Beyond Belief: Understanding the Demographics and Dynamics of South Korea’s Religious “Nones”

Abstract

Religious “nones” is currently used in academia as a category referring to individuals who do not have a specific religious belief or do not belong to a specific religious organization. The increase in the number of religious nones is a distinct religious, cultural, and social trend not only in the West but also around the world, and South Korea is no exception. The following questions arise: What are the trends of religious nones in South Korea? What are their characteristics? What are the historical, cultural and social factors for the large number of the irreligious in the country? This paper shows that South Korea boasts one of the highest percentages of the population with no religious affiliation in the world. The paper also finds that religious nones in the country tend to be “spiritual but not religious”, i.e., they have the characteristic of pursuing spirituality by practicing their faith in their own way outside of the institutional system. As for the factors for the high rate of religious nones, the paper argues that the phenomenon of irreligion in South Korea has a long history, e.g., suppression of shamanism and Buddhism during the Joseon dynasty (1392–1910), and that the popularity of shamanism and Confucianism, which are often seen more as spiritual practice and a philosophical system, respectively, has also been a contributing attribute. The rapid economic development, improved living standard, high education attainment level, and the rise of leisure culture are other factors for the rise in religious nones in Korea. The paper closes by reflecting on the implications of increasing religious nones for the concept of secularization.

1. Introduction

Religious nones are individuals who do not belong to or identify with any organized religion. A key characteristic of religious nones is that, while they are unaffiliated with institutional religion, they are not necessarily unbelieving. For many, indeed, identifying as a religious none reflects disaffiliation rather than outright disbelief. These individuals often continue to seek meaning, community, and ethical guidance through non-traditional pathways. Many express belief in a higher power or engage in spiritual practices even as they reject formal religious affiliation. Common subgroups include atheists, agnostics, and spiritual but not religious (SBNR), i.e., those who engage in spiritual practices (e.g., meditation, prayer, or other spiritual activities) without affiliating with a religious institution. What all of this indicates is that the boundary between the religious and nonreligious is becoming increasingly fluid, with some nones attending religious services occasionally or drawing selectively from multiple spiritual traditions without formal membership.

Currently, research on religious nones has become an important subfield of the sociology of religion, and related research has also increased significantly in recent years (Andrés 2025; Cragun and McCaffree 2021; Burge 2021; Beaman and Tomlins 2015; L. Lee 2015), although the academic importance of the concept of “religious nones” was raised more than 50 years ago (see Vernon 1968). As insinuated above, religious nones “denote those who profess no religion” (Tomlins and Beaman 2015, p. 2; see Breskaya and Arena 2024, pp. 1–5). Recently, however, the concept of “the unaffiliated” is also being used, highlighting the lack of organizational affiliation of those who identify themselves as irreligious. Other terms are also being used interchangeably to refer to religious nones, including “religiously unaffiliated”, “a-religion”, “irreligion”, “no religion”, “religious non-affiliation”, “not religious”, “non-religious”, “nones”, “non-religion”, and “nonreligion” (Woo 2022, p. 2). A related, more complex characterization of irreligion is provided by L. Lee (2012, p. 131), who asserts that the concept of nonreligion refers to “any position, perspective, or practice which is primarily defined by, or in relation to, religion, but which is nevertheless considered to be other than religious”. However, Cragun and McCaffree (2021, p. 9) question whether it is reasonable to categorize any demographic group as “nonreligious” in emphasizing that “religiosity and nonreligiosity are not a binary distinction but rather a continuum”. Also, indifference, disbelief and irreligiosity are not always associated with not belonging to a religion, although these characteristics may be included in it (L. Lee 2012, 2017).

The concept of secularization also deserves mention in regard to the phenomenon of increasing irreligiosity (see Taylor 2007; Martin 1978; Inglehart 2021; Cragun and Smith 2024; Asad 2003). Secularization can mean a variety of things, including the declining cultural and social significance of religion; the separation of secular and religious spheres; the marginalization or exclusion of religion from worldly spheres; rationalization; and privatization, i.e., religion has increasingly become a personal affair rather than a public one (Luckmann 1967). While secularization can occur at multiple levels, i.e., individual, organizational (social, political, and educational systems) and societal (Dobbelaere 1981), the phenomenon of the rise in religious nones highlights the extent of secularization occurring at the individual level in recent years. Indeed, the increasing irreligiosity draws attention to the fact that secularization at the individual level has been overlooked in comparison to societal-level secularization. That is because societal secularization entails more discernible changes in social structures and institutions, thereby attracting greater attention. The increasing number of individuals identifying as religious nones also challenges conventional interpretations of secularization. Rather than signaling a straightforward decline of religion, this development points to evolving forms of engagement with belief systems, values, and personal identity beyond institutional religion. The emergence of nones complicates the assumption that secularization entails the disappearance of religion altogether. Instead, it underscores the ways in which people are discovering new, often individualized, approaches to meaning and belonging.

An interesting aspect of religious nones is that while many “have little or no spiritual sense of the world, some do” (Breskaya and Arena 2024, p. 2). A finding by the Pew Research Center (2024) indeed shows that nearly half of American religious nones identified themselves as being “spiritual”, acknowledging the significance of spirituality in their lives (see Smith et al. 2024). The same survey (Pew Research Center 2024) further shows that more than two-thirds of American religious nones believe in God or some other spiritual force or higher power in the universe.

From the very brief observations above, two conclusions can be drawn about religious nones. First, it is an oversimplification to think that religious nones comprise a homogeneous social group (Breskaya and Arena 2024, p. 2; see Burge 2020; Cragun and McCaffree 2021). Indeed, religious nones include “a wide spectrum ranging from atheism, agnosticism, secular humanism, ‘nothing in particular’, ‘nonverts’ to spiritual but not religious beliefs” (Breskaya and Arena 2024, pp. 2–3; see Bullivant 2022; L. Lee 2015). Second, religious nones’ attitudes toward religion are also very diverse, from sympathy and indifference to staunch denial. British sociologist Grace Davie (1994) thus describes religious nones as those “believing without belonging”, which is similar to the idea of being “spiritual but not religious”.

Literature on religious nones in the Korean context has also been growing. Seong (2017) cites research by Kripal (2007, pp. 8–11) in analyzing the “religion of non-religion”. Kripal understands this concept as referring to a new form of “religiosity” observed outside the boundaries of traditional religion. At first glance, this may seem to be denying religion, but it reveals a different kind of religiousness from the past (Seong 2017, pp. 1–28). Woo (2022) accepts the phenomenon of non-religion, a characteristic “religious culture” trend of our time, as a new field of study for new religions. Jae-ryong Song (2013) argues that a significant number of non-religious Koreans are still pursuing spirituality, saying that the phenomenon of spiritual pursuit in the 21st century is a kind of post-modern religion that replaces traditional religion. And this type of “religion” is said to be a religion that lacks the ritual and community dimensions, which are the core components of religion. In other words, this phenomenon is explained as a “non-formative religion” that excludes the institutional and organizational, social, and public dimensions of religion (Song 2013). Other research by Kang (1997), Choi (2019), and Chong (2023, 2024) has examined the characteristics of Korean religious nones, which show, among others, that a considerable number of them are not nonbelievers, for many of them think of themselves as being “spiritual”.

In view of these preliminary observations, this paper aims to analyze the trends and characteristics of religious nones in South Korea (henceforth Korea). The paper first examines the trend of religious nones in Korea, followed by an analysis of the characteristics of their views and attitudes toward religion and spirituality. The paper then examines the factors that account for the large proportion of religious nones in the country, particularly focusing on the role of religious suppression during the Joseon dynasty and the popularity of shamanism (musok) and Confucianism, which are perceived by many Koreans as cultural practices. The paper also discusses potential factors which may have contributed to the rise in religious nones in Korea in recent years, including the rapid economic development and concomitant improved living standard, high education attainment level, and the rise of leisure culture. The paper closes by exploring how the growing number of people who identify as religious nones complicates traditional ideas about secularization. The rise of nones challenges the view that secularization means religion is declining. Rather, it highlights how individuals are finding new, often personal, ways to seek meaning and community. By looking at how people are both leaving and reshaping religion, the paper offers a more flexible understanding of secularization as an evolving social process.

2. Religious Nones in Korea

According to the 2015 Population and Housing Census Report published by Statistics Korea (2016), the “non-religious” population in Korea remained relatively high between 1985 and 2015. For example, the proportion of the Korean population with no religious affiliation was 57.4 percent in 1985, 49.6 percent in 1995, 47.1 percent in 2005, and 56.1 percent in 2015 (see

Table 1. Religious Population in South Korea (in thousands; percentage of total population)2.

	Religious Population in South Korea
	1985	1995	2005	2015
Total Population	40,448	43,834	46,352	49,052
Protestants	6489 (16.1%)	8505 (19.4)	8446 (18.2)	9676 (19.7)
Buddhists	8059 (19.9)	10,154 (23.2)	10,588 (22.8)	7619 (15.5)
Catholics	1865 (4.6)	2885 (6.6)	5015 (10.8)	3890 (7.9)
Won Buddhists	92 (0.2)	86 (0.2)	129 (0.3)	84 (0.2)
Confucians	483 (1.2)	210 (0.5)	104 (0.2)	76 (0.2)
Others	212 (0.5)	260 (0.6)	245 (0.5)	208 (0.4)
No Religious Affiliation	23,216 (57.4)	21,735 (49.6)	21,826 (47.1)	27,499 (56.1)

Source: Statistics Korea (2016).

).1

More recent Gallup Korea surveys also show similar trend of increasing religious nones (Gallup Korea 2021a; see

Table 2. Ratio of Religious Population, 1984–2021 (%)5.

		Proportion of People Who Believe in a Religion
		1984	1989	1997	2004	2014	2021
Total		44	49	47	54	50	40
Sex	Male	34	40	36	44	44	34
	Female	53	58	58	63	57	56
Age	19–29	36	39	36	45	31	22
	30s	45	46	47	49	38	30
	40s	49	54	53	57	51	32
	50s *	53	58	56	62	60	43
	60+					68 **	59

Source: Gallup Korea (2021a). * The age category “50s” from 1984 to 2004 refers to those aged 50 or older. ** Since 2014, separate categories have been established for those in their 50s and those over 60.

). The proportion of Koreans without religious affiliation rose to 60 percent in 2021, which is a considerable increase from 50 percent in 2014.3 The decline in the religious population among young adults between the ages of 19 and 29 in the 2000s is particularly noteworthy. In 2004, 45 percent of those in their 20s believed in religion, but the figure fell to 31 percent in 2014, and to 22 percent in 2021. The proportion of religious population among those in their 30s also decreased sharply from 49 percent in 2004 to 38 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in 2021.4 It is also noteworthy that, across the periods in question, a significantly higher proportion of men than women report being unaffiliated with any religion.

The latest national survey shows that the proportion of Korean population with no religious affiliation has increased even more. A survey by the Korean Christian Pastors Association, which has been conducting surveys on religious trends approximately every five years since 1998, found that 63.4 percent of Koreans in 2023 were religious nones (Hangukgidokgyomokhoejahyeopuihoe 2023, p. 43). This is perhaps the highest proportion of religious nones in any country in the world, excluding communist countries.

The notably high percentage of the non-religious population in Korea becomes even more apparent when viewed in a global context. A Gallup survey conducted in 1989 across 18 countries—including the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Mexico, Japan, and South Africa—found that Korea had the highest proportion of religious ‘nones’ at 51 percent, while the average across all countries surveyed was below 14 percent (Gallup Korea 1990). More recently, a 2015 Pew Research Center survey, drawing from over 2500 censuses and surveys worldwide, reported that only 16 percent of the global population had no religious affiliation (Pew Research Center 2017, p. 8). This marked a notable increase from 2007, when just 11.8 percent of the global population was considered ‘non-religious’. These figures indicate that while religious disaffiliation has become a global phenomenon, it is significantly more pronounced in Korea.

As for the question of whether the religious nones had previously believed in a religion, the 2021 Gallup survey shows that 25 percent of the respondents were found to have been affiliated with a religion (Gallup Korea 2021a). However, data from previous surveys show that the past religious experience rate of non-religious Koreans had been relatively higher in the past: 43 percent in 1984, 45 percent in 1989, 50 percent in 1997, 43 percent in 2004, and 35 percent in 2014 (Gallup Korea 2021a). The biggest reason for not believing in religion at present, answered by more than half of the non-religious respondents (54 percent) was “not interested”, followed by “distrust and disappointment in religion” (19 percent), “do not have mental freedom and freedom of time” (17 percent), and “believe in myself” (8 percent) (Gallup Korea 2021a). Gallup surveys from 1997, 2004 and 2014 show similar trends (Gallup Korea 2015, p. 29; 2021a; see

Table 3. Reasons for Non-Religious People Not Believing in Religion (%).

		Reasons for Non-Religious People Not Believing in Religion
		Distrust and Disappointment in Religion	Believe in Myself	Do Not Have mental and Time Freedom	Not Interested	Family and Friends Are Against It	No Courage and Feel Burdened	Others
1997		23	10	19	26	4	4	14
2004		14	18	21	37	2	2	6
2014		19	15	18	45	1	2	0
2021		19	8	17	54	1	1
Gender	Male	21	8	15	54	0	1
	Female	16	7	19	55	1	1
Age	19~29	18	5	10	64	0	1
	30–39	20	7	17	53	0	1
	40–49	15	8	20	55	0	2
	50–59	24	8	19	47	1	1
	60+	18	11	18	50	2	1

Source: Gallup Korea (2021a).

). Among age groups, young adults between the ages of 19–29 chose “no interest in religion” as the top reason for being religiously unaffiliated.

3. Characteristics of Religious Nones in Korea

One of the reasons why many Koreans are turning away from religion is that they think religion is not important in their personal life. This can be readily seen in surveys conducted by Gallup Korea from 1984 to 2021 (Gallup Korea 2021b; see

Table 4. The Importance of Religion in Personal Life 1984–2021 (%).

	Proportion of Respondents Agreeing with the Statement that “Religion Is Important in My Personal Life”
Year	1984	1989	1997	2004	2014	2021
	68	66	62	56	52	38
	Proportion of Respondents Agreeing with the Statement that “Religion Is Not Important in My Personal Life”
Year	1984	1989	1997	2004	2014	2021
	32	34	38	44	48	62

Source: Gallup Korea (2021b).

). According to the 2021 Gallup survey, for example, the percentage of Koreans who answered that religion is “important” in their personal lives fell to 38 percent in 2021, falling below 50 percent for the first time since the survey began in 1984, insinuating an increase in the number of religious nones (Gallup Korea 2021b). Surprisingly, 11 percent of religious nones viewed religion as being important in their personal life. Even more remarkable is that the figure for the same question was as high as 48 percent in 1984 (Gallup Korea 2021b).

On the question of how helpful religion is to our society, the proportion of Korean religious nones who responded affirmatively was just 18 percent (Gallup Korea 2021b). However, a considerable proportion of the religiously unaffiliated in Korea are also found to hold “religious views” to a certain extent. The proportion of religious nones who believed in the existence of various supernatural concepts was as follows: absolute being (18 percent); paradise/heaven (19 percent), afterlife souls (23 percent); miracles (45 percent); and ghosts/demons (21 percent) (Gallup Korea 2021b). Surprisingly, a 2014 Gallup Korea survey also shows that 21 percent of religious nones in Korea actually believed in creationism, a quintessential Christian doctrine (Gallup Korea 2015, p. 161). Except for afterlife souls and ghosts, all the other supernatural concepts mentioned above originate from Christianity, which shows the pervasiveness of Western influence on Koreans, irrespective of their religious orientation or lack thereof.

A survey by Mokhoedatayeonguso (2024), a research institute that regularly conducts surveys on various religious and social issues to help clergy and lay leadership, also sheds light on many important characteristics of religious nones in Korea. First, when the latter were asked whether they are religious, only 5 percent responded that they consider themselves “religious”, while 59 percent responded that they were “non-religious”, and 36 percent responded that they were “neither religious nor non-religious”.

Second, religious nones generally believe in religious truths, as 59 percent of non-religious respondents agreed with the statement, “Most religions have their own truth”, revealing their religiously pluralistic views and showing that non-religious people are not generally hostile to religion itself (Mokhoedatayeonguso 2024). In addition, 27 percent of non-religious respondents held the position that “There is no special truth in any religion”, while only 1 percent of the respondents thought that “Only one particular religion has truth”. A noteworthy point here is that 24.9 percent of the respondents who had never been religiously affiliated answered that they had an interest in religion, which shows that people without religion are not completely indifferent to religion.

Third, when asked whether they considered themselves spiritual, 24 percent—approximately one in four non-religious respondents—indicated that they do, explaining that while they do not identify with a particular religion, they are interested in the sacred or supernatural. This proportion was consistent across both genders and all age groups.

Fourth, similar to the Gallup Korea finding above, considerable proportion of non-religious respondents who do not believe in the existence of God actually have an interest in the supernatural and spiritual realm. For example, the Mokhoedatayeonguso (2024) survey finds that 60 percent of non-religious respondents do not acknowledge the existence of God, although more than half of them believe in transcendent powers. In addition, 24.4 percent of non-religious respondents oscillated between belief and nonbelief in the possibility of the existence of God, while 4.6 percent responded that they actually believe in the existence of God. In other words, among religiously unaffiliated Koreans, those who deny both the existence of God and transcendent powers are a minority, at only 26 percent (so-called “active atheists”). Other religious nones can be categorized as follows: those who do not believe in the existence of God but acknowledge transcendent powers can be called “passive atheists” (34 percent); those who oscillate between the belief and disbelief in the existence of God can be called “non-theists” (24 percent); and those who believe in the existence of God can be considered “theists” (5 percent) (Chong 2024, p. 162).

Fifth, the 2024 survey conducted by Mokhoedatayeonguso reveals that a significant proportion of non-religious Koreans maintain beliefs in supernatural concepts drawn from a range of religious traditions, including Christianity, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Among Christian concepts, 30 percent believe in an afterlife, 23 percent in hell, 21 percent in heaven, and 16 percent in religious miracles. As for Buddhist ideas, 29 percent of non-religious respondents expressed belief in reincarnation, while 19 percent affirmed belief in nirvana. Also, 30 percent of non-religious Koreans believe in the Confucian supernatural concept of “supernatural help from ancestors”. These findings suggest that Korea’s religious nones are not entirely detached from religious influence. On the contrary, they appear to maintain open and selective engagement with a wide spectrum of supernatural beliefs rooted in the country’s diverse religious heritage.

Lastly, the 2024 Mokhoedatayeonguso survey indicates that 29 percent of religiously unaffiliated respondents reported engaging in spiritual practices—such as meditation, yoga, or prayer—either for religious reasons or to attain peace of mind. Among these, meditation and mindfulness training ranked highest at 19 percent, followed by yoga at 8 percent and prayer at 6 percent. When those who participated in any of these practices were asked about their perceived benefits, the most frequently cited outcomes were achieving peace of mind and experiencing comfort or consolation. In contrast, fewer respondents reported that these practices significantly impacted their sense of life’s meaning or led to changes in personal values.

For example, 40 percent of non-religious Koreans responded that they have experienced practices of shamanism/superstition such as fortune-telling in 2023 (Mokhoedatayeonguso 2024). The most common practice was “saju”, fortune-telling based on one’s birth date and time (24 percent), followed by “tarot card reading” (15 percent), “palm reading” (5 percent), “physiognomy” (4 percent), “astrology” (3 percent) and “feng shui” or “geomancy” (2 percent), among others (Mokhoedatayeonguso 2024). Further proving that Korean religious nones have rather strong shamanic tendencies is that when asked to agree or disagree with certain popular beliefs about shamanism, considerable proportion agreed. For example, nearly half of the respondents (47 percent) agreed with the statement that “the birth date and time affect a person’s life”, while 29 percent and 27 percent of the respondents agreed that “talisman brings good luck” and “fortune tellers can predict the future”, respectively (Mokhoedatayeonguso 2024). It is noteworthy that the younger the age group, the higher the belief in talismans and fortune-telling. For example, 42 percent and 35 percent of the respondents in their 20s agreed that “talisman brings good luck” and “fortune tellers can predict the future”, respectively, while the figures for all other age groups were considerably lower.

What many of the above findings show is that the religiously unaffiliated in Korea, as elsewhere, still engage in spiritual activities, such as meditation, mindfulness and yoga, and hold supernatural beliefs. It is thus noteworthy to distinguish between spirituality and organized religion, which begins with a clear definition of the former. While there is no universally accepted definition of spirituality,6 spirituality can be defined generally as the human search for ultimate or sacred meaning and an individual’s pursuit of meaning and purpose in life, entailing a search for self-awareness, inner serenity and personal growth, typically outside of formal religious establishments (see Griffin 1988; Waaijman 2002). Characteristics of spirituality include fluidity in membership and identity, the absence of sacred texts that dictate the followers’ beliefs and practices, although there may be certain handbooks or guidebooks, and greater flexibility which enables people to find inspirations from various traditions and practices such as meditation, mindfulness, and yoga in lieu of formal rituals and ceremonies (Heehs 2019, pp. 5–14). Organized religion, on the other hand, can be defined as “a formally codified or institutionalized form of religion”, generally involving “specific doctrine, authority, rituals, myths, practice, sacred elements, and taboo elements” [italic in original] (Grande 2024, p. 524). Hamilton (2001, pp. 21–22; see Borg 2008, pp. 132–33; Southwold 1978) also offers the following attributes, among others, as characterizing organized religions: a central concern with supernatural beings; beliefs which must be held on the basis of faiths; an ethical code; a body of scripture or “exalted oral traditions”; a priesthood or specialist religious elite; and association with a moral community.

4. Factors for the Large Number of Religious Nones in Korea

4.1. Suppression of Shamanism and Buddhism During Korea’s Last Dynasty

A significant historical factor behind the relatively high percentage of religious nones in contemporary Korea can be traced back to the enduring impact of the Joseon Dynasty (1392–1910), the nation’s final dynastic era. During this period, Confucianism—particularly its Neo-Confucian variant—was formally adopted as the state ideology and actively enforced by the ruling elite. In aligning governance with Confucian principles of order, rationality, and hierarchy, the Joseon authorities implemented sweeping measures to suppress and delegitimize shamanism and Buddhism (Jung and Lee 1991, pp. 123, 136, 156, 172; Kim et al. 1992, p. 276, 278, 294; Grayson 1989, pp. 142, 151, 172; Baker 2008, pp. 63–64), both of which were viewed as obstacles to moral discipline, social hierarchy, and rational rule. As a result, the Joseon elite systematically suppressed these traditions through a combination of legal, fiscal, and cultural sanctions.

4.1.1. The Marginalization of Shamanism

Shamanism, an indigenous tradition with deep historical roots, was aggressively targeted by Joseon elites as vulgar, morally corrupt, and antithetical to Confucian virtues.7 Neo-Confucian scholars deemed shamanic rituals “superstitious and obscene”, particularly condemning the involvement of both sexes in ceremonies and the ritual use of alcohol (Yun 2019, p. 186).8 These rites were derogatorily labeled eumsa, or “sacrifices to evil spirits” (Kim et al. 1992, p. 277), and mudang (shamans) became targets of deep social disdain. Classified among the cheonmin (outcast classes), they were banned from the capital city and anyone who supported them risked corporal punishment—reportedly 100 public lashings (C. Kim 2003, p. 156).

Institutional repression further reinforced this marginalization. A tax known as muse (“shaman tax”) was levied on those performing gut (shamanic ritual ceremonies), and a triennial census of shamans was conducted to facilitate tax collection (Yun 2019, p. 44). By the 16th century, the Sarim faction—an influential group of Confucian literati—called not just for regulation but for the outright prohibition of shamanistic practices. This suppression endured until the twilight years of the dynasty. Even the modernizing Gabo Reforms of 1895, while eliminating the shaman tax, sought to eradicate what reformers viewed as irrational beliefs. Leading Korean intellectuals of the era frequently invoked the term misin (“superstition”) to describe shamanism, framing it as a regressive force impeding national advancement (Yun 2019, pp. 51–53; Kendall 2009, p. 4).9

4.1.2. The Systematic Dismantling of Buddhism

Far more than shamanism, it was Buddhism that became the principal target of the Confucian ruling elite during the Joseon dynasty. For centuries prior, Buddhism had been the dominant religious force and enjoyed privileged status as the de facto state religion. During the Unified Silla period (668–935), Silla monarchs actively styled themselves as Buddhist sovereigns, adopting Buddhist names and participating in rituals that signaled royal piety. This legacy continued and intensified during the Goryeo dynasty (918–1392), when Buddhism was elevated to the status of “religion of the state”. Goryeo kings were zealous patrons of the faith, channeling vast public resources toward the construction of temples, the commissioning of Buddhist art, and the performance of elaborate state rituals by Buddhist monks. These monks, in turn, frequently conducted ceremonial rites intended to protect the state and legitimize royal authority. Over time, however, Buddhism’s institutional presence grew bloated and increasingly entangled with secular power. Temples amassed significant wealth and political influence, becoming not only spiritual centers but also hubs of economic and administrative power. Many established commercial enterprises employed military retainers and managed sprawling estates staffed by tenants and slaves. By some accounts, Buddhist temples controlled up to one-third of all arable land and owned as many as 100,000 slaves (A. E. Kim 2022a, pp. 134–36). Monks—once regarded as ascetic spiritual practitioners—became symbols of excess and corruption, regularly involved in political maneuverings and power struggles.

The founding of the Joseon dynasty in 1392 marked a decisive break from this legacy. Determined to dismantle what they saw as a deeply corrupt Buddhist establishment, Joseon elites championed Neo-Confucianism as a moral and ideological corrective. Under the banner of “Respect Confucianism, Suppress Buddhism” (seungyu eokbul, 崇儒抑佛), the new regime enacted sweeping measures to expunge Buddhism from the public sphere (J. W. Lee 2010; Bu 2007).10 Participation in Buddhist ceremonies was officially forbidden, the Sangha (monastic community) was dissolved, and numerous orders were either banned or forced into retreat. The state confiscated temple lands, seized property, and dismantled Buddhist infrastructure. Temples within urban centers were destroyed, converted for secular use, or forcibly relocated to remote mountain areas—a geographic exile that explains the mountainous placement of most Korean temples today.

This forced marginalization had far-reaching consequences. Stripped of state patronage, urban presence, and public legitimacy, Buddhism was relegated to the periphery of Korean society. Monks, once esteemed figures of spiritual authority, were now equated with social outcasts such as butchers, concubines, and slaves. Buddhism’s previously robust cultural, social, and religious influence all but vanished from mainstream life. Cut off from the aristocracy and urban elite, the faith survived primarily among rural peasantry who continued to support remote temples. In short, the centuries-long campaign of suppression during the Joseon era effectively decimated Buddhism’s institutional power and reshaped Korea’s religious landscape—laying the groundwork for a society in which formal religious affiliation would become increasingly optional.11

4.1.3. The Legacy of a Religious Marginalization and Early Evidence of Secular Continuity

The net result was the formation of a unique religious situation. For more than five centuries, Koreans lived without a widespread cultural framework for religious identity or affiliation. While elsewhere in the world religions often competed for influence, Korea became distinctive in experiencing a prolonged and near-complete institutional vacuum outside of Confucian orthodoxy. Confucianism, while central to governance and social order, emphasized ritual and ancestral veneration rather than spiritual transcendence. Its state-sponsored practice of ancestor worship functioned more as a civic duty than a religious faith. For over five centuries, the state either prohibited or severely restricted alternative forms of religious expression. This prolonged suppression created a sociocultural environment in which organized religion played a minimal role in people’s daily lives. Generations of Koreans became accustomed to a form of religiosity that was personal, ancestral, or cultural rather than institutionally affiliated.

These factors collectively led early Protestant missionaries and foreign visitors arriving in Korea during the late nineteenth century to remark that the peninsula seemed to be a land devoid of a formalized religion (Griffis 1885, p. 161; Lowell 1886, p. 182; Miln 1895, p. 226; see A. E. Kim 2022a, p. 136). Methodist missionary Henry Appenzeller, upon arriving in Seoul in 1885, described the population as “practically without a religion,” noting that “Buddhist and Roman Catholic priests go about like thieves in the night” (Hunt 1980, p. 81). Griffis (1888, p. 371), also an early missionary to Korea, similarly remarked that “Koreans offer the spectacle of a nation without a religion and waiting for one”. The nineteenth-century British explorer and writer Bird ([1897] 1985, p. 63) made the following comment after her journeys to Korea: “… when Buddhist priests and temples were prohibited in the walled towns three centuries ago, anything like a national faith disappeared from Korea, and it is only through ancestral worship and a form of ‘Shamanism’ practiced by the lower and middle classes that any recognition of the unseen survives”. This absence of an easily identifiable religious structure led missionaries to conclude, albeit through a culturally filtered lens, that Korea represented fertile ground for Christian expansion (J. Lee 1995, p. 149).12

The systematic suppression of Korea’s long-standing religious traditions—many of which were intricately woven into communal rituals and individual identity—played a critical role in cultivating a social atmosphere marked by religious disaffiliation. This trajectory reflects not a temporary disruption but the emergence of a lasting secular sensibility, shaped by centuries of repression, marginalization, and the erosion of traditional religious institutions. This historical legacy continues to shape Korea’s evolving relationship with religion in the contemporary era.

4.2. Popularity of Shamanism and Confucianism as “Cultural Practices” in Contemporary Korea

The high proportion of religiously unaffiliated individuals in Korea can also be attributed in part to the enduring influence of Confucianism and shamanism—two traditions that, while deeply embedded in Korean life, are often regarded more as cultural or philosophical systems than as formal religions. For many Koreans, Confucianism functions primarily as a moral and social framework, shaping values such as filial piety, respect for hierarchy, and communal harmony. Similarly, shamanism is frequently viewed as a set of time-honored customs or pragmatic rituals for addressing personal concerns, rather than as a belief system requiring formal affiliation. As a result, individuals who engage with these traditions—whether by observing Confucian rites or consulting shamans for fortune-telling, healing, or rituals like gut—may not self-identify as religious in the conventional sense.13 This perception significantly affects how people respond to surveys: when asked whether they belong to a religion, many who participate in these practices may answer “no”, not out of disbelief or disinterest, but because they do not associate their practices with institutional religion. Consequently, they are categorized as “religious nones”, even though their lives may be shaped by deeply rooted spiritual or ritual traditions. This dynamic highlights the limitations of survey methodologies that rely on Western definitions of religion, which often emphasize formal membership, doctrinal belief, and institutional affiliation.14

There is ample evidence that Confucian and shamanic traditions continue to shape the cultural and spiritual landscape of contemporary Korea. One prominent example is the widespread observance of Confucian ancestral rites, which remain a central feature of Korean family life. According to the 2021 Gallup Korea survey, 66 percent of religious nones reported performing ancestral rituals during major holidays such as Seol (Lunar New Year) and Chuseok (Korean Thanksgiving) (Gallup Korea 2021b). This participation rate was second only to that of Buddhists (89 percent), suggesting that these rites are widely regarded not as religious obligations, but as cultural expressions of filial piety and family continuity. In fact, many Koreans view these rituals as integral to their heritage, irrespective of religious affiliation or lack thereof. Moreover, one does not need to identify as ‘Confucian’ to participate in it.

Beyond ritual practice, Confucian values continue to inform the social attitudes of a significant portion of the population. In the 2014 Gallup Korea survey, 41 percent of religiously unaffiliated respondents agreed with the statement that “the roles of the husband and wife should be distinguished”, reflecting enduring gender role expectations rooted in Confucian ideology (Gallup Korea 2015, p. 54).15 Similarly, 28 percent of non-religious Koreans endorsed the view that “children should follow their parents’ wishes rather than their own thoughts”, underscoring the persistent influence of hierarchical family norms (Gallup Korea 2015, p. 54). Even earlier, in a 2004 survey, nearly half (49.4 percent) of religious nones agreed that “the male elder in the household must hold authority for the household to be orderly”, a sentiment that echoes traditional Confucian family structure (Gallup Korea 2004, p. 86). Taken together, these findings suggest that Confucianism in Korea functions less as a formal religion and more as a pervasive cultural framework—one that continues to shape values, behaviors, and social expectations across generations. Many Koreans, while not identifying as Confucian in a religious sense, nonetheless embody Confucian principles in their daily lives, often unconsciously. This phenomenon illustrates the deep entwinement of Confucianism with Korean identity, where tradition persists not through institutional allegiance, but through lived practice.

Another enduring cultural tradition widely practiced in Korea is shamanism, which continues to form a vital part of the Korean spiritual worldview. For example, the 2024 Mokhoedatayeonguso survey reveals that 40 percent of non-religious Koreans reported having engaged in shamanic practices like fortune-telling in 2023. Among these, the most prevalent was saju—a form of divination based on one’s birth date and time—practiced by 24 percent of respondents. This was followed by tarot card readings (15 percent), palm reading (5 percent), physiognomy (4 percent), astrology (3 percent), and feng shui or geomancy (2 percent) (Mokhoedatayeonguso 2024).16 These figures suggest that shamanic practices are not fringe phenomena but rather popular cultural expressions that persist even among those who do not identify with any formal religion.

Further evidence of shamanic influence can be found in the widespread acceptance of folk beliefs traditionally associated with Korean shamanism. According to the same 2024 survey, 47 percent of respondents agreed with the belief that “a person’s birth date and time affect their life”, a foundational tenet of saju. Additionally, 29 percent believed that “talismans bring good luck”, and 27 percent agreed that “fortune tellers can predict the future”.17 These beliefs are not confined to older generations; in fact, they are especially pronounced among younger Koreans. Among those in their 20s, 42 percent expressed belief in the efficacy of talismans, and 35 percent in fortune-telling—figures that significantly outpace those of older age groups. This generational pattern suggests that shamanic worldviews are not merely remnants of the past, but are being reinterpreted and revitalized by younger Koreans in search of meaning, guidance, and control in an increasingly uncertain world. The persistence of these beliefs among the non-religious underscores the cultural embeddedness of shamanism, which functions less as a formal religion and more as a flexible, adaptive spiritual framework. This trend is not new. As early as 2014, a Gallup Korea (2015, p. 85) survey found that 34 percent of religiously unaffiliated Koreans agreed with the statement, “If the fortune-telling on marital compatibility is very poor, it is better not to get married”—a belief rooted in the traditional practice of assessing gunghap (marital harmony) through divination. Such findings reinforce the notion that shamanic traditions continue to shape personal decisions and social attitudes, even in a society that is increasingly secular in name.

In short, both Confucianism and shamanism do not offer a clear framework for religious self-identification. Many individuals who actively engage in Confucian or shamanic practices may nonetheless report themselves as “non-religious” when asked about their religious affiliation (Kang 1997, p. 91). In this sense, the category of “religious nones” in Korea may be misleading, as it likely includes a substantial number of practicing Confucians and shamanists whose spiritual lives are deeply shaped by these traditions, even if they do not formally identify with them. In the case of shamanism, the disconnect between cultural practice and institutional recognition is especially stark. Historically marginalized and often dismissed as mere superstition or folklore, shamanism has long occupied a liminal space between religion and tradition. Shamanic practices—such as consulting shamans for fortune-telling, inviting them to perform gut rituals, or seeking their assistance for this-worldly concerns like health, longevity, success, and prosperity—are often pursued pragmatically rather than devotionally. These engagements are typically episodic, personal, and goal-oriented, rather than expressions of sustained religious commitment. Moreover, Korean shamanism has no centralized doctrine, no formalized community of believers, and no hierarchical priesthood offering systematic theological instruction; instead, it operates through a decentralized network of mudang who serve as intermediaries between the human and spirit worlds. As a result, despite its deep historical roots and continued relevance, shamanism remains a largely “invisible” and instrumental form of spirituality—one that resists easy classification and eludes conventional methods of empirical measurement. For these reasons, for much of the modern era, it was excluded from official surveys on religious affiliation—not due to a lack of believers or practitioners, but because it was regarded primarily as a cultural custom rather than a legitimate religious system (Park 2000). When shamanism is excluded from official surveys as a recognized spiritual tradition, individuals who actively engage with its practices are typically categorized under the broad and ambiguous label of “no religion”. As a result, statistical data portrays an inflated proportion of the population as religiously unaffiliated, creating a skewed image of widespread secularism. The miscategorization not only obscures the enduring role of shamanistic practices in shaping existential meaning for many Koreans, but also reinforces a narrow definition of legitimate spiritual affiliation—one that favors institutionalized doctrines over informal or experiential forms of belief.

4.3. Socio-Cultural Factors for the Rise of Religious Nones

While the number of religious nones in Korea had been consistently high, their numbers seem to have increased even more in recent years. This is most clearly shown in the data by Hangukgidokgyomokhoejahyeopuihoe (2023), which shows that the proportion of religious nones in Korea has steadily risen from 43 percent in 2004 to 45 percent in 2012, 53 percent in 2017, and 63 percent in 2023. There may be many factors for this phenomenon, but the following are most noteworthy. First, the increasing distrust and disappointment in religion. Continual reports in the media of scandals involving the clergy, particularly those pertaining to the embezzlement of funds and sexual assault, have seriously hurt the image of religion as a whole. Another serious problem, albeit limited to Protestantism, is the controversy over the hereditary succession of the head minister in churches (Chae 2021). This particular practice is distasteful to most Koreans, because it not only goes against Korea’s highly valued meritocracy but also reveals that the clergy are pursuing secular benefits of money and power, just like ordinary people. All of these scandals have led to the overall negative view of, and disappointment in, organized religions as failing to serve as role models of society (Y. H. Lee 2012, p. 1). Accordingly, Korean religious nones’ evaluation of all the major religions has become generally less favorable, particularly Protestantism (Hangukgidokgyomokhoejahyeopuihoe 2023). For example, while Catholicism and Buddhism received 19.5 percent and 13.3 percent of responses, respectively, regarding the statement that “the positive influence of religion on our society is increasing”, Protestantism received only 6.8 percent of responses (Chong 2023, p. 19). As for the specific reasons for the less favorable view of Protestantism, the latter was singled out for not doing enough relief/volunteer work, for having relatively small number of religious leaders with excellent qualities, for tendencies to excessively demand offerings, and for not warmly treating non-believers (Chong 2023, p. 19).

Second, Koreans’ high level of educational attainment may have contributed to the rise in the number of religious nones. While there have been many studies on the relationship between the level of educational attainment and the level of religiosity, it is difficult to make generalizations, as contrasting conclusions can be drawn depending on religions, denominations, regions, and countries (see Pew Research Center 2016). One noteworthy finding is that the average education level of non-religious people is higher than that of religious people. For example, according to a finding by the Pew Research Center (2016) based on data from 151 countries around the world, the average education level of religious nones was 8.8 years, 1.3 years more than the average education level of religious people (7.5 years) in 2016. Data from Korea show a similar trend. According to the 2014 Gallup Korea survey, the proportion of religious nones with a college degree or higher was 59 percent, which was significantly higher than 41 percent for the religiously affiliated (Gallup Korea 2015, p. 192). In fact, Korea’s relatively high level of tertiary education attainment may actually be a factor for the large number of religious nones in the country. Korea boasts one of the highest educational attainment rates in the world, as indicated by, among others, the proportion of adults with college education. For example, as of 2014, the proportion of 25–64-year-old Koreans with tertiary education attainment was 45 percent, which was the fifth highest in the world after Canada (54 percent), Israel (49 percent), Japan (48 percent), and Luxembourg (46 percent) (Wikipedia 2024b). For the tertiary education attainment rate for those aged between 25 and 34 years old, Korea had the highest figure in the world at 69.8 percent in 2019, followed by Canada (63 percent), Russia (62.1 percent), Japan (61.5 percent), and Ireland (55.4 percent) (Newsweek 2021). Also, Korea has had one of the world’s highest college enrolment rates among high school graduates, rising from 27.2 percent in 1980 to 33.2 percent in 1990, 51.4 percent in 2000, and reaching the all-time high mark of 83.8 percent in 2008 (since then, the college enrolment rate among high school graduates in Korea has hovered around 70 percent).

Third, Korea’s rapid economic development may have led to a decline in Koreans’ need for religion in their everyday lives, resulting in a relatively higher number of religious nones. There tends to be a negative correlation between national levels of religiosity and average annual income, i.e., the world’s poorest are also the most religious (WIN-Gallup International 2012; Pew Research Center 2015). Indeed, according to a survey by the Pew Research Center (2015), people in poorer nations are more inclined to value religion more importantly than people in affluent nations. Also, belief in God and participation in religious services have been generally declining in most economically developed countries in recent decades, and Korea is no exception. While not subscribing to the deprivation-compensation theory—i.e., those belonging to lower socio-economic class, especially those suffering from economic deprivations, are more likely to be religious—the fact that Korea is now an economically developed country means that Koreans find religion less important in their lives than ever before. As it is well known, Korea has achieved a remarkable economic development, transforming itself from one of the poorest countries just a half century ago to one of the largest economies of the world today (often dubbed “the Miracle on the Han River”). Currently, the country boasts the 12th largest economy in the world with a total GDP of $1.87 trillion. In fact, in July 2021, Korea became the first and only country in the history of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to have its status changed from a “developing country” to a “developed country”. Korea’s per capita gross national income (GNI) has risen accordingly, jumping from $120 in 1962 to $6450 in 1990, $11,030 in 2000, $22,280 in 2010, and $36,194 in 2023.

Fourth, the economic development of Korea has engendered the spread of leisure culture. Koreans today have more free time due to higher living standards and shorter working hours, allowing them to engage in various leisure activities, including participant sports, particularly golf and mountain hiking, spectator sports, movies, and travel, all of which compete with religion for time, attention and commitment (see A. E. Kim 2022b, pp. 192–200). For instance, going to the movies has perhaps become the most popular pastime among Koreans. The number of tickets sold for movies increased from 64 million in 2000 to 123 million in 2005, 147 million in 2010, 217 million in 2015, and 217 million in 2019 (Korean Film Council 2025). Also, a 2020 finding by the Korean Film Council (2020) shows that the frequency of movie-going per capita among the Korean population was 4.37 times in 2019, the highest in the world. Attending sporting events, particularly those featuring professional spectator sports teams, has also become a popular pastime. The popularity of e-sports is also growing, as evidenced by the existence of a 24-h cable channel dedicated exclusively to the sport. Domestic and international travel also has grown in popularity as a leisure activity. For example, since the beginning of the 21st century, the number of outbound travelers has continuously increased as follows: 5.5 million in 2000, 10 million in 2005, 20 million in 2016, and 29 million in 2019, representing nearly two-thirds of the total population (Korea Tourism Organization 2020). As for participant sports activities, mountain hiking has emerged as the most popular pastime and sports activity since the end of the 1990s, when the number of those who enjoyed hiking on a regular basis totaled around 7 million. Since then, the number of hikers has increased significantly. According to a 2023 survey, the number of Koreans who go mountain hiking more than once a month was approximately 32.29 million, or 78 percent of all adult men and women, a noticeable increase from 53 percent in 2008 (Korea Forest Service 2023). The fact that mountains make up nearly 70 percent of South Korea’s land is a major factor in the popularity of mountain trekking. Golf is also a popular participant sport in Korea. The number of Koreans who enjoy golf increased from 900,000 in 1990 to 2.4 million in 2000, 4.3 million in 2010, 4.7 million in 2020, and 5.6 million in 2021 (Korea Leisure Industry Research Institute 2022). Fishing is another well-liked pastime in Korea. The number of Koreans who identify fishing as their hobby increased steadily from the 1990s, jumping from around 3 million in the 1990s to 5.7 million in 2005, 6.5 million in 2010, 9.2 million in 2020, and 9.9 million in 2023 (Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries 2024). In short, all of this shows that many Koreans today can be said to be no longer interested in religion, because they have alternative means to spend their leisure time, including various forms of entertainment, travel, and sports. There are two reasons why Koreans have become more involved in leisure activities. First, as noted above, Koreans enjoy relatively high living standard, which means that they can afford to spend more money and time on leisure activities than they did in the past. Second, the value of “work–life balance”, which refers to the desire of the working people to balance work and personal life, including hobbies, self-improvement, and leisure and recreational activities, has gained increasing popularity among Koreans. Therefore, as more people engage in leisure activities, the proportion of non-religious people in Korea can be said to have increased correspondingly.

Lastly, as seen above, younger-aged Koreans, more specifically those in their 20s, 30s and 40s, are less likely to believe in a religion than their older counterparts (Gallup Korea 2021a). This fact raises the possibility that the spread of social media or social networking service (SNS), which is much more popular among relatively “younger” adults than those in their 50s or older, can be a factor for their less commitment to religion. Indeed, social media, which broadly include KakaoTalk, Telegram, LINE, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram as well as YouTube and TikTok, may have contributed to the increase in religious nones in Korea in recent years. That is because social media likely has served as a direct competition against religion for younger adults’ time and attention. Social media is a platform that allows individuals to access a wide variety of activities and interests, including those for hobbies, personal growth and activism, all of which can compete against religion and can actually serve as substitutes for religion. Also, social media offers a channel for like-minded individuals to form a new community or stay connected, giving them a sense of identity and belonging, all of which can also serve as alternatives to religion.

5. Conclusions

This paper has examined the phenomenon of religious nones in Korea by analyzing their characteristics and the factors for the large number of irreligious individuals in the country. The paper shows that some Koreans became religiously unaffiliated because they were disappointed with established religions, while others became religious nones because they had no interest in religion to begin with. As for the characteristics of religious nones in Korea, a considerable proportion of them are found to hold “religious views” to a certain extent, as they believe in such supernatural concepts as the absolute being, paradise/heaven, and afterlife souls. Also, a considerable number of religious nones in Korea regularly participated in shamanic and Confucian practices. More importantly, many of them were found to be “spiritual but not religious” (SBNR), i.e., although most of them do not believe in the existence of God, they remain interested in the supernatural and spiritual realm, which is consistent with the findings from other countries. In other words, much like their counterparts in other parts of the world, many religious nones in Korea are “spiritual seekers”, which refers to those who do not belong to a religious organization but continue to explore religious or existential questions. Furthermore, the sharp decline in institutional religious affiliation in Korea since the 2010s—and the rise of the SBNR phenomenon—cannot be fully understood without considering contemporary social dynamics. Factors such as the proliferation of social media, increased cultural exchange, rising educational attainment, the growth of single-person households, the expanding popularity of companion animals, and a cultural shift toward personal well-being, individual happiness, civil equality, and personal freedom have all contributed to reshaping spiritual life beyond traditional religious frameworks. These developments challenge the stereotype of religious nones as atheists, wholly secular, or indifferent to matters of faith. On the contrary, they represent a diverse and evolving spectrum of spiritual engagement that often exists outside institutional boundaries.

5.1. Contributing Factors to the Rise of Religious Nones in Korea

One major factor contributing to the relatively high proportion of unaffiliated individuals in Korea, as this paper argues, is the long-standing suppression of spiritual practices—excluding Confucianism—over a period spanning more than five centuries, up until the early 20th century. This sustained restriction gave rise to a suppressed religious landscape, in which many Koreans were left without a strong sense of identity or communal belonging tied to formalized belief systems. The widespread engagement with shamanism and Confucianism—valued more as a form of spiritual expression and a guiding worldview, respectively—is also identified as a key contributing factor. A major reason behind the notably high number of individuals in Korea who report no affiliation in surveys and censuses lies in the nature of these traditions. Since they typically do not foster a strong sense of group identity or formal community belonging, many who follow their practices do not perceive themselves as adherents of a defined spiritual organization, and thus refrain from marking any affiliation.

Another critical dimension to consider is the phenomenon of “multi-religious persons”—individuals who participate in diverse spiritual traditions without maintaining exclusive commitment to any single one (Chong 2024, p. 145). In contemporary Korea, such pluralistic engagement is not only common but culturally embedded. It is not unusual for someone to identify as Christian while simultaneously practicing Buddhist meditation for personal mindfulness, observing Confucian ancestral rites out of familial obligation or cultural respect, and seeking guidance from a shaman in times of uncertainty. This fluid interweaving of practices illustrates a form of spiritual pragmatism that resists rigid classification. Rather than adhering to a singular theological framework, many Koreans draw selectively from various traditions to meet different emotional, moral, or existential needs. These expressions of syncretism complicate standardized survey categories, particularly those based on Western models that assume exclusive affiliation and doctrinal consistency. Such patterns call into question the reliability of binary labels like “religious” versus “non-religious” in the Korean context. They underscore the importance of adopting more flexible and culturally sensitive methodologies that can account for non-exclusive, situational, or symbolic forms of spiritual engagement. Without this nuance, the rich complexity of Korean spirituality risks being flattened or misrepresented in both academic discourse and policy-making.

5.2. The Rise of Religious Nones: Implications for the Secularization Thesis

Given the rise in the number of religious nones in many parts of the world, it is perhaps pertinent to reconsider the concept of secularization, which has long been a subject of controversy in the sociology of religion. And there are many seminal works on the subject, including more recent ones (Martin 1978; Dobbelaere 1981; Asad 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Taylor 2007; Turner 2020; Inglehart 2021; Cragun and Smith 2024). Secularization encompasses a range of meanings, including the diminishing cultural and social significance of religion; the functional differentiation between secular and religious spheres; the marginalization or exclusion of religion from public and institutional domains; the rise of rationalization as a guiding societal principle; and the increasing privatization of religion. As Luckmann (1967) suggests, in this context, religion becomes largely “privatized” and socially “invisible,” confined to the personal realm rather than shaping collective life. The recent upsurge in religious nones makes a strong case that secularization may indeed be a “force” that may lead some people ultimately to irreligion. Indeed, this paper can be said to argue that the rise in the irreligious is one of the indicators and consequences of secularization. What must be noted, however, is that the relationship between irreligion and secularization is complicated, because although secularization may lead to an increase in irreligion, or vice versa, the two are not synonymous. More importantly perhaps, while secularization can occur at multiple levels, i.e., individual, organizational and societal, the rise in irreligiosity in recent years highlights the extent of secularization occurring at the individual level. Compared to secularization at the societal level, secularization at the individual level has not been given the same level of attention. That is because societal secularization entails more broad and discernible shifts in social structures—e.g., the spread of secular principles in politics and education, the disentanglement of religion from other spheres of society, and the waning of religious influence in public life—thereby attracting greater attention. Individual-level secularization, on the other hand, which concerns one’s own religious beliefs and the role of religion in one’s day-to-day existence, can be less obvious and more subtle, which makes it more difficult to measure.

The growing number of individuals identifying as religious “nones” has profound implications for how we understand and theorize secularization—not just as a decline in religious belief, but as a transformation in the role religion plays in public and private life. Traditionally, secularization theory suggested that modernization would erode religious institutions, a pattern reflected in declining participation in organized religion. Yet, this trend also signals a reconfiguration of religious identity, as many nones still engage in spiritual practices, suggesting that secularization is not simply about disbelief, but about disaffiliation from religious frameworks (Bruce 2011, pp. 79–119). Also, as more people openly identify as nonreligious, nonbelief can become socially “normalized,” reducing the social stigma once tied to atheism or agnosticism, which contributes to a more diverse and pluralistic public discourse where religious and secular perspectives coexist more equitably. This development also challenges long-held assumptions that morality stems from religion; many religious nones turn to humanism, scientific reasoning, or personal ethics to guide their values, supporting a growing model of secular morality (see Cragun and Smith 2024, pp. 214–19). Moreover, the rise of religious nones does not signify the disappearance of religion altogether. Instead, scholars point to the emergence of “resacralization” in new forms—found in wellness movements, environmental activism, or fandoms that take on quasi-religious dimensions—suggesting that secularization is not a linear process but a multidirectional evolution. Ultimately, the rise of religious nones invites a richer, more complex framework for understanding how individuals craft meaning in a society where belief and unbelief intertwine in novel ways.

5.3. From Faith to None: The Sociocultural Impact of Religious Disaffiliation

It is also worth considering the wide-ranging societal transformations that may accompany the growing number of individuals who identify as non-religious (see Cragun and Smith 2024, pp. 207–49; Kasselstrand et al. 2023, pp. 115–39). One significant consequence may be the continued secularization of society, whereby organized religion gradually loses its authority and influence across cultural, social, and political domains. This shift can lead to the redefinition of public discourse, ethics, and policymaking, as religious frameworks are increasingly supplanted by secular and pluralistic perspectives. Moreover, in the absence of traditional religious institutions, many individuals may gravitate toward alternative forms of spirituality and meaning-making. Practices such as meditation, mindfulness, and various New Age philosophies—alongside renewed interest in astrology, magic, the occult, and other non-institutional belief systems—may fill the spiritual vacuum for those who still seek a sense of transcendence or inner guidance outside the bounds of organized religion. A further implication concerns the social function of religion as a community-builder and a source of belonging. As religious affiliation declines, there may be a parallel rise in the formation of alternative communities, many of which may be digitally mediated. Online spaces, interest-based groups, activist circles, and even fandom cultures may serve as new sites of shared identity, ritual, and solidarity—reconfiguring the ways in which people connect with one another. Finally, an increasingly irreligious society could foster greater inclusivity and acceptance of diverse lifestyles, beliefs, and personal choices. Freed from traditional religious prescriptions, societal norms may become more accommodating of same-sex marriage, non-heteronormative relationships, polyandry, births outside of marriage, body modification such as tattoos and piercings, as well as movements rooted in ethical considerations like veganism and animal rights. In this way, the erosion of religious influence may serve as a catalyst for broader social liberalization, encouraging the validation of identities and practices that have historically been marginalized or stigmatized.

5.4. Limitations of the Study

Lastly, it must be acknowledged that there are inherent limitations in relying solely on quantitative data to measure the extent and nature of irreligiosity in Korea. While surveys and statistical analyses can offer broad patterns and general trends, they often fail to capture the deeper, more subjective dimensions of religious disaffiliation—such as personal narratives, cultural influences, and emotional experiences—that shape how individuals relate to religion or choose to disengage from it. To fully grasp the multifaceted nature of religious non-affiliation in Korea and in other comparable contexts, future research would benefit greatly from the inclusion of qualitative methodologies. Approaches such as in-depth interviews, focus groups, and ethnographic fieldwork have the potential to uncover rich, textured insights into the ways people experience, negotiate, and interpret their lack of religious identification. These methods can illuminate the subtle social and psychological dynamics that often remain hidden behind numerical trends, offering a more holistic and humanized understanding of what it means to be religiously unaffiliated in contemporary Korean society.