The Metaphysics of Sophistry: Protagoras, Nāgārjuna, Antilogos

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

This is exemplary scholarship.  There masterly engagement of current scholarship (especially on Protagoras), and for the audience for this journal should find her case for a correction of the platonic view of the sophists (and antilogos) to be compelling (some is already familiar to classicists who have worked in this area).  The connection to Indian philosophical traditions and Nagarjuna was absolutely fascinating.  I also commend the interweaving of more contemporary philosophical thinkers such as Foucault; again, for this particular journal this will make the paper all the more interesting, accessible, and informative.

The Conclusion is especially well done. I very much appreciate the three reasons for why the paper matters.  

Author Response

Thank you very much for this review!

Reviewer 2 Report

While reading your manuscript, several ideas came to mind as you can see below.  Perhaps they can help you tone down your writing and give it a more objective, scholarly feel.

It would be good for you to focus on Protagoras who was one of the earliest Sophists and was relatively benign. Later generations of sophists were shadier.

Proagoras really wanted to encourage and educate people. By contrast. Gorgias was a political operative from Sicily who worked with reactionary rich old-school Athenians. They had a plan to overthrow the democracy.    In his writings, he drew nihilistic conclusions from Protagoras' antilogos, such that, in the words of Ivan Karamozov, Anything goes!  Famously, Gorgias constructed a proof showing that we cannot prove that anything exists, and even if anything did exist we could not know it. So, there should be nothing holding a person back from seeking their ends at the expense of everyone else, providing they are shrews enough to do so.   

I should add that while Callicles and Thrasymachus used sophistic grounds to argue that might is right, or the stronger are better and deserve more. Socrates respected them for their frankness, which made it easier for him to debate them. Gorgias was trickier and tried to let others, such as Callicles, speak for him, so he wouldn't be on the line.

The Sophists were a mixed bag. They offered courses for pay on all sorts of skills that are useful for public speaking in the Athenian Democracy, having acumen, appearing literate, and so forth.  In the view of Plato and Socrates, their knowledge tended to be piecemeal though they varied in their depth of knowledge and talent.

A danger they posed was that the Athenian democracy was based on social unity and trust among the citizens.  A key premise was that citizens would speak as frankly and truthfully to each other as possible. Obviously, the Sophists tended to be itinerant scholars from the colonies and other places who had no commitment to Athens or the democracy. So they offered skills for personal aggrandizement. To put oneself ahead one's fellow citizens.

In Platos' mind, this had been a key factor in the decline of Athenian democracy.  By contrast, Socrates would die upholding his support for the laws of Athens. 

Plato was alarmed that the people could not distinguish between Socrates-- who did not claim to have knowledge and did not teach anything, but was a truth-seeker and would seek truth with anyone who would talk to him-- and the Sophists-- who claimed to have knowledge and charged to give lessons. 

The Protagoras is a unique dialogue in that while it starts out as a sort of Socratic inquiry into Virtue--what it is and can it be taught--it devolves into a debate between Socrates and Protagoras.  In the course of the dialogues Socrates gets embroiled in.a sophist-style debate in which he seeks to be the winner, instead of focusing on seeking the truth of the proposition or the true answer to the questions as in a normal Socratic inquiry.  In consequence, by the end of the dialogue, both Socrates and Protagoras have antilogos:  Socrates is holding Protagoras' position and Protagoras is holding Socrates' position. Still energetic, Socrates proposes to sharpen up the logos of the discussion, so they may arrive at an answer, but Protagoras is weary and embarrassed.  Why would he be embarrassed? you ask.   Well, after all, both he and Socrates experienced antilogos and no solution was forthcoming. In other words, the problem was that neither side could prevail using his antilogic approach according to which one side should be shown to be more effective.  And, Socrates is still energetic because his analytic tools haven't been used yet.

You are right to distinguish Plato from Platonism, for Plato himself was not a dogmatist whereas Platonism later  became dogmatic. There is an argument that Aristotle was not chosen to head the Academy after Plato exactly because he was too dogmatic. His writings always begin with :The Master asserted.... Plato's writings always begin with a term, a proposition, and issue to be discussed, disputed, and he set up theories along the way to could solutions to problems, but over time, Plato shed most of the theories, including the theory of forms. Even in the Republic, he set up the theory of forms, to get people to think that truth and values were real and worth thinking about-- just so they would have higher aspirations and try to speak truly in the Athenian democracy and society.

In the Parmenides, he critiqued the theory of forms. (Aristotle's criticisms of the forms were rehashes of Plato's own criticisms in this dialogue.)

The realm of becoming is real for Plato. He is not like Plotinus who thinks there are grades of reality.  The material world is what it is. You won't find the perfect truths of math and geometry there, you won't find perfect instances of virtues there... etc. But you will find imperfect material knowledge.... to go with the unstable phenomena.

Here is the conclusion of a book on Plato's philosopher: "The Parmenides, Theatetus, Sophist, and Statesman examine their topics at a high level of abstraction and give the false impression that Plato regards philosophy as an esoteric discipline mainly interested in structural kinds and abstract general kinds, with down-to-earth examples introduced as models to make those issues more tractable, but several of the investigations culminate by applying the apparatus to worldly philosophical problems. The Theatetus ends its examination of knowledge by reflecting on the difference between knowing the boy Theatetus and merely judging him truly, and knowing how to spell his name and merely getting it right, and the Sophist crowns its investigations of not-being by analyzing a false statement about a mundane object, "Theatetus is flying."  Solving basic problems about recognition. linguistic competence, and falsehood constitutes constitutes the foundation of Plato's philosophical project, and those solutions then can be used to answer harder and more vexing questions. What is a true statement? What is a sophist? Why is his teaching so dangerous? Whom should we trust to answer these question?"

As you mention, antilogos makes sense in the realm of becoming, which is probably why Plato was wary of its possible misuse.  Thus he sought to make people believe they could arrive at more and more accurate accounts of situations.

Your attempt to establish a comparison between Protagoras' putative ontology of becoming and the ontology associated with Nagarjuna's dialectic  is interesting. The crucial difference of course is that Nagarjuna believes in prajna, enlightenment,  and nirvana whereas Protagoras is an agnostic about anything beyond the senses.

Here are some useful references:

Robin Reames, "Speech in the Pursuit of Silence" (On Buddhist rhetoric). In Philosophy and Rhetoric (2022) 55 (1): 32-39. http://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.55.1.0032

Robin Reames, Seeming and Being in Plato's Rhetorical Thinking. Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 2018.

Plato's Protagoras: Essays on the Confrontation of Philosophy and Rhetoric. Springer 2016.

Author Response

Thank you for your review, and for the suggestion that I focus on Protagoras. In fact, that is the sophist whose work I analyze in the paper, so it seems we are in agreement on that.   

I agree with you that the sophists were a "mixed bag", and if this were a longer project, I would be interested to go into more detail about what seems to set Protagoras apart from the others, and why calling all of them by the same label "sophist" can be misleading. But given the constraints of space, I must limit my analysis to the comparison between Nagarjuna and Protagoras's fragments only.   

I’ve attempted to clarify the difference between Socrates' method and sophistic antilogos, showing how Socrates must ignore Protagorean metaphysics in order to skewer sophistic antilogos. This is to make it clearer that it isn’t that the antilogos is unilaterally dubious; it’s that it is eradicated as a philosophically serious linguistic method for the apprehension of being. So it isn’t that it can’t be used full stop—it’s that it can’t be used to do metaphysics. I’ve also attempted to further justify my reading of the contradiction between Protagoras’s two doctrines.   

You are right to point out that the "end" of Nagarjuna's dialectic is enlightenment, and that we don't quite know what the corollary for Protagoras might be. This must remain an open question for now.   

Thank you again for your review. 

Reviewer 3 Report

This is a clear, well-written piece on an interesting question. It brings together Greek and Indian sources, albeit in a necessarily speculative way, to suggest a particular reading of some enigmatic lines of Protagoras. Its merits lie in the way it provides a plausible reading of Protagoras in this way, countering what the author takes to be a generally negative view of Protagoras at work in Platonism.

The paper is strongest when creating a plausible argument for the cross-fertilization of ideas between India and Greece during the right period (lines 120-164).

Some of the general remarks about the negativity of the Platonic view might be toned down. I don’t find them generally justified (more on this below). In fact, I wonder whether this isn’t conceded in lines 54-55 with the remark that both Plato and Aristotle treated Protagoras’ work seriously. Of course, you can treat something seriously and still render a negative judgment, but there does seem to be an adjustment to the tone here. (Muted again at 60-61).

The crux of the paper revolves around readings of the sense of antilogos operating in the very limited material we have with Protagorean roots. Some of this reading depends heavily on Kerferd’s “unparalleled account” (178), but the author doesn’t really pursue alternative literature that has explored antilogos in quite positive ways and shown it operating beyond Platonism (and presumably beyond the negative influence of Platonism). I am thinking here particularly of Michael Mendelson’s Many Sides book (Springer 2002), which I would recommend the author review. But also work like that of classicist and philosopher Manfred Kraus who draws on the Sophists and a reading of antilogos to suggest ways of addressing disagreement.

The reading is what’s assumed here and, of course, given the interpretative nature of what’s available, it’s hard to contest it. But, ironically, there is another side to this. Even the use of antilogos in the Euthydemus (which is taken as symptomatic of Plato’s relentlessly negative portrayal-ln 242) has received a positive reading from, say Mary, Margaret McCabe (“Persistent Fallacies,” in Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1994), who is a powerful reading reclaims the Sophist brothers’ approach in a way that depends on seeing them hold very different metaphysical beliefs from Socrates.

So, there’s room for some pause here and a toning down on the claims. I can’t read Foucault as the author can, but I do worry about the claim that a central use of antilogos has been effectively eradicated by Aristotle (ln 273). Mendelson (again), for example, makes a strong case for seeing it at work in Cicero and Quintilian, and beyond: “Cicero’s De Oratore is perhaps the most sophisticated elaboration of antilogical methods in the entire rhetorical tradition” (p.287).

My strongest worry lies with the author’s apparent belief that the antilogoi doctrine and the doctrine of contradiction attributed to Protagoras are unreconcilable (ln 316). If we read antilogos, as the author does, as having two opposing statements on any issue, each of which is equally plausible, then the claim doesn’t seem to follow. A contradiction (on Aristotle’s terms and the subsequent history of logic) is where two statements cannot both be true or false; one must be true and the other false (in contrast to contraries, where they cannot both be true, but they could both be false). The contradiction doctrine denies this (as the reading from the Metaphysics shows). But that’s consistent with claiming that ‘the strong man did not strike the weak man’ and ‘the strong man did strike the weak man’ are both true with equally likelihoods. Either statement is plausible for the antilogic of Protagoras. But, as Aristotle insists (Rhetoric Book 2, Ch. 24), only one of these statements must be true, something Protagoras would apparently have denied. Again, we have an underlying philosophical contrast at work.

When we turn to the interesting reading of Nāgārjuna, the examples drawn from that source indeed show that any statement can be contradicted. But is that the same as saying that each of the derived statements can be equally plausible (ln 379)? I wasn’t as convinced of this as the author seems. In fact, the fascinating extraction of Nāgārjuna’s ideas struck me as closer to Gorgias’ doctrine of Being/Not-Being (ln 457).

So, in summary: a good base to the paper. It’s a worthwhile project that should eventually be published. I would recommend a rethink on a few points (although, I submit, given the problems of interpretation that the author recognizes, he/she might respond to some of the points I have made that they are simply matters of interstation. Still, there are some things to think about).

Minor points:

Note that lines 209-213 and 231-237 involve quotes, although the layout of the text here doesn’t convey this.

And there’s a word missing from line 483, I think.This is a clear, well-written piece on an interesting question. It brings together Greek and Indian sources, albeit in a necessarily speculative way, to suggest a particular reading of some enigmatic lines of Protagoras. Its merits lie in the way it provides a plausible reading of Protagoras in this way, countering what the author takes to be a generally negative view of Protagoras at work in Platonism.

The paper is strongest when creating a plausible argument for the cross-fertilization of ideas between India and Greece during the right period (lines 120-164).

Some of the general remarks about the negativity of the Platonic view might be toned down. I don’t find them generally justified (more on this below). In fact, I wonder whether this isn’t conceded in lines 54-55 with the remark that both Plato and Aristotle treated Protagoras’ work seriously. Of course, you can treat something seriously and still render a negative judgment, but there does seem to be an adjustment to the tone here. (Muted again at 60-61).

The crux of the paper revolves around readings of the sense of antilogos operating in the very limited material we have with Protagorean roots. Some of this reading depends heavily on Kerferd’s “unparalleled account” (178), but the author doesn’t really pursue alternative literature that has explored antilogos in quite positive ways and shown it operating beyond Platonism (and presumably beyond the negative influence of Platonism). I am thinking here particularly of Michael Mendelson’s Many Sides book (Springer 2002), which I would recommend the author review. But also work like that of classicist and philosopher Manfred Kraus who draws on the Sophists and a reading of antilogos to suggest ways of addressing disagreement.

The reading is what’s assumed here and, of course, given the interpretative nature of what’s available, it’s hard to contest it. But, ironically, there is another side to this. Even the use of antilogos in the Euthydemus (which is taken as symptomatic of Plato’s relentlessly negative portrayal-ln 242) has received a positive reading from, say Mary, Margaret McCabe (“Persistent Fallacies,” in Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1994), who is a powerful reading reclaims the Sophist brothers’ approach in a way that depends on seeing them hold very different metaphysical beliefs from Socrates.

So, there’s room for some pause here and a toning down on the claims. I can’t read Foucault as the author can, but I do worry about the claim that a central use of antilogos has been effectively eradicated by Aristotle (ln 273). Mendelson (again), for example, makes a strong case for seeing it at work in Cicero and Quintilian, and beyond: “Cicero’s De Oratore is perhaps the most sophisticated elaboration of antilogical methods in the entire rhetorical tradition” (p.287).

My strongest worry lies with the author’s apparent belief that the antilogoi doctrine and the doctrine of contradiction attributed to Protagoras are unreconcilable (ln 316). If we read antilogos, as the author does, as having two opposing statements on any issue, each of which is equally plausible, then the claim doesn’t seem to follow. A contradiction (on Aristotle’s terms and the subsequent history of logic) is where two statements cannot both be true or false; one must be true and the other false (in contrast to contraries, where they cannot both be true, but they could both be false). The contradiction doctrine denies this (as the reading from the Metaphysics shows). But that’s consistent with claiming that ‘the strong man did not strike the weak man’ and ‘the strong man did strike the weak man’ are both true with equally likelihoods. Either statement is plausible for the antilogic of Protagoras. But, as Aristotle insists (Rhetoric Book 2, Ch. 24), only one of these statements must be true, something Protagoras would apparently have denied. Again, we have an underlying philosophical contrast at work.

When we turn to the interesting reading of Nāgārjuna, the examples drawn from that source indeed show that any statement can be contradicted. But is that the same as saying that each of the derived statements can be equally plausible (ln 379)? I wasn’t as convinced of this as the author seems. In fact, the fascinating extraction of Nāgārjuna’s ideas struck me as closer to Gorgias’ doctrine of Being/Not-Being (ln 457).

So, in summary: a good base to the paper. It’s a worthwhile project that should eventually be published. I would recommend a rethink on a few points (although, I submit, given the problems of interpretation that the author recognizes, he/she might respond to some of the points I have made that they are simply matters of interpretation. Still, there are some things to think about).

Minor points:

Note that lines 209-213 and 231-237 involve quotes, although the layout of the text here doesn’t convey this.

And there’s a word missing from line 483, I think.This is a clear, well-written piece on an interesting question. It brings together Greek and Indian sources, albeit in a necessarily speculative way, to suggest a particular reading of some enigmatic lines of Protagoras. Its merits lie in the way it provides a plausible reading of Protagoras in this way, countering what the author takes to be a generally negative view of Protagoras at work in Platonism.

The paper is strongest when creating a plausible argument for the cross-fertilization of ideas between India and Greece during the right period (lines 120-164).

Some of the general remarks about the negativity of the Platonic view might be toned down. I don’t find them generally justified (more on this below). In fact, I wonder whether this isn’t conceded in lines 54-55 with the remark that both Plato and Aristotle treated Protagoras’ work seriously. Of course, you can treat something seriously and still render a negative judgment, but there does seem to be an adjustment to the tone here. (Muted again at 60-61).

The crux of the paper revolves around readings of the sense of antilogos operating in the very limited material we have with Protagorean roots. Some of this reading depends heavily on Kerferd’s “unparalleled account” (178), but the author doesn’t really pursue alternative literature that has explored antilogos in quite positive ways and shown it operating beyond Platonism (and presumably beyond the negative influence of Platonism). I am thinking here particularly of Michael Mendelson’s Many Sides book (Springer 2002), which I would recommend the author review. But also work like that of classicist and philosopher Manfred Kraus who draws on the Sophists and a reading of antilogos to suggest ways of addressing disagreement.

The reading is what’s assumed here and, of course, given the interpretative nature of what’s available, it’s hard to contest it. But, ironically, there is another side to this. Even the use of antilogos in the Euthydemus (which is taken as symptomatic of Plato’s relentlessly negative portrayal-ln 242) has received a positive reading from, say Mary, Margaret McCabe (“Persistent Fallacies,” in Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1994), who is a powerful reading reclaims the Sophist brothers’ approach in a way that depends on seeing them hold very different metaphysical beliefs from Socrates.

So, there’s room for some pause here and a toning down on the claims. I can’t read Foucault as the author can, but I do worry about the claim that a central use of antilogos has been effectively eradicated by Aristotle (ln 273). Mendelson (again), for example, makes a strong case for seeing it at work in Cicero and Quintilian, and beyond: “Cicero’s De Oratore is perhaps the most sophisticated elaboration of antilogical methods in the entire rhetorical tradition” (p.287).

My strongest worry lies with the author’s apparent belief that the antilogoi doctrine and the doctrine of contradiction attributed to Protagoras are unreconcilable (ln 316). If we read antilogos, as the author does, as having two opposing statements on any issue, each of which is equally plausible, then the claim doesn’t seem to follow. A contradiction (on Aristotle’s terms and the subsequent history of logic) is where two statements cannot both be true or false; one must be true and the other false (in contrast to contraries, where they cannot both be true, but they could both be false). The contradiction doctrine denies this (as the reading from the Metaphysics shows). But that’s consistent with claiming that ‘the strong man did not strike the weak man’ and ‘the strong man did strike the weak man’ are both true with equally likelihoods. Either statement is plausible for the antilogic of Protagoras. But, as Aristotle insists (Rhetoric Book 2, Ch. 24), only one of these statements must be true, something Protagoras would apparently have denied. Again, we have an underlying philosophical contrast at work.

When we turn to the interesting reading of Nāgārjuna, the examples drawn from that source indeed show that any statement can be contradicted. But is that the same as saying that each of the derived statements can be equally plausible (ln 379)? I wasn’t as convinced of this as the author seems. In fact, the fascinating extraction of Nāgārjuna’s ideas struck me as closer to Gorgias’ doctrine of Being/Not-Being (ln 457).

So, in summary: a good base to the paper. It’s a worthwhile project that should eventually be published. I would recommend a rethink on a few points (although, I submit, given the problems of interpretation that the author recognizes, he/she might respond to some of the points I have made that they are simply matters of interstation. Still, there are some things to think about).

Minor points:

Note that lines 209-213 and 231-237 involve quotes, although the layout of the text here doesn’t convey this.

And there’s a word missing from line 483, I think.

Author Response

I’m grateful to the reviewers who made several useful recommendations for the revision of this essay. In my revision I’ve attempted to address several of these concerns. One reader very helpfully pointed out that I seem to suggest that antilogos is repudiated entirely as a technique, relying as I do on Foucault’s account. I’ve attempted to clarify this aspect of my claim by explaining that it isn’t that the antilogos is unilaterally dubious; it’s that it is eradicated as a philosophically serious linguistic method for the apprehension of being. So it isn’t that it can’t be used full stop—it’s that it can’t be used to do metaphysics. I’ve clarified this in the section on Foucault’s reading of Aristotle, including references to Mendelson and Kraus as the reader suggested. One reader rightly pointed out that antilogos is not always distinguishable from Socrates’s own method, a point I’ve tried to make more explicit.

I’m also very grateful for the mention of McCabe’s essay “Persistent Fallacies” which was excellent but which I hadn’t read previously. I’ve integrated some discussion of this essay into the paper as well, since it was extremely helpful in showing how Socrates must ignore Protagorean metaphysics in order to skewer sophistic antilogos. That discussion may be found just before the conclusion of the paper. In that same section, I’ve attempted to further justify my reading of the contradiction between Protagoras’s two doctrines (something that the third reader and I may simply interpret differently).

There were some structural and organizational suggestions that I have integrated where I felt it would not be a disservice to the paper to do so. For example, I included a chart in the discussion of Protagoras’s phrase ouk estin antilegein to assist with clarity. I did not, however, think that I could undertake a major organizational change without weakening the overall argument somewhat so I’ve refrained from an overhaul of this sort.

I deeply appreciate the valuable time the readers offered to this essay. 

Reviewer 4 Report

This article is engaging and well written. The writing style is scholarly but also conversational (even at times playful), which this reader appreciates.

For a formatting standpoint, I do not like the notes at the end and strongly prefer footnotes, because I can satisfy my curiosity without losing position. There are a few minor edit to be made (e.g. ln. 46).

One minor issue is that the author seems to set up the connection between the East and West but pulls back (too much) from establishing the connection only to rely on it throughout. While minor, it was a bother for this reader. Part of me wants the author to be bold and declare it instead of the hedging, since as they suggest, "a high degree of contact" (ln. 121-122). Either make the claim and stand by it or narrow it down to a few lines. I have a more of a wink wink, nod nod implication from the author instead of the real connective tissue that they claim (and I think rightly so) is there.

I assume the author recognizes the connections to the Socratic method, but do not see this connection (Farnworth's recent text may be useful).

As for the writing itself, I noted it was a pleasant read. In fact, I most enjoyed lines 318-24. That paragraph is delicious. In addition, the author comes back to unique terminology and descriptions that help establish connections throughout, which is a welcome style choice.

Lines 487-497 are a bit unclear for me. And since such reliance on them is used, I suggest taking more time to dig down on them. As a passing thought, it might be useful to use a table or other structure to help readers "see" these distinctions.

The discussion of Nāgārjuna seems positioned poorly. While perhaps too much to revise, it might be nice to see the two perspectives in a dialogue, back and forth. But I realize that might be me trying to be an author and not a reviewer (which I try to be mindful of as a reviewer). However, I do think the author could get to Nāgārjuna faster by trimming down some of the early discussion. Some of the so-called foundation or lit review could be seen as unnecessary and the author could then get to the good stuff faster.

In reading the conclusion, I am torn. My first reading felt as if it lack the punch I wanted as a reader, but upon second (and third) reading I did not feel this same way. I do feel somewhat adrift with it, however, in the sense of "being" (or not). The author seems to come down on the side of, "well, we can't know anything because everything is in flux" (but this leaks into section 4). This observation also hints at the failure of it being (fully) addressed, which the author, too, seems to step away from, when again, I had hoped they would bear down on. This might be unavoidable though. Nevertheless, it leads to the raising of even more questions and opportunities (and this is good!). Perhaps the author does not dig in, because one cannot dig into nothing(ingness).

Overall, with some minor clarifications, selective cuts, and edits, I believe this is a good addition to current scholarship.

Author Response

I’m grateful to the reviewers who made several useful recommendations for the revision of this essay. In my revision I’ve attempted to address several of these concerns. One reader very helpfully pointed out that I seem to suggest that antilogos is repudiated entirely as a technique, relying as I do on Foucault’s account. I’ve attempted to clarify this aspect of my claim by explaining that it isn’t that the antilogos is unilaterally dubious; it’s that it is eradicated as a philosophically serious linguistic method for the apprehension of being. So it isn’t that it can’t be used full stop—it’s that it can’t be used to do metaphysics. I’ve clarified this in the section on Foucault’s reading of Aristotle, including references to Mendelson and Kraus as the reader suggested. One reader rightly pointed out that antilogos is not always distinguishable from Socrates’s own method, a point I’ve tried to make more explicit.

I’m also very grateful for the mention of McCabe’s essay “Persistent Fallacies” which was excellent but which I hadn’t read previously. I’ve integrated some discussion of this essay into the paper as well, since it was extremely helpful in showing how Socrates must ignore Protagorean metaphysics in order to skewer sophistic antilogos. That discussion may be found just before the conclusion of the paper. In that same section, I’ve attempted to further justify my reading of the contradiction between Protagoras’s two doctrines (something that the third reader and I may simply interpret differently).

There were some structural and organizational suggestions that I have integrated where I felt it would not be a disservice to the paper to do so. For example, I included a chart in the discussion of Protagoras’s phrase ouk estin antilegein to assist with clarity. I did not, however, think that I could undertake a major organizational change without weakening the overall argument somewhat so I’ve refrained from an overhaul of this sort.

I deeply appreciate the valuable time the readers offered to this essay. 

Round 2

Reviewer 2 Report

The Sophists thought that reality was inaccessible and thus not a proper topic inquiry. Thus, it is a little strange to keep talking about their ontology or idea of reality.  For Plato the physical world is quite real and constantly changing. He recognized an irrational dimension in reality, signaled by irrational numbers as well as human madness. The forms are like a logical system unto themselves and not causally connected with phenomena in the physical world. This is between us. I green lighted your ms. to the editors.