Mindful Encounters: A Buddhist Revisitation of Daniel J. Siegel’s Mind Definition

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Excellent article. Very clearly explains notoriously challenging topics, including mind and karma. The addition of a moral component in mind through the inclusion of karmic imprints is just the sort of important contribution I believe Buddhism can make to psychology. Psychology has largely ignored the importance of morals not just in social but also in individual well-being. The argument laid out here provides a path for psychology to take moral thought and action more seriously. I do wonder if the language of karma might limit acceptance in the broader psychological community and if a more "natural" term/phrasing (but still based in karmic theory) would find more traction. But that's just a personal pondering. Buddhist concepts are becoming more widely accepted and integrated into mainstream psychology, so maybe the moment has arrived. 

Author Response

I am grateful for the positive feedback from the reviewer, who described my paper as excellent and commended its clear explanation of notoriously challenging topics, including mind and karma. I concur with the observation that Buddhist concepts are increasingly being accepted and integrated into mainstream psychology. When interpreted as morality or moral action, the Buddhist concept of karma will likely be naturally phrased in a manner readily accepted by the broader psychological community. Again, I appreciate the reviewer’s positive endorsement.

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The paper endorses Daniel Siegel’s definition of mind as “an embodied and relational process that regulates the flow of energy and information” and suggests to add, from a more traditional Buddhist perspective the qualifier “in a way that (invariably) leaves karmic imprints.

First of all one could argue that Siegel’s definition already includes the proposed addition, as karmic imprints (Skt. vāsana or *karmavāsana?) are already accounted for by “relational process,” which does not exclude the important dimension of Buddhist morality. Then vāsanas are an integral part of the mind, hence an essential part of the relational process. The active parts (pravṛtti-) of consciousness form vāsanas and the latter bring forth the pravṛttivijñānas in simultaneous top down and bottom up causal flows. This standard Yogācāra theory is of course not accepted by all Buddhists. See for example, Candrakīrti’s critique of causal flows from and into vāsanas in the Madhyamakāvatāra.

This points to another serious problem of the paper. It presents certain statements such that a svabhāva is negated as if this is accepted by all Buddhists. However, while a svabhāva is negated by Mādhyamikas it is not so in Abhidharma (notwithstanding their momentariness, dharmas have a svabhāva there).

The author writes “…Buddhism presents a universal definition of mind is a topic open to discussion”  One could argue, though, that there is a definition of mind (citta), namely “clear and knowing” (Tib. gsal zhing rig pa)  that is widely accepted across Buddhist traditions.

l. 57. Mind as citta. True, this is how citta is translated. But when we talk about mind, we mean not only citta, but also the caittas. If I were to translate our Western understanding of mind into Skt. I would use nāma (as in nāmarūpa, which means mind and matter). See Matia Salvini: “Language and Existence on Madhyamaka and Yogācāra” In: Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: Allies or Rivals . OUP 2015:

Lines 191f: As our mind operates continuously, our karmic accumulation persists incessantly and is interwoven with our daily activities, except during states of deep sleep, meditative absorption

This is a problematic statement, as vāsana-, or ālaya-consciousness-based (if one follows Yogācāra) karmic processes continue even in deep sleep and meditation.

Line 193f One of the factors distinguishing us from animals and humanoid robots lies in the intentional or mental quality. Whow. How can we know whether animals don´t have intention?

The question whether AI has intention or not is a bit more complex and requires a better defintion of intention. See Thomas Doctor et al: Biology, Buddhism, and AI , Entropy 2022.

Line 247 The middle circle of the diagram has an incomplete sentence

Western philosophical terms are not used sharp enough. Morality and ethics, for example, concepts at the centre of the paper, are not distinguished and used interchangeably. Note that  morality is normally considered as something that is personal and normative, whereas ethics is the standards of “good and bad” distinguished by a certain community or social setting. One’s Buddhist morality may thus differ from the ethics of a society that approves of war and violence as legitimate means.

Author Response

I am very thankful to the reviewer for the valuable suggestions. I have endeavored to incorporate all these inspirational and helpful ideas and have revised the manuscript accordingly.

Given that this is a submission for the special issue "Buddhist Psychology: An Interdisciplinary Exploration of Buddhist Theories of Mind" in the journal Religion, my writing has adopted a more comparative and interdisciplinary approach. The target audience includes non-Buddhist professionals who may benefit from a Buddhist perspective. Therefore, I have prioritized concepts from early Buddhism that tend to be widely accepted across Buddhist traditions. I have also avoided using overly specialized terminology or delving into complex debates within the Buddhist historical tradition to enhance accessibility for non-Buddhist scholars.

One of the aims of this paper is to bring Buddhist philosophical perspectives into dialogue with contemporary psychological discourse. The current study of the mind encompasses various approaches, with traditional religions and material science offering diverse interpretations. Incorporating Buddhist theories on the mind is beneficial as they reject theistic beliefs and extreme physicalism. The Buddhist approach, which differs from the mainstream scientific trends to a considerable extent, has the potential to enrich our understanding of the mind and contribute to a more integrated and comprehensive perspective.

The following is my point-by-point response to the reviewers' comments. I am willing to make further revisions if needed.

1. Siegel’s definition of mind possibly already includes the proposed addition of the concept of karma

Thanks for the reminder; I added one paragraph to illustrate this:

Siegel’s definition may implicitly presume the proposed addition, as karmic imprints could be considered part of the "relational process," which likely includes the significant dimension of Buddhist morality. The karmic disposition of our mind and behavior manifests in our interactions and relationships with others, primarily the relationship with humans. These decades, the relationship extends to animals, plants, and environments due to the uprising of eco-consciousness. Therefore, given his view of the mind as a relational process, Siegel might agree to integrate the concept of karma into his definition, as relationality inherently involves pertinent moral considerations. Incorporating the idea of karma into the definition would render the implicit moral dimension of the mind more explicit, highlighting the importance of the moral concern underlying the concept of mind.

2. svabhāva is not universally negated by all Buddhists; it is particularly denied by Mādhyamikas but not so in Abhidharma tradition.

I appreciate the reminder. My revised text now specifically references Mādhyamikas, who assert that things lack inherent natures.

3. a universal definition of mind in Buddhism

Thanks for the reminder; I add the following clarification:

Some Buddhists may characterize the mind as inherently luminous (prabhāsvara or ābhāsvara), while others may emphasize the pollutive aspect of our mental consciousness that inclines towards attachment (upādāna).

4. mind as nāma

Mind as nāma is indeed an inspirational reminder; many thanks. I added and revised it as the following:

The term commonly understood as "mind" in English is "citta" or "citta-caitta," encompassing various mental factors (cetasika) such as feeling (vedanā), perception (saṃjñā), volition (cetanā), attention (manasikāra), among others. Besides "citta," the terms "manas" and "vijñāṇa" are also used to refer to the general and non-technical sense of "mind." Although their primary uses are distinct, these three terms are sometimes used in sequence to refer to one's mental processes as a whole (Hamilton, 1996, pp. 105-107). Taken together, mental terms used in Buddhism are included within the broader category of "nāma," which may infer all mental activities or phenomena.

The counterpart of "nāma" is "rūpa," which are often linked together as "nāma-rūpa" and generally interpreted as "mind-body." However, this interpretation is provisional since there are more subtle differences between "mind-body" and "nāma-rūpa." Sue Hamilton, for instance, suggests that a more meaningful understanding of "nāma-rūpa" would be the individualizing or abstract entity of a human being. "Nāma" provides an abstract identity for the individual as the entire conceptual identity of the individual. "Rūpa," in turn, provides form or recognizability to the individual by giving shape to that abstract identity, making it apperceivable through sensory impressions. Nāma-rūpa thus represents both the name and the named, with each being mutually necessary for the existence of the other.[1]

While talking about "nāma," provisionally understood as mind in English, it implicitly connects to our karma and its continuum into future lives (samsāra). Nāma is what "tends towards" or "bends down" to a new birth due to the force of karma and the afflictions. This implies that the quality of our perceiving objects and mental operations is closely related to the state of our moving to a new birth.[2]

5. about karmic processes continue even in deep sleep and meditation

Thanks for the reminder; I corrected it as follows:

As our cognitive processes are continuous, karmic accumulation persists incessantly and is interwoven with our daily activities. Even during states of deep sleep and meditative absorption, subtle karmic formation may still occur, except upon entering nirodha-samāpatti, a state that reaches "the cessation of ideation and feeling" (Pāli, saññā-vedayita-nirodha).

6. what human beings would distinguish from animals and humanoid robots

Thanks for the reminder; I revised it as the following:

A factor distinguishing humans from animals and humanoid robots would be the difference in intentionality or mentality. This does not negate the possibility of animals and robots possessing some level of mind or intention (the existence of consciousness in animals and robots remains a subject of debate), but humans in wholesome conditions are undeniably beings characterized by both sentimentality and rationality. It could be said that animals are sentient beings with limited rationality, while robots perform rational processes but struggle to truly “feel.”

7. The sentence in the diagram is complete; thanks for the reminder.
8. about the distinction and connection between morality and ethics

Thanks for the reminder; I noted the following: Here the terms 'morality” and “ethics” are not distinctly separated but are considered closely interconnected. Although morality is typically viewed as personal and normative, it should be enacted within a community or social setting where it is evaluated by ethical standards of “right and wrong” or “good and bad.”[3]

Thank you again for the helpful and valuable comments. While some suggestions may not be elaborated upon due to time and space constraints, I will consider them further in future investigations. I am also open to making additional revisions if necessary.

[1] See Hamilton (1996, pp. 121-137) for more discussions on "nāma-rūpa." 

[2] Refer to Salvini (2015, pp. 33-37) for the definition of "nāma" and its relationship to rebirth and karma. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this inspiration.

[3] Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging this clarification.

 

Round 2

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Everything is fine now. Check again the diacritics of the Sanskrit . I caught vijñāna instead of vijñāṇa