Attitudes of Jewish and Muslim Religious Leaders Towards the Declaration of Principles as a Test Case for Judaism and Islam between Peace and Conflict

Abstract

The Declaration of Principles (Oslo I Accord, September 1993) was the inaugural groundbreaking agreement in the Israeli‒Palestinian Identity conflict, which revolves around consecrated territory as well as identity components on both sides. This historic accord elicited myriad responses, yet the stances of religious figures are particularly consequential given the profound and intricate religious underpinnings of the conflict. This paper presents the attitudes toward the Declaration of Principles (DOP) held by six religious personages: Rabbi Yehuda Amital, an Israeli Jew supporter of the DOP; Rabbi Shlomo Goren, an Israeli Jew who opposed it; Sheikh Abdullah Nimer Darwish, an Israeli Arab who endorses the DOP; Sheikh Raed Salah, an Israeli Arab who rejects it; Sheikh ʿImad al-Falouji, a Palestinian proponent; and Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a Palestinian opponent. Based on rulings, statements, and press publications, this paper analyzes their rationales and utilization of religion’s social influencing mechanisms, seeking to understand religion’s capacity to confer legitimacy upon alternative religious values enabling conflict resolution through political means, thereby impacting the conflict toward reconciliation or, conversely, escalation. This paper aims to characterize the discourse and reasoning to propose more efficacious means of attaining broad religious legitimacy for future, sustainable peace accords.

1. Introduction

Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed a historic agreement on 13 September 1993, known as the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” (DOP for short or, later, “Oslo Accord I”). It stipulated an interim period of five years before the parties would reach a permanent settlement based on the principle of “land for peace”. During this interim period, Israel would withdraw from Jericho and the Gaza Strip, with Palestinians establishing an autonomous authority. The DOP focused on practical issues, intentionally leaving the roots of the conflict in religion and identity and substantive issues including Jerusalem, refugees, and borders for future discussion. This constructive ambiguity left significant gaps to be bridged, and the seeds of destruction were within the agreement from the start (Knesset Research and Information Center 1993; Hirschfeld 2000, pp. 277–79; Karsh 2003, pp. 7–26; Shillon 2017, pp. 15, 41–44; Peres 1993, pp. 73–92; Maoz and Russett 2017, p. 25; Feldman 2009, p. 17; Rynhold 2008, pp. 2–26).

The Israeli‒Palestinian conflict is an example of “identity conflict” as it is termed in the research: A conflict that incorporates objective dimensions like territory and subjective factors, primarily those of rival identities informed by history, culture, and religion. Identity conflicts tend to be bloodier and more protracted, as well as being perceived as zero-sum ones. To resolve such complex conflicts, both sides need to profoundly modify their perception of their own identities in a way that enables coexistence (Abu-Nimer 1999, pp. 11–13; Bar-Tal 2000, pp. 351–65; Bar-Tal et al. 2020, pp. 23–120; Bar-Tal and Raviv 2021, pp. 13–109; Gopin 2002, pp. 3–6, 58–90; Handelman 2011, pp. 3–24; Kelman 2007, pp. 287–303; Melchior 2015, pp. 1–9; Scheffler 2007, pp. 173–87; Smock 2010, pp. xvi–xix; Waxman 2014, pp. 133–56). Religion is a factor in identity conflicts, for better or worse, given its four social dimensions: Creating a worldview that guides believers’ understanding of reality; establishing laws and norms of behavior that direct believers’ actions; lending legitimacy to certain institutions or actions, even non-religious ones, such as whether a government or certain of its decisions are acceptable; and uniting people in a broad collective (Bar-Tal 2000, pp. 351–65; Fox 1999, pp. 431–63; Landau 2003, pp. 3–12; Melchior 2015, pp. 1–9; Scheffler 2007, pp. 173–87; Smock 2010, pp. xvi–xix; Waxman 2014, pp. 133–56). Religion can change the direction of a conflict through the inherent ambiguities in monotheistic religions on issues that combine laws and values. These arise from different and even contradictory sources and commandments and the existence of a flexible space for interpretation, thus allowing a religious grounding for almost any view. These religious ambiguities can foster reconciliation and lend legitimacy to activities for and figures engaged in peacemaking between conflicting societies (Appleby 2000; Eisen 2011; Nardin 1996).

Religion is particularly significant for the Israeli‒Palestinian conflict for several reasons. Firstly, it is a conflict over territory considered sacred to both religions, meaning political discourse in both communities is imbricated with religious values and symbols related to the land, its sanctity, the struggle for it, and the historical national ethos. Secondly, identity, nationality, and the connection with territory in both Judaism and Islam are largely based on religion and its derivatives, tradition, and cultural heritage, which also influence the identity of those who do not define themselves as believers. Thirdly, the two communities are each backed by their respective faith’s external forces, which can be mobilized to intervene in the conflict on religious grounds. Finally, there are radical groups willing to use violence to thwart any possibility of infringing its religious principles on the conflict. While such groups do exist on both sides, they are predominantly on the Palestinian rather than on the Israeli side. Given all of this, religious values and beliefs, whether genuinely expressed or exploited for propaganda purposes, can be a formidable barrier to any negotiation, a “religious barrier to peace” as it is termed in the literature (Abu-Nimer 2004, pp. 491–511; Appleby 2000; Ashmore et al. 2001, pp. 17–41, 187–212; Frisch 2005, pp. 321–36; Frisch and Sandler 2004, pp. 77–96; Funk and Said 2009; Gopin 2002; Hancock and Weiss 2011, pp. 427–52; Kelman 2007; Khan 2010, pp. 51–55; Liebman 1995, pp. 6–8; Melchior 2015, pp. 1–9; Paz 1992, pp. 46–65; Reiter 2008; 2010, pp. 294–324; Rosen 2005, pp. 55–59; Scheffler 2007, pp. 173–87).

A salient religious barrier to peace in the discourse around the DOP has been the sanctity of the land. There are special commandments in Judaism that relate to settling on land and prohibit abandoning it to the nations (Deuteronomy 7:2; Nachmanides Hassagot, 4; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah—Melachim uMilhamoteyhem (Kings and Wars), 5:12, 7:4,15, Avodah Zarah (Idolatry) 10:4–6; Joseph Karo, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 329:6; Joseph Babad, Minchat Chinuch 425; Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz, Chazon Ish, on Eruvin 114a). In Islam too, Palestine has a special legal status as waqf land, which means its ownership cannot be transferred (Badir 2020c; Reiter 2006, pp. 173–97). The theological sanctity of the land in both Judaism (Mellamed 2005) and Islam (Bartal 2021, pp. 392–408; Reiter 2006, pp. 173–97; Bartal and Rubinstein-Shemer 2018) deems it holy, blesssed, and God’s gift to the chosen people. There is also the importance of human life. In Judaism, this is expressed through the principle of pikuach nefesh (saving a life, mainly Jewish ones), which overrides almost all other commandments. The unique aspect of pikuach nefesh is how it depends on an assessment of reality, meaning it can be used to justify opposite views (Talmud, Sanhedrin 74a, Yoma 85a; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah—Yesodei ha-Torah (“Foundations of the Torah”) 5:1, Shabbat 2:3; Joseph Karo, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 329:1). In Islam, the importance of human life is reflected in it being one of the conditions allowing the signing of a peace treaty (hudna) when Muslims are militarily inferior, relying on the precedent of the Prophet Muhammad signing the Treaty of Al-Hudaybiya with the Quraysh in 628 CE when he was militarily and numerically weaker1 (Adlan 2021; Al-Qaradawi 2009; Badir 2020c; Herrera and Kressel 2009, pp. 94–97; Jackson 2012, pp. 1–26; Kelsay 2016, pp. 374–83; Khadduri 1955, pp. 51–133; Reiter 2008, pp. 14–57). On the Muslim side there is the principle of jihād, which, practically, has meant throughout most of Muslim history a holy war to impose Islam on the rest of the world, which is also an important factor here. In the light of modern realities and international law, there is a broad agreement that jihād is an ideological-cultural struggle, except in the one place in which it remained an armed struggle—Palestine, which was under Muslim rule until its inhabitants were dispossessed of their land—and therefore defined as Dar al- Ḥarb, the place of the war (Adlan 2021; Al-Qaradawi 2009; Badir 2020c; Herrera and Kressel 2009, pp. 86–91, 96, 171–90; Kelsay 2016, pp. 374–83; Khadduri 1955, pp. 51–133; Jackson 2012, pp. 1–26; Reiter 2008, pp. 29–57, 108–23; Sarsour 2013). These religious issues at the heart of disputes over the DOP, coupled with political and security issues, created a situation where each side felt it was a victim of the process. Thus, one of the most basic conditions for a successful peace process was not met: The understanding on both sides that peace trumps violence (Hancock and Weiss 2011, pp. 427–52; Hassassian 2002, pp. 114–32; Kelman 2007, pp. 287–303; Shillon 2017, pp. 260–69, 286; Smooha 1998, pp. 26–45).

This paper examines the role of religion concerning peace and conflict around the DOP by examining the positions on the theological and religious-moral aspects of the agreement held by six prominent religious leaders who address the theological, legal, and religio-ethical aspects of the agreement. To delineate the boundaries of this article and distinguish it from significant research on pan-Islamic figures such as Sheikh Qaradawi and Mufti Ibn Baz, the following leaders were selected from groups at the heart of the conflict: Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs’ Muslims, and Palestinian Muslims. From each group, two representative religious figures were chosen—one supporting the agreement and one opposing it—totaling six. Emphasis was placed on selecting figures less frequently studied (at least regarding their stance on the DOP) and those presenting an ethical perspective rather than solely a legal one. Thus, Rabbi Amital, an important Zionist-religious head of Yeshiva, educator, public figure, and political activist, was chosen to represent the Israeli Zionist religious opinion supporting the agreement, rather than the influential Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, whose almost exclusively halakhic-legal perspective has already been analyzed in several studies. Alongside him, Rabbi Goren, who actively opposed ‘land for peace’, is considered a prominent, well-known, and influential figure in both general and religious Israeli society, justifying the examination of his position as representative of the opposing view. These two figures come from the Zionist-religious sector, which sees religious value in settling throughout the Land of Israel and in the sovereignty of the State of Israel, in contrast to the Haredi sector, which refrains from engaging in these issues and therefore does not provide a source for extensive arguments in this field beyond the halakhic aspect. The prominent and influential religious factor in the Israeli Arab public is the Islamic Movement in Israel. Therefore, two of its senior members, Shaykh Darwish and Shaykh Salah, who later became leaders of its two rival factions, were chosen to represent the Israeli Arab religious public’s opinion towards the DOP, with its religious and identity complexities. In Palestinian society, while the PLO is a dominant but secular factor, Hamas is a prominent and influential religious one. Therefore, the organization was chosen as a source for religious attitudes towards the DOP. Its founder and leader, Shaykh Yassin, staunchly opposes the agreement, while Shaykh al-Falouji, one of its senior members, a religious ideologue and a political and organizational leader, views the reality differently. These leaders constitute a fitting representation of the parties at the eye of the storm, presenting a variety of religious opinions and arguments on the issue. The analysis is based on religious rulings and articles published by these figures, as well as excerpts from newspaper reports from the relevant period, all concerning the political arena within which they operated.

2. The National-Religious Sector: Between Sanctities of Land and People

2.1. Rabbi Yehuda Amital

Rabbi Yehuda Amital (born Romania 1924, died Israel 2010) was an influential thinker, head of the Har Etzion Yeshiva, founder of the politically moderate, religious Zionist Meimad Party, and a minister in the twenty-sixth government of Israel (Reichner 2011, pp. 5–35, 50–70, 175–210, 223–45.). In his public, educational, and political activities, he adhered to two fundamental principles. The first was “to heed the cry of a child”, an expression based on a Hasidic tale that means a believing Jew should engage in activity to assist the general public when required. The second is kiddush hashem, the sanctification of God’s name, being any action that promotes Judaism. A sincere expounder and practitioner of his views, Amital heeded the cry of the child in his public and educational activities by opposing what he saw as “desecrations of God’s name,” matters that undermined Judaism, even if this meant battling accepted rabbinical opinions (Amital 2018, p. 149; 1996). This thinking shaped his attitude toward the DOP.

When the Oslo agreement became known, Rabbi Amital and Dr. Yehuda Ben-Meir, his partner in the leadership of Meimad, met on 22 September 1993 with the Labor leader Yitzhak Rabin, who they supported during the 1992 election. After that, Meimad publicly lauded his government for their “brave and heavily onerous decision” to sign an agreement “opening up a real opportunity for peace and the prevention of bloodshed” (Reichner 2011, pp. 193–207). This supportive statement was the first issued from within the national-religious community, but it emphasized that there were promises that no harm would come to the settlements, no Palestinian state would be established, and no negotiations would take place over Jerusalem’s status. Rabbi Amital support was based on halachic arguments similar to those made by Rabbi Ovadia Yosef in his famous speech accepting territorial concessions for peace, which have been extensively researched and need not be elaborated on here (Yosef 1980; Schuz 2021, pp. 19–20, 23–35). The innovation in Amital’s position was the predominantly moral and ethical arguments he used for it.

One article that Amital published in October 1993 clearly and systematically expressed his moral and ethical views regarding the DOP (Amital 1993a, p. 42). It opens with an inspiring quotation of Maimonides: “Great is peace, for the Torah was given to make peace in the world” (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah Zemanim: Hanukah u-Megillah (Times: Hanukkah and Purim), 4:14), but is immediately followed by this assertion: “This issue did not lead me to support the agreement…I am far from being carried away by the visionaries” (Amital 1993a, p. 42). Amital’s primary rationale is based on realpolitik: The agreement is a fait accompli, meaning, in his word to Ben-Meir:

“[I]t is our duty to ensure that the problems arising from the DOP are addressed and to care for the Jewish settlements, but we must convey to the government that the leadership in Judea and Samaria is interested in reaching an understanding within the existing situation”.

(Reichner 2011, p. 204)

That is, the interest of the right wing—which for security and/or ideological reasons supports settlements and sovereignty throughout the country and is reluctant to compromise with the Palestinians—is to join with the government to take advantage of the interim period and Israel’s position of power to create a permanent agreement that will guarantee important principles such as “our consolidation in the area and the setting of security boundaries” (Amital 1993a, p. 45). Amital also states that “time is not working solely in our favor…and any political agreement between Israel and the Arabs must involve painful compromise” (Ibid). Therefore, an agreement at that point, with Israel in a position of strength, was preferable to a future one against a more extreme enemy, after the loss of many lives, which will include even harder concessions of the holy Land (Reichner 2011, p. 203).

On a deeper level, the agreement is support-worthy because it constitutes a test of values. The classic national-religious outlook is based on three interrelated central concepts: The Torah of Israel, the People of Israel, and the Land of Israel. The Gush Emunim movement, the dominant force in religious Zionism from the early 1970s, emphasized ‘the Land of Israel’ out of a belief that the messianic destiny of the Jewish people would come about through settlement throughout the Holy Land, even if some of the Israel public opposed that. Contrary to that and also the publicly expressed views of most rabbis, Amital primarily emphasized ‘the People of Israel’ concept, based on the belief that redemption would come from “a more just society…[and] moral values in individual and communal life” (Amital 1996), realizing the destiny of the Jewish people as a light unto the nations (Israel State Archives 1995, pp. 3–14, 93; Bazak 1995; Inbari 2012, pp. 75–79; 2009, pp. 303–25; Reichner 2011, pp. 143–74;). Even when the DOP brought the conceptual debate down to the practical level, Amital continued to uphold the key concept of the “People of Israel.” For him, this concept had three dimensions, all of which were jeopardized by Israel’s contemporary reality of constant struggle. The first is the preservation of human life. As he said as early as 1978: “Can peace be a gamble?… The danger that Israel could face [for its internal security] is a gamble!” (Reichner 2011, p. 145). The second is the belief in basic Zionist tenets threatened by the struggles in which Israel is engaged:

Every casualty…weakens the Zionist devotion of masses of Jews in the Land of Israel, who believe in the accepted Zionist ideology that Zionism came to solve the problem of Jewish existence. Every war plants doubts in them about the righteousness of the path.

(Amital 1982)

Finally, there is the place of Judaism in Israeli society, which is harmed by the links between religion and tradition on the one hand and militancy and opposition to peace on the other. Amital argued that the unwillingness of the national-religious public to compromise on the ideals of settlements, despite the risks involved, harmed “the very ability to identify with this perception” in Israeli society and, more seriously, “the very ability to identify with the way of the Torah” (Amital 1993b), the salient aspect of this ideal.

In another article, Amital described how “for years I have made every effort to prevent an identification between ‘the opinion of the Torah’ and political extremism…to clarify that there are different opinions in religious Judaism” (Ibid). This issue was close to his heart because such a false association between political extremism and the Torah was a ‘desecration of God’s name’ and undermined the influence of the Jewish tradition on the Israeli public and, thus, Israel’s ability to be a light unto the nations (Bazak 1995, pp. 56–58). The DOP could remove the threat to all three central concepts and so was support-worthy.

From all of this, we see that Amital supported the DOP for practical and sober reasons out of a desire to preserve Jewish lives and Judaic unity based on renowned halachic sources that resolve the apparent prohibitions against ceding land to gentiles in certain situations. His support relied on exploiting religious ambiguity to emphasize alternative sacred notions, primarily that of the People of Israel, over the accepted idea of the sanctity of the land that constituted a barrier to peace. That said, he focused on his community and its needs while upholding the inequality between the two sides and emphasized support for the agreement as a means to secure the interests of Israel and settlement, something the Palestinians feared most and which was the chief argument against the agreement on their side. Although Amital placed importance on peace as a religious value, he states that there is no connection between this and his support for the agreement, which remained practical in character and had a religious-moral dimension arguably not substantial enough to foster religious reconciliation based on the political agreement.

2.2. Rabbi Shlomo Goren

One of the prominent voices for the value of the sanctity of the Land of Israel at that time was Major general (Res.) Rabbi Shlomo Goren (born Poland 1918, died Israel 1995), the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s first Chief Rabbi and the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel, a combatant in Israel’s wars and an important and pioneering halachic authority on issues of religion and state (Goren 2013, pp. 21–114; Mishlov 2010, pp. 4–12; Hollander 2013, pp. v–vii). The Israeli battle victories in 1967, in which he participated, led him to believe that the State of Israel is the beginning of the redemption process—“the first growth of our redemption”, as it is called in religious Zionist circles—and aroused expectations in him of a “religious and national spiritual upheaval” (Goren 1992, p. 5). However, the years that followed ushered in Western-style materialism, religion-state conflicts, and the trauma of the Yom Kippur War, leading him to declare: “There was a time when even the state was sacred in my eyes,” but that was no longer the case. What was the breaking point for him was the Oslo Process: “Since the agreement, I no longer see it that way…because they are dividing it in two and handing it over to the gentiles” (Quotes from Kadmon 1993; Hollander 2013, pp. v–xxxiv; Mishlov 2010, pp. 68–116; 2012, pp. 81–106).

There were three main reasons for Goren’s staunch opposition to the DOP. Firstly, there was his view of the sanctity of the Land of Israel. Apart from the halachic prohibitions on transferring territories over to Palestinian control, such as the prohibition of lo techonem (“Do not allow them to thrive”), and its contradiction of the commandment to settle the land (Goren 1994, pp. 11–22; 1996, pp. 130–39, 152–58; Rabbi Goren’s Archive 1993–1994a, pp. 58–60, 68–70), Goren argued that the Jewish people’s connection with God had always been inseparable from that with the Land of Israel and that, therefore, “[t]he Land of Israel [is] the soul of faith…Compromise on the wholeness of our Holy Land…constitutes an injury to the wholeness of the Torah and the Jewish faith” (Goren 1980, pp. 144–47; 1996, pp. 130–39, 152–58).2 Secondly, the principle of pikuach nefesh (saving a life, mainly Jewish ones) was key for Goren, since Israel was battling an enemy whose goal was to remove Jews from the land. This made the struggle a milchemet mitzvah (obligatory war) that overrode pikuach nefesh. In other words, it is not only permissible to retain control over territories, despite the potential risk to human life, but the risk posed by relinquishing territories in exchange for empty promises is far greater. Goren’s view was that “experience proves that terror against us will never cease as long as Israel exists” (Rabbi Goren’s Archive 1993–1994b, p. 27). In fact, withdrawal from territories would erode Israel’s security, terrorism, and even lead to war:

All our achievements in the Six-Day War are slipping from our grasp…Under the guise of peace with the arch-murderers, terror against us will intensify…until, eventually, a war breaks out between us and the Palestinian state that will be established.

(Goren 1996, p. 134)

Therefore, the agreement is invalid and unnecessary “as long as we remain strong in spirit and power” (Goren 1980, p. 147; 1994, p. 17).

The third argument relates to that same strong spirit. Like Amital, Goren identifies an erosion of the Zionist and Jewish spirit within Israeli society, though the manifestations of it he points to were fundamentally different. For Goren, the DOP encapsulated the ultimate expression of this degeneration. The loss of the Zionist spirit was primarily reflected in the perilous recognition of Palestinian national claims, particularly by leaders within Israel, which is “a Jewish state in the Land of Israel…and not a state of Israelis and Palestinians who never had any national rights in the land” (Rabbi Goren’s Archive 1993–1994b, p. 26. Also, Rabbi Goren’s Archive 1993–1994c, pp. 1–10; Goren 1996, pp. 150–58). Another expression of this was Israeli willingness to grant Israeli Arabs power within the Jewish state, with the government supported by Arab Knesset members “willing to lend a hand in the destruction of the state” (Rabbi Goren’s Archive 1993–1994a, pp. 53–58. Also p. 70). Moreover, he argued that this was halachically inadmissible and that, therefore “the current government operates only by virtue of a minority of the people and loses its authority” (Rabbi Goren’s Archive 1993–1994a, p. 70). Finally, Israel and its leaders were granting power and international legitimacy to their worst enemies:

Everything we have acquired over nearly 100 years of Zionism in the Land of Israel is being undone before our eyes. And this is not the achievement of our enemies, but rather the Jews are undermining our rights and security in our homeland with their own hands…We have imposed terrorist organizations upon ourselves and have rebuilt the image of the arch-murderer who had already been eliminated in the world…who on one hand ostensibly signs a peace agreement with us, and on the other…declares morning and night that without a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, there will never be peace with Israel.

(Rabbi Goren’s Archive 1993–1994b, p. 26)

The halachic problems with the DOP, along with its underlying moral flaws, led Goren to an unequivocal conclusion:

The covenant the government has made with the head of the PLO terrorist organization blatantly contradicts the Torah of Moses our teacher…Every Torah-observant Jew is obligated to protest and demonstrate against these serious violations of the Torah of Israel by the Government of Israel.

(Rabbi Goren’s Archive 1993–1994b, pp. 50–51)

Thus, Goren vehemently opposed the agreement, used religious practices that preserve the conflict, and even strengthened it by insisting on accepted religious principles that constitute a pretext for peace, foremost the sanctity of the land, while making the sanctity of the people and human life a means to that end. He demonized the Palestinian and Israeli Arab other to uphold boundaries and distance between communities; and denied legitimacy to the government and its actions in the peace process. Despite his willingness to sometimes bend the principle of the land’s sanctity, he saw the DOP as the surrender of holy and strategically important territories, undermining Jewish law and Israel’s Jewish and Zionist resilience in exchange for dubious verbal promises.

3. The Islamic Movement in Israel: Between Recognition and Segregation

Israeli Arabs’ encounters with those of the Territories after 1967 revived Muslim Brotherhood (MB)-inspired ideas promoted by young graduates of religious study centers in the Territories. This led to the founding of the Islamic Movement (IM) in Israel in 1971. After a brief initial phase of terrorist acts and consequent arrests, the movement shifted its focus to extensive religious, community, and municipal-level political activities. The IM’s goal is to establish “a society of Muslim believers in Islam as the source of strength and the future…[and] a modern society but one that has values based on ideology” (A quotation from Ibrahim Sarsour, in Madar 2003). It also aims to help the Arab community care for its own needs, which Israel does not sufficiently provide. The IM’s continued existence has always been challenging as an Islamic movement, in an area that was once part of the Muslim world, in a country under Jewish-majority rule. Differing views on how to square ideology with reality created a rift within it into two factions in 1996 over whether to participate in Knesset elections. Both factions3 see Israel as an illegitimate Jewish nation-state, for three main reasons: Judaism is a religion not a nation that need his own country; Israel cannot claim to rule over Palestine because the holy relation between the Children of Israel and the Land of Israel expired after the acceptance of Islam; and Palestine is part of Dār al-Islām and also waqf land. However, they differ on how they should act on these principles in practice and, hence, have taken different views on the DOP (Aburiya 2004; 2005, pp. 684–86; Al-Jazeera 2017; Ali 2004, pp. 132–64; 2006, pp. 18–21; 2018, pp. 62–78; Awawda 2010; Darwish 1993, 2021, pp. 117–35; Hatina and Al-Atawna 2018, pp. 18–24; Kedar 2011, pp. 117–23; Mustafa and Ghanem 2018, pp. 49–60; Rekhess 2011, pp. 63–73; Rudnitzky 2015, pp. 64–80; Sarsour 2005, pp. 242–49).

3.1. Shaykh Abdullah Nimer Darwish

Shaykh Abdullah Nimer Darwish (born Kafr Qasim 1994, died 2017) was an IM founder and its head until the 1996 split, when he became the leader of the Southern Faction. This is the more moderate of the two factions and is active in national politics through the United Arab List. Darwish and his students view the sharīʿa as pragmatically adaptable to complex realities:

Islamic jurisprudence has flexibility… Islam is built on principles suitable for situations of peace and war, strength, and weakness…We will not behave as if we live in the awaited era of the Mahdī, but rather live in our time, in accordance with the forces and powers that influence the management of the world.

(Badir 2020e)

The Southern Faction recognizes that Muslim citizens of Israel are a weak minority and acts accordingly. It distinguishes between the religious-historical right of the Jews over the Land of Israel which, in their view, does not exist, and the de facto rights resulting from reality. Since Israel exists and Muslims live within it, Israel and its Jewish character must be recognized as facts and Muslims must operate within it by all means to achieve the supreme Islamic goals: Preserving the identity and faith of Muslims and improving their lives. Darwish has stated that “I have no conflict…neither religious nor national, with upholding the law…Precisely because we are a minority we have an interest, because who will protect the minority if not the law?” (Koteret Rashit 1988). It is important to emphasize that this recognition is limited solely to within the Green Line, since beyond it, in the words of Darwish, “it is an occupation that must be eliminated…Therefore, I understand the Palestinians…who rebel in every way” (Abramov 2001). Thus, a certain recognition of the state allows for discussing agreements it makes.

Darwish publicly expressed support for the DOP on various occasions, emphasizing that it should lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital because it is in the best interests of the Palestinian people in current conditions:

The rules of Islamic jurisprudence are divided into the fixed principles of faith (aḥkām thābita) and legal rulings subject to interpretation (aḥkām ijtihādiya) … Is the Palestinian issue part of the principles of faith?… Faith, humanity, and homeland are presented before us. For the sake of faith, there is a willingness to sacrifice human life and for the sake of human wholeness, security, and stability, the homeland may accommodate more than one people.

(Jaber 1994, pp. 14–18)

His main argument was that compromise is necessary to preserve human life: “The entire Land of Israel, like Palestine from the River to the Sea, will bring both peoples to the battlefield. Whoever wants peace must cast dreams aside and compromise” (Ali 2004, p. 137). Although all of Palestine is considered waqf, it is preferable for part of it to be under Islamic rule rather than all of it under Jewish rule. In such a situation, neither side will have all their wishes granted, but enough for peace:

God has decreed that the two peoples live together. The Jews have an independent state, the Palestinians too are entitled to a state…Between the two neighboring states, there will be a peace agreement and, after all the suffering, I believe that both sides will respect the agreement.

(Quote from Landress 1987, p. 12. See also Aburiya 2005, pp. 690–92; Ali 2004, pp. 150–57; Daoud 2016, pp. 20–32; Mustafa 2011, p. 54; Rekhess 1997, pp. 9–21; 2000, pp. 185–290; Roth 2021, pp. 43–83; Rubin 2014)

Darwish is aware that important muftīs in the Muslim World oppose his views, which contradict the accepted view of the sharīʿa. This accepted view is based on Quran 8:61 (“And if they incline to peace, then incline to it [also] and rely upon Allah”)4 and on the peace treaties Muhammad made with Quraysh in al-Hudaybiya and subsequently with other tribes indicating that a peace agreement with the enemy is permissible as long as the Muslim ruler finds it beneficial. In Darwish’s view, the ultimate say regarding matters of the Palestinians and the Arab citizens of Israel rests with them alone, since they see the realities there clearly and face any direct consequences. In his opinion, the benefit of the agreement for Palestinians is clear since they are in an inferior position and since it gives them a certain autonomy and international recognition (Badir 2020b). This approach is redolent of the relatively new fiqh al-aqalliyāt (jurisprudence of the minorities) developed by Shaykh al-Qaradawi’s school, which deals with special laws tailored to Muslim minorities in Western democratic countries. Darwish and his successors in the Southern Faction believe that even concerning Arab citizens of Israel and Palestinians there is great permissible flexibility to depart from the accepted rulings to achieve the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa (the intentions of the sharīʿa), despite the fact that Qaradawi, according to the prevailing sharīʿa view, did not deem fiqh al-aqalliyāt as relevant to the Israeli Arabs, due to the definition of Israel as Dar al- Ḥarb (Aburiya 2005, pp. 682–98; Al-Atawneh and Hatina 2019, pp. 115–18; Al-Qaradawi 2001, pp. 5–8; 2003, pp. 492–95; Ali 2006, pp. 19–20; Badir 2020d, 2021; Bartal and Rubinstein-Shemer 2018, pp. 128–30; Ghanem and Ozacky-Lazar 2002, pp. 268–72; Mansour 2021; Mustafa 2011, pp. 99–115; Mustafa and Ghanem 2018, p. 59; Rubinstein-Shemer 2022; Rudnitzky 2011, p. 91; 2015, pp. 64–80; Zahalka 2016, pp. 173–88; Shaham 2020, pp. 435–50; Shavit 2011, pp. 21–26; 2015, pp. 127–29; Zahalka 2018, pp. 197–201).

The third rationale Darwish presents is groundbreaking: A principled moral position is that “cultural dialogue is the approach of the strong” (Darwish 1992) and this is germane to the Palestinian struggle. Moreover, he seeks “a religious dialogue that contributes to true peace between Palestinians and Israelis” (Badir 2020a) to prevent Islam being perceived as an obstacle to peace, when it is a religion of peace and tolerance toward the other (Roth 2021, pp. 43–83). Darwish summed up his various efforts for peace and interreligious dialogue with these words: “The name of God is peace. So what, I won’t support the name of God?” (Landress 1987, p. 13).

Despite his pragmatism and statements about the importance of peace as a religious value, Darwish and his successors in the Southern Faction still demand a “just and fair” peace that includes the partition of Jerusalem, the right of return, and self-determination, meaning a Palestinian state alongside Israel for of all its citizens (Darwish 2021, p. 22; Ghanem 1992, pp. 83–99.). Most Israelis oppose these demands as red lines. Neither has Darwish abandoned his dream of an Islamic Caliphate that will rule over the entire Fertile Crescent, emphasizing to his Jewish interviewer: “You think you’re the strong one in the Middle East? I am the strong one. I have a billion Muslims, all believing like me…in the Muslim ocean, you are a minority” (Ben Horin 1998, p. 32).

Like Amital, Darwish exploits religious ambiguity to promote values that justify the peace process on a religious basis, emphasizing human life over the sanctity of the land. On the other hand, he does so while looking to the interests of his community, expresses understanding toward radical and extreme factions, maintains a vision of future complete victory, and waives none of those demands that for many in the Jewish public constitute existential threats. His statements seem to harbor suspicion and distrust toward Israel’s intentions. It is impossible to achieve reconciliation when such publicly expressed suspicions raised on non-pacific religious worldviews are sustained. Yet despite the significant shortcomings in his position, Darwish’s main contribution to peace remains intact, making it—according to his complex perception of this concept—a sacred religious value.

3.2. Shaykh Raed Salah

The militant Northern Faction, outlawed in 2015, is led by Shaykh Raed Salah (born 1958, Umm al-Fahm). This faction seeks to build an “independent society” (al-mujtamaʿ al-iʿtiṣāmī) completely separate from the Zionist entity to protect the Muslim faith. He denies the Jewish and Israeli connection with Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, which has led to his arrest several times for incitement. For the Northern Faction, even de facto recognition of Israel is illegitimate because between the IM and Israel, there is “a conflict over very existence and not a conflict over borders” (Rudnitzky 2011, p. 84). The Northern Faction does not see Israel as a current threat, is confident that the Jewish state will disappear, and that an Islamic Caliphate will rule from the River to the Sea: “We say to all the oppressors: Learn from those who preceded you in the past. Many oppressors have tried to expel us from our land. The oppressors dissipated, while we remained steadfast in our place” (Quotation from Rudnitzky 2011, p. 86. See also Ali 2006, pp. 18–21; 2007, pp. 100–10; Awawda 2010; Bartal and Rubinstein-Shemer 2018, pp. 122–26, 128–30, 148, 151–60; Daoud 2016, pp. 20–32; Darwish 2021, pp. 37–109; Mustafa 2011, pp. 99–115; Nasasra 2019, pp. 1–23; Reiter 2010, pp. 294–324; Rekhess 2011, pp. 63–73; 2000, pp. 279–81; Rubin 2014, pp. 1–20).

Given this dogmatic position, the Northern Faction rejects any discussion on the DOP. Israel, which is in Dār al-Ḥarb (the territory of war), is an illegitimate entity, so Arab Israelis or Palestinians have no right to rework the sharīʿa due to Israel’s influence. That would recognize its existence and even incorporate it as a factor in Islamic legal thought. Thus, the DOP has no basis and those identifying with Salah’s movement have actively opposed it as a “false peace [al-salām al-zāʾif]” “treason,” and a “second nakba”(Aburiya 2005, pp. 690–92; Ali 2004, pp. 150–57; Daoud 2016, pp. 20–32; Mustafa 2011, p. 54; Mustafa and Ghanem 2018, pp. 49–60; Rekhess 1997, pp. 9–21; 2000, pp. 185–290; Rubin 2014, pp. 1–20; Ṣawt al- Ḥaqq wa-l-Ḥurriya 1993, p. 12). Salah himself participated in a large protest in Gaza in September 1993 and was also conspicuously absent from the Arab Israeli delegation welcoming Arafat into Gaza in July 1994 (Daoud 2016, pp. 20–32; Nasasra 2019, pp. 1–23; Rekhess 1997, pp. 9–21; 2000, pp. 185–290; Rudnitzky 2011, pp. 87–90).

Salah’s main argument against the DOP was drawn from the position of Shaykh Qaradawi, the unofficial spiritual leader of the MB: There was no “inclination towards peace” from Israel and no interest (maslaḥa) for the Palestinians in it, rather the opposite:

If Oslo succeeds, it will be the final nail in the coffin of the Palestinian cause. The changes and concessions are always in favor of the Israeli side, at the expense of the Palestinian side in a position of weakness… Oslo is… surrender and not peace.

(Khatib 1995, p. 23)

In such a situation, the DOP cannot be equated with al-Hudaybiya and so is unacceptable, even if the issue of recognizing Israel had not existed (Al-Qaradawi 1998, p. 63; 2003, pp. 486–87, 489–90; Bartal and Rubinstein-Shemer 2018, p. 121; Schuz 2021, pp. 74–102).

Salah also argued that there was a threat to religious, national, and Arab identities thus blurring boundaries between them and Israel. After obtaining Palestinian autonomy, Arab Israelis might feel that the conflict has ended, their hostility toward the Zionist establishment might decrease, and since the Oslo Accords did not address their plight, they might seek solutions to their problems through integration into Israeli society (Ghanem 1992, pp. 83–99; Nasasra 2019, pp. 1–23).5

Salah firmly adheres to all principles from an Islamic perspective that hinder peace, chief among them the sanctity of the land, and emphasizes the importance of communities remaining separate. He entirely rejects the existence of Israel and, in his actions to protect Al-Aqsa, fiercely demonizes the Jews. He is undoubtedly an exemplar of the use of religion to exacerbate conflict.

4. Hamas: Is Oslo Deception or Realism?

4.1. Shaykh Ahmed Yassin

Under Israeli rule after 1967, the MB branch in the Gaza Strip developed a broad infrastructure of religious and community aid organizations. With the outbreak of the First Intifada in early December 1987, its leaders established an independent military organization affiliated with the MB, called Ḥarakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiya (Hamas; the Islamic Resistance Movement). It grew to become a rival to the secular-nationalist PLO and Fatah and inscribed jihād on its Covenant: “From the viewpoint of the Islamic Resistance Movement, nationalism (al-waṭaniya) is part of the religious creed” (Hamas Covenant 2006, Article 12). For Hamas, the liberation of Palestine is the first necessary step toward the Islamization of the entire Arab world (Hakham 2006, pp. 7–24; Hroub 2000, pp. 139–43; Janssen 2009, pp. 13–21; Jensen 2009, pp. 11–30; Mishal and Sela 2006, pp. 3–67; Abu-Amr 1993, pp. 5–19; Hatina 1999, pp. 37–55; Litvak 1998, pp. 148–60; Scham and Abu-Irshaid 2009, pp. 4–7). The head of the organization was Shaykh Ahmed Ismail Yassin (born Al-Jura 1936, died Gaza 2004), assassinated by Israel after the deadly attacks his organization carried out during the Second Intifada. He was a senior MB figure in the Strip, a charismatic preacher, and well-versed in the Qurʾān, despite being a near-blind quadriplegic and lacking formal religious education. Yassin was in an Israeli prison from 1991 to 1997 but even from there continued to chart the organization’s path and publish opinions and religious rulings, with popular support for him growing (Hakham 2006, pp. 7–24; Usher 1999, pp. 166–69; Al-Jazeera 2023).

Hamas consistently opposed any negotiation with Israel because it deemed its very existence illegitimate and any discussion with it, that is de facto a recognition of it. When the Oslo Accord were published, Hamas issued an official statement condemning the “treacherous knife” (Filāsṭīn al-Muslima 1993f, p. 28) with which the PLO had stabbed the nation in the back.

Hamas had numerous reasons for rejecting Oslo, which threatened its standing among Palestinians leading a movement based on an armed struggle against the Zionist occupation. Among the prominent objections in the organization’s statements and articles were: That the timing of the agreement significantly weakened the Palestinian side; that how it was promulgated was secretive and unbecoming; that its ambiguous phrasing could be interpreted to the Palestinians’ detriment; that its terms signaled a willingness to renounce jihād and act against those engaged in it; that it fueled internal disputes and turning the PLO into an Israeli agent against other Palestinians; that it deferred the discussion of core issues such as Jerusalem and the settlements, effectively recognizing the current situation; that the envisioned Palestinian autonomous entity would lack true sovereignty; and that this entity would be almost entirely economic dependent on Israel (Abed Al-Rahman 1998; Al-Jarbawi 1994, pp. 127–54; Al-Khalidi 1995; Al-Na’ami 2022; Al-Umari 2019; Baconi 2015, pp. 503–20; Hakham 2006, p. 29; Hatina 1999; Hroub 2000, pp. 61–65, 80–91; 2013, pp. 80–85; Filāsṭīn al-Muslima 1993b, p. 29; 1993c, p. 28; 1993d, p. 5; 1993e, p. 7; 1993f; Fritzen Buan 2005; Janssen 2009, pp. 13–41; Mansour 1999; Nüsse 1998, pp. 109–17; Shabbat 1997; Shalhoub 1993). In short, “the agreement is simply another form of occupation…the Zionist entity offers us only crumbs” (Filāsṭīn al-Muslima 1993e, p. 7) intended primarily to achieve security for Israel.

Beyond this, Hamas deemed the DOP invalid for its simple betrayal of Islamic principles. In an official statement, it stated that “[w]e believe that Palestine is a holy land” and that no Palestinian had the right to relinquish an inch of waqf land. Therefore, “a curse shall befall whoever neglects it and hands it over as a gift to the [Jewish] enemies of humanity” (Filāsṭīn al-Muslima 1993b, p. 29). From the sharīʿa perspective, the legal status of Palestine derives from the way to liberate it: “Jihād is the way to victory” (Filāsṭīn al-Muslima 1993d, p. 5). The DOP does not meet sharīʿa conditions for peace agreements because it is part of a permanent process, includes recognition of Israel and its rights to Palestinian territory, and gives no clear advantages to the Palestinians. Therefore, comparisons with the Treaty of Al-Hudaybiya are invalid. Additionally, Hamas saw the DOP as departing from the Islamist worldview that sees Israel as a foreign implant doomed to perish and instead grants it further life to prolong the suffering of the Palestinians.

After about a year of assessing the new reality, Hamas unleashed a wave of deadly attacks inside Israel aimed at undermining the peace process and the nascent Palestinian Authority (PA). However, the organization was careful to say that it did not entirely reject peace. Between 1993 and 1996 and even beyond, Yassin and other senior figures have declared their readiness for a long-term hudna, subject to several conditions: Israel removes the settlements and withdraws to 1967 lines; it recognizes an independent, sovereign Palestinian state with East Jerusalem, including Al-Aqsa, as its capital; it compensates Palestinian exiles and their descendants irrespective of the right of return; and it immediately releases all prisoners.

For Hamas, hudna is part of the concept of jihād, as its purpose is to gain strength to wage the next stage of jihād: “The term hudna…expresses the continuity of the conflict…hudna is political and military action linked to an assessment of the situation…and to the supreme interests of the [Muslim] nation” (Scham and Abu-Irshaid 2009, p. 11). And in contrast to the Oslo Accords, a hudna as proposed by Hamas “does not appear in Shari’a history in the context of surrender” (Scham and Abu-Irshaid 2009, p. 11). This is not about moderation or a desire to resolve the existential conflict with Israel, but rather an adoption of a theory of phasing, as evidenced in Hamas’s conditions, ones which Israel would find very difficult to agree to due to the threat they pose to its security and character6 (Abed Al-Rahman 1998; Abu-Amr 1993, pp. 5–19; Al-Jarbawi 1994, pp. 127–54; Al-Quds 1993; Baconi 2015, pp. 503–20; Bartal 2021, pp. 392–408; Bartal and Rubinstein-Shemer 2018, pp. 140–47; Ben-Dror and Flamer 2023, pp. 1–19; Filāsṭīn al-Muslima 1993a, pp. 11–12; 1993b, p. 40; 1993c, p. 29; 1993f, p. 28; 1993g, p. 7; Fritzen Buan 2005, pp. 33–85; Hroub 2000, pp. 65–72; 2013, pp. 80–85; Ibrahim 1993, pp. 16–17; Janssen 2009, pp. 13–95; Kristianasen 1999, pp. 19–36; Litvak 1998, pp. 148–63; Mishal and Sela 2006, pp. 65–72, 108–11; Nüsse 1998, pp. 109–17; Rashid 1994, p. 49; Scham and Abu-Irshaid 2009, pp. 4–24; Shabbat 1997, pp. 73–80; Tuastad 2010, pp. 15–42; Usher 1999, pp. 18–34, 166–69).

Despite Hamas’s vehement opposition to the Oslo Process and religious rejection of an unjust ruler who derives authority from the enemy, the message of Yassin and the Political Bureau remained one of Palestinian unity. Since “[t]he Zionist enemy is the root and basis of all the suffering of our people” (Hroub 2000, p. 62), Hamas would not grant the enemy’s wish to weaken the Palestinian struggle through fratricidal conflict (Al-Jarbawi 1994, pp. 127–54; Al-Ṣabīl 1997, p. 1; Filāsṭīn al-Muslima 1993c, p. 29; Hroub 2000, pp. 61–68; Mishal and Sela 2006, pp. 5–19, 101–06; Nüsse 1998, pp. 109–17; Usher 1999, pp. 18–34, 166–69). Hamas’s complex stance toward the PLO and the Oslo Process was reflected in the issue of the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council held in January 1996. Yassin and other leaders of the military and political wings repeatedly stated that Hamas would not participate in elections, seen as a referendum on the Oslo Process, nor would it take part in institutions arising from agreements Hamas rejected. However, Yassin did say the elections could gain the movement significant power to protect its values and institutions, force the PLO to address its positions, and allow it to promote its worldview as the main opposition. Ultimately, Hamas did not officially participate in the elections. Given that significant electoral achievements were not guaranteed and the Council’s powers in Arafat’s shadow were limited, the organization saw no need to join a “system they hoped to replace for the sake of coexistence with a state they hoped to destroy” (Løvlie 2013, pp. 570–93) and thereby abandon non-recognition of Israel. However, the organization was active in arenas of “Palestinian public interest” such as local elections, labor committees, and student unions, in order to consolidate its power separately from that of the PA (Baconi 2015, pp. 503–20; Hroub 2000, pp. 216–20; 2013, pp. 80–85; Mishal and Sela 2006, pp. 138–42; Nüsse 1998, pp. 109–17; Usher 1999, pp. 18–34, 166–69).

Yassin’s words summed up Hamas’s position: “Peace is the demand of every human being…We want peace more than anyone else in the world” (Al-Ṣabīl 1997, p. 1) but only a peace that is fair and just, meaning the obliteration of Israel an Islamic Palestinian state raised upon its ruins. The DOP far from aided this goal and even jeopardized Hamas’s raison d’être. Despite its insistence on preserving Palestinian unity, Hamas refused to recognize the new reality and take part in it. By employing religious principles that inflamed the situation and sanctified conflict, its view persisted that the only path to peace is jihād for an independent Muslim Palestinian state where Jews would enjoy religious freedom as ahl al-dhimma. Meanwhile, it used terror to successfully undermine the agreement.

4.2. Shaykh ʿImad al-Falouji

Shaykh ʿImad Abd al-Hamid al-Falouji (born 1963, Jabalya) was a senior Hamas member and co-founder of the organization’s military wing, a member of the Palestinian parliament, Minister of Communications, and adviser to Arafat. After the arrest of Shaykh Yassin and the Hamas leadership during the First Intifada, al-Falouji became a prominent figure in reforming Hamas, though he too was imprisoned from 1991 to 1994. During his incarceration, al-Falouji publicly expressed claims widely shared in Hamas circles against the DOP. However, a rift between him and Hamas’s political bureau soon emerged that would lead to him leaving the movement (Al-Falouji 2002, pp. 28–32, 47–52, 83–86, 190–97, 205–7; 2010b; n.d.; Tapper 2005, pp. 56–58).

His time in prison cultivated independent thinking in him. His primary commitment was to the importance of dialogue between Palestinian society’s various streams. Al-Falouji saw intra-Palestinian solidarity as integral to the struggle against Israel since he saw Israel’s long-standing strategy—even in the Oslo Process—as fomenting division and infighting within Palestinian society. He wrote a book on the concept of dialogue in Islam in this regard and established the Adam Center for Intercultural Dialogue (Al-Bayān 1998; Al-Falouji 2003; 2008, p. 131; 2009, pp. 25–31; 2010a, 2010d, 2010e, 2011, 2016; https://www.adam.ps, accessed on 8 July 2024). His second commitment was to transform Hamas into an adaptable movement in the political arena. Al-Falouji foresaw the peace process progressing and Hamas’s popularity likely to suffer consequently, so argued that coordination with the PLO was critical and even for a separate political wing retaining Hamas’s ideology but also operating in and influencing decision-making circles. He argued that “religiosity does not contradict engagement in politics…and a non-extremist political practice in its implementation” (Al-Falouji 2010c). This approach guided al-Falouji thenceforth (Al-Falouji 2002, pp. 200–201, 222–31, 346–58).

With the publication of the DOP, Hamas refused to recognize this “betrayal” or to take part in the continuation of the negotiations and the development of the PA. Nevertheless, al-Falouji, as a senior Hamas member, created a line of communication with Arafat shortly after the latter returned to Gaza. At the end of 1995, al-Falouji was appointed head of the Palestinian Dialogue Office of the Palestinian National Council, which gained wider mass legitimacy than the PA and mediated between Hamas and the PLO. In November 1995, leaflets were distributed throughout Gaza declaring that al-Falouji had been expelled from Hamas due to his aberrant political activity. This prompted al-Falouji to run in the Legislative Council elections in January 1996. Once elected, he worked to create an Islamic bloc that would promote ideas in the spirit of the movement he came from. In March 1996, he was surprisingly appointed Minister of Communications and stated that Shaykh Yassin, when he had visited him, had expressed support for his appointment and promotion of dialogue. Even during his ministerial tenure, al-Falouji continued to mediate between Hamas and the PA. He described himself as “a prominent representative of the ideology of the Islamic movement, even if not a representative of Hamas” (Fran 2011). He served as minister until 2002, then as Arafat’s adviser until the latter’s death in 2004 (Al-Falouji 2002, pp. 28–32, 47–52, 83–86, 279–93, 326–39, 390–95, 431–46; 2008, pp. 13–20, 163–68, 239–41, 273–79; 2009, pp. 35–56, 74–88, 197–209).

How did these roles align with al-Falouji’s Islamist ideology? Firstly, his basic stance toward the DOP was more nuanced than Hamas’s wholesale rejection of it. He did not view the DOP as a peace agreement and so, despite opposing it, did not see recognizing its reality as a retreat from Hamas’s basic principles. Moreover, he saw significant advantages deriving from it like the return of the exiles from Tunisia as a prelude to the return of all refugees. He quotes Arafat saying: “If the DOP did not lead to any result other than the return of the leadership and thousands of Palestinians to their homeland, this would be enough for us…This is the beginning of the return of all refugees” (Al-Falouji 2009, p. 103; Wahbeh and al-Din 2011) and so the beginning of the liberation of the homeland. Al-Falouji stated: “The Authority’s aspiration is to liberate all of Palestine, and much [was achieved in Oslo] on the way to liberating the entire territory” (Al-Falouji 2018; Wahbeh and al-Din 2011). He further argued: “The Palestinian state began to take root in the land, and the wheel cannot be turned back” (Al-Falouji 2009, p. 103; Wahbeh and al-Din 2011) He also averred that “the leaders of the Zionist enemy recognized [us] and, in my opinion, this is the most important thing we achieved” (Ibid). He felt it would have been better to refer the discussion of the Oslo Process to prominent religious scholars who understand that in complex situations and certain contexts, the sharīʿa allows variant rulings for the sake of Muslim interests. He saw this in parallel with the continuation of the struggle: “As long as there is occupied Arab land, and this enemy exists…we have not yet reached a peace agreement with Israel…and I personally do not think we will reach a peace agreement” (Al-Falouji 2002, pp. 133–43, 343; 2009, pp. 67–74; 2018; Wahbeh and al-Din 2011).

Accordingly, al-Falouji believed that Islamic activity in the political arena was important, through means appropriate to the current stage of the struggle to bridge reality and the vision. This would help Hamas mitigate the damage Oslo caused it, strengthen Islam among the public, serve as a meaningful opposition enforcing true democracy, preserve Hamas’s power and positions, and gain international legitimacy for it. Finally, in line with the principles of cooperation and dialogue that guided al-Falouji, he argued that such activity would also contribute to Palestinian society that would benefit from the ”diverse capabilities existing among all groups of the Palestinian people” (Al-Falouji 2002, pp. 326–39, 414–16, 422–31; 2008, pp. 134–35; 2009, p. 163; Also Al-Bayān 1998).

Al-Falouji also engaged in interfaith dialogue and participated in several conferences that brought together rabbis and imams in the hope that religious leaders would resolve religious conflicts. In his words, there is no conflict between religions, rather a political conflict against the occupation and it is the duty of religious leaders to work against extremism and to support politicians striving for peace (Tapper 2005, pp. 56–58; Daily Bulletin 2006; Ruby 2006; Real Media 2016; Times of Israel 2016). Despite his optimism in this regard, al-Falouji is a complex character and not fully open. He neither categorically disavowed acts of terror nor expressed support for the Oslo Process. Although he saw the DOP as invalid from the outset, he thought it needed to be accepted once it existed. The positive points he saw in the process were those that would be a disaster for Israel. The process for him was a beginning of a long path, both through ongoing negotiation and armed struggle for a complete Palestinian state. He argued that it was necessary to act to preserve Palestinian unity in the struggle against the occupation and to strengthen Hamas. Al-Falouji proffers a surprising moderation for a senior Hamas figure, but it is insufficiently substantial. It is rather a pragmatic, sober political vision still ultimately aiming for complete victory.

5. Conclusions

The DOP was the beginning of a process that sought an end to conflict via interim agreements between political elites based on liberal paradigms and material incentives that would lead to future popular reconciliation. Despite religion playing a significant role in identity conflicts in general, religious leaders were not at the negotiating table, and those that were did not consider the religious barriers to peace, despite or perhaps because of their intensity and prevalence. One of the recurring conclusions in many studies, as described in the introduction, on the Oslo Process is that this mismatch between the nature of the conflict and the attempted path to resolving it was a key factor in its failure. Although religious leaders did not participate in the process, they did express their opinions on its outcome. The opinions analyzed in this article constitute a significant component of the circumstances that ultimately led to the DOP’s failure. Moreover, these perspectives offer valuable insights into both the vulnerabilities and the religiously significant foundations identified within the DOP. Such insights can be instrumentalized to inform a more resilient construction of any future peace agreement in the ongoing conflict between Palestinians and Israel.

This study surveyed the religious law and value-based opinions of six religious leaders: Rabbi Amital, Shaykh Darwish, and Shaykh al-Falouji—an Israeli Jew, an Israeli Arab, and a Palestinian respectively—who supported the DOP—and Rabbi Goren, Shaykh Salah, and Shaykh Yassin—an Israeli Jew, an Israeli Arab, and a Palestinian, respectively—who opposed it. The research shows that, on both sides of the divide, religious leaders took realities into account. However, those opposed to the DOP unsurprisingly clung to their uncompromisingly dichotomous ideologies of communal superiority, while those who expressed support for it interpreted the same realities more pragmatically and were open to compromise and complexity. Those opposed inevitably emphasized those accepted religious principles that hinder peace and utilized religion’s social influence to further sanctify land and nation over human life, to emphasize the alienation between societies, to delegitimize those engaged in the peace process, to encourage active efforts to hinder or end it, and, in general, to inflame conflict and undermine peace. Those expressing support for the DOP used religious ambiguities to justify their reinterpretations to prioritize alternative values and conflict resolution, however temporary. This study has shown how important these religious ambiguities are in this regard, especially in squaring theology with reality, allowing moderate religious leaders to justify their views to the masses. This conclusion can be expanded and applied, evidently, to the ongoing conflict between Palestinians and Israel, and, to a comparable extent, to other identity conflicts worldwide, insofar as these conflicts involve religions with backgrounds that allow for the existence of religious ambiguity, as described in the introduction. The potential for generalization is contingent upon the specific characteristics of each conflict and the religious traditions involved, particularly their capacity for interpretive flexibility and doctrinal ambiguity.

Nevertheless, this study has saliently shown that even those religious leaders who supported the DOP used religious methods to preserve and even inflame conflict rather than create religious reconciliation, hindering the reconciliation process on their side. The atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, alongside the implicit or explicit aspirations for long-term, zero-sum victories despite temporary compromises, are substantial weaknesses here, especially in Darwish and al-Falouji. The discourse of these three religious leaders has a lot in common and is based primarily on realism. It seems they internally accepted the secular and pragmatic nature of the DOP and, despite their religiosity that could have been harnessed for peace, as Darwish partially expressed it (See Ben Horin 1998), they judged the agreement on its own terms concerning community interests, achievements, control, borders, security, sovereignty, resources, and so on. This produced a flawed and insufficiently spiritual discourse to further the peace and reconciliation process, including interfaith harmony.

However, in the complex reality of societies mired for decades in existential identity conflict, with salient religious barriers to peace and the danger of their delegitimization by radical preachers, moderate religious leaders cannot suddenly conjure up a religious basis for supporting a peace process and the concessions and compromises included in it very easily. Reliance on practical justifications is their only possible route to gradually establish their position and prove that the values of religion and sanctity do not contradict those of peace and reconciliation. Like the previous insight about the importance of religious ambiguities, this approach, which advocates patience for gradual change, is generally applicable to other identity conflicts as well, considering the limitations arising from the unique characteristics of each individual conflict. Perhaps in the future a better management of such political peace agreements, backed from the outset by the broadest possible religious support, will lead to concerted and sincere interim educational efforts in both communities to prove that.