The Strategy of Interpreting the Daodejing through Confucianism in Park Se-dang’s Sinju Dodeokgyeong

Abstract

This research study examines Park Se-dang’s Sinju Dodeokgyeong, which was the first complete exegesis of the Daodejing (DDJ) in Korea. This study investigates the theoretical strategies that Park used to interpret the DDJ from a Neo-Confucian perspective and also examines the logical missteps that Park took to force a unity between Neo-Confucianism and Daoism. The core method for interpreting the DDJ that Park utilized in his attempt to assert the compatibility of Neo-Confucianism and Daoism can be summarized as “interpreting Daoism through Neo-Confucian theory”. This research study breaks down Park’s strategy for reinterpreting the DDJ, dividing Park’s argumentation into four parts: (1.) clarifying the historical hereticalization of the DDJ; (2.) identifying the ethics and treasured virtues of Confucianism and Daoism; (3.) the study of the cosmologies of Confucianism and Daoism; and (4.) interpreting Daoist moral ethics through Neo-Confucian cosmological theory. Park Se-dang’s strategy for forcing unity between Neo-Confucianism and Daoism had its limits. Among other things, Park attempted but failed to narrow the gap between Confucian and Daoist ethics and cosmology by converting the concept of "heaven" in the DDJ into a humanized heaven. Eventually, even though Park’s strategy failed, his work inspired other Silhak scholars of Joseon up to the 19th century and had a clear impact on the many subsequent reinterpretations of the DDJ.

1. Introduction

This paper aims to clarify the strategy of “using Neo-Confucianism to interpret Daoism” (以儒釋道), which was the main purpose behind Park Se-dang’s 朴世堂 Sinju Dodeokgyeong, the first complete explanatory commentary of the Daodejing 道德經 (below DDJ) written in Joseon Korea. The commentary serves as a treatise that focuses on the relationship between the concepts ti 體 and yong 用 and you 有 and wu 無.

Park Se-dang’s commentary on the DDJ reflects the awareness of social problems and the criticism that the author, who was a scholar of Silhak 實學 (Practical Learning), provided during the 17th century, and the ideas of social reform that followed. To date, a total of five moral commentaries exist in complete form in Korea, all of which were written during the period from the emergence to the flourishing of Silhak during the middle to late Joseon dynasty. The earliest existing commentary on the DDJ by a Korean author is Sun-eon 醇言 by Yi I 李珥 (1536–1584), but it is not comprehensive since Yi only wrote about a few selected chapters that corresponded to his views. For Park Se-dang, Yi’s attempt to interpret the DDJ not only provided the decisive impetus to begin the complete exegesis of the DDJ, but it also motivated him to write a fully annotated, first complete edition of the Zhuangzi 莊子—Namhwagyeong Juhaesanbo 南華經註解刪補, the first of its kind in Korea—by suggesting the possible ideological conformity of Confucianism and Daoism.

Not soon after Park Se-dang completed his commentaries on the DDJ and Zhuangzi, several other DDJ exegeses that were handed down were compiled in the 18th century, these included the following:

• Dodeokjigwi 道德指歸 by Seo Myeong-eung 徐命應 (1716–1787);
• Chowondamno 椒園談老 by Lee Chung-ik 李忠翊 (1744–1816);
• Jeongno 訂老 by Hong Seokju 洪奭周 (1774–1842);
• Nojajiryak 老子指略 by Sin Jak 申綽 (1760–1828).

The large number of commentaries that were compiled after Sinju Dodeokgyeong show that the work had a clear influence on the philosophical development of Daoism in the Joseon dynasty. Of the five existing DDJ exegeses, aside from Sun-eon, all of the other four—listed above—were completed by Silhak scholars during the Joseon dynasty. This pattern suggests that the appearance of DDJ exegeses during the Joseon period is closely related to the emergence of Silhak.

Silhak, as the name of this school already suggests, began to take shape in the early 17th century with the intention of finding methods to solve practical problems, and became very popular between the early 18th century and the mid-19th century.1 The fact that Silhak scholars established "actuality" as their academic principle must be understood as a reaction to the negative effects of Neo-Confucianism, the political ideology of the Joseon dynasty. While Neo-Confucian thought developed to its highest level over the course of the 16th century, the theory became increasingly metaphysical and lost its applicability to practical problems. Applied to real situations, Neo-Confucian theory failed to correctly assess problems or develop and provide workable solutions, which, in turn, led to more vehement criticism. In addition to the awareness of this issue among Korean scholars, external factors like the change in diplomatic relations following the dynastic transition from the Ming to the Qing dynasty in China, as well as the adoption of practically oriented teachings such as Seohak (Western Learning)2, played a crucial role.

Silhak, as pursued by Park Se-dang, aimed to strengthen the nation through practical studies, including farming and business, beyond the traditional academic methods of Traditional Confucian exegetics (gyeonghak 經學). According to a study by Yoon Sa-soon, an expert on Korean Silhak, the methodology pursued by the Joseon Silhak scholars can be largely summarized as “the spirit of broad scholarship (bakhak 博學)”3, “the search for empiricism and practicability”, and Gojeunghak 考證學 (Evidential Learning) (Yun 2008, p. 74). The term broad scholarship refers to the academic methodology pursued by scholars during the pre-Qin era, including interrogation (simmun 審問), contemplation (simsa 深思), and discernment (myeongbyeon 明辨). The “search for empiricism and practicability” alludes to the spirit in which the original Confucian scholars analyzed real-world problems and attempted to find workable solutions. Evidential Learning refers to the method of finding proof in older texts, which was popular in the Qing dynasty.4 What all three approaches mentioned above have in common is that they searched for their own methods in ancient ways of thinking, including the original Confucianism of the pre-Qin era, and in this way attempted to evade the theoretical limitations of the Neo-Confucianism prevalent in the Joseon period, although they did not attack it directly (Seo-Reich 2022, pp. 3–4).

While pursuing broad scholarship, which was neglected by Neo-Confucian scholars, Silhak scholars in the 16th century had the possibility to establish the DDJ as an object of research, which had been hitherto impossible since it was deemed a non-Confucian theory and thus classified as a heretical book5. However, in the second half of the 18th century, attempts to unify Neo-Confucianism and Daoism decreased significantly, while attempts to reinterpret the DDJ from other viewpoints, such as the original Confucianism or Sangsuhak 象數學 (numerology), increased. To explain this dynamic, most research thus far has focused on external factors like the acceptance and dissemination of foreign knowledge and theories, such as the Yangming school, Evidential Learning, or Western Learning, which were mostly introduced in Joseon during the 19th century (Saemio Kim 2011, pp. 11–27). This study hypothesizes that in addition to the external determinants, internal factors, namely the theoretical shortcomings of Park Se-dang’s approach to force a fusion of Neo-Confucianism and Daoism in the 17th century, also played an equally important—if not the decisive—role. Since Park’s method of interpreting Daoism through Confucian thought had reached its theoretical limit, it was inevitable that new attempts such as interpreting the DDJ based on numerology6, criticizing Neo-Confucianism7, or returning to original Confucian thought8 would be made.

To substantiate this hypothesis, we must first expose the logical deficiencies of the theoretical attempt to unify Confucianism and Daoism employed in Park’s DDJ commentaries. Therefore, this study will expose the theoretical contradictions in the annotations of the Sinju Dodeokgyeong and discuss them by analyzing the relationship of the concepts of ti 體 and yong 用 as well as you 有 and wu 無, which are the four core concepts of Park’s DDJ interpretation. Park’s understanding of the relationship between them clarifies the way in which he, as a Silhak scholar, tried to complete Yi I’s endeavor of interpreting Daoism through Confucianism.9 At the same time, the problems he posed to the Silhak scholars of his time might help to explain why several interpretations of the heretical DDJ could suddenly appear in the following 18th and 19th centuries.

2. Hereticalization of the Daodejing in the 16th and 17th Centuries

Since the DDJ was first introduced to Goguryeo in the 7th century10, it has maintained its vitality in Korean thought. The Bojangbongrojo 寶藏奉老條 chapter of the Samguk yusa 三國遺事, volume 3, states that people from Goguryeo were competing to study and adhere to the teachings of the Wudoumi 五斗米 sect—also known as Celestial Masters Sect (Tianshi Dao 天師道)—suggesting a high probability that the DDJ scriptures were circulated by this movement. As one of the three major sects of Daoism, the Celestial Masters Sect was concerned with ways to maintain health and extend lifespan (S.-b. Park 2019, p. 73), and there is a high probability that the DDJ at that time was read as a religious text rather than as a text for academic or political purposes. Afterward, the DDJ was only briefly mentioned in the 8th volume of the Goryeosa Jeoryo 高麗史節要 when the author discusses the bogwongwan 福源觀, i.e., the institution for training Daoists during the Goryeo dynasty. Therefore, it should be understood that it was not until the Joseon dynasty that the DDJ actually became an object of discussion in Korea.

Then how could it happen that the DDJ began to attract the attention of Yi I and other Neo-Confucian scholars through the mid-to-late Joseon dynasty? To answer this question, it must first be clarified why the DDJ could not be academically discussed prior to the middle of the Joseon dynasty. After Goryeo adopted the Song dynasty’s Neo-Confucian thought, the latter steadily evolved into the dominant political ideology, turning Joseon effectively into a Neo-Confucian kingdom. For example, as the ethical items (tiaomu 條目) and guiding principles (gangling 綱領)11 discussed in Zhu Xi’s朱熹 (1130–1200) The Great Learning became established as actual political norms, Neo-Confucianism was able to become the political ideology for both family centered kinship communities and state-centered social communities. The Four Books, i.e., Analects, Mencius, The Great Learning, and The Doctrine of Mean, reflect Zhu Xi’s perspective, which continues the academic lineage of Zhou Lianxi 周濂溪, Cheng Mingdao 程明道, and Cheng Yichuan 程伊川, occupied the central position in the national education system. Eventually, this led to the hereticalization of all other schools except Neo-Confucianism.

The reasons why Daoism, along with Buddhism, were branded as heretical ways of thinking and completely banned from the public discourse lie in the writings on Neo-Confucianism, which during the Joseon dynasty were read and interpreted in a dogmatic way. Zhu Xi declares, “the jing 精 (fineness) and cu 粗 (coarseness) of things are unified, there are no two origins”(Zhu 2023g, no. 95)12. In contrast, he explains, that “Buddha referred to heaven and earth as huanwang 幻妄 (illusion), which means there is nothing at all (quanwu 全無)” (Zhu 2023d, no. 126). According to Zhu Xi, huanwang is a state of nothingness, in which phenomenon and noumenon (thing-in-itself) are separated. A similar view is expressed in volume 95 of Zhuziyulei.

Nowadays, people only see the absence of xing 形 (image) or zhao 兆 (sign), and say it is empty (空蕩蕩) […] For example, since Buddhists only discuss kong 空 (emptiness), and Laozi only discusses wu 無 (nothingness), it is impossible to know whether there is an actual li 理 in the Dao.

(Zhu 2023g, no. 95)

Here Zhu Xi criticizes the impossibility of finding li in the Buddhist concept of kong and Laozi’s concept of wu. And he concludes that “the Dao of which Buddha and Laozi speak is empty (空虛) and lonesome (寂寞)” (Zhu 2023a, no. 38). This, in turn, would lead to an empty discourse that not only fails to solve real-world problems, but even risks to become an instrument of deception. Zhu Xi refers to The Great Learning to explicate the purpose of study that consists of “manifesting one’s bright virtue” (明明德) and “loving the people” (親民)—a purpose fundamentally different from the Dao of Laozi and Buddha, which he considers to be kindred spirits (laofo 老佛), as well as Guan Zhong管仲 and his disciple Wang Tong王通, all of which he considered heretics (Zhu 2023e, no. 17).

For scholars in the early and middle Joseon period, when the ideas of Zhu Xi had become the central tenet of scholarship and political ideology, there was no need to bring Buddhist and Daoist thought, already considered heretical, back to the center of their studies. Since the Neo-Confucianists regarded the DDJ as heresy, its contents were hardly ever discussed in academic literature. Nonetheless, Toegye Yi Hwang退溪李滉 (1501–1570), who established the academic foundation of Joseon Neo-Confucianism, left a brief mention of Laozi and Zhuangzi.

One human body has both li 理 (reason) and qi 氣 (energy). Li is highly valued, while qi is of little value. However, li is non-interference (wuwei 無為), while qi has desires. Thus, those who put li into practice, already foster their qi in the process. This is what a sage (聖賢) is. If you focus only on nourishing qi (yangqi 養氣), you will surely hurt your xing 性 (nature). This is what Laozi and Zhuangzi are.

(H. Yi 1915, p. 90)

Yi Hwang criticized that because the Lao and Zhuang put more emphasis on qi, this could lead to the destruction of li, and cautioned against it. Although he was aware of both thinkers, he only mentioned them in order to completely dismiss them as heresy.

Regarding Buddhism, Yi Hwang only had to say, “Just like a person that wades through the water drowns in it while testing its depth and shallowness, a person who encounters heresy will drown in it before he realizes it. That’s why I do not look at Buddhist scriptures” (H. Yi 1958, p. 42). This shows that he wanted to stay away from texts considered heretical. On the other hand, Yi I, who adopted Yi Hwang’s theory of the duality of li and qi, did not completely reject heresy.13 Discussing Buddhism, he posed the question, “Mencius says that ‘people are born good (性善)’, and praises Yao 尧and Shun 舜. How is this any different from ‘the heart itself is Buddha (即心即佛)’?” (I. Yi 1990, pp. 20–21). This quote shows that Yi I thought it conceivable to find true statements in Buddhist scriptures as well. Furthermore, Yi I defines his position as follows: “There are many things said by Laozi in the DDJ, but ‘non-interference (wuwei 無爲)’ and ‘being without desires (wuyu 無慾)’ are concepts close to li. Therefore, even for a gentleman (君子), there is something to be taken from it” (I. Yi 1990, p. 62).

This is quite an unconventional view considering the political situation in the 16th century.14 Yi I was the author of the Suneon 醇言, the first commentary on the DDJ in Korea, which was discovered only after his death. His disciples subsequently maintained a strict silence about it and even withheld it in the Yulgokjeonseo 栗谷全書, a collection of Yi I’s collected works.15 Furthermore, Yi I’s rather unbiased view of heretical topics can be understood as the main reason why he was able to write a text like the Suneon. Yi I quotes Sima Qian, “Those who study Laozi defeat Confucianism, and those who study Confucianism also defeat Laozi” (I. Yi 1990, p. 62), to illustrate the conflict between these two ideas. At the same time, he adds, “Initially, the study of Lao and Zhuang did not reach this point, however, the small difference that appeared in the original source must increase the more it flows down” (I. Yi 1990, p. 63).16 This can be understood as a reevaluation of Laozi, suggesting that the damage was caused by later interpretations, but not as a problem of the original thought of Laozi himself.17 This perspective is by and large shared by Park Se-dang.

The attempts to interpret the DDJ from a Confucian perspective have already begun during the Southern Song period. Lin Xiyi’s 林希逸 (1193–1271) Laozi Yanzhai Kouyi 老子鬳齋口義18 is a representative example. Lin Xiyi’s commentary on the DDJ had a considerable influence in East Asian countries: Park Se-dang19 in the Korean Joseon dynasty and Hayashi Razan 林羅山 (1583–1657)20 in the Japanese Edo period who were both active in the 17th century cited a large part of Lin Xiyi’s commentary. In addition, Park Se-dang actively accepted Yi I’s view, expressed in Suneon, “The purpose of this book [the DDJ] is clearly beneficial to scholars. Therefore, it should not be neglected just because it is not a scripture of a sage” (I. Yi 2011, pp. 124–25). Park further reveals his willingness to advance the unification of Confucianism and Daoism by attempting to interpret the ideas of Laozi in a Confucian manner throughout the DDJ. In the following section, I will examine the theoretical strategy Park Se-dang used to try to achieve this interpretation of the DDJ from a Confucian perspective.

3. The Purpose, Strategy, and Limitations of Park’s Sinju Dodeokgyeong

Park Se-dang’s Shinju Dodeokgyeong took Chen Shen’s 陳深 Laizi Pinjie 老子品節 as its main point of reference but also referred to the following works:

• Lin Xiyi’s 林希逸 Laozi Yanzhai Kouyi 老子鬳齋口義;
• Su Zhe’s 蘇轍 Laozi Jie 老子解;
• Dong Sijing’s 董思靖 Daodezhenjing Jijie 道德真經集解;
• Wang Bi’s 王弼 Laozi Zhu 老子注;
• Jiao Hong’s 焦竑 Laozi Yi 老子翼.

Among these other works, Lin Xiyi’s annotations in Laozi Yanzhai Kouyi are the most widely featured commentary in the Shinju Dodeokgyeong.21 This is partly because of the widespread popularity of Lin’s Laozi Yanzhai Kouyi in 17th-century Joseon society, but at the same time also shows that Park was particularly observant of Lin’s perspectives.22 This article focuses on the relationships between ti, yong, you, and wu, as applied in Shinju Dodeokgyeong.

3.1. The Ethical Ground: “to Cultivate Oneself and Govern Others” (修己治人)

The first and most important step that Yi I took in the 16th century to free the DDJ from accusations of heresy was to prove that Laozi’s thought did not deviate from Confucian thought.23 In the preface to Shinju Dodeokgyeong, Park also took this approach, assigning the purpose of his annotation of the DDJ to reveal the principles of a unified philosophical system shared between Confucianism and Daoism.

While he [Laozi] lived in seclusion, he wrote a book to define the Dao that he upheld and to reveal its meaning. Although Laozi’s Dao didn’t conform to the method of the [Confucian] sages (聖人). Nevertheless, Laozi’s intention was still to “cultivate oneself and govern others” (修己治人). Even though Laozi’s words are brief, the message is profound. For this reason, the numerous illustrations of the Dao [in DDJ] are valued and have been used throughout antiquity, up through the Han Dynasty. The ruling class such as kings performed ‘polite and wordless edification,’ while their subordinates practiced ‘clean and quiet politics.’ But, during the Jin dynasty, some scholars with great ambitions but who behaved recklessly, spread falsehoods and deceived an era. […] In the case of Lin Xiyi’s annotations for example, they’re all wrong, not one of them is right.

(S.-d. Park 2013, pp. 71–72)

In the above passage, Park noted that, although Laozi could hardly be regarded as a Confucian sage having lived in seclusion and absent from politics, Laozi did, however, embody the Confucian intention of cultivating oneself and governing others. In other words, according to Park, both Confucianism and Daoism have at their core a shared pursuit for the accomplished temperament of sages.24 This argument contradicts Lin Xiyi’s view that Laozi’s “words are too immoderate to have an impact on the Confucian sages” (Lin 2010, p. 5). Lin Xiyi believed that Laozi’s image of the sage differed from the Confucian ideal in terms of its ethical orientation, and argued that, “because what Laozi said is too volitional, it’s close to heresy” (Lin 2010, p. 4). Park criticized Lin’s arguments, and even went so far as to say that “they’re all wrong, not one of them is right”. In essence, this is Park’s refusal to participate in hereticalizing Daoism, which was pervasive in Joseon society. This purpose is clearly expressed in the preface of the Shinju Dodeokgyeong.

Park Se-dang also makes the case for destigmatizing the DDJ. First, Park Se-dang implies that, for both Confucius and Laozi, “cultivating oneself and governing others” was the ultimate goal of their studies, and then takes this assertion as the basis for the compatibility of Confucianism and Daoism. Park argues that the movement to hereticalize DDJ was actually more connected to the ambiguous language used in the DDJ rather than the philosophical system it established. And, in terms of that philosophical system, there was indeed, Park argued, a strong ethical code for political affairs, with concrete recommendations such as “polite and wordless edification” and “clean and quiet politics”. According to Park, misinterpretation of the DDJ occurred after the Han dynasty because of the implicit and often ambiguous nature of the language used in the text. These misinterpretations eventually became so commonplace that scholars forgot the core goal of the manuscript. Park further argued that the hereticalization of the DDJ was the result of Weijin metaphysicians whom he describes as having great ambitions but reckless behavior. This is in part a criticism directed at commentaries that are based on Wang Bi’s commentary of the DDJ. For context, of the DDJ commentaries that circulated widely through 17th-century Korean society, there were mainly two schools of commentaries25: commentaries from the post-Song dynasty and Ming dynasty Neo-Confucian thought, represented by Su Zhe 蘇轍 and Wu Cheng吳澄, and commentaries from the pre-Song dynasty perspective of the Weijin metaphysicians, represented by Wang Bi. Park criticized the latter.

Wang Bi interpreted the relationship between Dao (道, the Way) and ming (名, the name), which is discussed in Chapter 1 of the DDJ, as an issue of separation between “existence” and “language” (B. Wang 2011, p. 1). Lin Xiyi argued that “since the Dao generally doesn’t tolerate language, as soon as the Dao is expressed in language, the Dao is violated” (Lin 2010, p. 1). In other words, Lin argued that Dao only exists as changdao 常道 (the constant Dao, eternal or persistent Way), but not as ming, i.e., Dao as a language. However, Park Se-dang understands Dao and ming as they are presented in the first chapter of DDJ, not as distinct and separate relations of reality and the various phenomena within reality, but rather in terms of the following framework: “the Dao refers to the ontological noumenon (ti 體), and ming refers to the function (yong 用)” (S.-d. Park 2013, p. 77). That is to say, “because Dao has ming as its function, and ming has Dao as its body; thus, neither the ontological noumenon nor the function can be eliminated” (S.-d. Park 2013, pp. 77–78).

However, even if it is safe to assume that the hereticalization of the DDJ was the result of problematic interpretations proposed in part by Weijin-era metaphysicians, there are some other potential problems with Park’s argument. Core to Park’s central argument is that both Daoists and Confucians shared the primary aim of becoming a sage, as a point of completion for their ethical development. However, one passage from chapter 18 of the DDJ appears to call into question this very argument. This passage appears to carry strong anti-Confucian sentiment.

With the disappearance of the great Dao, benevolence and righteousness emerged. Once wisdom emerged, there also came with it great deception.

Only when parents fail to be in harmony do filial children and loving parents emerge. And only when the country falls to chaos do officials with strong allegiance to the sovereign show their loyalties.

(S.-d. Park 2013, p. 117)26

The virtues of benevolence and righteousness, filial piety, love and compassion, and loyalty or allegiance to the sovereign that appear in the above passage are all virtues that are revered in Confucianism. It is likely that Laozi mentioned these virtues as a means to address the Confucian teachings of the day. According to chapter 18 of the DDJ, filial piety was proposed as a solution for families that were divided, and allegiance to the sovereign was discussed precisely because the state was in crisis. In other words, it appears that Laozi did not propose the virtues of Confucianism as a means toward good governance, but rather as remedies to the problems that occur in the absence of the Dao. In other words, the virtues of Confucian thinkers and those of Laozi were not actually aligned. Aware of this issue, Park wrote the below passage:

Loyal subjects prove their loyalty to their sovereign when the nation is in chaos. Thus, the fault lies with the chaos, not with the officials. Filial piety and love are discovered when there’s tension in the family. Thus, the fault lies in the tension, and not in filial piety or love. After the disappearance of the great Dao, people learned of benevolence and righteousness. The fault lies in the disappearance of the Dao, and not with benevolence or righteousness. In this regard, Laozi deserves a critical evaluation that he did not properly understand the essence [of the Dao].

(S.-d. Park 2013, pp. 117–18)

In short, Park argues that loyal subjects are not only loyal during times of turmoil, but rather their loyalty is revealed in such times. Similarly, filial piety and benevolence are not the result of a lack of unity in the family but are merely revealed through temporary disorder or tension within the family. Park agrees with Laozi insofar that the Dao is absent first before people discover the virtues of Confucianism. However, Park Se-dang explains Laozi’s point of view in terms of chronology, saying that people gradually realized the virtue of Confucianism after the disappearance of the Dao. But Laozi misinterpreted this temporal relationship as a causal relationship and concluded that “virtue came into the world through the disappearance of the Dao”. In Park’s view, the state would be governed well if all people tried to become loyal subjects, and then those who share flesh and blood would have no choice but to seek unity and harmony with one another. Eventually, Park concludes, “if one tries to practice benevolence and righteousness, the great Dao is realized, and this is the reason why the sages value benevolence and righteousness”.

No matter whether Laozi misunderstood the sequence of events as causal in nature or he was simply lamenting the state of the world at his time and expressing it in an ironic way, Park’s initial argument has its limitations. Even though Park’s explanation might help to narrow the gap between the virtues of Confucian and Daoist thought, his explanation still failed to explain the connection on a more fundamental basis. In fact, narrowing the gap between Confucian virtues and Daoist ethics was the first issue that Park Se-dang attempted to resolve in his attempt to integrate Confucian and Daoist philosophy. Park worked to overcome these limitations by supplying the justification at the cosmological level.

3.2. The Cosmological Level: “Ti and Yong Have the Same Source” (體用一源)

According to Park Se-dang, the biggest problem with Wang Bi’s interpretation of chapter 1 of the DDJ is that Dao and ming are established as tangible and intangible objects. As Lin Xiyi pointed out, at the moment when Dao is expressed in language, ming名 (the name) is established as the “second meaning” (二義), which is separated from the original substance of Dao. However, Park opposed Lin’s interpretation by integrating Dao and ming in the following ways:

The Dao refers to ti 體 or the ontological body, and the ming or name refers to the yong 用 or functional use. Dao has ming as its function, and ming has Dao as its body, but neither the body nor the function can be eliminated. Therefore, if Dao becomes Dao by itself, it isn’t the so-called “constant Dao” or eternal way (changdao 常道), because there’s no function to establish itself as the body or ti [of Dao]. Further, if the name or ming becomes a name or ming by itself, it is not the so-called “constant ming” (changming 常名), because there’s no ti to act by itself.

(S.-d. Park 2013, pp. 77–78)

Park Se-dang approaches Dao as ti and ming as yong. Based on this premise, ti can be exposed as a phenomenon using the function of ming, and ming has its own fundamental substance, which is Dao. Therefore, Dao and ming are not independent entities but rather are entities that are interdependent upon each other, specifically as “constant Dao” and “constant ming”, respectively. Park further develops his argument by linking the concepts of “constant wu” (changwu 常無) and “constant you” (changyou 常有), as well as li 理 and xiang 象.

When Laozi uses the term “constant wu”, he’s actually referring to the ti together with the concept of the “constant Dao” and the “nameless” (wuming 無名). From this angle, Laozi attempted to understand the mysterious li 理 (reason, principle, or natural law) that encompasses all the other phenomena (xiang 象). Furthermore, the “constant you” discussed in this text refers to the yong together with the “constant ming” and “having name” (youming 有名). From this, it can be seen that all the phenomena that manifest themselves in the world “have their origin in the same one principle” (根源一理).

(S.-d. Park 2013, p. 78)

In the above quote, Park Se-dang analyzes the concept of the “constant Dao” in the first chapter of the DDJ as things that are on the level of the ti. He also analyzed the concepts of the “constant wu” and the “nameless”, as well as the concept of the "constant ming" as things on the level of the yong along with the concepts of the “constant you” and the “the named”. According to Park, if the former is something that follows li, then the latter becomes a xiang (phenomenon) through which li is revealed. However, since the xiang already embraces li, thus, these two are eventually “rooted in one li” (根源一理). Park’s proposed cosmological system is a direct application of the Neo-Confucianist perspective of “ti and yong originated from one source” (體用一源), which was prevalent during the Song and Ming dynasties. For this reason, Park quoted the following passage in his commentary and used it as a basis for his argumentation.

Li means that the yong is inherent in ti, this is the so-called “one root” (一源). Additionally, xiang means that “subtleness” (微) has no choice but to be included in “conspicuousness” (顯). This is so-called “gaplessness” (無間).

(S.-d. Park 2013, p. 79)

The concepts of “subtleness” and li or “conspicuousness” and xiang that Park discusses here correspond to Cheng Yi-chuan’s 程伊川 theory of ti and yong, which states that ti and yong originated from one source and that there is no gap between subtleness and conspicuousness (體用一源, 顯微無間) (Cheng 2019, p. 27). The term “gapless” or “gaplessness” in Cheng’s writings refers to the relationship between li and xiang, where the li, or the natural principle or reason for things, serves as the ti or ontological body that contains the yong or function of a thing to be revealed as xiang or an object or incident within reality. Zhu Xi understood that Cheng Yi-chuan’s conception of li existed first in time and that xiang originated from li, therefore emerging after li. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that li and xiang in Zhu Xi’s view are completely the same, but they also cannot be divided because they all originate from the same source. The following is Zhu Xi’s commentary on the concept that “ti and yong originated from one”.

“Ti and yong originated from one” means that, although there are no traces of ti (“the ontological body”), there is already yong (“function”) in the middle of ti; and “there is no gap between wei and xian” means that wei (“subtleness”) is in the middle of the xian (“appearance or conspicuousness”). That is, even when heaven and earth do not yet exist, all things on earth are already prepared for it, that is why “there is already yong in the middle of the ti”; when heaven and earth are already established, there li is already present, that is why “wei is in the middle of the xian”.

(Zhu 2023f, no. 67)

In summary, when viewed from the perspective of the passage of time, even when ti or the ontological body has no shape, it already exists from before the creation of all things in nature. A similar view can also be found in Zhu Xi’s Taiji Tujie 太極圖解 (Taiji diagram). In it, Zhu Xi explains the relationship between ti and yong as follows: “When one discusses li (the natural principle or order of things), ti (the ontological body) always precedes yong (the function). And, when one discusses ti, generally speaking, the li of yong already has taken place within the ti. This is the reason why they originated from one single origin”. In other words, Zhu Xi argues that ti and yong both originate from li, while recognizing that ti and yong emerged sequentially.

However, since ti here leaves no vestige, it is impossible for it to be recognized as itself; hence, we can only recognize it when ti appears outside. The reason why ti, which originally is not exposed on the outside, can be revealed on the outside is that yong is already contained in ti and because there is an invisible subtleness (wei) in the phenomenon (xian) that is revealed on the outside. Zhu Xi also interpreted xian—appearance, conspicuousness, or the external phenomenon—and wei—subtleness, which is present inside of xian—as the relationship between wu 物 (things) and li. Zhu Xi explains this idea in the following quote from Taiji Tujie: “If I explain ‘there’s no gap between subtleness and conspicuousness’ by means of a very prominent xiang 象, it can be said that there’s nothing that doesn’t have li involved in every affair and everything” (J. Li 2020, p. 2537). In other words, all phenomena whether objects or incidents can be understood as a recognizable xiang. However, li is already implied in all possible kinds of xiang without exception. Zhu Xi defined the meaning of what is implied in the outward phenomenon, that is, the relationship between xian and wei, through “gaplessness” (wujian 無間).

In contrast to this, Joseon Neo-Confucian scholars at the time applied li and qi 氣 as the absolute criteria for analyzing various phenomena when it came to understanding the relationship between Dao and ming. Considering this point, it is of notable significance that Park is applying Zhu Xi’s theory of “ti and yong originated from one” for the interpretation of the DDJ. This is because, through this method, the discussions about the relationship between Dao and ming could avoid the dichotomy of li and qi. At the same time, however, they did not deviate from the theoretical norms of Neo-Confucianism and eventually provided the possibility for an inclusive interpretation of the DDJ. Zhu Xi also summarized the concepts of ti and yong in the following way: “In terms of a metaphysical object, chongmo (沖漠, emptiness and tranquility) is ti, and when chongmo manifests itself in material objects, that becomes yong. In terms of a physical object, things also become ti, and the li of ti that gets revealed is yong” (Zhu 2023b, no. 48). In short, metaphysical objects come to existence earlier than physical objects because—although they are the noumenon of things, which itself is unrecognizable—they are already embedded in every physical object and affair as a reason (li). In other words, a physical object is a metaphysical object that appears as a xiang. This is nothing more than something that the li of ti revealed through yong, thus both metaphysical things and physical things both originate from the same source.

Notably, the theory of ti and yong, which Park applied as the basic perspective to annotate the DDJ is different from Wang Bi’s understanding (Jo 1997, p. 193). There are some lines in Wang Bi’s commentary for chapter 38 of the DDJ that show how Wang Bi understood the concepts of ti and yong: “Although the myriad things are noble, it is with nothingness that they function [because one must comply with nature and do nothing in order to demonstrate one’s virtues]” (萬物雖貴以無爲用). Since Wang Bi’s concept of yong refers to the action of wu (nothingness), thus, when seen from Zhu Xi’s perspective, Wang Bi’s concept of yong contradicts the concept of you 有 as a meaning of actual generative action. Following this, Wang Bi said, “they cannot reject nothingness in order to be ti” (不能捨無以爲體也). However, from Zhu Xi’s perspective, this understanding is also contradictory in that an invisible entity also abandons nothingness (Jo 1997, pp. 193–94). This shows that, although Wang Bi utilized the concepts of ti and yong in the process of interpreting the interaction of Dao and its use earlier, his understanding of ti and yong is completely different from Zhu Xi’s understanding. In addition, the conception of ti and yong in Wang’s commentaries on the Book of Change also take on a similar meaning to those present in his commentary on the DDJ. In Wang’s Book of Change Notes (Zhouyi Zhu 周易注), ti is used to signify the physical object itself existing in reality, and yong means the use of the physical objects. In other words, for Wang Bi, ti is established as a physical object in the form of a substance, and it also can be you in that it actually exists. Conversely, yong is established as a metaphysical object in the form of use or function, and at the same time, it also can be wu (nothingness).

In the preface of Sinju Dodeokgyeong, Park speaks about Weijin metaphysicians as Jin 晉 period scholars who have much ambition but behave frivolously, relying on empty discourse and endless colloquy. This shows that he was aware of the difference between the perspectives of Wang Bi and Zhu Xi. At the same time, this can also be understood as Park Se-dang’s will to approach and understand the DDJ rather through Zhu Xi’s idea of ti and yong than through Wang Bi’s concepts. In the structure of Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism, the concepts such as Dao and de 德 (virtue), you and wu, ti and yong, li and xiang, and wei and xian correspond to each other, and Park structurally deduced those corresponding concepts from Zhu Xi’s thought to interpret the relationship between Dao and ming.

3.3. The Dilemma: Daoist Ethics Established through Neo-Confucian Cosmology

Park Se-dang not only tried to prove the compatibility of Neo-Confucianism and Daoism by suspending the dichotomy between the Neo-Confucian “theory of li and qi” (理氣論) and Wang Bi’s conception of ti and yong, but Park also took Zhu Xi’s theory of “ti and yong originated from one” as the underlying principle behind his commentary of the DDJ. If it were proven that Neo-Confucianism and Daoism share the same ethical orientation (more specifically, the “sage”), while both at the same time follow the same principle that “ti and yong originated from one”, then the writings of Laozi and Zhuangzi would no longer be heretical books contradicting Neo-Confucian philosophy. But rather, they would be scriptures that only differed from it in terms of their language or methodology. In that case, the Neo-Confucian interpretation of the DDJ might be an ideological strategy to overcome the exclusivity of Neo-Confucianism and the resulting phenomenon of regime fragmentation.27

Even if Zhu Xi’s principle “ti and yong originated from one” is applied to the interpretation of the DDJ, there are difficulties that cannot be solved by the concepts of ti and yong alone because Zhu Xi understood the concept of yong in Buddhism from a dualistic perspective and separated it from ti. Thus, when Zhu Xi discussed Buddhism, he had no choice but to come to the following conclusions: “Buddhism is empty, but Confucianism is substantial; Buddhism is dualistic, but Confucianism is monistic. Buddhism doesn’t value the principles of the world and doesn’t understand them” (Zhu 2023d, no. 126). The yong that Zhu Xi is discussing here is an illusion that is separated from ti, and becomes a “nothingness” that does not actually exist. From that, Zhu Xi inferred, “since Buddha said that all things in heaven and earth are vain (幻妄), the four big artificial combinations (四大假合)28 became nothingness (無)”. In other words, Zhu Xi thought that Buddhism discusses illusionary things that are not real, which meant that the most prominent concept of “nothingness” would not have any real effect. Therefore, Buddhism cannot reach the ultimate purpose of study, as discussed in The Great Learning. These purposes included manifesting “one’s bright virtue” and “loving the people”.29 In short, the concept of “nothingness” in Buddhism deviates from the principle of “ti and yong originated from one” because it suggests that “there can be ti (an ontology or existence) without yong (function)” (有體而無用).

Zhu Xi’s perspectives on Buddhism apply similarly to the teachings of Laozi and Zhuangzi. Zhu Xi often named Laozi in the same breath as Buddha when discussing heresy. The following passage from Chuanxilu (傳習錄, Instructions for practical living) is such an example: “Since the Buddha only talks about ’emptiness’ (空) and Laozi only speaks about ’nothingness’ (無), it is hard to know where reason or li 理 exists [within their system of metaphysics]” (Zhu 2023g). According to Zhu Xi, both the Buddhist concept of “emptiness” and Laozi’s concept of “nothingness” have in common that there is no place for li within these conceptions because they are both objectively non-existent. Here, the concept of li is already separated from yong, which can also be defined as the illusion of physical objects in reality. Zhu Xi then continues: “If something happens right in front of someone that has no shape and no sign (兆) yet still exists, it only can be called ‘empty’ (空蕩蕩). Thus, even if there’s no sign of movement in a state [because it has not yet manifested itself], the people don’t know that everything is already prepared for movement” (Zhu 2023g). Here, the ti of an object already implies the possibilities of the phenomenon, so all things actually exist in an unseparated form of ti and yong, or “shiyou’”實有 (real existence). In short, the ti that Zhu Xi is referring to has the same fundamental meaning as li; it is unrecognizable and, therefore, recognized as “nothingness”. However, because this ti contains the possibility of “ti and yong originated from one”, it also already contains yong even before its point of emergence; thus, it is not separated from yong, and because yong becomes recognizable once it emerges as a phenomenon, ti and yong can be defined as shiyou, or real existence.

The interpretation of the concepts of you and wu in the DDJ according to Zhu Xi’s theory of “ti and yong originated from one” carries the risk of ultimately considering all things and affairs just as illusions. Therefore, for the purpose of merging Confucianism and Daoism, even though Park embraced the ethical view of the sage and the cosmology of “ti and yong originated from one” from Neo-Confucianism as the two main principles of his DDJ commentary, he did not fully adopt the logical structure of Zhu Xi’s thought when it came to the issue of you and wu. At the same time, Park also did not accept Wang Bi’s “theory of respecting nothingness” (尊無論), which was widely accepted at the time. If Park adopted the notion that “nothingness is the fundamental base of everything” (以無爲本) as Wang Bi asserted in his commentary of chapter 40 of the DDJ, then “Although the myriad things are noble, it is with nothingness that they function, thus, they cannot reject nothingness in order to be ti” (B. Wang 2011, pp. 113–14). Wang Bi contradicts Zhu Xi’s claim that wu existed before you. More importantly, Wang Bi thought that, even if ti existed, it could not be established without wu, which meant that ti and yong are separated. This view completely deviates from Zhu Xi’s original conception that “ti and yong originated from one”. For this reason, Park explicitly stated in the preface to his DDJ commentary that the heresy of the DDJ began with the theories advocating respect for “nothingness” by the many scholars of Weijin metaphysics, headed by Wang Bi.

In short, Park Se-dang aimed at building an understanding of where the concepts of you and wu in the DDJ actually both easily mapped to and directly corresponded with Zhu Xi’s idea of “ti and yong originated from one”. To demonstrate that Zhu Xi’s understanding of you or wu was different from the perspective adopted in the DDJ, Park Se-dang provided in-depth commentary on the contents of chapter 21 of the DDJ. Below are the contents of this chapter.

DDJ chapter 21 (Figure 1) concedes that since Dao is ambiguous and dark, Dao is difficult to recognize, but there are xiang and actual wu in it. Park described the characteristics of the unrecognizable Dao as “mysterious” (妙), emphasizing that even though it is difficult to perceive, there clearly is li in all things. In DDJ chapter 14, Dao is also described with the term huhuang 惚恍, which is similar to the two aspects of the Dao described above: huang 惚 (muddled) and hu 恍 (blurred). Park Se-dang explained these terms in the following way: “Symptoms without symptoms and figureless figures resemble so-called metaphysical objects. The term huhuang means indefinite or indistinct. The Dao is described as such because it seems both to exist and not to exist” (S.-d. Park 2013, p. 108). In other words, although it appears that Dao does not exist in its form, Dao does exist as a metaphysical object. A similar observation can be found in Park’s commentary for chapter 21 of the DDJ, where Dao is also defined as a metaphysical object that is both “the utmost empty and the utmost substantial” (至虛而至實). Dao is empty when considered from the perspective of cognitive content, but it is real when considered from the perspective of its functional action; therefore, it is not nothingness in the absolute sense.

In contrast, Zhu Xi interpreted Dao much differently. Based on the same passage in the Daodejing, Zhu Xi interpreted wu 物 and jing 精 as being in the unrecognizable state of huhuang 恍惚. His commentary is as follows.

The distinction between Confucianism and Buddha only lies in the dispute about xu 虛 (emptiness) and shi 實 (substance). Laozi said: “Shadowy and indistinct, yet within it is wu 物 (a thing or object). Dim and dark, yet within it is jing 精 (essence)”. Thus, the substance and essence here are xu.

(Zhu 2023c)

In other words, according to Zhu Xi, the Dao discussed in chapter 21 of the DDJ is affiliated with the category of xu 虛 or emptiness because it is impossible to perceive the mysterious modality of Dao. In contrast to this, Park Se-dang interprets jing 精 (essence) here as being the combination of both li理 (reason or order) and wu 物 (a thing or object), as physical things in reality. This perspective eventually leads Park to the conclusion that li exists in any and all objects. As for the specific sentences “Shadowy and indistinct, yet within it is wu. Dim and dark, yet within it is jing”, Park explains that wu 物 is bound to fall into a contradictory relationship between the unrecognizable “nothingness” (wu 無) and the “physical substance” (you 有). This contradiction he then attempts to resolve by explaining wu 物 through the yi-principle (易理).

For example, in the conclusion of Park’s commentary for chapter 21 of DDJ, he explicitly notes: “Zhou Lianxi said that the infinite ultimate (wuji 無極) is the supreme ultimate (太極)”, which shows that Park tried to explain both the problematic relationships between you and wu and ti and yong using the yi-principle (易理) from the Essay of the Taiji Diagram (太極圖說). In his annotation to chapter 14 of the DDJ, Park supplements the original description of Dao as “seeming to exist but not to exist” (若存若亡) with the description “The ti of Dao is inherently empty” (道體本虛) (S.-d. Park 2013, p. 108). Through Park Se-dang’s annotation below, we can see that he understood xu differently than Zhu Xi, who considered xu to mean that nothing existed at all.

The ti of Dao is essentially xu虛 (empty). But what we see, hear, and touch, what we consider as one, and that what we think it is not light, nor dark, or endlessly extending, everything is close to “youwu” 有物 (things with shape) but eventually returns to “wuwu” 無物 (things without shape). Signs without signs and shapeless shapes resemble so-called metaphysical objects. Huhuang 惚愰 means indefinite or indistinct. The Dao is described as such because it seems both to exist and not to exist.

(H.-s. Kim 2013, p. 108)

In the paragraph above, Park Se-dang describes the state of xu in detail. He writes that xu forms the shape of objects auditorily, visually, tactilely, or by obscure senses. In addition, he mentions the “endlessly extending” (shengsheng 繩繩) shapes without limits, which evade a clear grasp by humans. Park insists that the objects perceived in this way eventually return to a “shapeless state” (wuwu 無物). A similar sentence is found in chapter 40 of DDJ: “The ‘return’ (fan 返) is the movement of the Dao, and the weakness is the ‘function’ (yong 用) of the Dao”. Based on the implications of “return” that are revealed in the sentence “returning to its root is quietude” in chapter 16 of DDJ, the content of chapter 40 can be interpreted as “The movement of Dao occurs in quietude, and it can become stronger after it has been weakened” (S.-d. Park 2013, p. 171). Chapter 40 of the DDJ states, “All things on the earth are born from you, and you is born from wu”. Unlike Wang Bi’s interpretation of you and wu, Park understands these concepts in a spatial and temporal sense: “Movement comes from quietude or inactivity (jing 靜), and strength comes from weakness”30. Park’s idea, which is mentioned in the annotations to chapters 14 and 21, that the ti of you and wu is a metaphysical object, has the same meaning as “the metaphysical realm is called ‘the Way’ (Dao) and the physical realm is called ‘the vessel’ (qi 器)” (Zhu 2019, p. 242). There are “objects with shapes” and “objects without shape” that fill the universe. Park distinguishes here whether the objects are physical (connected to qi 氣) and thus can be recognized with the five senses, or metaphysical (connected to Dao) and cannot be perceived. Based on the above logic, Park’s understanding of the relationship between you and wu can be depicted in the following way.

Figure 2 shows that the way that Park Se-dang distinguishes you and wu is based on both the substance or physical status as well as the function of an object. This radically departs the way that Zhu Xi or Wang Bi distinguished you and wu. Both Zhu Xi and Wang Bi distinguished you and wu according to their cognitive status. Whereas, unlike Zhu and Wang who identified you and wu as well as xu and shi as individual separate states, Park interprets you and wu based on the premise that “ti and yong originated from one source” as a unified, singular body. Park Se-dang’s method for distinguishing “ti and yong originated from one” additionally incorporates concepts from the yi-principle from The Essay of Taiji Diagram. In particular, Park’s interpretation is ultimately in line with Zhu Xi’s perspective on the yi-principle that “[the metaphysical] is shapeless but with li” (無形而有理) (Zhu 2023g). Naturally, the interpretation of the DDJ from this perspective does not deviate significantly from the Neo-Confucian theory.

Park’s understanding of the relationship between both you and wu and xu and shi, which led him to the conclusion that Dao was compatible with Confucian ethics, however, involved two additional problems. First is the question of how to resolve the contradictions between the concepts of you and wu as revealed in the DDJ interpretation through the theory of “ti and yong originated from one source”. Second, is the question of how to explain the ethical justification of actions through the cosmological system discussed above. If the decisive basis for “ti and yong originated from one” has the same ethical goal as “to cultivate oneself and govern others”, then the key question is how can ethical issues be explained through a cosmological system consisting of yi and yong as well as you and wu. However, despite these questions, one thing that is clear is that Park Se-dang’s will to bridge together different systems of ethics and cosmology, as demonstrated in his DDJ commentaries, inherits the Neo-Confucian philosophical traditions of great philosophers through the Song and Ming dynasties. Park’s attempt was not only to connect the values and beliefs of Confucianism and Daoism but also to connect heaven with the people of feudal society to elevate the ethics of the day to an even more superior moral plane (Z. Li 2008, pp. 77–105).

4. The Strategy of Integrating Daoist Ethics and Confucian Cosmology and Its Theoretical Limitations

In the first passage of chapter 42 of the DDJ, the birth of all things is described in the following way: “The Way [Dao] begets one, one begets two, two begets three, and three begets the myriad creatures. The myriad creatures carry on their backs the yin and embrace in their arms the yang and are the blending of the generative forces (chongqi 沖氣) of the two” (S.-d. Park 2013, p. 49). Below is Park’s commentary on this paragraph, which allows us to confirm both his cosmological and ethical perspectives at the same time.

“One” here refers to the supreme ultimate (taiji 太極). Laozi said that “the way begets one” because he took nothingness as the foundation (zong 宗). "Two” refers to yin and yang (liangyi 兩儀), and “three” refers to the “three powers” (sancai 三才). “Three begets the myriad creatures” means that three extreme poles are established and all things on earth emanate from them. The sentence “the myriad creatures carry on their backs the yin and embrace in their arms the yang” means that because all things have received the two qi of yin and yang, upon emerging they hold the energy of yin and yang on their back and in their heart so that they don’t separate. Chongqi (ji 沖氣) here is “empty qi”. There is nothing in all creation that is not in harmony with this “empty qi”. Therefore, everything on earth can coexist without doing harm to each other, and can maintain itself for a long time.

(S.-d. Park 2013, pp. 176–77)

The first thing to note here is that Park Se-dang considers “one” to be the supreme ultimate or taiji. However, logically speaking, since “one” originated from the Dao, the Dao as Park understood it cannot be taiji or the Dao itself. Therefore, it must be the case that the Dao that Park is referring to above is actually referring to the “function (yong)” of Dao.31 Park Se-dang first mentions the existence of wu before the process of creating “one” from the Dao because he interpreted wu as “empty qi”—a type of medium shared by the Dao and everything that exists—and not merely as “nothingness” in a physical or spatiotemporal sense. That is, the Dao as the identity of taiji forms yin and yang, and while Dao holds li in harmony, all things are formed. Park also sought to define Dao in the commentary of the “A Great Master” chapter of Zhuangzi, stating that “the so-called Dao contains one yin and one yang” (一陰一陽所以道) (S.-d. Park 2012, pp. 446–47). In addition, Park commented on the concept of chang 常 in chapter 16 of the DDJ. Park wrote: “Chang 常 refers to a permanent reason. When yin and yang open and close, are active one time and inactive another time, this itself is the continuous reason” (S.-d. Park 2013, p. 113). The concepts of yin and yang here define the li of Dao that do not change along with the actual movements of inactivity (jing 靜) or activity (dong 動). Park’s understanding of the principle of creation of everything is not only consistent with the specific cosmology of the universe (太極陰陽論) as described in the Great Commentary (Xici 繫辭) chapter of the Book of Changes (Yijing 易經) but also generally conforms with “li of taiji” (太極之理). Park Se-dang linked human behavior to the principles depicted in the hexagrams of sun 損 and yi 益 in the Book of Change, and added, “I will regard the ancients’ words regarding sunyi (損益) as the most important teaching” (S.-d. Park 2013, p. 178).

Then, where does the postulation that human behavior should follow cosmological discipline come from? From the perspective of Neo-Confucianism, the li of taiji is established not only as an ontological and cosmological discipline but also as a justification for human behavior. However, the concept of heaven presented in the DDJ has no other meaning than the manifestation of nature that originated from Dao, without a humanized or subjective conception of heaven. For this reason, Park, noticing the gap between ethics and cosmology in this concept of heaven (tian 天), tried to integrate them. For example, in chapter 61 of the DDJ, he interprets the relationship between great and small states by linking them to human character attitudes toward heaven, such as “willingness to follow Heaven” (樂天) or “fearing Heaven” (畏天). Park explains Dao by indirectly referring to the concept of the mandate of heaven (tianming 天命) in the expression “receiving one’s destiny from heaven” (受命於天) in his annotation of chapter 16 of the DDJ (S.-d. Park 2013, p. 113). However, according to Lee Jong-seong’s research, there is no place where the concept of the mandate of heaven is referred to directly in either the Sinju Dodeokgyeong or the Namhwagyeong Juhaesanbo (Lee 2017, p. 176).

There is a fundamental difference between Laozi’s and Confucius’ understanding of heaven, so even though Park interpreted heaven from the Confucian perspective, he failed to find the unifying characteristics between them. The concepts of di帝 (the lord or heavenly emperor) and Dao appear together in chapter 4 of the DDJ: “I don’t know whose son it [the Dao] is. It seems to have preceded di 帝 [the lord]” (S.-d. Park 2013, p. 8). Park interpreted di here simply as a synonym for heaven (tian 天), lacking human characteristics. This was necessary because it is only possible to avoid the logical error that Dao preceded God if the humanized tian is reverted to tian in the objective sense. This also shows that Park Se-dang was clearly aware of the difference between the concepts of tian in Daoism and Confucianism. Furthermore, Park interpreted wuwei無爲 (inaction), which refers to refraining from manipulative behavior, as an action consistent with the ethical virtues of Neo-Confucianism. Park’s notes in chapter 48 of the DDJ: “Laozian thought lets everyone reverse their mistakes to preserve the natural state of things, but doesn’t dare to press things to happen, for the Dao exists in wuwei 無爲 (inaction) and wushi 無事 (being free from affairs). This is why it’s precious to lose it every day” (S.-d. Park 2013, p. 189). Wuwei here does not mean avoiding the manipulative behavior to comply with nature that Laozi aimed for, but the learning method of negation and self-control that is discussed in chapter 15 of Analects: “Is not Shun (舜) the one who governed effectively by inaction (wuwei 無爲)?” (Ni 2017, p. 354).

Park Se-dang’s attempt to interpret the DDJ through Confucianism has its limitations. Park tried to define the common ethics between Confucianism and Daoism and supported this understanding through an integrated cosmology. However, Park’s interpretations sometimes deviated from the original intention of Laozian thought. Yet, at the same time, the depth of Park Se-dang’s willingness to achieve a system that showed the compatibility of Confucianism and Daoism helped take the commentary on Daoist thought throughout the Korean peninsula to new heights and inspired others to venture into other reinterpretations and integrated thought.

5. Conclusions

This research study aimed to analyze and critically examine the theoretical strategies used in, and the purpose of, Park Se-dang’s Sinju Dodeokgyeong, which was the first complete commentary of the DDJ in Korea. This study also appraised the implications and academic influence of Park’s thoughts in the history of Joseon philosophy.

Sinju Dodeokgyeong is one of the five extant works of DDJ commentary in Korea. This work was compiled and written after Yi I’s Suneon, which was a compilation of commentaries to selected chapters of the DDJ. The 17th century—the time when the Sinju Dodeokgyeong was written—was for Korea a period of much internal and external political turmoil. Events like the Manchu invasion of Korea in 1636 (丙子胡亂) and intensifying factionalism within the Joseon government destabilized the livelihoods of many on the peninsula and caused many to doubt Neo-Confucian rhetoric and beliefs. During this time, Park Se-dang, the author of the Sinju Dodeokgyeong, had developed a critical view of Neo-Confucianism and the academic dogmatism revolving around it. This eventually led to his reorientation toward studying the philosophy of Laozi and Zhuangzi. The Sinju Dodeokgyeong reflects Park’s concern for solving practical problems that eventually led him to explore the DDJ, which under the ruling Neo-Confucian ideology, had long been excluded as a heretical text.

This study on Park Se-dang’s Sinju Dodeokgyeong was motivated by the interesting turn of events in Korean history that surround the text. Soon after Park Se-dang’s Sinju Dodeokgyeong, there was a sudden emergence of three other DDJ commentaries. Up to now, a number of research studies have found a cause for this change in regional factors, such as the influx of new knowledge from the Qing dynasty and Western Learning and from various political and social factors on the peninsula. This study attempts to shed light on the logical errors of Park’s approach to coercing unity between Neo-Confucianism and Daoism and seeks to establish it as an equally fundamental but thus far neglected cause.

Park’s strategy to interpret the DDJ with the objective of demonstrating compatibility between Confucianism and Daoism can be summarized as “interpreting Daoism through Confucian theory”. This study examined this strategy in four steps: (1.) Park’s clarification on the historical hereticalization of the DDJ, which Park then used as a starting point from where he began to interpret Daoist thought through Confucian theory; (2.) Park defined the ethics and virtues of Confucian and Daoist thought; (3.) Park examined the cosmological systems of Confucianism and Daoism; and (4.) Park interpreted Daoist moral ethics through Neo-Confucian cosmology. The first of these steps is detailed meticulously in the introduction of the Sinju Dodeokgyeong. Following Park’s reasoning, Laozi and Confucius shared the same scholarly goal when examined within the flow of the history of thought, but the DDJ had been misunderstood. This is because Weijin metaphysicians misinterpreted Laozi’s intentions in a metaphysical and extremely abstract fashion. Park’s explanation that Laozi’s thoughts in the DDJ have subsequently been misrepresented can be taken as Park’s strategy of proving that the discussions on DDJ are legitimate.

The subsequent steps were largely carried out through argumentation on the ethical and cosmological levels. First, Park Se-dang attempted to show that Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s thoughts were not heresy, but rather scriptures with a language and methodology that differed from Confucian texts. Park went about this by showing that Confucianism and Daoism not only had the same ethical orientation but at the same time also abided by the same cosmological principles. For this purpose, Park first argued that both Confucianism and Daoism aim to reach the ultimate goal of “cultivating oneself and governing others” as well as an awareness for solving practical problems. Next, in an attempt at reinterpretation on the cosmological level, Park interpreted the DDJ through the relationship between ti and yong from Zhu Xi’s theory and attempted to merge the two concepts. One issue of contention was whether the relationships between the concept of dao and ming as well as you and wu could be understood as dualistic in nature similar to xu and shi in Zhu Xi’s writings or you and wu in Wang Bi’s writings. Park needed to overcome these issues to negate the premise of Zhu Xi’s criticisms of Daoism and Buddhism. These issues became the core of Park’s strategy for a cosmological reinterpretation of Daoist thought. To this end, Park interpreted the relationship between you and wu in DDJ through the principle that “the infinite ultimate is the supreme ultimate” in the Essay on the TaiJi diagram, proving that the concepts of you and wu correspond to Zhu Xi’s standpoint of “the Dao is shapeless but there is li”. Finally, Park Se-dang attempted to reduce the gap between ethics and cosmology; this strategy is in accordance with the procedure of Neo-Confucian scholarship throughout both the Song and Ming dynasties. Ultimately this was an attempt to raise the position of an ethical subject up to the position of transcendental ethics by connecting heaven and people. However, unlike in Confucianism, the concept of heaven introduced in the DDJ text has no other meaning than that of a natural manifestation of the Dao, as opposed to a more personified or subjective form of heaven. In other words, Park Se-dang attempted to narrow the gap between ethics and cosmology by converting the concept of "heaven" in DDJ into a humanized heaven. However, using Park Se-dang’s strategy based on Confucian cosmology to prove the legitimacy of human behavior that Laozi mentioned in DDJ had its limits. Not only is Park’s method of interpretation highly arbitrary, but it also is not convincing because it deviates from the original intent of the DDJ.

Ultimately, Park’s attempt to achieve complete integration between Confucianism and Daoism by interpreting the DDJ using the theoretical structure of Confucianism failed. However, in the 18th century, Joseon Silhak scholars who had also strived for viable solutions to unifying the two systems of thought were greatly influenced by the work of Park Se-dang. That is, Park’s legacy is that he considered a new frontier of philosophical thought by reducing the scourge of scholarly heterodoxy around Daoism in Korea to resolve practical issues of the time. After Park, much work in supplementing and modifying the limitations of Park Se-dangs’s interpretive strategy continued into the 19th century, being the focus of many Joseon Silhak scholars. In other words, Park’s writings laid the foundation for a revitalization and reinterpretation of Daoist thought in Korea.