Who Am I? Exploring the Role of Religious Beliefs in Shaping the Ethnic Identity of Tibetan Muslims: A Case Study in Hebalin, Lhasa, Tibet

Abstract

Tibetan Muslims, as a unique ethnic group, hold significant religious, anthropological, and sociological value. This article examines the social functions of Islamic beliefs through questionnaires and structured interviews, focusing on the Tibetan Muslim community in Hebalin, Lhasa, Tibet. We analyze how Islamic beliefs influence the evolution of Tibetan Muslim ethnic identity and explore the relationship between nationality and religion. The key factors discussed include the developmental history of local Tibetan Muslims, the status of their Islamic culture, their community interactions, and changes in their ethnic identity. Despite these changes, their Islamic beliefs have remained consistent, playing a crucial role in shaping their ethnic identity, which mirrors the developmental history of their beliefs.

1. Introduction: Who Are Tibetan Muslims?

Tibetan Muslims, also known as Tibetan-speaking Muslims, live mainly in the Kaligang area of Hualong County, Tongren, and Jianzha in Qinghai Province; Lhasa in the Tibet Autonomous Region; Gannan in Gansu Province; and Diqing in Yunnan Province. They speak Tibetan, wear Tibetan clothes, and eat tsampa, but they believe in Islam, abide by the five pillars and six faiths, and are even more devout than the Hui (Chinese Muslim) people who surround them in large numbers. Since many Tibetan Muslims live in the Kaligang area of Hualong County, Qinghai, they are called Kaligang Tibetan Muslims, and this Tibetan–Muslim cultural blending is also known as the Kaligang phenomenon in academia.1

The Gansu-Qinghai region, where Tibetan Muslims are settled, is the junction of the Loess Plateau, the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, and the Inner Mongolia Plateau in China. Historically, it was a place where traditional economic groups involved in agriculture and animal husbandry met, crisscrossed by the Silk Road and the Ancient Tea Horse Road. Before the development of maritime transport, it was once the main artery of economic and cultural exchanges between Europe and Asia. Along this road, it was not only goods that were exchanged but also many ethnic groups with different skin colors and diverse languages and customs. At present, the Inner Mongolia Plateau in the north is home to the Mongolians; the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau in the southwest is inhabited by the Tibetans; and Muslim settlements are distributed throughout the Loess Plateau in the east. In the transition zone of the plateaus and the junction zone of Gansu and Qinghai, which professor Xiaotong Fei called the “ethnic corridor” (Jian 2006, p. 12), there are also small-scale settlements of other ethnic groups, including the Tibetan Muslims.

1.1. Muslim Migration into Tibet: A Historic Perspective

Tibetan Muslims constitute one of the ancient ethnic groups in Lhasa, and their ancestors were originally Muslims from the Kashmir region. This historical migration is generally believed to have occurred after the 14th century. However, according to a travelogue written by an Afghan merchant, a record found by Fang (1990), as early as 982 AD, a small number of Muslims lived in Lhasa and built the earliest mosque. This is the earliest documentary evidence of Tibetan Muslim history in Lhasa; specifically, their migration into Tibet occurred through roughly two main routes.

1.1.1. Foreign Muslims Entering Tibet

Firstly, the history of their ancestors entering Tibet can be traced back to Arab merchants. Muslims traveled from the Arabian Peninsula through Persia and Afghanistan, reaching China via the ancient Central Asian Silk Road. They then migrated from Ningxia to Eastern Tibet (Amdo region, which includes the Gansu and Qinghai Tibetan areas). They eventually settled in Xining (Siling) and the area around Qinghai Lake (Kokonor), conducting trade with central Tibet. Although most of these merchants settled in Eastern Tibet, some of them eventually moved to Lhasa (Radhu 1997). They became one of the sources of the Hui people in Lhasa. The Hui people’s trade activities in the Qinghai-Tibet region have a long history and developed further during the Qing Dynasty. These trade activities played an important role on the borders of Tibet (Moevus 1995). Hui merchants frequently traveled between Qinghai and Tibet, with some eventually settling in Tibet.

1.1.2. Political Migration

The history of Han Muslims (Hui) migration into Tibet also involves the political relations between Tibet and the central Chinese authorities throughout different historical periods. This migration can be traced back to the Tang Dynasty. According to elderly Hui residents in Lhasa, some Hui people accompanied Princess Wencheng when she traveled to Tibet during the Tang Dynasty and settled in Lhasa. After the Tang Dynasty, there were few instances of Hui people entering Tibet during the Song, Yuan, and Ming Dynasties. During the Qing Dynasty, especially after the reign of Emperor Kangxi, many Hui officials, soldiers, and merchants from the Qing army stationed in Tibet became a significant source of the Hui population in Lhasa. These Muslim merchants came from various regions, including Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Beijing, Shandong, Hubei, and Sichuan. This is evidenced by ancient tomb inscriptions from the Qianlong period found in Hui people’s cemeteries.

It is evident that Hui people migrated to Tibet during different historical periods for various reasons, with the Qing Dynasty being a major period for such migration. Hui people residing in Lhasa during the Qing Dynasty mainly consisted of stationed military personnel2 and their families, as well as merchants from Sichuan, Shaanxi, and other regions. They intermarried with local Tibetans, and many of their descendants still live in Tibet today (Lhasa City Situation Investigation Team 1995).

Therefore, there were two main origins of Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa: (1) the Muslims from abroad, especially those from Kashmir, who were the earliest ancestors of Tibetan Muslims, and (2) the Muslims who migrated to Tibet since the Tang and Song dynasties, especially those who settled in Lhasa after the Qianlong period of the Qing dynasty. They lived in Tibetan areas for many years, intermarried with local Tibetan women, and converted them to Islam, so they were deeply influenced by Tibetans in terms of language and living customs but nevertheless retained their devout Islamic beliefs, thus forming the Tibetan–Muslim ethnic group with a very different culture.

1.2. Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa

Before the 1950s, Tibetan Muslims lived “in peace” with the neighboring Hui and Tibetan groups, with very blurred boundaries among them. After ethnic identification, the Kaqi (Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa) were included in the Hui nationality, and the Tibetan Muslims began to adapt to this modern definition (Figure 1). Thus, they have been assimilating themselves into the Hui people, gradually abandoning or hiding traditional values that are not consistent with those of the Hui.

Hui is a nationality concept, and Islam is a collection of religious concepts. However, in the Chinese context, Muslims use “Hui” or “Tibetan Muslim” to express their identification with Muslims or Islam. The concepts describing the ethnic group of Tibetan Muslims, whether Hui or Tibetans of Islamic beliefs, define religious beliefs as the same starting point for judgment, all reflecting a general sense of self-identity in social life. From the perspective of religious identity, both Hui and Tibetans of Islamic beliefs are specific ethnic groups that believe in a universal religion, Islam, and assume a kind of “subgroup” identity, which explains the importance of religious beliefs in the identity of the ethnic group of Tibetan Muslims. Therefore, the cultural characteristics of Islam are the most important aspects of Tibetan Muslim culture and are closely related to the historical and cultural context of Tibetan Muslims’ ethnic origin, formation, and development, so that other cultural characteristics are all dependent on Islamic culture. The Tibetan Muslims in Hebalin, Lhasa, mentioned in this article belong to the orthodox Sunni sect in terms of denomination.

The existing ethnic policies in China face the problem of placing greater emphasis on language and customs in the ethnic identity of these marginal Muslim groups, while Tibetan Muslims’ self-identification in real life is complicated. The central and local governments still have different views on the current policies regarding the ethnic identity definition of Tibetan Muslims and the protection of ethnic rights and interests. Previous case studies on Tibetan Muslims have primarily focused on the regions of Kaligang in Qinghai. In Kaligang, the transformation of Tibetan Muslims’ socio-economic status within the community was driven by their conversion to Islam. In contrast, the Tibetan Muslims of Hebalin in Lhasa have maintained their Islamic faith. Based on this context, this article further elucidates the relationship between religious beliefs and ethnic identity by examining the role of religious beliefs in the evolution of the ethnic identity of Tibetan Muslims. It also explores the transformation of the political and economic status of the Tibetan Muslims (in Hebalin, Lhasa) in their community due to the maintenance of their beliefs to explain the role of the changes in social status and the role of Tibetan Muslims in the evolution of their ethnic identity.

2. Literature Review

The connotation of an ethnic “group” is that its members are at least latently aware of common interests (Peterson et al. 1980, p. 2). It provides symbolic power to a wide range of social structures, from national states to local groups. In the course of its historical development, the concept of the ethnic group has demonstrated its plasticity, inclusiveness, symbolism, innovation, populism, and stability. The ethnic group can be metaphorically linked to family and even genes, or to a political party and national identity, and is a modern bridge between family, nation, and state. Its plasticity makes it an ideal operational tool for politics and economy. The flexibility and changeability of an ethnic group is achieved through symbols and innovation, which reflect social and human phenomena while creating new “traditions” and mobilizing the entire population (Bilik 2000, p. 2). There are many theories and classifications regarding the origin and evolution of ethnic groups, such as primordialism (Anderson 1983; Smith 1983; Trotsky 1960), ethnic imagination (Alonso 1988), ethnic symbolism,3 and ethnic boundaries (Barth 1969). Ethnic identity emerges from traditions and expressions, which involve mythology, religion, beliefs, and rituals, as well as folk history, folk research, and art. These symbolic forms of cultural expression and ethnic identity give meaning to ethnic relationships. Ethnic identity is a policy that people adapt to a particular social environment. Members of an ethnic group can adopt various identities according to different scenarios and needs without causing an identity crisis.

“Ethnic identity” is a multidimensional concept that involves an individual’s sense of identification, belonging, and related emotions and behaviors within their ethnic group. The formation of ethnic identity is a long-term research process, which includes the individual’s subjective identification with a specific ethnic group (Bamberger 2020; Svensson et al. 2018; Verkuyten 2018). Ethnic identity is a complex historical and dynamic process that involves assimilation, the transition from single to multiple ethnicities, and the multifaceted nature of ethnic consciousness development (Verkuyten 2018). Observing the evolution of ethnic identity change, it mainly reflects three dimensions: from blood ties to regionality (Epstein and Heizler 2015; Fortes-Lima et al. 2024), from biological to cultural (Robertson and Grant 2023), and from natural to social (Milan 2022; Wang 2006). Additionally, various theoretical models such as the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner et al. 2000; Gaertner and Dovidio 2012), ingroup projection (Wenzel et al. 2007), and category conjunctions (Brewer and Pierce 2005; Hutter and Crisp 2005; Vasiljevic and Crisp 2013) have emerged to explain ethnic identity.

The multi-ethnicity of urban populations has intensified the interaction and mixing processes among ethnic groups (Johnston-Guerrero 2016). Despite this, ethnic identity remains a crucial factor in personal development, family culture, educational choices, and behavioral stereotypes in many cases (Verkuyten 2018). The formation of ethnic identity is not only influenced by the subjective guidance of the government but is also the result of ethnic members effectively and skillfully utilizing state policies to define their ethnic identity (Xiao and Liu 2004; Yuan 2011). In this sense, ethnic identity can be seen as a tool for altering one’s political, economic, and social status (Wang and Zhang 2009).

The ethnic group discussed in this article, Tibetan Muslims, first appeared as an academic concept in the early 1980s in the Investigation on Some People in the Kaligang Area Who were Tibetan in the Past and Hui at Present, co-authored by local Qinghai scholars Kengyan Li and Likui Xu. Since then, the term “Tibetan Muslims” has been used in anthropology and ethnology to describe and study this special marginalized group (Butt 1994; Ding 2006; Duan 2001; Li and Xu 1981; Ma 2002; Siddiqui 1991; Tashi 2014). On the basis of the detailed ethnographic survey, these studies can be divided based on three aspects. The first aspect involves the discussion of the ambiguous and changing identity of Tibetan Muslims between Tibetan and Hui ethnicities and, on this basis, the process of ethnic construction and identity from the perspective of their external characteristics, cultural diversity, and complexity of their historical origin (Atwill 2018; Bai 2008; Chen 2000, 2003; Dhondup 1978; Liu 2013, 2021; Tseden 2015; Zhang and Li 2009, 2012); the second aspect focuses on the possible cooperation, negotiation, contradictions, and conflicts between the Tibetan Muslim group and various local ethnic groups in their religious, commercial, and customary interactions (Chang 2015; Liu 2001, 2014, 2018; Wang 2015); and the third one addresses the trends and characteristics of the Tibetan Muslim culture in the context of social structural changes (Li and Li 2008; Li and Zhang 2008; Li et al. 2008a, 2008b).

3. Into the Field and Research Design

The Hebalin Subdistrict in the Chengguan District of Lhasa City is the community with the most concentrated Tibetan Muslim population (Figure 2), exceeding 60% of the total Tibetan Muslim population in Lhasa. The subdistrict is located on the bank of the Lhasa River and was originally a wooded area; hence, it is named Hebalin (“the wooded area on the bank” in Chinese). Historically, Hebalin was a gathering place for the Tibetan Muslims, and in the administrative division after 1959, it was incorporated into a subdistrict according to its geographical location. Hebalin is close to the south side of the Great Mosque, which is geographically very convenient for religious followers to participate in daily religious activities. There are 497 households in Hebalin, including 316 Tibetan, 178 Hui (i.e., Tibetan Muslim), and 3 Han households. The total population is 1293, including 781 Tibetan, 509 Hui, and 3 Han Chinese (who belonged to the 18th Army that entered Tibet during the democratic reform period). The residents practice Buddhism and Islam.

From January to February 2023, the survey team conducted a 20-day field investigation of the Muslim community in Hebalin, Lhasa. The main tasks included:

• Obtaining relevant materials from the Imam and the head of the mosque management committee and conducting interviews with the Imam, the committee chairman, and workgroup members;
• Administering questionnaires and conducting structured interviews with the local Tibetan Muslims;
• Interviews with the local Tibetan people and the immigrant Hui people;
• Understanding the local religious population and its distribution, the number of mosques, denominations, religious economy, and properties;
• Investigation into participation in local religious activities and religious education;
• Participating in local Muslim religious activities, such as attending the Friday prayers at the Lhasa Great Mosque twice.

Meanwhile, we administered a questionnaire survey (See Appendix A) with structured interviews on their ethnic composition, religious education, and religious population and distribution. A total of 150 questionnaires were distributed, with 148 returned for a recovery rate of 98.7%, and 20 interviews were conducted.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. Collective Memory and Self-Identity

Collective memory is also known as social memory. According to Maurice Halbwachs, collective memory is a collective social behavior, and groups (e.g., families, clans, countries, nations, companies, organizations) in a real society all have collective memories. Many of our social activities are often aimed at emphasizing certain collective memories to reinforce the cohesion of a certain group of people (Wang 2006, p. 24).

A legendary ancestor (such as Emperors Yan and Huang in Han Chinese legends) or an important historical event (a large-scale war or migration) can become a key collective memory of a group. An ethnic group often reinforces this collective memory with a shared consciousness on a regular or irregular basis or maintains it by establishing permanent and physical monuments, or the nation state institutionalizes the transmission of this collective memory through historical education. For example, the Hui Muslims hold two grand rites every year as well as Friday (Jummah) prayer.

The names of ethnic groups can be divided into “self-proclaimed ethnic names” and “other-proclaimed ethnic names”. The self-proclaimed ethnic name is often the simplest and most effective criterion for the self-definition of a group to delineate the range of “people” who can share the interests of the ethnic group. The self-proclaimed names are codes for the ranges of ethnic groups, but the self-proclaimed names of ethnic groups at different levels also reflect changes in system structure and identity. The same ethnic name may have different interpretations in different times, in different regions, and even by different individuals. The essence of an ethnic group is reinterpreted in each generation. In Hebalin, Lhasa, the local Tibetan Muslims call themselves “Kaqi” and call nonlocal Hui people “Han Muslims”.5 The Tibetan Muslims strongly assert their differences from the Tibetans and identify themselves more as Huis or Muslims, which deeply reflects the consistency of Tibetan Muslims’ religious identity (

Table 1. Survey question: “Do you know your ethnic origin?”

Do You Know Your Ethnic Origin?	Percentage of Population (Hebalin)
Former Tibetans later converted to Islam	37.3%
Hui people from the beginning, but can speak Tibetan	17.7%
Both of the above apply	26.3%
Not sure	18.7%

).

People unite their identity by a common ethnic origin, and a change in identity is accomplished by changing the ethnic origin. Therefore, it is very important for any group of people to emphasize, revise, or make up the history of an ethnic group. Each study of the historical origin of ethnic groups, whether it pertains to an individual ethnic group or other ethnic groups, becomes itself a revised version of the “ethnic origin memory” (Wang 2006, p. 54). As the clustered structure of human society expands, members of the ethnic group continue to imitate the bonds of kinship and common origins to emphasize the emotions and cohesion of the ethnic group or nationality. This is even more evident in the Tibetan Muslim group. What unites Tibetan Muslims is the collective historical memory, and the resulting ethnic sentiment imitates the bonds of kinship. This is the primordial and emotional aspect of ethnic identity. On the other hand, ethnic identity is created and maintained in the context of competition and allocation of some kind of resources. Changes in resources and environment cause changes in identity, and this is also a way of adjusting the range of people who can be regarded as “siblings” by means of collective forgetting, revision, or reconstruction of history, which is another instrumental aspect of ethnic groups. From this perspective, human ethnic identity remains “self-interested”, with the instrumental and revealing nature of ethnic identity as its essence.

4.2. Religious Beliefs and Ethnic Identity

Religious beliefs, as a sacred program, have a religiousness that involves a certain unique mixture of selfless devotion and persistent pursuit, submission and resistance, sensual immediacy, and spiritual abstraction; this creates a certain emotional tension, a particularly sincere and solid inner relationship, and a position of the subject oriented to a higher order—an order that the subject also takes as something within itself.

4.2.1. Identification and Differentiation of Islamic Beliefs

The word “Islam” is the transliteration of an Arabic word meaning both “peace” and “obedience”. Later, “Islam” evolved into a term specially used for the religion founded by the Prophet Muhammad and is officially named in the Qur’an.

“They show you favor by their beliefs in Islam. Say: ‘Do not show me favor with your beliefs in Islam; otherwise, Allah will guide you to show you favor in righteousness, if you are truthful.’”

(49:17)

Since then, the word Islam has been defined as “obedience”, which means obedience to Allah. Islam is thus the religion of obedience to the will of Allah, and those who believe in Islam are called Muslims or Mu’min, which means people who believe in and obey Allah.

The basic beliefs of Islam consist of three parts: faith (Iman), rituals (Ibadat), and good deeds (Ihsan). Faith is the ideological basis of Islam and is often translated by Hui Muslim scholars as “clear faith” or “right faith”. The Qur’an declares:

“It is unjust for you to turn your faces to the East or to the West. Righteousness is believing in Allah, in the Day of Judgement, in angels, in Holy Books, and in Prophets, and giving the beloved possessions to relatives, orphans, the poor, travelers, beggars, and redeeming slaves, as well as keeping worship, paying the Zakat, fulfilling the covenant, and enduring poverty, distress, and war; such people are indeed faithful; such people are indeed reverent.”

(2:177)

This scripture lays the foundation of the Islamic faith—belief in Allah, belief in holy books, belief in the day of judgement, belief in angels, and belief in prophets. In particular, “belief in Allah” is the core of all beliefs, determining and governing everything, while other beliefs, worships, and good deeds are subordinate to belief in Allah. Therefore, Hui Muslims usually refer to “belief in Allah” as “general faith”, i.e., the program of faith, and call belief in holy books, belief in the day of judgement, belief in angels, belief in prophets, and belief in predestination “subfaiths”, which collectively constitute the six basic beliefs, i.e., the basic program of the Islamic beliefs.

The majority of Tibetan Muslims identify with the Hui nationality, with 68% of the respondents of the survey in Hebalin, Lhasa, believing that they are “the same as” or “essentially the same as” the Hui people in inland China (

Table 2. Survey question: “Do you think you are the same as the Hui people in inland China?”

Do You Think You Are the Same as the Hui People in Inland China?	Percentage of Population (Hebalin)
Exactly the same	12.0%
Essentially the same, with little difference	56.0%
The difference is large	23.0%
Not sure	9.0%

). The finding that over half of the respondents expressed their identification with the Hui nationality is more evident in the following question.

It is easy to conclude that the identities of either Huis, Tibetans who believe in Islam, or Muslims expressed by the Tibetan Muslim community in Hebalin actually emphasize the identity of the followers of Islam (

Table 3. Survey question: “What ethnical identity do you think you are now?”

What Ethnical Identity Do You Think You Are Now?	Percentage of Population (Hebalin)
The same Hui as those in inland China	9.7%
Hui, but different from those in inland China	7.0%
Tibetans who believe in Islam	45.3%
Muslim	38.0%

). They express their identification with Muslims, a psychology of social identity centered on religious beliefs.

Religious beliefs, especially those of universalist religions such as Islam, are the main cause of major differences in values. Therefore, religion can be a central part of one’s identity (Armstrong 1982; Curtis and Olson 2019; Ysseldyk et al. 2010). Islam provides a system of categories that shape the thoughts and behaviors of its followers. The internalization of religious values, the willingness to pursue ultimate authenticity, and the discipline to practice religious ethics may serve as defenders of Muslims as immigrants against assimilation into the dominant culture of the place to which they have migrated. The veneration of religious values and participation in religious institutions not only strengthen religious consciousness and intrareligious solidarity but also provide a vehicle for countering various alienating forces (Jian 2006, p. 233).

Islam, in the process of social integration and its ordering, also forms stable social relationships among followers through the constraints of religious doctrines and creeds. Ethnic groups organize individuals into groups through beliefs, and the core mechanism of this social process is identification and differentiation; that is, the identification of people’s ethnic identity. An ethnic group, first of all, has an objective basis of physical attributes, which are tangible, and culture (e.g., language, religion, values), which is intangible. In the contact between this group and other groups, through the recognition of the similarities and differences in these tangible and intangible aspects, different levels of “identification” and “differentiation” are formed that distinguish the “ingroup” from the “outgroup” in terms of perception, as mentioned many times by Xiaotong Fei (Jian 2006, p. 33). It is through beliefs that Islam distinguishes Tibetans from Tibetan Muslims, making Muslims closer internally and more different externally (as Tibetans). In the Tibetan Muslim community surveyed, religious beliefs, behaviors, and values, which are the key factors of the ethnic group, permeate all aspects of daily life, stimulating people’s sense of identity anytime and anywhere, reinforcing religious awareness and shaping their sense of identity as Muslims while molding their daily lifestyles.

4.2.2. Expression of Ethnic Identity in Islamic Rituals

The Prophet once said, “Islam is built on five foundations: there is no other God but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, performing ritual prayers, paying the Zakat, pilgrimaging, and fasting of Ramadan” (The Essence of Bukhari Hadith 1981, p. 18). Accordingly, the Hui Muslims call these five basic religious tasks the “five pillars of destiny” or “five pillars of heaven”, which guide the misguided to cultivate their bodies and minds and worship Allah to open their minds and understand “the source and destiny of all things and why is that” (Mian 1997, p. 31). The five pillars,6 as fundamental Islamic beliefs and religious tasks, are practiced by all Muslim nationalities in China, reflecting the customs and traditions of Islamic beliefs in all aspects and being indispensable tasks for every qualified Muslim. The Tibetan Muslims in Hebalin, Lhasa also regard the five pillars as the basic form of religious practice, which are most manifested as worship, fasting, pilgrimage, and “Amal”.

Worship can be divided into five worship services every day, the salat al-jummah on Friday, and the rituals at the annual grand rites of Eid al-Fitr and Corban. Prayer is a type of intensive ritual. Before performing this religious task, Muslims are required to express their wishes, either verbally or mentally. For example, before performing worships at grand rites:

“I wish to return two salat namaz on Eid al-Fitr, and I am only true to Allah and follow the Imam, Allahu Akbar!”7

This is based on the Hadith: “All tasks depend on the mind”, which is a necessary condition for Muslims to fulfill their religious tasks. Muslim worship is not a herd behavior but has its own intention, which also shows its piety. Worship is a pillar of Islam and an important marker of Muslim religious practice. There is a saying among the Muslims in China that worshipers “travel hundreds of miles for the Jummah (salat), travel thousands of miles for the Eid al-Fitr (grand rite)”. A Muslim’s active participation in religious activities is not only seen as fulfilling his or her religious obligations according to the rules of the religion but also provides a clear position for the individual, thus gaining a sense of identity, security, and oneness in the collective. Most importantly, the integration of Muslims as individuals into the collective creates psychological unity. By human nature, people have an instinct to gather and associate. Regular worship brings Muslims together frequently, and the sense of belonging to the religious community arises spontaneously. In addition, participation in worship enhances community pride and friendship among fellow Muslims, further consolidating their religious identity. Furthermore, the Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa, like other Muslims all over China, attach great importance to main religious rituals such as the fasting of Ramadan, the payment of Zakat, the pilgrimage to the Kaaba in Mecca, and the celebration of Amal.8

Through field research, we concluded that the Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa are very devout in their religious practice.

The Tibetan Muslins expressed that they participate in worship with high enthusiasm. The data shown in the Hebalin survey were related to the occupations of the respondents. A large proportion of the respondents in Hebalin worked in state administration, which in turn affected their frequency of participation in worship, while a considerable proportion of the respondents attended Jummah (

Table 4. Survey question: “How often do you worship?”

How Often Do You Worship?	Percentage of Population (Hebalin)
Every day	65.0%
Only at Jummah	29.0%
Only at grand rites	4.0%
Essentially never	2.0%

).

Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa maintained a high level of participation in Ramadan fasting, accounting for 89.3% of the respondents in the Hebalin community. The results of the question on “paying Zakat” also showed a high degree of consistency with those of the previous two questions (

Table 5. Survey question: “How much do you fast in Ramadan?”

How Much Do You Fast in Ramadan?	Percentage of Population (Hebalin)
Fasting for the whole month	68.6%
Fasting for most of the month	20.7%
Rarely fasting	10.7%
Never fasting	0.0%

).

Shared attitudes and beliefs play a significant role in the definition of groups and group behavior, in the formation and maintenance of social identity, and even in the reality recognized by the collective. Any ethnic group fully takes advantage of the symbolic capital inherited from history and adds value to it through periodic rituals and social events, and this is a very important marker of social identity. The significance of this marker lies in the interpretation, publicity, and encoding of it by the bloodline of the ethnic group, as well as the resulting functions such as call, response, participation, and interaction it generates and the constantly reinforced social memory. Because the cultural symbol dominating the religion and rituals of a certain ethnic group is relatively exclusive, it must have systematic characteristics that are different from those of other ethnic groups to function in social mobilization and maintenance of internal members. In addition, it must trigger or encourage other ethnic groups to imagine and identify with their ancestors, thus prompting them to organize a series of ritual social activities to separate themselves from other ethnic groups in imaginary time and space, strengthening the internal cohesion and increasing the external repulsion (

Table 6. Survey question: “How often do you and your family pay Zakat?”

How Often Do You and Your Family Pay Zakat?	Percentage of Population (Hebalin)
Every year	64.0%
Sometimes	20.7%
Never	9.0%
Not sure	6.3%

).

4.2.3. Islamic Religious Education and the Formation of Ethnic Consciousness

Ethnic consciousness is acquired by people and is an important component of the socialization process. Education, in turn, is a key factor influencing the socialization of individuals. Islam advocates a commitment to inculcating social values and norms of Islam and providing appropriate social roles about Islam during childhood so that each generation accomplishes the collective goals. Therefore, religious education plays a very crucial role in the socialization of individual Muslims.

In China, religious education for Muslims is divided into two types: family education and mosque education. Generally speaking, family education is the prerequisite and basis of mosque education. The Hebalin community indicated that they attach great importance to the religious education of their children, which was characterized by equal emphasis on family education and mosque education, but with a clear division of labor between the two. Family education provides the inculcation of the most basic sense of identity, religious taboos, and norms of individual behavior.

“It is a tradition to require children to believe in Islam and to follow their parents. Children are asked to love the country and the religion; the children were sent to the mosque when they were young to recite the scriptures, to worship, and to not do bad things.”

(Interviewee No. 017 in Hebalin, who is a Tibetan Muslim with a high school education)

Many families do not directly indoctrinate their children with religion but rather shape their lifestyles and foster a sense of distinction. For example, “what we can eat, what we cannot eat, what is halal, and what is nonhalal”. The significance of constraining eating habits for children is not so much about strict adherence to Islamic teachings as it is about forming a distinction from others, and in family education, diet becomes a marker of distinction. The Hui people have developed a pattern in which religious ethics and family ethics as well as religious life and family life are merged to regulate family members to achieve the purpose of regulating the behavior of members of the society. The results of this common behavior objectively promote identity among Muslims.

Mosque education is a system of education in which Muslims can run schools in mosques, recruit Muslim children, hire imams to teach Islamic scriptures, teach doctrines and teachings, popularize religious knowledge, and train religious personnel (Mian 1997, p. 222). Scripture education consists of three stages, namely elementary school, middle school, and university. Elementary school is a place for Muslim children to receive elementary religious knowledge, is the basic education for Muslims, and is the further development of family education. Elementary school learning focuses on the reading and spelling of the Arabic alphabet; the use of “dua” in daily life; the common sense of bathing, worship, and fasting; and the recitation of the relevant chapters of the Qur’an. Most elementary schools have no teaching materials, and content is taught orally by imams and recited by children. In the mosque education system, elementary schools are the most popular and located in all mosques. In particular, elementary school education is compulsory for Muslims in Northwest China, so parents must send their children to elementary school when they reach the age of five or six to receive religious initiation, which is also a religious obligation and duty of parents. The Hebalin community attaches great importance to mosque education at elementary schools. Since most of the students who come to study are those who are receiving formal school education, the mosque education is scheduled during summer and winter vacations, and the Lhasa Mosque is often attended by college students and retired civil servants. Mosque education at the middle school and university levels is set up specifically for the cultivation of religious talents and generally takes place in large and medium-sized mosques, with the number of students ranging from only a few to several dozen. The curriculum consists of systematic learning of subjects such as Arabic or Persian grammar, syntax, rhetoric, fiqh, Quranic commentaries, and Hadiths, with high requirements for students (

Table 7. Survey question: “How important do you think it is to learn scripture in mosques?”

How Important Do You Think It Is to Learn Scripture in Mosques?	Percentage of Population (Hebalin)
Very important	60.0%
Relatively important	32.4%
Fairly important	5.9%
Not important	1.7%

).

Mosque education is more systematic and professional than family education. In addition to teaching Islamic law and doctrine, mosque education has a more important duty of cultivating professional religious talents. The imams all follow a few experienced imams to receive mosque education for many years. In particular, several imams at the Lhasa Mosque have studied in Pakistan, India, Kashmir, and other places, demonstrating their intellectual quality.

“I have learned scriptures for twelve years, at first locally and later in India. I have learned scriptures with many imams, and what I learned are the doctrine and law of the Sunni sect, which belong to the Hanafi school.”

(Interviewee No. 020 in Hebalin, who is a Tibetan Muslim with no formal schooling)

“I learned in Nepal for four years and then in India for two years. Most of our imams here have learned scriptures over in India.”

(Interviewee No. 006 in Hebalin, who is a Tibetan Muslim with a middle school education)

The religious value system is a profound social boundary which both divides people with the same ethnic background but different religious beliefs and blurs the ethnic boundaries within it. Compared with the migrant Hui people, the Tibetan Muslims in Hebalin are the “minority” of the “majority”. From the perspective of socialization, the Tibetan Muslims in Hebalin are shaping their offspring with religious values through religious education, and a strong religious identity inevitably leads to an identification with “Hui”.

4.3. Interactions Between Tibetan Muslims and Other Ethnic Groups in the Community

Tracing their course of development, the Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa have interacted with other ethnic groups in their community. Different ethnic groups identify with their own members while rejecting other ethnic groups to varying degrees. In this process of seeking common ground while preserving differences, certain ethnic boundaries are formed between them, and the formation and maintenance of these boundaries profoundly impact the evolution of their ethnic identities. The boundaries between them are primarily maintained by the differences between ethnic groups and the interaction of interests. As history progresses, the ethnic identities of the Tibetan Muslim groups and their ethnic boundary relations with other groups change accordingly due to changes in a variety of related influencing factors, including changes in cultural traditions and value orientations of each ethnic group caused by the influence of the culture or religious beliefs of the surrounding dominant ethnic groups, shifts in the political status and economic interests of Tibetan Muslims in the community, and changes in ethic boundaries caused by interactions among various ethnic groups in the community, especially ethnic conflicts.

There are complex ethnic interests in the Tibetan Muslim community interspersed with sensitive religious issues, thus resulting in unavoidable conflicts; a problem that is even more pronounced in the multicultural Hebalin Subdistrict in Lhasa. Most Tibetan Muslims do not want to bring up that history, when their mosques were burned down and the Islamic culture in Lhasa suffered major losses during the Tibetan unrest in 1959, an extreme act committed by a few reactionaries to achieve some political goal. When Tibetan Muslims first entered Lhasa, the Lhasa government adopted a very open policy for them; they were not classified as serfs and were relatively free to conduct their own business. The local Tibetans were satisfied with the meat products provided by them and appear to have considered them as an indispensable aspect of daily life. However, the deep-seated differences in beliefs destabilized their relationship, which created a volatile and dangerous situation. This is why the Tibetan Muslims and Tibetans often avoid talking about religious beliefs, and the conflict between them is more about ideological differences.

The contradictions and conflicts between Tibetan Muslims and Tibetans were concentrated in the March 14 incident, in which some reactionaries again attempted to burn mosques down but were stopped by the struggle and persuasion of local Tibetan Muslims and Hui people. According to the local people, the local Tibetan Muslim group was small and susceptible to the brunt of social conflicts, and this incident was precisely intended to provoke conflict between Muslims and Buddhists in Lhasa, ultimately for some political purpose. We also interviewed the working group formed in the mosque after the March 14 incident to reconcile the conflict between Tibetan Muslims and other ethnic groups in the aftermath of this conflict:

Q: How long have you been in the working group? How is the relationship between the Tibetan Muslims and the Tibetans here?

A: The working group started after March 14. At first, members from the working group would say we were exceptionally good people when they mentioned Muslims here. Now there are more and more people from other places, and they confuse local Hui with migrant Hui and confuse Kaqi with Hui. It is true that those engaged in the opium and heroin business are mostly migrants, especially migrant Hui people, who have a particularly bad impact on our local Muslims, but there are still good people out there, mainly after the opening up. After March 14, the relationship became even worse, and the government authorities also did a lot of explaining. There was a lot of rumor-mongering during the March 14 incident, which had a particularly bad impact on us.

(Interviewee No. 008 in Hebalin, who is a Tibetan Muslim with a middle school education)

Based on the interviews, we found that Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa continued to enjoy a very favorable image in the eyes of Tibetans in Lhasa. Tibetan Muslims are fair and trustworthy in business, and the essential differences in beliefs and ideologies have not been so great as to lead to large-scale violent conflicts. The Han Muslims’ entry into Tibet has broken the relatively stable structure of interaction between ethnic groups in Lhasa, making the ethnic relations increasingly complicated. The conflicts between Tibetan Muslims and Tibetans, between Tibetan Muslims and Han Muslims, and between Han Muslims and Tibetans are intertwined to bring more opportunities for friction and collision between ethnic groups.

Before the arrival of inland Hui people, there was no such name as “Tibetan Muslims”, since local Tibetans thought that Tibetan Muslims were simply Muslims. However, the movement of a very large number of Hui people into the area from the interior of China brought about a series of problems. A large number of Hui people who were good at business occupied the slaughtering industry that was once monopolized by Tibetan Muslims; hence, there are few Tibetan Muslims engaged in this industry now. The assumption of this role by people from the inland inevitably causes discontent among local Tibetan Muslims. The competition for business interests inevitably caused conflicts between Tibetan Muslims and Han Muslims, while the differences in living habits and lifestyles deepened the gap between them. The boundaries between Tibetan Muslims, Tibetans, and Han Chinese in Lhasa changed continuously, with varying manifestations under different conditions. The March 14 incident is a good example. When the Tibetan reactionaries attacked mosques, the Hui people united with the local Tibetan Muslims in mosques, with the latter numbering only approximately 4000 to 5000, while the Hui people numbered over 10,000. In this context, the identity of faith blurred the ethnic boundaries caused by interests conflicting in reality, and the Tibetan Muslims and Hui people formed more of a Muslim community in the full sense, defending their interests. Meanwhile, on the contrary, the rift between Tibetans and Tibetan Muslims was exacerbated accordingly.

Comparing the conflict between Tibetan Muslims and Tibetans and the conflict between Tibetan Muslims and Hui people, we see a subtle change in the relations among the three: the Tibetans and Tibetan Muslims, who were normally more like brothers and sisters, were “at war” against each other, while the Tibetan Muslims, who usually had a bad relationship with the Huis and even hated them, were united and fought side-by-side with them. Their ethnic boundaries and identities at this time also differed from those in the usual situation, and the main reason for this series of changes was the difference in their beliefs and the different interest relationships between them in the community.

4.4. Who Am I? Identity in Ethnic Interactions

As mentioned above, the Tibetan Muslims and the surrounding ethnic groups formed an interdependent ethnic interaction relationship, and the ethnic boundaries between them were not static but constantly shifted with changes in various influencing factors, among which the typical one was the impact of the conflicts between ethnic groups on their ethnic identities and boundaries.

The Hebalin Subdistrict in Lhasa is home to Muslims, Tibetans, Tibetan Muslims, and Han Chinese, as well as ethnic groups from abroad (such as Indians and Nepalis). There are different cultural traditions and interest relationships among them, and the intermingling of many complex factors makes the relationships between ethnic groups in Hebalin highly variable. The ethnic boundaries between them are not stable, especially for the Tibetan Muslim group, whose slightly contradictory identities make their relationships with other ethnic groups in the community more complex and changeable, also leading to the diversity and variability of their ethnic identity.

Based on the field survey and questionnaire data analysis, we found that Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa were increasingly inclined to identify themselves as Tibetans who believe in Islam, which is inextricably linked to their living environment and interdependent interactions with Tibetans. The convergence with the Tibetans in terms of living customs blurred their external ethnic boundaries, and the desire to maximize their interests in a Tibetan-dominated community was the driving force behind their identification. However, the difference in religious beliefs remains the main force maintaining the ethnic boundary between the Tibetans and Tibetan Muslims and is an unbridgeable gap between the two.

The question, “Who am I?” may be very contradictory in the minds of Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa. They are Hui under the official discourse, but opinions on this question vary among classes. The ordinary Tibetan Muslim people have limited knowledge and lack an adequate understanding of the history of their own nationality, so they are more influenced by the official discourse that they are Hui people. The intermediate and high-level intellectuals and Tibetans working in the government are more inclined to identify themselves as Tibetans for various reasons, the most convincing of which has been advanced by the imam of the Lhasa Mosque. He believes that religion and nationality are two different concepts. Islam is the religion of people all over the world, and any nationality can believe in Islam, so Tibetans do not necessarily have to believe in Tibetan Buddhism. In addition, those who believe in Islam do not necessarily have to be Hui, just as there are ten nationalities that follow Islam in China. He also believes that Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa are Tibetans who believe in Islam. The ethnic identity of Tibetan Muslims is influenced by a multitude of objective and subjective factors, and the relationship between Tibetan Muslims and their surrounding ethnic groups is continuously changing. Here, we only attempt to consider and explain this series of problems amid changes rather than trying to solve them.

4.5. Changes in Economic Factors in the Religious Identity of the Ethnic Group of Tibetan Muslims: From Industrial Monopoly to Civil Servants

In the study of the changes in the religious identity of the ethnic group of Tibetan Muslims, we must consider the material dimension, especially the impact of religious identity on economic interests. Traditionally, the unique Islamic beliefs of Tibetan Muslims enabled them to engage in professions that were discouraged under the Tibetan Buddhist religion but also introduced difficulties in engaging in public affairs-related occupations. After the liberation, this basic situation changed dramatically, as population mobility, the decline in ideological dominance of religious beliefs, and the policies of the Chinese Communist government combined to change the economic form of the Tibetan Muslim group that was traditionally closely tied to religious beliefs. The new popular professions, namely secularized “in-system jobs”, weakened the religious identity that had been originally dominant in ideological identity and reinforced by economic factors and replaced it with ethnic identity.

“Before Tibet’s peaceful liberation in 1951, the Gaxag government was administered by lay and monk officials. Lay officials were normally recruited from the estate-holding, hereditary, lay aristocracy …Each aristocratic family had to provide one male from the family to serve as a government official, reflecting the subordination of the aristocracy to the government…” (Goldstein 1991, pp. 7–8). The power was in the hands of the government, monasteries, and lay aristocrats, with the three parties standing side-by-side and keeping each other in check. Ordinary Tibetans did not have the opportunity to participate in political affairs and were even less likely to rise to high positions. When Hui people settled in Lhasa, the Tibetan government stipulated that Huis (i.e., Tibetan Muslims) were not allowed to participate in local Tibetan political affairs. Without the right to participate, Hui people could only focus on their own economic livelihoods. It can be seen that Hui people, as a group engaged in a specific trade, acted as an occupational class in the local social division of labor, and their lack of involvement in politics became inevitable. In a social form with clear class divisions, they, like Tibetans in general, had only economic rights and no political status. It was impossible for them, as an immigrant group, to choose group representatives to participate in political affairs.

In contrast to their political barrier, Tibetan Muslims traditionally had a solid economic base related to their religious identity. Prior to the liberation, Tibetan Muslims were mainly engaged in slaughtering, vegetable farming, and meat and vegetable businesses in Lhasa. The Tibetan government, out of concern for the livelihood arrangement of the Hui people entering Tibet and the Buddhist restriction on killing, officially approved Tibetan Muslims to operate and to a certain extent monopolize the slaughtering and meat market, which solidified the Tibetan Muslims’ occupational identity in the sense of social division of labor and made them a socially functional occupational group that could complement the Buddhist society (Huang 2007). Historically, due to their special economic role in Lhasa society, the Tibetan Muslims formed a complementary occupational relationship with the Tibetans, thus solidifying their “Hui” identity, and for many years, the Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa were regarded by local Tibetans as Hui Muslims.

The political and economic structure of Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa, traditionally with pronounced religious characteristics, has undergone major changes since the liberation. Their political status remains mainly based on their Hui identity, and they participate in congresses at all levels as Hui people. The government applies different policies to them than to Tibetans, but they still enjoy the same preferential policies as Tibetans in education. Compared with their previous ineligibility to participate in political life, their social status in Lhasa has been greatly improved. According to field research, many Tibetan Muslims are now working in government agencies and more often treated as “Lhasa natives”. Their change in political status has also objectively led to a change in their ethnic boundaries with local Tibetans, and they have started to identify themselves on some occasions as “Lhasa natives”; a role that has brought them closer to local Tibetans.

The economic role of Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa has changed, as has their political role, with their monopoly in the slaughtering industry gradually being replaced by Hui people from inland China (Han Muslims). According to the field survey, the traditional Muslim business sectors in Lhasa (such as slaughtering and Muslim catering) are now heavily dominated by Han Muslims. On the Muslim street near the mosque, most of the business people are Han Muslims from the inland. This change in social occupation has also objectively affected the identity of Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa to a certain extent: in the past, they were considered by Tibetans to be the only “Hui people” in the slaughtering industry, but now this industry has gradually become occupied by Han Muslims from the inland. Therefore, the name “Tibetan Muslims” has been coined accordingly to differentiate them from Han Muslims.

In the past, the solidified social occupation and the resulting complementary economic relationship with Tibetans objectively affirmed their “Hui” identity, and they were probably happy to accept such an identity because their monopoly position in the slaughtering industry brought them great benefits. Hence, accepting the “Hui” identity meant the maintenance and stability of their economic relations; a temptation that was hard to resist. However, with a large number of Hui people entering Tibet form the inland, the originally almost exclusive economic field of Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa was gradually subjected to a strong impact from the inland Han Muslims, and the economic patterns of the Hebalin area changed substantially. As a result, Tibetan Muslims lost their former dominant position and had to consider additional options. Currently, Tibetan Muslim students in Lhasa prefer to find a stable job in the government after graduation, and their occupational structure has changed considerably. The change in their occupational roles has led to a fundamental change in their structural interactions with the surrounding Tibetans. These changes have undermined the mutualistic relationship between Tibetan Muslims and local Tibetans in economic life, and the breakdown of this relationship has led to a shift in the ethnic boundary between Tibetan Muslims and Tibetans and a corresponding change in the ethnic identity of Tibetan Muslims.

To gain additional opportunities in government agencies dominated by Tibetans, Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa must first have good relations with local Tibetans. Being close to and identifying with local Tibetans means more benefits, which is why Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa now tend to identify themselves more as Tibetans who believe in Islam. In short, this is a process in which Tibetan Muslims pursue the maximization of interests in the community based on their own status and the changes in their interest relationships with other ethnic groups.

5. Conclusions

At present, the identity of Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa seems less certain. They are certainly officially recognized as Hui people, while in an interview with a female Tibetan Muslim, she expressed hope that the government would recognize Tibetan Muslims as a new nationality. This contradiction reflects the complexity and variability of the ethnic identity of Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa since the ethnic survey and the establishment of the Chinese ethnic identification system9 that began in the 1950s. Their tendency to identify with Tibetans can be viewed as a trend at this stage only, and no one is sure whether this trend will continue in the future. At the same time, the author believes that downplaying ethnic boundaries, adopting a regionalist approach to border governance to promote political integration among ethnic groups, and strengthening national identity are also aspects that China is continuously advancing in its ethnic policies.

The significance of ethnic identity to each individual is that it helps people answer the question of where they come from. This is a primitive inquiry into the meaning of life. Whether conscious or unconscious and whether innately given by nature or painstakingly sought by the individual, the answer to this question is important to the quality of individual life and the cohesion of the group; just as life is a process, so is an ethnic group. Through a system, the ethnic group explains how this process changes in a cultural manner, linking generation to generation, past to future, and providing people with a sense of direction and stability amid the changing world. In this sense, belonging to an ethnic group is related to a people’s ability to establish themselves.

Theoretically, the state pursues ethnic policies precisely to protect the ethnic identity, status, and the right to full the development of each ethnic group. Ethnic policies provide a set of discourses of equality in ethnic societies and effectively promote ethnic equality, ethnic unity, and the common prosperity and progress of all ethnic groups10 to promote social tolerance and protect cultural coexistence. However, policies themselves cannot play a role beyond the existing structure of social relations, as manifested in the abolition of the cultural uniqueness of Tibetan Muslims by the hegemony of discourse in Islam and the trend of social assimilation. Additionally, the Islamic value system (the Hui value system to be precise) is used to shape a highly homogenous society. Although there are sectarian disputes within this discourse hegemony, the attitudes toward ethnicity and traditional ethnic culture are essentially the same; that is, both Islamic beliefs and sectarian identities are opposed to ethnic or national consciousness.

Tibetan Muslims, on the one hand, are under the pressure of being assimilated by Hui people, and on the other hand, they face the pressure of so-called “tibetization” and “sinoization” under the traditional culture of society. They consciously or unconsciously resist the assimilation of traditional culture and modernization due to the uniqueness of their beliefs. In the cultural context of a small population group, people have voluntarily chosen a belief system with a high sense of identity, and in practicing their beliefs, the ethnic traditions are being abandoned, which is an unconscious abandonment of tradition. However, the question remains: people abandon the inherent, but do they know what they are doing?