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Applied Sciences
  • Article
  • Open Access

11 February 2023

Study on Cyber Common Operational Picture Framework for Cyber Situational Awareness

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1
Department of Computer Engineering, Sejong University, Seoul 05006, Republic of Korea
2
Department of Convergence Engineering for Intelligent Drones, Sejong University, Seoul 05006, Republic of Korea
3
Cyber Warfare Research Institute, Sejong University, Seoul 05006, Republic of Korea
4
Advanced Defense Science & Technology Research Institute, Agency for Defense Development, Daejeon 34060, Republic of Korea
This article belongs to the Special Issue Advanced Technologies in Data and Information Security II

Abstract

The remarkable development of the Internet has made our lives very convenient, such as through the ability to instantaneously transmit individual pictures. As a result, cyber-attacks are also being developed and increasing, and the computer/mobile devices we use can become infected with viruses in an instant. Rapid cyber situational awareness is essential to prepare for such cyber-attacks. Accelerating cyber situational awareness requires Cyber Common Operational Pictures, which integrate and contextualize numerous data streams and data points. Therefore, we propose a Cyber Common Operational Pictures framework and criteria for rapid cyber situation awareness. First, the system reaction speed based on the user’s request and the standard for easily recognizing the object shown on the screen are presented. Second, standards and frameworks for five types of visualization screens that can directly recognize and respond to cyber-attacks are presented. Third, we show how a system was constructed based on the proposed framework, as well as the results of an experiment on the response time of each visualization screen. As a result of the experiment, the response speed of the 5 visualization screens was about 0.11 s on average for inquiry (simple) and 1.07 s on average for inquiry (complex). This is consistent with the typical response times of the studies investigated in this paper. If CyCOP is developed in compliance with the framework items (UI, object symbol, object size, response speed) presented in this paper, rapid situational awareness is possible. This research can be used in cyber-attack and defense training in the military field. In the private sector, it can be used in cyber and network control.

1. Introduction

With the rapid growth of the Internet, the number of cyber-attacks within cyberspace increases day by day, which increases the importance of cybersecurity [1,2]. Recognizing this importance in the field of defense, the United States Department of Defense designated cyberspace as the fifth battlefield after land, sea, air, and space [3]. It also distributed doctrines for planning, executing, and evaluating operations in cyberspace [4].
Cyber-attacks are being actively conducted not only in peacetime but also in wartime situations. For example, in the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia, hybrid warfare, a complex tactic that mobilizes cyber-attacks as well as conventional attacks, has been consistently implemented since the beginning of the war [5,6]. Cyber-attacks against Ukraine surged 196% in the first three days of combat, while those against Russia increased by 4% [7].
In order to prepare for such a cyber-attack, it is necessary to quickly recognize the cyber situation. To do this, a Cyber Common Operational Picture (CyCOP) is usually required, which commanders and security officers can use for cyber situational awareness. In order to develop an effective CyCOP, screens that can analyze data in cyberspace or real data from multiple perspectives are first required. Second, it must have a fast response time and high awareness because it is necessary to quickly grasp the situation in cyberspace, and where data is coming and going. Visualization for this situational awareness is essential not only in national defense but also in the field of information protection. In particular, visualization for situational awareness is very helpful when conducting cyber battle training. Cyber warfare training requires a detailed understanding of the cyber situation of the Red and Blue Teams. Accordingly, this research studied a design for a CyCOP framework for cyber situational awareness. The goal of this paper is to consider all aspects of visualization for rapid cyber situational awareness. Most of the research on cyber situational awareness has been conducted in the military. Accordingly, it is necessary to collect and organize data on cyber situational awareness and visualization defined by many military forces. In order to find out how fast visualization is necessary, studies on response time should be investigated. Rapid cyber situational awareness should be easy to recognize at a glance. To do so, it is necessary to investigate the shape and size of icons with good visibility. Accordingly, this paper consists of five sections. Section 2 shows the need for CyCOPs based on the operational planning and cyber situational awareness specified in published military manuals. Then, we show how screens to compose CyCOPs were identified and studies such as those on the response time and object icons were investigated to compose the interface. Section 3 draws implications from the published military manuals and various research data investigated in Section 2. Then, based on the derived implications, we show how the CyCOP framework was designed and implemented. Section 4 discusses an experiment on the response time of the implemented CyCOP screens. Finally, Section 5 draws conclusions about this paper.

3. Design and Implementation of the CyCOP Framework

The CyCOP is a graphical visualization tool for situational awareness in cyberspace. Cyberspace should be divided into external network information and internal network information to collect data, process it, and visualize it. Accordingly, the CyCOP framework was designed as shown in Figure 3.
From a military point of view, IPB stages 1 and 2 are preparation stages for cyber-attacks. In the case of the 3rd and 4th stages of IPB, “information” and “operation” are the areas of response to cyber-attacks. Because the goal of this research was to prepare for cyber-attacks, we designed and implemented visualizations from ① to ⑤ that corresponded to IPB stages 1 and 2 among the types of CyCOP visualizations shown in Figure 1. Visualization screens ① to ⑤ of the CyCOP visualizations are shown in Figure 5, and the data used for these visualizations are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 5. CyCOP Framework Structure.
Figure 6. CyCOP Visualization Screens and Part of the Data used in each Visualization.

3.1. Collecting External/Internal Network Information

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) refers to information obtained from open sources. The upper portion of Figure 4 shows that external network information is collected based on information from public sources. External network information includes Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) information, Geographic (Geo) JSON, Persona, and other data.
BGP is an external gateway protocol used to exchange routing information between routers in different Autonomous Systems (AS). Oregon University uploads such BGP information to the University of Oregon Route Views Archive Project [41] every 2 h. In this research, these data were collected from 1 June 2021–20 June 2022 in a 24-h cycle. The data capacity was approximately 9.2 GB per day, approximately 260 GB per month, and approximately 3.2 TB per year.
GeoJSON is an open standard format designed to systematically represent terrain based on points with geographic information [42]. There is no detailed geographic information in BGP information, but by using information provided by MaxMind [43] and Caida [44], geographic information is obtained and converted into GeoJSON.
MaxMind, SecurityTrails [45], ip-api [46], and WhoisXMLAPI [47] were used for collecting Persona and other data. Using the IP and geographic information collected earlier, they found the information included in the 3rd layer of cyberspace and collected all non-overlapping items.
Information such as the network equipment, S/W, firewall, IP, and port was collected by requesting the internal network information from the infrastructure manager and security officer.

3.2. CyCOP Visualization

The CyCOP interface was designed in compliance with the reaction speed, UI, object symbol, and object size derived from Section 2. In order to comply with the reaction speed, the minimum number of resource files (js, css, etc.) was called during the visualization output. The UI was designed as shown in Figure 5. However, as suggested in Section 2.3.2, the UI shape slightly changed depending on the intent of the CyCOP visualization screens or type of data mainly used. The object symbols conformed to the standards of MIL-STD-2525D [40]. The object size was designed and implemented with a size of 13 pixels, as suggested in Section 2.3.4. Table 9 lists information for the hardware and software used to implement the CyCOP.
Table 9. CyCOP Implementation Environment Hardware and Software.
From a military point of view, IPB stages 1 and 2 are preparation stages for cyber-attacks. In the case of the 3rd and 4th stages of IPB, “information” and “operation” are the areas of response to cyber-attacks. Because the goal of this study was to prepare for cyber-attacks, we designed and implemented visualizations ① to ⑤, which corresponded to IPB 1 and 2, among the types of CyCOP visualizations shown in Figure 4. The visualization screens from ① to ⑤ of the CyCOP visualizations in Figure 4 and the data used for visualization are shown in Figure 6.
Visualization ① uses information such as the AS source, destination, and route from the BGP data. As shown in Figure 7, by linking the corresponding information with the visualization, the status of Internet network activity in the area of interest can be viewed dynamically. On the left interface, you can see the origin and destination of packets. On the right interface, it is possible to check whether a packet goes from a specific area to a specific destination via a specific area. This allows the network security officer to check which AS path the network packets accessing the enterprise access through. Such a visualization screen can be utilized by adding various functions. For example, adding functions such as network anomaly detection to Back-End can visualize packets suspected of being attacked.
Figure 7. Visualization ①: Visualization of Internet Network Activity in the Area of Interest.
Visualization ② uses the same map service API as Google Maps to visualize the satellite view-based map, as shown in Figure 8. On top of that, geographic information such as GeoJSON, other data, internal network information, and information such as the location/facility/building are mixed and visualized. The left interface shows the legend of the icons, and the central interface shows the satellite view-based map.
Figure 8. Visualization ②: Satellite View-based Geographic Visualization.
Visualization ③ shows the physical network status of a specific facility in visualization ② in detail, as shown in Figure 9. Among the physical network assets, it mainly visualizes the router, and checks the information of the router and how the routers are connected. The data used include GeoJSON, other data, and internal network information. The left interface shows the legend of the icons, and the right interface shows detailed information about the facility selected in the central interface. In general companies, it is possible to check the connection status of router devices of buildings managed in-house. The military can check how network devices are distributed within the threatening or threatened area. Through this, you can use operations such as disabling certain buildings and blocking certain networks.
Figure 9. Visualization ③: Visualization of Physical Network Device Location and Information within the Facility.
Visualization ④ is used to understand the internal network of the facility selected in visualization③. Physical network assets such as PCs, servers, switches, and firewalls, which cannot be properly located, are visualized in a logical graph, and their connection relationships are identified as shown in Figure 10. The left interface represents the legends of icons, and the central interface represents the connection status of each object. In the right interface, information such as the S/W, vulnerability, IP, and MAC address installed in the physical network asset is expressed. Vulnerability cases are represented using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [48]. The data used include Persona, other data, and internal network information.
Figure 10. Visualization ④: Visualization of Internal Network of Facilities.
Visualization ⑤ shows the internal network as three layers of cyberspace, as shown in Figure 11, to understand the relationships between network assets in detail. It is possible to understand how the assets of each layer have interconnections, as well as their relationships with other layers. The relationships between layers are displayed as shown in Figure 12. The left interface can select whether to visualize the elements for each layer. The right interface shows the hardware (H/W) information, IP, G/W, owner, application, S/W used, vulnerabilities, etc. of the object selected in the central interface. This is the most important screen among the visualization screens of the framework proposed in this paper. Security personnel can immediately know which software is used and what vulnerabilities are in the H/W of the physical network layer in a specific building. Security personnel can also check who is using the H/W. This helps to figure out which H/W or S/W is the core.
Figure 11. Visualization ⑤: Visualize the Three Layers of Cyberspace.
Figure 12. Diagram of Object Relationships between Network Layers.

4. CyCOP System Response Speed Test

The framework designed in Section 3 was implemented as shown in Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10 and Figure 11 in compliance with the UI, object symbol, and object size investigated in Section 2. However, because the response speed could not be confirmed with pictures, it was proven by experiments. The experiment tests the response speed of the implemented visualizations ① to ⑤. To measure the response speed, the developer tools provided in the Google Chrome browser were used.
Experimental items were extracted from the items in Table 6. Items with simple response times were excluded because these were difficult to measure in a web environment. However, the items corresponding to the complex response times were selected for an experiment on the detailed information inquiry and screen output of objects for which people are most sensitive to the response speed. Among these, File Update was excluded because it is a function that is not in the visualization implemented in this research. Accordingly, the finally selected test items are inquiry (simple) and inquiry (complex).
When any object in a visualization screen was clicked, a detailed description of the object was displayed in the interface on the right side of the screen. Inquiry (simple) measured the time from when an object was clicked on the visualization screen until the detailed description of the object appeared on the right interface. The object information was requested from the server, as shown in square 1 in Figure 13. As shown in square 2, the time (response time) until the object information was received on the CyCOP visualization screen (Client) was measured in the Network tab of the browser developer tool. Inquiry (complex) called a visualization screen using multiple external/internal data. To measure this, the time of the red box in Figure 14 was measured. This meant the time it took for all assets needed to output the visualization screen to be called. For objective evaluation, when measuring inquiry (simple) and inquiry (complex), after clearing the entire browser cache and calling 10 times, the average was derived as listed in Table 10. As a result of the experiment, inquiry (simple) showed a fast response speed of about 0.1 s for all visualizations. In the case of inquiry (complex), visualization ④ showed the fastest response time (0.63 s) and visualization ① showed the slowest response time (1.50 s). This was because visualization ④ had the fastest speed because the resource was not called for a large image. In the case of visualization ①, it showed the slowest speed because it was the first screen to call information about multiple packets and Google Map API.
Figure 13. Measuring Inquiry (simple) Response Time in Browser Developer Tools Network Tab.
Figure 14. Measuring Inquiry (complex) Response Time in Browser Developer Tools Network Tab.
Table 10. Response Time for each CyCOP Visualization.
What can be learned through this experiment is that only information that needs visualization should be retrieved and displayed. This is because if you call for a large amount of DB query information and APIs, the speed slows down. Slowing down means that rapid cyber situational awareness is impossible after all. The slower the cyber situational awareness, the more vulnerable it is to cyberattacks.

5. Conclusions

The purpose of this research was to design and implement a CyCOP framework for situational awareness in cyberspace. By analyzing the JCOPP and U.S.ATP 2-01.3 IPB documents prepared based on JP 3–12, the screens to be visualized in CyCOPs were identified. In addition, studies related to the interface (response time, UI, object symbol, object size) for designing and implementing CyCOPs were investigated. Based on the investigations, the CyCOP framework was designed and described for each visualization screen implemented. Finally, an experiment was conducted to measure the response time of 5 visualization screens to prove that the implemented CyCOP satisfies the inquiry (simple) and inquiry (complex) criteria. As a result, the response speed of the 5 visualization screens was about 0.11 s on average for inquiry (simple) and 1.07 s on average for inquiry (complex). This conforms to the common response times of inquiry (simple) and inquiry (complex) in Table 6.
This study presented the criteria (UI, object symbol, object size, response time) for rapid cyber situation awareness in a framework. If CyCOP is developed by applying these standards, the military will be able to have strong cyber command and control capabilities. In the private sector, it will be possible to identify and respond to various cyber-crimes that can occur in the currently operating service in real time. In future research, we will implement visualizations ⑥ to ⑩, which correspond to the 3rd and 4th stages of the U.S.ATP 2-01.3 IPB stage. Visualization ⑥ uses cyber asset information and ATT & CK’s APT Groups data. Visualization ⑦ utilizes cyber kill chain, ATT&CK’s Tactics, and CVE information to visualize network threats within the company. Visualization ⑧ predicts and visualizes the network activity time in areas where many attacks occur. Visualization ⑨ identifies which malware was used, which APT group it belongs to, and profiles cyberattacks. Visualization ⑩ establishes, selects, and prioritizes cyber threat countermeasures. Therefore, the final form of CyCOP will have the ability to actively respond to and prepare for cyber-attacks.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, K.K. (Kookjin Kim), J.Y. and S.Y.; Funding acquisition, D.S.; Methodology, K.K. (Kookjin Kim), S.Y. and J.K.; Design of Cyber Common Operational Picture Framework, K.K. (Kookjin Kim) and K.K. (KyungShin Kim); Supervision, D.S.; Validation, J.K.; Writing—original draft, K.K. (Kookjin Kim) and K.K. (KyungShin Kim), Writing—review and editing, D.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research was supported by the Future Challenge Defense Technology Research and Development Project (9129156) hosted by the Agency for Defense Development Institute in 2020.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Not applicable.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
CyCOPCyber Common Operational Picture
APPApplication
OSOperational System
JOPPJoint Operational Planning Process
JPJoint Publication
JCOPPCyberspace Operational Planning Process
JTCJoint Targeting Cycle
COPCommon Operational Picture
C2Command and Control
ATPArmy Techniques Publication
UIUser Interface
OSINTOpen-Source Intelligence
BGPBorder Gateway Protocol
GeoGeographic
ASAutonomous Systems
S/WSoftware
H/WHardware
CVSSCommon Vulnerability Scoring System

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