Post-Catholic Transformations: A Sociological Analysis of Nonreligion in Northern Poland

Abstract

This article analyses the phenomenon of nonreligiosity in Northern Poland in the context of secularisation, individualisation, and pluralisation in religion. Based on quantitative research conducted in 2024 among adult residents of Western and Gdańsk Pomerania (N = 1500), this study shows that nonreligiosity is not merely a lack of faith but a multidimensional social construct encompassing both religious indifference and active irreligiosity. Factor analysis confirmed a two-dimensional structure—religious indifference and irreligiosity—differing in their degree of reactivity towards religion. In Western Pomerania, both forms are statistically stronger and conceptually broader, taking the shape of secular individualism and demands for a more secular public sphere, whereas in Gdańsk Pomerania, attitudes are more polarised, ranging from institutionalised faith to open contestation of the Church. Drawing on the approaches of Campbell, Zuckerman, Bullivant, Klug, and Lee, this study interprets nonreligiosity as a dynamic field of attitudes, from distance to opposition towards religion. The findings indicate that secularisation in Poland does not lead to the disappearance of religion but to its restructuring and privatisation. Nonreligiosity thus emerges as an alternative source of meaning, morality, and identity in a post-Catholic society, while regional differences reveal a hybrid model of secularisation that combines passivity and distance with active contestation, confirming the continuum between religiosity and nonreligiosity in contemporary worldviews.

1. Introduction

In recent decades, secularisation processes have intensified in Europe, with varying degrees of intensity. In some countries, there has been a rapid decline in participation in religious practices, while in others, privatised and hybrid forms combining elements of tradition and individual beliefs have developed (Recio-Román et al. 2019; Pereira Coutinho 2016; Pickel 2008). Poland is a special case in this context: for decades, it was considered a society with a high level of religiosity and relative monoconfessionality (with a predominance of Catholicism), but today it is experiencing accelerated erosion of institutional practices, individualisation of faith, and a growing distance from religion, especially among younger cohorts. In this context, irreligiousness remains largely terra incognita in Poland: it is less frequently systematically described compared to religiosity and is often approached in binary terms (believer–non-believer) without distinguishing between motivations and socio-cultural contexts. This study adopts a continuum perspective on religiosity and irreligiousness, in which attitudes range from strongly institutionalised faith, through privatised forms, to religious indifference and complete irreligiousness. This approach allows us to capture the fluidity of contemporary worldviews and avoid the reductionism of dichotomous classifications.

At the theoretical level, this article integrates four complementary approaches: (a) the achievements of a multidimensional approach to measuring religiosity; (b) the concept of the religiosity–irreligiosity continuum; (c) contextual sensitivity—especially regional; and (d) the interpretation of the processes of secularisation, pluralisation and individualisation of religion as a field of social ‘offers of meaning’ from which individuals choose elements that are functional to their own lives. For the purposes of this article, the results of a broader empirical project devoted to changes in religiosity and irreligiousness in Poland, carried out in the area of Western Pomerania and Gdańsk Pomerania, are presented. In this article, the empirical analysis focuses on the area referred to as Northern Poland, operationalised as Western Pomerania and Gdańsk Pomerania. Although these two regions are discussed jointly for analytical purposes, they do not constitute a homogeneous spatial unit. Western Pomerania experienced a nearly complete population replacement after 1945 and has been shaped for centuries by Protestant traditions, whereas Gdańsk Pomerania retained a strong autochthonous, predominantly Catholic, Kashubian population. These divergent historical trajectories have long since produced different religious profiles. According to ISKK data, the dioceses of Szczecin–Kamień and Koszalin–Kołobrzeg consistently report the lowest levels of religious practice in Poland, while the Archdiocese of Gdańsk maintains medium, stable levels typical of regions with enduring Catholic continuity. This contextualisation is essential for interpreting the differentiated forms of nonreligious attitudes revealed in the empirical findings (ISKK 2023). “Non-religiousness does not always mean the same thing”—it can mean both distance and opposition to institutions, a strategy of privatising beliefs, or ideological indifference.

The aim of this article is to empirically describe and interpret the configuration of non-religiousness in the studied area and to determine whether its observed forms indicate a process of pluralisation and privatisation of faith or a separation from the religious sphere. This analysis aims to show the specificity of the Polish path of secularisation and its social determinants, assuming that non-religiousness is not a lack of faith, but a complex, multidimensional and socially rooted phenomenon, which is one of the key indicators of changes in religiosity in contemporary Poland.

2. Theoretical Framework and Previous Research

For decades, sociological analyses of religiosity have been dominated by the theory of secularisation, which also provided the theoretical background for explaining processes of irreligiousness. It is based on the assumption that with the development of modernity, rationalisation and science, the influence of religion on social life is gradually declining (Botelho Moniz 2023). Classic approaches to this process were developed by, among others, Max Weber, who emphasised the ‘disenchantment of the world’ and the rationalisation of social order (Greisman 1976), Bryan Wilson (1982), who pointed to the disappearance of the social functions of religion, and Karel Dobbelaere (2004), who distinguished three levels of secularisation: social, organisational and individual. Despite its heuristic value, this theory has proven insufficient over time to fully explain the diversity of contemporary changes in religiosity.

Peter Berger (1990), one of its most important representatives, revised his original position after confronting Thomas Luckmann’s (2023) concept, which pointed to the emergence of forms of non-institutional religion. Luckmann emphasised that secularisation does not mean the disappearance of religion, but its transformation—a shift from the public to the private and subjective sphere. In this sense, the process of secularisation does not reduce religion, but changes its social location. Olivier Tschannen (1991) synthesised this approach, describing secularisation as a multidimensional phenomenon—comprising institutional, social and subjective phases. Steve Bruce, on the other hand, developed a contextual analysis, pointing out that the degree of secularisation depends on local cultural and historical conditions (Bruce 1999, 2002). His approach emphasises the permanence of secularisation processes, but at the same time allows for their spatial differentiation, which is essential for interpreting regional phenomena in Poland.

Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems, which introduces an approach based on the functional differentiation of contemporary societies to the sociology of religion (Luhmann [1984] 2001), is underestimated in interpretations of religiosity. Religion is a separate system operating with its own binary code of sacred/profane, which serves to reduce complexity and interpret meaning. The religious system, like other social subsystems, responds to external ‘irritations’—social, cultural and technological changes—through self-reference and reproduction of its own meanings. Religiousness in this view is processual and dynamic: it is not a permanent state, but the result of constant communication, adaptation and reinterpretation of meanings (Luhmann 2000). Luhmann’s theory allows us to perceive religiosity and irreligiousness as two aspects of the same continuum of meaning, in which individual attitudes—from institutionalised faith to complete irreligiousness—are different forms of actualising meanings within a common medium of meaning. Each form of religiosity or irreligiousness is therefore a social selection of a specific variant of interpreting the world. The change in these forms is a natural result of the autopoietic nature of the religious system, which generates its own complexity and responds to new challenges through adaptive processes. In this way, religiosity and irreligiousness can be treated as variable, interlinked forms of social communication, differing in their degree of reference to transcendence, institutionalisation and community.

One of the most important interpretative references in research on the decline of religiosity remains Robert Wuthnow’s (1988) concept of the ‘restructuring of American religion’. Wuthnow showed that after the Second World War, the basic division of American religious life shifted from denominational boundaries to an ideological and moral axis—from liberalism to conservatism. In this view, religion became a tool of social and political mobilisation, and doctrinal disputes were replaced by moral conflicts over issues such as abortion, gender roles, education and sexual orientation (Wuthnow 1989). Over the last 30 years, the United States has seen a decline in institutional involvement, especially among white Christians, and a rise in the number of spiritual but not religious and religiously indifferent individuals. Wuthnow’s paradigm suggests that these changes should be analysed not in terms of secularisation, but as a restructuring of the religious field understood as a system of connections between religion, spirituality and non-religiousness. Contemporary religious–political conflicts thus arise not only from axiological differences but from the intersection of morality, social interests and power structures. Morality and social interests should be seen as mutually constitutive, and processes of racialisation, defence of white identity and heteropatriarchy, which shape American religious discourse, must be taken into account. Penny Edgell (2024) develops this perspective by including spirituality and non-religiousness as integral elements of the contemporary religious landscape. In her view, the American ‘religious field’ is not undergoing simple secularisation, but is restructuring towards a pluralism in which religion, spirituality and non-religiousness function as interdependent forms of interpreting meaning.

The development of research on irreligiousness has significantly broadened the field of sociological reflection. As early as the 1970s, Colin Campbell pointed out that this phenomenon cannot be understood solely as a negation of religion (Campbell 1971). In his concept of the so-called cultic milieu—environments of alternative beliefs and practices—non-religiousness appears as a complex cultural phenomenon, combining elements of criticism of religious institutions, spiritual quests and the creation of new worldview identities. Campbell postulated that irreligiousness should be treated as a fully-fledged social phenomenon with its own forms of organisation, expression and legitimisation (Campbell 1972). In his later works, Campbell clarified the distinction between irreligiousness and areligiousness. The former refers to an active attitude of opposition to religion, expressed in anti-institutional emotions, beliefs and actions. The latter, on the other hand, refers to religious indifference, i.e., distance and neutrality towards religious issues. Irreligion is reactive in nature—it is a response to the dominant religion and constitutes a form of social resistance to its normative pressure. Religious indifference, on the other hand, is rather the result of a decline in interest in the sacred sphere and a shift in attention to the secular dimensions of life (Campbell 1982). According to Colin Campbell, irreligiousness is clearly reactive and anti-institutional in nature. It is not limited to a lack of faith, but expresses active opposition to religion as an institution, ideology and source of social norms (Horii 2020; Pheasant 2018; Robbins 1973). Unlike indifference, which implies distance and non-involvement, irreligiousness has an affirmative and identity-related dimension: the individual affirms their attitude through the negation of religion (Demerath 1969).

Phil Zuckermann is a prominent researcher on irreligiousness. He notes that the absence of religion does not lead to moral chaos, but can coexist with high levels of social trust, altruism and happiness. His research shows that secular morality does not need supernatural sanctions—it is based rather on empathy, responsibility and rational thought. In his view, secularism is cultural rather than merely political. It is a system of meanings in which individuals and societies create alternative forms of ritual, symbolism and community (Zuckerman 2008). Zuckerman shows that ‘secular’ societies develop institutions that replace religion, such as humanistic ceremonies, ethical organisations and atheist communities. In his works, he consistently rejects the belief that a lack of religion means a lack of meaning, morality or identity. He argues that non-religiousness is not a lack of anything, but a positive state in which people find fulfilment, connection and meaning beyond transcendence (Zuckerman 2011). In this sense, his approach is anti-deficit and humanistic in nature.

On the other hand, Stephen Bullivant analyses the spectrum of unbelief, from staunch atheism to moderate agnosticism, emphasising the diversity of motivations and experiences of non-religious people. The author stresses that there is no single ‘correct’ form of unbelief—depending on the cultural context and personal experiences of the individual, they may manifest both firm atheism and moderate agnosticism. Bullivant’s research makes an important contribution to understanding the social and cultural diversity of non-religious attitudes, pointing out that non-belief can serve both contestatory and reflective functions (Bullivant 2010, 2013). An important addition to this trend is the work of Lois Lee (2016, 2017), who proposes expanding the category of secularism to include identity and cultural dimensions. Her analyses show that life without religion takes various social, emotional and communal forms and should therefore not be understood solely as a lack of religious involvement. Lee emphasises that secularism is a complex set of beliefs, practices and identities within which non-religious people can form communities, participate in pro-social activities and cultivate humanistic values. Secularism understood in this way is not a negation of religion, but an alternative form of building meaning and social bonds.

Moreover, Lori G. Beaman (2017a) introduces a significant development in contemporary research on religiosity and non-religiosity, proposing that the sociology of religion pay greater attention to the practical forms of coexistence between people with different or no religious beliefs. The author rejects the perspective based on the opposition between ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ and focuses on how these boundaries are negotiated and reconstructed in everyday social practices. Analysing cases of cooperation between religious and non-religious volunteers for environmental protection, Beaman shows that the categories of religion and non-religion become fluid, contextual and relational. From this perspective, non-religiousness becomes part of the social continuum of meaning, rather than the opposite pole of religiosity. Beaman points out that both spheres are linked by the practice of cooperation within the framework of shared values, such as concern for the common good, solidarity and the ethics of responsibility (Beaman 2017b). Johannes Quack and his team, on the other hand, point out that religious indifference can take various forms: passive disinterest, neutral observation, critical indifference and engaged neutrality (Quack and Schuh 2017).

It is worth recalling that Petra Klug has made a significant contribution to research on irreligiousness in the literature on the subject. Based on narrative interviews, she distinguished several types of religious indifference, treating them as different ways of experiencing distance from religion. The author points out that indifference can take the form of passive disinterest in religion, neutral observation, critical indifference, or engaged neutrality resulting from personal experiences of confrontation with religion (Klug 2017). This typology confirms that religious indifference is not a one-dimensional phenomenon, but rather a spectrum of attitudes—from complete apathy to reflective, conscious neutrality towards the sacred sphere.

Taking into account the findings of these authors, an important terminological distinction needs to be added. Distinguishing between religious indifference and irreligiousness is analytically essential, as these two types of non-religious worldviews differ in motivation, emotional involvement and social consequences. Religious indifference denotes a neutral, non-confrontational distance from the religious sphere: the individual does not reject religion, but simply does not assign it any relevance in their value system or life decisions. It is therefore a negatively free form of nonreligiosity, devoid of opposition or resistance.

This approach forms the theoretical basis for the present analysis, in which non-religiousness is treated not as a deficiency but as a fully-fledged dimension of contemporary social identity, particularly important in research on changes in religiosity in Poland and in regions with a high intensity of secularisation processes, such as Pomerania. It should be noted, however, that Western Pomerania and Gdańsk Pomerania differ in their levels of religious practice. While Western Pomerania consistently exhibits some of the lowest indicators in Poland, Gdańsk Pomerania maintains medium and stable rates characteristic of regions with strong Catholic historical continuity. For this reason, the article does not conceptualise Northern Poland as a homogeneous religious area but uses both regions to illustrate the internal diversification of non-religious orientations, which unfold with different historical dynamics and at different speeds. Western Pomerania is the region of Poland with the lowest rates of participation in religious ceremonies, and where secularisation processes have occurred most rapidly (ISKK 2023; CBOS 2024). At the same time, empirical findings from other sociological studies that are relevant to the subject of the research are an important reference point. In recent years, a particularly important contribution to research on non-religiousness has been made by Cheruvallil-Contractor et al. (2021), who show that being ‘non-religious’ is not a simple denial of religion, but a complex identity phenomenon. The authors conducted six focus group interviews in six cities in England and Wales (Blackburn, Cardiff, Derby, Leicester, Newham, Norwich) with fifty respondents who declared no religious affiliation. Their study reveals a diversity of non-religious orientations—from active, ideological and organised attitudes (e.g., humanists, atheists) to passive, non-institutional forms of distance from religion. This distinction between active and passive forms of non-religiousness fully corresponds to the division adopted in this analysis between irreligiousness (confrontational, anti-institutional attitudes) and religious indifference (neutrality and distance without a confrontational character). This conceptual distinction provides the analytical framework for the operationalisation of both dimensions in the empirical part of the article. In the latest British Social Attitudes survey (2020) cited by the researchers, the proportion of people without religion has already reached 52%, confirming the persistence of secularisation trends. Surprisingly, however, according to the authors, about one-fifth of those who declare themselves to be non-religious pray occasionally, which indicates the existence of indirect and deinstitutionalised forms within the spiritual sphere. These results confirm that non-religiousness is not an ‘empty’ state, but can include one’s own systems of meaning, ethics and community (Cheruvallil-Contractor et al. 2021).

It is also worth mentioning the research presented on the Pew Research Centre platform by authors such as Evans et al. (2025), which shows that the phenomenon of irreligiousness on a global scale is highly diverse and heterogeneous. A study covering 22 countries where the percentage of non-religious people (‘nones’) was large enough for comparative analysis revealed that a lack of religious affiliation does not automatically mean a lack of faith or spirituality. In most of the countries analysed, at least 20% of non-religious people declare their belief in life after death, and in some countries, more than half. Regional differences are very pronounced. In Latin American and African countries, the vast majority of ‘non-religious’ people hold theistic beliefs: in Brazil, 92% of ‘nones’ believe in God, in Colombia 86%, and in Chile 69%. Meanwhile, in countries with long-established institutional secularism, this percentage is many times lower—18% in Australia, 10% in Sweden, and 9% in Hungary. In the United States, where 29% of adults identify as ‘nones,’ 45% of them declare belief in God, confirming that non-religiousness is not synonymous with atheism, but encompasses a broad spectrum of attitudes—from distance from institutions to non-religious spirituality. A three-dimensional analysis (belief in God, life after death, spiritual beliefs) indicates that only some of the ‘nones’ can be considered consistently secular. For example, in Sweden—the country with the highest percentage of non-religious people (52%)—only about half of them, or 28% of the total population, do not declare any of these three types of beliefs. In the US, such consistently non-religious people account for 8% of the adult population, which proves that the majority of ‘nones’ have some transcendent or spiritual beliefs. It is worth noting that although most nones consider religion to be a social phenomenon of limited value (the median 53% believe that religion ‘rather harms society’), a significant minority (38%) admit that religion can have a communal and ethical function. These data confirm that attitudes towards religion among non-religious people are ambivalent rather than unequivocally negative. In terms of declarative statements, over 60% of ‘nones’ describe religion as ‘completely irrelevant’ in their lives, but the same group often maintains metaphysical beliefs or spiritual practices (Evans et al. 2025). It is also worth supplementing this picture with other empirical findings, indicating that a significant percentage of “nones” who declare spiritual beliefs prove that religiosity and irreligiousness today co-create a common spectrum of meanings, in which the boundaries between them are fluid and negotiable (Espinosa 2023). Irreligiousness is therefore not an absence of religion, but a socially embedded way of interpreting meaning—conditioned by experience, education, and relationship to religious institutions (Pew Research Center 2024).

An interesting thread in the research is the notion that irreligiousness is not synonymous with a lack of social control or moral deficit. Desmond et al. (2019) have shown that family factors have a stronger influence on the conformist behaviour of young people than religious affiliation alone. The results of studies on American youth show that irreligiousness does not necessarily mean deviance or moral deficit, but can just as well be embedded in the context of strong family and social ties. A large study conducted on a sample of over 10,000 high school students in the US, analysing the relationship between religiosity, irreligiousness, and deviant behaviour, showed that after taking into account protective factors—such as the quality of relationships with parents, peer support, school involvement, and a sense of belonging—religiosity ceases to be a significant predictor of reduced deviant behaviour. In other words, it is social and relational factors, rather than religious identification alone, that have a greater influence on the moral and normative behaviour of young people. Significantly, the study also revealed that approximately 33% of students who identified themselves as atheists, agnostics, or “without religion” reported occasional participation in religious services. This means that the boundary between religiosity and irreligiousness is fluid, and that one’s ideological identification does not always translate directly into practice. These data confirm that irreligiousness can coexist with social or ritual practices resulting from family, cultural, or community ties (Desmond et al. 2019). From a sociological perspective, this leads to the conclusion that religion is not the sole source of moral capital.

The theoretical approaches and results of previous research cited above provide the background for the approach proposed here, which is part of a broader debate on the diversity of forms of non-religiousness and their social roots.

3. Research Methodology and Sample Description

In order to answer the research questions, a quantitative empirical study was conducted on contemporary forms of religiosity and irreligiousness in northern Poland. The methodological assumptions, description of the research tool, characteristics of the sample and analytical procedures used are presented below. The project was designed as a quantitative study covering adult residents of Western Pomerania and Gdańsk Pomerania—regions with different cultural and religious traditions. Western Pomerania and Gdańsk Pomerania have followed different historical trajectories since 1945. Western Pomerania underwent almost complete population replacement after the Second World War and had long been shaped by Protestant traditions, while Gdańsk Pomerania retained a strong autochthonous, predominantly Catholic Kashubian population. These contrasting histories produced divergent cultural patterns of religious transmission. This context is crucial for interpreting the differentiated forms of indifference and irreligion observed in the data (Śleszyński et al. 2023). Although the study’s design allows for comparative analysis, this article focuses not on regional differences, but on empirically capturing the diverse forms of religiosity and non-religiosity and their relationship within a broader continuum of worldviews. This approach allows for an in-depth interpretation of the processes of individualisation, privatisation and secularisation of faith in the context of contemporary post-secular society. The structure of the tool was designed precisely to capture the internal diversity of non-religious orientations, allowing indifference and irreligiousness to be analysed as empirically distinct categories.

The study was conducted using a proprietary survey questionnaire developed on the basis of classic scales for measuring religiosity (Glock and Stark 1965; Piwowarski 1990; Hill and Hood 1999) and contemporary theoretical approaches to non-religiousness (Campbell 1971; Lee 2017; Bullivant 2013). The tool initially included 128 statements relating to four areas: (1) institutionalised religiosity; (2) privatised religiosity; (3) religious indifference; and (4) irreligiousness, constructed according to the Thurstone equal-appearing interval scale technique. In the content verification process, competent judges were used for evaluation, and quartile deviation was used as a measure of unanimity to analyse the consistency of the evaluations. Only those items that achieved a high level of agreement among experts (Q ≤ 1.0) were included in further analysis. After verification, the tool comprised 87 statements, of which the groups of statements falling within the category of irreligiousness (indifference and irreligiousness) were analysed in this case. The reliability index of the non-religious scale, measured by Cronbach’s coefficient, was α = 0.812, which indicates high internal consistency of the items. These reduced and empirically verified items enabled the construction of indicators used in the correlation and factor analyses presented later in the article.

The survey was conducted in 2024 using the CAWI technique as part of the project ‘Religiousness and irreligiousness in Pomerania’. The research sample was quota-random and included N = 1500 respondents aged 18+, proportional to the demographic structure of the population of Western Pomerania and Gdańsk Pomerania. In both regions, 750 interviews were conducted, maintaining representativeness in terms of gender, age, education, place of residence (city/village) and declared religious affiliation. The sample structure was designed based on data from the 2021 National Census, which allowed for a reflection of the actual socio-demographic structure of the regions. The average age of respondents was 41.2 years, and the gender structure was balanced (51% women, 49% men). Women accounted for 52.0% of the sample in Western Pomerania and 51.3% in Gdańsk Pomerania, which corresponds to typical population proportions. The age structure was dominated by people of working age: approximately 37% of respondents were in the 25–44 age group, while seniors (65+) accounted for 21.6% in Western Pomerania and 18.6% in Gdańsk Pomerania. This means that Western Pomerania has a slightly older demographic structure, which is important for the interpretation of religiosity analysis.

In terms of place of residence, the two regions differ in their urban structure. In Western Pomerania, 30.7% of respondents live in rural areas and 24.4% in large cities (over 200,000 inhabitants), while the remaining groups live in small and medium-sized towns. In Gdańsk Pomerania, rural residents account for 46.5% of the sample, and large cities (20.1%) are mainly concentrated in the Tri-City. This layout reflects the more polycentric nature of Western Pomerania and the metropolitan structure of Gdańsk Pomerania.

In terms of education, 23.7% of respondents in Western Pomerania and 32.8% in Gdańsk Pomerania have a university degree. In both regions, people with secondary technical education (approx. 23%) and secondary general education (16–18%) dominate. Vocational education is declared by 12.1% of respondents from Western Pomerania and 9.9% from Gdańsk Pomerania, while primary education is declared by less than 3%. These data indicate a higher level of schooling and cultural capital in the Gdańsk region, which favours the processes of individualisation and pluralisation of attitudes. In terms of marital status, 58.5% of respondents in Western Pomerania and 59.1% in Gdańsk Pomerania are married, while single people account for 16.3% and 18.2%, respectively, confirming the similar family profile of both populations. In terms of religious affiliation, 78.0% of the inhabitants of Western Pomerania and 74.7% of Gdańsk Pomerania identify themselves as Catholic, while 21.1% and 24.7% of respondents declare no religious affiliation. These results confirm stronger secularisation trends in the Gdańsk region, while maintaining a high level of religious identification in both cases.

Correlation analyses (Pearson’s and Kendall’s tau-b coefficients) were used to determine the relationships between variables, allowing us to describe the direction and strength of the relationship between dimensions of religiosity and socio-demographic variables. These analyses revealed, among other things, the influence of age, gender and education on the intensity of religiosity and the interrelationships between its declarative, ritual and moral dimensions. This article focuses exclusively on factor analysis relating to the dimensions of non-religiousness: exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to identify hidden dimensions and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to verify their structure; other analyses carried out as part of a broader project are not reported here.

4. Empirical Findings

The model approach described and used in this study is one of the basic analytical strategies used in empirical sociology. It allows for the organisation of complex social reality through the identification and statistical representation of its key dimensions. Sociological models do not literally reproduce reality, but serve as cognitive tools that enable us to grasp the structure, dynamics and relationships between the elements of the phenomenon under study. In this study, modelling was used to verify the thesis of the religiosity–irreligiosity continuum, understood as a spectrum of worldviews ranging from institutionalised faith to indifferent and irreligious attitudes.

The verification was carried out in two stages. In the first stage, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to empirically identify latent dimensions describing the structure of religiosity and irreligiousness without imposing a priori model assumptions. The analysis was performed in IBM SPSS Statistics 29, using the principal axis factoring (PAF) method, recommended for variables with distributions deviating from full normality. The number of factors was determined based on Kaiser’s criterion (eigenvalue ≥ 1) and scree plot analysis. Items with a factor loading ≥ 0.50 were qualified for further analysis, with the proviso that each factor must include a minimum of three test items. The validity of the model was confirmed by the following indicators: KMO ≥ 0.60 and a statistically significant Bartlett’s sphericity test result (p < 0.001), which indicates sufficient correlation between the variables.

In the second stage, based on the EFA results, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was applied using structural equation modelling (SEM) in IBM SPSS Amos. The aim of CFA was to verify the stability of the identified dimensions and assess their equivalence between two regional populations (MG-CFA). The model fit was assessed based on a set of indicators recommended in the literature (CFI ≥ 0.90; RMSEA ≤ 0.08; χ²/df < 3), which confirmed the satisfactory empirical and theoretical convergence of the model. The obtained factor solutions made it possible to construct a coherent, multidimensional model of religiosity and non-religiosity, allowing not only for the identification of differences in the intensity of attitudes, but also for their interpretation in the context of the processes of secularisation, individualisation and privatisation of religion. Below is an interpretation of these dimensions as typical non-religious attitudes, showing how individuals can be assigned to a specific model based on the intensity of individual factors.

A factor analysis conducted separately for Western Pomerania and Gdańsk Pomerania revealed a two-dimensional structure of non-religiousness, comprising religious indifference and irreligiousness as two independent components. The comparative results are presented in the

Table 1. Comparison of two-factor models of irreligiousness in the regions of Gdańsk Pomerania and Western Pomerania.

Dimension of Non-Religiosity	Region	Number of Items	Percentage of Explained Variance	Cronbach’s α	Mean (SD)
Religious indifference	Gdańsk Pomerania	4	28.3	0.82	1.25 (1.49)
	Western Pomerania	8	23.7	0.86	2.34 (2.58)
Irreligiousness	Gdańsk Pomerania	4	18.5	0.69	2.51 (1.37)
	Western Pomerania	8	16.7	0.79	5.68 (2.27)

Source: Author’s own calculations based on 2024.

below.

Referring to the results for Western Pomerania, significant differences should be noted in both the structure and content of the model of irreligiousness. Factor analysis for this region allowed for as many as eight test items to be retained for each of the two factors (indifference and irreligiousness), which means a broader range of content compared to the Gdańsk region, where these dimensions ultimately included only four items each. As can be seen from the table, despite the larger number of items, the two factors in the West Pomerania region explained slightly less variance (40.4%) than the two analogous factors in Gdańsk Pomerania (46.7%). This may be due to greater diversity of content—with a broader spectrum of attitudes, their statistical homogeneity decreases slightly. Nevertheless, the reliability of both dimensions is higher than in Gdańsk Pomerania (α = 0.868 for indifference and 0.798 for irreligiousness), which indicates good consistency of items within the factors. The KMO index = 0.80 and Bartlett’s test (χ²(120) = 933.32; p < 0.001) confirm that the data from Western Pomerania were very well suited to factor analysis. Religious indifference defines attitudes characterised by a lack of involvement in institutional forms of faith, while maintaining beliefs about the existence of a transcendent reality. People with high scores on this dimension express beliefs such as “I believe in God, but I don’t want to have anything to do with the Church” or “I believe in the existence of a higher power, but I don’t practice.” This phenomenon can be interpreted as spiritual individualism—private faith, devoid of communal and ritual forms. The average values indicate significant regional differences: religious indifference is clearly higher in Western Pomerania (M = 2.34; SD = 2.58) than in Gdańsk Pomerania (M = 1.25; SD = 1.49).

Irreligiousness represents the extreme pole of the continuum, referring to the conscious rejection of religion and negative assessment of church institutions. High scores were obtained by people who agreed with statements such as “Religion is a kind of collective mental illness” or “Christianity is a religion of violence.” In Western Pomerania, this factor achieved an average of M = 5.68 (SD = 2.27), and in Gdańsk Pomerania, M = 2.51 (SD = 1.37), which proves the greater expression of anti-clerical attitudes in the western part of the region. This factor is also characterised by high consistency (α = 0.86). The correlation between religious indifference and irreligiousness was low (r = −0.21; p < 0.001), confirming that these are two separate, independent dimensions of irreligiousness. The first—indifference—indicates a lack of need to participate in religion while retaining remnants of metaphysical beliefs, while the second—irreligiousness—reflects an active rejection of faith and demands for secularism in the public sphere.

In the next stage, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed using the maximum likelihood (ML) method in IBM SPSS Amos 29. The models were tested separately for both regions, obtaining a good fit: χ²/df < 5; CFI and NFI > 0.90; RMSEA = 0.05; SRMR < 0.08. The reliability of the construct was confirmed by CR > 0.70 and AVE > 0.50. Next, a multi-group confirmatory analysis (MG-CFA) was performed, testing three levels of equivalence: configurational, metric and scalar. All models met the accepted criteria (ΔCFI ≤ 0.01; ΔRMSEA ≤ 0.015), which means that the structure of the factors and their significance are identical in both regions. This allows for a direct comparison of the mean values of non-religious factors between Western Pomerania and Gdańsk Pomerania.

The

Table 2. Questionnaire items included in the ‘Religious indifference’ factor and the ‘Irreligiousness’ factor—final model confirmed in confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and multi-group factor analysis (MG-CFA) with a distinction between Western Pomerania and Gdańsk Pomerania.

Region	Number of Items	Questionnaire Item Codes	Complete Wording of Items (Original Version)
Factor 1: Religious indifference
Western Pomerania	8	p15_r29, p15_r33, p15_r36, p15_r56, p15_r16, p15_r38, p15_r19, p15_r15	There is an immortal soul in every human being, in addition to the body; I believe in the existence of a Higher Power that gives meaning to our lives; I believe that there is life after death; I do not need regular religious practices; I believe in God but do not want to have anything to do with the Church; I have spiritual beliefs but do not participate in religious practices; I pray whenever I feel the need; Faith is, for me, more a matter of the heart than of the institution.
Gdańsk Pomerania	4	p15_r35, p15_r36, p15_r38, p15_r33	I believe in God but do not want to have anything to do with the Church; I believe that there is life after death; I have spiritual beliefs but do not participate in religious practices; I believe in the existence of a Higher Power that gives meaning to our lives.
Factor 2: Irreligiousness
Western Pomerania	8	p15_r17, p15_r31, p15_r40, p15_r45, p15_r46, p15_r44, p15_r26, p15_r20	Christianity is a religion of violence; Religious symbols should not be present in public spaces; Religions are a source of violence in the world; Religious commandments have no meaning today; I believe that the desirable social model is the peaceful coexistence of all religions in their cultural diversity; I support a secular state; Religion limits human freedom; Religious practices are unnecessary and outdated.
Gdańsk Pomerania	4	p15_r17, p15_r40, p15_r31, p15_r23	Christianity is a religion of violence; Religions are a source of violence in the world; Religious symbols should not be present in public spaces; Religion is a form of collective mental illness.

below presents the full set of questionnaire items that make up the final model of religious indifference and irreligiousness, confirmed in confirmatory and multigroup analysis, with a distinction between Western Pomerania and Gdańsk Pomerania.

The interpretation of the factors indicates that religious indifference is more often neutral (‘faith without affiliation’), while irreligiousness takes the form of a worldview opposition to religion. In comparative terms, Western Pomerania is characterised by a broader spectrum of irreligiousness—from spiritual individualism to secular rationalism—while Gdańsk Pomerania is characterised by a more polarised structure of attitudes, with a clear division between institutional religiosity and overt rejection of religion. The results of the study indicate that in the Gdańsk Pomerania region, irreligiousness is clearly contestatory in nature. The most strongly saturated positions, Religion is a kind of collective mental illness and Christianity is a religion of violence, express active disapproval of religion and the Church, not just a lack of practice. In this perspective, religion is seen as a socially and morally harmful phenomenon, responsible for violence and conflict. This attitude is close to an atheistic or anti-clerical worldview, which is not only about a personal lack of faith, but also about the belief that religion should be strongly restricted or combated, at least in the public sphere.

In light of the presented results, it can be concluded that in Western Pomerania, irreligiousness is statistically stronger and broader in content (higher averages for both indifference: M = 2.34 vs. 1.25, and irreligiousness: M = 5.68 vs. 2.51), with a component of secular tolerance and a demand for the separation of church and state, while in Gdańsk Pomerania it is less common and more reduced and clearly irreligious. Taking a broader view, the model obtained confirms that irreligiousness in Poland is not homogeneous, but constitutes a complex system of attitudes: from apathy towards religion to active anti-clericalism.

5. Discussion

The proposed interpretative framework allows us to perceive irreligiousness not as a simple negation of religion, but as a complex, multidimensional phenomenon of the present day, shaped by cultural, biographical and structural factors. In the integrated approach of Campbell, Zuckerman, Bullivant, Klug and Lee, it can be understood as a dynamic field of attitudes ranging from religious indifference to active irreligiousness, differing in their degree of reactivity, intensity and social expression. The results of the research confirm that irreligiousness in Poland—especially in the northern regions—takes the form of both quiet distance from religious institutions and conscious contestation of their significance in the public sphere. This means that contemporary processes of secularisation should be interpreted in terms of the pluralisation and individualisation of worldviews rather than the decline of faith as such. In this sense, irreligiousness becomes one of the important components of modern identity—not a lack, but an alternative way of creating meaning, values and community in late modern society. The empirical results obtained fully correspond to the theoretical distinction proposed by Colin Campbell (1982) between irreligiousness and areligiousness. In the sample studied, both phenomena were reflected in the form of two factors: irreligiousness (understood as an active attitude of opposition to religion and church institutions) and religious indifference (which is the functional equivalent of areligiousness, i.e., distance and neutrality towards the sacred sphere).

These results are also consistent with Niklas Luhmann’s ([1984] 2001) systemic approach, which views religion as an autonomous system of communication of meaning in a functionally differentiated society. In light of his theory, both religious indifference and irreligiousness are a consequence of the process of dispersal of meaning-making functions—individuals seek meaning outside the institutional system of religion, and in the case of irreligious attitudes, they also actively contest its claim to interpretative monopoly. Thus, the phenomena studied confirm that secularisation in modernity does not mean a loss of meaning, but rather its pluralisation and privatisation.

Finally, the results obtained fit into the broader context of the theory of pluralisation and individualisation of religion, indicating that religiosity and irreligiousness constitute a continuum of worldview identities rather than simple opposites. Empirical data confirm that the phenomena of indifference and irreligiousness can be interpreted as parallel effects of the restructuring of the religious field in modern society: the former through withdrawal, the latter through opposition.

The results of this study are also consistent with the findings of Phil Zuckerman (2011), who, comparing secularisation in the United States and Scandinavia, showed that atheism and secularism are not fixed, homogeneous orientations, but are culturally and socially diverse. In his analysis, American irreligiousness is reactive and confrontational—it is a response to the dominance of religion in public life, while Scandinavian irreligiousness takes the form of mild indifference towards religion, without the need for opposition. Zuckerman describes this phenomenon as the difference between ‘active secularism’ and ‘silent secularism’. The Pomerania study points to similar internal differences. In the western region, with its more pluralistic and secularised social structure, irreligiousness manifests itself more often in expressive forms—with elements of distance, criticism and opposition to the Church. In the Gdańsk region, on the other hand, religious indifference is more reminiscent of the Scandinavian model of ‘silent secularism’—lack of participation here is not a sign of rebellion, but rather a neutral distancing from the sacred sphere. Zuckerman (2011) points out that these differences result from the level of religion’s presence in the public sphere. Where religion is dominant, as in the USA, irreligiousness takes the form of resistance and ideological self-identification. Where religion is socially marginal, as in Scandinavia, lack of faith becomes a cultural norm rather than an ideological declaration. The material studied from Pomerania shows similar mechanisms: greater axiological tension between religiosity and irreligiousness in Western Pomerania and greater indifference and ideological neutrality in Gdańsk Pomerania. Thus, the empirical data confirm Campbell and Zuckerman’s postulates that irreligion and areligion are not only categories describing individual attitudes, but also the result of structural relations between religion and social culture. In sociological terms, they can therefore be understood as socially diverse ways of ‘being outside religion,’ which depend on the historical and cultural level of religion’s presence in a given society.

The results of the empirical research presented here correspond with the theoretical framework of the restructuring of the religious field (Wuthnow 1988; Edgell 2024), in which it is not so much the forms of faith that are redefined, but rather the social functions of religion and its institutional boundaries. Data from the PEW project (2024), as well as analyses by Evans et al. (2025), indicate that in Western countries, there has been a decline in institutional affiliation while selective moral and spiritual beliefs are being retained. This has led to the phenomenon of moral nonaffiliation—a normative yet extra-ecclesial ethical orientation. In light of these findings, the results from Pomerania reveal a similar dynamic: the decline of communal practices coincides with a recontextualisation of the category of the sacrum, which does not disappear but is relocated into the sphere of private meanings and values. In the Polish context, this process takes the form of a reconstruction of symbolic loyalty: individuals may declare a lack of religious identification while maintaining an ethical language rooted in the Catholic tradition. What emerges, therefore, is a hybrid model of post-Catholic secularisation, in which religion ceases to serve an identity-forming function but continues to participate in defining the boundaries of public morality.

In Poland, a significant contribution to the study of nonreligiosity has been made by Radosław Tyrała (2014), who examined the identities and practices of individuals identifying as non-believers or atheists. The empirical findings presented here should be compared with Tyrała’s conclusions. In his survey (N = 1517), the majority of respondents were young, urban, and well-educated: as many as 61% held higher education degrees, and over 80% lived in cities with populations exceeding 100,000. These results confirm that nonreligiosity in Poland has a distinctly urban-intellectual characteristic, which corresponds with other authors’ observations on the secularisation of metropolitan environments.

Tyrała notes that the process of leaving religion is most often gradual and unfolds through biographical socialisation. Over 70% of respondents described their departure from the Church as a slow process, while only 12% referred to it as a sudden “conversion” towards non-belief. The main motives for this process included disappointment with the Church as an institution (58%), disagreement with its teachings (52%), a lack of personal religious experience (39%), and opposition to the clergy’s political involvement (33%). In light of the findings presented here, such factors can be directly linked to the dimension of irreligiosity understood as a contestatory and anti-institutional stance—a reaction to the dominant model of religiosity. At the same time, more than half of Tyrała’s respondents (54%) stated that their non-belief had a positive and affirmative characteristic, while 48% regarded it as an important element of their personal identity. Nearly 40% did not engage in any form of atheist activism, which points to the diversity of social expression of non-belief—ranging from highly articulated to entirely private forms. These findings fit well with the three-dimensional model proposed in this article: reactivity (a response to dominant religion), intensity (the degree of self-awareness of one’s convictions), and social expression (the extent to which they are made public).

In Tyrała’s study, an additional dimension of stigmatisation and worldview conformity also emerges—32% of respondents reported experiencing negative reactions after disclosing their lack of belief, a phenomenon the author refers to as “embarrassed atheism”. This attitude corresponds with the present study’s factor of religious indifference, understood as a quiet detachment from religion without the need for demonstrative rejection. In this sense, Tyrała provides empirical confirmation of the distinction between religious indifference (a passive, neutral attitude devoid of oppositional elements) and irreligiosity (a reactive, identity-forming, and contestatory stance).

When comparing the present findings with those of Radosław Tyrała, both clear points of convergence and important differences become apparent, stemming from the adopted methodological perspectives and levels of analysis. In both studies, nonreligiosity appears as a relational phenomenon, closely linked to the context of the dominant religion and to experiences of distance from institutional forms of Catholicism. Tyrała described this distance in terms of a minority worldview response, whereas in the present study, the phenomenon has been captured at a structural level as a factor of irreligiosity, combining elements of anti-institutionalism, critique of the Church, and moral opposition to its role in the public sphere (Tyrała 2014).

Both approaches also reveal a strong biographical component marking the transition from religiosity towards worldview individualism. Tyrała observed that for the majority of his respondents, departure from religion was a gradual and reflective process rather than a sudden rejection of faith. In the present study, this corresponds to the dimension of religious indifference—a stance of quiet withdrawal and gradual disengagement from practice while maintaining certain metaphysical beliefs. In both cases, this process does not take the form of a dramatic “conversion to unbelief” but rather of a privatisation of conviction and a gradual weakening of institutional ties.

In both Tyrała’s analysis and the factor model presented here, the response to the institutional Church plays a crucial role. In Tyrała’s study, 58% of respondents identified disappointment with the attitude of the clergy as the main reason for their loss of faith. In the present study, the high factor loadings of items referring to negative evaluations of the Church confirm that the anticlerical component constitutes an important element of irreligiosity in northern Poland. This indicates that in both approaches the dominant mechanism of nonreligiosity is not the rejection of the sacrum itself, but rather the erosion of trust in the institutional carriers of religion.

A key difference, however, lies in the degree and level of expression of nonreligiosity. In Tyrała’s research, more than half of respondents (54%) declared that non-belief represented a positive aspect of their identity, and 48% considered it a value worth expressing—reflecting a strong identity-based and affirmative component. In the present study, by contrast, most nonreligious attitudes took the form of religious indifference—a passive rather than expressive form of detachment. Contestatory irreligiosity appeared less frequently and was concentrated in specific social segments, mainly among younger cohorts with higher education living in large cities of Western Pomerania. In this sense, the findings presented here may be interpreted as reflecting an earlier phase of the secularisation process, in which religious indifference predominates over overt opposition—whereas Tyrała examined an environment of an already formed nonreligious minority, characterised by higher self-awareness and worldview expressiveness.

Another difference concerns the level of analysis. Tyrała focused on individuals who self-identified as non-believers, exploring their narratives, motivations, and experiences of marginalisation. In the present study, nonreligiosity was captured within the general population, allowing for a statistical distinction between religious indifference and irreligious attitudes. In this respect, the two approaches are complementary: Tyrała provides insight into the microsocial dimension of non-belief—its motives, emotions, and biographical trajectories—while the present study reconstructs the macrosocial structure of attitudes in regions with differing levels of secularisation.

Finally, the degree of conceptualisation also differs. Tyrała describes non-belief as a minority identity rather than as a continuum of attitudes, whereas the present analysis adopts a continuous model (religiosity–nonreligiosity continuum), which enables the identification of intermediary forms ranging from indifferent behaviour to open contestation. Yet, in both cases, the conclusions converge: nonreligiosity is not a state of axiological emptiness but a socially and culturally embedded form of interpreting reality, capable of assuming both private and public, passive and active expressions. Despite differences in scope and analytical level, the findings of both studies lead to a shared conclusion – that nonreligiosity in Poland constitutes a socially grounded, differentiated continuum of attitudes, ranging from quiet indifference to conscious contestation of religion, rather than a simple negation of faith.

6. Conclusions

It is therefore appropriate to welcome the emerging research suggesting that the contemporary sociology of religion should move away from understanding nonreligiosity as the simple antithesis of religion. The presented perspective makes it possible to avoid reductionism and to resist explaining nonreligion as a homogeneous phenomenon. Like religiosity, it has multiple shades and dimensions; hence, sociology requires greater methodological and conceptual sensitivity in selecting approaches and techniques that can capture its complexity. Increasingly, it is viewed as a socially and culturally embedded form of worldview orientation, shaped by the processes of secularisation, pluralisation, and individualisation. From this perspective, religiosity and nonreligiosity constitute elements of a single continuum of meaning—dynamic, open, and diverse—which is continuously reinterpreted according to its social context.

The findings discussed in this article reveal several complementary analytical perspectives. First, they show that the processes of secularisation in Poland do not lead to the complete disappearance of religion, but rather to its privatisation, individualisation, and pluralisation of meaning, in which religiosity and nonreligiosity coexist along a shared continuum. Second, they demonstrate that the specificity of the Polish trajectory lies not in a radical break with tradition, but in a quiet and differentiated transformation of religious consciousness, shaped by regional and generational contexts. This points to the need for further research into “maps of nonreligiosity”—exploring how local history, social structure, and cultural capital co-create patterns of distance from religion. Third, the findings highlight that nonreligiosity should be understood as a form of identity rather than merely a lack of affiliation. It may serve as an expression of autonomy, emotional independence, or even moral protest against institutional misconduct. This opens a pathway for studies focusing on the emotional and biographical determinants of distance from religion.

Most importantly, the perspective emerging from the present research calls for analysing religiosity and nonreligiosity not as two opposing categories, but as points along a continuum of attitudes, within which intermediate forms are possible: indifference, distance, selective belief, non-institutional spirituality, and secular ethics of meaning. At the same time, the empirical configuration of factors—from distanced belief to symbolic dissent—suggests that Poland is not following a path of full de-institutionalisation of religion, but rather a selective transposition of its functions from the institutional to the cultural-symbolic domain. In this sense, the findings confirm that secularisation processes in Poland are restructuring rather than reductive: they do not lead to the disappearance of religion, but to its social reconfiguration within evolving forms of participation, meaning, and morality.

Although the broader contextualisation of regional and nationwide trends could be further expanded upon, the present article focuses intentionally on one analytical dimension: the internal diversification of non-religious attitudes within Northern Poland. A fuller integration of historical, demographic and national-level data will be developed in subsequent publications based on the wider research project, of which this article presents only one component.