Censorship of the Sacred and the Rationalisation of Society in the Early Years of the Communist Regime in Romania: Combating Pilgrimages, Processions and Miraculous Phenomena

Abstract

During the parliamentary elections in Italy after World War II, rumours spread in the public sphere about the occurrence of “miracles.” These “miracles” were interpreted as warning messages from the divine about the danger posed by the Communist Party. This was considered part of a strategy to promote Christian Democrats by representatives of the Catholic Church and was viewed with concern by communist countries in Eastern Europe as the phenomenon began to spread. In the second half of 1948, the Romanian authorities initiated measures to abolish the Greek Catholic Church and persecute the Roman Catholic Church. In this context, rumours spread in Catholic circles about “miracles” intended to stimulate the resistance of believers in the face of persecution. The phenomenon of “miracles” also spread among Orthodox believers, who were dissatisfied with the elimination of religious education in schools and the beginning of the collectivization of agriculture. For this reason, this phenomenon was considered a danger by the communist authorities in Romania. In this study, we aim to examine how the authorities dealt with the issue of “miracles,” what measures were taken, which institutions were involved, and what the consequences were for long-term religious policy in communist Romania.

1. Introduction

One of the fundamental goals of the Russian Revolution of October 1917 was the complete eradication of religion. The Soviet regime pursued this policy systematically until the Nazi invasion of Germany in the summer of 1941 (Lupinin 2010). It was the first time in history that such a policy had been implemented systematically at the state level.

In the context of the defeats suffered by the Soviet armies and the promotion by the Axis powers of the idea of a “crusade” against communism, Stalin introduced an important change in the religious policy of the Soviet state. The fundamental idea behind this policy was the distinction between “religion” and “religious organization”/“church.” Religion was to find a role in Soviet society, and people were free to practice the religion of their choice. Attention was to be focused on religious organizations, which were viewed from two perspectives: as administrators and guardians of religious ideas and practices, and as organizations that could have an impact on social and political realities. Religious organizations could operate within the Soviet Union as long as they did not promote political ideas contrary to the communist regime. This framework allowed for the reorganization of the Moscow Patriarchate and the use of the Russian Orthodox Church as an effective propaganda tool of the Soviet Union against the “crusade” launched by the Axis powers, through which Stalin’s opponents sought to exploit Soviet citizens’ dissatisfaction with the regime’s atheistic policy (Kalkandjieva 2015, pp. 12–64). G.G. Karpov, chairman of the Council for Orthodox Church Affairs, clearly outlined the fundamental directions of the new religious policy: “Over the past 27 years, the Soviet state has experienced the vitality of religious faith and its positive contribution to the great work of social progress. And since the communist regime is a realistic regime, which takes into account and makes use of all real, lasting forces that have not been weakened by the dialectics of historical evolution, there are strong grounds for believing that it will continue to develop and deepen its harmonious relations with the church” (Stăniloae 1945). Karpov believed that between 1917 and 1941, the Russian Orthodox Church had purified itself of its ties to the previous political regime and thus no longer promoted incorrect political ideas, but only “pure” religious ideas. Under these new conditions, cooperation between the Orthodox Church and the Soviet state was possible.

The Soviet Union continued to apply this policy in the years following the end of World War II. The Soviet Union had become a global power involved in the fight against “Western imperialism.” Stalin believed that the Vatican and the Protestant churches were allies of the United States, and for this reason, he initiated a fierce struggle against them. Pope Pius XII was seen as an unyielding opponent of communism, and the links between local Catholic churches and the Vatican were viewed in a political light, whereas in the Catholic Church, loyalty to the pope is an essential matter of faith.1 The communist authorities tried on several occasions to create Roman Catholic Churches independent of the Vatican. In the case of the Greek Catholics, they were considered a product of the politics of the Catholic states in the 16th–18th centuries, which had to be corrected. From the perspective of the Soviet authorities, Greek Catholicism was not a “religion.” For this reason, Greek Catholics were forcibly integrated into the Orthodox Church, which was presented as “historical justice” and an act of religious freedom (Bociurkiw, 1996). In the propaganda disputes between East and West, the West repeatedly accused the countries of the Soviet bloc of violating religious freedoms. The Soviet Union responded by claiming that only in the communist sphere was true religious freedom respected, as religious groups were no longer obliged to support false political ideas. Religious groups in the Soviet camp, subordinate to political power, were mobilized to affirm these ideas in the public sphere. In this context, the 1948 Moscow Conference is a reference point, at which the Soviet authorities attempted to create a common front of Orthodox Churches under Moscow’s control and to define the Vatican as a representative of “imperialism” (Kalkandjieva 2015, pp. 307–8).

It is clear that Moscow sought, through this strategy, to achieve various domestic and foreign policy objectives, but from many points of view, it is important to distinguish between a perspective that considers religion to be completely compromised and must be completely erased from the consciousness of individuals, and a perspective that offers religion a place in society because this has allowed religion, in one form or another, to remain in the public sphere, with many compromises.2 It was not just a matter of renouncing the promotion of “wrong” political ideas, but also of revising aspects of religious teaching that could conflict with widely accepted social values.3 In the case of Christianity, for example, the contemplative values promoted by monasticism were at odds with the social activism espoused by communist ideology.4 However, churches sought, within certain limits, to harmonize such differences in order to allow coexistence. This harmonization was very difficult, given that certain aspects were viewed by the churches as religious matters, while the state saw them from a political perspective. Therefore, there was a constant dispute over the definition of the boundary between the spiritual and the political aspects. This study deals precisely with aspects such as miracles and pilgrimages, which are fundamentally religious in nature, but the political authorities took into account their political potential, and this led to major contradictions in which the boundaries of religious freedom were greatly violated.

The idea that churches should not spread ideas contrary to generally accepted social values and promote political attitudes contrary to the interests of the state in which they operated was widely accepted in modern Europe, and this was also true in interwar Romania. Thus, the Romanian authorities asked the Vatican to expel several Hungarian Roman Catholic clergies who were suspected of having irredentist opinions (Dumitriu-Snagov 1991, p. 78). In the case of the Orthodox Church, during the dictatorship of King Carol II, several Orthodox priests suspected of being members of the Iron Guard were sent to concentration camps (Petcu 2005, pp. 267–84). These issues were considered isolated and unrelated to respect for freedom of belief and the rights of religious organizations.

Beyond such clear political issues, there were controversial issues that the state interpreted politically, and the church addressed from a religious point of view. For example, Adventists had major problems with their recognition by the Romanian authorities, due to their refusal to perform military service (Achim 2013). From the perspective of the Adventist Church, this was a religious issue, but for the state, this attitude had negative socio-political consequences.

Religion and religious organizations played a very important role in interwar Romania, and this role grew under the successive dictatorships after 1938 (Enache 2014, pp. 267–84). Most churches collaborated in one way or another with these dictatorial regimes. The Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, and the Lutheran Church were involved in missionary activities east of the Dniester and supported the idea of a “crusade” against communism. From the Soviet Union’s perspective, these issues were politically serious, but Moscow, given the presence of the Red Army in Romania, preferred to play it safe on church matters, considering its medium- and long-term interests.

Moscow’s main objective was to bring to power the Communist Party, which had little representation in Romanian society. Therefore, the Romanian communists and their Soviet supporters sought to show the Romanian public that, once in power, they would not violently change society according to the Soviet model but would seek to preserve elements of the old society. As religion was an essential element of Romanian society, the Romanian communists gave assurances that they would not wage a war against religion and impose atheism. The solution was to establish a clear distinction between “religion” and the political instrumentalization of the church.

From the end of 1944, there were intense discussions about the attitude to be adopted towards religious organizations that had collaborated with Nazism. The main target was the Lutheran Church, which was believed to have become an appendage of the Nazi movement in Romania (the German Ethnic Group). Under these circumstances, the Romanian authorities proposed the liquidation of this church. Gheorghe Pop, the then Minister of Cults and Arts, rejected the proposal, arguing that the Lutheran Church was a historic cult with a democratic structure, which could therefore easily adapt to the new realities, and that the church leadership that had collaborated with the Hitler regime had been arrested. The minister’s report concluded categorically: “Under no circumstances do I believe that it is appropriate for the church to be dissolved, as this measure would be excessive and would give rise to an anarchic situation” (Șandru 1998, p. 220).

This decision set a precedent, and the model was adopted by the communists. They spoke of removing “fascist” elements from within religious organizations but guaranteed that, after this process of “purification,” religion and religious organizations would enjoy complete freedom (Enache 2014, pp. 307–67). In the run-up to the decisive elections in the fall of 1946, Communist leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej solemnly promised to respect religious freedom and the public presence of religious organizations (O diversiune 1946, p. 1). The communists even promised that they would continue to pay priests’ salaries from the state, and indeed, this was provided for in subsequent legislation. Romania was the only communist country in Eastern Europe that paid priests’ salaries until the fall of the regime.

In 1948, the communists took full power in Romania. King Michael I was forced to abdicate, and the Romanian People’s Republic was proclaimed. The main directions of religious policy were defined by the Minister of Cults, Stanciu Stoian. He emphasized that the new people’s republic would fully respect freedom of belief, provided that religious organizations “purified” themselves of their “bourgeois” political past and became loyal partners of the communist state (Stoian 1949). A first test of relations between the state and religious organizations was the oath of allegiance to the people’s republic taken by the leaders of religious organizations. This was done by all the leaders of churches in Romania (Enache 2008, pp. 183–96). The next test was the new law on the organization of religious life in 1948. The Romanian communist authorities promulgated a law that had no connection with Soviet legislation and was inspired by interwar Romanian legislation on the organization of religious affairs. The Romanian law was extremely permissive compared to Soviet law and allowed religious organizations to operate freely in public spaces (Enache 2013b, pp. 107–49). Religion was removed as a subject of study in schools, but religious studies were allowed to be organized in churches. This law, which remained in force until the end of the communist regime, was an invitation from the state to religious organizations to accept the new political and social reality.

Perhaps more important than the removal of religion from schools were the new provisions limiting the relations of some religious denominations with foreign countries. These provisions put pressure on the Catholic Church by limiting the relations of Romanian Catholics with the Vatican. For this reason, Romanian Catholics rejected the new law (Enache 2013b, pp. 107–49). Since the communists could not find any reliable collaborators among Roman Catholics and Greek Catholics, the Romanian state cancelled the concordat with the Vatican, adopting the Soviet idea that the Vatican was a political tool of American imperialism. The communist regime in Romania decided to follow the Soviet example and abolish the Greek Catholic Church, arguing that this church was essentially a political creation (Kom 2000, pp. 88–124; Vasile 2003, pp. 65–162). The Romanian communists also saw the Greek Catholic Church as a kind of extension of the National Peasant Party, led by the Greek Catholic Iuliu Maniu, the main opposition party against the rise of the communist regime. Therefore, in the logic of the communist authorities, the abolition of the Greek Catholic Church was not an act of violation of religious freedom, but, on the contrary, a restoration of a religious reality that had been politically altered at the beginning of the 18th century. For this reason, propaganda presented everything as a free “reunification” of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church.

The Roman Catholic Church was asked to comply with the law and adopt a status of organization that would comply with the new provisions. At the conference of Roman Catholic bishops on 23 January 1949, the idea was reaffirmed that the pope had the absolute right to appoint bishops in Romania and that communication with the Vatican must be free (AMAE, file 220 Vatican 2, p. 42). In order to weaken the Roman Catholic resistance, the communists proceeded to arrest bishops and priests and organize spectacular political trials, such as “the trial of the spy ring working for the Papal Nunciature” (AMAE, file 220 Vatican 2), the trial of the French Legation (AMAE, file 220 Vatican 2) and the trial of the Italian Legation (Procesul 1951). From the perspective of the Romanian state, the persecution was for political, not religious, reasons.

The rest of the religious organizations in Romania recognized the 1948 law and drew up statutes of organization that complied with its provisions. There were also arrests and convictions within these religious organizations but not to the same extent as in the Catholic Church. The motivation behind these arrests was also political. In the case of the Orthodox Church, the first priests to be arrested were those who had been members of “bourgeois” political parties before 1944 (Enache 2017, pp. 28–41). The communist regime suggested that, after a period of “purification” from the bourgeois political past, churches would enjoy all the rights provided for in the 1948 law.

2. Miracles as a Form of Struggle Against Communism

However, this never happened, as the Romanian communists immediately began to see political problems in issues that were naturally related to religion. At the beginning of the communist regime, these issues were related to miraculous appearances, processions, and pilgrimages, and attention to these phenomena came in the wake of events in Italy, where the Catholic Church became involved in elections that ended with the victory of Alcide de Gasperi and the Christian Democracy. The situation was discussed in the official Romanian press, an example being the article signed by I. Manea, Vaticanul, agentură a imperialismului american, focar de obscurantism și oficină de afaceri scandaloase (Manea 1949), in which he says: “every day in the Italian elections, ‘miracles’ directed by the press were happening in the villages and towns, corteges with statues carrying placards to vote for reaction. The older women were threatened with doomsday and biblical plagues, while the younger ones were promised good luck in love and good men if they voted for Alcide de Gasperi (Perrone 2017). Peasants and labourers were threatened with hell and imprisonment”. The Vatican is, in the view of the author of the article, a large financial trust that plays as guarantor for scandalous businesses. Behind Pope Pius XII’s mass-manufactured ‘miracles’ is in fact the intention to hide ‘the Vatican’s rottenness and the intention to defend exploitative clergy. Under the guise of hypocritical and bigoted phrases about ‘love’, ‘charity’, ‘forgiveness of sins’, ‘neutrality’, a reactionary conspiracy is hidden”.

The Italian elections referred to took place on 18–19 April 1948, a year before the date of the article. It was a time of fierce confrontation between the Communists and the Christian Democrats, supported by the Catholics. What happened in Italy is described by the journalist Ernest O. Hauser in the Saturday Evening Post of 5 June 1948, in an article with the suggestive title: How the Church Licked Communism in Italy (Hauser 1948).

The article tells how, as the American army withdrew from Italy, the Communists, strongly backed by Soviet advisers, tried to force the winning of the elections. Left-wing socialists were drawn to the Communists’ side, creating a Popular Front. The all-too-obvious communist symbols (the hammer and sickle) were discarded, and the campaign focussed on winning over the middle classes with promises such as tax cuts, higher pensions for civil servants and wide agrarian reform in southern Italy.

In the face of the communist assault, the Christian Democrats found themselves completely unprepared, unable to respond to their rivals’ effective propaganda. Salvation came from the massive involvement of the Catholic Church, led by Pope Pius XII. In February 1948, before 1600 workers in Rome, he told them that “the doctrine of Christ is irreconcilable with materialistic doctrine. To accept it is to leave the Church, to cease to be Catholic”.

In March, addressing parish priests, the Pontiff said that “it is now clear that the voice of conscience compels every sincere Catholic to vote for those candidates who offer sufficient guarantees for the real wellbeing of individuals, families and society, in accordance with divine law and Christian moral doctrine. Not to vote, the pope said, is a sin.”

The one who spoke out most vehemently against the Communist-led front was the Archbishop of Milan, Cardinal Schuster, who, in a pastoral letter, announced that those who follow the Communist line cannot obtain forgiveness of sins from priests. It was completely forbidden for a believer to give his vote to a party that was against Christianity and wanted to limit its presence in the public arena.

The categorical assertion that believers would not receive forgiveness of sins if they voted for the Communists stirred up a storm. Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti, who had kissed the pope’s ring on his return from exile, gave a speech in Milan in front of 100,000 people in which he characterized Cardinal Schuster as a capitalist who personally owned 10% of the shares in the Italian subsidiary of Edison. The crowd did not revolt, and even cheered the cardinal, so Togliatti’s message fell on deaf ears.

The church’s attitude disturbed the crowd of workers with communist sympathies but who had strong religious convictions, because a lack of forgiveness meant being condemned to hell. It was not so much these workers, who were not church-goers, but their wives who were affected, as the priests clearly asked what newspapers they read, which party was supported in the family and, in the case of the Communist Party, did not grant forgiveness of sins. The impact of wives on their husbands’ voting choices was extremely important.

The Catholic Action, an organization with 500,000 members, also entered the fray, organizing anti-communist committees in every parish, thus fighting with the means of the enemy, who made extensive use of local organizations. The battle to win over local communities was extremely bitter, with every communist poster being “cancelled” by a Catholic poster and Catholic Action propagandists publicly confronting communist ones.

Meanwhile, Christian Democrats began to receive campaign funds from Italian industrialists and Catholics around the world. Eventually, the 18,000 civic committees set up with the support of Catholic Action managed to turn the tide, so that a few days before the elections, the Italian communists were reporting to Cominform in Belgrade that there was no chance of victory.

Robert A. Vendresca points out that in 1948, there were 17 apparitions of the Virgin Mary noted in the local and national media, as opposed to none during the fascist period, nine in 1944 and 13 in 1954. The wave of miraculous apparitions began in the first part of February, when Alcide de Gasperi officially announced the elections for the new parliament. Over the course of a few weeks, a number of people from all corners of Italy claimed to have seen the Virgin Mary or had other supernatural experiences, including miraculous healings associated with devotion to the Blessed Virgin. The Virgin Mary was everywhere during the April elections, appearing in the most unexpected places. These miracles were so widespread that there was talk of a ‘miracle explosion’. The most famous apparition took place in Assisi, the birthplace of St Francis. On 10 February 1948, a woman saw the statue of the Virgin Mary on the roof of the church of Santa Maria degli Angeli moving her head and chest in deep distress. Immediately, people gathered in front of the church, and the power of suggestion was so great that they all saw the Mother of God manifesting her grief. The few sceptics who denied the miracle were molested (Ventresca 2000, pp. 242–44).

During the election campaign, dozens of statues and icons of the Virgin Mary were carried through the streets of Italy. The processions were attended by thousands of people who begged the Virgin Mary to guide Italy out of its political darkness. These pilgrimages were ostensibly aimed at conversion and repentance, but they also acted as “crusades” against the Communist Party. Such an atmosphere fostered faith in Our Lady’s ability to save individuals and communities, favouring miraculous apparitions, including miraculous cures. Officially, the Church called for foresight and disregard of these apparitions before the elections. But they worked in the popular imagination, leading to an unexpected political outcome (Ventresca 2000, pp. 207–9).

“Put another way,” Vendresca concludes, “the explosion of miracles in 1948, in which the figure of Mary was dominant, meant for Italians a form of resistance, albeit passive, to hostile elements who were trying to undermine the foundations of local religious authority” (Ventresca 2000, p. 256).

The events in Italy had echoes in Catholic circles in Eastern Europe, notably in Poland (Krzywosz 2016, pp. 46–48). In Lublin, for example, on 3 July 1949, a copy of the icon of Our Lady of Czestochowa in the cathedral began to weep tears of blood. Within a few hours the cathedral was full to overflowing, and the next day, a great number of worshippers queued for kilometres, waiting to worship. With communist pressure on the Catholic Church mounting, the miracle in Lublin was obviously interpreted in the context of this conflict.

The attitude of the communist power was clear—the miracle is provoked by the reactionary clergy to stir up unrest. In the case of the Catholic hierarchy, the attitude was ambivalent. On the one hand, deep down, everyone was enthused by the attitude of religious fervour, intensified by the news of miraculous cures, which strengthened the resistance against the totalitarian state.

On the other hand, the bishops feared that the great unrest would further stimulate the fight against the Church, so they decided to set up a commission to study what had happened in Lublin. The results of the commission were not publicized as such; only a press release was issued saying that it was certainly not a miracle, so people should remain calm.

The communist authorities were not happy with the bishop’s letter and decided to launch a press campaign to discredit the miracle and the Church. On the 13 July, an article titled Abuzurile credinței (Abuses of Faith) appeared, saying: “The bishops’ letter is evasive and “Jesuitistic”. The author leaves the door open to discussion and interpretation.” Rumours of the “miracle” continued to spread, stimulating the public imagination and pilgrimages to the holy place. The state authorities, the article said, respected religious freedom, but called on the bishop to clarify matters and put an end to the “psychosis”.

On the same day, a 20-year-old woman was killed in a stampede in the packed cathedral. It was the moment that spurred the authorities to strike decisively.

On the 17 July, a large communist demonstration was organized in Lublin, where demonstrators shouted against the Church, demanding an end to the “atmosphere of the Middle Ages” and an exemplary punishment of those who had stimulated the development of the phenomenon. In this extremely tense atmosphere, many believers were arrested.

On 8 August 1949, in order to calm things down, the Bishop of Lublin closed the cathedral under the pretext of repairs and the absence of any miraculous phenomena. At the same time, the faithful from the neighbourhood were asked to stop coming to Lublin. The threat of indefinite closure of the cathedral worked, and people stopped coming. The cathedral reopened on the 12 August, but there was no trace of the miracle on the icon.

Examples from these countries had also infected the Catholic faithful in Romania. The miraculous apparitions among Roman Catholics and resistant Greek Catholics were quite numerous and spread over a relatively long period of time.5 The major problem for the communist authorities was when such manifestations spread into Orthodox circles.

3. Religious Phenomena in the Spotlight of the Communist Authorities in Romania

The Orthodox Church, through Patriarch Justinian Marina, had reached a compromise with the communist state. The Church recognized the communist regime as legitimate. In return, the patriarch demanded that the state respect the commitments it had made under the 1948 law. However, part of society was dissatisfied with the compromises made by Patriarch Justinian. The elimination of religion and religious symbols from schools in the fall of 1948 was combined in 1949 with the beginning of the collectivization process. Social discontent was repressed in certain religious manifestations. Miraculous events with political overtones began to appear in Orthodox circles, channelling society’s discontent. For this reason, the communist authorities adopted plans to combat the phenomenon. For these reasons, the communist authorities adopted plans for measures to combat the phenomenon.

The plans included propagandistic (denouncing the false nature of miracles, convincing people that religious freedom was respected), repressive (arresting instigators) and administrative aspects aimed at restricting, as far as possible, the size of the crowds attending public religious gatherings. This also affected the religious celebrations of places of worship and pilgrimages to monasteries.

In the context of the situation described above, the communist authorities sought to force the faithful to limit their religious life to interaction with the parish church and discouraged participation in large pilgrimages to monasteries (Enache 2024, pp. 195–97). The monasteries were to close themselves off from the world, and monks were free to lead their spiritual life but within the walls, interacting as little as possible with the faithful.

In this context, on 25 November 1948, a meeting of the Secretariat of the CC of the PMR was held to discuss “deviations in the religious matter”. It was attended by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu, Lothar Rădăceanu, Alexandru Moghioroș (Scurtu 2002, pp. 380–86).

The rapporteur was Teohari Georgescu, Minister of Internal Affairs, who presented to his colleagues the storm stirred up by two measures that were applied practically simultaneously: the abolition of the Greek-Catholic Church and the removal of religious objects from schools. On the latter measure, Georgescu pointed out that the way the action was carried out was wrong because those in charge of explaining the decision to the people had “handled the issue of laicization in an unfair way, offended religious feelings with jokes that were not appropriate, and gave the enemy the opportunity to take action against us”.

For this reason, “there has been stir and discontent almost throughout the country.” “The matter cannot be considered finished,” said the Minister of Internal Affairs, “the discontent was raised not only by the kulaks, but also by poor elements, so that in many parts the opening of classes had to be postponed, because most of the children were not sent to school.” The minister emphasized that there was a tendency for religious classes to be moved to the church anteroom.

For these reasons, Teohari Georgescu considered “that the measure to remove the icons from the schools made the Party’s work in the countryside much more difficult, especially as the form of organized action of the enemy in the villages was becoming more and more evident; the state apparatus, even Party members who have not yet come to explain the world from a scientific materialistic point of view, can be stopped in taking measures because they are struck in their faith.”

He pointed out that “the Political Bureau agreed that religion had no place in schools” and was of the opinion that “if the Ministry of Education had confined itself to this separation alone and had not proceeded to remove the icons, we would have robbed the enemy of the opportunity of using this as a weapon against measures for the laicization of schools.”

In conclusion, he proposed “in order to counterbalance the action of the enemy, a work of enlightenment of the population and a clarification of the problem before the Party,” considering that “we cannot come up with a compromise and put back religious objects or reintroduce religion in schools, because the enemy will gain courage.”

Alexandru Moghioroș emphasised, in his turn, “that on the party line there are signs of serious unrest, that the peasants are saying that their faith has been taken away and children have been forbidden to pray. Party members are confused and answer wrongly or are themselves religious.”

He considered that “if laicization had been carried out without removing religious objects, the peasants would have calmed down, because they themselves say that if their faith is not taken away, they have nothing against the measure of laicization; also, if religion classes had been left optional, after a while children would not have come to these classes on their own.”

Vasile Luca pointed out that “we did not take into account that we have not yet completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that we are a country in which the majority of the population is made up of religious peasants, and we gave too much importance to religion, we cancelled the right to teach religion in school, although this was not the most serious problem, it did not hinder us in our struggle against reaction.

Through the measure taken by the Ministry of Education, we gave the enemy the opportunity to start a counter-revolutionary action in the villages, and instead of mobilizing the poor peasantry against the Kulaks, we allowed ourselves to be dragged into a religious conflict.”

Luca considered that “in the question of laicization, the religious sentiment should not be attacked”, giving as an example “the question of the passage of the Greek Catholics to Orthodoxy, which was not posed as a religious problem, but as a national problem, as a measure against imperialism.”

He proposed “that serious political work should be done against counter-revolutionary actions, and that measures should not be taken against religion, but against the popes who indulge in spiteful actions.”

Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej summed up the discussions, pointing out “that the measure taken by the Ministry of Education provoked, especially in the peasant sector, an alliance of struggle against the Government measures and put at the disposal of our adversaries a platform on the basis of which they mobilised the peasantry against these measures.” “Our Party,” Dej added, “for the first time set foot in the villages and began the democratisation offensive from below, the assault to clean up the administrative apparatus by replacing mayors, etc., that the basic concern was not religion but the material basis of religion.

The action of the Ministry of Education was an anarchic, petty bourgeois action, which mistakes the removal of religious objects for the removal of religious consciousness from people’s heads.”

The communist leader also pointed out that “the teachers and the clergy, with small exceptions, are against us; the unanimity of the peasantry, 76% of the country’s population, 12 million people, are believers and we cannot suddenly make them materialists. By the measures we have taken we have given a weapon to the church to strengthen its positions in the villages among the population, to strengthen the faith, and we have given a weapon into the hands of reaction, which has its reserves in the villages, has its political base in the villages, and has on its side prejudices, the general state of illiteracy.”

He favoured “the publication of a document stating the principled position on the religious matter.” He also asked his fellow travellers “to mobilize the party against the provocateurs, to take a stand against irresponsible elements who in some places have offended religious sentiment. Let us show that such actions are labelled by our party leadership as provocative acts committed by spiteful elements, infiltrated into our ranks, into the ranks of teachers and priests.

That such acts were used by opponents of the regime to mislead the religious population, interpreting them as acts directed against religious feelings and beliefs recognized by the Constitution.

That laicization aims at culturalization in the interests of the broad masses who have been alienated from culture, that in connection with this measure hostile elements within the ranks of teachers, reactionary elements within the clergy have interpreted laicization as directed against the freedom of faith of the population.

That such attitudes would be severely penalized as misleading the people as to the aims pursued by the Government for the cultural upliftment of the people.

That the right to exercise worship, provided for in the Constitution, the freedom of citizens of the Romanian People’s Republic to exercise their faith in places of worship, is assured.”

In conclusion, Gheorghiu Dej proposed “that a clarification in this regard be published in a substantive article; that concrete facts be mentioned, that it be shown how the enemies tried to provoke actions against our regime, that I have not been the cause of any hindrance to the exercise of faith, but that to turn the school into a place of prayer is not in conformity with the educational reform. Also, in the article on the substance and the mission of the Church, to be shown that it enjoys not only freedom but also material support, showing how much the State spends on the upkeep of churches and priests.

The question of laicization should be clarified, both for the population and for party members and clergy.

A passage should be addressed to those who falsify the party line and the Government’s measure, to show that by the action taken by the reaction within the village population and even in the towns on the religious question, an attempt has been made to divert the attention of the working peasantry and of all those who work from the practical problems for improving their livelihood, from the struggle against the capitalist elements and the village rich people, that the duty of the party members, of the representatives of the State and of the Church is to enlighten the population, to prevent them from being misled.

One should attack the positions of the enemy, who has taken the defense of the ancestral faith as its standard-bearer.”

He also proposed “that special instruction be given to party members, in the sense of the substantive article, on working methods, on the attitude to be taken towards the faithful” as well as “that the head of the Catholic Church and the heads of the Orthodox Church be summoned by the government to talk with them, to convince them that it is in their interest to go about their business and to show them what contribution should the church make to repair these mistakes.”

Last but not least, he proposed “the formation on party lines, at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, of a body which would deal on a daily basis with clergy demonstrations and would be in permanent contact with the Secretariat; in each county there should be someone who would know what was happening in the churches and could inform the party.”

4. Repressive Measures and Propaganda Campaigns to Combat Miraculous Phenomena, Processions, and Pilgrimages

The article-manifesto expressing the position of the Romanian Labor Party appeared in February 1949 and was titled În chestiunea libertății religioase (În chestiunea libertății religioase 1949, p. 3). It said that the church, not the school, was the place for the exercise of religion, and therefore there was no longer any provision for a religious lesson to be scheduled as part of the school curriculum: ‘The school cannot and must not fulfil missions that the church has, and the church cannot and must not fulfil missions that the school has. Religious faith is freely exercised in the church, while the school “has the mission of educating the developed and active citizen of the Romanian People’s Republic in the spirit of progress”. The People’s Democratic regime respects religious freedom, while the old regime did not promote real freedom. The materialist-dialectical conception is appropriated by the masses only through consciousness-raising work, by spreading scientific knowledge to the broadest strata, and not at all by curtailing freedom of conscience and religious freedom. Invoking the classics of Marxism, the party is said to shy away from taking of actions against religion, because “banning religion would put religious questions in the foreground at the expense of political questions, harming the workers’ struggle. The Party criticizes and punishes those who have allowed themselves to be led along the line of offending the religious feelings of the faithful, without seeing that they are thus playing the game of the class enemy, eager to divert the working people from the great tasks before them”. What appears to be anti-religious politics is in fact the fight against superstition: “But the party cannot remain indifferent to prejudices and mystical views cultivated in the past. The enemy uses it to cultivate fatalism, passivity, and resignation. Party members must work to free labor people from these prejudices.”

The culprits are the provocative elements, shared generously in all cults. For the Catholics, there is the case of the Hungarian Cardinal Mindszenty József, whose trial was in full swing (Jarvis 2016). Religious sects “hide under the guise of religious faith their links with various imperialist offices of reactionary propaganda and espionage. Under the guise of piety, these sects preach the futility of all human endeavour—they seek to thwart the successes of the working class”. As for the Orthodox, it speaks of “those who blessed the actions of the Legionaries and Marshal Antonescu” and now “use their status as ecclesiastical figures to slander the achievements of the people”.

Obviously, the political police could not be left out of the picture. In September 1948, a plan of measures was drawn up, titled “Details designed to assist in the drafting of the general order”, which guided officers on how to draw up operational records. Reading it makes clear what the priorities of political police officers were to be.

The action plan showed that “The records to be created (or where they exist, to be systematized in accordance with the present instructions) must take account of the following characteristics:

• Preachers, priests, monks, and other clergymen are in very large numbers, can legally manifest themselves, and are impelled not only by their social origin and upbringing, but also by their mystical-idealistic doctrine, to hostility against the materialistic-dialectical foundations of our People’s Republic. Consequently, our records must be broad enough to allow us to know at any given moment where they are and what they do.
• The manifestations of clerics, shrouded in biblical quotations and parables, allow the believers’ agitation, while at the same time making it difficult to prove the investigations. As a result, gathering evidence against a priest, preacher, etc. requires more work and more in-depth investigation than in other cases involving the political police.
• As the problem is complex, linked to a number of superstitions and prejudices, and at the same time known from the past, it requires more historical studies and documentary material than other problems.

We suggest the following practical organization of the records to enable all the Regional Directorates to systematize their material according to the Service corresponding to the problem in the DGSP:

1.

List of documents and files of the instructive orders received, knowing that from the above-mentioned causes more and more varied ones were given than in other problems.

2.

Documentary library, including also a file with a record of all laws and regulations concerning the problem of cults, including also excerpts from the press.

3.

The file with compromising material, containing evidence of the clergy’s offences against the morals of citizenship and religion, to serve, as the case may be and as the need of the moment may require, for information penetrations or unmasking.

4.

File with the record of the work of the county inspectors of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (in the process of appointment).

5.

Files—records of all the cults in the unit jurisdiction, including the following for each:

• The history of the cult in two parts, in general covering the evolution in the world and in the Romanian People’s Republic, focusing on the doctrinal principles, and in particular, covering the evolution within the unit. The latter part is to be completed every 6 months with a summary of the period that has expired. For the completion of the first part, reference will be made to the work provided by the DGSP.
• The scheme of the organization of the cult within the jurisdiction of the unit, comprising for each township the number of believers in relation to the number of inhabitants, the names and addresses of the priests, preachers, etc. (with a brief indication of the social strata to which they belong and of their political activity, the names and addresses of the persons who are members of the parish council, the sect committee, etc. (with the same indications). This organizational chart will be permanently kept up to date by noting conversions, removals, deaths, instructors sent from the centre, etc., in order to be always operational. To facilitate the creation of this record, all the data concerning the same township will be placed inside the file in the alphabetical order of townships.
• The summary scheme of the governing bodies of the cult and the centres of cultural concentration such as monasteries, theological institutes, boarding schools, etc. with the tables of the names and addresses of the persons concerned, with a brief indication of the social strata to which they belong and the political activity they have carried out.
• Records of religious associations operating within the cult, whether they have legal personality or not, mentioning once again that all sects are considered by the Ministry of Cults, cults and not religious associations, as they are sometimes called and as some DRSPs, such as Suceava insist on calling them. Each religious association will include the necessary data for identification, the table of the board of directors, with the indications detailed above, a list of branches by townships, with the respective tables.

6.

The operational problem files for each major objective. These files are to be prepared for the more specific problems of the respective Regional Directorate, County Service or Political Police Bureau. For this reason, it is not possible to give a precise indication of their number and composition. Of the most necessary problem-files, we reckon that the following must exist:

-

Records of Church Singers.

-

The catechisation of children—for each cult.

-

The question of crosses and crucifixes.

-

Violent counter-revolutionary agitations under religious guise.

-

The so-called miracles and the mood created by this. […]

-

Each individual monastery and hermitage, with a map of the region and access roads.

-

Each bishopric.

-

Each theological institute and each religious school. […]

-

Hostile demonstrations on the occasion of the nationalization of schools and tendencies to reintroduce icons and religious instruction in schools.

-

Patronages and pilgrimages. […]

7.

Personnel files will be compiled on all those reported to manifest hostile activity under the guise of worship. We consider, as we have shown above that the clerics in general are the opponents of our regime of popular democracy and that we have at our disposal personal data and files from the evidence records and operative files, the number of these will be quite large.

The files have to be created even when there is not enough material for Justice, but there is evidence of anti-democratic incitement” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 67, pp. 256–73).

Therefore, centres of “mystical” propaganda, which could turn into politically motivated manifestations, had to be identified. Anyone who had the ability to agglutinate a group with the potential for hostile activity was of interest. Next, we present some informative notes, which show what the political police bodies were pursuing in the religious question from December 1948 onwards, namely the reactions to the application of the law on religious cults and the removal of icons from schools.

Thus, in a document dated 5 December 1948, drawn up by the Brăila County Political Police Office, the evolution of the problem of icons in schools was reported:

“With reference to your order no. 13/31,287 of 20 November 1948, concerning the way in which the new law on cults is to be applied within the jurisdiction of our service, we have the honour to report as follows:

The School Inspectorate of Brăila, before 1 October 1948, summoned all the teachers and explained to them the importance, meaning and purpose of the new education law.

Among other things, they were instructed to remove the icons from the school classrooms, but in such a way that the students would not notice that this operation would be imposed.

At the beginning there was some dissatisfaction with this measure on the part of the teachers themselves, who said that these measures were an attempt to break with tradition, and some of the students, seeing this, took courage, and prayed at the entrance to school, although they had been told that the prayers didn’t take place anymore.

However, thanks to the efforts of some primary school teachers who understood the purpose of these measures and the direct action of some communist students, the situation calmed down and there are now no more cases of prayers being said at the beginning or end of the school day.

At the beginning, a more emphasised state was observed on the part of the students’ parents, who were demonstrating, claiming that the regime was also taking away their faith. Some of the parents even turned up at school, demanding explanations from the teachers for this measure.

Opposition to this direction was observed in particular from the clergy in rural municipalities. Thus, in the Tătaru Township, Brăila County, the priests of that township made hostile propaganda among the population against these measures and addressed the people even in the church saying that the current regime doesn’t allow for religion to be taught in schools, that it forbids prayers and even removed icons, following which they made recommendations that people should bring their children to church to worship.

Following this the population started to comment saying that the communists were taking away their icons and their faith.

These priests, based in particular on the dispositions they received from the bishop’s office with order 8147 of November this year, which said to set up those catechetical schools, took the liberty to make statements in front of the world […].

In Silistraru Township, measures were taken in the township council to replace the icons and prayers in the school. Subsequently, the priest, […] having received the bishop’s order to form the catechetical schools, the primary school teachers together with that priest began to have a voice, saying that the measure of removing the icons would not be a measure from above, since the bishop had sent them the order to continue with the teaching of religion, which is why they started making various comments […].

Looking at the situation in general, this state of affairs in this direction, the reason why certain manifestations and comments are still being made in connection with the measure to remove the icons and to stop prayers in schools, it is due to the fact that the priests are guilty of all this, because, being based on the bishop’s order they allow themselves to make this propaganda.

From information it is believed that this measure in regard to catechetical education was taken only in the bishopric of Buzău […] by Bishop Antim and that following the fact that he had been summoned by the secretary of the county organisation of the PMR—Buzău, who asked him to withdraw this order because great disturbances had been caused among the masses in the towns and villages, Bishop Antim gave a verbal order through the protoiereus Gogu Șerbu from Brăila not to proceed with the application of the order because serious confusion had been caused” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 4052, Vol. 1, p. 279).

Another report describes what happened in localities in the south of Moldavia (region of Barlad): “After the removal of icons from schools on the initiative of teachers, in some communes, such as Corodești Township, Mircești Township and Galțești Village in Puiești Township, the icons were put back by the inhabitants, influenced by the priests.

The icons are still preserved in these schools.

At the school in Bălăbănești, the teacher Elena Tașcă has the seventh-graders pray at the beginning and at the end of classes.

In the other schools the icons, once removed, were never put back, even though at the beginning, especially among the peasants, a worrying mood had been created, fuelled by hostile elements.” A special case was that of the primary school teacher Gheorghe Oprișan from Perieni, a member of the PMR, who put the icons back in the school, telling the inhabitants that “as long as the icon was not in the school, he kept seeing a ram with a single horn in front of him, which wanted to poke him and that, since he put the icon back, he no longer had this vision” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 4052, Vol. 1, p. 276).

Such reports exist from all regional directorates of the political police. They show the discontent of the population, the conviction that this is the way religion is slowly being driven out of people’s consciences. When discontent turned into acts of revolt, the political police took decisive action, classifying the persons concerned in subversive groups, preferably legionary, as in the following case, presented by the Tecuci County Political Police Service (note dated 1 February 1949): “We have the honour to report to you on your order no. 13/2581 of 6 January 1949, concerning the priests Sevastre Ioan, Micu Alexandru, Grigoraș Gheorghe and Iftime Ioan:

The named were the heads of subversive organisations which have not ceased their activities even to the present day and are seeking by every means to keep away this government from democracy and to make difficulties through rumours and manifestations of a subversive nature, even going so far as to reorganise the Legionary Movement.

At present the above-named are being detained at this Political Police Service for investigations” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 4052, Vol. 1, p. 231).

By the end of March 1949, the matter of the icons was considered resolved, but it was clear that discontent persisted, and people no longer trusted the government.

In addition to monitoring the situation in the schools, the political police also monitored possible catechisation actions in the churches, which the Political Bureau considered extremely dangerous. The order to supervise catechetical teaching was sent out in mid-December 1948 by the General Directorate of People’s Security. It was requested that a situation covering the following points be sent by the end of December:

“1. The general percentage of students attending religious classes for each cult.

2. Percentage by social class and by urban, suburban and village environment for each religion.

3. Percentage of those who pay to attend these courses.

4. The atmosphere in which the courses are held, details of the teachers, the means they use to attract children and persuade parents to send them to the courses, and

5. Any further details to clarify the matter”.

(ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 4052, vol. 1, p. 293)

The reports collected by the political police indicate that some of the priests took part in catechism actions, but there was no unity of action in this respect. Some bishops gave detailed instructions on how to carry out catechism actions, while others did nothing. The political police took measures to intimidate priests who were carrying out catechism actions and put pressure on bishops, as in the case of Bishop Antim of Buzău. He had given precise instructions about catechism actions, but under pressure, he gave up: “This measure was even reversed by the church bodies, so that nowadays such courses are no longer given to schoolchildren” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 4052, Vol. 1, pp. 286–97). Thus, at the beginning of 1949, the catechisation problem seemed to have been definitively resolved.

However, in 1949, the collectivisation of agriculture began (Cătănuș and Roske 2000; Iordachi and Dobrincu 2009). In this context, there was an explosion of miraculous apparitions in Romania, considered by the communist regime as “enemy manifestations under the guise of religion”, and rightly so, because these “miracles” clearly conveyed an anti-communist message, which was perceived as such by everyone. In order to combat the phenomenon, a large-scale press campaign and repressive actions by the political police were once again launched.

The press campaign took place in all the newspapers, but the most important were “Scânteia” and “Universul”. The series of articles in the communist official paper “Scânteia” began on the 5 June with Nestor Ignat’s article “Despre superstiții, “tremurici” și geamurile năzdrăvane” (Ignat 1949, p. 3) The author starts strongly: “Since ancient times, there have been those who have profited from the ignorance of the many. As mankind has advanced and science has elucidated the mysteries of nature, the few who exploited the many have hidden the truth from the eyes of men to keep them further in bondage. As science was explaining and clarifying all that there is in the world, all sorts of charlatans, false preachers, went about the villages and towns and spoke to the moon and the stars, putting into the minds of men all sorts of superstitions, false beliefs, lies. This, according to Ignat, was used by those who wanted to make people believe that they were powerless and that what is evil will remain so forever and ever. When the misery of the labourers was great, in order to divert them from fighting for their demands, the ruling classes used religion to make them reconcile themselves to their fate: “The capitalists were trying to channel the hatred of working people into the swamp of mysticism, to plunge the masses even deeper into the darkness of backwardness”.

In the new regime of popular democracy, the situation has changed. “However,” the political journalist begins his attack, “the capitalists seek to use the inherited state of backwardness to drive the people away from labour by means of ‘miracles’, ‘spirits’, ‘apparitions’, ‘gods’, ‘new born’. Speculators who can no longer do business on the black market, seek to create a new market to cheat people. They make use of the kulaks, of all sorts of crooks dressed up as Catholic priests, of certain sects, who are at the behest of the American gangs and the popes of Rome, of all sorts of ‘shysters’, ‘seers’ and so on. They use superstition to turn people into blind tools of faith.”

Two examples are given to support the assertions. In the Berzovia Township in Caras county, “the kulaks have been telling the country that there is a “holy spirit” there. This spirit said ‘no one should fight against the rich any more, if you are a serf, then you will remain a submissive serf’. The poor peasants were called into a house, where the lights were switched off and the “spirit” began to utter the above. But a poor peasant with an emancipated spirit unmasked the whole fabrication as the work of the kulak Bürger Joseph, who had made a hole in the wall of the house, through which he had hurled these venomous words against the revolutionary transformations in the country.”

Another example concerns the phenomenon of saints’ faces appearing on windows. Such an event, Ignat tells us, happened in Ploiești. The Mother of God with a baby and Moses with a staff could be seen on the windows. “In another Ploiești neighbourhood, those who couldn’t see and were keen to see were urged to look at pieces of glass worn by some individuals for 10 lei”. Those who were spreading the idea of the “miracle from the window” were “some scoundrels, enemies of the people: Comănescu Alex, a rich man, former legionary, Constantinescu Gheorghe, former colonel, Cristescu Alex, a landowner, former major, Susănescu Nicolae, son of a merchant, former legionary, Condruță Gheorghe, former general, Răducanu Grigore, former labourer for a landowner. While some of these bandits urged them on more fiercely, trying to convince the citizens that they could see the saints, the rogues were picking pockets”. In fact, says the author, the whole thing was a scam, because the windows were greased with gas. Apart from robbing people of their money, it was even more serious, a sabotage of a society in which Stakhanovism was to become the norm: “They stop people from working, reduce their strength and self-confidence, and steal their hard-earned money” (Ignat 1949, p. 3).

The articles attempt to stir up hatred between the so-called ‘kulaks’ and the poor peasants, emphasising a tension that was real (there is always a latent tension between the better-off and the poor) in order to produce a rupture within the village world. The kulak is the exploiter who manipulates the poor, but the latter, with a well-developed revolutionary conscience, managed to unmask the enemy’s villainous plans. The journalists were thus following the instructions given by the PMR leadership at the meeting of the CC Secretariat on 21 February 1949, where it was proposed that “the impoverished and agricultural workers should be mobilised when the estates were taken over. Basically, the party should enlighten them, so as not to let them show solidarity with the landowners” (Scurtu 2003, p. 117).

The most talked-about miracle by the propagandists was the appearance, in several localities, of the face of the divinity on the windows of houses. In the articles in “Scânteia”, it is not made clear who is appearing, but in a note from the political police in June 1949, it is clearly stated that it is the image of the Virgin Mary (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 74, Vol. 3, p. 170). The phenomenon was attacked in a sympathetic manner and pushed into the background.

Thus, on the 18 June, a new article appeared, titled S-a spălat geamul, s-a spălat și minunea (Capătă 1949, p. 3), in which it is said that on the 5 June in a village in the Râmnicu Sărat County, a rumour spread that “holy” images and signs had appeared on the school window. The author of the article mentions that the “miracle” was seen only by the “kulaks”, led by Stanca, the wife of Andronache Voicu, a former tavern keeper and large landowner. Dima Gheorghe, a hard-working peasant, stood up against them and told the people that it was all nothing but a cunning trick of the kulaks. The poor peasants washed the windows, which were gas-fuelled. The conclusion of the article was that “The poor man is not as stupid as the landlord thinks”.

But the series of miracles is more complex than just the Virgin’s face appearing on the windows. We also have “classic” miracles. In the documents of the political police, we have identified two informative notes, which speak of practically the same miracle, but in different locations, one in Dobrogea, the other in Transylvania. In the first case, it is said that “the priest Popovici Stere from Lunca Village, Tulcea County, popularised a rumour in June 1949: that God had appeared in Sinoie Village, Constanța County, appearing to a mute shepherd and asking him to give him a sheep, the shepherd gave him the sheep and from that moment on he began to speak. God then told him to put his hand into a hole nearby and the man in question, doing as he was told, put his hand into the hole, first taking out an ear of dry wheat and a cob of corn, and then he took out his hand full of blood. God would have explained to the shepherd that this meant there would be a war.6

During the same period, “in the Oarba de Mureș Township […] a child mute since birth, meeting an old man who asked him for a sheep, returned home and recovered his speech. Leaving in the same place, the child is said to have met the old man again, who told him to put his hand into a mound, from which he drew a handful of wheat, a handful of corn and a handful of blood. On account of this miracle, the people make various comments about the harvest and a possible war” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 67, p. 215).

The scenario is identical, the differences being in the local colour, and expresses very well the popular religiosity, which believes in signs and wonders. It is about the shepherd whom everyone knows to be voiceless, and God in the guise of an “old man” who tries to see if he is merciful. As a reward for his virtue, he is given the gift of speech and, through the three signs, is shown the future: drought and war. A diffusion is also possible, but it is likely that both variants share a common model: that of Petrache Lupu, about whom we will speak later.

Then, we have a “miracle” that has stirred up much controversy, that of the woman transformed into a donkey, which we learn about in a note of 22 January 1949: “Last week was characterised from a religious point of view by the rumour of the miracle of the donkey at the Patriarchate. Dozens and hundreds of people from the capital, the outlying villages and from some remote villages came to the Patriarch’s Palace and later to the Plumbuita convent of nuns to see the donkey, transformed from an infidel woman. As no one could show the donkey to those who wanted to see it, the rumour spread that Patriarch Justinian, who had sold himself out to the communists, had hidden the animal so that people would not see the miracle. Both this fact and the fact that the miracle happened in order to punish an unfaithful and atheist woman, shows that this rumour was spread with clearly hostile purposes. At the origin of this rumour was apparently Aesop’s fable of the donkey and the goose, popularised in December 1948 at a party among priests by priest Chiriac of the Popa Tatu Church, who said on that occasion that it would not hurt if God turned a woman into a donkey to punish the tendency of women today to stop believing in God and to join the communist political movements” (ACNSAS, Informative Fund, File no. 2193, Vol. 3, p. 158).

Alongside articles dedicated to miracles, there were articles dedicated to rain processions. These were frequent in the period 1946–1948, due to the devastating drought that hit Romania. Indirectly, these articles sought to combat the phenomenon of pilgrimages because, with the occurrence of various ‘miracles’7, it became extremely important to discourage large religious gatherings such as pilgrimages or processions. Such gatherings generated strong emotions that could be converted into political gestures hostile to the communist regime.

In one of these articles, the author explains that rain processions are vain superstitions and that the scientific basis for rain is different. The propagandist points out that “the kulaks, speculators and former landowners use rumours to blind people’s minds and introduce the idea of unseen powers, to keep the working people in the dark”. He gives an example from the county of Tulcea, where some “reactionary” priests gathered the peasants, telling them that there would be a drought, and called them to a religious procession through the fields. At the head of the procession, says the author, were speculators, expropriated landowners, kulaks, merchants. When the rain began to fall, they said that it was through them that the miracle had been achieved. In fact, the priests had read the weather forecast and knew it was going to rain (Bârlădeanu 1949, p. 2). The conclusion of the article was that the problem of drought could only be solved by collectivisation and the scientific organisation of agricultural activities.

In addition to propagandist actions through the press, the political police acted in several major directions: preventing any public religious demonstrations (processions, pilgrimages), identifying clerics who would encourage mystical manifestations and a sociological analysis of the level of religiosity. It was precisely in this complex context that the work of the repressive bodies on religious matters was reorganised, with the creation of Service 3, Directorate I, within the General Directorate of People’s Security as the main body responsible for the surveillance of religious cults (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 74, Vol. 1, pp. 134, 139).

In June 1949, the agents of Service 3 began to report miracles “in various regions of the country, so-called apparitions of saints in the homes of certain people, which attracts thousands of citizens to the place in question”. It was recommended to monitor these actions and to gather evidence valid in court for those who would have manifested hostile activities under the guise of religion (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 74, Vol. 1, p. 180).

In July, further clarifications were made concerning “those priests, preachers and religious fanatics who are deliberately instigating against our people’s democratic regime” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 74, Vol. 1, p. 197). Files had to be compiled on them and had to prove beyond doubt that “the guilty person used the pulpit or the preacher’s place to openly incite against the regime, so that when it came to the courts, the administrative evidence would be overwhelming, ensuring a heavy sentence”. To this end, the workers had to be much more careful, serious and swift, so that “no more time would pass between the time of the offence and the time of the court case” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 74, Vol. 1, p. 197).

The reasons for this attitude are given in the summary document of 30 September 1949: “Since Marxist-Leninist doctrine shows that religious prejudice cannot be combated by administrative measures which only serve to stir up fanaticism, our immediate and future task is to expose those who use the mask of religion to incite against the regime.

“As the freedom to exercise religious worship is guaranteed by the constitution, we are and will be faced with legal manifestations, the tactic of the class enemy being to make full use of these legal possibilities for his evil activity. Moreover, as the mass base of the hostile elements narrows, they will take refuge in increasing numbers in the activity under religious disguise, so that the problem of cults will grow and become more and more acute, not only in the immediate future, but also in the very distant future.

“Consequently, even if for the time being the hostile manifestations in the guise of religion do not appear to be as serious as those connected with counter-revolutionary actions, they must be watched with all attention” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 67, pp. 256–57).

In mid-August 1949, all the regional directorates of the political police received the following order: “Take measures to prevent pilgrimages in the future, religious celebrations and feasts to be held only inside churches. This measure concerns all religious cults and comes into force immediately”. Local political police bodies were to liaise with party organisations and People’s Councils in this action, in which they acted as the armed wing (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 67, p. 199).

Following this order, the Iași Regional Security Directorate made the following recommendations to the sub-order units: “From all the reports received at this regional directorate, it appears that the so-called miracles are nothing but a campaign organised by hostile elements to sow unrest and exaltation among naive citizens.

Although work has been done to clarify each individual case, however, not enough has been done to identify the priests, known reactionaries and the kulaks, who have instigated and continue to instigate the population. Since these elements are pushing forward the mentally ill, poor peasants and women, the information must always be deepened so that the instigator can be reached.

For the enlightenment of the naïve who are misled, you will provide compromising material to the competent Party bodies, but limiting this provision of material to matters which do not involve the subversive.

In all cases, clarification will be sought primarily through the local leaders of the cults (priests, pastors, chaplains, preachers), considering that, although for the moment there is a certain calm in the matter, a new epidemic of miracles may break out at any moment, the psychological terrain being favourable due to the growing sharpness of the class struggle and the disorientation prevailing in some circles in the face of the transformations imposed by the transition to socialism” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 67, p. 200).

An example of how the political police monitored public religious demonstrations in those years is the report of 24 January 1950, which said: “There being information that enemy elements would attempt to turn Epiphany into a hostile demonstration against the regime under religious disguise, surveillance measures were taken throughout the country, as a result of which the following was observed:

In general, there was a large influx of worshippers among whom were senior and junior officers of all arms, as well as from the political police and Militia troops.

In the Capital, particularly hostile manifestations were signalled at the churches: St Mina in Bariera Vergului, Alba, Flămânda, Mihai Bravu and Blănari.

At St. Mina’s, situated in the heart of a working-class neighbourhood, the priest Constantin Sârbu (who also patronised the campaign of miracles) preached the following sermon:

First he pointed out that on the eve of Epiphany when he went around the parish with the Baptism, many closed the door, and others hid so that the priest would not come to baptise them, emphasising that whoever does not receive baptism is not Romanian and neither is he a believer, and those who talk on street corners are also not Romanians or believers but are pagans and fools, stressing the following: «Now more than ever everyone must be imbued with faith. Where the door of the priest does not open, you should go in to lead the children, who today no longer learn religion in schools, to the path of truth. Some people seek to slander religion and run from the priests, who enlighten them, for he is neither a policeman nor a tax agent, but a guide to the way of Jesus».

He went on to point out that all the time he was walking about with the baptism he found people complaining that they had nothing to eat, and towards the end he urged the citizens to approach the holy water vessel in orderly order, without crowding “since when they stand in line for days in a row they do not get bored, so there is no need to cause disorder for the few minutes it takes to draw water from the cauldron.”

Also, when a young man asked him about the distribution of holy water, priest Constantin Sârbu replied in a very cheerful and demonstrative way: “Go faster and fill the buckets with water. Why are you laughing? Do you still do that in your cell?”.

At the Flămânda church, priest Davidescu spoke about “those who fell in the fight for the motherland, for Christianity and for the cross”, causing a rumour among the faithful.

In his sermon on the afternoon of the 6 January this year, Bishop Nicolae Popovici said that “1950 is the decisive year when all the wronged will be righted”.

In the services that Metropolitan Firmilian Marin officiated at the Epiphany, he emphasised that all those who do not respect the religious freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution will be denounced and punished, and that no one has the right to censure religious faith or to stop its manifestation.

In the city of Dorohoi, on the occasion of the Epiphany Mass, the priests Brânzei Valerian and Rosca Anania said: “Lord, cleanse the earth of unbelieving Satans who seek to lead us away from the faith. Let us pray to the Lord to crush Satan under our heel and those who come against us”, and the priest Anuța, also from Dorohoi, said: “Dear Christians, let us pray for those who lie in prisons, that God will help them” (ACNSAS, Informative Fund, File no. 2669, Vol. 1 p. 59).

5. The Communist Regime’s Elimination of the Maglavit and Vladimirești Phenomena

The fight against miraculous phenomena, pilgrimages and public processions culminated in the liquidation of the Maglavit phenomenon and the disestablishment of the Vladimirești monastery.

In the summer of 1935, a shepherd, Petrache Lupu, from Maglavit Township in Oltenia, had a vision of a “Moș (old man)” (God) who asked him to start preaching to people to repent and to follow the way of God. Word soon spread that at the place where God appeared, the sick could be healed. This gave birth to a formidable religious phenomenon that divided Romanian society in two: those who believed and those who did not. It is not the place to discuss these wide-ranging and complex debates here. What is certain is that the Orthodox Church assimilated and accepted the Maglavite phenomenon to a large extent. Initially, Bishop Vartolomeu Stănescu, who had Maglavit Township under his guidance, wanted to create a centre similar to the one in Lourdes, under his direct coordination. Later, Patriarch Miron Cristea took over Maglavit under his direction, and King Charles II became a kind of patron, both of Petrache Lupu’s family and of the monastery built on the site of the visions. Thanks to these high patronages, Maglavit was always under the eye of the law enforcement agencies, but until the end of 1948, Petrache Lupu and Maglavit were not on the communist Political Police’s agenda of priorities (Vanciu 2019).

Maglavit came to the attention of the repressive apparatus in October 1948, in the context of the agitation to remove religion from schools. Obviously, the centre of “mysticism” in Romania could not be ignored. So, the commanders in Bucharest asked the Craiova Regional Security Directorate for a report on Petrache Lupu’s activities (ACNSAS, Penal Fund, File no. 16678, p. 2).

The reply stated that Petrache Lupu was not particularly active, except that “in all circumstances, he told the population to sow so that the workers would not go without bread and to have every confidence in the government of Petru Groza”, i.e., the communist government. It was also said that people no longer believed Petrache Lupu as before, although the monastery continued to function, people came to worship at the holy place, and Petrache Lupu spoke to the pilgrims every time (ACNSAS, Penal Fund, File no. 16678, p. 3). Another report from June 1949 said that Petrache Lupu no longer travelled to other localities as in previous years, but concentrated on working in the fields and tending the sheep: “Every morning he goes to the church where he prays, after which he goes to work in the fields or with the sheep.”

Although Petrache Lupu was not hostile to the political regime, the communist regime decided to compromise the shepherd by spreading rumours that he had taken to drinking, partying and stealing (ACNSAS, Penal Fund, File no. 16678, p. 6). These slanders, promoted intensively by the Political Police agents, upset Petrache Lupu, and this was seen on 15 August 1949. On the feast of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary, a religious service was held at the monastery of Maglavit, attended by over 600 people from various townships. The sermon was given by Petrache Lupu, who said the following: “Dear believers, I spoke with God and he told me that in a week’s time he will tell me the great saying, which after this saying doomsday will come”. Then, the shepherd is reported to have said that “The old Man also said that another, better party will come and that God will protect the party that will come” (ACNSAS, Penal Fund, File no. 16678, p. 24).

Obviously, such statements deeply disturbed the faithful, and the reaction of the Political Police was swift, Petrache Lupu being arrested on the 17 August (ACNSAS, Penal Fund, File no. 16678, p. 69). The arrest was made by Political Police agents in Bucharest. Local police forces knew nothing. The Maglavit police officer later reported that “Petrache Lupu had disappeared from the township, and it was alleged that the Saint had been picked up by three civilian individuals and taken away from his home in a car during the night under the pretext that they needed his power to heal a woman”.

The arrest order indicated the following measures: “order the admission of Petrache Lupu in a mental hospital. On the spot you will establish the instigators of the action of 15 August 1949 and the link between this instigation and the collectivisation campaign. Establish who allowed him to preach in the monastery and who organised the pilgrimage.” Petrache Lupu was also to undergo medical tests to determine whether he had syphilis. The idea was therefore clear: Petrache Lupu was to be proved mentally ill, fit to be hospitalised in a clinic, the illness being the result of congenital syphilis (ACNSAS, Penal Fund, File no. 16678, p. 34).

Subjected to torture, Petrache Lupu, who had a fragile psyche, quickly gave in and made several (self-)exposing statements between 24 August and 8 September. The statements are a mixture of fabrications imposed by the investigators and incoherent fragments of the shepherd’s memories. The investigators are directing the enquiry to prove that Petrache Lupu was a poor man manipulated by various people interested in generating a false miraculous phenomenon” (ACNSAS, Penal Fund, File no. 16678, pp. 39–41).

The main idea that the investigators wanted to prove was that everything started from the priest from Maglavit, Nicolae Bobin, who took advantage of Petrache Lupu’s psychological weaknesses, so that later, the phenomenon was taken over and instrumentalised by Bishop Vartolomeu Stănescu, who had Maglavit township under his guidance, and then the phenomenon was taken over by the ecclesiastical and political authorities in Bucharest, with the aim of instrumentalising it in order to manipulate the population. Initially, the Political Police wanted to force Petrache Lupu to declare that the priest Nicolae Bobin had disguised himself as the “Moș/Old man” that the shepherd had seen, but they thought that this would not be credible and, in the end, they kept the version of a well-maintained hallucination later maintained by interested parties. Following the investigation in August–September 1949, the Maglavit narrative was finalised, which would later be promoted in Romanian society with the aim of compromising the phenomenon.

On the 15 August, Petrache Lupu had said that he would call the people again on the 14 September, the day of the Holy Cross, and would pass on to them the “great word” that the shepherd would receive from God. This “great word” was an eschatological prophecy. The world was to be punished for its sins. The question remains: was this prophecy of a general nature, or was it particularised to the political context of the time? Did Petrache Lupu speak of a better party that would come to power in Romania, and would this party be protected by God? The statements of witnesses who took part in the pilgrimage on the 15 August are nuanced. They say that Petrache Lupu said that people have a duty to submit to political power, but it would be desirable to have parties in power that respect religious freedom. Therefore, it was not a call to overthrow the existing political power, but a criticism of the religious policy of the communist regime. Petrache Lupu does not say more in his speech of the 15 August, suggesting that all would be revealed on the 14 September. The Political Police sought to induce Petrache Lupu to declare that the “big word” would have contained a clear political message against the communist regime and to spread the rumour that the Americans were coming to Romania very soon. To incriminate the monks from the Maglavit monastery, the statements that Petrache Lupu was forced to sign stated that the monks had induced the shepherd to say these political ideas after getting him drunk.

Once the story that was to be spread among the population had been established, the question remained whether Petrache Lupu was to be sentenced or released. During all this time, Petrache Lupu underwent medical examinations. The conclusions of these examinations were not clear, the only finding being that Petrache Lupu had a rather limited intelligence. During the investigations, the Political Police was convinced that Petrache Lupu was not capable of organising resistance actions and that he was too close to his family to endanger the lives of his wife and children. For this reason, the communist authorities decided to make Petrache Lupu an example of communist generosity. On 3 September 1949, the Minister of Cults, Stanciu Stoian, visited Maglavit and met Petrache Lupu’s wife, Elisabeta. The latter, on the 19 October, submitted a request to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, asking for her husband’s release: “Comrade Minister, both I and our little children beg you to have the goodwill to grant that my husband be released from wherever he is to be arrested, he has no ill-will to the government, the party and he has not been a man of politics, he is and has been a poor man.”

On the 12 November, the Political Police leadership mentioned the following resolution on the request: “He should be released and warned that if he does not stop his action to mislead the population, he will be arrested and imprisoned. Let him be the one to reject any proposal from elsewhere to make pilgrimages and receive money” (ACNSAS, Penal Fund, File no. 16678, p. 70).

Indeed, Petrache Lupu was released, but not before signing a commitment promising to refuse any offer that would lead him to “commit certain propagandist religious matters with the aim of misleading the population”. He also pledged to abide by the laws of the country or face arrest (ACNSAS, Penal Fund, File no. 16678, p. 67).

Petrache Lupu kept quiet about what had happened to him, avoiding getting involved in religious “propaganda”, instead continuing to attend church regularly (ACNSAS, Penal Fund, File no. 16678, p. 72).

Two problems remained to be solved in Maglavit. The first problem was related to the people who had gathered on the 14 September to hear the “big word”, even though the shepherd was under arrest. Details about how the Political Police solved the problem we learn from the following document: “On 13 September 1949, approximately 500 pilgrims arrived at the so-called “Holy Place” at the Maglavit monastery, who on the evening of 13 and 14 September, gathered around fires, reading from various religious books. A few pilgrims preached about the faith, without contradicting the current regime and who are in the process of being identified.

Through the political and administrative bodies of Maglavit, the pilgrims were enlightened, fighting superstition and mysticism.

After midnight, the pilgrims were evacuated under the pretext that the next day (14 September) the army and the militia would undergo a military drill. Thus, most of them realised that there was no point in staying any longer in the area and left, and some of them stayed on until 4 am when they were all evacuated.

The mood of the pilgrims was peaceful, being stratified from all walks of life.

The evacuation was done in good conditions without stirring of spirits.

In view of this situation, I contacted the commander of the Calafat border patrol company so that subsequent pilgrimages could be evacuated, as the monastery is in the border area and so the pilgrims without any prior authorisation to enter the area could not enter the monastery; thus subsequent evacuations would not create an unfavourable atmosphere for us, the public opinion” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, File no. 74, p. 229).

The second problem was the disestablishment of the Maglavit monastery in 1950, by order of the Metropolitan of Oltenia, Firmilian Marin. The monks were sent to other monasteries, and the buildings were transferred to the patrimony of Maglavit Town Hall (Vanciu 2019, pp. 107–8).

While in Maglavit things were resolved quickly and without much fuss, in the case of Vladimirești monastery, the Political Police had a lot of trouble. The Vladimirești monastery was built thanks to the visions of a young woman, Vasilica Barbu, who had received a command from God to found a convent of virgins who would pray continually for the forgiveness of people’s sins. The monastery began to function in 1939 and, thanks to the personal qualities of Vasilica Barbu (who became Abbess Veronica), a strong and prosperous monastic community was established here, which by 1954 numbered 300 people.

In 1949, the young Ioan Iovan came to the monastery of Vladimirești as a confessor priest. With an ardent faith, uncompromisingly affirmed with a special talent as a preacher promoting forms of religious expression with a great impact on the people (confession and the sacraments of Holy Communion), Father Ioan Iovan gave a new impetus to the Vladimirești phenomenon. Vladimirești has become a centre to which tens of thousands of pilgrims from all walks of life come. They believed that here they could find the spiritual wellspring that the communist authorities had dried up elsewhere.

The Visions of Mother Veronica, promoted and interpreted by Father Ioan, are multiplied in samizdat editions and read by many believers. Some of them had “subversive” content. Such is the vision of 5 March 1945, in which the Mother of God shows that “there is a Chosen One, who, when he turns thirty years old, will begin his preaching and will confess Christ for three years, during which time many will follow him. Then, after the three years, he will give to our nation such a multitude of martyrs that it will surpass that of all the Christian nations until now […] there are eight years more (from 1945) until he will begin preaching, and during the three years of preaching the three men who were lifted up with the body to heaven, Saints Elijah, Enoch and John the Evangelist will also come […] After their coming you will sow this earth (the place of the monastery) with blood […] Tell (the nuns of Vladimirești) those who have strayed from the seen church of My Son that they are lost and will have no part in the unseen and victorious church of heaven. Do not miss the Mass of my Son!” (Lascarov-Moldovanu 2004, p. 240)

In the vision of 1 September 1948, the Mother Superior appears to Jesus in the face of a child, who says to her: “Monasticism will suffer, and many will deny, not the flesh, but my kingdom. Some of them will receive the crown of the martyr, but few will be among them […] No one will destroy My church, but know that I am not speaking of a church made of stone, but of the living church […] In the heart that calls Me and my Mother with all longing, I come with all heaven and make the church, my altar!” (Lascarov-Moldovanu 2004, pp. 203–4).

In 1950, Mother Veronica had several visions. We recall only the one of the 19 March, in which St John the Evangelist says that “The Mother of Mercy weeps in three places in your land for the redemption of your nation. Here and in two places …” (Lascarov-Moldovanu 2004, p. 244).

The spread of the type of religiosity promoted by Mother Veronica and Father Ioan to other monasteries made the issue of intervention to stop the phenomenon even more pressing for the political authorities. For this, they tried to use the existing misunderstandings between Vladimirești monastery and other monastic centres. Although, on 5 November 1950, Patriarch Justinian visited the monastery and praised the monastery and Mother Veronica, there were monks, such as those from the monastery of Slatina, under the leadership of Ilie Cleopa, who theologically opposed Father Ioan’s practices of heavy communion and public confession and called for greater caution in believing in the visions.8 But, for a time, the disputes were confined to an exchange of opinions, with both currents continuing to manifest themselves naturally within the framework of the Orthodox Church.

However, from 1953, the communist authorities considered that Vladimirești was a new Maglavit and that the phenomenon had to be stopped. At first, they appealed to the authorities of the Orthodox Church. Patriarch Justinian Marina highly esteemed the monastery of Vladimirești but felt that it was not the time for a direct confrontation with the communist regime. For this reason, he advised Father Ioan Iovan to be more discreet. In response, Father Ioan radicalised his speech, speaking more and more clearly of the “communist satan” that wants to destroy the Church of Christ, urging people to defend the Orthodox faith.

This greatly angered the communist authorities, who put pressure on the Holy Synod to stop Ioan Iovan from serving in Vladimirești. Father Ioan had to leave the monastery and go to Bucharest to serve at the patriarchal cathedral (ACNSAS, Penal Fund, File no. 160, Vol. 3, pp. 11–13). For refusing to obey the order, Ioan Iovan was sued, catechised and excluded from monasticism on 27 January 1955. Knowing what was in store for him, Father Ioan wrote a note as early as the 25 January, in which he harshly accused the church leadership: “All decisions are taken on the orders of apostate atheists or of people expelled from the party or government. […] Why are you selling the interests of God and the church to the atheist state for the interests of maintaining a salary and giving up the labour of professing the faith?” Father Ioan emphasised that in Vladimirești, all that is done is to confess the true faith, even at the price of martyrdom. At Vladimirești, it is not a question of heresy and disobedience to ecclesiastical authority, but of a restriction of the freedom of faith: “The State, through the Ministry of Cults, tolerates its representatives to undertake a sometimes open persecution of the faith. Why, if the fight against faith is only ideological, are churchgoers punished? Religious freedom “is gradually becoming confined to the soul alone, and not even in the Church can the Christian take refuge […] If we have a collaboration between Church and State, why is it that the State has unlimited rights and interferes grossly in all that the Church does, while the Church is not allowed full freedom to fulfil its mission of sanctifying souls?”

The Church must be prepared against the growing pressures of the State: “we want to confess Orthodoxy not only with our hearts and lips, but if need be even with our blood”. To this end, he called on the bishops to risk “even to the point of shedding blood to confess Christ”. Compromise and prudence have no place here: “To make a pact with wolves is to scatter the sheep” (ACNSAS, Penal Fund, File no. 160, Vol. 3, pp. 85–102).

The solidarity of the whole monastery with Father Ioan Iovan forced the communist authorities to intervene directly, through a large-scale armed action on the night of the 30 March 1955, arresting Father Ioan and Mother Veronica. Attempts were made to reorganise the monastery in the absence of those considered instigators, but in March 1956, the decision to close Vladimirești monastery for good was taken. The 300 nuns were evicted in one night in a large-scale action by the forces of repression. Many of them were sent to prison.

6. Conclusions

What do all these aspects mean? They show that the Romanian communist state, although it maintained officially permissive legislation on religion and did not carry out systematic campaigns to destroy religion, continued to be permanently concerned about the explosive political potential of religion. For this reason, the Romanian communists adopted administrative, repressive, and propaganda measures that drastically limited the freedoms provided for in the 1948 law on the organization of religious cults. The communist state went beyond clearly political issues and began to judge matters related to religion, such as miracles and pilgrimages, from a political perspective. We have shown what measures the communist state took to combat these phenomena and how some representatives of the Orthodox Church pointed out that the state was violating the religious freedoms it had guaranteed.

To avoid an open confrontation with the communist state, Patriarch Justinian and his collaborators limited the number of processions and pilgrimages and fought against the idea of miracles. On the other hand, the church urged believers to practice more discreet forms of spirituality. However, in the view of the communist authorities, the term “spirituality” was equivalent to “mysticism.” In official discourse, “mysticism” was seen as “superstition” and “obscurantism” in general, which had to be combated through education. But in the view of the political police, the Securitate, “mysticism” was equated with “fanaticism” and with an irrational political and/or messianic fanaticism that was attributed to the far-right Legionary Movement (Iron Guard). For the political authorities, anyone considered overly religious was considered “mystical,” and therefore “fanatical,” and thus a supporter of the Legionary Movement. This scheme could easily be applied to entire groups of real or imagined enemies of the communist regime.

Between 1948 and 1949, the Securitate believed that the Legionnaires had sought refuge in the ranks of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, who were considered the most fanatical/mystical religious group, so that later, after its ban, the Army of God, a spiritual revival movement within the Orthodox Church, would be considered the gathering place of the Legionnaires, a reason for banning this organization as well (Stoian 1949, p. 48).

After 1955, the Securitate used the theory of legionaries camouflaging themselves in religious organizations to justify the measures it wanted to take against Orthodox monasticism as a whole (Enache 2024, pp. 149–86). Securitate documents show that the authorities were aware that there was no “Legionary conspiracy” in Orthodox monasteries, but Orthodox monasticism had undergone remarkable development after 1948, thanks to the care of Patriarch Justinian, and the spirituality promoted in monastic circles, although not a political ideology, was considered a danger to the communist worldview.

Therefore, in 1958, a campaign of arrests began among the monks, who were accused of coordinating a Legionary conspiracy under the guise of religion. One of the groups of accused was formed around the monk Daniil. In his youth, he was a journalist and wrote under the pen name Sandu Tudor. He had left-wing beliefs and rejected the ideology of the Legionary Movement. Sandu Tudor was always close to the Orthodox Church and started a spiritual movement called “Rugul Aprins” (The Burning Bush), which focused on “prayer of the heart,” which is specific to Hesychasm. After becoming a monk, Sandu Tudor continued to promote “prayer of the heart,” not only among monks but also among lay people (Enache 2018, pp. 81–157).

Father Daniil was arrested in 1958. The investigation is very interesting because the political police were aware that Daniil was not a Legionnaire, but he was considered a danger because, through “prayer of the heart,” he was diverting young people from communist values. For this reason, during the investigation, those arrested were forced to declare that “prayer of the heart” was a practice that contributed to the formation of hostile feelings towards the communist regime, which could be linked, in one way or another, to Legionary ideas.9

The communist state went further and demanded that the Orthodox Church take a series of measures to limit the number of monks in monasteries. Faced with Patriarch Justinian’s refusal, the communist authorities adopted Decree 510 of 1959, which amended a number of provisions of the 1948 law on the organization of religious denominations. This is the only case of amendment of this law during the communist regime.

In conclusion, communist Romania officially created a generous legislative framework for religious denominations, but the freedom of churches was constantly violated by administrative and repressive measures and by unofficial interventions that went beyond the law. The main fear of the communist state was that churches would be used as political tools by opponents, given that the communists themselves sought to exploit the political potential of churches to the fullest. To prevent this, the communist state increasingly interfered in religious matters considered to have political potential. This led to a drastic restriction of religious freedom. However, the way in which the Romanian communist state conducted its religious policy favoured the maintenance of religious sentiment at a much higher level than in other communist states, which had a policy based on the simple idea that religion in its entirety was something negative that had to be systematically combated.