Tolerance before Secularism: Models of Tolerance in Nineteenth-Century Arabic

Abstract

By analyzing temporal language, this study investigates the intellectual origins and the conceptual history of three concepts of tolerance that emerged in the Arabic context towards the end of the 19th century. The first is a philosophical concept that has evolved within the philosophical-rational tradition and has connections to the Enlightenment and liberalism. The second is a theological concept that advocates for a harmonious interpretation of all monotheistic religions based on the assumption that all monotheistic scriptures are true. The third is a legal Islamic concept that aims to preserve the traditional imperial and hierarchical Islamic system while addressing contemporary concerns related to citizenship and political affiliation. Tolerance is frequently examined within the research framework on secularity and secularism. Before secularism emerged as a holistic doctrine in Arabic (ʿalmāniyya), discussions surrounding tolerance were closely linked to societal and political principles, including civil equality, freedom of conscience, and the neutrality of religion in the public domain.

1. Introduction

The concept of tolerance has regained attention in academic and public spheres due to significant events that have shaped the history of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In the West, discussions have developed in the context of the crisis of liberal democracy. Central issues, such as waves of refugees from Africa and the Middle East and the rise of populist right-wing ideologies, created a new environment in which liberal democracy is being challenged by both the promises of human rights and the desire to preserve national and religious symbols (Vormann and Lammert 2019, pp. 1–18).

In the Middle East, the crisis of democracy is evident through various positions and events, the most prominent of which is the failure of the massive demonstrations known as the “Arab Spring” to establish a stable democratic regime. In this crisis, two main trends stood out in the region, where religious politics played a central role: the success of Islamist parties in places where elections were held and a noticeable strengthening of religious identity and religion in several spheres. In the post-“Arab Spring”, Islam is being used as a source of political power by both the opposition Islamist parties and the Arab regimes. The efforts of the modern Arab territorial state in the twentieth century to limit the social influence of religion eventually led to its nationalization and its shape as a code of public morality (Cesari 2014, pp. 110–12). The retreat of the idea of private religion or the increase in religiosity occurred in all the Middle Eastern countries in several areas, including in the lifestyle, the symbols of collective identity, national and international politics, and the perception of conflicts, including the Israeli-Arab conflict. This process impacted groups with a delicate social status, such as religious minorities, women, and political actors aligned with the liberal and leftist forces. In this context, the discussion about tolerance becomes most relevant (Cesari 2014, pp. 237–63; Fischer 2012, pp. 10–15).

In social sciences, tolerance is commonly analyzed in two contexts. The first is the historical–normative aspect in which tolerance is perceived as a central principle of liberal democracy and a normative basis for any discourse on pluralism and diversity. It is widely agreed that the intellectual content of the liberal concept of tolerance was crystalized in two significant events: the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment movement of the eighteenth century. These events created a new meaning of tolerance based on several principles, the most important of which is the principle of individual autonomy. In the shadow of the historical context that accompanied Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially the European wars of religion, this principle became a basic idea by which the religious conflicts of Europe were dealt with. Based on this principle, tolerance means accepting the assumption that autonomy is a desirable and positive value. In that sense, the term contains a dual meaning, suggesting that the individual is expected to endure an intolerable situation or an opinion they disagrees with. In a social context, their non-active resistance is perceived as a positive and desirable value. Later, this idea became part of a doctrine that referred to areas that concern society and the state (Seligman 1995, pp. 1–14; Laursen and Nederman 2011, pp. 236–37).

In addition to its historical aspect, tolerance is commonly analyzed in the context of studies on secularity and secularism. Tolerance is perceived as a fundamental component of the broader thesis of secularism. According to claims that dominated scholarship for most of the twentieth century, the spread of modernization would reduce the role of religion in individuals’ lives, primarily through its privatization and, consequently, the spread of secularism. In recent decades, these claims have been challenged by what is commonly known as post-secularism, a collection of theories that focus on the persistence of religion or its deprivatization. In this context, the relatively early work of José Casanova emphasized the return of religion into the public sphere and the shortcomings of the thesis of secularism. He argued that the privatization of religion is not necessary for the success of the modernity process as long as it happened within a democratic context in which religion could contribute to the evolvement of civil society or liberal values (Casanova 1994, pp. 3–66). The exclusion of the concept of tolerance of Enlightenment from the border arguments on democratization and modernity was expanded in later works. Challenging the notion that defines religion solely as a collection of beliefs, Talal Asad criticizes the manifestation of tolerance in the legal–political realm. He uses the example of India to argue that a secular state does not guarantee tolerance and social peace. Despite having a democratic, liberal, and secular constitution, the national identity of India and the predominant representation of Hinduism have marginalized other groups, labeling them as minorities (Asad 2003, pp. 1–17). Charles Taylor explored the significance of the Enlightenment idea of tolerance in his monumental book, A Secular Age. He argued that while tolerance is a product of the Western experience, it is still relevant and can be embraced by non-Western societies. The Enlightenment’s formation of tolerance was used as a common denominator for peaceful coexistence among diverse religious groups. Tylor criticizes the previous thesis on secularism and argues that the triumph of secularism is evident in challenging religion as a social authority. According to him, religion becomes one of the many sources of social behavior and ethics. Following previous research, this conclusion emphasizes the importance of focusing on religiosity as an analytical category (Taylor 2007).

Stemming from the common post-secular assumption of an unnecessary association between tolerance and secularism, Humeira Iqtidar emphasizes the impact of the Enlightenment and colonialism on establishing a distinct and universal category of religion. Rather than the privatization of or a decrease in, Iqtidar argues that secularization should be seen as a significant transformation in how religion is perceived: “Secularization is, then, best understood as a qualitative shift in how religious thought and practice are imagined within society rather than as the quantitative change (less religion, less public religiosity, etc.) that influential social and political theory had posited” (Iqtidar 2016, pp. 5–11; Iqtidar and Sarkar 2018, p. 5).

This article aims to contribute to both levels of discussion in scholarship: the historical and the theoretical. From a historical perspective, it will explore three models of tolerance that emerged in the Arabic context during the nineteenth century, prior to the advent of secularism as a comprehensive socio-political doctrine and lifestyle, commonly referred to as ʿalmāniyya.1 In essence, this study will investigate the period during which forms of secularity evolved into social and political principles, preceding their maturation into a fully articulated and distinct political concept.

To put this argument in a broader conceptual framework, the historical analysis will focus on what Reinhart Koselleck refers to as the Sattelzeit (saddle period). This heuristic term denotes a transformative era characterized by significant semantic shifts in the political and social vocabulary of modernity. During this period, there were considerable instabilities in meaning, as terms lost their premodern connotations and were either abandoned or reinterpreted multiple times until they received their conventional modern form. The inherently unstable nature and distinctive characteristics of the Sattelzeit are evident in its connections to both preceding and subsequent periods, suggesting a continuity with both the prior and following epochs (Motzkin 2005, pp. 145–58).

To contextualize the discourse within the political and social rhetoric of the nineteenth century, various forms of secularity emerged, framed by concepts such as “civil” and “civilization” (madanī and tamaddun). It is important to note that these terms were not necessarily positioned in opposition to religious influences. The notion of secularity reached its most nuanced interpretations with the evolution of the term ʿalmāniyya, which transitioned from a focus on ecclesiastical matters to encompass political considerations, thereby signifying a viewpoint that excludes religion as a foundation for political organization. In its broadest and most integrative application, ʿalmāniyya came to represent a political regime, secular legal frameworks, educational systems, intellectual orientations, and a comprehensive lifestyle. In the early years of the twentieth century, ʿalmāniyya evolved into what Koselleck terms a “collective singular”, which synthesizes a multitude of experiences into a singular concept.2

This research intends to adopt a conceptual framework and examine the temporal language utilized by nineteenth-century intellectuals in primary sources. The objective is to explore philosophical components such as civil equality and political neutrality prior to their linkage with secularism and, subsequently, with nationalism and democracy. In pursuing this analysis, I will contend that prior to the establishment of secularism, different forms of secularity displayed a variety of distinct and inconsistent characteristics.

While the primary emphasis of this research is on conceptual history, the case study will serve to elucidate some observations regarding the theoretical discourse surrounding secularism. By employing a conceptual approach and analyzing the temporal language used by nineteenth-century intellectuals in primary texts, this research aims to investigate philosophical components such as civil equality and political neutrality prior to their association with secularism and, subsequently, nationalism and democracy. By doing so, I will argue that before secularism, forms of secularity embedded multiple and incoherent characteristics.

If we focus on the linguistic aspect of tolerance, the Arabic language created two primary signifiers. The term tasāmuḥ means forgiveness, leniency, turning a blind eye, and tasāmaḥ means to behave with forgiveness (Ibn Manzur 2004b, pp. 249–50). The second term is tasāhul, which means leniency, indulgence, and kindness (Ibn Manzur 2004a, pp. 288–89). The prominent nineteenth-century Syrian–Lebanese philologist and journalist Butrus al-Bustani argues that the terms tasāmuḥ and tasāhul can be synonymous (al-Bustani 1998, p. 425). During the Nahda period in the mid-nineteenth century, scholars developed a growing fascination with the notion of tolerance. The interest in the concept began when new forms of political and social unity arose, encompassing ideas such as patriotism and the aspiration to create new social and civic frameworks marked by the term civilization (tamaddun).

The upcoming sections will examine three concepts of tolerance:3 a philosophical concept that has evolved within the philosophical–rational tradition, Enlightenment, and liberalism. A theological concept that suggests all Monotheistic scriptures are true and promotes a harmonious interpretation of all monotheistic religions. The last is a legal Islamic concept that seeks to reshape and maintain the traditional imperial and hierarchical Islamic system while addressing contemporary concerns regarding citizenship and political affiliation.

2. The Philosophical Concept

The philosophical concept of tolerance is based on discussions about human nature, natural law, and universal concepts where reason is regarded as the primary source of knowledge. Despite the decisive influence of the French Enlightenment on this concept, its ideational infrastructure was formed in many works written by philosophers in antiquity, in the context of the Arabic Islamic culture of the Middle Ages, and in modern times.

The philosophical concept of tolerance developed in Arabic around the mid-nineteenth century. Between the Crimean War (1854–1856) and the First World War (1914–1918), the Ottoman Empire was increasingly influenced by modern ideas, attracting the attention of politicians and journalists. During this period, the Ottoman Empire formed alliances with Britain and France, and European influence became more pronounced among the Ottoman elite, particularly in Mediterranean coastal cities. The British occupied Egypt and Sudan, while France strengthened its control over North Africa. Notions such as self-determination fueled the popular calls for national independence in the eastern European regions of the Ottoman Empire, leading to the independence of territories like Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia. The modern ideological discourse, inspired by major events like the French and American revolutions, evolved in Arabic and Turkish. The Ottoman response to the political challenges from Europe was expressed through the need for reform and renewal (tajdīd). This response took two forms: a philosophical approach influenced by the rise of rationalism (and later positivism) and a legal Islamic approach advocating for Islamic revival. Ottoman statesmen embraced the first approach with the Tanzimat movement, which culminated in the establishment of the first Ottoman parliament in 1876 (Hourani 1983, pp. 67–102).

The Tanzimat reforms led to substantial modifications in political discourse and expectations. Additionally, the new discourse was influenced by changes from below, which were reflected in the rise of new social forces. The new class, which appeared as merchants, journalists, and bureaucrats, created a diverse knowledge infrastructure that was not exclusively based on religious learning. Globally, this era was characterized by extensive colonization and the creation of worldwide connections facilitated by technological advancements like the telegraph and steam engine, which the Ottoman Empire adopted during the mid-nineteenth century.4

In this context, two terms have moved to the center of political controversy among public intellectuals. The first term, tasāmuḥ, was used by (Ahmad) Faris al-Shidyaq, a prominent journalist and philologist who converted from Christianity to Islam. In 1867, al-Shidyaq translated the English word “liberal party” into “supporters of tolerance”, “mutasāmiḥīn” (al-Shidyaq 1877, pp. 118–19, 130). Similarly, Adib Ishaq, a Christian intellectual born in Damascus, wrote in 1874 about the supporters of tolerance and called them “mutasāhilīn” (supporters of tolerance) (Ishaq 1978, pp. 378–84). In both cases, the linguistic use of tasāmuḥ and tasāhul shifted from being an adjective to being a noun, shifting from a use that indicates social characteristics to a use that indicates a category of political and ideological affiliation. In both cases, tolerance became a central concept around which a complex set of ideas was woven.

The early theorization of the philosophical concept of tolerance came to light with the publication of Butrus al-Bustani’s series of articles between September 1860 and April 1861. This publication contained a vision for the end of the civil war (ḥarb ahliyya, fitna) that emerged on a religious background in Mount Lebanon and Damascus in the summer of 1860. Al-Bustani envisioned rebuilding the Syrian society on a basis that would prevent the recurrence of acts of violence. The main concerns of the publications were the present and the future, not the past.5

These articles present several groundbreaking ideas. One notable departure from the traditional Islamic concept of ahl al-dhimma, which established a hierarchical relationship between Islam and other monotheist religions, al-Bustani presents an egalitarian concept of tolerance. According to him, the act of harming Christians is considered a violation of their human rights (ḥuqūq insāniyya), which forms the foundation of their civil rights (ḥuqūq madaniyya), rather than being based on the legal status of their religious affiliation (al-Bustani 1990, p. 15). This view is not only incompatible with the traditional religious view but also offers an alternative that is influenced by the philosophy of social contracts that flourished in the shadow of the eighteenth-century French and European Enlightenment.

The fact that there is a philosophical concept of universal morality, which is used as a measure to assess the validity of religions, shows that natural law is a prominent theme in his work. According to al-Bustani, if religions fail to meet these moral standards, they “do not deserve to be called a religion” (al-Bustani 1990, p. 20). The origins of these ideas are not only philosophical. Al-Bustani, a Protestant Christian himself, believed that by returning to the original principles of Christianity, the religion could be saved from the corruption it has faced over time. In this context, there is a strong correlation between the purity level in religion, truth, and universal morality. The purer a religion is, the more authentic it becomes, and the greater its impact on the advancement and growth of civilization (tamaddun). According to this interpretation, recognizing the religions of Syria within a universal moral code is necessary for rebuilding social life and respecting religious differences. This recognition prevents the mistreatment and disdain (iḥtiqār) of individuals with different faiths.6 The guiding value for the concept of tolerance in his text stems from a belief in natural law and egalitarianism in the context of homeland (waṭan). This concept is connected to the vision of a common identity, solidarity (ulfa), and a belief in a shared future for all the members of the group.

Al-Bustani argues that a society cannot become egalitarian (tasāwī) in a religiously fanatical environment. This belief forms the foundation of his revolutionary idea of society. He asserts that fanaticism arises from social divisions and is used by certain groups to maintain their privileges. He contends that the Syrian legal and social structure is built on the combination of religious and civil matters (mazj al-umūr al-dīniyya bi-l-umūr al-madaniyya), which has fueled the hatred responsible for destroying Syrian society. According to him, religion should only concern the relationship between the believer and God, while civil affairs should be limited to the interactions between individuals and their fellow citizens, as well as between individuals and their government. He suggests that social norms and political affiliations (nasāba siyāsiyya) should be based on these civil principles (al-Bustani 1990, pp. 49–57).

Al-Bustani’s revolutionary concept lies in his connection between the privatization of religion and the individualization of the public sphere. Freedom of religion is not only a religious matter but a public matter and is a basis for social peace and civil equality. Needless to say, this approach undermines prevailing religious norms in Christian–Maronite tradition and Muslim religious law, according to which the issue of religious affiliation is subject to the supervision of the community. In this early period, the demand for the separation of religion from the state was not absolute, and the separation between the religious and the political did not penetrate political concepts such as sovereignty. Thus, from a political point of view, al-Bustani believed that the ruler receives legitimacy from God (al-Bustani 1990, p. 56). In this sense, al-Bustani was a social revolutionary and a political conservative.

In al-Bustani’s writings, this philosophical perspective on the law, society, and the state was used to promote tolerance and advocate for eliminating inherent privileges (imtiyāzāt). It is also a basis for an optimistic view of the future manifested in the vision for a new era (ʿaṣr jadīd) of progress and prosperity. This almost eschatological promise creates a worldview of binary contrasts: science, light, love of the motherland, civilization, progress, freedom, equality, and tolerance are presented as an ideological worldview that contradicts a negative view consisting of ideas such as darkness, fanaticism (taʿaṣub), barbaric tribalism, savagery, and regression (taʾakhur) (al-Bustani 1990, pp. 22–26, 31, 48, 60).

Osama Makdisi, who has written extensively on the issue of sectarianism, proposes the research term “ecumenical framework” to describe the attempts to conceive a shared and inclusive inter-religious political solidarity in which religion plays a central role. In his opinion, the ecumenical framework created a new concept of belonging and social organization that is opposed and even alternative to sectarianism. He refers to al-Bustani’s vision as “the first coherent indigenous Arab vision of what ecumenical equality between Muslim and non-Muslim might look like in the shadow of a reforming Ottoman state” (Makdisi 2019, p. 20). Makdisi acknowledges that the intellectual sources of that framework were eclectic, “Ottoman, European and Arab”, but his discussion barely refers to those conceptual sources.

Al-Bustani’s intellectual sources can be diverse. Jens Hanssen and Hicham Safieddine emphasized in their historical interpretation the connection between al-Busatani’s ideas and the political context of the Ottoman reforms. In their opinion, al-Bustani’s ideas were, to a large extent, an expression of the spirit of reforms of the Ottoman Empire as expressed by the special envoy of the empire to Syria, Fuad Pasha, who came to deal with the crisis created after the massacre and to prevent international intervention, especially French. In contrast to the prevailing universal discourse, al-Bustani’s interpretation of the Christian crisis in relation to civil and human rights, there were voices that aimed to safeguard the “rights of Christians”. These voices were backed by French statesmen who threatened to intervene directly (al-Bustani 2019, pp. 21–22). The general discourse on rights at that time was influenced by the global discourse that became central to the Arabic intellectual discourse of the second half of the nineteenth century.7

Different interpretations of tolerance can be found in various humanistic traditions in Arab history, such as the philosophical Aristotelian tradition. Al-Farabi, for instance, presented a pluralistic perspective on the potential of different religions to attain the philosophical religion or its metaphysical concept, known as “the principles of beings”. According to al-Farabi, religion is an imitation of philosophy, so the differences between religions are not essential, and one’s religious affiliation does not necessarily determine moral standards. Al-Farabi argued that imposing unity could lead to conflicts, and therefore, Muslims should embrace the principle of diversity, including in matters of religion, as a guiding principle (Orwin 2017, pp. 11–13, 201–3). Alongside common principles with the thought of al-Bustani, such as the supremacy of reason as a guiding principle and the existence of universal morality, al-Farabi was the one who introduced the early theorization of the concept madanī (Abu-ʿUksa 2022, pp. 389–418). Despite the common features, there was no systematic doctrine on tolerance in medieval Arab philosophy, and it is unclear to what extent al-Bustani was familiar with these philosophical sources.

John Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration”, written in Latin in 1685 and published in 1689, introduced the concept of separating religion from the state. This idea aimed to promote social peace and establish a constitutional framework for civil coexistence, ultimately bringing an end to religious conflicts. Locke advocated for separating religious rituals from civil law and used the term “tolerance” to refer to the non-interference of individuals’ faith by those who disagree with them. He argued that tolerance is compatible with both religion and reason. According to Locke, the state’s role should not involve the redemption of souls or the definition of religious doctrine; instead, it should focus on safeguarding the rights of citizens (Locke 2010, p. 10). He believed in a complete separation between the state and the church, with the latter’s role limited to serving God (Locke 2010, pp. 6–12). Locke also viewed tolerance as a means to achieve civil peace, prosperity, and a harmonious society. He criticized social privileges, which he considers a source of intolerance and inequality.8

It is likely that al-Bustani did not directly encounter these ideas from Locke’s works but instead learned about them through Voltaire’s later writings. The latter was known to contemporary Arabic-speaking scholars, including in translations to Arabic. In addition, some of the terms al-Bustani used were not part of Locke’s jargon. A distinct concept is the concept of civilization (tamaddun), a fundamental concept in Voltaire’s works that became common in the French language only in the eighteenth century (Woolf 1989, pp. 96–120).

Voltaire wrote about “tolerance” about eighty years after Locke. In 1763, he wrote his Traité sur la Tolérance, wherein he criticized the execution of Jean Calas, a Protestant merchant accused of killing his son because the latter wanted to convert to Catholicism. Voltaire saw this case as a manifestation of societal intolerance. He argued that intolerance stems from norms and laws that create an unequal social existence, unfairly judging individuals based on their religious beliefs. The similarities between Voltaire’s views on civil and religious matters and al-Bustani’s are significant. Voltaire supports the concept of natural law and natural rights, which he summarizes with the command derived from Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” (Voltaire 1764, p. 48). In matters of religion, Voltaire claims that true Christianity calls for tolerance, while intolerance is foreign to true religion (Voltaire 1764, p. 142). Voltaire also has a universal and autonomous view of morality. Thus, he claims that “philosophy is the sister of religion”, and through it, it is possible to overcome false beliefs (Voltaire 1764, p. 22). Al-Bustani and Voltaire are similar in their use of binary contrasts to construct arguments. Voltaire believes that reason promotes tolerance, humanity, freedom, and civilization, while ignorance leads to fanaticism, prejudice, injustice, violence, and barbarism. He also proposes that fanaticism is not just a societal problem but also has a geographical aspect, as its social influences primarily arise in the periphery, while urban areas tend to foster influences that promote tolerance (Voltaire 1764, p. 1–41). In his argument, Voltaire attempted to justify the Peace of Westphalia’s agreements, which essentially acknowledged the state’s authority over its territory as a legal matter, setting the principle of uti possidetis juris (the principle which sanctifies state’s borders) (Voltaire 1764, p. 42). Despite the similarity with al-Bustani, there are also several differences that can stem from differences in context and time. Voltaire does not demand in his letter, like al-Bustani, the cancelation of the privileges of the members of the majority religion compared to other religious minorities. Yet, he defends the principle of full civil rights. It is important to note that Voltaire’s writings predate the French Revolution and the substantial revolutionary measures implemented to challenge the confessional character of the French state (Voltaire 1764, pp. 29–41).

A few years after the publication of al-Bustani, the concept of tasāhul as having a contradictory meaning to taʿaṣub, becomes very common. The two prominent Muslim reformers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh wrote critically in 1884 that the meanings of the term taʿaṣub “preoccupy the people in the various countries, especially in the East, and it was chewed up by many in gatherings and assemblies… until very few expressions did not include, end with, or contain it in their meaning” (al-Afghani 2002, p. 131). During these years, the term tasāhul gained prominence, and other scholars made contributions to its meaning. Adib Ishaq, entitled a speech he gave around 1874 by “al-Taʿaṣub wa-l-tasāhul” (fanaticism and tolerance). Ishaq was a public intellectual originally from Damascus and carried with him the memory of the massacre in the Christian neighborhood of Bab Tuma in the summer of 1860. For him, as for other Syrian–Lebanese Christian intellectuals, the discussion about tolerance had a fundamental and existential meaning. In his speech, Ishaq emphasizes the connection between the concept and a perspective on science and religion associated with progress. He argues that both science and religion are continuously evolving, and as a result, individuals should be open-minded and accepting of diverse and unconventional opinions. Accepting differences is a crucial stance for the advancement of humanity. Ishaq takes the concept further than al-Bustani’s socio-political understanding by presenting a historical and sociological analysis of the emergence of taʿaṣub. He proposes that taʿaṣub arises from a combination of social forces and a desire for control and influence. This combination establishes a custom and tradition (ʿāda, taqlīd) of prejudice that safeguards the advantages and interests of the particular group that practices it. As a result, prejudice becomes a widely held belief among the general population. Ishaq condemns the religious conflicts that are often given a positive religious connotation, such as referring to massacres (madhābiḥ) as “holy war” (jihād) (Ishaq 1978, pp. 378–84).

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the discourse of tolerance developed significantly and was used to criticize the role of the clergy in society and to criticize colonial and international politics. Amin al-Rihani, a Syrian–Lebanese Maronite intellectual who immigrated to the United States, gave a speech in February 1901 to the Maronite Youth Organization in the United States entitled “al-Tasāhul al-Dīnī” (religious tolerance). In his speech, he argues that the public should pay attention to the role of the clergy and their involvement in society. The religious and political elite’s manipulation of religion has caused division and weakness in Syrian society. Additionally, he offers a critical analysis of the Ottoman government’s concept of tolerance, arguing that it has negative consequences. He asserts that the state’s tolerance towards Christians is manipulated to exert power over them and guarantee their compliance with both religious and political institutions.

According to al-Rihani, tolerance extends beyond social matters and applies to international relations. He condemns European colonialism, referring to it as “international fanaticism” based on the idea of patronizing weaker nations. He contrasts this with the internal relations among Europeans, which he sees as being built on mutual respect. Colonialism, including the wars associated with Christianity, is seen as a manifestation of intolerance that aims to impose religion on “barbarian groups” (al-Rihani 2012, pp. 237–39). He ends his speech with the slogan, “Tolerance is the basis of modern civilization” (al-Rihani 2012, pp. 240–46). This form of tolerance became fundamental for all ideologies of progress expressed in Arabic towards the end of the nineteenth century. Ilham Khuri-Makdisi convincingly argued that this discourse was also adopted in those years by socialist thinkers (Khuri-Makdisi 2010, pp. 42–43).

The most systematic doctrine regarding tolerance emerges from the work of Farah Antun, a Christian intellectual from Tripoli who immigrated to Egypt and was one of the early socialists (Reid 1975; Hourani 1983, pp. 245–59). Antun divides taʿaṣub into two types: al-taʿaṣub al-jinsī, national fanaticism, and al-taʿaṣub al-dīnī, religious fanaticism. The first, if it becomes extreme, can be harmful and oppressive to internal diversity, but it can also be beneficial when directed against an external group. On the other hand, religious fanaticism can be destructive to the nation’s unity because it is directed inward: “There is no nation in the world that all adheres to the faith of one religion” (Antun 1906, pp. 185–91).

Antun presents the most systematic theorization of the concept of tasāhul as part of his famous polemic with Muhammad Abduh. Following al-Rihani’s claims and under the title “The meaning of the tasāhul which is the basis of modern civilization”, Antun continues the claim of his predecessors and argues that a government founded on religion cannot be tolerant because it cannot maintain equality among its citizens. This type of government will treat its citizens in two ways: through varying levels of pressure to encourage them to change their religion or through treating religious minorities condescendingly until they are forced to join the state’s official religion. In an indirect criticism of the Islamic legal concept that prevailed in the region throughout Islamic history, he claims that a religious regime creates a hierarchy in society between groups that enjoy privileges versus others that are perceived as inferior. This practice led to trampling human rights (al-ḥaqq al-insānī) and denying the attribute of tasāhul (Antun 1988, p. 147).9

In addition to the arguments already presented, Antun challenges the notion that a reformed religion can bring about civil peace. Criticizing this approach, he argues that a religious regime can contain a certain degree of tolerance, but this tolerance will not be honest because it cannot accept absolute freedom of belief, including for atheists. Consequently, such a regime would fail to uphold human rights. Antun argues that genuine tolerance can only exist in a system that prioritizes civil law (al-sharʿ al-madanī) over religious law (al-sharʿ al-dīnī) and where religion remains neutral (ḥiyāda) and detached from political competition (Antun 1988, pp. 151–59).

Antun provides a sincere analysis of the Islamic legal concept of tolerance as it evolved over time in the Islamic empires. According to him, initially, tolerance was primarily extended to members of the Islamic community and less so to those who did not follow the Islamic faith. The latter group was expected to submit to the authority of Islam. Antun believes that this legal approach led to the subjugation of nations and the deprivation of their freedom. Similarly, he argues that jihad wars go against the principle of human solidarity (Antun 1988, pp. 241–42). An example of the failure of reformed religion to establish an egalitarian society he finds in the reformism teachings of Muhammad ʿAbduh, which ignores the Eastern Christians and leaves them disadvantaged as outsiders within the group. In his opinion, Christianity is presented in ʿAbduh’s work in “contempt”; therefore, “all Eastern Christians are not interested in hearing about religious reformism at this time, neither in Christianity nor Islam” (Antun 1988, pp. 286, 325–26).

3. The Theological Concept

The development of the philosophical notion of tolerance posed a significant challenge to orthodox religious beliefs in all monotheistic religions. Religious scholars responded to this concept in various ways, with some focusing on the transformative connection it established between the privatization of religion and the principle of equality. This gave rise to conservative criticism based on the belief that the philosophical concept marginalized God in public life. The emergence of conservative, theological, and legal reactions had local and global dimensions. At the local level, starting in the late 1870s, the empire moved away from its civil-oriented approach of the reform period and instead emphasized political and religious unity. During this period, the Islamic religious community (umma) concept started to acquire a geopolitical dimension, influenced by the emergence of nationalism and racial ideologies. Pan-Islamism became the official ideology of the empire, and the concept of the Caliphate regained widespread acceptance (Aydin 2017, pp. 65–98). This was primarily a response to the continued weakness of the Ottoman Empire in coping with growing financial difficulties and the European powers’ encroachment on its territories (Hourani 1983, pp. 103–29).

In a historical context influenced by the dominance of universalist ideologies and the presence of religious and sectarian divisions, Khristufurus Jibara, a Greek Orthodox clergyman who attained the esteemed rank of Archimandrite, lived and wrote. Jibara, born in Damascus in 1835, personally saw the tragic incident of the massacre that specifically targeted the Christian community. This event led to the death of his teacher and sibling (Jibara 1894, p. 700). During his life, he enjoyed the global atmosphere created in the second half of the nineteenth century by moving, experiencing, and living in many cultural centers, including Damascus, Beirut, Moscow, New York, Boston, and Cairo. Later in his career, he actively participated in the World Parliament of Religions, held in Chicago in 1893. This momentous event brought together approximately three hundred clergymen from diverse nations, encompassing representatives from religions originating in India, China, and Japan, as well as Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. The purpose of the gathering was to promote human brotherhood and to find common ground between the different religions (Barrows 1893, pp. vii–ix). Furthermore, the participants expressed a desire to formulate a religious response to the philosophical challenges of certain contemporary ideologies that undermine religion. As stated in one of the conference’s publications, their objective was “to unite all Religion against all irreligion” (Kitagawa 1993, p. 175). It was a period that witnessed the rise of anti-religious currents of thought such as materialism, Darwinism, and positivism.

Jibara developed a political theology in the last three decades of the nineteenth century, which formed the basis for his advocacy of tolerance. He believed that all monotheistic holy books were divinely inspired and, therefore, inherently true. Drawing from this theological premise, Jibara proposed a new interpretation of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, emphasizing continuity and harmony. His aim was to challenge positivist philosophies and establish a social and political framework that would foster a tolerant and egalitarian coexistence among different religions in Syria and the Ottoman Empire.

His ideas regarding tolerance appeared in the seventies of the nineteenth century. In the 1860s, he translated a book by Vladimir Guettée, a French historian and former Latin priest who embraced Orthodox Christianity. In this publication, Guettée disapproves of Christians who endorse the concept of a civil state (dawla madaniyya) (Jibara 1869, p. 11).10 The idea of a state founded on the theological principles of a true religion continued to preoccupy Jibara until the end of his life. In 1877, he wrote a letter addressed to the American Presbyterian Mission in Beirut containing twenty questions in which he questioned the doctrine of the Trinity in Christianity. In those years, he notes a tendency towards the Puritan approach of the Protestants in understanding Christianity, according to which they “interpreted the Bible according to the Bible” (Jibara 1895, appendix 3). The concept of going back to the basics (aṣāla), which was prevalent among Protestants and their critique of traditional Catholic and Orthodox churches, influenced Jibara and became a significant element of the Islamic reformist movement. The emphasis on understanding Christianity through scripture established a firm conviction regarding the separation between the original religion (pure, primitive Christianity) and tradition (the historical heritage of the Church) to which foreign ideas and customs adhered (Jibara 1895, pp. 3–4).

Jibara perceives a connection between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, rooted in the belief in the unity of God. This belief is influenced by Arianism, which predates the establishment of the Trinity in Christianity (at the First Council of Nicaea in 325), and Unitarian Protestant churches that view God as a singular being and Jesus as a prophet rather than part of a Trinity. He perceived the belief in the Trinity as an obstacle to the cohesive interpretation of the scriptures in the three religions and believed that reforming the monotheistic religions could lead to reconciliation. Jibara expressed his political theology in a published text that discussed religious interpretation, as well as ideas about the state and society (Abu-ʿUksa 2021, pp. 362–64).

In his 1895 treatise “Unity in Faith and Harmony in Religion in the Torah, the New Testament and the Qurʾan”, Jibara presents a Puritan perspective to critique traditional monotheistic religions. He argues that the texts of these religions contain the same truth but have been distorted by their traditions. Jibara focuses on specific verses from the New Testament and the Qurʾan that are at the center of doctrinal disputes between Christianity and Islam. Jibara’s novel religious doctrine is founded upon three principal arguments. The first argument pertains to the Islamic assertion that both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament have undergone corruption. In this context, he contends that there are no historical sources predating Islam that substantiate this claim. He presents a second argument asserting the veracity of the crucifixion of Jesus, a fundamental tenet of Christian doctrine that is rejected by Muslims. He employs an allegorical interpretation of a verse from the Qurʾan, which states, “They [the Jews] killed him not, nor crucified him, but the resemblance of ʿIsa [Jesus] was put over another man [and they killed that man]” (Q 4.157). Muslims often utilize this verse to counter the Christian perspective on the crucifixion. In his allegorical interpretation, he contends that Jews did not kill the true Jesus (the esoteric, spiritual Jesus) but only called for his trial. The true reason for the Crucifixion was Jesus himself, who followed God’s will by sacrificing his body for the sins of the world. The third argument is related to Qurʾanic verses such as: “Surely, in disbelief are they who say that Allah is the Messiah, son of Maryam (Mary). Say (O Muhammad): ‘Who then has the least power against Allah, if He were to destroy the Messiah, son of Maryam (Mary), his mother, and all those who are on earth together?’” (Q 5.17). This verse highlights a purported inconsistency between Christian and Islamic teachings, as it refutes the notion of Jesus as the son of God. To harmonize these two theological perspectives, Jibara posits that the expression “the son of God”, as found in the Gospels, signifies one who is in the closest proximity to God. Using a Unitarian argument, he depicts supporters of the Christian Trinity doctrine using Qurʾanic terms like shirk (polytheism) and ḍalāl (deception). Jibara’s work is unique in that it combines the holy scriptures of these religions and uses them as a theological basis, asserting that the Qurʾan is necessary for a correct understanding of the gospel. He calls his doctrine al-madhhab al-qayyim, “the straight path” (Jibara 1894, pp. 699–700).

The concept of tolerance he presented is based on the ancient idea of equality among believers who share a belief in one God and belong to the same homeland. According to his concept, ghulūw, the exaggeration of religion, is a source of intolerance and a reason for the weakness of society and cultural deterioration. While Jibara’s political views align with the foundational principles of pan-Islam, they differ in that he proposes a solution for integrating non-Muslims. Specifically, he advocates for including Christianity and Judaism within a state founded on monotheistic principles. Jibara contends that a reformed religion does not require the philosophical concept of tolerance, as true religion inherently embodies principles of tolerance. He presents religious unity as a means to achieve social harmony and as a pathway to religious redemption and progress. His governance model resembles the caliphate model, in which the ruler serves as the leader of the religious community and the head of state (Jibara 1894, pp. 46–55).

Jibara faced numerous opponents, including Christian scholars who championed progress, Christian clerics, and Muslim clerics. Against the first group, Jibara claimed that tasāhul, which is based on the idea of separating religion from the state and creating a society based on egalitarian citizenship (al-jamāʿa al-madaniyya) is not compatible with religion. He even argued that tasāhul has replaced religion as the foundation of social and political existence. He refers to the views of the proponents of tasahul using words like heresy. In his opinion, since religious ties are the strongest and deepest, harmonizing religions is the right approach to achieving tolerance and social peace (Jibara 1901, pp. 366–67). Prominent intellectuals who support the idea of tasāhul, such as the editors of the al-Muqtataf journal, Yaʿqub Sarruf, and Faris Nimr, as well as others such as Amin al-Rihani and Farah Antun, used his demonizing terminology to demonstrate the intolerance arising from his religious teachings. Antun stated that his teachings have the potential to generate never-ending debates about religious convictions, which renders them unproductive for society (al-Rihani 1901, pp. 541–43; Antun 1901, pp. 103–6). In his final years, Jibara faced the threat of expulsion from the Greek Orthodox Church and encountered opposition to being buried in an Orthodox Christian cemetery. However, his ideas were supported by some Muslim reformists. During his final days, he received financial assistance from Muhammad ʿAbduh. After his death, Rashid Rida praised him as a believer in monotheism and expressed confidence in the salvation of his soul (Rida 1901, pp. 479–80). As far as can be determined, the influence of Jibara’s ideas on later generations was limited compared to the broader influence of the philosophical and legal Islamic concepts.

4. The Islamic Legal Concept

The Islamic legal concept, similar to the theological concept, was formulated in opposition to the philosophical universalist concept. The theological and Islamic legal concepts are conservative responses to the philosophical concept. However, unlike the theological concept, the development of the Islamic legal concept aimed to renew and uphold the longstanding tradition of social and political relations in the Muslim empires, which was rooted in the Qurʾanic idea of the People of the Book (ahl al-kitāb).

The philosophical concept faced opposition from Muslim clerics. This group aimed to uphold the imperial order and hierarchical value system nurtured throughout Muslim history within Dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam). The relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims was traditionally governed by legal contracts that determined their social status and the level of tolerance towards them. Milka Levy-Rubin, who studied the contracts that formed the foundation of this tradition, argued that the nature of these contracts changed due to the evolving relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims. In the early years of Islamic rule, Muslim rulers were content with agreements that entailed surrender and the payment of the jizya tax. In return, these agreements allowed the communities to continue under Islamic rule while recognizing their right to maintain their religious traditions. With the increasing presence of Muslims and their settlement in these areas, the document known as the Shurut Umar (“Pact of Umar”) was written around the year 800 to replace the various contracts that had established these relations (Levy-Rubin 2011, pp. 113–14). The main purpose of this document is to maintain the dominance of shariʿa in the public sphere. It is worth noting that this model of tolerance existed in the cultures of the region that preceded Islam, including the Byzantine Empire. There, too, subjects who did not belong to the ruler’s religion were subjected to rules that enforced their inferior status in exchange for protection and limited autonomy in religious matters (Levy-Rubin 2011, pp. 113–14; Friedmann 2003, pp. 37–39).

In the context of the Ottoman Empire, certain religious groups and denominations that differed from the Sultan’s religion were acknowledged and granted a restricted level of self-governance. This autonomy was primarily expressed through administrating their religious affairs and appointing a prominent religious figure to represent their interests in Istanbul (Masters 2004; Tyler 2008, pp. 119–25). Karen Barkey argues that the social and religious inclusion model during this period exhibited three primary characteristics: segregation, inequality, and protection. These attributes were evident in the practices and norms that upheld the dominance of Islamic values and facilitated social separation through regulations governing public behavior. For instance, Christians and Jews were restricted to riding donkeys and mules, while Muslims were permitted to ride horses and camels. Additionally, non-Muslims were subjected to dress codes, restrictions on the height of their houses compared to those of Muslims, limitations on displaying religious symbols in public, and the prohibition of using bells. In exchange for adhering to these regulations, individuals belonging to these religious groups received protection (Barkey 2008, pp. 16, 119; Friedmann 2003, pp. 13–53). Despite the religious and legal nature of the concept, these regulations were not always upheld. Sometimes, they were revised, and, in other cases, they were disregarded. The implementation of these regulations was also influenced by various factors, such as personal relationships driven by self-interest, the policies of rulers, and proximity to urban centers where legal and religious norms were more familiar compared to rural areas, where social, familial, and tribal connections held more significant influence. These norms were associated with the comprehensive concept of siyāsa sharʿiyya, which advocated for the subordination of legal and political practices within the political entity to shariʿa (Barkey 2005, p. 9; Tyler 2008, p. 122). A significant turning point in the history of the Ottoman Empire came with the reforms, particularly with the decree of 1856, which explicitly acknowledged civil equality for non-Muslims. This step was a significant effort towards establishing a society based on recognizing the principles of individuality and civil tolerance. This policy changed under Abdul Hamid II, who adopted a conservative stance (Maoz 1968, p. 27; Hurewitz 1972, pp. 149–53).

The concept of tolerance that emerged within Islamic law during the nineteenth century aimed primarily at maintaining the hierarchical structure of the dhimma system and refining it rather than dismantling it. In this sense, it can be seen as a reformist ideology that sought to foster a more harmonious and inclusive relationship with non-Muslims. One of the earliest responses to the philosophical concept of tolerance came from the Egyptian scholar Rifa‘a Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi. In a text published in 1869, al-Tahtawi defends, on the one hand, the principle of tolerance and points out its importance, and on the other hand, requests to preserve the “ʿahd”, the pact or commitment with the non-Muslims. His dual approach is reflected in his attitude to concepts. In line with the supporters of the philosophical concept, he claims that the kings’ fanaticism (taʿaṣub) is an undesirable quality, as is their coercive interference in religious matters. Imposing authority can result in hypocrisy (nifāq) and suppression of freedom of choice. However, contrary to the philosophical concept, religious fanaticism can be desirable and even positive if its goal is the defense of religion. In this sense, jihad wars are desirable if their purpose is religious (strengthening religion and supporting it), not material (al-Tahtawi 1973, pp. 556–57).

The attitude towards tolerance is also reflected in al-Tahtawi’s selective approach in choosing his religious sources regarding inter-religious relations in an Islamic society. He cites a fatwā (a legal ruling in Islamic law) from the fourteenth-century scholar Siraj al-Din Umar al-Hanafi, who claims that non-Muslims should be treated within the framework of muʿāmalat (laws that govern relationships between individuals) in the same way that Muslims are treated. However, it is forbidden for a non-Muslim to build their house higher than the house of a Muslim if it causes damage, such as blocking light. Al-Tahtawi cites other legal scholars who allow the inclusion of dhimmis in the military under specific circumstances, such as when they need them or after their loyalty has been ensured. If this occurs, the ruler must handle them cautiously by segregating them within the army. In contrast to his more lenient stance on muʿāmalāt, al-Tahtawi asserts that it is prohibited to support the beliefs of non-Muslims or engage in religious activity with them (muwālā). According to the same principle, the rights to the religious and normative distinction of the dhimmis are derived from Islamic law, not their natural rights. Al-Tahtawi claims that every Muslim should adhere to the agreement (ʿahd), as it is a sacred commitment (al-Tahtawi 1973, p. 556).

Like tolerance, so is the character of the community. The image of the community that al-Tahtawi outlines does not consist of faceless citizens but of Muslims, Christians, and Jews who have a common denominator (the homeland) but also fundamental differences that stem from their religious affiliation. This feature challenges the creation of autonomous individuals with the right to choose their lifestyle. In such a context, religion, belief, and lifestyle are not a private matter, as the philosophical concept of tolerance suggests, but rather a religious and collective one.

The approach to maintaining the ʿahd tradition received support from Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh. In 1884, they published a critical essay on the philosophical concept of tolerance. They argued that the critics of taʿaṣub imitated European thinkers and were misled by false claims. In their opinion, the goal of this group’s claims is to weaken the morale of the Muslim community so that it becomes easy prey for colonialism. Like Jibara, Afghani and ʿAbduh designate the group that criticizes religious fanaticism “mutazandiqa” and “mufsidīn” (holding the views of heresy and corruption) (al-Afghani 2002, pp. 131–39).

In contrast to the negative perception of taʿaṣub, al-Afghani and Abduh argue that this concept has multiple meanings. Following al-Tahtawi, they distinguish between positive and desirable religious feelings and extreme and negative ones. The first meaning is necessary for maintaining social life and building civilization. Thus, the religious feeling of Islam was the force that lifted the Arabs from a state of savagery and propelled them to high levels of civilization (madaniyya). Additionally, compared to instances of extreme fanaticism in Christianity, such as the Crusades and the Inquisition, Islam has not exhibited the same level of fanaticism that has resulted in the murder and elimination of entire groups. Compared to the Christian case, throughout history, Muslims have upheld the “right of patronage” (haq al-dhimma) and given different religions their rights. According to their perspective, the allegations of religious discrimination against individuals of various faiths within the context of Islam are false claims. Since the inception of Islam, Muslims have not hindered individuals of different religious beliefs from progressing in various fields based on their abilities (al-Afghani 2002, pp. 131–39).

ʿAbduh expands on the ideas presented in the article and develops them into a more coherent doctrine. In his debate with Farah Antun in 1902–1903, he argued against separating religious authority from civil authority. According to him, this approach does not promote tolerance because even if the government mandates separation, the ruler cannot detach himself from his religion. “What good does separation if the king’s religion compels him to oppose science?” (ʿAbduh 1993, pp. 293–94). Furthermore, according to ʿAbduh, there is no form of theocracy in Islam because there is no middleman between the individual and God. The role of the clergy is restricted to providing advice and guidance (ʿAbduh 1993, p. 304). In this sense, the assertion that the division between religious and civil authority is necessary for tolerance and freedom is not applicable within the Islamic framework, as the Qurʾan permits unrestricted freedom of opinion and belief (ʿAbduh 1993, p. 264). He finds the proof of his arguments in the history of Islam, where groups considered “zanādiqa” (infidels) survived and still live with Muslims. Furthermore, he argues that politics, rather than religion, is what has caused civil wars within Islam (ʿAbduh 1993, pp. 265–67, 275).

There are various sources for the argument that the logic behind the philosophical concept of tolerance does not apply to the religion of Islam. Alongside many stances that developed in the Islamic context and supported the argument for a special relationship between religion and state in Islam, a source for this claim can also be found in the Enlightenment tradition. Locke also believed that the separation of civil and religious authority was unique to the Christian case. In contrast to the Christian theocratic case, Locke presented a distinct perspective on the Jewish state and Judaism as a religion governed by religious law. He asserted that in the Jewish state that was theoretically established by Moses, religious law and civil law were identical, thereby making religious law legally binding. In this context, Locke connected the granting of civil rights to religious conversion and justified the expulsion of non-Jewish groups from Canaan based on the prohibition of idolatry in the law. Given that Islam is a religion that adheres to religious laws, it is likely that Locke held a similar perspective on Islam.

Furthermore, ʿAbduh developed a political notion that draws from the siyāsa sharʿiyya and aligns with the reasoning presented by Locke. According to ʿAbduh’s view, the ruler (the sultan or caliph) who is committed to implementing Islamic law is a civil ruler. The new theorization that ʿAbduh makes between the religious and the civil is a new connection that seeks to renew the traditional doctrine of siyāsa sharʿiyya and employ it to challenge the philosophical concept. In the same spirit, ʿAbduh claims apologetically that the jihad wars did not take place to impose religion but rather to defend Muslims against aggression. Furthermore, the payment of jizya protected the existence of non-Muslim groups under Islamic rule (ʿAbduh 1993, pp. 307–11).

Nilüfer Göle emphasized the importance of identity politics in interpreting the position of Islamists in general toward social and political issues. The discussion surrounding identity plays a significant role in shaping the arguments against the philosophical concept of tolerance. From this perspective, supporters of the Islamic legal concept have two objectives: to redirect attention away from the West as a dominant force and to break down the hierarchical relationship between Islam and the West in the narrative of global history. This focus on the marginalized status of Islam with the Western center and examining identity-related questions resembles contemporary movements like feminism. Just as feminism challenges the universal concept of “man”, ʿAbduh rejects assimilation into the universal categories and emphasizes the importance of Islamic distinctiveness (Göle 1998, pp. 53–70).11 In addition to considering identity politics, it is essential to acknowledge the differences these reformists bring that stem from their holistic understanding of the Islamic legal traditions as a source for establishing a concept of justice, lifestyle, and path to salvation.

5. Epilog

Gabriel Motzkin argued that “periods of transition are in practice conceived more in terms of continuity with either the preceding period or the subsequent period” (Motzkin 2005, pp. 145–58). Retrospectively, tasāhul, tasāmuḥ, and tamaddun are more of a case of continuity with the past. This terminology and the partial content of secularity it represented seem, for the political lexicon of the twentieth century, outdated, vague, and hence require interpretation. The unique terminology of tolerance as a political principle was transformed and reshaped in the twentieth century by the term ʿalmāniyya, which represents a case of discontinuity with the past. This distinctiveness justifies the unique nature of the Sattelzeit as a period of transition that is connected to the previous and subsequent periods.

In contrast to the prevalent understanding of secularism and secularity as a coherent concept, historical conceptual analysis reveals their varying characteristics, non-monolithic nature, and the diverse motivations that underpin them. Before tolerance became associated and integrated with modern ideologies such as secularism, democracy, and nationalism, discussions about tolerance were linked to social and political values such as civil equality, freedom of conscience, the neutrality of religion in the public sphere, and optimism about the future. These discussions were influenced by various factors that were not always directly related to religious and ethnic relations in the Ottoman Empire. The discussion on tolerance emerged in response to the universal aspects of the Enlightenment, the desire to promote particular worldviews and concepts of justice, and the changing expectations of religious minorities who sought integration and voiced their opposition to feeling alienated. It also arose as a response to the hierarchical social and religious orders and the ambition to cultivate a modern subject who is free from traditional limitations. The competition, debates, and ideological conflicts surrounding the understanding of tolerance reflect a historical narrative characterized by disagreements between those advocating for an egalitarian society and a free civil space where individuals can exist autonomously and those influenced by hierarchical political and religious traditions. The changes in societal expectations influenced perceptions of religion and proposed new forms of religiosity.

The development of the three concepts of tolerance occurred within the framework of the Arabic Sattelzeit, yet they exhibit both synchronic and diachronic influences. The philosophical aspect draws from Enlightenment thought as well as from medieval Arabic rationalist traditions. The theological dimension is shaped by the principle of equality among believers, while the legal aspect represents the renewal and reformulation of medieval Islamic legal traditions alongside inherited practices of hierarchical tolerance. The interaction among these three concepts is reflected in the contested interpretations of the term “civil” (madanī), which was used as a marker of the Arabic Sattelzeit.12 Advocates of the philosophical concept of tolerance sought to address the equality and integration of non-Muslims through a universal approach based on civil rights. In the theological concept, this issue is addressed by proposing a change in belief and doctrine (religious reform). On the other hand, the Islamic legal concept disregards this issue and emphasizes the significance of the Muslim subjects and their history in the global historical narrative. It is evident that factors such as religious affiliation, educational background, and geography influenced opinions. The philosophical concept was supported by Christians and Syrians, while the Islamic legal concept included Muslim clerics from various regions. In all cases, there was a competition to define the meaning of “civil”. The first group defined it by excluding the religious (dīnī), whereas in theological and Islamic legal concepts, “civil” is considered part of religion. In line with this reasoning, these methods established different models of the public sphere, citizenship, and political culture. The early twentieth-century use of ʿalmāniyya as equivalent to secularism was an attempt to give this conceptual contestation a particular ideological interpretation that excluded the Islamic–legal and –theological interpretations. The term ʿalmāniyya has transformed into a collective singular, providing Arabic speakers with a new way to imagine all aspects of life free from the constraints of religion, encapsulated in a single word.

The revolutionary aspect of the philosophical concept lies in the connection established between tolerance, civil equality, and the privatization of religion. This concept ensures that civil equality, social tolerance, and individual freedom are upheld through rational and utilitarian relationships that exclude religion through the process of privatization. On the other hand, supporters of the legal Islamic concept do not acknowledge the existence of inequality with non-Muslims, intolerance, or suppression of freedom. Unlike the other two concepts, the theological and the philosophical, the idea of equality with non-believers does not appeal to the adherents of the legal concept. However, both the theological and Islamic legal concepts share similarities. They both view the separation of religion from law and the principle of rights as a threat to religion and society. They also believe that the concept of tolerance and freedom of belief undermines the sacred bonds of the community. This last subject is seen as essential not only for social peace but also for religious salvation. The tolerance that emerges from these ideas is not rooted in individualism but rather in the sense of belonging to a specific group.

The concepts that were explored in the article were not the only concepts of tolerance that developed in the nineteenth century. The three investigated concepts are merely prototypes of the forms of tolerance that developed within the ideological context of the twentieth century.