1. Introduction
Public procurement represents a critical lever of public administration, accounting for a substantial share of national budgets and playing a strategic role in innovation, sustainability, and economic development (
European Commission, 2023). In the European Union, public procurement accounts for approximately 14% of the European Union’s gross domestic product (GDP), positioning it as a central policy tool for delivering public value and supporting modernization (
OECD, 2017;
Bosio et al., 2022). Beyond its traditional transactional role, public procurement is increasingly expected to advance digital transformation, environmental sustainability, and inclusive growth.
Across Europe, procurement reforms have shifted from fragmented, decentralized practices to more centralized models, intended to achieve economies of scale, cost-efficiency, and regulatory harmonization (Directive 2014/24/EU;
Petersen et al., 2022). Romania has followed this trajectory through the establishment of the National Office for Centralized Procurement (ONAC), which manages framework agreements across sectors, including higher education. ONAC’s role is particularly relevant in the acquisition of digital infrastructure and strategic assets for technical universities, linking public procurement to national innovation priorities (
Dragos & Neamtu, 2014;
Aleynikova, 2022;
Uyarra & Flanagan, 2010).
Despite these developments, centralized approaches in transition economies face multiple challenges, including institutional fragmentation, limited digital maturity, and weak integration of sustainability objectives (
Georgieva, 2017b;
Birleanu & Lungu, 2024). While extensive research has examined centralized procurement in high-capacity Western European contexts, less attention has been devoted to how central purchasing bodies function in transitional governance settings, where legal alignment with the EU may not fully translate into strategic effectiveness.
Romania’s centralized procurement system (CPP), coordinated by ONAC, reflects the broader EU shift toward aggregation of demand to enhance efficiency, transparency, and policy alignment. While such systems offer cost and compliance benefits, they also face well-documented challenges in flexibility and SME inclusion (
Racca & Yukins, 2020;
Correia, 2023).
To address these gaps, this study evaluates Romania’s centralized procurement system through the case of ONAC and its coordination with technical universities. The study aims to examine how institutional capacity, digitalization, and sustainability intersect in the operationalization of centralized procurement.
Table 1 presents the research questions and the specific gaps addressed in the literature.
This study addresses a significant gap in the literature: the limited empirical evidence on how centralized public procurement authorities in transition economies, such as Romania, integrate digitalization and sustainability objectives in the higher education sector. Romania’s National Office for Centralized Procurement (ONAC) provides an ideal case examining how institutional capacity, digital tools, and sustainability considerations intersect in the procurement of technological infrastructure for technical universities.
The study is guided by three research questions: (1) What are ONAC’s institutional strengths and weaknesses as a centralized procurement authority? (2) How does ONAC implement digital tools and manage interoperability with beneficiary institutions? (3) How are sustainability objectives embedded in centralized procurement frameworks? The manuscript is structured to address these questions, and the conclusions explicitly return to each of them.
2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review
2.1. Strategic Models of Public Procurement
Public procurement systems worldwide operate along a spectrum ranging from centralized to decentralized governance models. Centralized public procurement (CPP) involves the aggregation of purchasing authority into a central body that manages procurement on behalf of multiple public entities. This model has been associated with stronger negotiation leverage, lower unit costs, greater procedural efficiency, and improved regulatory compliance (
Petersen et al., 2022;
De Vries & Yehoue, 2013;
Kundu et al., 2020). By consolidating demand and enforcing uniform standards, centralized systems are particularly effective in sectors requiring large-scale procurement of standardized goods and services.
However, several limitations of highly centralized procurement models have been identified in the literature. These include decreased responsiveness to localized needs, rigidity in procurement design, and reduced autonomy of institutional actors (
Dameri et al., 2012;
Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos, 2008). Centralized procurement may also lead to market distortions, such as supplier concentration and the marginalization of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (
Georgieva, 2017b). Furthermore, the bureaucratic distance between procurement authorities and end users can result in a mismatch between purchased goods and the operational realities of public institutions (
Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos, 2008;
Correia, 2023).
By contrast, decentralized procurement systems delegate purchasing authority to individual institutions or subnational authorities. These systems offer flexibility and contextual responsiveness, yet often lack the economies of scale and standardization benefits of centralization. They may also be vulnerable to inefficiencies, fragmented standards, and increased corruption risks—particularly in countries with limited administrative capacity (
Hong et al., 2024;
J. Liu & Li, 2018). Comparative research suggests that decentralized systems perform better in high-governance, high-capacity settings, while centralized models may be more appropriate in transitional or fragmented institutional environments (
Baldi, 2014;
Kundu et al., 2020;
Racca & Yukins, 2020).
In Romania, the introduction and expansion of ONAC (National Office for Centralized Procurement) exemplify a strategic shift toward centralization, intended to overcome inefficiencies and fragmentation within public procurement. ONAC serves as the country’s primary central purchasing body (CPB), managing framework agreements and promoting national-level consolidation of procurement processes, especially in areas such as education, health, and digital infrastructure.
Recognizing the trade-offs between centralization and decentralization, many European Union (EU) member states have adopted hybrid procurement models. These systems seek to combine the efficiency, standardization, and regulatory oversight of centralized approaches with the responsiveness and flexibility of decentralized procurement (
Kundu et al., 2020;
Dameri et al., 2012;
Georgieva, 2017a).
For example, Italy employs a hybrid sector-specific model where framework agreements negotiated at the national level (e.g., by Consip) are implemented regionally, particularly in the healthcare sector (
Dameri et al., 2012;
Baldi, 2014;
Birleanu & Lungu, 2024). Similarly, countries such as Germany and the Netherlands (through agencies such as PIANOo) operate mixed systems in which centralized agencies coexist with regional consortia or voluntary coordination bodies.
As argued by
Racca and Yukins (
2020), procurement systems should not be viewed as a binary between centralized and decentralized structures, but rather as a continuum of organizational arrangements. Emerging models—such as inter-agency purchasing consortia, regional centers, and shared procurement frameworks—illustrate the value of collaborative procurement. These approaches maintain supplier diversity and market competition while achieving cost reductions and improved contract management (
De Vries & Yehoue, 2013;
Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos, 2008).
Furthermore, recent EU directives and procurement reforms have encouraged flexibility in governance models, allowing national systems to evolve in response to sectoral needs, administrative capacity, and innovation goals. This trend underscores the importance of institutional adaptability, particularly in countries like Romania, where procurement reform must reconcile centralization with sector-specific operational realities, such as those of technical universities.
2.2. Digital Transformation in Public Procurement
Digital transformation has become a defining priority for modern public procurement systems, particularly in the European Union, where transparency, efficiency, and anti-corruption objectives are strongly linked to the adoption of digital tools. E-procurement platforms are now widely regarded as enablers of institutional modernization, cost savings, and improved contract integrity (
Bosio et al., 2022;
Aleynikova, 2022;
Cerrillo-i-Martínez & Ponce, 2017).
Several leading countries have pioneered digital procurement ecosystems that go beyond simple tender publication. For example, Ukraine, Estonia, and South Korea have integrated advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), optical character recognition (OCR), and blockchain into procurement platforms to monitor performance, detect anomalies, and optimize decision-making. These systems enhance price benchmarking, ensure regulatory compliance, and enable real-time supplier monitoring—all while reducing the administrative burden associated with manual processes (
Bosio et al., 2022;
Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos, 2008).
Nevertheless, the successful implementation of such digital instruments requires not only infrastructure but also significant organizational capacity, both in procurement agencies and in contracting authorities. This includes IT integration, staff digital competencies, and policy alignment across institutions. These challenges are especially present in transition economies, where legacy systems, budget constraints, and fragmented institutional landscapes limit the scope of transformation (
Aleynikova, 2022;
J. Liu & Li, 2018).
In Romania, digitalization efforts have been supported through legislative mandates and national strategies (
ANAP.GOV, 2023), resulting in the development of two main platforms:
SEAP (Sistemul Electronic de Achiziții Publice/Electronic Public Procurement System)—the national digital platform managed by the National Agency for Public Procurement (ANAP). SEAP is used to publish tenders, manage bids, and conclude procurement contracts across all levels of government. While SEAP has increased transparency and procedural efficiency, it remains technically limited and lacks integration with emerging innovations such as AI-powered analysis or blockchain authentication (
Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos, 2008).
PEAPC (Platforma Electronică de Achiziții Publice Centralizate/Centralized Electronic Public Procurement Platform)—developed under ONAC’s coordination, PEAPC supports the management of framework agreements and centralized procurement procedures. It is designed to streamline operations, ensure compliance, and consolidate procurement processes for high-value, multi-institutional projects. Despite these goals, PEAPC still faces usability and interoperability issues with institutional systems, particularly in the education sector.
In the context of technical universities, centralized digital procurement coordinated via PEAPC has aimed to deliver infrastructure such as smart classrooms, cloud computing tools, high-performance computing (HPC), and simulation labs. However, these acquisitions often encounter integration barriers at the institutional level due to outdated IT architectures or limited internal support capacity (
Kundu et al., 2020;
Birleanu & Lungu, 2024). As a result, the long-term impact of digital investments is sometimes diluted, with resources underutilized or disconnected from academic workflows.
The strategic potential of digital procurement in Romania remains significant, especially if AI-enabled contract analytics, automated red-flagging systems, or blockchain-based auditing tools can be integrated into existing platforms. Such innovations could reduce manipulation risks, foster real-time transparency, and increase public trust in procurement processes (
Bosio et al., 2022;
Racca & Yukins, 2020). For this to materialize, however, digital transformation must be addressed not just as a technical upgrade but as a comprehensive organizational shift, including governance reform, staff training, and cross-institutional alignment.
Romania’s ongoing challenges highlight a broader insight from the literature: digital procurement reform is only as strong as the institutional and organizational maturity of the systems that adopt it. In this sense, platforms such as SEAP and PEAPC need not only continuous technical development, but also deeper institutional embedding within the workflows, priorities, and feedback systems of public sector organizations, particularly universities at the forefront of national innovation strategies.
2.3. Sustainability, SMEs, and Public Value in Centralized Procurement
Public procurement has increasingly been recognized not only as a regulatory and financial mechanism but also as a driver of sustainability, social inclusion, and public value. The 2014 EU Procurement Directives (especially Directive 2014/24/EU) explicitly promote the integration of environmental and social criteria into public tenders, encouraging contracting authorities to move beyond lowest-price logic toward strategic objectives such as green procurement, socially responsible sourcing, and innovation-driven contracts (
Geropoulos et al., 2024).
Key mechanisms recommended by EU policy include life-cycle costing (LCC), energy efficiency requirements, fair labor practices, and the encouragement of SME participation in public tenders. These instruments aim to ensure that public spending generates broader socio-economic benefits. Nevertheless, implementation across member states has been uneven, with considerable discrepancies between normative ambitions and operational realities, particularly in transition economies (
Rolfstam, 2015;
Georgieva, 2017b;
Kundu et al., 2020).
In Romania, sustainability remains underrepresented in centralized procurement procedures. Framework agreements managed by ONAC have made limited use of green or social criteria, often defaulting to cost-efficiency as the primary award principle. This narrow focus may hinder Romania’s alignment with EU climate objectives and broader sustainability targets. One contributing factor is the limited administrative capacity, including a lack of training, practical guidance, and coordination, needed to mainstream sustainability into procurement practice (
Birleanu & Lungu, 2024).
Another persistent challenge in centralized procurement frameworks is the underrepresentation of SMEs. While the aggregation of demand through CPP structures enhances efficiency and standardization, it may simultaneously raise entry barriers for smaller suppliers. Complex technical specifications, high eligibility thresholds, and limited consultation with SME stakeholders can inadvertently marginalize this segment of the market (
Correia, 2023;
Racca & Yukins, 2020). This is particularly problematic in countries such as Romania, where SMEs represent a significant share of economic activity and are crucial to local innovation ecosystems.
The centralized model also faces tensions between uniformity and institutional specificity. Framework agreements, once concluded, tend to be rigid and difficult to adapt to evolving sustainability standards or university-specific priorities. In the case of technical universities, this rigidity can result in misalignment between procurement outputs and the long-term sustainability objectives of the institutions, such as energy-efficient infrastructure or digital inclusion for disadvantaged student groups.
Furthermore, while sustainability and SME access are often treated as policy add-ons, they are, in fact, tightly linked to the administrative capacity of both the central purchasing body and the contracting institutions. Research suggests that professionalization, institutional maturity, and cross-agency coordination are critical for embedding sustainability and inclusiveness into centralized procurement (
Dameri et al., 2012;
Kundu et al., 2020;
Aleynikova, 2022).
In Romania’s case, ONAC’s limited institutional mandate in relation to sustainability—combined with fragmented communication channels between ONAC and sector-specific institutions such as universities—undermines opportunities for more innovative and inclusive procurement. Without systematic stakeholder engagement and feedback loops, it is difficult to evolve procurement frameworks toward higher levels of environmental and social ambition.
Ultimately, sustainable and SME-inclusive procurement must be viewed not merely as technical or regulatory objectives but as dimensions of public value. Their integration into Romania’s centralized procurement system depends on strengthening the organizational capacity of ONAC, enhancing collaboration with end-user institutions, and expanding the governance scope of CPP beyond compliance to include long-term societal impact.
2.4. Summary of Gaps and Conceptual Framing
Despite the expanding body of research on public procurement reform, three critical limitations persist in the literature, particularly when viewed through the lens of transition economies and sectoral implementation challenges.
Gap 1: Lack of empirical evidence from post-socialist and transitional settings. Most academic studies on centralized procurement systems focus on high-capacity administrative environments, primarily in Western Europe and OECD countries (
Kundu et al., 2020;
Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos, 2008). These studies offer valuable theoretical frameworks and normative assessments, but underrepresent countries such as Romania, where institutional fragmentation, evolving legal systems, and digital infrastructure gaps fundamentally shape procurement outcomes. There is a need to better understand how centralized public procurement (CPP) functions in hybrid or constrained governance contexts.
Gap 2: Limited focus on implementation-level dynamics. Existing literature often emphasizes legal harmonization, procedural transparency, or cost-efficiency, but rarely investigates how centralized procurement interacts with administrative capacity, digital maturity, and sustainability integration at the level of implementation (
Aleynikova, 2022;
Georgieva, 2017b). These dynamics are especially salient in sectors such as higher education, where technical complexity, institutional autonomy, and evolving digital infrastructure create challenges that are poorly captured in macro-level studies.
Gap 3: Overlooked role of national procurement authorities in sectoral coordination. The literature pays little attention to the institutional mediation between central procurement agencies (e.g., ONAC) and sectoral stakeholders (e.g., universities). The relational and operational dimensions of this interface, such as feedback loops, governance adaptability, and responsiveness to sector-specific needs, are insufficiently explored, despite their importance in shaping procurement success or failure.
Conceptual Framework of the Study. This study addresses these gaps by offering an institutionally grounded case study of Romania’s centralized procurement system, focusing on the National Office for Centralized Procurement (ONAC). The analysis examines how ONAC’s organizational structure, administrative tools, and procedural models align (or fail to align) with EU-level policy goals, such as digital transformation, sustainability, and inclusive governance.
To guide this inquiry, the study applies a conceptual lens that synthesizes three intersecting domains:
Institutional capacity—examining ONAC’s internal capabilities, inter-agency coordination, and professionalization;
Digital governance—assessing platform integration, technological readiness, and strategic use of e-procurement;
Sustainability alignment—analyzing how environmental and social value considerations are operationalized (or not) in centralized tenders.
By integrating these perspectives, the study positions public procurement not merely as a compliance instrument but as a strategic governance tool—one that, when properly aligned, can contribute to broader administrative reform and innovation in transitional EU member states.
This conceptual orientation also supports comparative insights, allowing Romania’s experience to inform broader debates on centralized procurement reform, institutional design, and policy implementation under constraint. Building on the identified gaps and theoretical intersections, the study proposes a conceptual model positioning ONAC as a central governance actor whose performance is shaped by three core dimensions: institutional capacity, digital governance, and sustainability alignment. These elements jointly influence the agency’s ability to act as a strategic intermediary between national procurement mandates and sector-specific needs, particularly in higher education.
Figure 1 below presents the conceptual framework guiding the study’s analytical orientation. The framework positions ONAC as a central governance actor whose performance depends on institutional capacity, digital maturity, and sustainability alignment—dimensions critical for achieving innovation and reform in higher education.
3. Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative, case-based research design to examine the institutional and operational dynamics of Romania’s centralized public procurement system, focusing on the National Office for Centralized Procurement (ONAC). The research explores how ONAC’s governance model supports—or constrains—strategic objectives such as digitalization, sustainability, and innovation delivery in the higher education sector.
Rather than pursuing statistical generalization, this study aims for analytical generalization (
Yin, 2014), identifying conceptual patterns and governance mechanisms that are relevant to other transitional procurement environments in the EU.
3.1. Research Design
This study adopts a qualitative case study design to explore the institutional performance and strategic challenges associated with centralized public procurement in Romania, with a specific focus on the National Office for Centralized Procurement (ONAC). The case study method is particularly well-suited for examining complex administrative phenomena embedded in evolving regulatory and institutional environments (
Pinto de Araújo & de Sousa Lemos, 2020). It enables a context-sensitive investigation of procurement governance, allowing for the integration of organizational, technological, and strategic dimensions into a single analytical framework.
The choice of ONAC as a focal institution is justified by its formal role as the primary authority responsible for managing centralized procurement procedures in Romania. Since its establishment in 2018, ONAC has coordinated framework agreements on behalf of multiple public entities, including national ministries, local governments, and higher education institutions. Its activities intersect with EU procurement directives, national digitalization objectives, and sustainability targets, making it a highly relevant case for studying strategic procurement capacity in a transitional governance context.
A single-case design was selected not only for its depth of insight, but also for its capacity to generate analytical generalizations. The study does not aim to produce statistically representative findings; rather, it seeks to uncover causal mechanisms and institutional dynamics that may be applicable to other centralized procurement systems facing similar constraints (
Kundu et al., 2020;
Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos, 2008). The research focuses on the period 2020–2024, which corresponds with major public investment programs in Romania, including digital infrastructure initiatives funded through the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP).
The unit of analysis is the centralized procurement process managed by ONAC in relation to digital infrastructure acquisition for technical universities. By zooming in on this domain, the study captures a policy area that is both strategically sensitive and operationally complex, thus providing fertile ground for understanding the institutional trade-offs, coordination bottlenecks, and long-term risks of centralized governance models.
3.2. Data Sources and Collection
The empirical analysis is based on secondary data collected from official public sources between 2021 and 2024. The data corpus includes legislation, policy reports, procurement records, institutional strategies, and evaluation documents related to centralized procurement and higher education digitalization in Romania. Key sources include ONAC’s official procurement portal, the Ministry of Education, the Romanian Court of Accounts, the SEAP and PEAPC digital platforms, and national policy documents associated with the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) (
Georgieva, 2017a).
Several legal instruments define the framework for centralized procurement in Romania. These include:
Emergency Ordinance No. 98/2017, which introduced the centralized procurement mechanism and outlined the general principles applicable to ONAC’s operations (
Kundu et al., 2020);
Government Decision No. 502/2018, which formally established ONAC as the national agency responsible for centralized procurement procedures (
Racca & Yukins, 2020);
Law No. 98/2016 on public procurement, which transposes EU Directive 2014/24/EU into national legislation (
Racca & Yukins, 2020);
Additional strategic documents such as the National Strategy for Public Procurement 2015–2020 and subsequent updates (
Dameri et al., 2012).
In addition to government sources, the study draws on analytical reports published by the European Commission, the OECD, and civil society watchdogs such as Expert Forum and Funky Citizens. These documents offer independent evaluations of procurement processes, public finance transparency, and institutional performance—providing triangulation and mitigating bias in government-reported data (
Geropoulos et al., 2024;
W. Castelnovo & Sorrentino, 2021).
The selection of documents was guided by three criteria:
Relevance—only materials directly related to centralized procurement, ONAC operations, or digital infrastructure acquisition in higher education were included;
Credibility—priority was given to publicly available and verifiable sources published by institutions with formal mandates or proven analytical track records;
Temporal alignment—data collection focused on the period 2020–2024, corresponding with ONAC’s active engagement in digital procurement under EU-funded national programs.
All documents were systematically coded using thematic content analysis, allowing for the extraction of key patterns related to institutional capacity, procurement governance, digitalization strategies, and sustainability integration. Given the reliance on secondary data, we applied a source triangulation approach. Each key finding was corroborated using at least two independent data types, including legal documents, policy reports, and evaluation studies. This mitigated the risk of bias inherent in using a single data source. A detailed discussion of limitations is provided in
Section 6.3.
3.3. Analytical Framework
Institutional and administrative capacity—reflecting an organization’s ability to plan, coordinate, and execute procurement activities in compliance with legal requirements and strategic objectives (
Racca & Yukins, 2020;
T. Liu & Wilkinson, 2011);
Each dimension corresponds to a set of evaluation criteria (see
Table 2) and is grounded in the theoretical and regulatory context discussed in
Section 2. The rationale for choosing these axes is based on their recurrence in both academic literature and EU-level strategic documents (
Kundu et al., 2020;
Geropoulos et al., 2024).
To guide data analysis and interpretation,
Figure 2 below presents the conceptual model used in this study. It illustrates the interaction between centralized procurement functions (as performed by ONAC), sectoral demands (e.g., higher education institutions), and the cross-cutting challenges of capacity, digitalization, and sustainability. The framework helps to structure the findings in a way that captures both vertical governance constraints and horizontal coordination dynamics.
The operationalization of this framework is detailed in
Table 2, which outlines the indicators and coding criteria used during the content analysis phase. Each category was assessed against empirical sources from
Section 3.2 and coded according to presence, relevance, and implementation depth.
The qualitative content analysis followed a structured coding procedure. Coding was conducted in two stages: (1) deductive coding, using the three main dimensions of the conceptual framework (institutional capacity, digitalization, sustainability) as parent categories, and (2) inductive coding, where emerging subthemes (e.g., feedback mechanisms, interoperability challenges) were identified.
All documents were reviewed systematically, and relevant excerpts were assigned to thematic codes using a coding protocol to ensure consistency. Although inter-coder reliability was not assessed due to single-author coding, coding decisions were documented, and triangulation across legal, institutional, and evaluation sources enhanced the credibility and rigor of the findings.
This analytical configuration supports a structured yet adaptable approach, enabling the systematic examination of ONAC’s procurement role in the digitalization of Romanian technical universities. It also facilitates cross-case comparability and potential transferability to other institutional contexts with similar procurement architectures.
4. Centralized Procurement in Practice: Institutional Performance, Sectoral Challenges, and Strategic Reflections
Romania’s move toward centralized procurement in higher education represents a significant institutional shift aimed at increasing efficiency, transparency, and alignment with EU strategic objectives. However, the practical implementation of centralized procurement frameworks—particularly those managed by ONAC—raises important questions about organizational coordination, digital readiness, and sustainability integration. This section analyzes how ONAC’s operational approach translates into outcomes at the university level and explores the challenges and trade-offs encountered in practice.
4.1. Overview of Centralized Procurement in Higher Education
In alignment with Romania’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) and the EU Digital Agenda, the National Office for Centralized Procurement (ONAC) has expanded its institutional scope to manage large-scale framework agreements in the higher education sector. Between 2021 and 2024, ONAC coordinated several procurement campaigns specifically targeting technical universities, aiming to provide smart educational infrastructure, digital platforms, and IT services.
The total awarded value of ONAC’s framework contracts during this period exceeded €836 million, with approximately €65 million executed in advance of subsequent contracts. More than 9700 individual contracts were concluded across beneficiary institutions. These investments focused on enhancing teaching, research, and administrative capabilities through integrated digital systems, in line with broader strategic priorities such as digital transformation, public sector modernization, and green transition.
The centralized procurement model pursued several key objectives:
Promote standardization of specifications across universities, particularly those with strong research profiles;
Aggregate demand to improve cost-efficiency and increase supplier responsiveness;
Ensure procedural compliance with EU directives, including sustainability and transparency provisions.
Public procurement experts estimate that shifting from fragmented, institution-led purchases to centralized frameworks could generate national savings of 10–18% annually, equivalent to €1.5–2 billion, by reducing administrative redundancy, consolidating negotiations, and enhancing procedural oversight.
ONAC’s role in higher education procurement also reflects a broader European trend: using centralized public procurement (CPP) as a strategic governance mechanism—not only to reduce costs, but to align investments with national reform objectives. In the Romanian context, this includes equipping universities with cloud infrastructure, smart classrooms, high-performance computing (HPC), and blended learning solutions, all acquired under centralized agreements.
However, as subsequent sections will show, the operationalization of this model revealed significant implementation barriers, particularly regarding flexibility, digital compatibility, and stakeholder consultation.
4.2. Case Study: Centralized Procurement for Technical Universities (2021–2024)
The case study focuses on ONAC’s procurement coordination efforts between 2021 and 2024 for Romania’s technical universities, implemented under the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), which prioritized investment in digital infrastructure for education.
ONAC developed and executed framework agreements that consolidated demand across the national network of technical universities, including the Technical University of Cluj-Napoca, Polytechnic University of Bucharest, Gheorghe Asachi Technical University of Iași, and other major regional institutions. These agreements targeted smart classrooms, digital laboratories, cloud storage services, integrated software platforms, and hybrid learning environments.
The centralized procurement process included three key phases:
Consultation and planning, based on the national IT strategy and partial input from universities;
Technical standardization and publication via PEAPC, with rigid specifications and predefined lots;
Execution and monitoring, via subsequent contracts managed at the institutional level under ONAC oversight.
Many universities reported the following implementation challenges:
Delays in procurement timelines were misaligned with academic calendars;
Difficulty integrating procured equipment with existing systems or infrastructure;
Limited training or support for institutional IT staff and users;
Lack of consultation in defining technical needs and flexibility in contract execution.
Figure 3 below illustrates the procurement flow as coordinated by ONAC and implemented across the technical university network.
The implementation of centralized procurement involves multiple institutional actors at different levels of authority and responsibility. ONAC serves as the central procurement authority, operating within a broader network of universities, ministries, platform operators, and suppliers.
Table 3 outlines the main stakeholders involved in the centralized procurement process, along with their respective functions in the planning, execution, and oversight phases.
The distribution of roles presented in
Table 3 reveals a multilayered governance architecture that requires both vertical coordination (between ONAC and the Ministry) and horizontal collaboration (between universities and platform operators). While ONAC holds the central mandate, the success of procurement implementation is heavily dependent on the clarity of institutional responsibilities, timely information flow, and shared accountability mechanisms. Any disruption or misalignment among these actors—whether due to capacity gaps, regulatory ambiguity, or limited communication—can compromise the effectiveness and responsiveness of the centralized model.
The implementation of centralized procurement for digital infrastructure in Romania’s higher education sector has revealed a number of institutional barriers. These can be grouped into structural, operational, and strategic categories, each affecting the effectiveness and responsiveness of ONAC-led initiatives.
The process revealed several institutional barriers, classified as structural, operational, and strategic (
Table 4). These include:
Structural: over-centralization, lack of feedback mechanisms, and unclear role distribution;
Operational: timeline misalignment, insufficient staff, complex sub-contracting;
Strategic: limited sustainability criteria, SME exclusion, and lack of end-user consultation.
Table 4 summarizes key barriers identified during the analysis, along with examples and their institutional implications.
The next section discusses the implications of these barriers for institutional performance and governance in Romania’s centralized procurement system.
Figure 4 shows the procurement flow and key barriers identified at each stage, based on stakeholder reports and implementation outcomes from 2021–2024.
Figure 4 summarizes the procurement flow and highlights the stages where institutional barriers were most frequently reported by stakeholders.
4.3. Institutional Performance
Building on the findings of the case study in
Section 4.2, this section examines ONAC’s institutional performance in light of the centralized procurement challenges identified in practice.
The institutional performance of ONAC in managing centralized procurement is shaped by both formal administrative capacity and informal coordination dynamics. Legally, ONAC possesses the authority and mandate to consolidate procurement needs across sectors and to negotiate large-scale framework agreements on behalf of multiple public institutions (
Kundu et al., 2020;
Racca & Yukins, 2020). Procedurally, its operations are aligned with national procurement law (Law 98/2016) and EU Directive 2014/24/EU, emphasizing transparency, efficiency, and competition (
Caranta et al., 2013). The institutional performance of ONAC is assessed not only in terms of legal compliance and procedural execution, but also through its capacity to deliver relevant, timely, and adaptive procurement outcomes that align with the operational and strategic needs of the higher education sector.
However, the study reveals persistent challenges in translating this legal and procedural foundation into effective implementation. Despite an increase in procurement volume and contract execution during 2021–2024, ONAC faces significant limitations in strategic planning, stakeholder engagement, and cross-sectoral alignment.
The analysis shows that institutional performance is affected by:
Rigid internal procedures, which limit adaptability to sector-specific needs (e.g., academic calendars or infrastructure compatibility);
Insufficient integration of technical expertise, particularly in evaluating complex ICT requirements for digital infrastructure;
Lack of proactive communication with beneficiaries, resulting in mismatches between procured items and institutional priorities.
The absence of structured feedback mechanisms prevents ONAC from learning across procurement cycles or adjusting frameworks based on implementation experience.
While ONAC demonstrates procedural compliance and operational expansion, its institutional maturity remains constrained by siloed decision-making and limited policy agility. As previously outlined in
Table 4, these constraints can be traced to both structural and operational barriers within the procurement ecosystem.
Moreover, institutional performance should not be evaluated solely based on procurement volume or contract value. Instead, performance must reflect the ability to deliver relevant, timely, and sustainable outcomes aligned with user needs. In this regard, ONAC’s procurement campaigns risk becoming administratively successful but strategically underperforming, particularly when evaluated against long-term objectives such as digital transformation, educational innovation, or green procurement integration. These institutional limitations underscore the need for a more integrated and mission-oriented procurement strategy—one that bridges legal authority with strategic alignment, particularly in sectors such as higher education that demand flexibility and innovation.
4.4. Strategic Misalignments and Sustainability Gaps
One of the most significant findings emerging from the case analysis concerns the misalignment between centralized procurement objectives and the strategic needs of higher education institutions. While ONAC’s mandate emphasizes efficiency and procedural compliance, it does not sufficiently incorporate long-term policy goals such as digital transformation, innovation, or environmental sustainability. As a result, the procurement process risks becoming disconnected from the evolving demands of the university sector and broader public value creation. This disconnect highlights a critical policy-level gap: while ONAC’s mandate is rooted in legal and financial efficiency, it lacks a mission-oriented framework that aligns procurement with public value creation.
A core issue is the lack of institutional flexibility in adapting procurement frameworks to sector-specific dynamics. The technical specifications used in ONAC-led agreements are often too rigid, leaving limited room for customization or modularity. This creates a structural disconnection between centralized supply and local implementation capacity, particularly in institutions with varying digital maturity levels.
Additionally, sustainability integration remains weak. Although Romanian public procurement legislation formally allows the inclusion of green and social criteria (
Caranta et al., 2013;
Geropoulos et al., 2024), their actual operationalization in ONAC-led contracts is minimal. There is limited use of life-cycle costing (LCC), environmental certifications, or innovation-oriented award mechanisms. Moreover, procurement documents rarely include indicators related to energy consumption, interoperability, or end-user accessibility—critical elements for educational institutions aiming to align with EU sustainability standards.
Strategically, ONAC’s centralized approach reflects a transactional orientation, focused on price and volume, rather than a transformative logic that supports institutional innovation and resilience. This is further reinforced by the absence of post-procurement evaluation mechanisms, preventing the measurement of outcomes such as educational enhancement, user satisfaction, or environmental impact.
These misalignments point to a broader governance challenge: centralized procurement is not yet embedded within a mission-oriented or value-driven procurement strategy. Without active coordination between ONAC, sector ministries, and institutional beneficiaries, centralized frameworks risk remaining administratively robust but strategically shallow. These findings reinforce the argument that centralized procurement should evolve from a purely administrative function into a strategic governance tool integrated with policy objectives, institutional diversity, and long-term sustainability targets to mitigate risk.
4.5. Strategic Gaps, Comparative Insights, and Lessons Learned
The Romanian experience with centralized procurement, particularly in the higher education sector, reveals a mix of procedural strength and strategic limitations. While ONAC has demonstrated the ability to coordinate large-scale acquisitions and ensure procedural compliance, several structural, organizational, and cultural challenges continue to hinder its strategic effectiveness.
Comparative lessons from innovation-oriented systems. Countries such as Italy (Consip) and the Netherlands (PIANOo) offer instructive models of centralized procurement that are strategically aligned with innovation and public value. These systems embed strong consultative processes, learning mechanisms, and flexibility in specification design (
Dameri et al., 2012;
Baldi, 2014). Likewise, Norway’s Public Procurement of Innovation (PPoI) framework emphasizes experimentation, inter-agency coordination, and support for SME participation (
Mwesiumo et al., 2019). Compared to these systems, Romania’s ONAC remains focused on procedural compliance, lacks innovation incentives, and demonstrates limited adaptive capacity.
Organizational and institutional barriers. Persistent gaps in institutional culture—including resistance to change, over-standardization, and limited stakeholder engagement—impede the development of a more agile and innovation-driven procurement system in Romania. Although Romanian legislation allows for the inclusion of sustainability and social criteria (
Caranta et al., 2013;
Geropoulos et al., 2024), these are rarely implemented. Life-cycle costing, user accessibility, or broader environmental indicators remain absent from evaluation frameworks. Moreover, ONAC-led frameworks typically exclude cutting-edge digital technologies due to rigid technical specifications and a lack of foresight (
Birleanu & Lungu, 2024).
Strategic Disconnects and Governance Misalignments. The analysis also highlights a structural disconnection between centralized procurement procedures and sector-specific goals. Higher education institutions require modular, adaptive, and user-informed solutions, yet ONAC’s centralized contracts offer limited customization. The exclusion of SMEs and the lack of co-design processes further reduce institutional ownership and procurement effectiveness. Sustainability, though emphasized at the policy level, remains underutilized in implementation (
Dragos & Neamtu, 2014).
Policy Lessons and Recommendations. Several policy-relevant lessons emerge from this case:
Centralized procurement must balance scale with responsiveness, especially in dynamic sectors such as education;
Stakeholder engagement is essential: participatory design, feedback loops, and pilot phases can improve functional alignment;
Sustainability and innovation should be embedded not only in legal frameworks but in operational practice and award mechanisms;
Capacity-building is critical to empowering procurement officers to adopt advanced tools and standards.
Ultimately, Romania’s centralized procurement must evolve from a transactional model into a strategic governance instrument—capable of supporting institutional innovation, public value, and long-term national development goals.
5. Discussion
This chapter discusses the empirical findings in relation to the conceptual and analytical framework outlined in
Section 2 and
Section 3. It critically reflects on how Romania’s centralized procurement system, as implemented by ONAC, aligns (or fails to align) with broader objectives such as innovation governance, public value creation, digital transformation, and sectoral responsiveness. It also connects these insights to the European and international comparative literature, identifying leverage points for reform.
5.1. Strategic Misalignment and the Limits of Proceduralism
As illustrated in
Table 4 and
Figure 3 and
Figure 4, ONAC’s centralized procurement model revealed structural, operational, and strategic barriers that limit its overall effectiveness. These barriers are not merely procedural—they reflect deeper governance limitations that reduce responsiveness and institutional adaptability.
Addressing these gaps requires more than technical fixes; it demands institutional learning, stakeholder engagement, and adaptive policy design. This finding is consistent with prior studies of transitional procurement systems, which show that centralization often enhances compliance but sacrifices local flexibility (
Georgieva, 2017b;
Birleanu & Lungu, 2024).
International experience supports these observations. Italy’s Consip uses hybrid and modular contracts to improve local adaptability, while the Netherlands’ PIANOo emphasizes feedback loops and SME participation to strengthen market responsiveness (
Dameri et al., 2012;
Racca & Yukins, 2020). Applying similar mechanisms could address ONAC’s current strategic misalignment and improve long-term procurement outcomes.
5.2. Digitalization and Sustainability Gaps in Governance Capacity
ONAC’s limited integration of digitalization, sustainability, and co-design criteria into its procurement logic reflects a governance capacity problem rather than a purely technical issue. As shown in
Table 4, the absence of systematic stakeholder engagement and feedback loops reduces ONAC’s ability to adapt procurement frameworks to sector-specific needs.
These institutional gaps are compounded by fragmented governance between ONAC, ANAP, and sectoral ministries, which weakens vertical coordination and delays organizational learning. As a result, procurement remains reactive rather than enabling, even when significant resources are mobilized through centralized frameworks.
International comparisons highlight that countries with mature procurement systems invest heavily in human capital, inter-agency coordination, and iterative policy design—not just digital infrastructure (
Petersen et al., 2022;
Bosio et al., 2022). Romania’s reliance on rigid frameworks and limited IT integration mirrors patterns seen in other transition economies, where legacy systems and constrained digital capacity limit innovation potential (
Aleynikova, 2022;
J. Liu & Li, 2018).
Furthermore, sustainability integration remains weak. ONAC rarely applies life-cycle costing (LCC) or green criteria, reflecting the policy-practice gap emphasized in the literature (
Rolfstam, 2015;
Geropoulos et al., 2024). Addressing these gaps would require not only digital upgrades but also governance reforms that embed sustainability and innovation into routine procurement operations.
5.3. International Benchmarking and Lessons
Italy’s Consip, the Netherlands’ PIANOo, and Norway’s PPoI provide valuable benchmarks for how centralized procurement bodies can support national innovation strategies. These systems blend central oversight with institutional agility, promoting sustainable procurement, SME participation, and experimentation. The case of Romania illustrates the cost of neglecting these dimensions: even with an EU-compliant structure, the system underdelivers in terms of digital alignment, institutional ownership, and sustainability impact.
This confirms that procurement systems must evolve beyond legalism and standardization, embracing a logic of strategic flexibility, user-institution fit, and anticipatory governance (
Kattel & Mazzucato, 2018). Romania’s current configuration offers little room for local adaptation or market shaping, leaving a gap between policy rhetoric and operational reality. Romania’s centralized procurement remains procedurally strong but strategically under-leveraged, confirming that alignment with EU directives is insufficient without adaptive governance and participatory mechanisms.
5.4. Reframing Procurement as a Strategic Policy Tool
The findings suggest that Romania’s centralized procurement, as implemented by ONAC, remains largely transactional and compliance-focused, underutilizing its potential to drive digital transformation, sustainability, and innovation.
Reframing procurement as a strategic governance instrument—rather than a purely administrative function—requires institutional capacity-building and alignment with sectoral policies. Detailed policy recommendations for achieving this transformation are provided in
Section 6.
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
This study evaluated the institutional performance, digital maturity, and strategic alignment of Romania’s centralized public procurement system through the case of the National Office for Centralized Procurement (ONAC) and its role in supporting digital transformation in technical universities. The analysis confirms that centralized procurement has delivered administrative benefits, including cost-efficiency, harmonization of standards, and expanded access to digital infrastructure. However, these gains remain constrained by rigid implementation mechanisms, underutilization of advanced digital tools, and limited integration of sustainability criteria.
6.1. Answers to the Research Questions
RQ1: ONAC demonstrates strong legal compliance and coordination capacity, but its flexibility and stakeholder feedback mechanisms remain limited. While the centralized procurement model achieves procedural efficiency, it still struggles to fully adapt to sector-specific needs in higher education.
RQ2: Digitalization is only partially implemented through SEAP and PEAPC. These platforms improve transparency and contract management but lack interoperability with university-level systems and do not incorporate advanced tools such as AI-based analytics or blockchain-enabled monitoring.
RQ3: Sustainability objectives remain weakly integrated into centralized procurement frameworks. Although EU directives allow the use of green and social criteria, ONAC’s framework agreements rarely apply life-cycle costing or explicit environmental/social indicators, confirming the strategic gap identified in the literature.
6.2. Policy Recommendations
Based on the case analysis of ONAC’s centralized procurement for technical universities, several policy measures are recommended to improve institutional capacity, digitalization, and sustainability, in line with the three pillars of the conceptual framework (
Figure 1):
Revise ONAC’s mandate to explicitly include policy alignment and innovation facilitation.
Finding linked: Weak institutional adaptability and limited feedback loops (Pillar 1—Institutional Capacity).
Example: Italy’s Consip integrates strategic goals into its mandate to ensure national digitalization and sustainability targets are met.
Adopt modular and hybrid framework contracts to increase flexibility and responsiveness.
Institutionalize participatory design and formal feedback loops with beneficiary universities.
Integrate sustainability and innovation criteria systematically into centralized procurement.
Finding linked: Minimal use of life-cycle costing and green award criteria (Pillar 3—Sustainability).
Example: Norway’s Public Procurement of Innovation (PPoI) pilot integrates environmental criteria and SME access in digital procurements.
Strengthen human capital and digital capabilities within ONAC.
Finding linked: Limited IT capacity and absence of advanced digital tools (Pillar 2—Digitalization).
Example: Advanced e-procurement platforms in South Korea and Estonia show the benefits of combining training and digital infrastructure upgrades.
6.3. Limitations and Future Research Directions
This study has several limitations that must be acknowledged. First, the analysis relies exclusively on secondary data sources, such as policy documents, legal frameworks, and publicly available reports. While these offer valuable institutional insights, they cannot fully capture internal administrative dynamics, informal practices, or actor perceptions. The absence of primary data—such as interviews with procurement officials or university representatives—limits the depth of organizational analysis.
Second, the case study focuses on a single national procurement authority (ONAC) and one policy domain (digital infrastructure in higher education). While this provides analytical clarity, it restricts the generalizability of the findings. Romania’s experience may not fully reflect the dynamics of other EU member states or policy areas where procurement priorities differ significantly.
Third, the study does not measure the long-term effects of the procured technologies—such as educational performance, digital inclusion, or institutional innovation. These impact dimensions require longitudinal data and mixed-methods approaches that go beyond the scope of this research.
A key limitation of this study is the exclusive reliance on secondary data, which limits the depth of empirical nuance compared to interviews or surveys. To mitigate this, we applied systematic triangulation across multiple document types and a structured coding protocol to enhance reliability.
Despite these limitations, the paper provides a grounded empirical contribution to the literature on strategic public procurement in transition contexts. It opens several avenues for future research:
Comparative studies across EU countries with centralized or hybrid procurement models;
Longitudinal evaluations of procurement outcomes in higher education institutions;
In-depth case studies using primary qualitative data to explore governance dynamics;
Policy experiments involving user-centered or participatory procurement pilots.
As public procurement continues to evolve from a compliance-driven process to a strategic governance tool, further research is essential to understand how institutional capacity, digital maturity, and sustainability priorities can be embedded more effectively in procurement systems—especially in sectors that shape human capital and innovation potential.
Building on the findings and limitations of this study, future research should adopt more comprehensive, multi-level approaches to assess the strategic role of centralized procurement. First, cross-national comparative studies can illuminate how institutional design, legal frameworks, and stakeholder engagement shape procurement performance in diverse contexts. Second, longitudinal case studies should be developed to track the long-term institutional, educational, and sustainability outcomes of centralized acquisitions—particularly in rapidly evolving sectors such as digital education.
Future work could also explore participatory procurement models that integrate co-design principles, user feedback loops, and supplier innovation mechanisms. Experimental designs—such as public procurement sandboxes or innovation labs—may offer valuable insights into how centralized agencies can balance standardization with adaptability. Finally, research should examine the intersection between procurement systems and broader public sector reform agendas, including green transitions, digital resilience, and skills development in public administration.