Analyzing the Relationship between Supervisors and Post-Graduates Based on Differential Game Theory
Abstract
:1. Introduction
1.1. Background
1.2. Literature Review
1.3. Aim of Present Study
2. Problem Formulation
3. Game Model and Solutions in Three Scenarios
3.1. Non-Cooperative Scenario
3.2. Cooperative Scenario
3.3. Stackelberg Scenario
4. Comparison of Equilibrium Strategies
4.1. Comparison of Efforts
4.2. Comparison of Academic Level of the Community
4.3. Comparison of the Community’s Optimal Total Benefit
5. Numerical Simulation and Analysis
5.1. Parameter Settings
5.2. Results and Analysis
5.2.1. Quantitative Analysis
5.2.2. Graphic Analysis
6. Results with Different Parameters
6.1. Results with Different Cost Coefficients of Efforts (, , , )
6.2. Results with Different Benefit Coefficients of the Efforts (, , , )
6.3. Results with Different Decay Factors of the Academic Level ()
6.4. Results with Different Efficiency Coefficients of the Academic Level Change (, )
6.5. Results with Different Cost Sharing Ratios in the Stackelberg Scenario
7. Conclusions
- A comparison of the results in the three game scenarios indicated that the cooperative game can achieve the highest optimal academic level and total community benefit, followed by the Stackelberg game and, finally, the non-cooperative game.
- (A)
- The quantitative results show that compared to the cooperative game, the non-cooperative game greatly curbs the positive efforts but enlarges the negative efforts of both actors. Specifically, in the non-cooperative game scenario, the supervisor’s positive effort was reduced by 22%, and the negative effort is increased to nine times that of the positive effort. Meanwhile, the postgraduate’s positive effort was reduced by 25%, and the negative effort grew to about ten times that of the positive effort. As a result, the optimal academic level and total benefit of the community in the non-cooperative game were reduced by 38% and 32%, respectively, when compared to those of the cooperative game.
- (B)
- For the supervisor-led Stackelberg game, when compared to the non-cooperative game, the supervisor’s positive and negative efforts remain unchanged, whereas the postgraduate’s positive and negative efforts were both increased by about 67%. Consequently, the optimal academic level of the community is improved by 26%, and the optimal total benefit of the community was improved by 20%. In short, the benefits of both the supervisor and the postgraduate were improved in the Stackelberg game.
- (C)
- Compared to the Stackelberg game, in the cooperative game, the supervisor’s positive effort was increased by 28%, while the negative effort was reduced by 67%. The postgraduate’s positive and negative efforts were decreased by 20% and 83%, respectively. This can lead to a 23% improvement of the optimal total benefit and a 28% improvement of the optimal total benefit of the community. Obviously, both the supervisor and postgraduate’s benefits were also enhanced in the Stackelberg game. This finding indicates that when the supervisor and postgraduate both cooperate, this was conductive to improving their respective benefits and the optimal total benefits of the community. In the cooperative scenario, the supervisor was more willing to actively mentor the postgraduate, and the postgraduate was also more willing to actively make progress on the research. Conversely, if both the supervisor and postgraduate go their own ways and ignore the other party, the optimal total benefit of the community will be at the lowest level. For example, if, for private profit, the supervisor compels the postgraduate to carry out non-academic work, then the postgraduate may passively cope with and even have a rebellious mentality towards the scientific research. This will waste much time and resources, and will ultimately weaken their respective benefits, as well as the total benefit of the community.
- The growing rate of the optimal academic level and total benefit of the community in the three game scenarios all experience an increase first and then a decrease, before finally tending to a level stage. In the initial stage of the game, the optimal total benefit increased at a rapid pace via the supervisor’s and postgraduate’s respective efforts, for example, by working hard on the academic activity. However, the optimal total benefit only grew slowly over time.
- For both the non-cooperative and cooperative game, the supervisor’s benefits were higher than those of the postgraduate. For the Stackelberg game, as the supervisor shared the cost with the postgraduate at the early stage, the supervisor’s benefit was temporarily less than that of the postgraduate. However, as time went on, the benefits of both actors grew, and the supervisor’s benefit eventually exceeded that of the postgraduate. Additionally, the results indicate that a proper improvement in terms of the supervisor’s sharing cost ratio will not only improve the postgraduate’s benefit but will also increase the supervisor’s benefit, thereby realizing a win–win condition.
- The influences of different model parameters were also discussed. The correlation between the model parameters and the critical indicators, including the optimal academic level and the total benefit of the community, were presented. Particularly, for the Stackelberg game, when the sharing cost ratio was increased to a specific level, the supervisor’s benefit will not be further improved.
8. Limitations and Future Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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Indicator | Non-Cooperative Game | Cooperative Game | Stackelberg Game |
---|---|---|---|
Supervisor’s positive effort | 0.5152 | 0.6606 | 0.5152 |
Supervisor’s negative effort | 0.1455 | 0.0485 | 0.1455 |
Postgraduate’s positive effort | 0.4545 | 0.6061 | 0.7576 |
Postgraduate’s negative effort | 0.1697 | 0.0485 | 0.2828 |
Academic level of the community | 2.0515 | 3.3029 | 2.5828 |
Supervisor’s sharing ratio of cost | - | - | 0.4 |
Supervisor’s benefit | 1.2518 | 1.7921 | 1.3823 |
Postgraduate’s benefit | 1.0435 | 1.5839 | 1.3675 |
Total benefit of both | 2.2953 | 3.3761 | 2.7498 |
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Liu, F.; Fan, N.; Zhu, J.; Li, C.; Xie, S. Analyzing the Relationship between Supervisors and Post-Graduates Based on Differential Game Theory. Behav. Sci. 2023, 13, 414. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs13050414
Liu F, Fan N, Zhu J, Li C, Xie S. Analyzing the Relationship between Supervisors and Post-Graduates Based on Differential Game Theory. Behavioral Sciences. 2023; 13(5):414. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs13050414
Chicago/Turabian StyleLiu, Fangfang, Ning Fan, Jiangjun Zhu, Chaoping Li, and Shaobo Xie. 2023. "Analyzing the Relationship between Supervisors and Post-Graduates Based on Differential Game Theory" Behavioral Sciences 13, no. 5: 414. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs13050414
APA StyleLiu, F., Fan, N., Zhu, J., Li, C., & Xie, S. (2023). Analyzing the Relationship between Supervisors and Post-Graduates Based on Differential Game Theory. Behavioral Sciences, 13(5), 414. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs13050414