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Article

Will Cyborgs Ever Be Humans in the Image and Likeness of God?

by
Krzysztof Krzemiński
Faculty of Theology, Nicolas Copernicus University, 87-100 Toruń, Poland
Religions 2021, 12(10), 850; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12100850
Submission received: 14 September 2021 / Revised: 27 September 2021 / Accepted: 5 October 2021 / Published: 9 October 2021

Abstract

:
Advances in technology and genetic engineering have rekindled the hopes of some communities for human immortality on earth. Projects aimed at copying the human brain for the purpose of enabling humans to achieve “cybernetic eternity” are emerging. From the perspective of Christian anthropology, it is advisable to ask the following question: is a cyborg a human being in the image of God? It boils down to the criteria for being in the image of God. The first of these is creativity, understood as the actualized relationship of the human with their Creator. For the human is not a product of even the most brilliant minds and technologies, but a creature for whom a personal relationship with the Persons of the Holy Trinity is constitutive in nature.

1. Introduction

Future technological development will allow human beings to gain immortality on earth, according to futurologist Dr. Ian Pearson. This will be achieved by copying the human mind and moving it into a cloud storage (Osiński 2018, 2021). Thus, such a copied mind will live eternally in digital form, able to inhabit the body of any cyborg. Dr. Pearson presumes that the result will not just be software, but a living, although digital, person. In contrast, Yuval Noah Harari, professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, claims that with the latest technologies and genetic engineering, humans will undergo evolution. Hence, they will become more powerful, live much longer, and even be immortal (Harari 2017). In the next 200 years the rich will become cyborgs because of the gradual integration of natural and artificial components. It may sound like a science fiction movie script, but Professor Harari seems to be serious in his statements. In his opinion, humanity will develop to such an extent that it will eventually overcome death with its own powers.
For quite some time, there has been ongoing work in the field of technology ensuring longevity and aiming toward the implantation of human consciousness into a machine. Thus, the Russian billionaire, Dmitry Itskov, is trying to achieve immortality by becoming an android and wants to accomplish this by 2045. The famous scientist Stephen Hawking (d. 2018) believed that the project is perfectly feasible. Ben Goertzel, a Doctor of Mathematics who is one of the leading architects in the field of artificial intelligence, also dreams of human-made immortality. In cooperation with David Hanson of Hong Kong, he has constructed the social humanoid robot “Sophia”—a fembot, that is, a female-like robot that was granted citizenship in Saudi Arabia in late 2018. Goertzel is currently working on the software for a humanoid robot that is intended to register the memories, opinions, and beliefs of Bina Rothblatt. The aim is to “capture” the human spirit and perpetuate it so that it can function after the death of its “prototype” (Wirtwein and Przegalińska 2019).
According to Professor Harari, “we no longer need God, but technology.” For him, from a religious point of view, Silicon Valley is the most interesting place on earth, for scientists are there developing a “techno-religion.” In his opinion, new technologies will turn humans into cyborgs and equip them with immortality (García-Barranquero 2021, p. 179).
Is that really the case? Is a cyborg that is in line with the understanding of Christian anthropology—according to the encyclopedic definition derived from literature and science fiction movies: a human being or an animal whose particular organs have been replaced by technical devices, or a robot that looks like a human or a living organism enhanced by mechanical devices—indeed a human being?
This article endeavors to look at these futuristic predictions from the standpoint of Christian anthropology. Looking to the future, will it be possible for a cyborg to actually become a human being made in the image of God? Does artificial intelligence—and not Jesus Christ—have the ability to provide humans with immortality?

2. From Homo Sapiens to Homo Cyborg?

The case of Peter Scott-Morgan testifies to the incredible possibilities opened up to humans by the development of the latest technologies. This British scientist was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. In spite of that, he is not about to give up.
This is where he resembles Stephen Hawking—a brilliant astrophysicist who was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis at the age of 21. Doctors gave him a maximum of 2–3 years to live. Owing to the application of modern scientific discoveries, Hawking lived over 50 years. The same applies to Scott-Morgan, who uses state-of-the-art technology to sustain life and treats his body as a testing ground (Kowalski 2020). After the disease was discovered in 2017, doctors predicted he would live only a few months. The year is now 2021 and he is still alive. In 2020, he was featured in the Channel 4 documentary Peter: The Human Cyborg. He met Hawking only once, but that was enough for him to seize the genius’ rule: “always think about what you can do, not what you cannot do.” He wants to become part machine and part wetware. This term is used to describe those elements of computer hardware and software that can be linked to biological life forms, such as humans. In collaboration with the world of science, Scott-Morgan is working on the improvement of his senses. In the future, his entire exterior is to be electronic and regularly upgraded. Scott-Morgan has become an advocate of the idea that it is a fundamental human right to live in the form in which one wishes to exist—whoever they are, regardless of their origin, circumstances, or ambitions (Zagórna 2020).
Scott-Morgan wants—with the help of scientists and the latest technologies—to transform himself into Peter 2.0—a cyborg. By cyborg, he means the most advanced human cybernetic organism that has ever been created in the 13.8 billion years of human existence. Almost everything in it will be irreversibly changed—body and brain. The physical interaction with the world will become robotic. The five senses will be enhanced. Part of the brain and external personality will become electronic, which will be partly hardware and partly software (Sikorski 2019). As he stresses, the motto guiding him in this is: “I am not dying, I am transforming.” Because of technology, he is able—in overcoming pathological changes—to speak and express his emotions. The number of modifications he has already made is impressive. A specific exoskeleton allows him to stand on his feet, and in the future, it is even expected to enable movement. His brain is directly connected to the computer. His paralyzed face is to be replaced by a hyper-realistic avatar that will not only “speak” but also express emotions in parallel. Lama Nachman, director of Anticipatory Computing at Intel Labs, is working on solving the problem of interpersonal communication.
In May 2019, Peter Scott-Morgan said, “I will continue to evolve, dying as a human, living as a cyborg” (Zagórna 2020). He is Peter 2.0, an entity that exists physically—and online. It is a living organism permanently fused with a machine and artificial intelligence—not to acquire superhuman abilities, but to overcome the limitations caused by disease. Some people say that, if Scott-Morgan succeeds, modern technologies will be able to help the sick and paralyzed, and this gives enormous hope to people from all over the world (Kowalski 2020).
At the Consumer Electronics Show (CES) 2020, the Samsung-related company STAR Labs unveiled a prototype of an artificial human identified as NEON. Perfection is still a long way off, but the idea is under constant refinement. The intention of Pranav Mistry, head of STAR Labs, is for NEON to become “an independent yet virtual being, that can show emotions and learn from experiences.” NEON is meant to be a virtual companion with whom a human can build shared experiences and memories (Florencka 2020).

3. Is a Cyborg a Person?

As for the main topic, it appears necessary to answer the question of the personal status of the creation that has become the work of the latest technologies (Szopa 2021, pp. 198–202). Raymond Kurzweil tries to explain the viewed developments. In his opinion, the process of evolution has gradually accelerated. According to the scientist, this has resulted in an increasingly sophisticated way of recording and handling information, which in turn leads to the fact that innovations created by evolution are stimulating and enable even faster progress (Kurzweil 2013, p. 53; Hołub 2015, pp. 83–94). Kurzweil is not alone in this, for a similar belief that humans will become cyborgs at some stage of their development is proclaimed by Hans Moravec (Moravec 1999) and Kevin Warwick (Warwick 2004). According to Julian Savulescu of Oxford University, transferring the contents of human minds to systems characterized by artificial intelligence represents one of the most advanced capabilities of human development (Savulescu 2009). Kurzweil believes that
“every form of human knowledge and artistic expression—scientific and engineering ideas and designs, literature, music, photographs, movies—can be expressed through digital information. … Human brains work digitally as well, by a discrete stimulation of neurons. The networks of our interneuron connections can be described digitally, and the structure of our brains is determined by a surprisingly short digital genetic code”
He sees the possibility of scanning the human brain and copying it. This process—in line with his thought—could capture a person’s entire personality, memory, skills, and history. To try “uploading” human patterns into a suitable non-biological substrate could be one way of gaining control of human intelligence (Kurzweil 2013, p. 370). What Kurzweil has in mind here is the posthuman existence, some form of natural existence. The vision of overcoming biology and replacing it with artificial products of technology places the human being in a one-dimensional reality of the physical and the biological (over time—postbiological).
The solutions proposed are internally contradictory, according to Brent Waters. In order to accomplish the potentiality of the human, it is suggested to destroy the body, which, after all, makes a human being human. Thereby, despite all the rhetoric on improving bodily functions, the project is driven by an attitude of resentment toward human corporeality (Waters 2010).
Hence arises the question: does the information obtained from scanning neurons contain data on the psychological and personality properties of a person? In line with Grzegorz Hołub, the emergent self is more than just the sum of the properties of the structures that created it. Moreover, “scanning the very structures of the brain and nervous system, understood as microstructures, does not lead to the knowledge about certain properties which constitute it at macro level” (Hołub 2015, p. 89). In this regard, Bruce Tonn inquired about psychological motivations and the collective unconscious (Tonn 2011, pp. 25–34).
Who is a human as a person in light of the proposed solutions? Grzegorz Hołub defines this concept a “bundle” (Hołub 2015, p. 90; Hołub 2010, pp. 207–10). The person appears as a bundle of information, a bundle of higher mental properties. This understanding often emerges in bioethical debates and is referred to as the naturalistic concept of the person (Walters 1997). Personism is another name for it, under which killing a human being may be permissible, but killing a person understood as an existence with moral status is unacceptable. This, however, is determined by the possession of personal properties characteristic of a maturely developed personality (awareness, self-awareness, ability to enter into relationships). Peter Singer and Michael Tooley are equated with these views on personalism (Hołub 2005, p. 189).
Ray Kurzweil raises a question as well, with regard to the identity of the posthuman person—Will Dmitry Itskow be the same person after having his brain scanned? The problem is addressed, among others, by Derek Parfit in his book Reasons and Persons (Parfit 1984, 2021). According to Kurzweil, the copy of a given person, although it may look and function like the original, no longer meets the criterion of personal identity. “Thus, the scanning and transmission of a person is not a form of radical life extension,” Hołub concludes (Hołub 2015, p. 91). Kurzweil states that copying the brain and destroying the original indicates the end of the person. Despite the fact that a copy holds the capability of convincingly embodying the original, it does not constitute a continuation of its existence (Kurzweil 2013, p. 371).
This standpoint is inconvenient for a movement whose main goal is to transcend the barriers of biology, that is, to enable the human’s gradual independence from natural limitations. At best, one can speak of prolonging the existence of the bundle of information reflecting a given personality. Still—as Hołub points out—the bundle itself is not a person. As a result, “the idea of person uploading means at most the multiplication (proliferation) of some set of information” (Hołub 2015, p. 91). Kurzweil considers that scanning does not allow for the transfer of a person’s subjective awareness. He perceives the problem in relation to the consciousness associated with abstract thinking, which, for example, functions in the creation of mathematics or philosophy, but he fails to identify the place of this important type of awareness in the project of posthuman existence that he is developing. However, according to Hołub, this clearly weakens his reflection and the strength of justification for the propositions put forward (Hołub 2015, p. 93).

4. Elements That Constitute the Human Being

From the context above, it seems appropriate to ask the question—with reference to theological anthropology, where the “object,” meaning the human, is read in the light of the Divine Revelation—about human essence, that is, what actually makes a human being a human? (Napiórkowski 2002, p. 79). Benedict XVI emphasizes that it is necessary to “start again from God” in order to restore to the human “all his dimensions and full dignity”. In the constitution Gaudium et spes, the Second Vatican Council pointed to the fundamental principle of Christian anthropology: “The Bible teaches that man was created ‘in the image of God’” (Gaudium et Spes, n. 12; Scanziani 2007, pp. 633–52). This truth is stressed by Cardinal Chistoph Schönborn when he claims that “in the concept of God’s image, the Council found the ‘leitmotif’ of the Church’s teaching about man” (Schönborn 2008, p. 49; Delhaye 1967, pp. 159–60). John Paul II pointed to the importance of the theology of imago Dei: “Man is in the heart of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit from the very beginning. Was he not created in the image and likeness of God? Apart from God man does not ‘make any sense’. Man ‘makes sense’ in the world only as an image and likeness of God. Otherwise one would have to say, as indeed some have done, that man is ‘a useless passion’” (Paul 1998, p. 702). The human being—as we read in the Book of Genesis—was created “in the image of God” (imago Dei) (cf. Gen. 1:26–27; 5:1). God is reflected in the whole human person. The Polish dogmatist Czesław Bartnik stresses, that “being ‘God’s Icon’ is the most perfect, supernatural genealogy of man and establishes a personal connection with his ‘source’” (Bartnik 2000, p. 307). Therefore, as “the image of God,” he or she can be God’s “associate,” engage in dialogue with God, and enter into communion with Him” (Bartnik 2000, p. 307; Pontificia 2019, no. 45–68).
Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God, raised the human being as the image of God to the level of salvation. The redemption accomplished by Him is the renewal of the image of God in the human. In Jesus Christ as the “radiance of the Father’s glory” (Heb. 1:3) and “the image of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15; cf. John 12:45; 14:9), mankind has received the fullness of God’s image—which in the human is not a static reality, but a dynamic one, open to complementation. Human persons are called and enabled by the grace of God to conform themselves ever more through holiness, love, and personal communion to the divine image of Jesus Christ, and on the path of Christian life the process of this divinization takes place. The dynamic of God’s iconicity is completed when humans perfect themselves, sanctify, acquire values, fight sin, and deepen their communion with the Divine Persons of the Holy Trinity (Bartnik 2000, p. 310).
“The truth is that—as Vaticanum Secundum teaches—only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light. ... Christ fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear. ... For by His incarnation the Son of God has united Himself in some fashion with every man. He worked with human hands, He thought with a human mind, acted by human choice and loved with a human heart. Born of the Virgin Mary, He has truly been made one of us, like us in all things except sin”
The Catechism accentuates that “the human person, created in the image of God, is a being at once corporeal and spiritual ... Man, whole and entire, is therefore willed by God ... The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the ‘form’ of the body. That is, because of its spiritual soul that the body made of matter becomes a living, human body; spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature” (Catechism 1993, nn. 362–65).
With regard to the aforementioned substantial aspects of being imago Dei, it is worth confronting the position of Christian anthropology with the features of a being produced by modern technology. Does a cyborg comply with the aforesaid features of imago Dei?
(a) 
Creativity—the Relationship between the Human and God the Creator
Gerhard Müller points out in Katholische Dogmatik—after Genesis 1:27; 2:7—that the human being is a creation of God. Creativity means that in the whole reality of humans, their existence, and the realization of their spiritual-bodily being, the transcendental relation to God the Creator as the beginning and end is exclusively and fully constituted. It is not about the cosmological beginning of the world, the material conditions of the evolutionary and genetic origin of humans as a species and individuals, nor their transience and insignificance or the experience of human fragility and helplessness in the face of the laws of nature and impermanence (Müller 2014, p. 111; 2015, p. 143).
Creativity defines everything that humans experience—thanks to the will of God—as being existentially different from God but allowing them to realize themselves in relation to the Creator (Roszak 2018). It is understood not only as the first cause, but also as the principle (arche) of the human being. This constitutive reference allows human persons to read themselves as relational beings. Because of relational identity, humans understand themselves as persons, that is, beings unconditionally endowed with autonomy, subsistence. By owning themselves, humans are able to freely dispose of themselves, enter into personal (free and conscious) relationships with others, and identify themselves with them in love (relationality, transcendence of self). Vaticanum Secundum teaches, that “by his innermost nature man is a social being, and unless he relates himself to others he can neither live nor develop his potential” (Pastoral 1965, n. 12). Humans can then actualize their transcendental relationship with the Creator in the history of salvation. Furthermore, they may also adopt an attitude of adoration, obedience, thanksgiving, and love toward God, not as humiliating dependence and immaturity (as atheism alleges), but as harmonizing with God’s personal love for the human in holiness, justice, grace, justification, and forgiveness of sins. A relationship thus understood makes a partnership built on dialogue and personal communication between the created human being and their Creator possible. Second Vatican Council stated that through the gift of the Holy Spirit “man is called to communion with God. From the very circumstance of his origin man is already invited to converse with God. For man would not exist were he not created by Gods love and constantly preserved by it; and he cannot live fully according to truth unless he freely acknowledges that love and devotes himself to His Creator” (Pastoral 1965, n. 19). “The constitution of man as a creature endowed with spirit and freedom reveals him as a living being who, by its very principle and always, can be either a ‘hearer of the word’ or the recipient of God’s useful free action in history” (Müller 2014, p. 112; 2015, p. 143).
The image of God (imago Dei) is in humans, by its very nature, directed toward completion. This urges the human to become an even greater, aware, and active image of God. To this end, it is necessary for the human to constantly learn, ponder, and contemplate the mystery of the personal life of the Persons in the Holy Trinity. Cardinal Angelo Scola links the truth about the iconicity of the human with the sonship of God. Integrating anthropology with Christology allows us to grasp the fullness of what is human in the humanity of the Son of God (Balthasar 2004, pp. 23–42; Bettega 2007, pp. 19–21; Colzani 2003, p. 496; Bordoni 1982, p. 213). “What the Old Testament reveals as a special nature, which the human being created by God receives by virtue of its unique reference to God, is fully realized as a sonship in the event of Jesus Christ. Man is a creation intended to live as a son of God—in accordance with the form of the Only Begotten Son, who is Jesus Christ” (Scola 2005, pp. 156–57).
(b) 
Corpore et anima unus—“One Body and Soul”
The biblical account of the calling of humans into existence indicates that, as beings created by God, they are both corporeal and spiritual beings. The material element is referred to by the Hebrew baśar or the Greek sarx, soma. The noun baśar is derived from the verb create (bara) and signifies, in the biblical sense, the whole person—for the Bible takes a holistic view of the human person. When Christians speaks of the human, they cannot fail to include the “soul” or “spirit” (Sacred 1979). The Bible and Christian tradition mainly employ two terms: soul—nephesh, psyche, anima, and spirit—ruah, pneuma, spirytus. The soul is a “living being” (nephesh hajjah), “breath of life” (nishmā hajjim), “mental life,” and a sensual soul (cf. Gen. 1:30; 2:7). While “Spirit,” on the other hand, has “wind,” “breath” and “breath of the inner life” at its core. In the biblical context it most often reflects cognition, intellect, understanding, judgment, and dynamism of the will and emotions. At present, the term “person” (faneh, panim, prosopon, hipostasis, persona) enters the picture. It signifies, first of all, the whole human, but seems to be used to render the spiritual world of the human being, that is, as a synonym for “soul” (Bartnik 2000, pp. 380–89). The Catechism of the Catholic Church concludes, that “the term soul often means human life in Scripture (Matt. 16:25–26; John 15:13) or the whole human person (Acts 2:41). It also signifies everything that is innermost (Matt. 26:38; John 12:27) and most valuable in a human (Matt. 10:28; 2 Macc. 6:30); that which makes the human in a special way the image of God: ‘soul’ signifies the spiritual principle in man” (Catechism 1993, n. 363; Berry 2017, pp. 96–103).
From the perspective of Christian anthropology, the human being is both “body and soul.” Neither the body itself nor the soul itself is a human. This standpoint—as Saša Horvat notes—is referred to as the Aristotelian–Thomistic hylomorphism (Horvat 2017, p. 141). The soul is the only substantial form of the body. Christian anthropology considers the beginning of human existence to be the moment of union of the immortal soul, given by God, with the body transferred in the act of coexistence of the spouses. The joining of the immortal soul and the mortal body has a substantial nature, and therefore constitutes the human.
What is the significance of this in relation to the constitution of a human–cyborg? Is it possible for the human soul to be reduced to the level of a bundle of information that can be scanned into a computer to ensure human immortality? From a Thomistic viewpoint—according to the philosopher Jörgen Vijgen—cognitive attempts to reduce the soul to a materialistically understood brain are not justified. The soul and the brain are not and cannot be an alternative to the concept of St. Thomas Aquinas. The soul, body, and brain are not autonomous elements constituting a human being. They are metaphysical components of a complete being—the human being. In the light of Thomistic hylomorphism, the actuality of the body (matter) is derived from the soul (form), which is the principle of life activity and substantial unity. In the Thomistic way of looking at it, the soul is not a neuroscientific concept, but a metaphysical and anthropological reality that cannot be reduced to a naturalistically understood bundle of scannable information (Vijgen 2017, p. 77).
In search of an answer to the question: what is a human?—the aforementioned Croatian philosopher Saša Horvat attempts an interdisciplinary collaboration of neural sciences with Christian philosophy and theology, which gives rise to the following questions: are we witnessing the possibility of overcoming the concept of the soul through neurological brain research? Do the fascinating neural structures reveal the whole truth about the human? Firstly, he notes that neural sciences do not recognize the concept of the human being as a unity of soul and body. He concludes that the contemporary paradigm of human studies is based on physicalism, while theologians turn to non-reductive physicalism (Horvat 2017, p. 128; Kim 1995; Horvat and Roszak 2020). According to Aquinas, because of the soul, which is the “substantial form of the body,” human beings are distinguished from other created beings by their ability to establish personal relationships and become familiar with everything that surrounds them. In Joseph Ratzinger’s account of the dialogicality of the human being, some see an opportunity for a dialogue between Christian anthropology and contemporary neuroscience. “The concept of dialogical soul can become a very fruitful platform for discussion between representatives of different sciences. The analogies with the achievements of modern neuroscience are quite strong and a universal language of dialogue needs to be elaborated to find common points and lead to the identification of issues and common content” (Szetela and Osiński 2017).
Joseph Ratzinger highlights in anima—understood as the substantial form of the body—that the human, on one hand, belongs entirely to the material world, while on the other, transcends this world. “The material world comes to itself precisely because anima in the human reaches out to God” (Ratzinger 2014, p. 154). Humans are constituted in a relationship that conditions their immortality. They are creatures whose “essence includes the ability to see God (i.e., the capacity to know the truth in a broad sense) and thus the possibility of participating in life” (Ratzinger 2014, p. 155). The soul, enabling the openness of human existence on God “is not merely some addition to his as if independently existing being, but constitutes the greatest depth of the human being” (Ratzinger 2014, p. 155).
(c) 
Eternal Life as a Consequence of the Relationship between the Human Being and the Risen Christ
Joseph Ratzinger links the immortality of the whole human being with the openness toward the relationship with the Divine Persons (Gallardo Gonzalez and Elena 2020). It is inherent in the human but is ultimately the consequence of creation by God the Creator. This endowment—Joseph Pieper states—constitutes the creature such that what has been given to it truly becomes its share (Pieper 1968, p. 96). However, a serious difficulty arises here. The criteria of purely human knowledge, as Ratzinger notes, proves to be inadequate. From their perspective, one can only intuitively extrapolate that a future life does exist (Ratzinger 2014, p. 160). But is “cybernetic immortality,” by transferring a scanned human mind to a super-intelligent computer, eternal life in the sense of Christian anthropology?—wonders Emilio Justo (Justo 2019, p. 235). In his view, this implies a neurological reduction of the human being. Humans are identified with what their brains do (Justo 2019, p. 236). The questions arise: what about the personal identity of a human being since transhumanists themselves admit that a scanned brain is a copy? “The bundle itself is not a person” (Hołub 2015, pp. 91–92; Hołub 2020, p. 211; Kurzweil 2013, p. 376). Is a cyborg able to build interpersonal relations?
According to the optics of Christian anthropology, eternal life signifies a complete participation in the life of the risen Jesus Christ. It is an involvement in the relationships of the Persons of the Holy Trinity, an experience of giving and receiving (Ladaria 2009, pp. 438–44; Ladaria 2011, pp. 155–56). It begins with the reception of the sacrament of baptism (cf. Rom. 6:4–11) and will reach its fullness in the eschatological era. It is the full transformation of the human into the image of the risen Christ and, as a gift of the grace of God, a partaking in His life. It is not narrowed down to a selection of few but applies to every person in all aspects of being. Human immortality is therefore not possible without participation in the Paschal Mystery of Christ or without the Holy Spirit that the risen Jesus communicates to people (cf. 1 Cor. 15:44–49). There is no eternal life without being conformed to Jesus by the power of the Holy Spirit. Ratzinger emphasizes: “although the human body is constantly ‘subject to destruction’, man remains one whole person moving toward eternity, maturing in bodily life to see God face to face” (Ratzinger 2014, p. 158). The resurrection of the body presupposes the full identity of the human and the possibility of unrestricted communication with the Divine Persons and other people (Tryścień 2017, pp. 121–25). It is in the resurrection and through the work of the Holy Spirit that the human’s personal being reaches the summit of its possibilities. Theology defines it the state of visio beatifica—seeing God face to face (Roszak and Huzarek 2019). Aquinas speaks of a perfect union and vision that is equally a happy community (communio) of all the saved, an experience of complete love and joy, and attendance in the life of the Trinity that embraces the whole person (Ladaria 2011, pp. 151–55). Initiated at baptism, the whole-person relationship of the human with the Divine Persons in the Church leads them out of isolation toward true unity with the Holy Trinity, other saved persons, and all creation (Ratzinger 2014, p. 159).

5. Conclusions

Humans are beings who experience the truth that “God created man incorruptible, and to the image of his own likeness he made him” (Wis. 2:23). They carry a longing for permanence and immortality, and they make many efforts to prolong their existence. Therefore, it is not surprising if one becomes excited about the latest developments in technology that seem to offer such opportunities. This is quite typical of naturalistically reduced anthropology. The triumph of information technology ignites the imagination and raises expectations that the most pertinent anthropological questions will be resolved with the help of information and technological advances. Essentially, the “bundle concept of the person” does not make it possible to grasp the specificity that is determined by the inner life of the human person and their relationship to the Persons of the Holy Trinity. We are thus dealing with some type of quasi-personal existence, being a function of natural processes and phenomena, in which the ontic content of a person is not perceived: independence, reason, the ability to self-determination and the constitution of the individual nature (Szulakiewicz 2006, pp. 229–30).
Human beings—according to theological anthropology—are created in the image of God (imago Dei). As such, they exist in a unique and personal relationship with the Divine Persons. Imago Dei in the human is inherently directed toward the completion of knowing, exploring, and penetrating the mystery of the personal life of the Persons of the Holy Trinity. Human persons find the fullness of what is human in the humanity of Jesus Christ. They are intended to live like the incarnate Son of God. There is no way a human being can be reduced to a laboratory-constructed cyborg controlled by a supercomputer (Kull 2016).
The biblical account of the calling of human beings into existence presents them as a unity of soul and body. Modern anthropologists like to refer to them as persons (Colen and Vecchio 2021). From the perspective of Christian anthropology, the human is “body and soul” (Oleksowicz 2018). Neither the body itself nor the soul itself is a human. The soul is the substantial form of the body. Furthermore, the body–soul relationship is not accidental, but substantial. The soul cannot be reduced to a bundle of information that can be scanned or copied. As the transhumanists acknowledge, there can be no personal identity between the copy and the original. Moreover, the soul, body, and brain are not autonomous elements constituting a human being but are metaphysical components of a complete being—a human being. The soul enables the human’s openness to God and represents the greatest depth of the human being.
The immortality of the whole human being is determined by the constitution of humans in their openness to God and others. From the standpoint of specific sciences, without recourse to the Revelation of God it can only be assumed that a future life exists. In the sense of Christian anthropology, “cybernetic immortality” is not equivalent to eternal life. True immortality of the human is only possible through the Passover with Jesus Christ in the power of the Holy Spirit. It is a full participation in the life of the risen Jesus Christ. This life is initiated in the human by sacramental baptism, it grows through a vital relationship with the Divine Persons to reach its fullness in the eschatological times. The resurrection of the body presupposes the full identity of the human and the possibility of unrestricted communication with the Divine Persons and other people. The whole-person relationship with the Holy Trinity in the Church brings humans into the deepest communion with the Persons of the Holy Trinity, other saved persons, and all creation. It is therefore a completely different reality from the technological extension of human existence in the temporal dimension.
The aspects indicated are shared by the human being created in the image of God (imago Dei). It is difficult to look for these realities in a laboratory creation such as a cyborg or humanoid android. Technological progress makes it possible to support human life in many dimensions or to make up for the human body’s deficiencies resulting from illness. It is a great accomplishment of human genius and the power of science. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of theological anthropology, a cyborg cannot be identified with a human being created in the image of God.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

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Data Availability Statement

Not applicable.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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