, the Brotherhood avoids engaging with questions of institutional reform or addressing past governance failures.

Finally, the Brotherhood’s motivational framing is aimed at mobilizing both domestic and international audiences. Domestically, it frames its struggle as part of a broader national fight against authoritarian rule, calling on opposition groups to unite around shared democratic principles. Internationally, it highlights human rights violations and appeals to external actors, including human rights organizations and other international bodies, in order to delegitimize the military regime. This engagement with international norms reflects an effort to maintain external support while reinforcing the Brotherhood’s legitimacy as a non-violent political actor.

Taken together, these findings demonstrate how the Brotherhood’s post-2013 discourse functions as both a survival strategy and a tool for political positioning. While its framing strategies have sustained its legitimacy narrative, they have also exposed contradictions, particularly in its lack of internal democracy and ideological rigidity. This reflects a broader tension between its internal legitimacy among members and factions and its pursuit of external legitimacy through engagement with international actors and a democratic discourse. Nevertheless, the democracy and human rights discourse remains a pragmatic tool for political engagement, allowing the Brotherhood to maintain relevance in both domestic and international arenas. This study contributes to broader discussions on the adaptability of the Muslim Brotherhood under authoritarian repression and the limits of framing strategies when unaccompanied by substantive organizational or ideological transformation.

While this article has focused on the strategic use of framing by the Muslim Brotherhood in the aftermath of the July 2013 coup, it has not sought to assess the effectiveness of these efforts in securing actual legitimacy. Nevertheless, the political context in which these frames were deployed shifted dramatically. In this transformed environment, the Brotherhood’s appeals to democratic legitimacy encountered substantial obstacles. Following its brief tenure in power and its perceived departure from democratic norms, significant segments of Egyptian society—particularly within the secular–liberal camp—abandoned the democratic process altogether, instead endorsing authoritarian restoration and, in some cases, expressing approval of the state’s repression of the Brotherhood (Lachapelle 2022).

The widespread anti-Islamist sentiment, which remained largely indifferent to the extreme violence directed at the Brotherhood, was not merely the product of state-driven manipulation. Rather, it stemmed from deep-seated fears of an Islamist takeover and the potential collapse of the state (Hatab 2020). As Armbrust (2019, p. 215) observed, the groundwork for the Brotherhood’s political exclusion had already been laid prior to the 2011 Revolution. This anti-Islamist backlash resulted in the Brotherhood’s political isolation and, to a considerable extent, erased decades of efforts by the movement to cultivate a public image of moderation and credibility. The resulting deficit of trust continues to hinder the Brotherhood’s capacity to forge alliances with non-Islamist actors—particularly among activist youth and political elites (Lynch 2022, p. 4).

The muted international response to the 2013 coup in Egypt underscores the limited resonance of the Muslim Brotherhood’s framing efforts beyond its core constituencies. Over the past decade, states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have spearheaded a sustained ideological campaign to portray the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, emphasizing its alleged radicalism. This persistent propaganda offensive, coupled with acute regional political polarization, has significantly weakened the Brotherhood’s capacity—and that of similar Islamist groups—to present themselves as credible moderate political alternatives (Lynch 2022, p. 8).

Future research would benefit from a systematic examination of how such frames are received, adopted, or contested—both within the movement and beyond—across Egyptian and broader global political discourses.