Pilot Study on Institutional Trust, Security, and Democratic Support in Ecuador During the 2024 Crisis

Abstract

This pilot study seeks to answer the following question: How does the ongoing security crisis in Ecuador shape public support for democracy and approval of the incumbent government? Using a panel design with monthly surveys of 84 university students between June and November, perceptions of the armed forces, police, political parties, parliament, and ideological self-placement were assessed. The analysis shows that trust in the armed forces and the police significantly increases the probability of approving of the government, although only trust in the police is positively associated with the approval of democracy. For political institutions, only trust in parliament had a significant impact on both the dependent variables. Trust in political parties was not statistically significant. These findings suggest that, in crisis contexts, security institutions reinforce the legitimacy of the executive, while the legislative branch can become a key agent of democratic stability. Constant monitoring of institutional confidence is recommended, considering the risk of autocratization in presidential regimes in scenarios of prolonged conflict.

1. Introduction

Recently, there has been a growing interest in socio-political changes related to security in Ecuador, especially since 2024, when President Daniel Noboa declared an internal (not international) armed conflict against organized crime groups, which were classified as terrorist organizations after the attack perpetrated against TC Television in Guayaquil on January 9 of that year.

This declaration of internal armed conflict reflects a drastic shift in the Ecuadorian security landscape, where state forces are now openly confronting highly organized criminal networks (Carrión 2022; Andrade-Vásquez 2024). This emerging security crisis reconfigures not only the dynamics of violence, but also the scope of governance and public order, presenting new challenges for the consolidation of democracy.

Although this conflict between non-state-armed organizations and security forces intensified in 2024, its antecedents date back to the government of Lenín Moreno in 2021 (Pontón 2022). During that period, the change and elimination of leadership in criminal organizations led to a series of massacres in Ecuadorian prisons, resulting in hundreds of deaths. Gang violence not only continued inside prisons, but also moved to the streets of the country, affecting the coastal provinces. These regions with their strategic ports have become key points for the export of narcotics to the rest of the world. In particular, the ports of Guayaquil and their logistics in Durán (Guayas Province), Machala (El Oro), Manta (Manabí), and other smaller-scale ports in the province of Santa Elena are the epicenters of illicit operations, intensifying the country’s security crisis (Pontón Cevallos and Vélez 2024).

1.1. Approach to Literature and Theory

Studies on the development of socio-political conflicts in Ecuador are not new; however, the magnitude of violence in recent years has radically transformed this panorama. The escalation of conflict has surpassed all previous levels of violence and has led to internal armed conflict, which represents a change in thinking in the analysis of conflict in the country. Less than a decade ago, Ecuador was considered an “island of peace” in the region, but today, it has become the country with the highest homicide rate on the continent (Carrión and Rodríguez 2024; Pontón Cevallos and Vélez 2024; Rivera Rhon and Vélez 2022; Carrión 2022). This change has created a gap in the literature regarding its impact on governance and democratic stability.

In this context, the following crucial question arises: How does this transformation impact the government and political regime, particularly the support or rejection of democracy? Given that the violence exercised by criminal organizations can only be counteracted by the state as the entity that, in theory, has a legitimate monopoly on the use of force in Ecuadorian territory, the current security crisis presents two major challenges to democratic governance. First, if the government is unable to provide effective responses to this crisis, its legitimacy and that of the democratic system may be seriously undermined, creating fertile grounds for institutional weakening and the rise of authoritarian alternatives. Second, intensifying the role of military and police forces in internal affairs, even under democratic mandates, may lead to the erosion of civil liberties and normalization of exceptional measures (Cardoso and Borba 2024; Cruz 2022; Laebens and Lührmann 2021). In this scenario, there are more questions than answers to the problem.

Previous studies on the relationship between the development of security forces, particularly the armed forces, have shown that trust in these institutions can significantly influence government approval. In countries such as the United States, where the military holds a prominent position in national identity and foreign policy, it has been observed that high trust in the armed forces tends to correlate with a positive impact on the perception of the government (Ponder 2011; DeRouen and Sobek 2004). This pattern has also been identified in the Global South, where backing the military can strengthen government legitimacy, especially in contexts with strong executive agendas or national security discourses (Lotito and Joyce 2025).

However, this relationship is neither uniform nor unidirectional. In certain contexts, strengthening the armed forces can lead to adverse effects such as reduced government approval or weakened support for democracy, suggesting a more complex interplay between security and political stability (Cruz 2022; Solar 2022). In Latin America, the historical role of the military in politics continues to be a determining factor in citizens’ perceptions. Unlike today’s conflicts linked to organized crime, the military interventions of the twentieth century were marked by dictatorships that justified restrictions on civil and political rights based on ideological struggles (Solar 2022; Lesgart 2020; O’Donnell 1972a, 1972b). This historical memory can influence how citizens perceive the involvement of the armed forces in internal security, generating ambivalent responses regarding the resulting impact on governance and democracy.

Building on this context, we argue that the relationship between security and political legitimacy unfolds in at least two different ways. First, when security forces are perceived as effective, citizens may attribute success to the incumbent government, especially in presidential systems where the executive concentrates on the crisis response. This boosts government approval. Second, when militarization expands or becomes permanent, particularly if it replaces civilian authority or infringes rights, public support for democracy may erode, even while trust in the military remains high.

Comparative research in Latin America has shown that public reactions to crime differ significantly depending on whether violence is perceived as chronic or as a recent and unexpected threat. In countries like Honduras or El Salvador, where criminal violence has persisted over time, public responses tend to normalize fear and reinforce support for strong security measures, often at the expense of democratic rights (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017; The Military Balance 2016, 2025; Briscoe and Kalkman 2015). By contrast, Ecuador maintained a relatively peaceful context until the rapid escalation of violence in 2021–2024. This abrupt transformation has altered public expectations and trust in institutions, triggering more reactive attitudes. As Valdez and Medina argue, perceptions of insecurity can become politicized, forming collective emotions such as fear and mistrust that reshape the legitimacy of both security and political institutions (Valdez-Duffau and Medina 2020). In our case, this sudden deterioration may explain the divergence in trust in the armed forces and the police and the different associations with government approval and democratic support.

An effective way to assess whether institutions linked to law enforcement or politics influence government approval and support for democracy is through analysis of public opinion. Studies based on data from Latinobarómetro and LAPOP have shown that trust in institutions, including the armed forces, affects the probability of citizen support for democracy (Latinobarómetro 2018, 2021). Likewise, it has been identified that the perception of security plays a key role in trust in institutions in Latin America, establishing a direct relationship between social stability and institutional support (Fernandez and Kuenzi 2010).

In the case of Ecuador, trust in the armed forces is a particularly consolidated phenomenon. According to the 2023 LAPOP report, this is the only institution that enjoys the majority support of the population, with 63% of citizens expressing confidence (Basabe-Serrano et al. 2023). This level of trust highlights the relevance of the armed forces within the country’s institutional framework and their potential influence on the perception of the legitimacy of both the government and the democratic regime, a trend that has been sustained since the return to democracy.

The literature has shown that trust in political institutions influences government approval and support for democracy, both from the perspective of the ruling and opposition political elites (Bohigues 2018; Gamboa 2017) as well as from citizens’ perceptions (Latinobarómetro 2023; Paul 2022; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013). According to LAPOP data, only 14% of Ecuadorians trust political parties, a percentage that is lower than the already low regional average of 20%. Similarly, only 22% of the Ecuadorian population expresses confidence in parliament, which is below the regional average of 32% (Basabe-Serrano et al. 2023; Lupu and Zechmeister 2023).

While studies of political elites have highlighted the role of legislators in consolidating or weakening democracy (Bohigues 2018, 2021), it is equally relevant to examine the role of citizens in this dynamic (Rivera 2019); such research has recently been carried out in some countries in the region (Elías and Benites 2024). The recent literature underscores that citizens are not merely passive spectators of democratic breakdown or consolidation. A classic book by Nancy Bermeo (2003) argues that while elites often initiate institutional change, support or withdrawal of support from ordinary citizens ultimately determines regime survival. In the Latin American context, McCoy (2008), McCoy and Somer (2019), Anderson (2005), Philip (2003), and other researchers have shown how public frustration, ideological estrangement, and civic mobilization have played critical roles in resisting autocratic shifts or accelerating democratic backsliding. These perspectives shift the analytical focus towards mass-level attitudes and justify the empirical examination of trust, political preferences, and ideological orientations as being central to understanding democratic resilience.

In this sense, citizens’ ideological self-location allows us to evaluate whether, just as elites and their ideological orientations impact the stability of the political regime, citizens’ ideological positions also exert a significant influence on the configuration and sustainability of the democratic system.

Additionally, the government’s relationship with security and political institutions has direct implications for the performance of the political regime and its democratic quality. Depending on the nature of these interactions, a country can move towards higher levels of democratization or, on the contrary, towards authoritarian drift (Rosero-Delgado 2024; Vera-Rojas and Llanos-Escobar 2016; Basabe-Serrano and Martínez 2014; Pachano 2011).

1.2. The Evolution of Violence and Institutional Trust in Ecuadorian Democracy

Since the return to democracy in 1979, the country has not experienced a comparable episode of armed conflict, defined by the government as terrorism, except for the existence of a guerrilla group that has operated since the 1970s, with an impact in the 1980s (Baratta 1987); that group disarmed in 1991, ending its operations. However, the insurgency had an ideological background and sought a change in the political system. In this context, it is pertinent to ask whether the transformation of non-state violence within a democratic regime can have a significant impact on both the governability and stability of democracy in Ecuador. In addition, this section of the current study updates the socio-political analysis by incorporating the new challenges Ecuador faces in the 21st century, particularly the rise of drug trafficking as part of the broader economy of transnational organized crime (Andrade-Vásquez 2024; Carrión and Rodríguez 2024). Therefore, it is relevant to analyze how this shift unfolds within a presidential system that must confront new challenges to democratic governance.

In presidential systems, the president’s power is particularly significant, especially because of the rigidity of fixed terms and the absence of mechanisms to resolve executive–legislative conflicts, as noted by Linz, who warned that such institutional design increases the risk of democratic instability (Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Linz 1997). This topic has also been discussed by other authors (Sáenz 2022; Freidenberg and Casullo 2018; Mainwaring and Shugart 1996). Tension can lead to deadlocks or confrontations with the legislative branch (Sánchez 2022), as happened during the administration of Guillermo Lasso. Confrontation in the National Assembly culminated in his dismissal and the arrival of Daniel Noboa to power in 2023 (Ospina Peralta 2024). Likewise, the head of the government’s quest to consolidate his control over his party and other parliamentary forces has been a determining factor in the autocratization processes of the twenty-first century (Maerz et al. 2020; Treminio Sánchez 2015, 2019, 2020). These episodes have shown that political conflicts, institutional distrust, and disapproval of both the government and other institutionalized actors can weaken the standards of the rule of law, favoring democratic deterioration and the concentration of executive power (Pelke and Croissant 2021).

In the context of profound socio-political change in Ecuador during 2024, characterized by a drastic increase in violence and the declaration of an internal (not international) armed conflict, the main objective of this pilot survey was to analyze how the exposure of citizens to this crisis may have reshaped their institutional trust and political attitudes, influencing their trust in and approval for both the government and the democratic system. It also examines how these changes in the Ecuadorian reality can modify citizens’ perceptions of political institutions, such as political parties and parliament, with direct effects on the legitimacy of the government and democracy.

To clarify our institutional framework, we adopt a simplified distinction between political institutions, such as political parties and the legislature, and security institutions, namely, the armed forces and police. This approach avoids the ambiguous term “political–ideological institutions” and follows prior literature that distinguishes between institutions based on their perceived politicization and normative expectations (Stolle and Hooghe 2004; Rothstein and Stolle 2003). Courts, for example, are often classified as less overtly political and neutral, and thus merit separate analyses (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Although our pilot survey did not include judicial institutions, we recognize their relevance and intend to incorporate them in the future phases of our broader research project. This distinction is not merely conceptual; prior work has shown that public trust in different institutional types may derive from separate ideas about legitimacy and can affect support for democracy differently (Stolle and Hooghe 2004; Rothstein and Stolle 2003, 2008).

We propose four working hypotheses, based on the literature on institutional trust and democratic legitimacy.

H1: 

We expect that greater trust in the armed forces is positively associated with approval of the government and support for democracy.

H2: 

We hypothesize that trust in the police is positively associated with both government approval and democratic support.

H3: 

We expect that trust in political institutions—specifically, political parties and parliament—is positively associated with support for democracy but not necessarily with the approval of the incumbent government, as these institutions are often evaluated based on long-term systemic performance rather than executive outcomes.

H4: 

Finally, we hypothesize that right-leaning ideological self-placement is positively associated with the approval of the government but unrelated to support for democracy.

This study presents preliminary results on the impact of the security crisis on public opinion in Ecuador, exploring how variations in the security environment influence institutional trust and the approval of the government and democracy. To this end, a survey was designed and applied based on methodological references from the World Values Survey, the LAPOP, and the Latinobarómetro, to guarantee comparability with previous studies on political attitudes and institutional trust in the region.

Data were collected longitudinally over six months from the same individuals in each application, which allowed evaluation of the stability or variability of their perceptions over time. Due to the flexibility of online and blended learning modalities where students can combine asynchronous learning with in-person or synchronous virtual sessions, UNEMI’s student population includes individuals beyond the traditional college age, particularly adults who have returned to higher education later in life. The sample was composed of university students, including both those in the typical age of higher education and adults in the later stages of their academic training, owing to the flexibility of the virtual and blended modalities. This methodological feature broadened the spectrum of analysis by including participants with differentiated life experiences, thus enriching the understanding of the impact of the security crisis on various segments of the population.

Details of the sample design, selection criteria, and characteristics of the surveyed population are provided in the methodology section, where the procedures used to ensure the validity and reliability of the study are specified.

2. Materials and Methods

The purpose of this pilot study was to analyze the influence of trust in institutions, particularly those related to security, on political preferences in Ecuador. In this sense, the following central hypothesis is proposed: a higher level of confidence in the security forces (armed forces and police) and political institutions of the country increases support for the government in office. Likewise, we explore whether trust in other Ecuadorian institutions is associated with the perception and exercise of government power. In this research, it is assumed that the government does not separate itself directly from the president’s figure, because of the presidential character of the Ecuadorian state (Mainwaring and Shugart 1996; Freidenberg 2012; García-Montero and Alcántara 2011), which some authors refer to as hyper-presidential (Ortiz 2018; Negretto 2018; Montúfar 2015).

In addition, this study investigates the second hypothesis: distrust in the armed forces and police reduces approval for democracy.

2.1. Sample Selection for Pilot Survey

A pilot survey on public opinion was conducted among university students from the Universidad Estatal de Milagro (UNEMI), specifically from the Faculty of Social Sciences, Commercial Education, and Law (FACSECYD). Participants were selected on the basis of the following inclusion criteria: being over 18 years of age, having enrolled in university study, having access to the internet, fluency in the Spanish language, and provision of informed consent online. In the first pilot phase, students from Tourism, Social Work, Social Communication, and Economics courses were included.

One methodological advantage of this study is the online education model implemented by UNEMI, which allows data collection at the national level. In the first pilot application, information was obtained from 12 of the 24 provinces in Ecuador. Most responses were from coastal provinces, where the perception of insecurity was more critical. A higher number of responses was recorded in the provinces of Guayas, Santa Elena, Manabí, Los Ríos, and El Oro. In addition, although to a lesser extent, data were collected from various provinces of the Sierra region, which allowed preliminary approximation of the differences in perceptions of security and trust in institutions in different geographical contexts of the country.

2.2. Sample Design and Features

The survey was conducted during the last week of each month, between June and November 2024, with the aim of systematically collecting monthly public opinion. A total of 84 students answered the same survey each month, ensuring methodological consistency by applying a questionnaire with identical questions and in the same order of presentation in each application. Overall, 504 cumulative responses were obtained over the six months of the study.

Regarding the demographic composition of the sample, 78.8% of the participants were women and 21.2% were men. Regarding study modality, 45.4% of the respondents attended training in virtual mode, 47.4% in blended mode, and 7.2% in face-to-face mode. Most participants identified as mestizo.

Respondents’ ages ranged from 18 to 48 years, with an average age of 28 years. The presence of students over 30 years of age responds to the flexibility of virtual and blended modalities, which allows access to higher education for people who cannot pursue university studies at the traditional age and resume them at a later stage of their lives.

In socioeconomic terms, most respondents reported an income below the minimum living wage in Ecuador. The average income of the sample was USD 271, while the top quantile of the income distribution ranged from USD 490 to USD 900, with the latter value being the maximum limit recorded. These data suggest that the sample was mostly from ordinary sectors, with individuals having a high probability of residing in areas affected by the growing violence and security crisis in Ecuador by 2024.

2.3. Ethical Considerations

The students who responded to the pilot survey accepted an informed consent form that guaranteed the confidentiality of their personal data, which were not disclosed. This initial phase and subsequent steps of this research on public opinion in Ecuador in the context of safety were supervised by the Human Research Ethics Committee (CEISH) of the Ministry of Public Health. This committee accompanied the research team in the processing of information and data collection to ensure compliance with current regulations and the protection of the rights of the participants.

CEISH reviewed and approved the research protocol, which was validated at the “Kennedy Clinic” in Ecuador under the code HCK-CEISH-2022-006. Additionally, the questionnaire was evaluated in terms of the public opinion of colleagues from other higher education institutions.

2.4. Temporary Unit of Observation

In the context of the escalation of violence and strengthening of the security discourse by the Ecuadorian government in 2024, two institutional events were decisive in reconfiguring the interaction between the state and society in Ecuador.

The first of these events occurred on 9 January 2024, when the government declared the existence of an internal (not international) armed conflict after the irruption of an armed group into the facilities of the TC Television channel in Guayaquil. Attackers carrying weapons and explosives sought to put pressure on the government in the context of growing instability. This event was preceded by the escape of Adolfo Macías, alias “Fito,” on January 7 of the same year, from the prison where he was held. In response, the Ecuadorian government declared organized crime groups within the national territory as terrorist organizations.

The second key event took place on 21 April 2024, with a popular consultation focused on issues of citizen security, judicial control, and deportation of Ecuadorians in the context of the internal armed conflict that began in January 2024. Of all the questions raised in the referendum, the two that obtained the most support were directly related to the strengthening of the role of the armed forces and the police. The first approved the complementary assistance of the armed forces in security operations, together with the police, to combat organized crime. The second allowed the armed forces to take control of the entry of weapons into social rehabilitation centers.

These events marked a turning point in the perception of security in Ecuador, a country that until a few years ago was considered an “island of peace.” In this context, after a month of elaboration of the research protocol and validation of the questionnaire by experts from higher education institutions external to UNEMI, as well as coordination with teachers and students of the Faculty of Social Sciences, a pilot survey was conducted between June and November 2024. This period was established as the study period, since the university community later went into academic recession.

This pilot study used a longitudinal panel design to collect monthly data from June to November 2024. While our core goal was to assess the overall association between trust in institutions and political support, the structure of the data allowed for the future development of time-series analyses. Although we did not fully exploit temporal variation in the current article, we recognize the value of connecting opinion shifts with key contextual events such as spikes in violence, presidential decrees, or changes in security discourse. This will be addressed in more detail in subsequent studies using these and more recent panel datasets.

2.5. Data Analysis

In the first phase, a descriptive analysis of the main variables was conducted, including confidence in the armed forces and police, approval for the government, and support for democracy. Bar graphs are presented to visualize the evolution of these variables between June and November 2024. The graphics were created by Jamovi, version 2.6.26 (The Jamovi Project 2024).

Subsequently, panel data analysis was conducted to identify the factors associated with government approval and support for democracy. This approach allowed us to observe changes and consistencies in political and security-related perceptions over time, as the survey was administered monthly to the same individuals between June and November 2024.

The models included predictors such as trust in the armed forces, trust in the police, trust in political parties and parliament, and ideological self-placement. All regressions were controlled for sex, age, field of study, and city of residence. In addition, individual fixed effects were included to account for unobserved heterogeneity across respondents. The analysis was performed using Stata software, version 18 (StataCorp 2023).

Four logistic regression models were used to explore the determinants of political support. Models 1 and 2 examined the influence of trust in security institutions—specifically, the armed forces and the police—on government approval (Model 1) and support for democracy (Model 2). These models were designed to isolate the effects of trust in coercive institutions.

In contrast, Models 3 and 4 focused on ideological–political factors, incorporating trust in political parties and parliament as well as ideological self-placement, while excluding trust in the armed forces and police. This separation allowed a clearer assessment of the role of political attitudes and institutional trust outside the security domain. Model 3 again used approval for the government as the outcome and Model 4 used support for democracy. By structuring the analysis in this way, we were able to compare the relative influence of different types of institutional trust—security vs. political—on political attitudes without multicollinearity between overlapping predictors.

3. Results

3.1. Descriptives

Regarding the trust of university students in the institutions in charge of security, the armed forces had higher levels than the police. However, only in June and November did the sum of the answers “some” or “a lot” of confidence reach 50% and 51%, respectively, while the category of “a lot” of confidence remained in a reduced range, between 7% and 12%. In contrast, trust in the police was significantly lower; in June and July there were no responses indicating “a lot” of trust, and only when combining the answers “some” and “a lot” of confidence did this reach a maximum of 21%, equivalent to less than half of the trust towards the armed forces reported in the same period.

On the other hand, the accumulated distrust, represented by the categories “little” and “no trust”, also reflects a negative perception towards both institutions. For the armed forces, this distrust ranged from 49% to 69%, indicating that, although trust is higher compared to the police, there is still a significant proportion of students who do not trust them. In the case of the police, the levels of distrust were even higher, with values fluctuating between 78% and 84% (see Figure 1).

Approval for the government by university students fluctuated between 36% and 48%, whereas disapproval had a low rate of 52% in September and a high rate of 64% in August. The respondents were asked: ‘Do you approve of the management of the government headed by the president?’ That is, the evaluation focused on the figure of the government head rather than on the institutional performance of the government.

Regarding university students’ approval of democracy, the results indicated that their support was not absolute. Those who agreed with the phrase “Democracy may have problems, but it is the best form of government,” ranged from 42% to 48%, while disapproval varied between 52% and 58%, reflecting a divided perception of democracy as a political system, although with a tendency above 50% to disapprove of it. In contrast, according to the 2023 Latinobarómetro report, only 37% of Ecuadorians agreed that “democracy is preferable to any other form of government” (Latinobarómetro 2023). These findings place Ecuador among the countries with the lowest democratic support in Latin America, although university students exhibited slightly higher levels of support than the national average in 2024 (see Figure 2).

As part of the evaluation of political institutions, trust in two key institutions was described, political parties and parliaments. Political institutions that are fundamental to the functioning of a democratic system have high levels of mistrust. Trust in political parties was the lowest, with values of distrust (“little” or “no trust”) between 84% and 92%, while parliament registers levels of distrust between 70% and 80%. Cumulative confidence in parliament ranged between 20% and 30%. These data reflect negative perceptions of political actors and their capacity for representation (see Figure 3).

While the main analysis focuses on average levels of trust, it is important to acknowledge the presence of polarization in the distribution of responses, particularly regarding the armed forces. Figure 1 reveals a bimodal pattern, with a notable share of respondents expressing either very low or very high levels of trust. This polarization suggests divergent interpretations of the military’s role during a security crisis. Although a deeper exploration of how these polarized groups relate to government approval or democratic support is beyond the scope of this pilot study, we consider this a promising direction for future research aimed at identifying the implications of extreme attitudes towards state institutions.

Regarding the distribution of students’ ideological self-placement, most tended to be at the center of the ideological spectrum, suggesting a moderate bias in their political orientation. On the left of the spectrum, the distribution was uniform from the center to the extreme, whereas on the right of the spectrum, a higher concentration was observed at the highest values. This pattern caused a trend in the towards the right in the box plot; however, the median remained at 5, which reaffirms the moderate trend of respondents’ ideology (see Figure 4).

Our initial inclusion of citizens’ ideological self-placement aimed to test the hypothesis that polarization may reduce support for democracy and legitimize authoritarian alternatives (Somer et al. 2021). This concern is present in various strands of the literature on democratic instability, particularly in Latin America (Loriente and Harteveld 2024; Rivera-Escartin 2023; Svolik 2019). However, our findings suggest that Ecuadorian university students show limited ideological polarization. The majority of respondents placed themselves near the center of the ideological scale (positions 5 and 6 out of 10), reducing the explanatory power of ideology in this sample. Consequently, while we retain this variable in our analysis, we clarify that it plays a marginal role. We also recognize that other factors, such as economic satisfaction and perceived security, deserve further exploration in future research.

3.2. Panel Analysis

For panel analysis, confidence categories were recoded for ease of interpretation. The answers “little” and “no trust” were grouped as distrust at the value zero (0), and “some” and “a lot” as confidence (1). This recoding was applied to the variables of trust in the armed forces, police, political parties, and parliament, enabling a clearer interpretation of their effects on government approval and support for democracy.

An analysis of panel data was carried out with the aim of observing and comparing changes and permanence in political and security perceptions over time, considering that the same 84 individuals responded to the survey over six consecutive months. Neither the passage of time nor the control variables (sex, age, and income) modified the relationship between the main predictors and dependent variables when incorporated into the models, thus confirming the stability of the observed effects.

Table 1. Panel Results (Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Models). Dependent variables: Government Approval (Gov) and Democracy Approval (Dem) (Reference category for all trust variables: “Distrust”).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Gov	Dem	Gov	Dem
Trust in Armed Forces	3.122 *	1.499
	(1.743)	(0.546)
Trust in Police	7.218 *	2.616 *
	(4.592)	(1.108)
Trust in Political Parties			0.646	2.210
			(0.647)	(1.461)
Trust in Parliament (Congress)			13.29 *	2.954 *
			(9.247)	(1.269)
Ideological Position (1–10, from left to right)			1.206 +	0.967
			(0.128)	(0.0710)
Observations	208	330	208	330

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1. Source: authors.

presents the four evaluated models. Model 1 estimates government approval based on variables related to trust in security institutions (public forces), whereas Model 2 assesses approval of democracy using the same predictors. Models 3 and 4 estimate government approval and democracy based on variables related to political institutions (political parties, parliament, and ideological self-placement).

The distinction between these two groups of independent variables—public force and political institutions—is theoretically relevant because they operate in a differentiated way in the legitimization of the government and the democratic regime (Tannenberg et al. 2019; Kailitz and Stockemer 2017; Gerschewski 2013; Mann 1986). This differentiation is also empirically supported since both groups have different historical levels of citizen trust in Ecuador, as shown by various public opinion surveys in the region (Latinobarómetro 2021, 2018; Basabe-Serrano et al. 2023; Latinobarómetro 2023; Paul 2022; Vidigal 2022; Inglehart et al. 2014). In addition, when trying to integrate them into a single model, it was observed that statistical convergence was not achieved. The variable associated with parliament absorbed a large part of the explained variability, hiding the effect of the other predictors. Therefore, we decided to theoretically separate both sets of variables in the panel analysis and contrast them by controlling for sociodemographic characteristics.

Trust in the armed forces shows a positive and statistically significant effect on government approval; specifically, those who trust this institution are more than three times more likely to approve of it. An even stronger effect is observed in the case of the police, whose confidence increases the probability of government approval by more than seven times. In contrast, with respect to the approval of democracy, trust in the armed forces does not reach statistical significance, while trust in the police is significant and is associated with an increase of more than two-fold in the probability of supporting the democratic regime. Taken together, the predictors linked to security institutions explain government approval more than support for democracy. However, the same finding shows a relevant divergence between the effects of trust in the police and the armed forces. While both are security institutions, only trust in the police is positively associated with both government approval and support for democracy, as discussed in Section 4.1.

Regarding ideological–political variables, trust in parliament was positively and statistically significantly related to government approval (p < 0.05). Additionally, an ideological position on the right increases the probability of approving of the government by 20%, although this result was marginally significant (p < 0.10). Regarding approval of democracy, once again, only confidence in parliament had a statistically significant effect, doubling the probability of support for the democratic regime. In this case, citizens’ ideological self-location does not have a relevant effect. Trust in political parties was not statistically significant in any of the evaluated models.

Despite the high correlations among trust indicators, common in Latin American surveys, recent scholarship emphasizes that citizens increasingly distinguish between political and security institutions (Booth and Seligson 2009; Newton et al. 2018). In our case, trust in the armed forces is associated with government approval but not with democratic support, indicating differentiated effects. Although underlying correlations exist, disaggregating institutional trust remains valuable, especially in the context of insecurity and democratic fragility.

4. Discussion

The objective of this pilot study was to analyze the relationship between public opinion on security institutions and political institutions and levels of government approval and support for democracy. In the specific case of the government, the findings can be directly linked to the figure of the head of state, given the presidential nature of the Ecuadorian political system and the centrality of executive power in the country’s political dynamics (Ortiz 2018; Guerrero-Salgado 2018; Basabe-Serrano 2017; Meléndez and Moncagatta 2017; Albala 2016).

4.1. Safety

Based on the findings of this pilot study, it is essential to consider the impact of a change in levels of trust in the armed forces, traditionally among the most credible institutions in Ecuador, highlighting the crucial role that they play in shaping political evaluations during periods of internal conflict. While our data do not suggest a direct threat to democratic stability, the literature has noted that under certain conditions, heightened trust in military institutions may create incentives for non-institutional political solutions, which could in turn pose risks to democratic regime (Solar 2022; Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021; Trejo and Ley 2020; Trejo et al. 2018). However, this pilot study found no significant relationship between trust in the armed forces and support for democracy. This suggests a functional view of the military, valued for security but not tied to democratic legitimacy. While current data do not indicate a direct risk to democracy, the literature warns that, if politicized, such trust could enable non-institutional political behaviors. This asymmetry highlights the need for continued observations in future research.

In line with the literature on governance and political regimes, fluctuations in trust in security institutions can foster authoritarian practices in presidential systems (Stoyan 2020; Cheibub 2006a, 2006b). In the context of rapid socio-political change—marked by conflict declarations, shifting security strategies, and evolving public perceptions—the military may acquire a leading role within the power structure, potentially influencing governmental decision-making (Tomini 2021; Fortin-Rittberger 2014). Given the novelty of this dynamic in Ecuador, its implications for democratic governance should be evaluated in future research.

This pilot study confirms the influence of security institutions on government approval and democracy. This opinion about the armed forces is the most significant for both government approval and democracy, confirming previous findings in the literature (Ponder 2011; Lotito and Joyce 2025; Solar 2022; Fernandez and Kuenzi 2010). The lack of a statistically significant relationship between opinions about the police and government may be related to the negative perception that citizens have about the police compared with the armed forces (Section 3.1). This perception translates into a greater correlation between the levels of distrust in an institution and approval or disapproval for the government but not democracy. In addition, unlike the armed forces, the police have a closer and more daily presence in the territory, exposing them to greater scrutiny by citizens. This may reflect the normative role of police forces in democratic regimes, where they hold a monopoly on internal coercion and are designed to engage with domestic populations under civilian control. In contrast, armed forces are oriented towards external threats and typically operate with a logic distinct from democratic responsiveness. This institutional difference, both in training and constitutional mandates, may explain the asymmetry in their political effects. As highlighted in the literature on civil–military relations and democratic governance (Pion-Berlin et al. 2024; Pion-Berlin 1992; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2005), democracies are more resilient when internal security remains firmly under civilian policing institutions.

On the other hand, the historically rooted perception of the police as susceptible to corruption and infiltration by organized crime may help explain why trust in this institution, while positively associated with democracy, is comparatively lower in relation to government approval than trust in the armed forces. The perceived institutional fragility of the police may limit their capacity to generate broader political legitimacy, especially in the context of a security crisis (Rivera Rhon and Vélez 2022; Basabe-Serrano 2023; Alda-Mejías 2023; Vélez 2022; Basabe-Serrano 2013). Although this pilot study does not present specific data on corruption, the specialized literature has documented the relationship between police corruption and its impact on institutional legitimacy (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Alda-Mejías 2023), which in the Ecuadorian case could be simultaneously anchored to transnational organized crime (Andrade-Vásquez 2024; Pontón 2022; Pontón Cevallos and Vélez 2024).

These findings suggest the need for continuous monitoring of citizens’ perceptions of security institutions and their influence on democratic stability, especially in the context of prolonged crises and the reconfiguration of executive power.

4.2. Political Institutions

Trust in political parties is not a strong predictor of government approval or support for democracies. This finding coincides with what has been observed in Latin America, where the weakening of parties and personalization of political leadership are increasingly noticeable (Mainwaring and Shugart 1996; Levitsky and Ziblat 2018; Levitsky and Way 2010; Carreras 2012, 2018; Mainwaring and Scully 1992). In Ecuador, the consolidation of individual leadership over party structures could explain the low incidence of this variable in government evaluations (Basabe-Serrano and Martínez 2014; Freidenberg and Casullo 2018; Freidenberg 2012; Thiébault 2018; Freidenberg 2007, 2008).

By contrast, trust in parliament emerges as a robust predictor, indicating that this institutional variable plays a key role in government approval and support for democracy. The relevance of the legislature may be associated with the transition from a period of extreme institutional conflict between the executive and legislative powers, which characterized the interrupted administration of Guillermo Lasso (Eberhardt and Basabe-Serrano 2024; Stoessel 2024; Abad Cisneros et al. 2022; Barrera 2021), towards an initial stage of greater cooperation between these powers during the government of Daniel Noboa. This context has led to an unprecedented increase in parliamentary approval (CEDATOS 2024), which suggests that citizens’ perceptions of the stability and functionality of the legislature have a direct impact on the legitimacy of the democratic regime in Ecuador, as shown in previous research in Latin America (Albala 2016; Chasquetti 2008; Pérez-Liñán 2007; Cox and Morgenstern 2001).

In the Ecuadorian context, the relationship between trust in parliament and government approval must be interpreted within a highly polarized institutional landscape. In 2023, President Lasso dissolved the National Assembly amid escalating tensions, triggering early general elections (Eberhardt and Basabe-Serrano 2024). The subsequent administration of President Noboa emphasized cooperation with the legislature, marking a significant contrast. Against this backdrop, citizens may associate legislative stability with effective governance. As a result, trust in the parliament may operate as a proxy for perceived institutional harmony and governability, which in turn reinforces approval for the executive. This dynamic reflects a broader public desire for institutional coordination during times of crises.

On the other hand, the analysis of the ideological orientation of those who approve of the government’s management in 2024 shows a clear inclination towards the right, aligned with Daniel Noboa’s pro-business approach (Valencia 2023; Reuters 2024). It is striking that most respondents did not belong to this sector and had incomes below the basic salary. This suggests that identification with the right does not respond only to socioeconomic position but also to perceptions of stability, security, or governmental effectiveness, as indicated by the literature on ideological preferences in Latin America (Luna and Kaltwasser 2021; Zechmeister and Michel 2021; Baker and Greene 2011; Luna and Zechmeister 2005). Discourse that associates order and economic growth with conservative policies could also play a role in generating support, even among voters in precarious economic situations.

In summary, the levels of trust in political parties in Ecuador remain in line with the historical trend of distrust observed in Latin America (Latinobarómetro 2018; Basabe-Serrano et al. 2023; Latinobarómetro 2023; Paul 2022; Lupu and Zechmeister 2023). In contrast, the data from this pilot study show that parliament experienced a favorable change in its citizen perception during 2024, marking a milestone in its institutional image. Traditionally characterized by low levels of trust both in Ecuador and in the region, the legislature has achieved an improvement in its public approval, suggesting a reconfiguration in the relationship between citizens and this institution.

4.3. Final Considerations and Limits

Although the results of this pilot opinion survey offer promising findings to explain changes in Ecuadorians’ perceptions of trust in law enforcement and political institutions, as well as in government approval and democracy, it is critical to recognize their limitations. This study makes a relevant contribution to the fields of public opinion, political science, and political sociology, particularly regarding the analysis of governments and political regimes. However, because of the exploratory nature of this pilot study, it was necessary to delimit its scope.

First, the sample was composed exclusively of university students, which restricts the generalizability of the findings to the Ecuadorian population. In particular, the results may not be representative of sectors that have not accessed higher education or that belong to other occupational groups. While demographic data indicate that respondents reside in areas with high levels of violence—a phenomenon that has escalated in Ecuador since 2021—and provide valuable input for analyzing the opinions of those who directly experience security issues, it is also important to recognize the class bias present in the sample. Most students at public universities, such as UNEMI, come from the general population and have limited incomes, which implies that the conclusions of this study are not applicable to the middle and upper classes of the country. However, this analysis constitutes a fundamental starting point to study the impact of security changes on public opinion in Ecuador.

Although the sampling strategy aimed to capture diversity in the province of residence, age, and socioeconomic status, we acknowledge the gender imbalance in the sample. This limitation is relevant when interpreting generalizations and will be addressed in the next phase of this research. Future applications of this instrument will seek to rebalance gender representation and examine whether patterns of trust and political attitudes systematically differ by gender.

Finally, although the study used data from the Latinobarómetro, LAPOP, and the World Values Survey as reference, and the questions of the pilot questionnaire were designed to coincide in their formulation with these international surveys, it is crucial to consider the differences in the times of information collection, as well as in the composition of the sample. In those comparative surveys, the participants had greater socioeconomic diversity and were not limited to university students from popular sectors. Similarly, those studies did not specifically focus on populations directly exposed to security problems. In contrast, this pilot study included a university population residing in provinces with high levels of conflict, providing a closer perspective on the security dynamics in areas of Ecuador with the highest incidence of crime. University students present a dual profile; they are more civically engaged and politically aware due to their education, yet at public institutions such as UNEMI, they also come from low-income sectors and often reside in areas heavily affected by violence. This combination makes them particularly valuable for studying the perceptions of security and institutional trust in crisis contexts.

Although this pilot study provides valuable evidence on the perception of security and governance in Ecuador, its findings should be interpreted within the margins of methodological limitations. Future research could expand the sample to include a more diverse representation of the Ecuadorian population, enabling a deeper understanding of the factors affecting institutional trust and democratic legitimacy in crisis contexts.

5. Conclusions

This pilot study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between trust in security institutions and political institutions with government approval and support for democracy in Ecuador in a context marked by high levels of violence in 2024. The results show that trust in the armed forces and the police is closely linked to a higher probability of government approval, although its effect on support for democracy is limited.

Trust in parliament has become relevant as a predictor of the legitimacy of both the government and the democratic regime, in contrast to the persistent distrust of political parties. This finding reinforces the importance of the legislature’s role in the context of institutional transition, suggesting that a cooperative relationship between the executive and the legislative can temporarily strengthen institutional trust and democratic stability.

Likewise, the results contribute to the understanding of democratic resilience in the context of political polarization, such as the Ecuadorian case, crossed by tensions between Correísmo and anti-Correísmo. The legitimacy of a political system seems to largely depend on the capacity of institutions to articulate coordinated responses to security and governance crises.

Despite the limitations of the pilot study and a university sample that is not representative of the total Ecuadorian population, this study captures public opinion during a critical moment marked by the security crisis and the government’s discourse, offering a snapshot of political attitudes in the midst of institutional transformation rather than establishing a direct causal impact. The growing centrality of security in political management raises critical questions regarding the future of democracy and the risk of authoritarian drift in the country. In this sense, it is essential to maintain constant monitoring of institutional trust and its impact on democratic legitimacy, particularly in scenarios of prolonged internal conflict.