The Reality of the Invisible: The Phenomenology of Invisibility in H. Conrad-Martius’s Metaphysical Realism

Abstract

This article aims to establish the theoretical foundations for a phenomenology of the invisible, conceived as an ontologically primary dimension of reality. It draws on the work of the realist phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) and situates the discussion within the methodological framework of Husserl’s phenomenology—as developed by members of the Munich–Göttingen Circle, of which Conrad-Martius was one of the leading figures, and which employed the methods of Ideation and epoché. This study elaborates three ontological structures, Nothingness, Selfness (ichhaftes Sein), and Transcendence, proposed here as anchor points for addressing the phenomenon of invisibility. Through this, it seeks to extend the phenomenological notion of givenness from what appears to that which resists appearance. Given that Conrad-Martius herself does not explicitly link these structures—as developed in her thought—to invisibility, nor does her writing offer a systematic conceptual development or detailed examination of their broader implications, the author—taking inspiration from Eugen Fink’s notion of “philosophizing-along-with” (Mit-Philosophieren) as a means to achieve a methodological and “theoretical stance”—frames a thematic exploration of invisibility in relation to these structures. The article thus proposes an ontologically grounded phenomenological framework for understanding the invisible as an integral dimension of the totality of reality: the primordial ground preceding all existence (Nothingness), the structural condition of human reality (Selfness), and that which lies beyond both human finitude and existence as such (Transcendence). In doing so, it seeks to contribute to contemporary phenomenological discourse by articulating the invisible as a fundamental mode of Being.

1. Introduction

Phenomenology has traditionally been associated with the study of what is present to consciousness and appears as an object1—what is frequently referred to as the given.2 The term phenomenon, derived from the Greek verb phainesthai, means “to appear” or “to show itself from itself.”3 Accordingly, insofar as the phenomenon is understood as synonymous with presence—that is, with what manifests itself in and through presence—phenomenology is dedicated to exploring the complex relationship between presence and appearance, so as to clarify how things show themselves to us.

However, this article argues that phenomenology is no less permeated by the complex presence of the invisible—those dimensions that remain unseen yet operate within the very world of phenomena. The roots of this concern with the invisible can already be traced in Wilhelm Dilthey’s work. He maintained that the objects of the human sciences are not merely physical entities but possess an invisible depth, intimating concealed processes and forces within human reality. This conviction underlies Dilthey’s notion of historical understanding (Verstehen), which engages materials that “have more than one meaning (Dilthey 1968, GS VII, 227).”4 A subsequent foundational advance is Edmund Husserl’s method of eidetic intuition (Wesensschau), designed to apprehend “the intimate self-being of an individual” so that its essence—conceived as an inner and invisible dimension—becomes disclosed—as when “every such What can be set out as Idea.” (Husserl [1913] 1952, Hua III/1 §3 13).5 Another phase in the question of the relation between the manifest and the invisible is reflected in diverse ways in the thought of the phenomenologists of the Munich–Göttingen circle,6 whose members belong to Husserl’s first generation of contemporaries. Behind the distinctive philosophical phenomenon characterizing this circle7—and which provides the background to the present study—lies a fundamental complexity that endowed the investigation of the invisible with a unique context. As will become evident, on the one hand they were profoundly influenced by Husserl’s early thought and adopted his method. On the other hand, unlike Husserl, who ultimately turned toward transcendental idealism8—prioritizing pure consciousness as the ground of meaning—this circle rejected epistemological foundationalism and identified itself as “confirmed realists” (entschiedene Realisten) (ESGA 1, 200). The phenomenon of the invisible thus emerges as constituting an element both of their interpretations of the Husserlian method as compatible with the study of reality, and of their simultaneous efforts to repudiate Husserl’s subsequent turn to transcendentalism in favor of grounding a phenomenological realism.

This article seeks to lay theoretical foundations for a phenomenology of the invisible, conceived as an ontologically primary and irreducible dimension of reality. The fundamental understanding of reality as bearing within it a primordial dimension of invisibility is examined in relation to the thought of the realist phenomenologist Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (also known as HCM).9 She was one of the leaders of the so-called Munich–Göttingen Circle—a group of young philosophers and intellectuals from the University of Munich who went to Göttingen10 to attend the lectures of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), then a professor there, who had risen to prominence with the publication of Logical Investigations (1900–1901),11 a work that is rooted in the ideal of overcoming prejudices and various forms of reductionism in the study of objects (Husserl [1901] 1984a, Hua XIX.1, I, §7).12 The Munich–Göttingen circle distilled this ideal13 into the slogan “The Turn to the Object” (die Wende zum Objekt), which Conrad-Martius described as conceiving and construing objects and phenomena “in distance, in total separateness from the perceiving subject… at the position of its standing (Stehen) and existence (Bestehen)” (Conrad-Martius 1921, p. viii).14 Drawing on their Munich teacher Alexander Pfänder (1870–1941)—who urged probing a phenomenon’s self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit) to grasp its essence rather than merely examining individual moments15—the members of the circle adopted Husserl’s method of ideation. Rooted in the Logical Investigations, this method was designed to disclose aprioristic essential relations (Wesenszusammenhänge) and to articulate essential laws (Wesensgesetze) that explain and clarify the concrete realm (das Konkretum) (Husserl [1901] 1984a, Hua XIX.1, II, §1). While the individual dimension of an object pertains to its properties, ideation is a sort of direct, non-sensuous seeing (Husserl 1968, Hua IX, p. 83) directed toward its content (Inhalt) which is regarded as an idea (Idee) (Husserl [1901] 1984a, Hua XIX.1, II, §42). In the first volume of the Ideas Husserl has expanded the method of ideation so that it could encompass both concepts and objects (Husserl [1913] 1952, Hua III.1, §3, §74). The commitment to the study of essences underpinned the position of Husserl and the related circle, who rejected the empirical sciences’ promotion of a direct approach to phenomena. In particular, the recognition that an inner essence can be disclosed through essence intuition (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 395), guided “the idea of reality” (ibid, p. 396) from the earliest stage of her studies onward.16 In this regard, she characterized the Husserlian method as “the genuine philosophical assignment” (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 348) and asserted that “whoever is not blind to essence (wesensblind) sees them.” Furthermore, she maintained that there is a cosmos of essences (Wesenskosmos), just as there exists a cosmos of being” (Seinskosmos) (Conrad-Martius 1951, p. 15).17 Conrad-Martius aligned herself with this realist orientation, emphasizing that the ontological reality of things includes “the factuality of the things that cannot be reached” and noting that “unmediated phenomenality faces a transcendent factor” (Conrad-Martius [1930] 1963f, p. 45), thereby affirming the existence of an irreducible and unmanifest dimension of reality inaccessible to empirical means. Likewise, she adopted Husserl’s idea of the epoché, which ultimately radicalized the principle of presuppositionlessness with respect to all cognitions (Erkenntnisse) and sciences (Melle 1984, p. xxxiv), by requiring that all knowledge be placed in question (Husserl 1950, Hua II, p. 29), in particular regarding everything transcendent (Ibid., pp. 45, 48)—an adoption enabled by the understanding of the epoché as not involving “an assertion of or doubting the Being of this world” (Conrad-Martius [1958] 1965a, p. 401).18 However, together with the phenomenologists of the Munich–Göttingen Circle, Conrad-Martius rejected the method of phenomenological reduction following the epoché, contending that it unduly restricts the scope of phenomenological inquiry.19 Moreover, she mounted an unequivocal critique of Husserl’s turn toward transcendental idealism by confronting what she called “the paradox of Being”—namely, that a natural thing (Naturding) possesses being and sustains itself within Being (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 89). Contrary to Husserl’s reduction of the real world to a “noematic world” fully subsumed by the structures and contents of consciousness (Conrad-Martius [1958] 1965a, p. 396), Conrad-Martius posed the question that epitomizes the metaphysical realism permeating her corpus: “But where does the world remain?” (Conrad-Martius [1956] 1965b, p. 371).20

Although the question “What is reality?” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 159) anchors her project, Conrad-Martius never offers a systematic thematization of invisibility.21 Drawing on her overall realist orientation, and grounding the discussion in her ontological conception of real being, this article suggests that access to the phenomenon of the invisible arises from her view of real being as unfolding in two simultaneous movements—outward and inward. The outward movement grants the real being both “description and appearance” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 223) through its “participation in space” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 226), yet it never severs itself from its inner realm. Rather, real being continues to “hover” within itself, sustained by an interiority that is “held and preserved outside itself” even as it remains a “living possession” (lebendiger Besitz)—enabling self-sustenance beyond itself (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 226). The inward movement—“substantialization inward” (ibid.)—denotes “the distinctive immersion of the entire body of being into the respective entity” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 225) without “becoming something completely externally determined” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 227). Neither externalization nor internalization ever exhaust real being; rather, they operate as two tangential forces that continually rub against one another within the fabric of reality. Seen in this light, the focus on invisibility proposed here does not merely add a new theme to Conrad-Martius’s ontology but expands the phenomenological notion of givenness itself—from the analysis of what appears to the recognition of what resists appearance and even refuses to appear.

In particular this article proposes approaching the phenomenon of invisibility through three ontological structures in her work—“Nothingness,” “Selfness” (ichhaftes Sein), and “Transcendence”—which, though not explicitly linked to invisibility, can serve as anchor points for its analysis.22 Taking inspiration from Eugen Fink’s method of “philosophizing-along-with” (Mit-Philosophieren) as a path to a “theoretical stance” (see Fink 1957, p. 321), the discussion develops a new thematization of invisibility, framed within an explicitly ontological analysis. This framework encompasses the totality of reality understood as the primordial ground prior to all existence (“Nothingness”), the structural condition of human reality (“Selfness”), and what lies beyond both human finitude and existence as such (“Transcendence”).23

2. Nothingness

The all-overarching question “What is reality?”, posed at the outset of Realontologie (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 159)24, epitomizes Conrad-Martius’s phenomenological project—a foundational orientation that informs all her later work. At this juncture, Conrad-Martius asserts that the only philosophically meaningful distinction lies in the primordial contradiction between existence and Nothingness. Far from a mere dialectical schema, this opposition constitutes a primordial ontological rupture, described as absolute and “devoid of any conceivable transition from one element to the other” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 160). It is precisely this unbridgeable gap that gives rise to “the entire further fullness of specifically real-ontological determinations and oppositions” (ibid.). Conrad-Martius then asks whether “we are confronted here with one of those ultimate distinctions that, due to their incomparability with any other differences, can only ever be presupposed but never fully characterized?” (Conrad-Martius 1924, pp. 159–60). The primary relevance of Husserl’s method of essence intuition for the study of Nothingness lies in its capacity to disclose the primordial ground of phenomena, which, as such, is internal and unmanifest. In this respect, the method is directed toward “gaining insight into the nature of real-ontological relations in general,” namely, “uncovering the essential fundamental constituents of real being… everything that immediately establishes real being in its manifold configurations and allows it to emerge from itself—so that all real-ontological moments are implied in real being” (Conrad-Martius 1924, pp. 172–73). In the context of the present study, this “primordial ground” may be regarded as structurally analogous to the invisible—present as a condition of manifestation, yet inherently resistant to it. It can thus be seen as broadening the phenomenological notion of givenness: not restricted to what appears, but including what resists and even refuses appearance. Accordingly, Nothingness is situated at a threshold, depicted as “a most peculiar state of affairs!” wherein reality “does not yet ‘exist,’ but ‘begins’” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 173). Crucially, this very beginning enables regarding Nothingness not mere absence or negation but as a necessary structural counterpart to Being: irreducible, radical, and formative within reality’s ontological fabric.

Having secured the most primordial framework for her phenomenology of reality—one in which Nothingness is recognized as an indispensable ontological factor—Conrad-Martius subsequently proceeds to posit, so to speak, its positive existence. The foundational distinction between existence and non-existence, she observes, marks “the root out of which everything springs forth” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 160), and real beings are said to “elevate” themselves from non-being or from merely ideal and formal existence into full being (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 173). The verb elevation (Erhebung), later described as “a metaphysically necessary moment” (Conrad-Martius [1932] 1963a, p. 196), is not metaphorical but indicates that an originary ground underlies every ascent. Such quasi-figurative language reappears in her essay Sein und Nichts (1931), where she articulates existence as moving “inside into Nothingness, out of Nothingness, surrounded by Nothingness, within Nothingness!” (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 89). This imagery, depicting an ever-present surrounding that both contains and exceeds the existent, invites reading Nothingness as a hidden depth—a layer of reality that conditions appearance while eluding it. By employing such “spatial” formulations, Conrad-Martius lays the groundwork for treating Nothingness as a mode of being. She writes: “The groundlessness of the existent (Seiend), which corresponds to Nothingness, is a founding in the abyss of one’s own being! There, the groundlessness arises from the fact that one’s own being can find... a foundation and an end” (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 92). She further contends that “as soon as a being sets boundaries toward Nothingness—as soon as it includes even the possibility of non-being (Nichtsein) in any way—it stands, in this groundless, radical sense, not in itself but in Nothingness. It does not rise from itself, but from Nothingness” (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 93). Conrad-Martius even goes so far as to suggest that it is not Nothingness, but rather the existent itself, that becomes questionable—to the point that reality appears as a burden imposed upon primordial Nothingness:

How does such a “burden of being” (Seinsballast) enter the midst of Nothingness?! What a paradox, even an impossibility: this nothingness—can it be explained through a descriptive word? It is impossible!—and in the midst of it, suddenly and without any possibility of transition, this something? … How can nothingness “bear” this something (Etwas)? …Without reason, without beginning, without end, or perhaps starting and ending in Nothingness, in a state of isolated, transitionless, unfathomable, bare factuality? Where does it derive the strength, the possibility to exist within non-being? How does it gain this “place” (Ort) of its being? Or how can there even be a “place” of being within the immeasurability of non-being (Nichtseins)?

(Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 89)

Therefore, although Conrad-Martius acknowledges that “standing in the Nothingness is, in the literal sense, groundless, ungrounded, and thus unjustifiable” (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 92), she ultimately concludes that “only the groundless foundation—the immeasurable and boundless standing within oneself—is not a metaphysical contradiction, but is entirely intelligible” (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 94). In this framework, the “groundless foundation” appears as an active, structuring depth—an invisible dimension integral to the very constitution of reality.

This affirmative reconception of Nothingness coheres with Conrad-Martius’s principal objective in Realontologie: to unveil and clarify those “constitutive moments that are essentially included in real existence,” thereby elucidating “the point with which real existence stands and falls” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 161) and providing a “descriptive guidance” into real being (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 160). Achieving this requires dismantling the “blinding” contradiction of “Platonic–Idealistic metaphysics” (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963e, p. 22)—the rigid bifurcation of “pure existence and pure non-existence” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 160)—which, in her view, has obstructed any genuine study of reality throughout modern philosophy (See here also Conrad-Martius 1931b, N; [1932] 1963b, pp. 32–37). By discarding the qualifier “pure”—the hallmark of the idealistic framework—Conrad-Martius not only establishes a corrected point of departure for the investigation of reality but also reconceives the very ontological opposition at issue. Being and Nothingness are thus positioned so that, just as the notion of negative Being is absurd, so too is the notion of negative Nothingness. It is precisely the positive character attributed to both Being and Nothingness that secures their distinction as a genuine ontological difference. Far from eliminating the opposition, this move renders it amenable to rigorous philosophical scrutiny by affirming the positive content of each term.

After distinguishing Being from Nothingness—and with Nothingness affirmed here as an ontological factor in its own right—the analysis discloses a movement toward substantiating the intrinsic bond between them. This step implies that their relation is not one in which Nothingness merely precedes or lurks behind Being; rather, as a constitutive element of reality, Nothingness remains preserved within real being through the notion of the “abyss” (Abgrund) (For further reading, see Miron 2018). Thus, real being “rests on the grounds of the abyss” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 222), “is carried out in the abyss” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 227), and “expands in the abyss with which it is filled” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 226). Conversely, real being itself is characterized as “the substantively realized content… on the foundation of its abyss!” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 219), as “substantiation into the ‘dimension of the abyss’” (ibid., p. 227), as “fullness in the fulfillment of the abyss” (Abgrundserfüllung) (ibid., p. 238), and even as a “spatial wedding” (Raumvermählung) or “wedding” (Vermählung) of material being with the boundless abyss (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 218).25 In this way, the abyss functions both as the ontological ground of real beings and as the immanent force of Nothingness within them—and within reality as such.26 Here the abyss can be understood as expressing the invisible’s structural embedment within the visible, an inner depth that supports without revealing itself.

The final articulation of the ontological bond between Being and Nothingness emerges when Conrad-Martius insists that boundlessness is not an external counterpart to Nothingness but an “internal” dimension of it (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 92). Nothingness, then, is not merely opposed to Being but is contained within it. As she writes, “There is no protection against the abyss of Nothingness except through a commensurability, an equipollence with it. An existing something that sets boundaries against Nothingness remains beyond understanding” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 261).

This interweaving of Nothingness and reality means that the “elevation” from Nothingness is not a discrete ontological leap; the boundary between Being and Nothingness is itself internal to Being (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 92). By situating their distinction at the very foundation of philosophical inquiry, Conrad-Martius transforms it into an inclusive difference rather than an exclusionary divide—one that affirms, rather than negates, the co-belonging of Being and Nothingness within reality. This dynamic culminates in finite beings, whose emergence from Nothingness is matched by their eventual return—finding their ultimate “end” therein (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 92). For Conrad-Martius, this very availability—likened to “that in whose all-too-close and all-too-quickly” (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 92)—manifests as “a complete powerlessness of Being” (Seinsohnmacht). She observes that the existent appears “constantly surrounded by the looming threat of Nothing, as though it is ‘snatched anew’ from it” (ibid.). Yet she cautions that “just as the autonomy of Being may seem exaggerated, so too can the fall into this powerlessness appear excessive. Even more peculiar is the demand to unite both within the same entity” (Conrad-Martius [1932] 1963a, p. 216).

In Conrad-Martius’s metaphysical realism, Nothingness appears not merely as negation or an ontological limit but as the “groundless ground” (Abgrund) from which finite beings arise and within which they remain silently held. Understood as an immanent tension, Nothingness does not lie outside or beyond existence but is woven into it as a withdrawn depth that structurally eludes perception. While existence designates what manifests, is graspable, and becomes phenomenologically accessible, reality extends beyond these bounds to include what resists thematization and exceeds epistemic availability. In this light, Nothingness offers the most radical figure of the invisible—not merely “what is not yet seen,” but “what, in principle, cannot appear” without distortion. From this perspective, every visible phenomenon can be seen as resting upon an invisible ground—a structural opacity that both separates and sustains the poles of Nothingness and appearance. By centering Nothingness in her ontological investigations, Conrad-Martius reconceives the invisible as an ontological condition rather than a mere deficiency. Here, too, the scope of phenomenological givenness is reconfigured: Nothingness “gives” not by presenting itself but by withholding, by constituting the very condition in which phenomena can arise without itself ever becoming phenomenal. This withdrawal is thus a form of invisible givenness that grounds appearance while evading it—an originary donation in which reality presents itself, precisely through what withdraws from presentation. The tension between appearance and the depth that sustains it becomes the metaphysical register of the invisible, revealing reality as intrinsically porous, layered, and irreducible to the merely given. In this account, Nothingness emerges as an invisible ground, sustaining and withdrawing from manifestation. Its very withdrawal functions as an originary donation that lets phenomena arise without itself becoming phenomenal. This constitutive interplay between absence and presence defines the structural link to the invisible, a link that grounds the subsequent analysis of the other two ontological structures.

3. Selfness

One of the distinctive terms in the vocabulary of reality proposed in Conrad-Martius’s phenomenology is the “self” (Sëität), or “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit or Selberkeit), which designates the pure ontological core of real existents as such (see Miron 2015). The characterization of the latter in terms such as “by-themselves,” “in-themselves,” and “from-themselves” indicates their possession of a formal constitutive ground in the “selfness of Being” (Conrad-Martius [1932] 1963a, p. 203). By contrast, ideal beings lack this core: through their very arising they “sink into selfless and merely formal existence,” whereas real beings “establish themselves from the outset as a complete and positive mode of being” (Conrad-Martius 1924, pp. 179–81). Indeed, Conrad-Martius goes so far as to claim that without selfness “there could be no existents, indeed no world” (Conrad-Martius [1932] 1963a, p. 205).27 In this light, selfness can be read—within the thematic horizon of this study—as the inward counterpart to the structural depth of Nothingness: the moment at which reality turns inward, gathering itself in a way that resists full exteriorization. It is in this preserved, invisible depth that the integrity and singularity of the self’s real presence are secured—nothing less than the very condition for a world of real beings.

Conrad-Martius then demonstrates the intrinsic link between selfness and Being by characterizing it as the “self-full groundness of Being” (selbsthaft Seinsgegründetheit; Conrad-Martius [1934] 1963c, p. 232) and as “standing in the Selfness to Being” (Conrad-Martius [1956] 1965d, p. 295). This constitutive Selfness (Sichheit) confers upon real beings an “essential necessity” (Conrad-Martius 1957, p. 132), establishes their substance (Conrad-Martius 1957, p. 120, pp. 91–97), and grounds their Being in itself (Conrad-Martius 1957, p. 95). As with Nothingness, the invisibility of Selfness here is not an absence but a structural interiority (Conrad-Martius [1932] 1963a, p. 203). Thus, alongside the real being’s outward manifestation, inward processes—“substantialization inward” or “internalization” (Innerung; Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 226) and an “internal mode of structuring” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 176)—unfold within it. In Conrad-Martius ’s words, “in every true existent lies an internal potentiality for being of its own” (Conrad-Martius [1934] 1963c, p. 232), a “self-centered unity” (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 227).

On the basis of real being’s self-full nature, Conrad-Martius construes the spiritual-I as subject to two co-operative forces: originalness (Ursprungshaftigkeit) and spiritualness (geistlichthafte). Originalness signifies the I’s unbreakable rootedness in itself—“entirely origin, depth, ground level, abyss” (Conrad-Martius [1956] 1965d, p. 295)—so that it has no “outside itself” but “lives inwardly in its own origin” (Conrad-Martius [1956] 1965d, p. 296). Unlike animals and material things, which are substrate-full (substrathaft; Conrad-Martius 1957, p. 131) and project outward, the I is person-full (personhafte) in its selfness (Conrad-Martius [1934] 1963c, p. 242). Because its being is directed back toward its own origin, the I stands perpetually toward Being (hin zum Sein; Conrad-Martius [1934] 1963c, pp. 235, 237), incapable of escape, inescapably surrendered (ausgeliefert) to it (Conrad-Martius [1934] 1963c, p. 236)—a self-full relation to Being (selbsthaftes Verhältnis zum Sein). Yet this self-capability of being its own being (Selber-Können-des-eigenen-Seins) and personal capability-for-Being (persönliches Seinsvermögen) unfolds positively inside oneself (Conrad-Martius 1957, p. 128). In this account, Selfness here intensifies interiority while remaining phenomenally inaccessible, marking an ontological invisibility rooted in self-possession rather than in lack.

The second operative force within the I-being introduces a paradoxical mode of invisibility: spiritualness (geistlichthafte) (Conrad-Martius [1956] 1965d, p. 302), expressed as infrastasis (Infrastase). This dimension signifies the I’s capacity to turn outside and beyond itself (Conrad-Martius [1956] 1965d, p. 296), manifesting as self-less (selbstlos) (Conrad-Martius [1956] 1965d, p. 298)—“totally empty of itself down to its most internal ground, which is therefore precisely an abyss” (Conrad-Martius [1956] 1965d, p. 296). Ontologically, infrastasis confers upon the I-being “an unlimited freedom and power”:

By being nothing in itself, it is capable of being everything. Since nothing falls back upon it, it is capable of grasping everything and constantly new things. Because it can never be burdened, enclosed, or locked by the fullness it grasps, it remains open to the possibility, choice, and freedom toward all things.

(Conrad-Martius [1934] 1963c, p. 239)

The verb “elevation,” previously applied to Nothingness, reappears decisively in Conrad-Martius’s account of the I-being’s outward orientation. She observes that it “belongs to the most genuine constitutive-existential essence of the I-being, and thus of spiritual being, to elevate itself above and beyond itself (über sich selbst hinauszusteigen), or rather always already to be that which elevates itself (Gesteigener) outwardly. Indeed, the I-being cannot exist at all except in this elevation-beyond (Übersteigenheit), or being-beyond-itself (Jenseitigkeit)” (Conrad-Martius [1934] 1963c, pp. 230–31). Far from contingent, this condition is essential—rooted in the “factual power of Being (Seinsmacht)” operative within infrastasis and constitutive of the I’s spiritual core (Conrad-Martius 1957, p. 140; [1956] 1965d, p. 296; ). Accordingly, spirit is defined as “truly elevated,” free and self-less (selbstlos), “entirely emptied of itself down to its innermost ground” (Conrad-Martius [1956] 1965d, pp. 296, 298). Here, invisibility takes on a second form: not the concealment of self-possession but the openness of self-emptying, a structural exposure that resists thematization.

This ecstatic elevation, however, yields no self-illumination or visibility. As Conrad-Martius observes, “the pure ecstatic constitution (Verfassung) allows no retained opposite (Gegenüber) by which it could become illuminated for itself” (Conrad-Martius [1956] 1965d, p. 310). From her early work onward, she insists that the spiritual being “dwells in transcendence” not by rupture but “as a mode of its own being” (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 408; [1934] 1963c, p. 231). Transcendence is thus neither foreign nor distant to the I-being but intrinsic to its ontological constitution. Accordingly, the I-being carries within itself a structural “projection-against” (Gegenwurf) and a dynamic of “existential objectification” (existenzielle Objizierung) born of its “absolute self-transcendence” (Conrad-Martius 1957, pp. 126–30). This self-objectifying activity is not cognitive (Erkenntnis) but emerges from an “existential ground-level (Ungrund) of its own self” proper to the spiritual nature itself (Conrad-Martius 1957, p. 131; [1956] 1965d, p. 299). By reframing infrastasis, self-transcendence, and objectification as ontological structures rather than psychological processes, Selfness emerges as the structural nexus between its inward mode of invisibility and a transcendent mode that ultimately finds its fullest articulation in Transcendence.

This distinctive duality within the I-being mirrors Conrad-Martius’s view of reality as grounded in “two opposing extremes that seem to immediately touch each other”: on one side, an autonomous, causa sui existence; on the other, “complete powerlessness” (vollkommene Seinsohnmacht) ever menaced by Nothingness (Conrad-Martius [1932] 1963a, p. 216). Although the I-being is sui generis and “incomparable to any other mode of being” (Conrad-Martius [1934] 1963c, p. 240), Conrad-Martius insists that only “on the ground of Being itself” can a genuine comprehension of the I be achieved (Conrad-Martius 1931a, p. 6, N; [1934] 1963c, p. 243). Accordingly, the “existential dualistic primordial dynamic” (Urdynamik) structuring the I-being (Conrad-Martius 1957, p. 129) simply echoes the fundamental duality informing all real beings:

It is evident that our position is precisely this: the situation inherently comprises both aspects, and only together do they constitute the single, concrete ontic unity that finite existence (Dasein) represents. This is not a dialectical opposition to be reconciled. Rather, the autonomy of Being (Seinsautonomie) and the decay of Being (Seinshinfälligkeit) each occupy their ontic stance at entirely distinct points—or planes—within the totality of existence (Daseinstotalität).

(Conrad-Martius [1932] 1963a, p. 216)

Conrad-Martius’s formulation leaves no room for either mutual exclusion or dialectical synthesis of the I-being’s two constitutive elements. The doubling at play is not mere duplication—which would “cancel the entire ontological meaning of the matter”—but a single I-being that constitutes itself only through its self-owned (selbsteigenen) ontic transposition outward (Hinausversetztheit) beyond itself and, at the same time, an absolute transposition back (Zurückversetztsein) beneath itself (Conrad-Martius 1957, p. 126). These two moments remain distinct—any conflation collapses the essential tension at the heart of the I’s being. Thus, “originalness” and “spiritualness” are inseparable aspects of one I-being, yet endure in their separation.

The twofold constitution of the spiritual-I—its originary inward compression and its radical openness beyond itself—reflects Conrad-Martius’s broader metaphysical concern with what eludes external observation or conceptual capture.28 Selfness, as the innermost core through which real beings sustain their ontological autonomy, is not invisible through absence but through its non-objectifiability. Moreover, this constitutive concealment marks a mode of phenomenological givenness: the self “gives” reality by gathering into its abyssal origin, functioning as an invisible source of individuation that enables appearance without ever being exhausted by it. Thus, the invisibility of Selfness is not lack but an originary donation, an interior depth that both withholds and sustains, thereby situating the self at the structural threshold where Being discloses itself through what cannot appear. In turn, the phenomenological notion of givenness itself is expanded: what is “given” here is not what shows itself directly, but the very depth that sustains manifestation precisely through its withdrawal from objectification. Conversely, the I’s infrastatic dimension reveals a paradoxical invisibility grounded in radical exposure: a mode of being emptied so as to remain open. Here, invisibility is not merely concealment but structural openness—an interior abyss enabling the I’s exposure to alterity. This self-emptiness confers upon the I the capacity to relate, choose, and become. Far from indicating lack, it discloses a second register of invisibility: a non-possession of self that makes room for the other. Together, these dimensions present selfness as a hidden reservoir within reality—the site where Being both withholds and manifests itself. In Conrad-Martius’s metaphysics, this intersection of inward concealment and outward exposure marks the heart of the invisible: not merely that which is unseen, but that which structures presence from within its own concealment. Invisibility thus emerges not at the periphery of reality but at its very core, where the self draws its ontological force from a depth that cannot be laid bare.

This interplay acquires added depth when Selfness is aligned with Conrad-Martius’s notion of Nothingness. Nothingness signifies the irreducible groundlessness from which existence is elevated, while Selfness names the inward force that sustains this elevation. Far from opposing one another, these dimensions are interwoven: Nothingness makes Being possible, and Selfness secures individuation and ontological autonomy. Thus, the abyss is not external to the existent but folded into it as its “groundless ground”—its inner horizon. This hidden depth confers resistance to abstraction and vitalizes each being as a lived, singular presence. Selfness thus marks the site where the invisible and the real converge—where Being is inwardly shaped by what at once resists and enables appearance. Within Conrad-Martius’s metaphysical horizon, this dual structure of the I-being points beyond itself to a third ontological vector—Transcendence—underscoring the insight that invisibility lies at the core of reality.

4. Transcendence

First, in her 1913 dissertation (Conrad-Martius 1913N), Conrad-Martius establishes the reality of transcendence while sharply distinguishing it from the mere transcendence of the external world. In her words:

Real transcendence does not denote a factual separateness (Auseinander)—such as the spatial distance between two material objects, which can be undone at any moment by contact—but rather an essential separateness grounded in a difference of spheres (Sphärenverschiedenheit) that, in principle, cannot be overturned (unaufhebbare). [An object is] truly transcendent in relation to another when it possesses a distinctive ‘inner structure’ (inneren Gestalt) and occupies an existence-position (Daseinsstelle) that is, in principle, unreachable by the other (where ‘reachability’ [Erreichbarkeit] must be understood in a strictly defined sense that inherently includes the possibility of an ontological intervention [Seinseingriff]).

(Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 437)29

Real transcendence is defined by four interrelated characteristics: separateness, inner structure, existence-position, and unreachability. Separateness designates its self-assertion as an independent mode of Being. Unlike Nothingness—the total withdrawal of Being into non-ontic nullity—and Selfness—the inward locus of self-reflection—real transcendence occupies an ontological domain that neither collapses into pure negation nor recedes into solipsistic interiority. This distinctive stance indicates that transcendence cannot be conflated with mere absence or with reflective self-activity; rather it constitutes a discrete ontological mode that is structurally aligned with the invisible through its refusal of both negation and self-containment. Inner structure names the determinate configuration concealed beneath transcendence’s invisibility: a positive, relational “structural void” that both separates and sustains the poles of Nothingness and Selfness. What is ‘concealed’ here means that this structure never itself appears, yet it nonetheless shapes the conditions under which phenomena may be disclosed. In this way, transcendence has an internal articulation that is positive and formative even while it remains invisible. Here the interplay of absence and presence configures an invisible architecture that does not simply delimit but “gives” a field of manifestation. It does so by withholding itself from appearance, while at the same time preventing its reduction either to pure non-being or to assimilation within conscious experience.

A position of one’s own (Eigenposition) designates the self-grounded station of real transcendence—an ontological site neither derived from nor co-constituted by external meaning-structures. In occupying this “position of its own,” transcendence asserts its sovereignty, resisting any instrumental or indexical correlation with other entities and precluding reduction to intersubjective givenness. Phenomenologically, such a locus cannot be disclosed by intentional acts that presuppose a shared horizon of sameness: any attempt to apprehend it by analogy inevitably fails, since its identity resides in inherent integrity rather than resemblance. The self-situated stance thereby underpins the autonomy of real transcendence. Unreachability marks, then, its fundamental withdrawal from all intentional correlates, precluding any genuine cognitive or experiential appropriation. Such inaccessibility is not a contingent impediment but an ontological condition—transcendence remains “unreachable” precisely because it refuses to present itself within the domain of relational givenness.

Accordingly, any apparent encounter with the real signals a deformation of its autonomous mode, underscoring that true transcendence perpetually eludes grasp. In this structural withdrawal, invisibility is not a derivative effect but a defining ontological trait: transcendence “gives” not by appearing but by holding itself back—its mode of givenness consists precisely in its concealment, which grounds relation while resisting appropriation. Building on this unreachability, Conrad-Martius further articulates transcendence’s essential closedness (wesensmäßige Abgeschlossenheit): a positive structural feature in which the transcendent resists objectification not merely as a cognitive limit but as an ontological trait. In its self-concealment, it safeguards ontological alterity and secures its irreducibility to any immanent or conceptual schema. Through this structural inaccessibility, real transcendence aligns with the invisible—neither accidental absence nor faint remainder, but an active refusal to assimilate into the visible or intelligible realms30—thus marking the outermost horizon of phenomenological inquiry: not what may still be seen, but that which, in principle, cannot appear.

Crucially, situating transcendence within its own ontological sphere distinguishes it fundamentally from both the external world and mere externality. Whereas externality names a mode of appearance, real transcendence remains invisible. Nonetheless, Conrad-Martius shows that its defining features resonate with those of the external world. Its separateness echoes the autonomy and absoluteness attributed to external existents (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 392); its inner structure—the “in principle invisible ‘interior’ (Innere)” (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 465)—parallels the self-standing being (Seinselbstständigkeit) of real things (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 391); its existence-position corresponds to the external world’s own ontological status (Realbestand), since the world itself “rises” beyond “mere appearance” (bloßer Erscheinungsbestand) and emerges integrally from primordial Nothingness (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 389). Finally, the unreachability of transcendence finds its counterpart in the external world’s resistance to spirit and consciousness (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 424). Moreover, the epistemic inaccessibility implicit in the structures of Nothingness and Selfness now becomes an explicit ontological feature of real transcendence. In Conrad-Martius’s words:

What is ‘closed’ can only be accessed by something internally akin at the point of its closed existence. However, what is ‘open’—that is, capable of entering into an objective relationship with any and all beings—lies beyond the possibility of any genuine relation with the truly existent; it is, in reality, transcendent to it (realiter transzendent).

(Conrad-Martius 1916, pp. 439–40)

Given the essential interplay of openness and closure that characterizes real transcendence, the requirement that an encounter involve something of the same nature (Gleiche) can never be fulfilled. In fact, any apparent accessibility indicates the absence of true transcendence. Put simply, real transcendence—“conforming to an essential closedness (wesensmäßige Abgeschlossenheit)” (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 349)—remains necessarily veiled and invisible. This stance stands in sharp contrast to the inherent openness of spiritual being (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 439). Thus, when spirit or consciousness participates in the manifestation of the real, that reality no longer counts as “real existence (Realbestände) in the genuine and true sense” (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 389). Ontologically31, real transcendence vis-à-vis consciousness must be distinguished from what lies “beyond the I-being” (Ichjenseitigkeit), which refers to what does not belong to me (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 447). There is a clear boundary between real transcendence and the epistemic transcendence involved in knowledge. The latter—“spirit as consciousness” (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 438)—presupposes a spiritual entity as an achievement of transcendence (Transzendenzleistung), entailing the openness specific to spiritual being and regarding such an entity as “open” (Conrad-Martius 1916, pp. 474–75). In contrast, real transcendence remains closed to spirit and fundamentally “unreachable” (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 437), retaining its significance as utterly incomprehensible with respect to the external world (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 434).32 The epistemological dimension is thus relegated to a subsidiary status—absent in “Nothingness” and “Selfness”—a point made explicit in the structure of real-world transcendence. As Conrad-Martius states: “We believe that philosophy, in a genuine and rigorous sense, is outside of any epistemological question of reality” (Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 355).

In concluding the analysis of real transcendence, attention returns to Nothingness and Selfness, whose interplay reveals the invisible structure of transcendence at its deepest level. Nothingness marks the radical withdrawal of Being from any ontic determination; Selfness indicates the intimate interiority of self-encounter. Real transcendence, however, lies beyond both: neither the abyss of Nothingness nor the locus of the I-being, but rather an ontological gap that remains ungraspable. This invisibility is not a mere absence but a mode of givenness—an active, sustaining void that both separates and holds apart the extremes of Nothingness and Selfness. The void functions dually: as a negative limit preventing the collapse into non-being, and as a positive horizon restraining Selfness from solipsism. In this sense, transcendence discloses its reality through a paradoxical givenness: it bestows the very space of relation by withholding itself from appearance. By withholding itself from both, real transcendence provides a realm in which Being is not reduced to negation or self-manifestation. This invisible gap thus enables an encounter with Being that escapes self-containment and self-abolition. The reality of transcendence is not just a dialectical play of opposites but an autonomous ontological presence that grounds all relation. Accordingly, the study of transcendence must first attend to its independent standing, with its mode of givenness—concealment as donation—understood as integral to its reality, and only then consider its interplay with negation and self-awareness.

5. Discussion

The three ontological structures—Nothingness, Selfness, and Transcendence—together comprise the full ambit of Reality: Nothingness precedes any real entity, Selfness designates the human subject, and Transcendence refers to what lies beyond human experience. While Conrad-Martius does not thematize invisibility, my analysis introduces a re-thematization of these three ontological structures, reconstructing them from her writings and interpreting them as interdependent modalities. When placed against the background of her ontological concerns and the eidetic method’s orientation toward what is non-apparent (essence), their interrelation can serve as a framework for a phenomenology of the invisible, so that invisibility itself emerges as a constitutive dimension of reality rather than a marginal feature. In this reading, they function as archetypes of invisibility, capable of encompassing diverse manifestations of the invisible, each opening a distinct gateway into reality. This ontological analysis of the three structures make it possible to situate them on the plane Conrad-Martius calls “real reality” (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) (Conrad-Martius [1958] 1965a, pp. 397, 401).33 On this vantage point, invisibility can itself be described in terms of phenomenological givenness: what “is” given here is not direct appearance, but the very withholding, concealment, or unreachability through which reality discloses itself. At the same time, this dimension is inherently operative within each structure, framing their respective roles in a phenomenology of the invisible. From a meta-perspective—drawing inspiration from Fink’s principle of “co-philosophizing” as applied to the suggested reading of Conrad-Martius’s writings and, more broadly, to Husserl’s thought—this tripartite configuration invites not only descriptive analysis but also critical interrogation of how these modes of Reality engage with broader phenomenological and metaphysical debates, both historical and contemporary. Within this framework, Nothingness constitutes the primordial layer—an inner depth in which invisibility is compressed, making it potentially immanent in every being or, in its unmanifested aspect, inherently invisible. If Nothingness exists, so must the invisible; thus, defining invisibility as interiority both locates and affirms its reality. Nothingness “gives” not by presenting itself phenomenally, but by withholding—structuring the very condition in which phenomena arise without itself ever appearing. Reality, then, includes not only what appears but also what remains concealed—an internal, invisible dimension underlying all manifestation.

A pivotal development in the phenomenology of invisibility arises from the bifurcation of Nothingness and Being within the I-being. One dimension, “originalness,” preserves interiority and a substantial core, whereas “spiritualness” extends outward, transcending inner depths and assuming an external scope. As “spiritualness,” the I-being opens outward through infrastasis, while the invisible depth persists as the abiding ground of its being. Both dimensions inform Conrad-Martius’s account of invisibility: originalness marks an inward depth resisting externalization, while spiritualness denotes existential dispersal into the realm of spirit, where the I-being seems to dissolve into everything it is not. In both modes, the I-being remains invisible to itself—either as withdrawn depth or as selfless dispersion—so that invisibility is constitutive of its being. Here, givenness is again reconfigured: selfness “gives” reality not through visibility, but through its interior depth of non-objectifiability, while spiritualness “gives” as openness, an exposure that withholds any stable form. From a critical standpoint, this polarity can be read not only as a phenomenological description but also as a structural model for understanding tensions between self-enclosure and openness in broader metaphysical contexts, including debates on subjectivity in post-Husserlian phenomenology. In this respect, the method of “co-philosophizing” underscores that engaging with Conrad-Martius’s thought entails both fidelity to her conceptual structures and an openness to re-situating them within ongoing philosophical dialogues.

However, insofar as nothing can traverse the interval between “originalness” and “spiritualness,” and their unity is precluded, the I-being assumes the role of keystone among the three ontological structures. In its inward orientation, the I-being engages the Nothingness immanent in Being; in its spiritualness, it transcends itself and thus connects with Transcendence, where it ultimately realizes its infrastasis. Conrad-Martius designates this scarcely graspable position—the “self-founded state of Being” (Seinsstand)—as follows (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 95):

Where no transition is possible, a transition nonetheless occurs. Where no beginning can be made, a beginning is nonetheless present. Where there is no ground of Being (Seinsgrund), but only an abyss—or rather, the groundlessness of Nonbeing (Ungrund des Nichtseins)—something rises toward Being and toward itself, as if it were its own ground of Being. Where there is groundless and measureless blindness to Being and powerlessness of Being (Seinsohnmacht)—and even such designations are far too positive to express what “Nothing” (Nichts) contains in contrast to “Being”—there is sudden openness to Being (Seinsoffenheit) and potency of Being (Seinsmächtigkeit).

(Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 95)

Moreover, this distinctive stance—seemingly transcending the inherent invisibility of its ontological structure and momentarily manifesting within real reality—entails the sudden emergence of openness to Being (Seinsoffenheit) and power of Being, which attest to the I-being’s ontological exclusivity (see Miron 2017). This unique capacity is first enabled by the self-full freedom of Being (Seinsfreiheit): the ability to detach from one’s own existence, relinquish the plenitude of Being that encumbers natural and material entities, and yield to what lies beyond oneself. Conrad-Martius explains:

Only that which is neither directly burdened (beschwert) nor weighed down (belastet) by Being—and indeed cannot be burdened by it—can apprehend Being in free openness toward it. Here lies the deepest essence of I-ness: liberation from the imposed burden of mere existence and suchness (Daßsein), to which purely natural beings are subject (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, pp. 97–98).

From a broader philosophical perspective, this keystone role of the I-being exemplifies how Conrad-Martius’s ontological structures can be mobilized beyond descriptive phenomenology, offering a conceptual apparatus for addressing perennial philosophical tensions between finitude and openness, self-foundation and dependence—tensions that remain central to both classical metaphysics and contemporary phenomenological debates.

At once: “The I elevates itself from being-free (seinsfreien) and being-empty (seinsleeren)—from a ‘null’ ground—toward Being” (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 98). This fundamental, irreconcilable duality enables the I-being to rise from a groundless origin toward Being, giving rise to the “metaphysical paradox” of I-ness (Ichhaftigkeit): its openness and capacity for Being are grounded in Nothingness and remain ultimately groundless—“a foundation in Nothingness… a rising toward Being from an origin that is, ‘in essence,’ Nothing” (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, pp. 95–96). As Conrad-Martius also states: “In this ‘I’ (‘Ich’) lies an elevation from Nonbeing to being, an inception in the inceptionless, a self-grounding (Sich-Gründen) in the groundless!” (Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 94). This paradox does not dispel the invisibility at the core of the I-being’s ontological structure; rather, it reinforces it, revealing invisibility as the enduring condition through which the I-being negotiates the passage from Nothingness to Being. In Conrad-Martius’s words:

…something attempts to creep in here, something that does not remove the Nothingness underlying Being (Seinsnichtigkeit) but, on the contrary, only makes it more glaring (krasser)! As we have already seen, in the initial elevation toward Being—as characterized by the I in its openness to Being—the Nothingness from which this wondrous inception arises is overcome yet remains unconquered. That is why our gaze turns away from this origin in Nothingness, from this mere elevation toward Being, and instead is drawn toward the immeasurably and infinitely filled abyss and groundlessness of Being. Yet even this fullness of Being does not carry us beyond the boundaries of Nothingness (Nichtigkeitsgrenzen).

(Conrad-Martius [1931] 1963d, p. 97)

From the standpoint of “co-philosophizing,” this paradox offers fertile ground for critical engagement: it situates Conrad-Martius’s ontology in dialogue with broader metaphysical traditions grappling with the coexistence of origin and abyss, presence and withdrawal—ranging from classical negative theology to contemporary debates on the limits of manifestation.

Ultimately, invisibility finds its fullest expression in Transcendence as a distinct ontological sphere. Yet the inward compression of Nothingness and the bifurcation of Selfness persist within Transcendence, which further radicalizes the invisibility inherent in these structures. In its non-appearance, Transcendence echoes the primordial concealment of Nothingness while forming a comprehensive sphere of hiddenness. With respect to Selfness, Transcendence intensifies the infrastasis of Spiritualness and, in its closure, mirrors the Originalness of the I-being. This heightened infrastasis deepens the problem of access to spirit, shifting focus from epistemological to ontological questions, consistent with the Munich–Göttingen circle’s emphasis on ontology. However, the issue remains for Nothingness and Selfness: neither inward self-directedness nor the split of infrastasis grants genuine access. By radicalizing infrastasis, Transcendence redefines the parameters of invisibility: Selflessness, once enabling the I-being’s engagement with the world, is consolidated within Transcendence as a separate sphere, thus severing its relation to spirit and affirming both epistemic inaccessibility and inherent incomprehensibility.

Thus, the prior anchor in interiority that underpinned Nothingness and Selfness—and allowed for their partial emergence into visibility—is transformed in Transcendence. Here, any internal dimension is absent; instead, externality defines Transcendence, whose invisibility is absolute. While interiority in Nothingness and Selfness may, in certain cases, provide a ground for visibility to emerge, Transcendence lacks such depth and cannot break into visibility. Therefore, whereas the invisible in Nothingness and Selfness points to a concealed depth, Transcendence represents ultimate invisibility—an ineluctable concealment. Here, too, givenness takes on its most paradoxical form: transcendence “gives” precisely by refusing appearance, bestowing the horizon of relation while holding itself back. As a mode of Reality, Transcendence thus reveals that Reality itself—Conrad-Martius’s central concern—contains within it this ultimate form of invisibility. From a broader interpretive perspective within the phenomenological tradition, this portrayal of Transcendence resonates with treatments of the “wholly other” that stress radical alterity and unapproachability—as in Levinas’s reworking of Husserlian intersubjectivity and Marion’s account of the saturated phenomenon—while Conrad-Martius’s framework reframes such alterity not as an external limit but as an intrinsic ontological register of the Real.

Invisibility, for Conrad-Martius, signals that reality cannot be reduced to what is immediate, concrete, or material. Instead, as the mode that characterizes Nothingness, Selfness, and Transcendence, invisibility marks a fundamental gap between real phenomena and their appearance. This gap is to be understood in terms of phenomenological givenness: what is “given” is not direct appearance but the very concealment through which reality discloses itself—not as lack, but as an originary donation grounded in its interiority and inaccessibility. From a meta-discursive standpoint, this reconfigured notion of givenness can be brought into conversation with broader phenomenological and metaphysical—from Husserl’s analyses of the horizons of perception to Levinas’s ethics of the Other—thereby situating Conrad-Martius’s ontology within a wider field of critical engagement. What is most decisive is that the persistent, essential invisibility structuring these ontological domains serves as a “gateway to reality” (Tor der Realität)—the point at which “a radical overcoming” of the “mere formal positioning” of reality becomes possible (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 173). Importantly, the “gateways” opened by Nothingness, Selfness, and Transcendence do not erase one another; rather, when their relations are viewed through the lens of invisibility, each emerges as a distinct yet interacting magnetic field. Ultimately, the interplay of these three modes demonstrates that invisibility is not simply an attribute, but a constitutive dimension of reality itself in Conrad-Martius’s thought.

The shared feature of invisibility across Nothingness, Selfness, and Transcendence—an interpretive insight that recasts these ontological structures as the primary dimensions of invisibility—highlights that Conrad-Martius’s concept of Reality is not confined to the immediate, concrete, or material domains in which phenomena might appear. Rather, invisibility as operative within these structures establishes a fundamental discontinuity between real phenomena and their appearance. This essential and enduring invisibility functions as a “gateway to reality” (Tor der Realität) in Conrad-Martius’s sense: a datum-point where “a radical overcoming” of the “mere formal positioning” of reality occurs (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 173; see Miron 2014). Although each structure inaugurates its own gateway, none cancels out the others; instead, they form an interwoven network of “magnetic fields,” each preserving its distinct meaning while dynamically interacting. Here, the practice of “co-philosophizing” offers a productive stance: rather than closing the inquiry within Conrad-Martius’s conceptual immanence, it encourages an expansion of perspective that tests and extends these structures beyond their immediate formulation. In this threefold configuration, invisibility is not a lack but the ontological condition grounding and unifying the phenomenology of the Real. It is the invisible substratum from which all phenomena emerge and to which they return—a silent foundation that both enables and shapes all appearance.

6. Epilogue: The Invisible Depth Amidst Reality

The phenomenological inquiry into Conrad-Martius’s metaphysical realism through the lens of invisibility sheds new light on three of her foundational doctrines: Nothingness, Selfhood, and Transcendence. Although Conrad-Martius never developed a “theory of the invisible,” nor treated non-spatial aspects of reality explicitly as dimensions of invisibility (see Miron 2018), analyzing these doctrines and their interrelations offers a robust basis for understanding invisibility as an operative dimension of real reality, a thematization that emerges here through my reconstruction of Conrad-Martius’s framework. Viewed from a broader interpretive horizon, this reconstruction extends Conrad-Martius’s conceptual framework into a critical reflection on the role of what remains unmanifest within the Real, thereby positioning her thought within wider philosophical debates on the limits of appearance. In this sense, invisibility functions less as a distinct philosophical concept and more as an element “through which philosophical thinking is thought.”34 Thus, whereas phenomena with overt modes of appearance can be thematized directly, a genuine grasp of reality as essentially incapable of fully appearing requires recognition of an ontological “depth” (Tiefe), which is by definition invisible. Conrad-Martius clarifies that, in contrast to “phenomenon-being” (Erscheinnungsentität)—constituted solely on the surface (oberflächenhaft konstituiert), “where all is visible in the daylight, and nothing is concealed, because there is nothing at all that could possibly be hidden”—“material givenness” (materielle Gegebenheit) imbues reality with “closedness” (Verschlossenheit) and “darkness” (Dunkelheit) (Conrad-Martius 1924, p. 206). As the preceding analyses of the three ontological structures have shown, this invisible depth ultimately not only shapes but also complicates the balance between epistemological accessibility and inaccessibility in Conrad-Martius’s concept of reality.

Against this backdrop, the methodological phenomenology of the invisible unfolds in three general stages—each subsequently instantiated in Conrad-Martius’s metaphysics. First, the inquiry must discern where and how invisibility manifests in lived experience and clarify each phenomenon’s mode of “appearance.” In Conrad-Martius’s framework, this foundational move takes the form of identifying three ontological structures—Nothingness, Selfhood, and Transcendence—whose modes of invisibility are expressed, respectively, as withdrawn depth, the internal tension of dual self-dimensions, and radical concealment. Second, the investigation must expose the distinct ontological grounds sustaining each dimension of invisibility, now understood in terms of phenomenological givenness: Nothingness gives through its withdrawal, sustaining every appearance from a hidden ground; Selfness gives through its interior depth and non-objectifiability, securing individuation from within; and Transcendence gives through an active refusal, an opacity that nonetheless opens the very space of relation. Third, the phenomenologist must chart the dynamic interplay among these structures in a way that not only respects their conceptual integrity but also opens them to comparative and critical engagement. In Conrad-Martius’s account, the inward compression of Nothingness resonates with Selfhood’s split, and both are echoed—and further intensified—by Transcendence’s extreme concealment. These overlapping “magnetic fields” of invisibility neither merge nor collapse; rather, they continually inform and refract one another’s modes of non-appearance, thus marking a fundamental discontinuity between real phenomena and their manifestation. From a meta-philosophical perspective, this discontinuity suggests that phenomenology must be understood as broadening its very notion of givenness, while extending beyond Conrad-Martius’s own formulations, so that what is “given” is not limited to phenomenal presence but also includes those originary donations through which reality discloses itself precisely in modes of withdrawal, opacity, and concealment. In conclusion, these stages coalesce into a unified account, demonstrating how invisibility both grounds and propels the phenomenology of real Being. In this integrated view, invisibility emerges not as absence but as a mode of givenness: the silent substratum—and set of gateways opened by Nothingness, Selfness, and Transcendence—through which reality discloses itself while resisting appropriation. This dual register, at once descriptive and meta-philosophical, underscores the broader import of Conrad-Martius’s metaphysical realism as a resource for rethinking the limits of appearance within phenomenology today.