Quality Dimensions for Automatic Assessment of Structured Cyber Threat Intelligence Data
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- Providing a systematic literature review of CTI data quality dimensions;
- Defining separate calculations of CTI data quality for technical and tactical levels of using CTI. To the best of our knowledge, such an approach is novel for CTI data quality assessment;
- Defining a set of literature-based CTI data quality dimensions for structured CTI data provided in a machine-readable format;
- Creating measurement formulae for defined CTI data quality dimensions. Most of the formulae are original ones;
- Implementing defined formulae and providing experimental results of applications to real CTI data.
2. Review of Related Work
3. Proposed Automated CTI Data Quality Assessment Method
3.1. Choice of the Dimensions
Dimension | Wang & Strong [15] | ISO/IEC 25012 [16] | Gao et al. [19] | Li et al. [20] | Meier et al. [21] | Grispos et al. [30] | Li et al. [22] | Schaberreiter et al. [23] | Griffioen et al. [35] | Tundis et al. [32] | Mavzer et al. [25] | Schlette et al. [24] | DeCastro-García & Pinto [33] | Wang et al. [34] | Zibak et al. [26] | Yang et al. [27] | Chen et al. [28] | Total |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Timeliness | ** | + | ** | ** | ** | ** | + | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | 16 | |
Completeness | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | + | ** | + | ** | ** | ** | + | *+ | ** | 14 | |||
Accuracy | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | 9 | ||||||||
Reliability | + | + | + | + | + | + | ** | 7 | ||||||||||
Relevance | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | 7 | ||||||||||
Reputation (Provenance) | ** | + | + | ** | ** | + | + | 7 | ||||||||||
Similarity/Exclusivity | ** | ** | + | ** | + | + | ** | 7 | ||||||||||
Consistency | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | *+ | 6 | |||||||||||
Amount of data | ** | + | + | ** | + | 5 | ||||||||||||
Extensiveness | + | + | ** | ** | 4 | |||||||||||||
Portability | ** | + | ** | 3 | ||||||||||||||
Update frequency | ** | + | ** | 3 | ||||||||||||||
Actionability | ** | ** | 2 | |||||||||||||||
Compliance | ** | ** | 2 | |||||||||||||||
Concise representation | ** | ** | 2 | |||||||||||||||
Differential contribution | ** | + | 2 | |||||||||||||||
Understandability | ** | ** | 2 | |||||||||||||||
Objectivity | ** | ** | 2 | |||||||||||||||
Security | ** | + | 2 | |||||||||||||||
Value-Added | ** | + | 2 | |||||||||||||||
Verifiability | ** | ** | 2 |
3.2. Definition of the Formulae for the Dimensions
- (a)
- Basic case. This is the time difference between the current time and creation time of the objects in the CTI provided by the feed. The timeliness of CTI vt is calculated as follows (Equation (1)):
- (b)
- Indicator object case. The timeliness dimension can be based on specific properties of objects. The indicator object has unique properties valid_from and valid_until available only in this object. The value of property valid_from usually repeats the value of property created. However, the value of property valid_until, if it is available (since it is optional), defines the time till this indicator is valid. So, to know the time till the indicator is valid is very important. If this value is available, it must be used in the calculation of the timeliness dimension (Equation (2)). The valid_until property is usually defined for an indicator with the pattern “ipv4-addr:value”. The threshold is applied for the indicator case, as well. The value of timeliness declines very quickly if the threshold is not applied.
- (c)
- Statistical data case. When statistical data about the decline of timeliness for specific CTI objects are available, the timeliness dimension must be adapted (Equation (3)). We know that the decline of certain CTI objects is higher than for others. File hashes used in the indicator object will likely have unchanged values, as malware binaries are often subject to slight modification, resulting in changed hash values. Meanwhile, information regarding object types such as malware analysis, threat actors, and tools might not change over time. For such object types, statistical decline must be taken into account.
4. Results Analysis
4.1. Experiment
- Gson Java library [48]—used to convert a JSON string to an equivalent Java object representing a STIX file.
- Apache POI library [49]—to export data in Excel format.
- Java version—JDK 23 (build 23.0.1+11-39)
Listing 1. Example of STIX file. |
{ “type”: “bundle”, “id”: “bundle--56be2a3b-1534-4bef-8fe9-602926274089”, “objects”: [ { “type”: “indicator”, “spec_version”: “2.1”, “id”: “indicator--d81f86b9-975b-4c0b-875e-810c5ad45a4f”, “created”: “2024-10-22T13:49:37.079Z”, “modified”: “2024-10-22T13:49:37.079Z”, “name”: “Malicious site hosting downloader”, “description”: “This organized threat actor group operates to create profit from all types of crime.”, “indicator_types”: [ “malicious-activity” ], “pattern”: “[url:value = ‘http://x4z9arb.cn/4712/’”, “pattern_type”: “stix”, “valid_from”: “2024-10-22T13:49:37.079Z” }, { “type”: “malware”, “spec_version”: “2.1”, “id”: “malware--162d917e-766f-4611-b5d6-652791454fca”, “created”: “2024-10-22T09:15:17.182Z”, “modified”: “2024-10-22T09:15:17.182Z”, “name”: “x4z9arb backdoor”, “description”: “This malware attempts to download remote files after establishing a foothold as a backdoor.”, “malware_types”: [ “backdoor”, “remote-access-trojan” ], “is_family”: false, “kill_chain_phases”: [ { “kill_chain_name”: “mandiant-attack-lifecycle-model”, “phase_name”: “establish-foothold” } ] }, { “type”: “relationship”, “spec_version”: “2.1”, “id”: “relationship--864af2ea-46f9-4d23-b3a2-1c2adf81c265”, “created”: “2024-10-22T18:03:58.029Z”, “modified”: “2024-10-22T18:03:58.029Z”, “relationship_type”: “indicates”, “source_ref”: “indicator--d81f86b9-975b-4c0b-875e-810c5ad45a4f”, “target_ref”: “malware--162d917e-766f-4611-b5d6-652791454fca” } ] } |
4.2. Discussion
CTI Quality Score | Confidence Score of the Provider | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Method | Timeliness | Completeness | Accuracy | Relevance | Consistency | Amount of Data | Concise Represent. | Understandability | Reputation | Similarity |
Chen et al. [28] | 9% | 12% | 3% | 36% | 40% | - | - | - | 70% | 30% |
Zibak et al. [26]. Ranks for CT data | First | - | Fourth | Second | - | - | - | - | Sixth | - |
Zibak et al. [26]. Ranks for CTI | Third | - | Fourth | First | - | - | - | - | Fifth | - |
Schlette et al. [24] | The weights are defined by the user. Initially, they are equal. | |||||||||
DeCastro-García & Pinto [33] | The weights are defined by the user. The default values are not disclosed. | |||||||||
Our CTI Quality Score Technical | 22% | 11% | 11% | 32% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 70% | 30% |
Our CTI Quality Score Tactical | 8% | 18% | 18% | 32% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 70% | 30% |
Features | Wang & Strong [15] | Li et al. [20] | Schaberreiter et al. [23] | Tundis et al. [32] | Mavzer et al. [25] | Schlette et al. [24] | DeCastro-García & Pinto [33] | Wang et al. [34] | Zibak et al. [26] | Yang et al. [27] | Chen et al. [28] | Our Method |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Comprehensive literature analysis | + | + | ||||||||||
Fully automatic assessment of the dimensions | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | ||||
Ability to assess new CTI data | + | + | + | + | + | |||||||
Way to calculate dimensions | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | ||||
Number of summarizing dimensions | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 5 |
Structured CTI oriented | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | |||
Visualization | + | + | + | |||||||||
Delphi study | + | + | + | |||||||||
Total number of possessed features | 3 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 7 |
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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Dataset | Objects | Number |
---|---|---|
geosakel77 | identity | 50 |
indicator | 67,307 | |
report | 50 | |
threat-actor | 4 | |
vulnerability | 4 | |
bundles | 50 | |
bari24 | identity | 30 |
indicator | 1445 | |
report | 30 | |
threat-actor | 15 | |
vulnerability | 14 | |
bundles | 30 | |
bariMit | attack-pattern | 853 |
course-of-action | 140 | |
identity | 10 | |
intrusion-set | 17 | |
malware | 465 | |
marking-definition | 10 | |
relationship | 4125 | |
tool | 13 | |
x-mitre-collection | 10 | |
x-mitre-matrix | 16 | |
x-mitre-tactic | 105 | |
bundles | 10 |
Dimension | Indicator | STIX File |
---|---|---|
Timeliness (TM) | 0.93 | 0.93 |
Completeness (CM) | 0.65 | 0.49 |
Accuracy (AC) | 0.82 | 0.69 |
Relevance (RL) | 0.55 | 0.49 |
Reputation (RP) | - | 0.99 |
Similarity (SM) | - | 0.24 |
Consistency (CN) | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Amount of Data (AD) | - | 1.00 |
Concise Representation (CR) | - | 0.47 |
Understandability (UN) | 1.00 | 0.92 |
Confidence Score of Provider (CS) | - | 0.92 |
Actionability Score (AT) Technical | - | 0.67 |
Actionability Score (AT) Tactical | - | 0.61 |
Quality Score (QS) Technical | - | 0.70 |
Quality Score (QS) Tactical | - | 0.65 |
Dimension | How It Relates to the Number of Objects |
---|---|
Completeness (CM) | STIX Domain Objects (SDOs) and STIX Relationship Objects (SROs) are counted. |
Consistency (CN) | Constraints for all objects are checked for higher numbers of objects, higher probabilities of inconsistencies, incorrect relationships, or missing attributes. |
Amount of Data (AD) | The number of object types is divided by the total number of objects. |
Concise Representation (CR) | Related to similarity between objects. A larger number of objects introduces more opportunities for overlapping attributes and affects the dimension value. |
Understandability (UN) | Related to the number of unique object types. |
Similarity (SM) | Object pairs are compared looking for the maximum similarity, therefore files with more objects will have an impact on final value. |
Relevance (RL) | The intersection of consumer required attributes with provider available attributes is compared across all objects. |
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Venčkauskas, A.; Jusas, V.; Barisas, D. Quality Dimensions for Automatic Assessment of Structured Cyber Threat Intelligence Data. Appl. Sci. 2025, 15, 4327. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15084327
Venčkauskas A, Jusas V, Barisas D. Quality Dimensions for Automatic Assessment of Structured Cyber Threat Intelligence Data. Applied Sciences. 2025; 15(8):4327. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15084327
Chicago/Turabian StyleVenčkauskas, Algimantas, Vacius Jusas, and Dominykas Barisas. 2025. "Quality Dimensions for Automatic Assessment of Structured Cyber Threat Intelligence Data" Applied Sciences 15, no. 8: 4327. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15084327
APA StyleVenčkauskas, A., Jusas, V., & Barisas, D. (2025). Quality Dimensions for Automatic Assessment of Structured Cyber Threat Intelligence Data. Applied Sciences, 15(8), 4327. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15084327