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Article

Contributing to Public Deliberation by Religious Behavior: Beyond the Inclusivism–Exclusivism Debate

Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
Religions 2024, 15(10), 1234; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15101234
Submission received: 19 June 2024 / Revised: 27 September 2024 / Accepted: 4 October 2024 / Published: 11 October 2024
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Religion and Politics: Interactions and Boundaries)

Abstract

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Recently, political philosophers have debated the role of religious reasons in public deliberations, such as appealing to religious convictions and religious classics. Exclusivists, such as Rawls, Quong, Hartley, and Watson, argue that democratic governments and citizens should restrict or exclude the use of religious reasons in making laws and policies, while inclusivists, such as Gaus, Vallier, and Billingham, oppose such categorical exclusion. Nevertheless, the debate mainly focuses on the role of religious reasons in public deliberation. In this paper, I will argue that religious behaviors—defined as highly altruistic actions motivated by religious beliefs, such as dedicating substantial time and effort to serving the poor and advancing the common good—can exert positive influences on public deliberation. Through this kind of altruistic action, religious believers can subtly influence non-religious citizens. While religious believers may not rationally persuade non-religious citizens through religious reasoning, the altruistic actions exhibited by religious believers could emotionally inspire admiration and motivate non-religious citizens to learn more about those religions. This enhances mutual understanding among different religious and secular sects and thus improves public deliberation. Furthermore, I argue that the improved understanding fostered by religious behaviors can facilitate exclusivism and inclusivism to overcome certain philosophical challenges, such as the problems of incompleteness and anarchy, which are among the most frequent criticisms directed at exclusivism and inclusivism. Hence, this paper highlights an aspect overlooked in the exclusivism–inclusivism debate: no matter whether the democratic government and citizens should permit or restrict religious reasons, religious behavior is still beneficial in public deliberation.

1. Introduction

Rooted in the religious tumult of early modern Europe, liberalism is notably characterized by its commitment to embracing the pluralism of religions. While a wide range of religious organizations enjoys robust protection in liberal democracy, religion is simultaneously subject to various restrictions. Notably, several philosophers argue for constraints on the use of religious reasons in the public justification of laws and policies (Rawls 2005; Quong 2011; Schwartzman 2011; Watson and Hartley 2018; Neufeld 2022; Wong 2022). These philosophers call their view exclusivism. For example, Rawls (2005, p. 453) and Quong (2011, p. 275) argue that reasonable citizens should not make political decisions solely on the grounds of religious reasons. They may support certain laws and policies based on religious reasons, but in due course, they should be able to offer public reasons to justify their decisions, which are decisions accessible to other reasonable citizens. Watson and Hartley (2018, p. 76), furthermore, propose the total exclusion of religious reasons from public justification. They argue that the act of appealing to religious reasons itself is disrespectful to other citizens (Wong 2020).
Meanwhile, some philosophers reject this restraint on religious reasons and argue that citizens should have the permission to make political decisions solely on the grounds of religious reasons (Eberle 2002; Gaus 2011; Waldron 2012; Wolterstorff 2014; Vallier 2014; Billingham 2022). These philosophers call their view inclusivism. For example, Waldron (2012, p. 845) contends that the government and citizens should not impose an outright ban on religious reasons in public discussion simply because they are “non-public reasons”, given the complex and varied nature of religion, which often includes aspects that are sufficiently accessible to other citizens. Additionally, Vallier (2014, p. 66) posits that barring religious reasons from public justification places an unfair burden on religious believers in the public domain, compared to their secular fellow citizens. The prohibition of invoking religious reasons compels religious citizens to split their identities and conceal their genuine beliefs in the public domain of liberal democratic societies. This leads to a kind of self-estrangement and an assault on their personal integrity.
As discussed above, the debate between exclusivism and inclusivism has been one of the most dominant debates in liberal political thought about the relationship between religion and politics.1 Both sides present sophisticated arguments, yet it seems that the philosophers who participate in this debate have excessively focused on whether religious reasons should be permitted in public deliberation. Religion is a multifaceted entity that encompasses a vast array of practices, and it is vital not to neglect those aspects that fall outside the realms of speech and debate. In this paper, I will concentrate on a research gap in liberal political theory, where the role of religious action has been overlooked by philosophers in favor of reason and argument. Instead of aligning with either exclusivism or inclusivism within the debate, I will rather focus on an often-neglected aspect of religion by both camps—religious behavior, specifically those altruistic actions inspired by religious convictions. My research question is how religious behavior influences public deliberation in liberal democracy, and my claim is that religious behavior plays a beneficial role in public deliberation, as it can demonstrate an exemplary influence on other citizens and mitigate disagreement in a pluralistic society.
This research holds theoretical significance that will contribute to the field of liberal political theory. First, it broadens the inclusivism–exclusivism debate by shifting the focus from the frequently discussed issue of religious reasons in public deliberation to a new dimension—religious behavior. This shift offers a fresh perspective that re-examines the role of religion in liberal politics. Second, it presents a novel perspective on understanding the positive impact of religious behavior on liberal politics through the lens of moral exemplarism. The paper suggests that religious practitioners, acting as moral exemplars, can inspire admiration and curiosity among citizens, potentially leading to a more harmonious society.2 This viewpoint can contribute to theories of civic virtue and moral leadership within liberal democracies. Third, my paper draws upon Neo-Confucianism to exemplify the role of religious behavior. This introduces cross-cultural insights, which can diversify and enhance the current inclusivism–exclusivism debate that is predominantly Western-centric.

2. Religious Behaviors

Religion manifests itself in highly diverse traditions and cosmologies. Amidst this variety, there is a notable commonality in the moral guidelines offered by religions, most prominently reflected in their encouragement of altruistic action. Here, altruistic actions mean actions showing a sincere, selfless concern for the welfare of others, often manifested through actions of religious believers who intend to help without expectation of personal gain or reward (Nagel 1970, p. 79; Barasch et al. 2014, p. 393). This emphasis on altruism can be found in the Abrahamic faiths—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—but also in the main dharmic religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism (Bakker 2013). All these religious groups tend to limit self-interested behavior and encourage altruistic actions (Shaver et al. 2016, p. 129). One example of this is the idea of agape, epitomizing a kind of love that is both unconditional and sacrificial, reflecting the nature of God’s boundless affection for humankind. Emulating God’s example, Christians are called to love others with the same selflessness and generosity. This commitment to agape often translates into Christians contributing their money, time, and resources to assist those less fortunate and bolstering charitable organizations dedicated to alleviating suffering and need (Jackson 2021). Buddhists have the practice of giving (dana), which means offering food, shelter, wisdom, or medicine to monks, nuns, and other laypersons. In Islam, Zakat is one of the Five Pillars, which is a form of almsgiving to the needy. Zakat is obligatory for all financially stable Muslims and thus supports many Muslim faith-based relief and development organizations in reducing poverty and providing basic education to less affluent people. In other words, despite the diversity in religious beliefs and practices, altruism is a universal value shared among various faiths. As the evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson observes, most enduring religions promote altruism expressed among members of the religious community (Wilson 2015).
I shall define those highly altruistic actions motivated by religious beliefs as religious behaviors. These religious behaviors include donating a large portion of income to the needy, spending time and effort on activities of their church or religious organizations that help the poor, visiting the sick, providing disaster relief, etc. An example of a person wellknown for his religious behavior is St. Francis of Assisi, the founder of the Franciscan Order, whose members are known for their devotion to simplicity and their dedication to helping the needy. St. Francis renounced most of his wealth and chose a life of poverty that serves the poor and marginalized. Another example is Thich Nhat Hanh, a Vietnamese Buddhist monk who established a grassroots aid organization during the Vietnam War, rebuilt villages, and later founded Plum Village in France, where he inspired many people to embrace compassion and mindfulness. These people consistently performed ascetic practices of self-discipline and abstention from indulgence for the sake of helping others in need.
I do not mean that all altruistic actions are motivated by religious beliefs. However, as some social scientific studies show, religious beliefs often serve as a powerful incentive for individuals to dedicate their time, resources, and energy toward altruistic activities (Gill 1999, 2005; Lunn et al. 2001). For example, Robin Gill (1999, pp. 145–70) utilizes extensive international data from social attitude surveys and examines the potential correlation between religious belief and altruistic behaviors. The findings indicate that those who are religiously engaged exhibit distinctive altruistic attitudes and actions. It is observed that their views can evolve over time, particularly concerning issues like sexuality, and there are notable ethical divergences among various congregations. Yet, in comparison to their non-religious counterparts, those with religious beliefs tend to exhibit a distinctive consistency in both their attitudes and actions related to altruism. Individuals who regularly attend Christian churches not only hold specific theistic and Christian beliefs but also possess “a strong sense of moral order and concern for other people” (Gill 1999, p. 197). As stated in surveys by the European Value Systems Study Group in the 1980s and 1990s, “churchgoers in Britain, and more widely in Europe, were two or three times more likely than other people to be involved in some form of voluntary service” (Gill 1999, p. 172). Many voluntary community services such as childcare facilities, youth organizations, charity stores, and elderly care rely substantially on the contributions of churchgoers (Gill 1999, p. 173). Additionally, they prioritize international charitable donations and take the needs of the poor overseas more seriously than do other people (Gill 1999, p. 197). An analysis of data from the British Social Attitudes survey in 1994 on preferred uses for national lottery funds reveals that regular churchgoers are significantly more likely to support spending on helping starving people in poor countries (48%) than non-churchgoers (22%) (Gill 1999, p. 190).
The reason for this is that, for many religious believers, altruism is not pursued for recognition or tangible rewards. Rather, it is a duty stemming from their spiritual perspective, integral to their understanding of existence. Their actions align with their beliefs, dictating that they assist others regardless of their circumstances—wealth, poverty, acclaim, or criticism. This explains the sincerity and consistency of religious believers.3 Below, I shall illustrate the idea of religious behavior through a Neo-Confucian idea of oneness, showing how altruistic actions are required by this metaphysical and religious idea in the Confucian tradition. There are two reasons that I use Confucianism as an example. First, Confucianism’s potential to contribute to democratic politics in public deliberation has not been as extensively examined as other religions such as Christianity or Islam. Christianity (e.g., Quinn 2005; Billingham 2021) and Islam (e.g., March 2009; Westfall 2024) have been the subject of significant scholarly attention regarding their contributions to democratic politics, whereas Confucianism, particularly Neo-Confucianism, has not been afforded the same depth of analysis. Secondly, apart from China, Confucian philosophy has had a significant impact across various East Asian societies, including Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Hence, exploring how individuals with these Confucian values and beliefs could influence public deliberation would be of great academic significance.

3. The Neo-Confucian Idea of “Oneness”

For over two millennia, Confucianism has significantly shaped the religious and philosophical landscape of East Asia. Originating from the teachings of Confucius (551–479 BCE), this school of thought gained prominence when it was adopted as the official ideology by Chinese dynasties starting in the 1st century BCE. Confucius, along with other classical Confucian thinkers like Mencius (372–289 BCE) and Xunzi (310–238 BCE), concentrated primarily on the practical questions of “how”, such as how a person can learn to be virtuous and live a moral life, rather than what the world is (Sarkissian 2010, pp. 11–12). The lack of a well-defined metaphysical framework within Confucianism has rendered it comparatively less appealing to Chinese intellectuals in the wake of Buddhism’s transmission to China. Buddhism, which made its way to China around the 2nd century, reached the zenith of its influence from approximately the 6th to the 9th century, primarily during the Tang dynasty. It boasts a detailed and expansive metaphysical system that robustly underpins its ethical teachings and self-cultivation practices. This comprehensive metaphysical foundation in Buddhism highlighted perceived shortcomings within Confucian thought, prompting many Confucians during the Song (960–1279) and Ming (1368–1644) dynasties to acknowledge these gaps. In response, they began to formulate a more substantial metaphysical structure to enrich the Confucian philosophical tradition.4 Due to their emphasis in metaphysical speculation, these Confucians, such as Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and Wang Yangming (1472–1529), are often called Neo-Confucians (Chang 1955). Oneness is one of the metaphysical ideas that Neo-Confucians have often appealed to. In this section, I shall explain this idea and its ethical implications.5
Oneness is a view of the fundamental essence of the world; it primarily emphasizes the ethical dimension of the connection between an individual and others, including fellow humans, animals, and various things within the world. According to this view, “we—and in particular our personal welfare or happiness—are inextricably intertwined with other people, creatures, and things” (Ivanhoe 2018, p. 1). The reason that Neo-Confucians look at the world from this perspective of oneness can be attributed to their ides of li (理, pattern). In general, Neo-Confucians hold the view that qi (氣), a vital and dynamic substance, forms the foundation of all things in the world. However, they were also skeptical that qi by itself could fully explain everything of significance about the phenomenal world. Neo-Confucians recognized a profound coherence and structure in the world, which they deemed of great value. This is observable in phenomena such as the natural behaviors of plants and animals and the harmonious interplay between the changing seasons and the cycles of life they support and propagate. To explain this intricate order and unity, many Neo-Confucians posited that an additional, underlying principle must be shared among everything in the world. They referred to this principle as li, which they believed underpinned the observable order of the universe (Angle and Tiwald 2017, pp. 23–49). Furthermore, this li does not exist independently of everything. Rather, many Neo-Confucians believe that “everything in the world contained within itself all the…patterns in the universe” (Ivanhoe 2018, p. 22). In brief, Neo-Confucians believe that all in each. The creation and demise of any one thing can have an impact on everything in the world. An example of this view of oneness can be seen in the writing of Wang Yangming (Ivanhoe 2009, pp. 160–62). To Wang, great people feel with all things in the universe, viewing Heaven, earth, and all entities as extensions of themselves. This perspective sees the world as one family and does not differentiate between self and others based on physical separation. This intrinsic empathy is a natural expression of one’s benevolence, extending not just to other humans but also to animals, plants, and even inanimate objects. This universal empathy is evident in the instinctive compassion one feels towards a child in danger, the pain of animals, the distress for damaged plants, and even the concern for broken objects. Wang suggests that this is not due to their similarities to us or the fact that they possess life, but rather because of an inherent feeling of benevolence that enables us to connect with all of them.
Here, Wang Yangming vividly describes the Neo-Confucian view of oneness.6 First, the scope of oneness extends beyond humanity. It encompasses not just sentient beings within the cosmos but also inanimate entities. Therefore, the principle of oneness suggests a profound connection with all aspects of the universe. Secondly, oneness does not mean that everything is biologically connected by li. The suffering and demise of other creatures and entities would not harm us directly. Nevertheless, we are emotionally connected by li with other things. Thus, the aesthetic appeal of a beautiful building can bring us joy, while its damage can leave us feeling a sense of regret. Thirdly, the idea of oneness suggests an expanded conception of self (Ivanhoe 2018, p. 70; cf. Tien 2012). The boundary between self and others is undermined. The idea of oneness requires one to incorporate the other into one’s own identity, embracing the “other” within a broader and evolved understanding of oneself. As Wang outlines, this process begins with encompassing fellow humans into one’s sense of self, followed by sentient beings, and ultimately extends to non-living things. Over time, the joy and pain experienced by these “others” cease to be solely their experience; instead, their emotions are interwoven with our experiences of joy and pain.
Given this expanded conception of self, Neo-Confucians advocate for religious behaviors that aim to promote the collective good of every being and find balanced, mutually beneficial, and harmonious ways of living together. This expanded conception of self enables Neo-Confucians to understand the cosmos as an integrated whole, where each component, no matter how seemingly insignificant, plays a role in the maintenance and functioning of the larger system. This view fosters a deep concern for the welfare and suffering of others. Every being is seen as contributing to the prosperity of one another. Therefore, the ideal scenario is one where all beings coexist in harmony, minimizing harm to one another, and collectively thriving. To Neo-Confucians, there is no difference between altruistic actions and egoistic actions. For when they promote the collective good of all beings, they do not do this at the cost of their self-interest. Rather, their altruistic actions benefit others as well as them.7 Philip Ivanhoe once used parenting as an example (Ivanhoe 2018, pp. 72–73). A father perceives unity with his children, recognizing their welfare and joy as extensions of his own. In the act of benefiting them, the father’s actions are for the children’s benefit, yet they also promote the father’s personal well-being and happiness. Often, when the father attends to their needs, he is not preoccupied with thoughts of personal sacrifice. Instead, he finds satisfaction in nurturing their development. The father is conscious and accepting of the fact that to foster the children’s happiness truly, the father must be attentive to their individual desires and vigilant against the imposition of his own wishes and ambitions onto them. In the words of Neo-Confucianism, this father is in oneness with his children, and Neo-Confucians ask us to expand this scope of oneness all over the world.8
This idea of oneness explains why many Neo-Confucians have consistently performed altruistic and ascetic activities throughout their lives. One example of this is Zhu Xi, the most representative Neo-Confucian during the Song dynasty. While contemporary scholars often focus on the comprehensive philosophical system of Zhu Xi (e.g., Ng and Huang 2020), his religious behaviors should not be overlooked. Like his contemporaries, Zhu Xi was well versed in Confucian classics and succeeded in civil service examinations, securing a position as a government official. However, he was deeply committed to the resurgence of Confucian teachings, which often put him in conflict with other officials. This tension resulted in a cyclical career, oscillating between governmental roles and scholarly seclusion. During his retreats, he dedicated himself to prolific writing and the establishment of academies, steadfast in his mission to rejuvenate the teachings of Confucius.
As the Sinologist Chan Wing-tsit observes, Zhu Xi lived a life marked by severe financial scarcity (Chan 1989, pp. 61–89). His familial background did not afford him wealth, and his own earnings were meager. Despite this, Zhu Xi frequently allocated much of his limited resources to assisting those less fortunate, establishing educational institutions and disseminating Confucian texts, thereby facilitating the spread of Confucian doctrine. He spent his money on acquiring farmland to provide a steady source of support for academies, and he also set up charitable granaries, which allowed individuals to stockpile food in anticipation of potential famine. He managed his finances in such a frugal manner that he maintained only the most basic level of sustenance for himself. “He led a very thrifty life, needing only enough clothing to cover his body and food to fill his stomach, and took situations in stride that others would have found unbearable” (「其自奉則衣取蔽體,食取充飢,居止取足以障風雨。人不能堪,而處之裕如也。」) (quoted from Chan 1989, p. 77). Despite these challenging circumstances, Zhu Xi still insisted on promoting Confucian rituals, assisting those in need, and instructing his disciples. His religious behavior can be explained by the idea of oneness. Zhu Xi held the conviction that the world could improve if a greater number of people were liberated from poverty and cultivated goodness, guided by the teachings of Confucius. Therefore, in his view, his personal poverty was not a misfortune but a necessary expenditure for the greater collective good.
Zhu Xi’s ascetic lifestyle garnered considerable respect from scholars during that time. He spent most of his life in Fujian, a peripheral region distant from the flourishing capital. Nevertheless, Zhu Xi’s location on the fringes did not deter eager learners from various locales. They journeyed to this outlying province to study under him. Among those whose names are recorded, over four hundred were his students, not to mention the countless others whose names have not been etched into the records of history. Some even predict that Zhu Xi may have the largest number of students of any Neo-Confucian in history (Chan 2007, pp. 176–93). Despite the looming threat of a death sentence as a result of his critical stance against influential politicians, and the active suppression of his teachings, Zhu Xi maintained a loyal following of students up to his demise. The adherence to Zhu Xi went beyond an appreciation for his profound knowledge of Confucian classics. It was also because his sincere and ascetic religious behaviors provided a tangible example of sagely conduct. This demonstration of virtue captivated many, inspiring admiration and emulation among those who aspired to lead a similar life of virtue.
To clarify, I do not claim this peaceful, service-oriented way of life as unique to Neo-Confucians. The idea of oneness, as well as the religious behavior inspired by this idea, can be found across various significant philosophical and religious traditions, albeit manifested in diverse forms (Ivanhoe et al. 2018; Streib and Klein 2016, p. 76). For example, according to Aquinas, Christianity believes that the world is formed by the “Great Chain of Beings”, which means “the seamless continuum of being from God to the lowliest inanimate entity” (Shields and Pasnau 2016, p. 175).9 Within this chain, while distinct gaps demarcate different species, there is also a certain degree of overlap. Take humans, for instance; we share certain characteristics with the primates that are considered below us in this hierarchy, as well as with the angels that reside above us. This interconnectedness implies that the natural world is so intricately linked that any destruction to one part can have far-reaching effects on the whole. Aquinas further suggests that the expression of God’s goodness is not limited to the well-being of individual beings. Rather, it is through the collective thriving of all creatures, in their rich diversity, that God’s goodness truly manifests (Shields and Pasnau 2016, p. 172). Therefore, many Christians’ moral action extends beyond personal or anthropocentric concerns, for they have a consideration of the well-being of the entire world. This holistic view underscores the moral demand to preserve and nurture the diversity of life, as each creature plays a role in the universe.10
Similarly, Buddhism presents a vision of the self that is deeply interconnected with the entire universe, seeing each individual as a part of a vast, interwoven network. The concept of a fixed “self” is replaced by an understanding of a constantly shifting composition of elements. Buddhism, therefore, challenges the notion of a lasting, unchangeable identity. The self is considered to be more like a loose container, with boundaries that allow a continuous flow of sensations, thoughts, emotions, and consciousness. In other words, the self, like all things in the world, is impermanent (Kaza 2018, p. 435). From this viewpoint, it is a significant misconception to regard oneself as a separate, enduring entity, distinct from the rest of existence. Buddhist thought emphasizes “interdependence”, the idea that all beings are interconnected and mutually reliant (Ivanhoe 2018, p. 52). Nothing can exist in isolation; it is always the product of a network of causes and conditions, which in turn are influenced by other factors. This leads to a complex, web-like structure of causality, where everything is in some way linked to everything else. Given the intimate and inextricable interconnection between self and world, Buddhists argue that to get rid of the suffering of oneself, one must seek to get rid of the suffering of all beings of the entire world. This holistic concern for the collective well-being is especially evident in Mahāyāna Buddhism, which places a strong emphasis on “great compassion” (mahākaruṇā) as a fundamental virtue (Ivanhoe 2018, pp. 94–95). This tradition promotes a broader sense of care, advocating for the welfare of all beings.
To conclude, a multitude of philosophical and religious traditions espouse a worldview that all entities in the universe are fundamentally interconnected. This perspective suggests that an individual’s existence is deeply entwined with that of others, encompassing fellow humans, animals, and the environment. Consequently, a person’s concern should extend beyond their own welfare, embracing a selfless approach that encompasses the well-being of all beings. This way of altruistic living is exemplified by revered religious figures like Thích Nhất Hạnh, as previously noted.11 In the following, I shall explain how these altruistic religious behaviors could have positive influence on public deliberation.

4. Religious Behavior and Public Deliberation

In the last section, I illustrated religious behavior through the example of Neo-Confucians, who were driven by the idea of oneness. They embraced the collective welfare of the world as their personal responsibility and consistently demonstrated altruistic and ascetic behavior throughout their lives. In fact, philosophers have often neglected this aspect of religious action in the inclusivism–exclusivism debate. Usually, when exclusivists and inclusivists discuss the interactions of religious believers with dissenting individuals, three primary modes of engagement are often mentioned. The first mode is offering religious reasons (Eberle 2002; Vallier 2014). Religious believers can support or reject a law or policy by offering religious reasons. For example, some Christians oppose the recognition of homosexuality based on biblical passages such as Romans 1:26–27, which they interpret as characterizing homosexual acts as unnatural. The second mode is to translate your religious beliefs into public reasons and present them (Rawls 2005; Schwartzman 2011). For instance, while Martin Luther King Jr. opposed racial segregation on the basis of Christian ethics, stating that “every man must be respected because God loves him” (King 1986, p. 122), he also articulated that racial segregation is objectionable because it violates fundamental liberties and undermines social solidarity.12 The third mode is conjecture, which means that religious believers imagine themselves adopting the comprehensive doctrine of fellow adherents from different faith traditions, presenting arguments derived from those believers’ own comprehensive doctrines (Schwartzman 2012; Clayton and Stevens 2014; Wong 2019). The aim is to demonstrate that, based on their religious belief, they should agree or reject certain laws or policies. Although these three activities vary in approach, their unified goal is persuasion, articulating reasons why my stance is logical or why you might consider altering your viewpoint. Essentially, these actions can be viewed as employing a “pushing” strategy. While these religious believers provide reasons to others, their intention is still to “push” others to revise their thinking through dialogue and reasoning.
In contrast with these activities, religious behavior is more like a “pulling” strategy. Religious behaviors are often based on non-scientific beliefs. For example, the religious practices of Neo-Confucians, as mentioned in the previous section, are founded on their worldview of oneness, which clearly conflicts with modern science (Priest 2019). Hence, it is unrealistic to expect that other citizens who do not believe in this religion would be rationally persuaded to perform religious behavior. However, the influence of religious behavior is not on rational grounds, but on emotional grounds. Those religious practitioners dedicate their time, efforts, and sometimes their very lives to advancing the greater good of humanity. This level of sacrifice is extraordinary, so much so that it often surpasses what many people would be willing or able to endure. Yet, for these religious practitioners, such sacrifices are not only bearable but can be sources of fulfillment and joy. Their actions, marked by a sincere and selfless concern for others, can spark curiosity of those who witness them. In the words of Linda Zagzebski, they become a kind of moral exemplar, people that we naturally admire and strive to emulate (Zagzebski 2017, p. 2).13 These moral exemplars can exert an exemplary influence on others, leading observers to become intrigued by the deep sense of purpose and fulfillment that these religious practitioners exhibit. Questions might arise about the driving force behind their willingness to forsake personal gain and comfort. What beliefs fuel their passion? What convictions compel them to live in such a self-denying yet contented manner?
As admiration grows, it can lead to a deeper exploration of the religious practitioners’ way of life. Other citizens may start to reflect on the principles and values that guide these religious practitioners. This exploration can evolve into a thorough engagement with the believers’ spiritual texts and teachings, fostering a genuine appreciation for their religious doctrines. Through this process of inquiry and discovery, some people may find that the teachings resonate with their own search for meaning and purpose. This resonance can lead to a more profound connection with the religious community, where what started as simple admiration may blossom into a personal spiritual journey, potentially culminating in the decision to emulate the practitioners and become followers themselves. This process of moral learning, which begins with the admiration of moral exemplars and progresses by emulating their virtues, has been frequently proposed by philosophers of education in recent years (Zagzebski 2017; Kristjansson 2017; Croce 2020). Even if people do not become followers of those religious practitioners, they may still be moved by those religious behaviors and take their religious views seriously. This transformative experience is a testament to the power of religious behaviors and the impact they can have on the world. In other words, instead of being “pushed” to change their view, these people are “pulled” to these religious practitioners, voluntarily seek to comprehend them further, and may eventually join the ranks of the faithful.
While the narrative outlined may seem idealistic, it does provide insight into how revered religious figures often garner extensive support and sympathy from diverse populations. Take, for instance, Zhu Xi, the Neo-Confucian mentioned earlier. His religious behavior drew a multitude of disciples from across the country, eager to learn from his wisdom. Remarkably, Zhu Xi’s influence was so compelling that it even persuaded students of other contemporary Neo-Confucians, such as Lu Jiuyuan (1139–1193), to abandon their original teachers and seek tutelage under him (Chan 2007, p. 185). Although some people disagreed with Zhu Xi’s thought, they still acknowledged that he was a public-minded and respectable figure. In a similar vein, the followers of St. Francis of Assisi and Thích Nhat Hạnh were not primarily swayed by theological discourse or religious arguments. Instead, it was the tangible manifestation of their faith through their actions that touched people deeply. Observers became captivated by the extraordinary way these venerable individuals lived their lives, which sparked a desire to understand the spiritual underpinnings that fueled such exemplary behavior.
This pulling effect of religious behaviors can make positive contributions to public deliberations. As numerous liberals suggest, a primary challenge in public deliberation is the disagreements stemming from diverse secular and religious convictions, which often escalate into moral and political controversies (Rawls 2005, p. xvii; Larmore 2020, p. 76). To address this, liberals seek out various strategies for coexistence and the establishment of laws that gain legitimacy from diverse viewpoints. This includes limiting the basis of lawmaking to publicly accessible public reasons (Quong 2011; Schwartzman 2011) or allowing religious citizens to use their religious reasons as grounds for contesting laws and policies (Vallier 2019). These approaches mainly discuss how people can live with each other given the disagreement.
Religious behaviors, however, offer a means of mitigating disagreements directly. By consistently engaging in religious behavior, the religious practitioners can attract the attention and admiration of other religious and secular citizens. They may be sympathetic with those religious practitioners and thus eager to know more about their religion. Eventually, they may even join the sect of those religious believers. No matter whether they convert or not, such admirations of religious behaviors can narrow down the gap between differing religious and secular viewpoints in public deliberation. Over time, the religious values of those practitioners might gain broader acceptance. The religious behavior can enhance other people’s understanding of the religious practitioners’ doctrines. This mutual understanding may facilitate all citizens reaching certain agreements with each other in public deliberation. In other words, while many liberals focus on how rational exchanges and justifications among secular and religious citizens are possible, I suggest that liberals should not underestimate the emotional effect caused by religious behavior, such as admiration (Zagzebski 2017, p. 28), that is, the “pull” people feel to understand more about each other’s view and narrow down disagreement in public deliberation.14 Citizens should publicly commend such religious behaviors and encourage broader participation in these practices. While the moral respectability and value of religious behavior are widely acknowledged, its positive political impact has not been given sufficient consideration.15
However, I shall clarify that the pushing strategy (e.g., translating religious reasons to public reason, convincing others by religious reasons, etc.) and the pulling strategy (e.g., religious behavior) are not mutually exclusive. I do not mean that merely performing religious behaviors is sufficient to address moral and political disagreement. Religious behaviors cannot replace the function served by public reason and religious reason in public deliberation. On the contrary, these two strategies can be seen as mutually supplementary. The pulling strategy aims to emotionally motivate citizens to explore each other’s moral and religious doctrines, thereby fostering a deeper mutual comprehension. This approach reduces the disparities in viewpoints among diverse secular and religious groups and aids in enabling citizens to persuade one another public or religious reasons. Put succinctly, the pulling strategy facilitates the pushing strategy to be more likely successful. Hence, the aim of my discussion of religious behaviors is not to present it as a third alternative to exclusivism and inclusivism in addressing disagreement. Rather, my contention is that both exclusivism and inclusivism can be benefited by acknowledging the value of religious behavior. Consequently, religious behavior is an element of religion that should not be overlooked in this philosophical debate.

5. Why Both Exclusivism and Inclusivism Should Be Concerned with Religious Behavior

I shall explain how religious behavior can help address certain theoretical issues that challenge exclusivism and inclusivism. First, for exclusivism, religious behavior can help to resolve the problem of incompleteness. The problem of incompleteness is a philosophical issue raised by some philosophers in opposition to exclusivism (Reidy 2000; Horton 2003). According to these critics, exclusivism fails to explain how a government can resolve fundamental moral and political controversies because it excludes too many considerations from the political domain. Only very few moral values can be used as public reasons that are accessible to different reasonable citizens. The content of public reason is not substantial enough to settle controversial matters. While various exclusivists have explained how this problem can be resolved (e.g., Schwartzman 2005, pp. 209–14), religious behavior offers a novel approach to tackling this challenge. If some religious practitioners persist in their religious behavior, they could prompt others to explore their religious doctrines, possibly leading to an increase in followers. Even individuals who do not completely convert may adopt some of the moral values advocated by these practitioners. Citizens may then gradually share these religious values, and this enables these religious values to become a part of public reason. As some philosophers suggest, public reason should not be seen as an ahistorical, unchangeable set of moral values. Rather, it can be adapted and expanded, depending on different historical and cultural settings (Flanders 2012; Bonotti 2017, p. 135). Religious behaviors, therefore, can be seen as fostering an environment that piques the interest of people with different comprehensive doctrines and thus enriching the content of public reason. This, in turn, provides citizens with richer resources to resolve a multitude of disputes.
Secondly, inclusivism has been troubled by the problem of anarchy. The problem of anarchy is a philosophical issue raised by critics of inclusivism (Wall 2013; Boettcher 2015; Enoch 2015).16 According to these critics, inclusivism argues that non-public reasons, such as religious reasons, should be permitted to enter public justification. Citizens should be able to legitimately reject laws and policies on the grounds of these non-public reasons. This, however, leads to an embarrassing situation in which nearly all potential options of agreement are objectionable on the grounds of some non-public reasons. Consequently, inclusivism is left with no choice but to accept a state of anarchy (Wall 2013, p. 169; Enoch 2015, p. 118). Religious behavior, however, can help inclusivism to avoid this problem, for it enhances mutual understanding of different religious and secular sects in a pluralistic society. As some philosophers suggest, a way for citizens to convince others in inclusivism is to understand others’ comprehensive doctrines and offer arguments that could be derived from these doctrines (Kogelmann and Stich 2016, pp. 724–25). In other words, citizens can convince each other by conjecture and may eventually reach agreement (Schwartzman 2012). However, this process hinges on the precondition that the citizens proposing conjectures possess an understanding of the religious doctrines of those to whom they are directing their conjectures. Coincidentally, religious behaviors can foster better mutual understanding among citizens with varied comprehensive doctrines, thereby aiding them in presenting conjectures to one another. Even if citizens do not believe in certain religious values, those religious values may become popular through the religious behaviors of some practitioners. Consequently, citizens can utilize these religious values to formulate conjectural arguments to convince those citizens who believe in those religious values. In brief, the popularity of certain religious values can reduce the difficulty of offering conjectural arguments, thereby enhancing the likelihood of achieving agreement among citizens within an inclusivist framework.

6. Conclusions

Instead of taking a side in the inclusivism–exclusivism debate, this paper posits that both sides focus too heavily on the task of offering reasons and arguments. My claim is that religious behavior, which means highly altruistic actions motivated by religious beliefs, should not be neglected in this debate because of its beneficial influence on public deliberation. I illustrate religious behavior using the example of the Neo-Confucians, who believe that everything in the world is inextricably intertwined. Thus, people should incorporate everything into their expanded conception of self and consistently strive to advance the collective good, even at significant expense to their own personal well-being. I further suggest that religious behavior represents a largely overlooked method of exploring the interactions between religious believers and their fellow citizens. Unlike the “pushing” strategy often adopted by exclusivists and inclusivists, which aims to rationally convince others or justify one’s position using public or religious reasons, religious behaviors can be seen as a “pulling” strategy which emotionally inspires the admiration of other citizens towards moral exemplars and motivates them to understand other religions in greater depth. The pulling effect of religious behavior can be supported by the effect of moral exemplarism suggested by Linda Zagzebski. While I do not intend to argue that the pulling strategy can replace the pushing strategy, I believe that these two strategies are mutually complementary. Relying solely on religious behaviors may not resolve moral and political disputes, yet it can enhance mutual understanding among different religious and secular groups. This, in turn, assists both exclusivism and inclusivism in tackling some of their philosophical problems, such as the problems of incompleteness and anarchy. In sum, this paper makes three contributions: (1) it presents a novel perspective on the positive impact of religious behavior on liberal politics through the lens of moral exemplarism; (2) it introduces cross-cultural insights by drawing upon Neo-Confucianism to illustrate the role of religious behavior; and (3) it broadens the inclusivism–exclusivism debate by shedding light on an aspect of religion that both sides have overlooked. No matter whether inclusivism or exclusivism is justified, that is, whether public reasons are necessary or religious reasons can be the sole grounds for political decision making, religious behavior can still play a beneficial role in mitigating moral and political disagreements in modern societies.

Funding

This paper results from an ongoing Faculty Development Scheme (FDS) project on “Exploring the Idea of Public Reason” (#FDS14/H12/20), funded by Hong Kong’s University Grants Committee.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Data sharing not applicable.

Acknowledgments

The earlier versions of this article are presented at the conference “Religion, Freedom, Equality”, hosted by the University of Texas and Magdalen College, the University of Oxford. I would like to thank the audience for their very helpful and inspiring comments. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers of Religions for their detailed comments and suggestions.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Notes

1
For an overview of this philosophical debate between inclusivism and exclusivism, see (March 2013; Zoll 2021, pp. 249–62; Wong 2021, pp. 69–71).
2
However, I shall clarify that I do not intend to advocate for an autocratic understanding of religion. In other words, I do not argue that a single religion should eliminate pluralism in society. My paper assumes the idea of public justification, a notion accepted by many exclusivists and inclusivists alike. For the idea of public justification, it assumes that members of society will freely develop their worldviews, leading to a diversity of opinions on political and legal matters. To treat people as equals, we must ensure that political power is justified to them according to their own views, meaning that laws and policies should be justified by reasons that the public can recognize as valid. Exclusivists, like Rawls (2005, p. 229) and Quong (2011, p. 43), and inclusivists, like Gaus (2011, p. 15) and Vallier (2014, p. 24), both support this idea of public justification. In alignment with this, I also advocate that the pluralistic views in a liberal democratic society should be respected and thus laws and policies should be publicly justified, not based on religious reasons that some citizens may reject. Consequently, it is illegitimate for a government to enact religious laws and policies that are biased toward a particular religion because they would not be justifiable to believers of different faiths or to secular citizens. While I share this idea of public justification with exclusivism and inclusivism, my paper intends to go beyond the inclusivism–exclusivism debate, arguing that religious behavior can mitigate disagreements among citizens and facilitate public justification. This positive contribution of religious behavior to public justification should not be overlooked by both sides in the debate.
3
I shall clarify that my argument does not assert the superiority of religious altruism over non-religious altruism. In fact, altruistic acts from those who are non-religious are equally admirable and deserving of respect. The altruistic behaviors of some non-religious citizens may also attract people to understand these citizens more and thus narrow down possible disagreements. The emphasis of this paper on religious altruism is merely because it is a more common phenomenon for religious individuals to exhibit altruistic behavior (e.g., Gill 1999).
4
Nevertheless, as some scholars observe, although many Neo-Confucians saw themselves as fighting off Buddhism, their thoughts were deeply influenced by Buddhism at the same time (Ivanhoe 2000). Some ideas that are similar to the idea of oneness can also be found in the traditions of Daoism and Buddhism (Ivanhoe 2018).
5
For other possible areas in which Confucianism could contribute to modern societies, see (Wong 2021, 2023; Wong and Jackson 2023).
6
A similar view of oneness can also be found in the writing of another Neo-Confucian Zhang Zai (1020–1077). Zhang once wrote that “Heaven is my father and earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as finds an intimate place in their midst. Therefore, that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which directs the universe I regard as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions” (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, p. 135).
7
However, this does not mean that all beings are considered equally in the perspective of oneness. Neo-Confucians still admit that there is a hierarchy of concern, even for the sage. Human beings, as the creatures that have the best quality of qi and are thus most capable of making the world better, have a uniquely high value. The perspective of oneness, therefore, should be called “anthropocosmic”, rather than “anthropocentric” (Tu 2002, p. 2). Human beings do not need to consider everything equally, but they have a greater sense of shared identity and destiny between self and world, aiming for the collective good of the entire interrelated system.
8
This does not mean that only a Confucian father would feel a sense of unity with his children. Fathers from other religions, as well as non-religious fathers, can also experience this feeling. The example of Philip Ivanhoe is simply used to demonstrate that the feeling of oneness is not a rare occurrence but rather a common aspect of parenthood. What Confucianism suggests is that we ought to take this feeling seriously and strive to extend it to all beings in the world.
9
In fact, the idea of “great chain of being” has a long history in the West. See (Lovejoy 1936).
10
Some might argue that the altruistic actions of these Christians are not out of pure altruism but to ensure their place in heaven, thus attributing a self-interested motive to their actions. However, as Thomas Aquinas suggests, acts of charity are not self-serving. Rather, they are manifestations of participating in God’s love, which is inherently selfless toward others. Therefore, altruistic deeds are not a means to an end, such as securing a place in heaven, but are expressions of the individual’s participation in the ultimate good, which is God (Porter 2012, pp. 267–68). The final outcome, which means securing a place in heaven, is at most a byproduct, but not an ultimate goal of altruistic actions.
11
Some might argue that religions in practice tend to be exclusive and be partial to those who share their faith. I also agree that these biased behaviors should be avoided. Nevertheless, regarding the question of whom to help, most major religions, including Christianity (Jackson 2021, pp. 1–2), Buddhism (Heim 2020, p. 37), Islam (Esposito 2011, p. 128) and Confucianism (Ivanhoe 2018, p. 70), concur that one should help people universally, irrespective of their religious beliefs. Therefore, unconditional altruism is a shared moral belief among these major religions, and I mainly attempt to argue that religious behaviors inspired by this unconditional altruism are beneficial to public deliberations in liberal democratic societies.
12
This can be seen as a kind of declaration (Rawls 2005, p. 465), which means that religious believers declare their own comprehensive doctrines in order to show that they support a political conception of justice in their political advocacy. Nevertheless, this approach of offering public reasons also encounters the problem of cheap talk (Wong and Li, forthcoming).
13
Here, I adopt Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory (Zagzebski 2017), which outlines in detail how moral exemplars can inspire admiration in others and become central to moral education.
14
To clarify, my stance is not to overlook the various negative aspects that can be found within religious communities. Indeed, instances of corruption and scandal within some religious charities are undeniable and should be rightfully condemned and punished. Nevertheless, my argument does not encompass the broad assertion that religion is inherently advantageous to public discourse in liberal democratic societies. Instead, I am presenting a more focused viewpoint: I contend that religious behavior—specifically, altruistic actions that are driven by religious beliefs—can have a positive impact on public deliberations within liberal democratic societies. It is vital to differentiate these positive actions from the corrupt and scandalous activities that occur within some religious communities, which are not representative of religious behavior and do not invalidate the beneficial aspects of religious behavior.
15
Nevertheless, I am hesitant to suggest that the state should use subsidies to encourage religious behavior, as these subsidies may suggest government bias toward a particular religion, which could be objectionable to adherents of other religions and to secular citizens from the standpoint of public justification. Both exclusivist (Quong 2011, p. 61) and inclusivist (Vallier 2014, p. 202) perspectives would likely reject such subsidies. Therefore, I maintain that praise and encouragement for religious behavior should occur at the level of individual citizens, rather than at the level of government.
16
Given that “anarchy” is a term frequently encountered in various contexts, readers might mistakenly assume that “the problem of anarchy” is relevant to the discussion of anarchism. To clarify, “the problem of anarchy” as it is used here does not pertain to anarchism but is a particular philosophical concept used in critiques of inclusivism, notably by thinkers like David Enoch. This “problem of anarchy” refers to the concern that inclusivism, by allowing a broad range of defeater reasons in the public justification process, could paradoxically result in a situation where no laws can be recognized as legitimate within its own system.

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