The YouGovern Secure Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) Management and Access Control
Abstract
1. Introduction
- An identity model in which its data is owned or controlled by any individual organization or thing—a centralized authority does not control it.
- The owner of the identity system cannot remove an identity.
- Identity owners retain all the personal information stored in their accounts.
- The system does not require an intrinsic authority to trust the nature of the integrity, protection, privacy, and identity of the owners—identity owners may use their data, as well as select who may access and manage their identity online.
- Modifications are easy to make for the challenge-response part (verification process).
- The transparency is preserved by rapidly providing six sections of the: (i) anchor, (ii) credibility, (iii) entity, (iv) self-limit, (v) zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), and (vi) ZKP itself.
- Decentralization allows entities to manage themselves and eliminates unnecessary targets or single points of failure. It will enable you to control your digital identifiers without relying on external authorities to access your data and sell it to others.
- Privacy enhances the security of data.
- Security enables a necessary degree of trust in decentralized identifier (DID) documents.
- Proof-of-stake allows DIDs to provide identity and information integrity when communicating.
- Discoverability increases entities’ ability to find their self-identity.
- Interoperability allows existing tools and software to be used.
- The portability system is system-agnostic, independent, and able to support all types of DIDs and DID methods.
- Simplicity means it is easy to understand, implement, deploy, and maintain the technology.
2. Background Theory and Related Works
2.1. Background Theory
2.1.1. Centralized Approach—Web Application Paradigm
2.1.2. Distributed Approach—Blockchain Solution
2.1.3. Smart Contract
2.1.4. Account in BSC
Externally Owned Accounts
Contract Accounts
2.2. Related Work
3. The YouGovern SSI Solution
3.1. Design
- How will decisions be made, and who has the authority?
- If the Implementation Phase must happen in August, then when does the money have to be secured to start?
- What staff training is required and when?
3.2. Saving Data into Blockchain
3.3. Use Case Model
3.4. Use Case Essential
3.5. Use Case Elaborated
4. Implementation
4.1. Development Environment
- Truffle Suite: Used for compiling, migrating, and testing smart contracts. It integrates with Ganache, a personal Ethereum blockchain that simulates various network conditions.
- Solidity: The programming language used to implement smart contracts on BSC, valued for its security features and suitability for contract-based logic.
- Node.js and npm: Serve as the runtime environment and package manager, respectively, facilitating the management of project dependencies.
- React.js: Used to develop a responsive, user-friendly front-end interface for interacting with the blockchain.
4.2. Smart Contract Deployment
4.3. User Interface and Interaction
- MetaMask Integration: A significant component of the YouGovern user interface is its integration with MetaMask (Figure 8), a widely used Ethereum wallet that facilitates secure and direct user interactions with the blockchain via a browser extension. MetaMask acts as a bridge between the browser and the BSC, allowing users to securely manage their identities and perform transactions without needing to trust third-party web servers. The interface guides users through the process of setting up MetaMask, ensuring they can securely sign transactions and authenticate their actions on the blockchain, thereby maintaining privacy and control over their data.
- InterPlanetary File System (IPFS): To enhance the security and decentralization aspects of identity management, YouGovern incorporates the IPFS, a peer-to-peer protocol for storing and sharing data in a distributed file system (Figure 9). IPFS is used to store identity documents and other user data in a way that ensures data permanence and reduces reliance on centralized storage solutions. When a user uploads a document, it is broken into blocks and distributed across the network, making it resilient to node failures and censorship. The integration of IPFS with YouGovern allows for a decentralized, owner-controlled storage solution, aligning with the principles of self-sovereign identity by giving users full control over their personal information.
4.4. Testing and Security
Listing 1. DID revocation sample code. |
function revokeDID(address user) public onlyOwner { didRecords[user].active = false; emit DIDRevoked(user); } function rotateKey(address oldKey, address newKey) public onlyOwner { require(!didRecords[oldKey].active, "Old key must be revoked first"); didRecords[newKey] = didRecords[oldKey]; didRecords[newKey].active = true; emit KeyRotated(oldKey, newKey); } |
Listing 2. Access control sample code. |
mapping(address => mapping(address => bool)) public accessPermissions; function grantAccess(address verifier) public { accessPermissions[msg.sender][verifier] = true; emit AccessGranted(msg.sender, verifier); } function verifyData(address user) public view returns (string memory) { require(accessPermissions[user][msg.sender], "Access not granted"); return didRecords[user].dataHash; } |
4.5. Deployment and Real-World Application
5. Experimental Evaluation
5.1. Testing Framework and Methodology
5.2. Comparative Evaluation of SSI Frameworks
5.3. Security Threat Analysis and Mitigations
- Sybil Attacks: Although the current version of YouGovern does not implement on-chain identity weighting mechanisms, access to verification actions is restricted to registered validators and approved smart contract roles, limiting the scope of Sybil vector exploitation.
- Phishing and Smart Contract Spoofing: To prevent impersonation via malicious contracts, YouGovern uses contract whitelisting, ensuring users only interact with signed and verified entities. Smart contract addresses are transparently published and verifiable via BscScan.
- MetaMask Spoofing and UI Manipulation: The front-end integrates security cues such as address checksums, signer origin warnings, and verification badges for known DIDs to help users distinguish trusted connections. Enhanced UX patterns reduce the chance of user consent errors during transaction signing.
- Reentrancy and Input Validation: All critical functions, especially those involving state changes (e.g., identity revocation or access grants), are protected with OpenZeppelin’s ReentrancyGuard. Inputs are sanitized, and all authorization flows follow a checks-effects-interactions pattern to mitigate runtime manipulation.
5.4. Quantitative Cost Analysis
- IPFS and Storage Overhead:
- ○
- Average document size: 1 MB (e.g., encrypted identity document).
- ○
- Estimated IPFS/Filecoin storage cost via Web3.Storage: ~$0.02/month per document.
- ○
- Hybrid backup (institutional fallback node): negligible added cost when co-hosted.
- Hosting Infrastructure:
- ○
- The front-end (React-based) and API gateway (Node.js/Express) are designed for lightweight deployment using serverless or containerized environments (e.g., Heroku, Vercel, AWS Lambda).
- ○
- Monthly operational cost for a medium-scale deployment (~10,000 active users) is projected under $50/month when using a decentralized-first strategy with minimal centralized backup reliance.
5.5. Performance Simulation and Stress Testing
6. Discussion and Future Work
6.1. Comparative Analysis
6.2. Future Extensions
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
BSC | Binance Smart Chain |
dapp | Distributed application |
DID | Decentralized identifier |
DNS–IdM | Domain Name System–Identity Management |
eID | European electronic identities |
eMRTD | Electronically machine-readable travel documents |
EOA | Externally Owned Accounts |
EVM | Ethereum Virtual Machine |
ICAO | International Civil Aviation Organization |
HTML | HyperText Markup Language |
IPFS | InterPlanetary File System |
P2P | Peer-to-Peer |
PoSA | Proof of Staked Authority |
SSI | Self-Sovereign Identification |
VC | Verifiable Credential |
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Specifications | uPort | Sovrin |
---|---|---|
Sovereignty | uPort is a SSI | Sovrin is a SSI |
Storage control | Identity and its associated confidential/personal information are maintained in the Digital Wallet at the owner’s device end | Identity and its associated confidential/personal information are maintained in the Edge Wallet at the Edge Agent device of the owner. They can be also maintained in a Cloud Wallet at a Cloud Agent device (safeguarded from unauthorized accesses) |
Longevity | Based on DIDs | Based on DIDs |
Verifiability | Based on Verifiable Credentials (VCs) | Based on VCs |
Recovery | Social recovery approach—Recovery delegates denoted by the identity owner (e.g., selected organizations, friends, family members, etc.) can assist the user to regain his/her uPort identity | Social recovery approach—Recovery Key Trustees, who are trusted by the identity owner, can store recovery information on their agents on behalf of the owner and assist him/her recovering the identity. |
Cost-free | Currently, identity is free for a user. Nevertheless, all transactions impose an inherent cost. | Currently, identity is free for a user. Also, there is no additional costs for identity transactions. |
Security | Password/PIN and biometry are demanding for the identity control via the blockchain. A user can securely publish his/her identity, as well as control his/her data, sign transactions, and transfer his/her credentials. | Password/PIN and biometry are demanding for the identity control via the blockchain. A user can securely publish his/her identity, as well as control his/her data with powerful cryptography, sign transactions, and transfer his/her credentials. |
Privacy | uPort is privacy preserving. A user does not have to disclose personal data to establish uPort identifiers for low value accounts. uPort supports several mechanisms to limit the correlation of a user’s on-chain smart contract transaction among different dapps. | Sovrin provides privacy-by-default and privacy-by-design. It utilizes anonymous credentials based on ZKPs that enable a user to disseminate data which retain the users’ anonymity |
Safeguard | Users’ right to privacy has to be safeguarded | Users’ right to privacy has to be safeguarded |
Accessibility | uPort is easy-to-use and has a simple design architecture. Currently, there is no provision for a relevant Agent/Guardian | Sovrin exhibits a complex design architecture, with several users requiring a Guardian to control the identity on their behalf |
Availability | A user has to use his/her smart phone to control his/her identity | A user needs a smart phone, but it is not required to owned it |
Transparency | Transparency is built on open-source projects and open standards | Transparency is built on open-source projects and open standards |
Portability | Portability is limited. Nevertheless, uPort is utilizing various open standards to enhance portability, such as DID and VC | Portability is limited. Nevertheless, Sovrin is utilizing various open standards to enhance portability, such as DID and VC |
Interoperability | Currently, it is evolving. Thus, it needs a further alignment with other SSI proposals | Currently, it is evolving. Thus, it needs a further alignment with other SSI proposals |
Scalability | Scalability is limited. The public Ethereum blockchain elaborates around 15 transactions per second. uPort is resolving this by permitting users to generate Ethereum key pairs and avoiding the establishment of multiple contracts on the blockchain. | Scalability is limited. Sovrin resolves it by utilizing two rings of nodes. One ring of validators is accepting write transactions. A bigger ring of observers performs read-only copies of the blockchain and executes read requests. |
Security | Controllability | Portability |
---|---|---|
Protection | Existence | Interoperability |
Persistence | Control | Transparency |
Minimization | Consent | Access Portability |
User Intention | System Responsibility |
---|---|
Sign-up with details | Stores user’s data on the blockchain as well as on IPFS |
Govt. verification | Govt. Authority will verify the user’s data |
Users can request to see another user data | Will fetch other user’s details and show it to a user who requested it |
Download user data | After the user’s account address has granted access to see data, he can directly download files or see data in fields from the blockchain smart contract |
Grant access role | Data owners can grant access to other accounts by their addresses |
Features | YouGovern | Microsoft ION | Sovrin | uPort | DNS-IdM |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Blockchain platform | BSC | Bitcoin (via Sidetree protocol) | Hyperledger Indy | Ethereum | Ethereum + DNS |
Storage layer | IPFS + Filecoin (optional) | IPFS | Indy Node Storage | IPFS | On0chain + DNS |
DID Standard (W3C) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Partial |
Key revocation | Smart contract + DID logic | Key rotation via update | Ledger-based deactivation | Limited | DNS record change |
Interoperability | Designed via DDComm | Partial | Partial | Limited | Low |
Transaction costs | Low (BSC) | Zero-fee (off-chain ops) | Variable (Indy pool fees) | Medium | Variable |
Decentralization level | Medium (PoSA validators) | High (uses Bitcoin base layer) | Medium (permissioned network) | High | Centralized registar |
Operation | Gas Used | Estimated Cost (USD) |
---|---|---|
DID creation | 105,000 | $0.015 |
Grant access | 48,000 | $0.007 |
Revoke identity | 65,000 | $0.009 |
Key rotation | 72,000 | $0.010 |
Verifier lookup | 21,000 | $0.003 |
Metric | Observed Value |
---|---|
Average DID creation latency | 1.28 s |
Grant access latency | 0.94 s |
Verifier response time | 0.76 s |
Throughput (tx/sec peak) | 12.5 transactions/s |
System uptime during test | 100% |
Error rate under burst load | 0.2% |
Features | BSC | Ethereum Network |
---|---|---|
Gas price | 16 Gwei | 260 Gwei |
Block time | 3 s | 13 s |
Unique addresses | 5.2 million | 140 million |
Daily transactions | 2.6 million | 1.3 million |
Scalability | Yes | No |
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Share and Cite
Papatheodorou, N.; Hatzivasilis, G.; Papadakis, N. The YouGovern Secure Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) Management and Access Control. Appl. Sci. 2025, 15, 6437. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15126437
Papatheodorou N, Hatzivasilis G, Papadakis N. The YouGovern Secure Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) Management and Access Control. Applied Sciences. 2025; 15(12):6437. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15126437
Chicago/Turabian StylePapatheodorou, Nikos, George Hatzivasilis, and Nikos Papadakis. 2025. "The YouGovern Secure Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) Management and Access Control" Applied Sciences 15, no. 12: 6437. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15126437
APA StylePapatheodorou, N., Hatzivasilis, G., & Papadakis, N. (2025). The YouGovern Secure Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) Management and Access Control. Applied Sciences, 15(12), 6437. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15126437