Family Firms and Coupling among CSR Disclosures and Performance
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Framework and Research Hypothesis
3. Method
3.1. Sample
3.2. Analysis Model
4. Results
4.1. Basic Descriptive
4.2. Basic Model Results
4.3. Robust Analyses
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Panel A. Relative Frequency by Country | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Country | Country Weight | Family Firm Weight by Country | Country | Country Weight | Family Firm Weight by Country |
ARGENTINA | 0.04 | 21.43 | NEW ZEALAND | 0.43 | 10.27 |
AUSTRALIA | 6.28 | 19.27 | NIGERIA | 0.02 | 0.00 |
AUSTRIA | 0.4 | 11.94 | NORWAY | 0.54 | 7.61 |
BAHREIN | 0.01 | 0.00 | OMAN | 0.05 | 23.53 |
BELGIUM | 0.66 | 31.84 | PANAMA | 0.01 | 0.00 |
BERMUDA | 0.26 | 25.00 | PAPUA NEW GUINEA | 0.03 | 0.00 |
BRAZIL | 1.3 | 21.41 | PERU | 0.06 | 73.68 |
CANADA | 5.87 | 17.52 | PHILIPPINES | 0.47 | 11.95 |
CAYMAN ISLANDS | 0.04 | 16.67 | POLAND | 0.46 | 10.19 |
CHILE | 0.49 | 38.32 | PORTUGAL | 0.24 | 48.15 |
CHINA | 1.82 | 15.07 | PUERTO RICO | 0.01 | 0.00 |
COLOMBIA | 0.25 | 10.71 | QATAR | 0.15 | 1.96 |
CYPRUS | 0.02 | 0.00 | RUSSIA | 0.69 | 16.38 |
CZECH REPUBLIC | 0.1 | 0.00 | SAUDI ARABIA | 0.15 | 22.00 |
DENMARK | 0.74 | 14.00 | SINGAPORE | 1.12 | 12.37 |
EGYPT | 0.06 | 15.79 | SOUTH AFRICA | 1.9 | 16.54 |
FINLAND | 0.61 | 18.05 | SPAIN | 1.14 | 39.53 |
FRANCE | 2.54 | 45.69 | SRI LANKA | 0.02 | 0.00 |
GERMANY | 2.22 | 24.87 | SWEDEN | 1.36 | 22.83 |
GREECE | 0.35 | 40.17 | SWITZERLAND | 1.67 | 33.87 |
GUERNSEY | 0.02 | 83.33 | TAIWAN | 2.86 | 22.23 |
HONG KONG | 3.06 | 30.85 | THAILAND | 0.67 | 11.45 |
HUNGARY | 0.09 | 27.59 | TURKEY | 0.51 | 28.49 |
INDIA | 1.95 | 13.33 | UKRAINE | 0.01 | 0.00 |
INDONESIA | 0.72 | 3.28 | UNITED ARAB EMIRATES | 0.15 | 48.08 |
IRELAND | 0.57 | 16.49 | UNITED KINGDOM | 7.14 | 22.15 |
ISLE OF MAN | 0.01 | 100.00 | UNITED STATES | 29.34 | 15.81 |
ISRAEL | 0.34 | 14.66 | |||
ITALY | 1.17 | 26.45 | Panel B. Relative weight by industry | ||
JAPAN | 11.96 | 6.55 | Industry | Industry Weight | Family Firm Weight by industry |
JERSEY | 0.04 | 100.00 | Oil and Gas | 6.37 | 19.08 |
JORDAN | 0.02 | 100.00 | Basic Materials | 9.62 | 16.24 |
KOREA SOUTH | 2.03 | 33.82 | Industry | 18.69 | 0.02 |
KUWAIT | 0.07 | 8.00 | Consumer goods | 11.32 | 21.47 |
LUXEMBURG | 0.14 | 45.83 | Health | 5.87 | 19.40 |
MACAU | 0.04 | 28.57 | Consumer services | 13.26 | 0.03 |
MALAYSIA | 1 | 7.40 | Telecommunications | 2.61 | 13.35 |
MEXICO | 0.66 | 43.30 | Public services | 4.5 | 5.32 |
MOROCCO | 0.05 | 0.00 | Financial and Real State | 21.29 | 0.02 |
NETHERLANDS | 0.78 | 30.19 | Technology | 6.46 | 20.15 |
Variable | Mean | Std.Dev. |
---|---|---|
CSRgap | 0.11 | 0.015 |
Fsize | 16.936 | 2.835 |
Fage | 38.775 | 32.406 |
ROA | 5.245 | 11.511 |
GrowthOpp | 2.488 | 341.155 |
Fleve | 121.346 | 2065.024 |
Fwc | 0.107 | 0.150 |
Fdivid | 64.392 | 6.975 |
Fintern | 17.737 | 26.461 |
CovAna | 13.670 | 9.042 |
GoverScore | 40.641 | 21.714 |
ICSRPI | 0.102 | 3.040 |
NCSRPI | −0.584 | 8.928 |
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | CSRgap | 1 | |||||||||||||
2 | FamilyFirm | 0.026 *** | 1 | ||||||||||||
3 | Fsize | −0.344 *** | −0.090 *** | 1 | |||||||||||
4 | Fage | −0.096 *** | −0.061 *** | 0.185 *** | 1 | ||||||||||
5 | ROA | 0.025 *** | 0.048 *** | 0.002 | 0.024 ** | 1 | |||||||||
6 | GrowthOpp | 0.000 | −0.002 | −0.004 | −0.008 | −0.003 | 1 | ||||||||
7 | Fleve | −0.004 | 0.013 ** | 0.016 *** | 0.000 | −0.015 *** | 0.000 | 1 | |||||||
8 | Fwc | −0.044 *** | −0.012** | 0.186 *** | 0.009 | 0.030 *** | −0.004 | −0.003 | 1 | ||||||
9 | Fdivid | −0.053 *** | 0.000 | 0.167 *** | −0.001 | 0.004 | 0.0000 | −0.002 | 0.138 *** | 1 | |||||
10 | Finter | 0.035 *** | 0.037 *** | −0.040 *** | 0.061 *** | 0.005 | −0.005 | −0.007 | −0.033 *** | −0.039 *** | 1 | ||||
11 | CovAna | −0.008 | −0.049 *** | 0.222 *** | 0.042 *** | 0.096 *** | −0.007 | 0.001 | 0.070 *** | 0.007 | 0.078 *** | 1 | |||
12 | GoverScore | 0.057 *** | −0.026 *** | −0.030 *** | 0.060 *** | 0.001 | 0.004 | −0.004 | −0.006 | −0.036 *** | 0.041 *** | 0.093 *** | 1 | ||
13 | ICSRPI | −0.089 *** | −0.055 *** | −0.074 *** | 0.066 *** | −0.036 *** | −0.006 | −0.010 ** | 0.019 *** | −0.015 *** | 0.174 *** | −0.011 ** | 0.028 *** | 1 | |
14 | NCSRPI | 0.023 *** | 0.086 *** | −0.098 *** | 0.034 *** | 0.006 | 0.000 | −0.002 | −0.034 *** | 0.009 * | 0.282 *** | −0.073 *** | −0.028 *** | 0.020 *** | 1 |
Equation (1) | |||
---|---|---|---|
CSRPerf | CSRDiscl | CSRgap | |
Coeff. (Std. Error) | Coeff. (Std. Error) | Coeff. (Std. Error) | |
FamilyFirm | −0.000517 | −0.0170 | −3.84 × 10−5 ** |
(0.0206) | (0.0214) | (1.89 × 10−5) | |
Fsize | 5.517 *** | 1.984 *** | −0.00157 *** |
(0.162) | (0.126) | (0.000131) | |
Fage | 0.125 *** | 0.0223 *** | −3.72 × 10−6 |
(0.0119) | (0.00788) | (9.01 × 10−6) | |
ROA | 0.0107 | 0.0229 | 3.13 × 10−5 ** |
(0.0121) | (0.0194) | (1.26 × 10−5) | |
GrowthOpp | 0.0103 | −0.0360 | −2.57 × 10−5 |
(0.0380) | (0.0738) | (3.95 × 10−5) | |
Flev | −2.93 × 10−5 | 3.16 × 10−5 | 5.51 × 10−9 |
(3.89 × 10−5) | (7.93 × 10−5) | (4.08 × 10−8) | |
Fwc | 2.82 × 10−10 ** | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(1.38 × 10−10) | (2.06 × 10−10) | (0.000) | |
Fdivi | 0.000111 | −0.00222 *** | −3.04 × 10−7 |
(0.000727) | (0.000682) | (6.70 × 10−7) | |
Finter | 0.0137 ** | 0.00453 | −1.38 × 10−5 * |
(0.00554) | (0.00842) | (7.74 × 10−6) | |
CovAna | 0.00522 | 0.275 *** | 0.000199 *** |
(0.0272) | (0.0289) | (2.53 × 10−5) | |
GoverScore | −0.00546 | 0.135 *** | −6.07 × 10−5 *** |
(0.00478) | (0.00966) | (5.13 × 10−6) | |
ICSRPI | 0.447 *** | 0.470 *** | −0.000377 *** |
(0.172) | (0.115) | (0.000130) | |
NCSRPI | 0.453 *** | 0.438 *** | 7.75 × 10−5 ** |
(0.0395) | (0.0308) | (3.24 × 10−5) | |
Year, Country and Industry included | |||
Constant | −1.564 *** | −2.932 *** | 3.320 *** |
(82.59) | (150.8) | (0.0872) | |
R2 | 0.482 *** | 0.171 *** | 0.207 *** |
Equation (1) | Equation (1) | Equation (1) | |
---|---|---|---|
CSRgap2 | DSilent | CSRgap | |
Coeff. | Coeff. | Coeff. | |
(Std. Error) | (Std. Error) | (Std. Error) | |
FamilyFirm | −0.00112 *** | −0.0211 *** | −2.89 × 10−5 ** |
(0.000219) | (0.00779) | (1.35 × 10−5) | |
Fsize | 0.0114 *** | −0.0514 | −0.00151 *** |
(0.00161) | (0.0523) | (7.68 × 10−5) | |
Fage | 0.00126 *** | 0.0292 *** | |
(0.000115) | (0.00479) | ||
ROA | 0.000306 ** | 0.0179 *** | 2.32 × 10−5 ** |
(0.000134) | (0.00552) | (9.57 × 10−6) | |
GrowthOpp | −0.00104 ** | 0.0121 | |
(0.000429) | (0.0251) | ||
Flev | 3.34 × 10−7 | −4.06 × 10−6 | |
(4.41 × 10−7) | (5.48 × 10−5) | ||
Fwc | −0.000 *** | −6.58 × 10−11 | |
(0.000) | (8.73 × 10−11) | ||
Fdivi | −2.79 × 10−5 *** | −0.000694 *** | |
(7.41 × 10−6) | (0.000233) | ||
Finter | 0.000253 *** | 0.0143 *** | −1.24 × 10−5 ** |
(6.18 × 10−5) | (0.00424) | (5.90 × 10−6) | |
CovAna | 0.00192 *** | 0.116 *** | 0.000195 *** |
(0.000291) | (0.0139) | (1.84 × 10−5) | |
GoverScore | −0.000123 ** | −0.00264 | −5.34 × 10−5 *** |
(5.41 × 10−5) | (0.00335) | (3.86 × 10−6) | |
ICSRPI | 0.00400 ** | 0.0984 * | −0.000556 *** |
(0.00166) | (0.0509) | (9.91 × 10−5) | |
NCSRPI | 0.00306 *** | 0.0487 *** | 8.73 × 10−5 *** |
(0.000398) | (0.0152) | (2.38 × 10−5) | |
Year, Country and Industry included | |||
Constant | −14.80 *** | −274.5 *** | 3.147 *** |
(0.918) | (58.57) | (0.0655) | |
R2 | 0.482 *** | 0.171 *** | 0.191 *** |
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Parra-Domínguez, J.; David, F.; Azevedo, T. Family Firms and Coupling among CSR Disclosures and Performance. Adm. Sci. 2021, 11, 30. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci11010030
Parra-Domínguez J, David F, Azevedo T. Family Firms and Coupling among CSR Disclosures and Performance. Administrative Sciences. 2021; 11(1):30. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci11010030
Chicago/Turabian StyleParra-Domínguez, Javier, Fátima David, and Tania Azevedo. 2021. "Family Firms and Coupling among CSR Disclosures and Performance" Administrative Sciences 11, no. 1: 30. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci11010030
APA StyleParra-Domínguez, J., David, F., & Azevedo, T. (2021). Family Firms and Coupling among CSR Disclosures and Performance. Administrative Sciences, 11(1), 30. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci11010030