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Article
Peer-Review Record

Taiyi: The Axis of Philosophy of the Laozi

Religions 2023, 14(11), 1372; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111372
by Yongfeng Huang 1,2 and Zhikun Li 1,*
Reviewer 1:
Reviewer 2: Anonymous
Reviewer 3: Anonymous
Religions 2023, 14(11), 1372; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111372
Submission received: 13 June 2023 / Revised: 3 August 2023 / Accepted: 15 September 2023 / Published: 31 October 2023
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Pathways into Early Daoist Philosophy)

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Review of “Taiyi: The Axis of Philosophy of the Laozi”

 

Overall, this is an excellent paper that offers an interesting interpretation to the philosophy of the Laozi by going deeper into the metaphysical background of the time by concentrating on Taiyi, a notion that begins as a celestial and religious notion. I find this interpretation fascinating, well-constructed, I recommend it to be accepted with no revisions necessary. I do have two minor comments, one stylistic and one regarding content, which are my own questions and are not crucial to be dealt with in the paper.

1.     The beginning of the paper states that taiyi is a major notion for the Laozi, yet the Laozi does not use the term taiyi—and in guodian, the version frequently cited herein, even the term yi does not appear. It was unclear to me if the claim was that the Taiyishengshui was a part of the Laozi, was Daoist, or if it served inspiration for the Laozi. I do not know that Guodian is the primary text upon which the Laozi was written, or merely excerpts from a complete and fuller version. It would be helpful for the readers if you could clarify these points—because although much becomes clear in the third section, on the 5th page, I would perhaps suggest that this appears in the beginning.

2.     I feel that the proof that taiyi is central in Daoist philosophy (pre-Huang Lao) is insufficient. All Daoist works that mention taiyi and are cited in this paper are from a later period (assuming that the Taiyishengshui is not Daoist). They include other influences. I did not understand why the Zhouyi mentioned at all? Could the common metaphysical background of the time be connected to the cosmology of the Zhouyi? Is the Taiyishengshui a detailed cosmology based on the Zhouyi, or a unique cosmology that served as a basis in itself? If it does reflect on the Zhouyi, then perhaps we should reconsider the origin of Dao in the Laozi to a phenomenological explanation constructed from the meeting of wu and you?

 

Aside from these questions, which are not extremely crucial for this paper, and can perhaps be dealt with in further research, this paper is excellent, reveals a new understanding of Daoist philosophy through shedding light on the background metaphysics and cosmology of the time and questioning the background of Daoist thought in general. I hope for further research on this topic by the author because there are still a few issues I would hope to see resolved.

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

I think the question raised by the Zhuangzi about the significance of taiyu for the Laozi, despite its absence, is definitely interesting hermeneutically. I also think that working out the astronomical history of the meaning of taiyi and some of the scholarship marshaled to that end is also really interesting.

At the same time, I have serious reservations about the details of the various analytical perspectives and the main thesis of the paper, which claims "profound" and "far-reaching" impact on the discourse of the Laozi and "profound and nuanced" insights into human nature and epistemology.  My hesitation about this claim is grounded in the fact that taiyi is simply assimilated into an extant understanding of the Laozi as an implicit concept that is functionally synonymous with dao. Logically speaking, I don't see how it can change our understanding in profound or nuanced ways, if it is functionally equivalent to dao and we're using our reading of dao to establish the meaning of taiyi. Moreover, profundity and nuance can only come from a close analysis of what precisely is meant in this context by ontology and epistemology and how what is meant is truly distinctive to this text/tradition. But there is no real analysis that digs down to this level. Rather, these overarching categories (cosmology, ontology, metaphysics, epistemology) are never critically considered and views are simply assimilated into them, such that Daoism begins to appear quite Platonic or neo-Platonic! Given just what is said in the paper, I'm not sure how the author could substantively distinguish taiyi from Aristotle's "prime mover" or Plato's "one."  That strikes me as a very problematic outcome.  

The opening discussions that aim to pin down the origin of the meaning of taiyi in astronomical terms is quite interesting. And yet, there is no effort made to reconcile for the reader what seem like straightforward contradictions once the author slides into a more cosmological perspective. For example, the author claims that taiyi as the "one" "embodies a force of generation and creation" but then 10 lines later insists that taiyi is defined by its nonduality and indivisibility as the "one." Daoism is replete with contradictions and it isn't that this tension cannot be resolved, but there is nothing by way of argument to resolve this tension for the reader. This concern pervaded my reading of the text, because there are so many big claims made about taiyi from astronomical, cosmological, symbolic, ontological, metaphysical, epistemological perspectives that themselves are not clearly defined. I found myself frustrated by the constant dropping of philosophical rhetoric without the attending logical control and clarity to which philosophy aspires. 

For example, in the opening paragraph of section 3, the author characterizes taiyi's significance as "symbolic" "metaphysical" "ontological" and "cosmological" without ever being clear about what the author really means by these terms and how they are positioned vis-a-vis one another.  And even more critically, there is no consideration of the deeper hermeneutical question as to whether conceptual frameworks like "metaphysics" and "ontology" are at all appropriate to the classical Chinese context. For example, the claim that dao has "ontological" significance (p6) is NOT at all a consensus in the scholarship. Indeed, one of the scholarly weaknesses of the paper is that there is no engagement (albeit a brief mention of A.C. Graham) with English-language scholarship, where there are many high-powered scholars who argue that the categories of metaphysics and ontology are utterly inappropriate for classical Chinese thought, because they bend our reading towards the concerns and presuppositions of classical Greek philosophy and the resulting Western tradition.

On page 6, the author notes the "aforementioned three facets of ontological significance," but I can't locate where they are "aforementioned." And when these facets are developed, the discussion of ontology is quite thin. What is discussed as ontology seems more like cosmology or a kind of ontotheology as it is grounded in the notions of genesis, reliance, and dominion. This conception of ontology seems more appropriate to Aquinas than to Daoism. The fact that taiyi and dao are referred to as "entities" in several places further expresses this confusion about ontology. The author argues that ontology and cosmology "seamless coexist" within the Laozi, but this claim seems to simply support an equivocation between the notions, which are never clearly defined. 

When the author turns to epistemology, again I don't find this discussion very nuanced about what kind of knowing we're talking about. Indeed, on page 12, the author cites the opening of ch 48 of the Laozi in a very misleading way, such that it presents a rather glaring misreadingIn Ch 48, there is a contrast being drawn between the Confucian virtue of learning characterized as the accumulation of knowledge that begins the passage and the Daoist emphasis on loss, reduction, shedding in order to realize wuwei and forms of non-propositional knowing that occupies the remainder of the passage. The author cites the first part of the passage as though it is being endorsed. It clearly is not. Rather, it is the view being expressly criticized. The author later cites the Daoist view on "stripping" or "losing" knowledge, but never recognizes the rhetorical situation or the critical point being made in relation to their earlier claim. As a result, we don't learn what is meant by knowing in a Daoist context, irrespective of its connection to taiyi.  

The comment on page 4 that quickly tries to connect taiyi, the Liji, and rites is very cryptic. I can only guess at what is being claimed there.

In conclusion, there is much of value in this paper, despite my critical comments. But the larger framing of the paper and "philosophical" analyses in terms of ontology and epistemology (alongside the other big categories) is not very helpful because it collapses all the differences into sameness. There needs to be much more conceptual and critical control over the main analytical standpoints in order to give the paper hermeneutical nuance it needs and to be responsible to the ambitions of the project.  

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 3 Report

Within this article, the author aims to demonstrate how the concept of tai yi 太一 forms the central axis around which the entire philosophy of the Daoist classic Laozi 老子 revolves.

To be blunt: they do not succeed.

As the author admits, the term itself does not appear in the transmitted Laozi at all. Instead, they base their theory on a quote from the Zhuangzi's 莊子 "Tian xia" 天下 chapter. This alone is already questionable as the textual histories of both Zhuangzi and Laozi are highly disputed and we simply do not know what version of a Laozi, if any at all, the composer(s) of the "Tian xia" had at hand. Indeed, the association of tai yi with Lao Dan 老聃 appears to be better attested for the Han era rather than the WS and might well be constructed in retrospect, inspired by the further development of the so-called Huang-Lao 黃老 movement and the Daoist religions. (Within this context, the author might want to include a short discussion of the Laozi ming 老子銘 in the discussion.)

The author then proceeds to cite from various other sources to demonstrate that the concept of tai yi played an integral role in Warring States astronomy and philosophy, and therefore also the Laozi. But a closer look at the citations reveals that only one or two of them actually make use of the term tai yi. Instead the author expects the reader to simply accept that the terms tai yi, tai ji 太極, tian ji 天機, and later on the Dao 道, as employed by the Warring States writers (some of the cited sources are not even from the WS, as, e.g., the Wenzi 文子) all denote exactly the same idea. Whereas I agree, that there are overlaps in their meaning, they are not simply interchangeable, particularly not when we talk about the works associated with different thought traditions and authored centuries apart. Just the term tai yi went through various developments and has been employed differently even within single works. To discuss a text in which the term itself does not even appear on the basis of this vague synopsis appears rather far-fetched.

Although I do enjoy the thought process of the author and also the rather innovative new translations of the Laozi passages, the idea that tai yi denoted one single "pivotal axe" around which WS era philosophy, and in particular a WS era version of the Laozi, revolves, is simply not adequately proven.

I would suggest the author to consult more literature around this topic, shorten the manifold passages that basically just reiterate how important tai yi was, and instead substantiate this claim with proper proof and references.

To keep it simple: the literature listed in Fabrizio Pregadio (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Taoism (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 956-59 should already be a decent starting point for further inquiry.

While the English might not be incorrect per se, the article has clearly been translated from a Chinese draft. The writing style is repetitive and uneconomical, often using 3 sentences to simply say: "Therefore,..." In several instances, the author/translator appear to employ high-sounding terms simply for the sake of sounding professional, without having proper command over them.

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Round 2

Reviewer 3 Report

The article has been improved significantly.

Most importantly, purpose, scope, methodology, and audience have been stated far more clearly, thus rendering most of my remaining issues obsolete.

Comparing the original submission and the later additions, there seems to be a leap in quality. That might need some adjustment. But in general it seems that the remaining errors can easily be dealt with by a copy-editor.

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