The Ethical Examination of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Extraction Technology from the Perspective of Classical Confucianism’s Benevolence Toward People 仁民 (renmin) and Love for Things 愛物 (aiwu)

Abstract

The medical application of human embryonic stem cell technology has sparked ethical controversies, with the core issue being whether human embryos possess the same right to life as humans. According to classical Confucianism, humans are born from the essential Qi 精氣 (jingqi) of heaven and earth, making them the noblest beings in the world. Human embryos are the simple form of human life in its early stages, and as living human beings, they should therefore possess the legitimacy and justification to life. Confucianism advocates benevolence toward people 仁民 (renmin) and love for things 愛物 (aiwu) distinguishing between benevolence and love: benevolence toward people is benevolence, while love for all things is love. How people treat one another is how they should treat human embryos. Things exist to serve humanity; humans may utilise things but must not be treated as tools. Embryo life must not be harmed or sacrificed for the sake of saving human life. One should show benevolence to people and love to things. Therefore, the attitude toward human embryos should be “benevolence.” Human embryos inherently possess the potential to become human beings and do not require medical intervention to demonstrate their value. However, when humans extract and utilise stem cells from human embryos for their own benefit, this is tantamount to treating the embryos as things and reducing them to the status of things, thereby blurring the ethical boundaries between humans and things and disrupting the distinction between the recipients of benevolence and love. The extraction of human embryonic stem cells is ultimately an artificial technological achievement. Humans are not superior beings to heaven, and such practices must be confined within the moral framework of technological ethics and bioethics. Notwithstanding the technological advancements that have furnished humans with contemporary instruments, the necessity for a sense of awe for the heaven remains.

1. Introduction

Embryonic stem cells (ESC) are a type of cell derived from the inner cell mass (ICM) of the blastocyst stage of an embryo, which can be established and maintained under specific conditions in vitro. These cells possess the characteristics of self-renewal and pluripotency. These cells can be cultured in vitro for extended periods and expanded in large quantities while retaining the potential to differentiate into any cell type found in the human body (Gao 2020, p. 7). Human embryonic stem cells (hES cells) are the initial cells of human development. These cells, which are found in human embryos, possess the capacity for differentiation and multifunctionality. They are primarily derived from normal blastocysts, which are structures formed after 32–64 cells of a fertilised egg divide (Li and Li 2007, p. 241). This technology has demonstrated significant clinical value. In principle, any disease involving the loss of normal cells can be treated by transplanting specific tissue cells derived from stem cells. Examples of such conditions include neurodegenerative diseases such as Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s chorea, and Alzheimer’s disease (Gao 2020, p. 4). A wide range of medical conditions and diseases are associated with this issue, including but not limited to: ophthalmologic diseases, diabetes mellitus, neurologic diseases, female reproductive organ and genitourinary disease, cardiovascular disease (Park et al. 2024, pp. 379–94), etc. Lisa C. Ikemoto points out that “[c]ombining human embryonic stem cells with SCNT (Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer) has been a gold standard of stem cell research”; however, the primary ethical concern is “the risk that SCNT will lead to reproductive cloning” (Ikemoto 2014, pp. 7–8). In fact, “[t]he embryos from which the stem cells have been derived must have been produced by medically-assisted in vitro fertilization in order to induce pregnancy” (Taupitz 2017, pp. 121–30). Nevertheless, due to the unique characteristics of human embryos, “ESC research is very controversial because the derivation of ES cells—at least at the present time—destroys the embryo” (Steinbock 2007, p. 417). The vast majority of methods of obtaining human embryonic stem cells result in the destruction of human embryos (Wang and Yan 2019, pp. 66–73). This indicates that current human embryonic stem cell technology finds it difficult to avoid causing harm to human embryos.

Consequently, the utilisation and implementation of this technology have given rise to a plethora of bioethical debates from the outset.1 The main issues are whether manipulating human embryos constitutes desecration of life, whether using and consuming embryos is the same as killing life, and whether manipulating embryos can be considered the creation of “genetically modified humans” (Gao 2020, p. 4). Is a human embryo a human life? If so, do we have the right to sacrifice embryos that cannot be seen in order to save patients who can be seen? (L. Zhang 2004, pp. 189–201) Furthermore, to what extent can a human embryo be considered a life, and is it reasonable to sacrifice embryos to save patients? In fact, all ethical debates focus mainly on this question: Are human embryos life? Are they human beings? And what attitude should we adopt towards them? Some people think that embryos are human beings with the same value and dignity as humans and that they should not be used or disposed of arbitrarily. Others see embryos as biological life, but not human life in the sociological sense, so they are not really human beings. Some people think that embryos are “potential human life” (Zhang et al. 2007, p. 221). Perspectives on the moral status of human embryos can be distributed into three categories: the belief that embryos are human beings, that embryos are not human beings, and that embryos are potential human beings (Wu 2020). Those who voice criticism and opposition to the extraction of human embryonic stem cells may be categorised as conservatives. They make the argument that “the destruction of an embryo constitutes the killing of a human being.” Those who advocate and encourage such research are to be regarded as radicals. They contend that “an embryo is merely a cluster of cells, devoid of sensation, emotion or human form, and therefore research on such a cluster poses no moral issues”. Those who emphasise the need to impose ethical, legal and moral restrictions belong to the middle group. They argue that “human embryonic stem cell research is ethically justifiable during specific phases of embryonic development or under certain conditions.” These three groups have been engaged in an ongoing debate, but no consensus has yet been reached (Zhao 2011, pp. 21–27). Ali Seyhan Uğurlu summarised two opposing approaches: “The biological humanity view and the person view, Under the former, human life begins at conception and even at the blastocyst stage an embryo is considered as a person having the right to be respected, whereas according to the latter view, the embryo is just a bunch of cells not having any human characteristics” (Uğurlu 2014, pp. 21–34). Wu Zhenzhu 吳珍珠 posits that, in order to ensure adherence to ethical principles in the utilisation of human embryonic stem cells, there is a necessity for the enhancement of researchers’ moral standards (Wu 2020). Xu Ran’s 徐然 analysis of the “patentability” of human embryonic stem cell technology was conducted from an ethical perspective. The author proposed that specific value comparisons and ethical judgments should be made based on five aspects: practicality, innovativeness, creativity, violation of public morality, and harm to public interests (Xu 2023).

The prevailing ethical framework that governs human embryonic stem cells is characterised by Western cultural principles, including respect, fairness, benefit and informed consent. Professor Hu Zhiqiang 胡志強 and Rui Chen 陳睿, both of University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, believe that “despite the adoption of ethical principles by China that align with those of Western countries, the adaptation of some of these theories to bioethical issues within the socio-cultural context of non-Western countries remains challenging” (Chen and Hu 2018, pp. 518–26). Chen Rui 陳睿 further emphasises the importance of respecting cultural differences and establishing a “common ethical bottom line” 共同的倫理底線 (gongtong de lunli dixian). In various interviews, she concludes that traditional Confucian values such as respect for life, an emphasis on human relationships and the importance of family status influence Chinese scientists’ ethical judgements on human embryonic stem cell research (Chen 2020, pp. 108–15). Fan Ruiping 范瑞平, professor at City University of Hong Kong, draws a distinction between the pursuit of individual value and interests as espoused by Western liberal individualism and, drawing upon the Confucian family-oriented ethical perspective, proposes a “two-dimensional moral strategy” 二維道德策略 (erwei daode celue) that emphasises “not seeking maximum utility, but seeking virtue and moral conduct” 不求效用最大，但求品節德行 (buqiu xiaoyong zuida, danqiu pinjie dexing) (Fan 2011, pp. 287–300). Associate Professor Zhao Xu 肇旭 of East China University of Political Science and Law has demonstrated a conscientious consideration of Confucian ethical perspectives, including the tenets of “the great virtue of life” 生生大德 (shengsheng dade),” cherishing life” 愛惜物命 (aixi wuming), “benevolence towards others” 仁者愛人 (renzhe airen) and “respect for life” 敬畏生命 (jingwei shengming). However, a direct articulation of the ethical position of Confucianism with regard to embryonic stem cell research has still not been explicitly expounded (Zhao 2011, pp. 18–19). A comparison of the ethical standards for patenting human embryonic stem cells in China, the United States, Japan and Europe was conducted by Wang Yuanyuan 王媛媛 and Wenjun Yan 閆文軍. The conclusion of their study was that China’s “ethical obstacles” 倫理障礙 (lunli zhangai) are the most severe (Wang and Yan 2019, pp. 66–73). In 2003, the various ministries and commissions of the People’s Republic of China have successively issued the “Ethical Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research” 人胚胎幹細胞研究倫理指導原則 (renpeitai ganxibao yanjiu lunli zhidao yuanze)2, the “Administrative Measures for Stem Cell Clinical Research (Trial)” 幹細胞臨床研究管理辦法（試行） (ganxibao linchuang yanjiu guanli banfa (shixing)) and, In 2016, the “Ethical Review Measures for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects” 涉及人的生物醫學研究倫理審查辦法 (sheji ren de shengwu yixue yanjiu lunli shencha banfa). These regulations provide detailed provisions on various aspects of human embryonic stem cell research, including the source of stem cells, methods of acquisition, management regulations, ethical norms, and ethical review. The regulations emphasise the fundamental requirements of bioethics to ensure the healthy and orderly development of embryonic stem cell research in the field of biomedicine. However, these legal requirements tend to be “broadly defined from a technical perspective” and “rarely take into account the need for detailed rules on technical ethics” (Shou 2024, pp. 81–85). This paper re-examines the right to life and existence of human embryos from the perspective of Confucian concepts such as “benevolence” 仁 (ren) and “love” 愛 (ai) considering their definitions, moral cultivation and awe for heaven. It then engages in a rational reconsideration and moral investigation of human embryonic stem cell extraction technology, combining the principles of benevolence and love with contemporary medical ethics. This approach opens up new avenues for Confucian studies and reinvigorates the theoretical value of Confucianism in the development of modern medical bioethics. Furthermore, it highlights the guiding role of Confucianism in this technology.

2. The Human Embryo Is the “Beginning of a Human Being” 人之始 (Ren Zhi Shi)

The object of Confucian benevolence is human beings, not things. If human embryos are to be treated with benevolence, the first question that must be addressed is in what way the view that “human embryos are human beings” is reasonable and justified. The Shigu 釋詁 of Erya 爾雅 says, “Embryo means the beginning” 胎，始也 (tai, shiye). Guo Pu’s 郭璞 commentary says, “Although an embryo has not yet formed, it is still the beginning of a living thing.” 胚胎未成，亦物之始也 (peitai weicheng, yi wu zhi shiye) (Guo and Xing 2010, p. 12). The embryo is the first stage in the development of a living organism. The human embryo is the earliest manifestation of human life. So, is an embryo a human being? The ethical debate surrounding human embryos is “related to the human dignity, conception of the person, and human being” (Uğurlu 2014, pp. 21–34). The character for “human” 人 (ren) in Oracle Bone Script is recorded in the Collected Oracle Bone Inscriptions 甲骨文合集 (jiaguwen heji) 6175. While the structure of the character is based on the human body, it is difficult to argue that it represents the attributes of a human embryo since the embryo has not yet taken human form. In the radical “human” 人 (ren) of the Shuowen Jiezi 說文解字, Xu Shen 許慎 says, “Man is the most precious of all creatures in heaven and earth” 人，天地之性最貴者也 (ren, tiandi zhi xing zui gui zhe ye). Duan Yucai 段玉裁 commented: “All birds, beasts and plants are created by heaven and earth, but they cannot be at the heart of it. Only humans are the heart of heaven and earth, which is why the creation of humans by heaven and earth is so precious. This heart is called ‘humanity’, and it is in harmony with heaven and earth” 禽獸草木皆天地所生，而不得為天地之心，惟人為天地之心，故天地之生此為極貴。天地之心謂之人，能與天地合德 (qin shou cao mu jie tiandi suo sheng, er bu de wei tiandi zhi xin, wei ren wei tian di zhi xin, gu tian di zhi sheng ci wei ji gui, tian di zhi xin wei zhi ren, neng yu tian di he de) (Xu and Duan 2015, p. 640).3 Human beings are born with the same Dao 同道, the same mind 同心 (tongxin), and the same virtue 同德 as heaven and earth. There is communication between heaven and humanity, and heaven and humanity are integrated 天人合一 (tianren heyi). However, animals, beasts and plants do not possess this inherent nature and these qualities.

Human beings hold the highest and most noble position among all things in heaven and earth and are revered by all other beings. The Chapter on Holy Governance 聖治 (Shengzhi) in the Classic of Filial Piety 孝經 (Xiaojing) states: “Among all creatures, humans are the most precious” 天地之性人為貴 (tiandi zhi xing ren wei gui). Li Longji’s 李隆基 commentary elaborates on this, stating that “humans are precious because they are different from all other creatures” 貴其異於萬物也 (gui qi yiyu wanwu ye) (Li and Xing 2014, p. 36). Humans and other creatures are not born equal: humans are inherently superior and noble. The chapter Li Yun 禮運 in the Book of Rites 禮記 (Liji) says, “ Man is (the product of) the attributes of Heaven and Earth, (by) the interaction of the dual forces of nature, the union of the animal and intelligent (souls), and the finest subtile matter of the five elements” 人者，其天地之德，陰陽之交，鬼神之會，五行之秀氣也 (renzhe, qi tiandi zhide, yinyang zhi jiao, guishen zhi hui, wuxing zhi xiuqiye) (Legge 2013, p. 104). Zheng Xuan’s 鄭玄 commentary says, “This means that humanity possesses all of these qualities, and one’s nature and character are pure” 言人兼此，氣、性純也 (yan ren jian ci, qixing chun ye) (Zheng and Kong 2014, p. 432). One is born from the essence of heaven and earth and Yin and Yang. Humans are born from the Qi 氣 of Yin 陰 and Yang 陽 of heaven and earth, and embody the virtues of the heaven and the earth. They have superior Qi, a noble nature and an exalted moral character. Their status far exceeds that of other life forms. The chapter On Preserving Life and Maintaining Integrity 寶命全形論 (baoming quanxing lun) in the Suwen 素問 chapter of the Huangdi Neijing 黃帝內經 states: “Heaven covers the earth, and all things are complete; nothing is more precious than human life” 天覆地載，萬物悉備，莫貴於人 (tian fu di cai, wanwu xi bei, mo gui yu ren). Human beings are born with unique and prestigious innate qualities and genetic natures, which cannot be compared to any other thing in the world. In the chapters of Regulations on Officialdom Reflect Heaven 官制象天 and Heaven, Earth, Yin, and Yang 天地陰陽 of the Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn 春秋繁露 (Chunqiu Fanlu), Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 of the Han Dynasty included “human beings” among the “Ten starting points” 十端 (shiduan) (Queen and Major 2016, p. 260) comprising Heaven 天 (tian), Earth 地 (di), Yin 陰, Yang 陽, Wood 木 (mu), Fire 火 (huo), Earth 土 (tu), Metal 金 (jin), Water 水 (shui) and Human Beings 人(ren). “Why are human beings noble? [It is because] what originates with Heaven extends to human beings [and thus] is brought to completion” 聖人何其貴？起于天，至于人而毕 (shengren he qi gui, qi yu tian, zhi yu ren er bi) (Queen and Major 2016, p. 607). The juxtaposition of man and heaven at the beginning and end carries special significance. The “Ten starting points” begin with heaven and end with humanity, which is clearly intended to emphasise humanity’s pivotal status. The cosmos and everything in it are inseparable from heaven and earth, yin and yang, the four seasons and the five elements. Likewise, they cannot exist without humanity. Without human beings, the universe would be incomplete and might even cease to function properly. Dong Zhongshu’s conception of humanity elevates it beyond mere animal existence to the levels of cosmology and ontology, thereby underscoring its noble value and the profound meaning of life. He stated that what lie outside this completion are called “things.” Although things may take on the incipient qualities of nobility, they do not fall within the compass of [the word] “noble.” 畢之外謂之物，物者投所貴之端，而不在其中 (bi zhi wai wei zhi wu, wuzhe tou suo gui zhi duan, er bu zai qi zhong) (Queen and Major 2016, p. 607). Humans can enter the realm of the “Ten Elements”, while things cannot, indicating an inherent hierarchy between humans and “things” characterised by superiority and inferiority, nobility and baseness. “From this, it can be seen that human beings are, by a great margin, superior to other things, the noblest in the world” 以此見人之超然萬物之上，而最為天下貴也 (yi ci jian ren zhi chaoran wanwu zhi shang, er zui wei tianxia gui ye). Because “Below, human beings nurture the myriad things; above, they form a triad with Heaven and Earth” 下長萬物，上參天地 (xia zhang wanwu, shang san tian di) (Queen and Major 2016, p. 607). Humans exist between heaven, earth, and all things. They can follow the great principles of heaven and earth to guide their actions and bestow blessings on all things to help them flourish. They occupy a position below heaven and earth, yet above all things. The chapter of Human Correlates of Heaven’s Regularities 人副天數 (renfu tianshu) explains, “Observe the uniqueness of the human body. How surpassingly lofty a thing it is, and how similar in kind to Heaven! [Other] things tangentially and meagerly partake of Heaven’s yin and yang and thereby survive, but human beings possess [Heaven’s] elaborations and patterns in all their brilliance. This is why as a general rule, the forms of other [living] things do not enable them to move about except in a crouched and creeping fashion. Human beings alone stand erect, look straight forward, and assume an upright position. Thus, those who appropriate a bit of Heaven and Earth assume a non-erect posture; those who appropriate much from Heaven and Earth assume an upright posture. This example makes evident that human beings are distinct from other living things and that they join with Heaven and Earth” (Queen and Major 2016, p. 435).4 Although “things” are also created by heaven and earth, they contain relatively few elements of heaven and earth compared to humans. Only humans are born with an upright posture, while other animals crawl on the ground with crooked bodies. “Distinct” 絕 (jue) means to block, cut off or separate. Humans are humans and things are things. The two are completely different and cannot be compared. Humans are far superior to things and cannot be mentioned in the same category. Therefore, he said, “Of the living things born of the vital essence of Heaven and Earth, none is nobler than human beings. Human beings receive their destiny from Heaven, and therefore they surpass [the lesser creatures] that must fend for themselves” 天地之精，所以生物者，莫貴於人。人受命乎天也，故超然有以倚 (tiandi zhi jing, suoyi sheng wu zhe, mo gui yu ren, ren shouming hu tian ye, gu chao ran you yi yi) (Queen and Major 2016, p. 434). Though both humans and things are born of the Qi of Heaven and Earth, human nature is the most refined and excellent. Their nobility and superiority are innate and necessarily existent, endowed by Heaven’s mandate. The Spirit Discipline 精神訓 (jingshenxun) chapter of the Huainanzi 淮南子 states: It is posited that “Disturbing Qi becomes insects, while pure Qi becomes humans “煩氣為蟲，精氣為人 (fan qi wei chong, jing qi wei ren) (Liu 1989, p. 68). Human life is defined as the condensation of the pure Qi of heaven and earth. In contrast, other species are characterised by a mixture of evil or corrupt Qi, which hinders their ability to attain the level of human life.

The nobility and sanctity of a human being lie not only in the purity of their essential Qi and the uprightness of their physical form, but also in the nobility of their inner spirit. The chapter Zhongyong 中庸 in the Book of Rites 禮記 (Liji) says, ”Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity” 仁者，人也 (ren zhe, ren ye) (Legge 2013, p. 260). Benevolence is a fundamental human quality; the characters for ‘human’ and ‘benevolence’ can be used interchangeably. The chapter Zhou Discourses 周語 (zhouyu) of the Discourses of the States 國語 (Guoyu) states: “When speaking of benevolence, one must consider others” 言仁必及人 (yan ren bi ji ren). Wei Zhao’s 韋昭 commentary explains: “Benevolence means extending universal love to all people” 博愛于人為仁 (bo ai yu ren wei ren) (Zuo 2015, pp. 62–63). Once designated as a human being, one is inextricably bound to benevolence, endowed with an innate capacity for loving others and possessing the inherent qualities of benevolence. The part A of the chapter Kung-sun Ch‘ou 公孫丑 (Gong sun chou) in the Mencius regards benevolence 仁 (ren), dutifulness 義 (yi), rites 禮 (li), and wisdom 智 (zhi) as the “four germs” 四端 (si duan) that define humanity. He states that “[i]f a man is able to develop all these four germs that he possesses, it will be like a re starting up or a spring coming through” 凡有四端於我者，知皆擴而充之矣，若火之始然，泉之始達 (fan you si duan yu wo zhe, zhi jie kuo er chong zhi yi, ruo huo zhi shi ran, quan zhi shi da). When Heaven created humanity, it endowed humans with life genes and moral qualities distinct from those of things. Dong Zhongshu further pointed out, “Other living things suffer troubles and defects and cannot practice humaneness and righteousness. Human beings alone practice humaneness and righteousness. Other living things suffer troubles and defects and cannot match Heaven and Earth. Human beings alone match Heaven and Earth” 物疢疾莫能為仁義，唯人獨能為仁義；物疢疾莫能偶天地，唯人獨能偶天地 (wu chen ji mo neng wei renyi, wei ren du neng wei renyi, wu chenji mo neng ou tiandi, wei ren du neng ou tiandi) (Queen and Major 2016, p. 434). Not only are humans inherently endowed with a unique potential for benevolence and righteousness, they alone can be born in perfect harmony with heaven and earth—from their external appearance and internal organs to their inner ethics, emotions and spirit. Although the human embryo has not yet attained the moral capacity for benevolence and righteousness, nor has it formed a visible form matching heaven and earth, no one would comfortably equate a human embryo with an animal embryo. Nor would anyone deny that a human embryo will one day become a being capable of benevolence and righteousness, one that matches heaven and earth. The human embryo has no other possibility but to develop into a human being. This fact determines the irreplaceable and inevitable belonging of the human embryo to the human species, a status established from the very moment of human embryonic life’s occurrence. In the chapter entitled Bu Lie 卜列 of the book Qianfulun 潛夫論, the assertion is made that “what makes a person human is not this eight-foot physical body, but rather the spirit within it “人之所以為人者，非以此八尺之身也，乃以其有精神也 (ren zhi suoyi wei ren zhe, fei yi ci bachi zhi shen ye, nai yi qi you jingshen ye) (J. Zhang 2023, p. 375). The fundamental attribute of being human does not lie in external appearance, but in the inherent spiritual qualities of the individual. The moment of fertilisation, in which the male and female gametes unite, the human embryo possesses the distinctive characteristics of human life and the inherent right to exist. It can only be regarded as a human embryo and cannot be classified as a non-human embryo. While some scholars may have different views based on the concept of “person” in the sense of personality, this paper refers to “human being” in the sense of the human species. Li Ruiquan 李瑞全 and Jin Meihua 金美華 state: “Everything pertaining to the natural life of any human being belongs to humans or humankind. This includes adults, children, infants, and even foetuses, embryos and stem cells. In other words, anything possessing human genetic material may be considered human” (Li and Jin 2017, pp. 48–59). Consequently, owing to humanity’s innate uniqueness and superiority, human embryos should be classified as human in terms of their genetic attributes, innate characteristics and moral potential. It would be difficult to regard them as anything other than human.

So why might human embryos possess the same noble nature and moral standing as human beings? According to the classical Confucian interpretative framework of heavenly principles, Yin and Yang 陰陽, the four seasons 四時 (si shi) and the Five Elements 五行 (wuxing), human life is formed through the harmonious union of the essential Qi of heaven and earth. From the moment of conception, a human being is a unified, complete, continuous, unique and indivisible living entity. The human embryo itself is the natural, living embodiment of human life. Despite the fact that human embryos have not yet acquired human form, from the perspective of the interaction between Yin and Yang in heaven and earth, it clearly possesses the vital attributes and existential value that define humanity. Western scholars excel at analytical thinking and tend to consider and discuss the moral status of human embryos from a variety of different stages, perspectives and disciplines. Li Ruiquan 李瑞全 argues that “western philosophy’s focus on analysis and decomposition has led to a strong emphasis in medicine on dissecting the body into distinct organs, tissues and systems. This approach involves further dissecting each organ and system and conducting in-depth research and treatment for each minute component.” This approach seeks direct, highly effective therapeutic methods for specific diseases. However, influenced by philosophical concepts such as the unity of heaven and humanity, Yin and Yang, and the five elements, traditional Chinese medicine places greater emphasis on the interconnectedness of humans and nature, as well as the connection between medicine and humanistic values. “Not only are humans and all things in heaven and earth products of the transformation and circulation of Qi, but particularly, various medicinal substances have corresponding relationships with the human body. Human life is regarded as a microcosm, and health or illness reflects whether this Qi is harmonious or not.” Human life should be viewed as a unified whole, considering not only the interconnectedness of bodily organs, but also the entirety of one’s life cycle as a complete process. He argues, “From the holistic perspective of Confucian benevolence, which views humanity as being in harmony with heaven, earth and all things, medicine must regard the body as a whole, with all its parts influencing and resonating with one another. Medicine must more faithfully reflect the multi-layered and interconnected wholeness of the human life form” (R. Li 2015, pp. 49–66). Based on the Song dynasty Confucian principles of caution at the beginning and theories of foetal education, Cai Zhen 蔡蓁 contends that Confucian physicians “generally regarded the embryonic period as the beginning of human life”, emphasising that “the life of the embryo was already perceived as human life” (Cai 2021, pp. 106–15). However, Western scholars have adopted different perspectives in their discussions about the moral status of human embryos. For example: Bonnie Steinbock presents four views of moral status, based on four different criteria: “biological humanity, personhood, possession of interests, and having a future-like-ours (FLO)”, She continues:

On two of these views (the person view and the interest view), embryos clearly lack moral status, but they most likely do not have moral status on the FLO account either. Only the biological humanity criterion combined with the view that life begins at conception results in the conclusion that very early extracorporeal embryos have full moral status, making ESC research that destroys embryos morally wrong”.

(Steinbock 2007, p. 417)

According to Steinbock, human embryos “do not have moral status nevertheless have moral value and are entitled to respect” (Steinbock 2007, p. 417). Some scholars also argue that “ethical debate cannot be reduced to ‘potential for life’, since inherent within the potential of an embryo is an assumption regarding the appropriateness of its environment.” Therefore, “it is appropriate to ask whether it is useful to continue thinking of the blastocyst as an independent entity with a moral status stemming entirely from its organisation and perceived potential” (Towns and Jones 2004, pp. 410–13). Other scholars refer to a “developmental” approach according to which, roughly, an embryo achieves more status as it becomes more like a person, with the transition to blastocyst marking an important jump. This approach emphasises determining the moral status of an embryo based on its developmental stage. However, Glenn McGee and Arthur L. Caplan argue that this approach is conceptually confused and lacks clear threshold criteria for distinguishing between tissue that can and cannot be used for treatment. They therefore call for broader religious and scientific discussions to redefine reproductive material and its significance (McGee and Caplan 1999, pp. 36–38). This also demonstrates that modern Western medicine, developed according to traditional models, has encountered certain ethical obstacles. It has begun to pay attention to human spiritual, cultural, religious and natural aspirations—precisely the moral ideals and conception of life that have been consistently upheld by Confucian traditional Chinese medicine. From a Confucian perspective, the human embryo is considered a unified living entity, so dissecting it into different stages or aspects for anatomical study would not be endorsed.

However, Confucian thought is richly diverse and remarkably comprehensive. When considering the ethical issues surrounding human embryo technology from a medical perspective, different scholars may reach different conclusions by focusing on different aspects of Confucian philosophy. Yet the fundamental principle of benevolence remains unchanged. D. F.-C. Tsai categorises ethical stances towards human embryos into three positions: “the all position”, “the none position”, and “the gradualist position”. These positions address Mencius’s “conception of personhood”, Confucius’s theories of the “love of gradation” and “due treatment”, which emphasise that Confucianism advocates for varying degrees of love and respect based on the closeness of the relationship between the subject and the object, as well as their differing moral statuses. Therefore, the author contends that “[t]he human embryo has less moral status and ethical significance than the later foetus, infant, child, and adult human. The moral obligation we have for (rational, conscious) persons is clearer and stronger than those we have for human embryos” (Tsai 2005, pp. 635–40). Therefore, Confucianism should emphasise balancing embryonic life with human interests, adopting a “gradualist position”. In fact, Confucianism has always been concerned with the daily interests of the people, as demonstrated by the concepts of rectifying names 正名 (zhengming), People-centred 民本 (minben), edification 教化 (jiao hua), regulation for balance 調均 (tiao jun) and people’s means of livelihood 民產 (min chan). However, all these ideas must be rooted in benevolence. Unlike the philosophy of the Mozi school, which is based on “universal mutual love and exchange of mutual benefit” 兼相愛，交相利 (jian xiang ai, jiao xiang li) (Johnston 1893, p. 139). Kong Deli 孔德立 claimed that Mencius’ opposition to Mohism 辟墨 (bi mo) resulted in the full incorporation of Mohist thought into Confucianism (Kong 2009, pp. 36–40). It demonstrates that Mozi’s practical thought did not fundamentally overturn Confucianism; within the Confucian discourse system, the principle of benevolence as the foundation and the notion that “righteousness outweighs profit” have always been upheld. Confucians would forsake even the greatest gain should any action violate the path of benevolence and righteousness. The Li ren 里仁 chapter of the Confucius Analects 論語 (lunyu) states that “[o]ne who truly loved Goodness could not be surpassed” 好仁者，無以尚之 (hao ren zhe, wu yi shang zhi) (Slingerland 2003, p. 31). Benevolence remains the fundamental principle and highest aspiration that governs human behaviour. Therefore, if human embryos are considered human beings, destroying embryonic life contravenes the Confucian doctrine of “[t]he benevolent man loves others” 仁者愛人 (renzhe, ai ren) (Lau 2004, p. 94). Any benefits derived from such actions would not be sanctioned by Confucianism. From a benevolence-centred perspective, the benefits to society of curing disease may not outweigh the harm inflicted upon embryonic life.

3. Human Embryos Are Not Things

The following analysis will seek to address the question of why an embryo cannot be defined as a “thing”. It is evident that, in consideration of the character’s configuration, the primary signification of “thing” is associated with bovine animals. The radical “oxen” 牛 (niu) of the Shuowen Jiezi 說文解字 states the following: “Thing refers to all things. Cattle are substantial creatures, and the numbers of heaven and earth originate with the star in the constellation of the Ox. Consequently, the character is composed of the radical for cattle and the sound element for ‘wu’” (Xu and Duan 2015, p. 640).5 Xu Shen 許慎 elucidated the etymology of the character wu 物, expounding its significance in relation to celestial phenomena and measurements. The reason why oxen are considered such great creatures can be traced back to their connection with the star Altair in the cosmos.6 In ancient times, “things” were often interpreted as plants, animals and beasts. The Zhou Rites 周禮, chapter on the Zaifu 宰夫 of the heavenly official 天官 (tianguan), states that lost property and things should be used 凡失財用物 (fan shicai yong wu). In Zheng Xuan’s 鄭玄 commentary, “things” are explained as referring to animals and beasts 物，畜獸也 (wu, chushou ye) (Zheng and Jia 2014, p. 48). Animals and beasts all belong to the category of things. The part A of the chapter Jinxin 盡心 in the Mencius says: “He is attached to his parents but is merely benevolent towards the people; he is benevolent towards the people but is merely sparing with living creatures” 親親而仁民，仁民而愛物 (qinqin er renmin, renmin er aiwu) (Lau 2004, p. 156). Zhu Xi 朱熹 of the Song Dynasty explains that the term “things” refers to “animals, birds and plants” 禽獸草木 (qinshou caomu), and that “love” signifies “taking them at the right time and using them in moderation” 取之有時，用之有節 (qu zhi you shi, yong zhi you jie) (Zhu 2011, p. 340). People demonstrate their love for things by not abusing or overindulging in them and by keeping their desires within reasonable limits. In the seventh year of Duke Zhao 魯昭公, the Zuo Zhuan 左傳 states that the “utilisation of numerous refined things strengthens the soul” 用物精多則魂魄強 (yong wu jing duo ze hunpo qiang). According to Kong Yingda’s 孔穎達 commentary, the term “things” is used to denote “resources used for sustenance, the general name for food and clothing” 物謂奉養之物，衣食所資之總名也 (wu wei feng yang zhi wu, yi shi suo zi zhi zongmingye) (Du and Kong 2014, p. 764). The term “things” is defined as all the resources and items necessary for people’s daily lives, including but not limited to grain, fruit, vegetables, livestock, clothing and everyday items. It is evident that these things are inherently beneficial to humankind, and their purpose is to serve the needs of individuals. It is only through human utilisation and advancement that these minerals attain their true value. In accordance with the Confucian ethical perspective, which emphasises the importance of respecting and treating life with kindness, it is held that “people are a purpose in themselves and should not be regarded as instruments or means” (Guo 2016, pp. 77–81). It is submitted that medical technology itself should also be a “thing” serving humanity. However, it cannot transcend the exalted status and dignity of human beings. It can thus be concluded that it is impossible to elevate the technology of extracting human embryonic stem cells above the human being and cause harm to human beings. Human embryos are to be regarded as human beings and not as things. These are human embryonic lives formed through the natural processes of creation, the interaction of Yin 陰 and Yang 陽, and the union of male and female. The purpose of their existence is to become human beings, rather than to serve as tools for the development of stem cell technology or as things for human utilisation. The Geron EAB concludes that the respect accorded hES cell lines means that they should be valued in themselves, but not more than other “substantial values.” Glenn McGee and Arthur L. Caplan criticise the argument that “the problem with hES cell lines’ status is not established by their developmental potential, but the trade-off seems empty” (McGee and Caplan 1999, pp. 36–38). Although human embryos are accorded a certain degree of respect, this seems to be arbitrarily revoked in the face of greater human values or interests. This is in opposition to the Confucian concept of benevolence, which values human beings above all else.

The human embryo is the initial stage of human formation and growth, representing the very beginning of human life. This entity is characterised by its vitality, dynamism and continuous movement, and it embodies the complete potential and characteristics of human life. Consequently, it possesses the legitimacy and validity of human existence. It is submitted that it should not only be entitled to the absolute dignity and benevolent treatment accorded to all human beings, but also be granted the same life rights and moral status as humans. As human embryos are regarded as human life, they should be treated with the same benevolence prescribed by Confucianism. How humans treat each other is how they should treat human embryos. In the Confucian tradition, humans are regarded as inherently superior and sacred. The Part B of the chapter lilou 離婁 in the Mencius says: “The benevolent man loves others” 仁者，愛人 (renzhe, ai ren) (Lau 2004, p. 94). Since benevolence is directed towards human beings themselves, the requirements of benevolence are stricter than those of love for other things. As human life, embryos should be regarded with benevolence and not treated as animals, medicine or tools to be used and harmed. If stem cells are extracted from embryos for the sake of medical research, this undoubtedly treats embryos as things, blurring the distinction between humans and things, failing to distinguish between different categories and ranks, and reducing humans to the level of things. This clearly contradicts Confucian ethical principles and aspirations regarding the nature of human life. Mencius also claimed: “Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses this distinguishing feature, while the gentleman retains it” 人之所以異於禽獸者幾希，庶民去之，君子存之 (ren zhisuoyi yiyu qinshou zhe jixi, shumin quzhi, junzi cunzhi) (Lau 2004, p. 91). Zhao Qi’s 趙岐 commentary states that “slight” 幾希 (ji xi) means “very little” 無幾 (wuji) (Zhao and Sun 2014, p. 153), and that the difference between humans and animals is only a tiny bit. A gentleman’s behaviour is motivated by inner benevolence and a sense of justice (to follow “the path of morality” 由仁義行 (you ren yi xing)) (Lau 2004, p. 91). while a base person is neither benevolent nor righteous. If one abandons benevolence and righteousness, one loses the essence of being human and is reduced to an animal. The part A of the chapter King Hui of Liang Wang 梁惠王 (Liang Hui Wang) in the Mencius says: “Even the devouring of animals by animals is repugnant to men. If, then, one who is father and mother to the people cannot, in ruling over them, avoid showing animals the way to devour men, wherein is he father and mother to the people?” 獸相食，且人惡之；為民父母，行政，不免於率獸而食人，惡在其為民父母也？ (shou xiangshi, qie ren e zhi; wei min fumu, xingzheng, bumian yu shuai shou er shi ren, e zai qi wei min fumuye) (Lau 2004, p. 7) Sun Shi 孫奭 provides the example of “tigers and wolves devouring cattle and sheep” 虎狼食牛羊 (hu lang shi niu yang), suggesting that when beasts kill and devour one another, people feel disgusted, and even more so when those in positions of governance lead beasts to devour people (Zhao and Sun 2014, p. 14). When Confucius said, “The inventor of burial figures in human form deserves not to have any progeny,” he was condemning him for the use of something modelled after the human form. How, then, can the starving of this very people be countenanced?7 Confucius was so resentful toward those who first made clay figurines in the likeness of humans to be buried with the dead, and he could not tolerate the situation where rulers, who were supposed to be the parents of the people, governed in such a way that the people starved to death. In such circumstances, people were no better than cattle and horses. Because there is mutual destruction and consumption between things, Confucianism believes that things are inferior and humans are superior. The Human Correlates of Heaven’s Regularities 人副天數 (renfu tianshu) chapter of the Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn 春秋繁露 explains that “Other living things suffer troubles and defects and cannot practice humaneness and righteousness. Human beings alone practice humaneness and righteousness” 物疢疾莫能為仁義，唯人獨能為仁義 (wu chenji mo neng wei renyi, wei ren du neng wei renyi) (Queen and Major 2016, p. 434). “Things” in nature are imperfect and have shortcomings; they do not know how to treat their own kind benevolently and righteously. What makes humans noble is our ability to treat one another with benevolence and righteousness, and our refusal to allow situations in which people kill or harm one another. Protecting human embryos is clearly a moral bottom line and an ethical requirement for humanity. Otherwise, we would descend into the realm of beasts. Some scholars argue that the moral rights that humans possess should be extended to embryos. Ernlé W. D. Young states that “fetuses are alive and thus have some moral status based on the respect for life principle” (Holland et al. 2001, p. I70). Shaun D. Pattinson refers to the concept of a “full status” position. This means that “full moral status is granted to the embryo from the moment of its creation” (Pattinson 2006, p. 317). This indicates that people are increasingly recognising the right to life and moral status of human embryos, significantly advancing bioethical awareness of human embryonic stem cell research.

However, if a human embryo is considered a living being and the patient is also a living being, is it morally justifiable to harm or sacrifice the embryo in order to save the patient? Whose life has greater value, the embryo’s or the patient’s? This raises the question of the tendency to prioritise the protection “護生”的傾向性 (husheng de qingxiangxing) of potential life (the embryo) and actual life (patients who may be cured through embryonic stem cell research) (Zhao 2011, p. 19). According to conventional secular moral principles, the moral status of a human embryo is higher than that of an animal embryo at the same stage of development. However, its value and significance are determined by the person to whom it belongs, such as the father or mother. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. states: “This is usually unambiguously the father and mother who conceived it, especially the mother since she bears it. They produced it, they made it, it is theirs. The foetus can be regarded as a special form of very dear property: the biological lineage of a family, a couple’s attempt to fashion another person on whom to bestow their love and give their care and concern” (Engelhardt 1996, p. 255). If the moral status of a human embryo is placed between that of animals and humans, then humanity itself becomes the ultimate arbiter and controller of embryo life. However, according to Confucianism, the life of an embryo is bestowed by Heaven. Fan Ruiping 范瑞平 states: “A person must form their own life through the union of their father and mother, and be born into this world—this is the mandate of Heaven” (Fan 2024, p. 79). The life of a human embryo is not created by the union of male and female themselves, but by the interaction of the Yin Qi and Yang Qi of Heaven and Earth. Human beings are born from Heaven, and Heaven is above human beings. Therefore, judging the moral status and life value of a human embryo based on its importance to human interests is inconsistent with the Confucian concept of the relationship between heaven and humanity. However, some people believe that “the independent moral standing of preembryonic human tissue is so slight and the research being done is important, that it should be allowed to proceed both with respect and in accordance with the principles of informed consent (the agent’s right principle, as applied to the donors of such tissue)” (Holland et al. 2001, p. I73). The early stages of embryonic development are categorised as “tissue” in the biological sciences, thereby negating the human embryo’s status as a living human being with rights and legitimacy. This also contravenes the Confucian principle of benevolence towards all human life. Even from a utilitarian perspective, one should adhere to the “Greatest Happiness Principle”, which “holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness” (Mill 2014, p. 9). Therefore, the question of whether protecting embryonic life constitutes a virtue cannot be considered in terms of the happiness of any particular patient or individuals connected with the embryo. Instead, it must be considered in terms of the long-term welfare and interests of humanity as a whole. John Stuart Mill states that “the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one’s neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality” (Mill 2014, pp. 24–25). From the perspective of harmonious coexistence and the pursuit of happiness for all of humanity, utilitarianism likewise demands that people show compassion towards their fellow human beings and refrain from harming or killing them. This principle aligns with the Confucian moral imperative of benevolence towards others. Therefore, Fan Ruiping 范瑞平 stated that “even if utilitarians do not strictly adhere to the formula of maximising benefits—that is, when individual interests conflict, it is not necessary to sacrifice the interests of individuals with lesser interests in order to achieve the goal of maximising benefits—they must still resort to the so-called ‘quality of life’ perspective to prioritise the value of human life over qualities such as self-awareness and rationality.” Therefore, “the value of a person cannot be reduced to a set of empirically determinable, mutually comparable characteristics” (Fan 2011, p. 301).8 Thus, the moral status and value of human embryos should not be determined simply by comparing their potential benefit to humanity.

The order between the life of a human embryo and the life of a human being is another interesting topic. In the Confucian tradition, human life is regarded as a divine gift, imbued with sanctity and inviolability. The value of life cannot be judged by comparing the magnitude of benefits, as harming embryonic life already violates the Confucian principle of benevolence towards all humans. Even if the intention is good, Confucians would still regard it as evil. Actually, based on the Confucian concept of “caution at the beginning” 慎始 (shenshi). Volume 1 of Yiwei Tongguang Yan 易緯通卦驗 states that “correcting the root will put everything in order. If you lose even a tiny bit of the beginning, you will be a thousand miles off later” 正其本而萬物理，失之毫厘，差以千里 (zheng qi ben er wanwu li, shi zhi haoli, cha yi qianli) (Zheng 1991, p. 14). The earliest stages of anything are the most important and have the greatest impact on the future. The Bao Fu 保傅 chapter of the Da Dai Li Ji 大戴禮記 states that “a gentleman is cautious at the beginning” 君子慎始也 (junzi shenshi ye) (Wang 1983, pp. 58–59). Confucianism emphasises the importance of establishing a good root and preventing potential problems. The embryonic stage of human life is therefore considered the most important and critical period. According to the logic of human life’s occurrence and development, the embryo represents the beginning of human life. Everyone develops from an embryo, and without an embryo, human existence would not be possible. This seems to imply that the embryo precedes the human being and is more important than them. Therefore, sacrificing the embryo to save a patient is clearly immoral.

4. Benevolence Is Nobler than Love, and Human Embryonic Life Cannot Be Destroyed

In the Confucian tradition, benevolence is regarded as a higher moral principle than love. This is because benevolence is considered to be nobler than love 仁大於愛 (ren da yu ai) and more important in terms of moral obligation 仁重於愛 (ren zhong yu ai). According to Confucianism, people are more important than things, and thus loving humans is benevolence 愛人為仁 (ai ren wei ren), while loving things is love 愛物為愛 (ai wu wei ai). The objects of love are different, and the ethical requirements for life are also distinctive. Heaven created human beings, as well as creating things to nurture them. As human beings are more precious and valuable than things, Confucianism requires people to treat each other with benevolence and to treat things with love. The way in which people treat human embryos directly affects human beings’ right to life and dignity. Human embryos are also human lives, and we should treat them with benevolence 仁 (ren) rather than staying at the level of emotional love 愛 (ai). Benevolence is the core definition and primary meaning of being human. The term “benevolence” is reserved exclusively for instances where the object of love is human, and not for things. The Part B of the chapter Jinxin 盡心 in the Mencius says that “’Benevolence’ means ‘man’. When these two are conjoined, the result is ‘the Way’” 仁也者，人也。合而言之，道也 (ren yezhe, ren ye, he er yan zhi, dao ye) (Lau 2004, p. 160). Zhu Xi 朱熹 explained “benevolence” as “the principle that makes a person human” 仁者，人之所以為人之理也 (renzhe, ren zhi suoyi wei ren zhi li ye) (Zhu 2011, p. 344). The essential reason for being human is not the external body or appearance, but rather the inner benevolence. When the body and benevolence are combined, one can attain the Dao 道 and only then can one be considered a true and complete human being. Conversely, love is regarded as a moral precept and behavioural requirement for individuals, and therefore cannot be elevated to the level of Dao 道 or Li 理. Love for things 愛物之愛 (ai wu zhi ai) is the basic aspect of human emotion, while benevolence towards people 愛人之仁 (ai ren zhi ren) is a moral principle 道義法則 (daoyi faze) that transcends love. If people show sympathy and affection for human embryos, but still destroy them ruthlessly when necessary to save human lives, this will inevitably remain at the level of love and will never rise to the nobler, deeper and more advanced realm of benevolence. The concept of “benevolence” is predicated on human beings as the object of concern, with the fundamental ethical imperative for a benevolent individual being to love their fellow human beings. The learning 學而 (xue er) chapter of the Confucius Analects 論語 (lunyu) states that one “should display a general care for the masses but feel a particular affection for those who are Good” 汎愛眾，而親仁 (fan ai zhong, er qin ren) (Slingerland 2003, p. 3). Xing bing’s 邢昺 commentary explains the concept of “the general” 汎 (fan) as “broad and generous language” 寬博之語 (kuanbo zhi yu). According to Confucianism, a gentleman should respect the virtuous, be generous to the masses and love all people. The broader the scope of one’s love, the greater one’s benevolence. Such a gentleman should be “close and friendly” 親而友之 (qin er you zhi) (He and Xing 2014, p. 7). If someone does not love their own kind, they cannot be considered human, let alone capable of benevolence. The Necessity of [Being] Humane and Wise 必仁且智 (birenqiezhi) chapter of the Luxuriant gems of the spring and autumn 春秋繁露 states that “humaneness is the means to love humankind” 仁者，所以愛人類也 (renzhe, suoyi ai renlei ye) (Queen and Major 2016, p. 320). A fundamental aspect of being human is to show sympathy and care for one’s own kind. As an embryo is an instance of human life, everyone should care for it. The zhushuxun 主術訓 chapter of the Huainanzi 淮南子 states that “loving all living things but not humans is not benevolence; benevolence is loving one’s own kind” 徧愛群生而不愛人類，不可謂仁，仁者愛其類也 (bian ai qunsheng er bu ai renlei, buke wei ren, renzhe ai qi lei ye) (Liu 1989, p. 100). Love between people of the same species is called benevolence, whereas love between people and other beings is simply called love. In the “Humanity” 人類 (renlei) chapter of Kang Youwei’s 康有為 Study of Dong Zhongshu’s Spring and Autumn 春秋董氏學 (Chunqiu dongshi xue), we find the following passage:

Classification was one of Confucius’s major principles. The reason why sages kill animals is because they are of a different species. Lice are born on humans, but humans do not love them; humans love the children of their own species. This is the difference between the same and different species. Therefore, the benevolence of the sages is focused primarily on loving the human race 類，為孔子一大義。聖人之殺禽獸者，為其不同類也。蟣虱生於人，而人不愛之，子則愛焉，同類不同類之別也。故聖人之仁，以愛人類為主 (Lei, wei kongzi yi da yi, shengan zhi sha qinshou zhe, wei qi butong lei ye, jishi sheng yu ren, er ren bu ai zhi, zi ze ai yan, tonglei bu tonglei zhi bie ye, gu shengren zhi ren, yi ai renlei wei zhu).

(Kang 1990, p. 145)

The Confucian concepts of benevolence and love are two distinctive notions. When confronted with one’s own embryonic offspring, an individual is compelled to demonstrate benevolence rather than merely expressing love. Although people love animals, they still eat their meat; people love nature, but they still cut down trees. These are all expressions of love. However, when it comes to human embryos, love can be too superficial, so benevolence must be invoked instead.

The appropriate stance towards human embryos is to regard them as human beings and to treat them with benevolence. Thus, they should not be destroyed for medical purposes. Confucian love is characterised by a hierarchical structure, and an essential distinction is to be made between benevolence and love. Love can be defined as an emotional need, and when it is necessary to satisfy higher rational needs, love can be sacrificed appropriately. As a result, humans have the right to take the lives of animals in order to ensure their own survival. Nevertheless, benevolence is a rational principle and an ultimate pursuit that is unshakable and non-negotiable. Under no circumstances should it be removed or sacrificed for other interests or purposes. As long as one is human, one should practise benevolence and avoid harming one’s fellow human beings. People’s love for human embryos clearly belongs in the realm of benevolence. The attitudes of people towards human embryos, the level of care they provide, and the degree of affection they show, as well as the ethical requirements, are clearly much higher than those towards things. The Images for the Regulation of Dress 服制象 chapter of the Luxuriant gems of the spring and autumn 春秋繁露 posits that “The reason that Heaven and Earth generate the myriad things is in order to nourish human beings” 天地之生萬物也, 以養人 (tiandi zhi sheng wanwu ye, yi yang ren) (Queen and Major 2016, p. 175). Things are created to serve people, and their value is determined by how people use and develop them, not by themselves. Yu Zhiping 余治平 writes:

Although things are lovable, they should be used when needed by humans and destroyed when necessary. We should not show too much mercy. For the sake of their own survival, humans can eliminate things. Therefore, human rights are superior to the rights of things. Human existence is more important and legitimate than animal existence. Human needs are reasonable and therefore have superiority and priority

(Yu 2021, pp. 905–24).9

Even if people’s love for things is extremely deep and intense, it can only be called love and cannot be elevated to benevolence. Things can be killed and used, but it is absolutely unacceptable to kill or use other humans to satisfy one’s own needs. The Part A of the chapter Jinxin 盡心 in the Mencius says:

A gentleman is sparing with living creatures but shows no benevolence towards them; he shows benevolence towards the people but is not attached to them. He is attached to his parents but is merely benevolent towards the people; he is benevolent towards the people but is merely sparing with living creatures” 君子之于物也，愛之而弗仁；於民也，仁之而弗親。親親而仁民，仁民而愛物 (junzi zhi yu wu ye, ai zhi er fu ren; yu min ye, ren zhi er fu qin. qinqin er renmin, ren min er aiwu).

(Lau 2004, p. 156)

A gentleman’s attitude towards his parents, other people and all things is graded. The order in which kindness should be given is as follows: first, be filial to one’s parents 親親 (qinqin), this primarily refers to love for one’s parents, but it can also include love for one’s siblings and is based on blood ties. All of this falls under the category of internal family affairs; second, be benevolent to the people 仁民 (renmin); and third, love all things 愛物 (aiwu). Filial piety is the most important, benevolence to the people is second, and love for all things is the least important. These three orders cannot be confused. Here, “things” refers to the resources used to sustain and nurture human life. Benevolence can only be shown to people, not things. When dealing with these things, people should not treat them with the same care as they would their parents or fellow humans, but rather maintain an attitude of loving them. People have two attitudes towards others: either filial piety or benevolence. The former is reserved for blood relatives, while the latter is directed towards the general population. While people need not treat human embryos with the same filial piety that children show their parents, they should at least treat them with the same “benevolence” that they show to ordinary people. In any case, their attitude towards human embryos should not be reduced to the same level as their attitude towards things. In his commentary, Zhao Qi 趙岐 says, “This refers to anything that can nourish people. We should love and nurture it, but not treat it with benevolence. If it is a sacrificial animal, it must be killed” 謂凡物可以養人者也，當愛育之，而不加之仁；若犧牲，不得不殺也 (wei fan wu keyi yang ren zhe ye, dang aiyu zhi, er bu jia zhi ren; ruo Xisheng, bu de bu sha ye) (Zhao and Sun 2014, p. 243). Indeed, the Confucian spirit of benevolence towards all things is already highly humanitarian. Even when it comes to things, one must not kill or use them indiscriminately. Only in unavoidable circumstances should one sacrifice things to satisfy human needs. The production of a piece of wood, for instance, is the result of a tree growing for decades, or even centuries. Similarly, a grain of rice is the product of a year’s nourishment and the harvest of a season’s labour. The procurement of a domestic animal necessitates feeding and care over an extended period before it can be consumed. Everything in the world is hard-won and valuable. Whilst it is acknowledged that individuals may engage in the taking of possessions for their own use, it is imperative that they do not permit themselves to indulge in excessive desires or engage in the profligate use of resources. In Confucianism, how people treat things determines how things respond to people. All things have their own life, power and value. The basic attitude that people should have towards things is to love and treasure them. However, this love should not be equated with or surpass benevolence. When necessary, people must sacrifice things for the greater human good. Otherwise, there would be no distinction between humans and things, and benevolence and love would lack order, thereby undermining the significance of Confucian benevolence.

It is important to note that the treatment of people must not be equated to that of things, and conversely, the treatment of things must not be equated to that of people. In accordance with the principle of “benevolence toward the people and love for the things” 仁民而愛物 (renmin er aiwu) asarticulated by Mencius, benevolence is directed towards people, while love is directed towards things. It is imperative to note that these two concepts cannot be confused or reversed. Cheng Zi 程子 said:

Benevolence is extending oneself to others, such as showing respect to one’s own elders and showing that same respect to the elders of others. This concept is applicable to people, but not to things” 仁，推己及人，如老吾老以及人之老，於民則可，於物則不可 (ren, tuiji jiren, ru laowulao yi ji ren zhi lao, yumin zeke, yuwu ze buke).

(Zhen 2018, p. 197)

It is possible to demonstrate that benevolence can be shown to people, but not to things. If people were to treat things with benevolence by refusing to kill animals, feeling pity for picking plants and cherishing the lives of grains, they would starve to death because they would have to stop eating. In the event of humanity’s extinction, the most noble beings created by the heaven and the earth would cease to exist, resulting in the loss of value and meaning attributed to their role in the creation of the universe. Consequently, the value of things is contingent, at a certain extent, on human needs and the degree of exploitation. Human embryos inherently possess the tendency and requirement to become human beings, and their value of life does not need to be demonstrated through the utilisation of human medicine. Xu Ran’s 徐然 ethical standpoint is that “every human being has an absolute and inviolable value. It is imperative that individuals perceive each other as ends in themselves, as opposed to considering them as tools. The utilisation of human embryonic stem cell technology, by allegedly treating humans as mere tools for the benefit of others, has the effect of undermining the fundamental ethical values of human society” (Xu 2023).10 The author assumes that human embryos are also human beings, and that humans should not treat their own kind as if they were tools. Consequently, within the Confucian ethical perspective, human embryos are not regarded as “things” that can be used or destroyed at one’s free will. Instead, they are considered to be human beings with inherent rights, including the rights to survival, personality, and life. It is imperative that individuals extend benevolence and respect towards them, and that their right to life is protected.

However, in order to advance modern medical science and technology, humanity must develop more effective and sophisticated medical techniques in order to treat diseases more effectively and reduce mortality rates. When it comes to confronting technologies such as human embryonic stem cell research, which touch upon fundamental human rights to life, bioethical dilemmas have escalated from a conflict between humans and things to a conflict between one human being and another, inevitably demanding heightened attention and reflection on bioethical concerns. Classical Confucian concepts of the relationship between humans and things, as well as the bioethical principles of benevolence and love, offer future generations a reliable reference point for technological ethics, providing suitable moral boundaries. This helps prevent the ethics of technology and life from overstepping legitimate human boundaries. In ancient China, “acupuncture originated from Huangdi (the Yellow Emperor), materia medica began with Shennong (the Divine Farmer), and pulse diagnosis was passed down by Sunü (the Plain Girl)” 針灸始于黃帝，本草肇自神農，脈訣傳之素女 (zhenjiu shi yuh uang di, ben cao zhao zi shen nong, mai jue chuan zhi su nü) (G. Xie 2003, p. 14). The traditional Chinese medicine 中醫 (zhongyi) was predicated on the utilisation of things for the treatment of illnesses. However, contemporary medical technology has evolved beyond the utilisation of mere “things” and is gradually transitioning towards the use of “people” as a means of treatment. This is also the fundamental reason why human embryonic stem cell technology has been the subject of enormous ethical controversy. Despite the fact that the extraction of human embryonic stem cells is carried out with the support of medical technology in order to minimise the impact on the foetus, if not subject to strict ethical restrictions, the fundamental purpose of human medicine—to heal and save lives—may begin to be compromised. Heaven created “things” to serve humanity. People utilise these things to satisfy their needs for food, medicine, worship, warfare and leisure. Provided this use is found to be in accordance with the established ethical requirements and the fundamental moral principles of “loving things” 愛物 (aiwu), it can be considered justifiable. However, when Heaven created “humans,” it required that members of the human race love one another with benevolence, rather than using one another. Consequently, the utilisation of human embryonic stem cells for the treatment of human diseases gives rise to a conflict with the ethics of life. “According to Kant, any tentative of commodification and instrumentalisation of a human being is against the human dignity” (Uğurlu 2014, pp. 21–34). Human beings and human embryos are both classified as members of the human species. They are considered to be of the same kind, possessing equal status and rights to life, with no distinction between superiority or inferiority. In the same manner that benevolence is extended to human beings, it is also incumbent upon us to extend this same benevolence to human embryos. The transition of modern medicine from a paradigm of “treating people with things” 以物治人 (yi wu zhi ren) to a paradigm of “treating people with human embryos” 以人類胚胎治人 (yi renlei paitai zhi ren) serves to dismantle the boundaries that have been established between humans and things, love and benevolence. The treatment of embryos as things to be used and disposed of represents a reduction in the human status, reducing humans to the equivalent of things. This approach stands in direct opposition to the Confucian philosophy of benevolence.

5. The Instinctive Urge Arising from “A Heart Sensitive to the Suffering of Others” 不忍人之心 (bu ren ren zhi xin)

Regarding human embryos, people should treat them with the same “benevolence” that they would show to human beings. According to Confucianism, we should treat people as people and embryos as embryos. This means putting ourselves in the place of human embryos and considering, understanding and caring for their lives from their position. The act of loving another person cannot be reduced to mere lip service or superficial concern. The concept signifies the act of transcending one’s individuality, fostering profound concern for one’s fellow human beings, actively assimilating those who are divergent from oneself into one’s own world, and extending to them the same benevolence and empathy that one would bestow upon oneself. In the Yanyuan 顏淵 chapter of the Confucius Analects 論語 (lunyu), Zhonggong asked about Goodness. The Master replied, “Do not impose upon others what you yourself do not desire” 己所不欲，勿施於人 (ji suo buy u, wu shi yu ren) (Slingerland 2003, p. 126). In his book, A New Interpretation of the Analects 論語新解 (lunyu xinjie), Qian Mu 錢穆 posits that this sentence “seems negative at first glance, but it is true in the present moment. If one were to extend their heart in this manner, it would be possible to find benevolence within. Consequently, it can be practised throughout one’s entire life” (Qian 2002, p. 372).11 Confucian benevolence is predicated on the notion that individuals should commence with themselves and subsequently extend this benevolence to others. While loving oneself is not benevolence, loving other people is. Therefore, Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 stated in the Standards of Humaneness and Righteousness 仁義法 chapter of the Luxuriant gems of the spring and autumn 春秋繁露 that “the standard of humaneness lies in loving others, not in loving the self” 仁之法在愛人，不在愛我 (ren zhi fa zai ai ren, bu zai ai wo) (Queen and Major 2016, p. 313). The specific methods and paths for Confucians to implement “benevolence” are “taking what is near at hand as an analogy” 能近取譬 (neng jin qu pi) (Slingerland 2003, p. 63). That is to say, one should start from one’s own subjective will and empathise with and understand others from their perspective. “Confucianism’s reflective methodology and its path to the practice of Benevolence always starts from the self and focuses on self-reflection, self-examination, and introspection” (Tang and Yu 2023). The Confucian Dao of Due consideration 恕道 (shu dao) is not a form of psychological conjecture or sentimental consideration, but rather an inherent moral capacity and rational discipline of humanity, extending oneself to others 推己及人 (tui ji ji ren) and putting oneself in another’s shoes 將心比心 (jiang xin bi xin). “Within this framework, universal reason and absolute moral values should prevail” (Yu 2012, p. 388). If people respect the moral status and life significance of human embryos as human beings, they will naturally treat them with the same moral rationality they would apply to other human beings. The Part A of Kao Tzu 告子 (Gao zi) Chapter in the Mencius explains:

What is it, then, that is common to all hearts? Reason and rightness. The sage is simply the man first to discover this common element in my heart. Thus reason and rightness please my heart in the same way as meat pleases my palate 心之所同然者，何也？謂理也，義也。聖人先得我心之所同然耳。故理義之悅我心，猶芻豢之悅我口 (xin zhi suo tong ran zhe, he ye? wei li ye, yi ye. sheng ren xian de wo xin zhi suo tong ran er. gu li yi zhi yue wo xin, you chu huan zhi yue wo kou).

(Lau 2004, p. 127)

Human beings possess an innate commonality of life and a mutuality of spirit, and the various faculties of our fellow humans exhibit similarity and communicability. Xie Xialing 謝遐齡 contends that Mencius’s notion of “common” 同然 (tongran) does not denote sensory similarity, but rather unity of judgement 判斷 (panduan) or comprehension 領會 (linghui). “Common element in my heart” 我心之所同然 (wo xin zhi suo tong ran) relates to the “common sense” (sensus communis, gemeinschaftliche Sinne) discussed in Kant’s Critique of Judgement. This refers to the innate capacity for intuitive judgement and perceptive insight within the human mind (X. Xie 2007, pp. 26–38). In other words, every human being should possess an innate capacity for commonality of heart. Deep within each human soul lies a primordial force of benevolence and an ethical imperative to care for and understand one’s fellow human beings. Through the practice of benevolence 仁道工夫 and the common element of the human heart, one can understand the existence of embryonic life and its desire to grow. Cherishing other human lives as one cherishes one’s own is the embodiment of benevolence. Therefore, once people regard embryos as human beings, just like themselves, compassion will be instinctively stirred and activated in their hearts. They will naturally and spontaneously feel a desire to protect human embryos, developing sympathy for them at a deep level. This is almost an inherent moral quality of being human. Conversely, failing to show consideration for the lives of human embryos constitutes a lack of benevolence. Cheng Hao 程顥 and Cheng Yi 程頤 of the Song dynasty said: “Medical books state that flaccidity and numbness of the hands and feet are called ‘lack of benevolence’” 醫書言，手足痿痹為不仁 (yi shu yan, shou zu wei bi wei bu ren) (Cheng and Cheng 2000, p. 65). When the body experiences poor blood circulation, resulting in numbness and loss of sensation in the limbs, it ceases to perceive their existence. It feels as though the hands and feet are not one’s own, as though they bear no relation to the rest of the body. Consequently, the body cannot function as a unified whole with perception and circulation capabilities. This condition, in which the limbs are isolated from the body, is a manifestation of lack of benevolence. From a life development perspective, humans and human embryos should be considered as a unified living life. If humanity fails to empathise with the embryonic life of their own kind, it effectively fragments human existence into two separate parts. This separation obstructs the connection between humans and their embryos, preventing human goodness flowing to our own embryos. This stance seems to contradict Confucianism’s belief that benevolence is the essence of being human. Li Ruiquan 李瑞全 said: “or a moral agent, there is never sufficient justification to harm a living being, let alone a human life. Even when an embryo or early foetus lacks the capacity to perceive pain, we cannot casually toy with life, just as we do not permit embryos to be subjected to arbitrary manipulation or unethical experimentation. Although Immanuel Kant did not consider animals to be moral subjects, his warning still has moral significance: when we are cruel to animals, our hearts harden and we become unkind to other human beings. Similarly, if we treat human embryos cruelly, we become more likely to treat others cruelly. This is part of our moral experience and habit” (R. Li 2009, pp. 39–53). Therefore, treating human embryos with benevolence is the appropriate choice for humanity to uphold its dignity and moral baseline.

Building upon Confucius’s definition of benevolence, Mencius further developed the concept by internalising it and tracing its origins. The Kung-sun Ch’ou 公孫丑 (Gongsun chou) of the Mencius says, “[n]o man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of others” 人皆有不忍人之心 (ren jie you bu ren ren zhi xin) (Lau 2004, p. 38). It is an irrefutable fact that, by virtue of their humanity, all individuals are born with an innate tendency to be unable to bear witness to the suffering or hardship experienced by their fellow human beings. This phenomenon appears to be an innate instinct, seemingly bestowed upon them by heaven. Sun Shi’s 孫奭 commentary asserts that “all individuals possess an inherent aversion to inflicting harm upon others” 人人皆有不忍加惡於人之心也 (renren jie you bu ren jia e yu ren zhi xin ye) (Zhao and Sun 2014, p. 66). All human beings are born with an innate quality—“a heart sensitive to the suffering of others”. No individual exhibits an excess or deficiency of this instinct; rather, it is an inherent impulse to protect life. Mencius gave an example, saying,

Suppose a man were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He would certainly be moved to compassion. not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child” 今人乍見孺子將入于井，皆有怵惕惻隱之心；非所以內交于孺子之父母也，非所以要譽于鄉党朋友也，非惡其聲而然也 (jin ren zhajian ruzi jiang ru yu jing, jie you chuti ceyin zhi xin; fei suoyi nei jiao yu ruzi zhi fumu ye, fei suoyi yao yu yu xiangdang pengyou ye).

(Lau 2004, p. 38)

Anyone who sees a child about to fall into a well will be moved by compassion and rush to save them without hesitation. They will run straight towards the child because saving their life is the most important thing. When saving someone, it is human nature to act instinctively without considering their identity, status or cries. This response is pure, natural, real and obvious. Mencius said, “The heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence” 惻隱之心，仁之端也 (ce yin zhi xin, ren zhi duan ye) (Lau 2004, p. 38). Every individual’s benevolence flows from a compassionate heart, without exception. The innate “a heart sensitive to the suffering of others” should be understood as a moral capacity and rational inclination, driven by the inherent goodness of human nature. Actions prompted by this heart are not impulsive or sentimental, but rather a conscious moral awareness, internalised and aligned with the Dao of benevolence 仁道 (ren dao). Acting contrary to this heart leads one astray from the ethical path of humanity, resulting in feelings of guilt, anxiety and unease. Lai Wenyuan 賴文遠 argues that Confucianism is distinct from the modes of thought prevalent in Western ethics and other philosophical schools. Its ethical theory is grounded in the moral value of “a heart sensitive to the suffering of others”, emphasising that “all existence warrants moral consideration and care.” Applying this principle to the question of whether an embryo constitutes a human being, it can be inferred that Confucianism does not support abortion (Lai 2004, pp. 48–55). It can also be inferred that Confucianism would probably disapprove of the use of human embryonic stem cell technology.

However, the question must be posed: why is it easier to feel compassion for children than for human embryos? People may be more inclined to show compassion (a heart sensitive to the suffering of others) towards visible life forms than towards human embryos, which are considered to be simple life forms that have not yet taken shape or been born. This phenomenon may be attributed to the fact that, at this stage of development, embryos are not visible to the naked eye and have not yet acquired a human form, thus rendering them subtle and inconspicuous. Consequently, it is challenging for individuals to conceptualise them as living beings. This makes it difficult to arouse people’s compassion for them. Absent physical proximity, there is an absence of immediate sensation of pain or connection. It is only when an embryo is presented as a tangible, sensory entity, a lively physical being, that people’s compassion naturally arises. Consequently, this can easily lead to a lack of compassion for human embryos as human beings, resulting in a disregard for their lives. This may also be because the urgent need to save a sick person’s life makes people overlook the respect for the embryo as a human being with the right to exist. The empathy experienced towards the sick individual significantly surpasses that towards the embryo.

Confucianism emphasises that humans have “a heart sensitive to the suffering of others”, as well as “a heart sensitive to the suffering of things” 不忍物之心 (bu ren wu zhi xin). With regard to animals, Confucius opposed the indiscriminate killing of innocent creatures. Advocating a compassionate approach, Confucius’s philosophy emphasised the importance of avoiding the unnecessary killing of innocent creatures. When killing is unavoidable, it is advocated that it should be done with minimal harm. In the xue er 學而 chapter of the Confucius Analects, there is the following passage: “The Master would fish with a hook, but not with a net. He would shoot with a corded line, but would not aim at roosting birds” 子釣而不綱，弋不射宿 (zi diao er bu gang, yi bu she su). In Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 Collected Commentaries, it says: “A net is made of large ropes connected to a frame, which is used to catch fish by stopping their flow. A bow is used to shoot arrows with raw silk strings. A nest is a bird’s dwelling place” 綱，以大繩屬網，絕流而漁者也。弋，以生絲系矢而射也。宿，宿鳥 (wang, yi da sheng shu wang, jue liu er yuzhe ye; yi, yi shengsi xi shi er she ye; su, suniao) (Zhu 2011, p. 96). Confucius eschewed the use of fishing nets made of ropes, as he could not countenance the use of such a method that impeded the movement of fish to catch them in large numbers. In the context of archery, he refrained from attacking flocks of birds returning to their nests to rest. Confucius’s philosophy did not subscribe to the notion of treating animals as property or as mere resources to be owned. Instead, he expressed respect and sympathy for their right to life and never sought to eliminate them completely. Utilising moral reasoning, he sought to regulate his actions in a manner that prioritised the preservation of animal life and mitigated human-induced harm, thereby enabling them to flourish and reproduce in a manner analogous to humans. Edward Slingerland explains that “Master adhered to traditional standards of sportsmanship when fishing and hunting, unlike his greedy, unprincipled contemporaries who were intent only upon gain” (Slingerland 2003, p. 73). In antiquity, the practices of fishing and hunting were subject to specific ritualistic and ethical rules, the purpose of which was to moderate human greed and the desire to hunt animals. So why did Confucius engage in fishing and hunting? Zhu Xi 朱熹 cited Hong Xingzuu 洪興祖 as stating:

When Confucius was young, his family was poor and of lowly status. In order to support his family and honour his ancestors, he was sometimes compelled to engage in activities such as fishing and hunting birds. These activities may be considered analogous to ‘hunting with proper rituals’. However, he would never engage in indiscriminate fishing or ambushing and killing animals. From this, we can see the true nature of a benevolent person. If he treats things in this manner, one can imagine how he treats other people. If he can act this way in small matters, his conduct in major matters is not difficult to foresee” 子少貧賤，為養與祭，或不得已而釣戈，如獵較是也。然盡物取之，出其不意，亦不為也，此可見仁人之本心矣。待物如此，待人可知；小者如此，大者可知 (zi shao pinjian, wei yang yu ji, huo budeyi er diao yi, ru liejiao shi ye. ran jin wu qu zhi, chu qi bu yi, yi buwei ye, ci kejian renren zhi benxin yi. dai wu ruci, dai ren ke zhi; xiao zhe ruci, da zhe kezhi).

(Zhu 2011, p. 96)

Confucius’s participation in fishing and hunting can be understood as a means of meeting fundamental survival needs, and through the practice of sacrificial offerings to their ancestors, the assurance of lineage continuity. This resulted in the sacrifice of animal lives to meet the demands of human civilisation’s development. However, for the gentleman, love for things 愛物 (aiwu) is the most basic moral requirement and ethical bottom line. The exploration and utilisation of things and resources must be grounded in a profound love for things, entailing the acquisition of only that which is indispensable and the application of these things in moderation. This approach is indicative of a commitment to the protection and cherishing of things, thereby facilitating their self-growth, self-perpetuation, self-development, and self-realisation to the greatest extent possible. This profound love for things is also the natural result of benevolence arising from the heart. It is possible to deduce Confucius’s attitude towards humans from his cautious and caring attitude towards animals. If he could demonstrate such a level of compassion towards fish and birds, it stands to reason that he would extend even greater compassion to human embryos, and would be unwilling to cause them harm. In Part A of the King Hui of Liang 梁惠王 chapter in the Mencius, it says:

The attitude of a gentleman towards animals is this: once having seen them alive, he cannot bear to see them die, and once having heard their cry, he cannot bear to eat their flesh. That is why the gentleman keeps his distance from the kitchen” 君子之于禽獸也，見其生，不忍見其死；聞其聲，不忍食其肉。是以君子遠庖廚也 (junzi zhi yu qinshou ye, jian qi sheng, buren jian qi si; wen qi sheng, bu ren shi qi rou. shi yi junzi yuan pao chu ye).

(Lau 2004, p. 10)

Confucian gentlemen have a deep compassion and love for all living things and cannot bear to see any form of life hurt or terminated cruelly. They cannot even bring themselves to eat meat, let alone tolerate the harming of human embryos. As a living organism, the human embryo merits the full respect and care that accompanies its inherent value as a life form. In contemporary society, there is a pressing need to revive the Confucian principle of compassion and ensure that embryos are treated with the dignity and respect they deserve. Rather than sacrificing the lives of human embryos to satisfy humanity’s excessive desires for medical advancement, it is essential to recognise the inherent value and dignity of the human embryo. Caring for human embryos should not be motivated by any external value or function beyond the embryos themselves. Instead, it should be guided by the fundamental belief that the life of human embryos inherently deserves compassion and respect. This phenomenon is precisely driven and guided by the innate sensitivity to the suffering of others inherent in human nature, which emerges naturally and instinctively. In the face of continuous advances in human embryonic stem cell extraction technology, it is urgent that humanity activates its inherent benevolent instincts, heeds the genuine moral call of compassion and returns to the fundamental principles of morality. This is likely to be the most reassuring and sensible choice.

6. Conclusions

The development of human embryonic stem cell extraction technology represents a significant advancement in contemporary scientific and technological progress. It is inevitable that the bioethical issues it raises will capture the public imagination. Confucian benevolent love provides a robust ethical framework and spiritual guidance for the utilisation of this technology by humanity, facilitating individuals in approaching the opportunities and challenges of modern medicine with the appropriate attitude and leading a life oriented towards goodness. In accordance with the principles of Confucian life ethics, the human embryo is considered to be a human being, rather than a mere object, and there are distinct differences between humans and objects. The concepts of benevolence 仁 (ren) and love 愛 (ai) are also defined differently. The ethical requirements and moral provisions for loving people 仁民 (renmin) and loving things 愛物 (aiwu) are not equivalent. As a human embryo is a living organism and a living human life, it should be treated according to the rules and standards for loving people rather than things. Confucianism posits that love for others should reach the noble realm of “benevolence”, rather than remaining at the sensory level of loving things. The act of loving one’s own kind is an inherent aspect of the human condition. It is therefore incumbent upon humanity to awaken its innate “a heart sensitive to the suffering of others” 不忍人之心 (bu ren ren zhi xin) in order to respect and protect every human embryo. Activate the moral power of the spirit of the Dao of Benevolence 仁道精神 (ren dao jing shen) to establish boundaries of medical ethics. Without strict ethical limits, extracting stem cells from human embryos is undoubtedly an invasion and interference with, and destruction of, human life. While this may be how things are treated, it cannot be applied to human embryos. If people treat human embryos as things to be used and disposed of, they lose the most essential aspect of humanity: benevolence. They can no longer be considered human anymore. However, in the context of modernisation, the power of humans continues to increase. The unregulated pursuit of technological advancement and economic gain, in addition to the extraction of stem cells from human embryos through human intervention, poses significant risks. This phenomenon not only serves to obfuscate the ethical and moral boundaries that delineate human beings and things, and the distinction between benevolence and love, but also has the capacity to alienate and distort the established rules of human life and the laws of nature. The ultimate objective of medicine is to eradicate diseases, preserve lives, and promote life for the benefit of humanity. The practice of conducting medical experimentation and technological innovation at the expense of human embryos can be regarded as a form of indirect killing, with the intention of saving lives. This represents a significant deviation from the fundamental purpose of medicine and constitutes a violation of its bioethical principles. If human embryonic stem cell technology skirts the ethical boundaries, disregarding the inherent right to life of the human embryo, this will inevitably lead to the exacerbation of more severe ethical issues in medicine. Should the extraction of human embryonic stem cells be permitted, there exists a risk that people’s sense of ethical boundaries may gradually diminish. This implies that more unethical methods of treating illness and saving lives may well become acceptable in the future. Therefore, Confucianism regards “Heaven” as the ultimate basis for all human behaviour. The life of a human embryo is given by Heaven, not created by humans themselves. Consequently, one should be benevolent towards the life of the human embryo and show proper reverence for life. Otherwise, it is a provocation and defiance of Heaven’s will.12 The biological humanity view is “derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition, which teaches, first, that human beings alone of creation are created in God’s image, which gives human beings a status far superior to the rest of creation, and second, that all human beings are created in God’s image, which makes us all God’s children” (Steinbock 2007, p. 420). The moral status and value of human embryos are heaven-given. Therefore, people should revere Heaven, be kind to others and all living things, strengthen their sense of ethics, treat human embryos kindly and establish clear moral boundaries about what it means to be human. If people do not act in accordance with Heaven’s will, they will be severely punished, which is tantamount to self-abandonment and self-destruction. Thus, irrespective of the advancements made in the field of human medicine, its ultimate limit is the utilisation of the available “things” to the fullest extent, and it must never turn its attention to humans themselves. The reason for the ethical controversy surrounding human embryonic stem cell technology is that such actions have triggered a sense of conflict and guilt within people’s inherent compassion, deviating from benevolence and going against nature, causing discomfort and fear. It is imperative that ethical restrictions and moral constraints are imposed on such actions to prevent harm and persecution to human life. Confucian ideas of benevolence have the potential to provide a moral foundation for contemporary medicine. requiring people to innovate medical technology and promote human health as much as possible under the premise of humanitarian bioethics. It is submitted that this is the appropriate path for the development of medicine.

However, protecting human embryonic stem cells does not mean abandoning the use of these cells in medical research. With the advancement of science and technology, some of the ethical conflicts associated with human embryonic stem cell technology can be mitigated through technical means to avoid harming embryonic life. For instance, research into adult stem cells has identified their presence in the liver, pancreas, bone marrow, brain, and umbilical cord blood of adults. The development of new extraction techniques is expected to result in significant progress in this field. For instance, research into adult stem cells has identified these cells in adult tissues such as the liver, pancreas, bone marrow, brain, blood and skin. “Multipotent adult progenitor cells are similar to embryonic stem cells in that they can be extensively expanded in vivo”, and they also possess differentiation and proliferation capabilities (Kørbling and Estrov 2003, pp. 570–82). New stem cell extraction techniques are expected to make significant progress in the future. John R. Meyer has stated that “Obtaining human PG and ES cells from aborted fetuses or surplus embryos of in vitro fertilization are unacceptable from an ethical standpoint. Another possible source is spontaneous, non-elective abortions, but that solution does not address the question of embryo manipulation. I discuss the possibility of using adult autologous PG and ES cells to avoid the destruction of human embryos. Transplantation techniques using connective-tissue inducing proteins may be more effective than using PG and ES cells alone” (Meyer 2000, pp. 166–70). Ali Seyhan Uğurlu pointed out that in the face of various ethical concerns regarding human embryonic stem cell technology, “a compromise considering different methods of obtaining hESCs” is needed, such as research with embryos from somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) (Uğurlu 2014, pp. 21–34). Furthermore, medical methods such as the creation of “embryo-like structures” have been proposed as alternatives, with the potential to mitigate harm to human embryos and ethical concerns. However, irrespective of the progression of medical technology in the future, the adherence to the principles of benevolence and the respect for the Dao of Heaven 天道 (tiandao) will perpetually constitute the fundamental requirements of life ethics.