Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation Policies: Addressing Unintended Effects on Inequalities

Abstract

It is well known that climate change exacerbates inequalities and vice versa. What is less known is that the most disadvantaged groups are also at risk of becoming non-negligible producers of emissions that cause climate change. Examples include the difficulties disadvantaged micro-entrepreneurs face in limiting the emissions of their activities, or the need for subsistence farmers to cut down trees to increase the amount of farmland. The above is mainly due to the unintended negative effects of some mitigation and adaptation (M&A) policies on the most vulnerable and their non-inclusion in the deployment of these policies. This paper aims to provide a detailed analysis in this respect, highlighting the significant limitations of some policies, which often exclude/penalise disadvantaged groups and are likely to be strongly resisted by them. The possible anti-equalisation effects of such policies, which tend to protect those who are better off more, are also highlighted. To overcome these limitations, the prospect of combining climate and social justice is emerging. However, this perspective has so far had limited impact on M&A policies, as it is only occasionally applied in practice. Conversely, specific social clauses (including social inclusion, protection of vulnerable groups, and gender mainstreaming) should be defined and applied.

1. Introduction: Inequality and Climate Change

Two of the biggest challenges facing the world today, climate change and inequality (Guivarch et al. 2021), are inextricably linked.

While global economic growth has indeed lifted millions out of extreme poverty in recent decades, income and wealth inequalities between population groups have continued to widen in many countries. This growing inequality is a major topic of political debate and public policy concern (Qureshi 2023).

In addressing this last issue, it is worth digressing and pointing out that behind the word inequality lies hundreds of definitions and concepts in fields ranging from mathematics to the physical characteristics of human beings, from art to finance, and affecting various dimensions of human well-being, such as knowledge and skills, health and natural and environmental living conditions, working and cultural life, or political participation and voice (EC 2021).

In social sciences, inequality appears as a controversial issue with an extensive past and ongoing debates that hardly reach fixed and widely shared views (Cattani 2007). Inequalities can relate to income, employment status, wages for equal work, access to health care, nutrition, mortality, educational qualifications, top professional positions, career advancement speed, housing conditions, and many other issues, and many of these issues overlap with each other. With respect to these various issues, inequality analysis looks at the differences between people or, to put it better, in most cases, between human groups defined by gender, migration status (and country of origin), location, age group, place of residence, etc. (Carmo 2021; Galland and Lemel 2018; United Nations 2020; Ventura 2021).

Since the notion of inequality can refer to all the characteristics just mentioned, one can experience inequality with respect to a number of them at the same time. To understand more about the issue, it is useful to resort to the concept of intersectionality, as the complex, cumulative way in which the effects of multiple forms of discrimination (e.g., ‘race’/ethnicity, indigeneity, gender, class, sexuality, geography, age, disability/ability, migration status, religion, and classism) combine, overlap, or intersect, especially in the experiences of marginalised individuals or groups exposed to different layers of inequalities, within the context of connected systems and structures of power (e.g., laws, policies, state governments and other political and economic unions, religious institutions, and media) (Hankivsky et al. 2014).

Climate change exacerbates inequality…

It is fairly well known that climate change exacerbates inequality and particularly affects certain categories of the most disadvantaged people—including smallholder farmers, indigenous peoples, rural coastal populations, members of minority groups, women, children, older people, and people with chronic diseases and disabilities (Levy and Patz 2015; UNDESA 2020).

Looking specifically at the world’s richest countries, it is highlighted that the costs of extreme weather events, such as heat waves, floods, and storms, disproportionately affect people living in areas with low environmental quality and people with low socio-economic status, who face higher relative damages and have fewer resources to recover, and people with physical conditions that make it more difficult to prepare for and recover from the impacts of climate change (Botzen et al. 2019; Breil et al. 2018; Smith 2023).

Adopting a worldwide perspective, the IPCC noted that there is high confidence in stating that vulnerability to climate change is exacerbated by inequity and marginalisation linked to, e.g., gender, ethnicity, low incomes, informal settlements, disability, age (and their intersectional relationships), and historical and ongoing patterns of inequity such as colonialism, especially for many indigenous peoples and local communities (IPCC 2023).

The particular impact that climate change has on gender inequality is often emphasised in the literature. Women, particularly those in rural and lower-income communities, are more vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change due to existing social and economic disparities, as has been emphasised by weADAPT1, which highlights, among others, that floods and heat stress reduce the total incomes of rural female-headed households in low- and middle-income countries by USD 16 billion and USD 37 billion, respectively, relative to male-headed households (WeADAPT 2024). On the one hand, women are more likely to experience job losses in climate-sensitive sectors and have fewer opportunities to move into new areas of employment, thereby increasing economic inequalities between men and women (Jordan et al. 2021). On the other hand, women are more underrepresented in green jobs, which improve environmental sustainability or reduce greenhouse gas emissions, than in polluting jobs. Notably, only 6% of women working in advanced economies have green jobs, compared to over 20% of working men (Fabrizio et al. 2024). In short, poverty, inequality, and cultural norms make women more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

… and inequalities exacerbate climate change

Not only does climate change exacerbate inequalities, but socio-economic inequalities also exacerbate climate change.

In 2019, the richest 1% of the planet (77 million people) was responsible for 16% of global CO₂ emissions from consumption, a share greater than that produced by all the cars in circulation and other means of road transport. In turn, the richest 10% of the world’s population was responsible for half of global emissions; those in the richest 1% by income pollute on average in one year as much as a person belonging to the remaining 99% of humanity would pollute in 1500 years. Every year, the emissions of these super-rich effectively cancel out the reduction in CO₂ emissions resulting from the use of almost a million wind turbines (Stockholm Environment Institute 2023).

There is therefore a clear connection between inequality and climate change. Those who are better off, both as countries and as human groups within a country, have the greatest impact through their huge consumption (including luxurious goods) on climate change, while conversely, climate change tends to hit the most disadvantaged groups (or, at least, some of them) harder, making them more vulnerable, as they bear a disproportionate share of the risks. Climate change is therefore profoundly inequitable, as people who have contributed least to creating the problem (such as those living below the poverty line, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples) are the groups most disproportionately affected by its impacts (Sullivan-Wiley and Jungwiwattanaporn 2023).

This will continue to be dramatically true. However, at least in Europe, the reverse may also gradually become true. Indeed, the weight of the most disadvantaged groups in the production of emissions is gradually increasing and is expected to continue to increase in the future, albeit only in relative terms. Three examples of this process are given below.

Micro-enterprises led by disadvantaged people. It is known that in the industrial sphere, multiple actors, starting with the European Commission, are implementing functional measures for the adoption by enterprises of measures (even drastic ones) for energy efficiency and, where possible, transition to renewable energy. To this end, the European Commission requires all companies (European Parliament 2023b), with the exception of non-energy-intensive SMEs, to conduct functional energy audits to identify what needs to be carried out to reduce emissions and then to implement the measures identified. For non-energy-intensive SMEs, audits and, more importantly, the adoption of measures to decrease emissions are only recommended. A recent study documented that, as expected, small and micro-entrepreneurs who do not take action in this respect are mainly those in severe economic hardship, including micro-enterprises led by people in poverty, migrants, or the elderly. There are, of course, exceptions: those who bet precisely on the green economy to get out of a crisis situation and, often, succeed (Quinti et al. 2024). But the more one is in distress, the less one is virtuous (Declich et al. 2020). What has just been said is even more relevant when we consider that, according to the World Bank, there are 322 million SMEs in the world (according to the latest available data from 2019), the vast majority of which are micro-enterprises, and that their number is growing at a rate of 3% per year (World Bank 2019). Moreover, according to the UN (UNDESA 2024) SMEs account for 50% of GDP worldwide.

Highly polluting vehicles. The fossil fuel vehicle market is literally bogging down the battle against climate change. While many developed nations have pledged to phase out gasoline and diesel vehicles over the next two decades, the transition will be more complicated in developing countries, where old cars imported from Europe, Japan, and the United States are often the only affordable option (Mascia 2024). An old gas-powered car has a good chance of ending up on a cargo ship, as old vehicles from Western Europe are typically shipped to Eastern Europe and then move south to Africa (Stokel-Walker 2022). In this context, the good news is that if until a few years ago the electric car represented a niche choice, the sales of zero-emission vehicles have now taken on an extremely significant weight. In 2022, for the first time in history, exclusively battery-powered cars sold worldwide exceeded 10 million units, reaching 14% of the total market (IEA 2023). However, despite the incentives, and the existence of a second-hand market, electric cars are only bought by those who have the money to change their car and buy a rather expensive electric car (Bellagamba 2023). So, the most disadvantaged people, even in Europe, are mostly forced to keep polluting cars for as long as they can.

Poor energy efficiency buildings. One of the most effective ways to fight energy poverty is to improve the energy efficiency of buildings. This can be achieved through improvements in construction and insulation, among others (EDP 2024). Nevertheless, effective building interventions that are functional for energy efficiency and the transition to renewable energy are very expensive. Therefore, only wealthy people or those who can benefit from very strong incentives or financing schemes that are functional in combating energy poverty can afford them, which often does not happen. For instance, the official number of households living in a low-income household with poor energy efficiency in England in 2022 was 3.26 million (but it is estimated to be much higher, between 4.1 and 7.5 million (Department for Energy Security & Net Zero 2023)); recent evidence published by the University of York stated that 32% of households identified in fuel poverty will not be helped by the existing governmental support (ACCESS 2024).

In this way, the most disadvantaged people contribute significantly to the worsening of the climate crisis, because they do not have the means to adopt virtuous measures in the way they live and work. As said above, the weight of disadvantaged groups in emissions production is still marginal but could become more important in the future.

This trend is also due to the unintended effects of some mitigation and adaptation (M&A) policies on the most vulnerable. This is the main theme we will address in this paper. Following the introduction (Section 1), which outlines the interplay between inequalities and climate change, Section 2 describes the materials and methodological approach employed in this study. Section 3 focuses on the results, highlighting the unintended negative impacts of climate policies on the most vulnerable populations, as well as examples of promising practices that counteract these effects. Section 4 discusses the implications of integrating social and environmental objectives in climate policy design, and offers several related recommendations. Section 5 addresses the limitations of this study, while Section 6 provides concluding remarks.

2. Materials and Methods

In order to document and thus confirm or refute what has just been said, we first identified the main climate policies that have been designed and implemented in recent years; then, the literature dealing with the relationship between policies and vulnerability was collected and analysed.

‘Policy’ refers to a set of actions (as well as non-actions) taken by public and private actors that are in some way related to a collective problem (Dente 1992). Inequality can be taken as a critical lens through which to examine any social and economic policy, because policies are applied to and have effects on different groups of people that are, or can be, very different precisely because of the inequalities we have just discussed. This, of course, also applies to climate change policies, if only because climate change poses a greater threat to exposed and vulnerable countries, communities, and social groups.

Climate policies can be divided into mitigation and adaptation policies (with some overlap), as shown in the figure below (Figure 1).

Adaptation policies or measures are those that aim to help people and communities adapt to climate change by adjusting their daily lives to rising temperatures and their associated consequences (UNDP 2024a). These consequences are, on the one hand, slow processes (but very significant even in the short and medium term), such as melting ice, increasing sea and air temperatures, rising sea levels, and major droughts, and, on the other hand, catastrophic and often sudden and extreme events such as hurricanes, floods, avalanches, landslides, heat waves, etc. These events have occurred many times in the past, but with climate change they seem to be occurring with much greater frequency.

There are two main ways (Adger et al. 2007) in which people adapt: (a) by trying to ensure that such events are as infrequent and mild as possible; (b) by trying to ensure that human communities are able to withstand such events as best they can (i.e., by increasing their resilience).

In the European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT (Climate-ADAPT 2021), a number of key adaptation policies have been identified related to risk management (e.g., developing river basin management plans or flood risk management plans; developing Community-Based Risk Management schemes; developing and disseminating early warning systems; and awareness-raising and training/capacity-building for increasing the level of preparedness of communities at risk); safety infrastructures (e.g., building sea walls to protect against sea level rise); ecosystems (e.g., restoring damaged ecosystems, including through the use of nature-based solutions; replanting forests; and planting of drought-resistant crops); and buildings (e.g., building safer buildings and infrastructure in areas that are not vulnerable to extreme events or building green roofs to reduce the urban heat island effect).

Mitigation policies or measures focus on addressing the root cause of climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing carbon sinks (UNDP 2024b).

These policies cover various sectors that partially overlapped, such as energy (e.g., improving energy efficiency and opting for renewable energy in enterprises and in buildings; energy advice programmes), transport (e.g., restriction on the use of vehicles in certain areas/urban planning and zoning restrictions, regulatory restrictions to encourage modal shifts; enforcement of fuel and vehicle standards compatible with zero emissions or very low emissions; and construction of cycle paths), buildings (e.g., labelling programmes for efficient buildings), industry (e.g., decarbonisation in industry; introduction of energy management systems in enterprises; and creation of green enterprises/climate-friendly enterprises), and agriculture and ecosystems (e.g., reforestation and reduction in deforestation; investment in improvement and diffusion of innovative technologies in agriculture and forestry; and protection and sustainable use of soil). Financial measures are also mentioned by the IPCC (e.g., introduction of new taxes, such as a carbon tax, fuel tax, and other fossil energy taxes, fertiliser or nitrogen taxes, and sprawl tax; introduction of subsidies, such as fossil fuel subsidy removal, biofuel subsidies, subsidies or tax exemptions for investment in efficient buildings, retrofits and products, subsides for energy audits for enterprises and buildings, credit lines for low-carbon agriculture, emission credits, and credit lines for low-carbon agriculture and sustainable forestry), as well as educational and awareness-raising actions (IPCC 2014; Zoungrana et al. 2024).

Reference can be made to the frame set up by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); the following key mitigation policies have been identified (IPCC 2014).

The adaptation and mitigation measures mentioned here represent only a small subset of the many possible strategies. It would be impractical to list even all those catalogued by sources such as the IPCC and Climate-ADAPT, let alone those found across the broader literature, due to sheer volume. For instance, in the domain of mitigation alone, 73,625 policies have been identified across 216 entities (Wu et al. 2024). Moreover, the same policy may be referred to using different terminology depending on the source, context, or target audience—a reflection of variations in language, technical jargon, and institutional focus. It is also crucial to emphasise that trade-offs and overlaps exist between different policies (Viguié and Hallegatte 2012).

Our objective is not to provide an exhaustive inventory of such policies, but rather to highlight how certain measures can critically affect vulnerable populations—or specific categories of disadvantaged groups, as we elaborate below. It is essential to recognise that individuals’ capacity to adapt to climate change is deeply shaped by broader structural vulnerabilities, which both reflect and reinforce existing inequalities (Gannon 2022). At the same time, many climate policies that are vital for mitigation and/or adaptation—such as enhancing energy efficiency in medium and large enterprises, promoting renewable energy, implementing carbon taxes and emission credits, or restoring ecosystems through nature-based solutions—do not directly harm vulnerable groups.

But what do we mean by vulnerable2 or disadvantaged people? Vulnerability refers to “the quality or state of being exposed to the possibility of being attacked or harmed, either physically or emotionally” (LEXICO 2021), while “Social vulnerability refers to the inability of people, organizations, and societies to withstand adverse impacts from multiple stressors to which they are exposed” (Ballesteros 2024). For example, in the ACCTING project vulnerability profiles are identified according to the following criteria (and their intersections): gender, gender identity, age (e.g., elderly people on one hand, and children on the other), disability, national minority, ethnicity, religion/belief, sexual orientation, socio-economic background (employment, income, etc.), and geographical isolation. A few people are characterised by only one of the conditions (or traits) just listed, but many others are characterised by more than one: ‘young gay migrant in a lower social class’; ‘illiterate elderly woman’; ‘homeless elderly disabled person’; ‘young non-white working class woman, in a society marked by racism and sexism’; and dozens more (in line with the notion of intersectionality we introduced above) (Strid and Zorell 2023).

Having briefly reviewed the main adaptation and mitigation policies, along with the associated measures they entail, the next section examines how these policies affect disadvantaged populations or those with identifiable vulnerability profiles. To this end, we conducted a review aimed at gathering relevant evidence and, in particular, concrete examples that support our analysis. In addition to synthesising key findings from several research lines within the ACCTING project, we examined a range of reports from international organisations—including the European Commission (EC), European Environment Agency (EEA), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN), UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the World Bank—as well as from international programmes such as CREWS, the IPCC, PWP, and weADAPT.

In total, approximately 100 sources informed the development of this paper—double that number were consulted. These were identified using a ‘snowball’ sampling approach, beginning with foundational documents from the IPCC and the weADAPT platform and major reports by key international climate policy bodies. Keywords associated with vulnerability profiles were systematically cross-referenced with those relevant to the specific climate policies under review. Additional relevant studies addressing these issues were also included.

It is important to note that the sources consulted are highly heterogeneous in both scope and geographical focus. Some, such as the ACCTING project, the weADAPT platform, and reports by the European Commission (EC) and the European Environment Agency (EEA), primarily address Europe or specific European countries and regions. Others, such as many reports from UN bodies, concentrate on the Global South or its subregions. Still others, such as those produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), adopt a global perspective. This diversity, however, does not undermine the analysis, as the climate policies examined are, in one way or another, universally relevant and broadly applicable across contexts.

This paper does not constitute a systematic literature review. Rather, the approach aligns more closely with what is commonly referred to as a scoping review (Arksey and O’Malley 2005). Unlike systematic reviews, which are narrowly focused and designed to identify and synthesise evidence related to a specific research question, scoping reviews have a broader purpose: to map the existing literature on a given topic and provide an overview—either broad or detailed—of its scope and focus (Munn et al. 2018).

More specifically, our objective was to investigate the inadequacy of certain climate policies in addressing the needs of large segments of disadvantaged populations. These groups are often excluded from the benefits of such policies (which de facto neglect them) and, in some cases, experience additional harm as a result (which worsens their leaving conditions). We therefore sought supporting evidence from the literature to substantiate this thesis.

As previously noted, we do not aim to conduct an exhaustive analysis—such an undertaking would be unfeasible given the breadth and complexity of the issues involved. Instead, our objective is to illustrate how the problem manifests in practice by presenting a selection of representative examples drawn from the sources consulted. These examples are based on specific cases that help to illuminate the broader patterns and dynamics at play.

3. Results: Unintended Effects of Climate Policies on the Most Vulnerable

As stated by Liao et al. (2023), “Some policies related, for example, to urban mobility, sustainable food consumption or aimed at safeguarding human settlements to improve adaptation to climate change, often risk affecting the poorest and most disadvantaged people. There are different social impacts of climate and environmental policies”. In line with this thought, in the pages that follow, our focus will be on a dozen illustrative policies and related measures that can affect, in some way, disadvantaged people. We will look first at adaptation and then at mitigation.

3.1. Adaptation Policies and Measures and Vulnerable People

Avoidance of houses in flooded areas. Housing usually represents the highest losses from natural disasters (Tran et al. 2012). As a consequence, one of the most important adaptation measures is to prohibit the construction of houses and any other human settlements in the areas most prone to natural hazards (such as, for example, frequently flooded areas or areas subject to landslides). Sometimes, these are poorly constructed or dilapidated houses that can collapse or suffer structural damage in the event of these natural disasters. It is a phenomenon that is growing in severity. According to the World Bank (2022), the number of people living in substandard housing, whose homes are often vulnerable to natural hazards such as earthquakes, floods, and cyclones, is expected to more than double to three billion in the next 15 years. Another measure is to encourage the people who currently live in these areas to relocate and live elsewhere. However, very often these houses and areas are inhabited by the most disadvantaged people: poor people, irregular migrants, and discriminated people (Satterthwaite 2017). These people face considerable difficulties in moving to live elsewhere (Mezzana and Quinti 2024), despite any incentives. Therefore, this policy often turns out to be inadequate for the most disadvantaged people, although there are examples of vulnerable communities being successfully relocated to safer housing. In northern Italy, for example, the Piedmont region has been developing and implementing a policy of anticipatory relocation of residential buildings at hydro-geological risk since 2003. Residential property owners participate in a voluntary buy-out scheme and move to safer areas within the same province with public funding support, including purchasing and demolition costs (Climate-ADAPT 2024).

Avoidance of deforestation/reforestation. One of the most important adaptation measures is the protection and expansion of forests in order to reduce natural hazards related to gravity (rockfalls and avalanches) or water (floods and droughts) (Groasis n.d.; Rey et al. 2024). In this context, however, it is important to remember that poor farmers are among the drivers of deforestation. Indeed, beyond logging, grazing, and commercial agriculture, one of its saddest causes is the fact that many subsistence farmers contribute to the removal of trees.

“When faced with the immediate needs of their families, they must take down trees for a quick profit. Some people will harvest trees to turn into charcoal to quickly earn cash. In other places, forest areas are cleared and burned to be used as extra land for farming. Eventually, these areas lose so many trees that soil and water are left unprotected”.

(PwP 2018)

It is therefore clear that reforestation policies, while undoubtedly appropriate for adaptation purposes, may not adequately address the concerns of some of the most vulnerable populations, such as the opposing farmers mentioned above.

Early warning system (EWS) development. Of all risk reduction and climate change adaptation measures, early warning and early action are among the most proven and cost-effective ways to adapt the lives of communities in hazard-prone areas, save lives, and reduce the economic impact of natural hazards. Recalling that, as noted above, the impact of hazards is unequally distributed and disproportionately affects the most vulnerable communities, EWSs are considered as essential to protect these people, to promote resilience, and to achieve the global development agenda (UNESCO 2024). However, one-third of the world’s population still lacks EWSs (mainly in less developed countries, while in Europe, there is considerable experience with EWSs, especially for flood and flash-flood risk, storms, forest fires, heatwaves, and droughts). Moreover, where EWSs exist and are effectively functioning, they often do not reach the most vulnerable people. In the 2020 paper ‘A systematic review of community engagement (CE) in disaster EWS’ (Sufri et al. 2020), the following is highlighted:

“EWSs have traditionally focused on technology and infrastructure with the absence of comprehensive engagement with the community across the four EWS elements of risk knowledge, monitoring, dissemination and communication and response capability. Subsequently, past experience shows inappropriate responses by communities during disasters”.

Thus, EWSs often reach well-connected people: those who use advanced ICTs that allow two-way communication with those managing the system, and also those who have received risk information via radio or television, while disadvantaged people such as disabled, illiterate, or old people may not receive information. More specifically, as regards disabled people, it has been highlighted that “despite the fact that there are an estimated 600 million persons with disabilities in the world, very little has been done to create inclusive and comprehensive EWS which meet the needs of individuals with physical or cognitive impairments” (Osterwalder et al. 2021). Various reports by international organisations have highlighted similar issues (CREWS 2016; IFRC 2009; IFRC and CREWS 2021). So, even for EWSs, the question is whether this adaptation measure is appropriate for the most vulnerable people.

Increased and shared preparedness. As a fourth example, we can refer to all measures that fall under human preparedness, from which millions of disadvantaged people remain excluded, either because they lack capacity (e.g., elderly or disabled) or because they are excluded because of gender, religion, or social status (ReliefWeb 2018; Baldelli et al. 2025). Five main barriers have been identified to implementing preparedness activities for vulnerable people (Sekar et al. 2023).

• Challenges in the identification of disadvantaged people, even for those who are cognisant of the discourse surrounding intersectionality. Frequently, this awareness is not accompanied by the ability to accurately identify and map the various categories of vulnerable individuals within the designated territory.
• Poor availability of preparedness measures for vulnerable groups (preparedness measures are often conceived without taking into account the enormous differences within the human groups that inhabit a territory, even in the best cases where the specific context has been carefully considered).
• Inadequate coordination between actors (there are many diverse actors involved in improving community preparedness, including public and non-profit organisations that have expertise in a particular type of vulnerability—e.g., those caring for children or the elderly; the disabled; or migrants—and it is very difficult to ensure adequate coordination between them).
• Lack of policies and plans to promote preparedness among vulnerable groups (also because of the above, there is a lack of tailor-made measures for specific groups of people; therefore, plans and policies, even when they address these issues, are often generic).
• Lack of trust (of vulnerable people) towards stakeholders due to negative experiences in the past, also because their specificities have not been taken into account in the past, if at all, and therefore many people believe that policies are leaving them behind and will leave them behind).

Thus, even with many preparedness measures, the question of their appropriateness in relation to the most disadvantaged people is still quite prominent.

Management of emergencies. The same problem of inadequacy arises with regard to the management of emergencies. This appears, for example, in a study carried out in Tuscany, an Italian region that has one of the most advanced civil protection systems in the country and that is particularly sensitive to social issues and aware of the existence of different vulnerability profiles to be taken into account in emergency management. During the 2023 floods in Campi Bisenzio (Florence metropolitan area), rescue seemed to be guided primarily by the principle that those who are worse off should be helped as a priority or with special precautions, with an exclusive interest in the practical aspects of vulnerability, mostly related to mobility, communication, or food to be provided (for which the elderly, children, the disabled, migrants, and autistic and celiac people are often mentioned); conversely, there seems to be no awareness or interest in many other profiles related, for instance, to socio-economic conditions, gender identity, or mental issues, and even less in intersectional vulnerability profiles (White 2024).

It is worth noting that much is being carried out to change this bleak picture and improve the relevance of adaptation policies for the most vulnerable. Firstly, we can highlight the ongoing attempts to make EWSs accessible to all and people-centred (Mirianna et al. 2025) and, as far as possible, to adopt a bi-directional perspective (i.e., also valuing information coming from the community level). For example, in Ivory Coast, WhatsApp groups have been created that include actors ranging from the national meteorological agency (Sodexam) to French-speaking people from some village communities such as that of the remote village of Sangabili, where the leaders of the local youth committee receive all the relevant alerts and disseminate them in the two local languages by going around with megaphones throughout the whole territory (Mezzana and Quinti 2024).

Broadly speaking, in 2022 the United Nations launched the worldwide programme ‘Early Warning for All’ with the goal of ensuring that every person on Earth is protected by life-saving early warning systems for hazardous weather, water, or climate events by the end of 2027 (United Nations 2023). In parallel, numerous Community-Based Risk Management (CBRM) initiatives—often explicitly tailored to disadvantaged populations and incorporating intersectional approaches—have empowered community members to take leading roles in risk preparedness and response (Mezzana and Quinti 2024). It is important to recognise that communities have long developed their own coping strategies for dealing with environmental hazards such as floods and droughts.

For example, in a community in northern Benin, indigenous knowledge has been used to anticipate drought conditions based on early indicators such as the premature leafing of Cassia siamea, fog between May and July, and the increased presence of locusts and caterpillars in May and June. Similarly, signs of impending floods include strong north-to-south winds, an extended harmattan season, and the migration of wild ducks (WMO 2022).

Beyond these local and community-based practices, climate services must also contribute to enhancing climate education, capacity building, climate literacy, and access to relevant information (IPCC 2023).

Many other good practices can be reported. For instance, we can also mention cases of multiple transformations in agriculture involving vulnerable farmers (e.g., in the Tanore sub-district of Rajshahi district, Bangladesh) due to climate change:

“Farmers were shifting from traditional farming practices to more ecosystem-based, integrated farming practices that are less climate-sensitive. Combined agriculture, selecting drought-tolerant rice varieties, and shifting cropping patterns were some strategies that farmers adopted to address risks”.

(Sultana et al. 2023)

3.2. Mitigation Policies and Measures and Vulnerable People

Decarbonisation in industry. The closure of coal mines or industrial plants that use coal or other fossil fuels extensively, and/or their conversion to low energy or renewable energy consumption, as well as other de-industrialisation programmes (mitigation pathways with significant emission reductions), imply large and sometimes disruptive changes in the economic structure, with significant distributional impacts not only between countries but also within countries, including shifts in income and employment during the transition from high- to low-emission activities (IPCC 2023). Employment and income shifts are often problematic and strongly affect vulnerable groups (e.g., older workers) and can create unemployment, migration, mental disorders, and weakening of social cohesion, often triggering protests, sometimes even slowing down the above-mentioned mitigation pathways (Caiati et al. 2022; Filčák et al. 2022; Komorowska et al. 2022).

Car-free mobility measures. Measures such as fuel taxes, regulatory restrictions to encourage modal shift, restrictions on the use of vehicles in certain urban areas, enforcement of zero- or very low-emission vehicle standards, etc., can have a devastating impact on the poorest people and those living in peripheral areas, especially in cities where public transport services do not function very well. In the context of an ACCTING study (Pugliese et al. 2024), the implementation of car-free policies in marginalised urban areas in Europe has helped to highlight how such policies can generate forms of protest, even intense ones, by different groups of low-income citizens. These are people who do not have the means to replace their polluting cars (see Section 1) so that a new one can meet the high environmental standards required. In cities where public services are poor, these citizens are prevented or at least severely hampered in their mobility, bearing in mind that there is often not even sufficient cycling infrastructure and that there can be significant differences in altitude, making the use of bicycles problematic even for people who have the physical capabilities to use them. As a result, car-free mobility measures have often been inadequate for a diverse set of vulnerable people, and their protests have delayed or severely limited their adoption.

Low-emissions buildings. The adoption of building codes and standards, as well as the practice of energy audits, includes the identification and implementation of energy efficiency or renewable energy measures. These can be both lighter measures, such as replacing old fluorescent and incandescent lighting with certified LEDs or installing heat pumps, and more structural measures, such as energy-efficient roofs and walls, which significantly improve the quality of buildings but also significantly increase their value and make them even more inaccessible to all but the wealthy. In addition, there are even more important measures such as green roofs and walls, which are essential to control the building’s carbon footprint and improve energy efficiency while promoting biodiversity, or the installation of photovoltaic systems. These measures, which contribute a lot to better environmental sustainability and low energy bills, are (very) expensive and, even where high incentives are available, they are not so feasible for many people living in disadvantaged conditions3, who therefore continue to live in low-energy-efficiency houses and without access to renewable energy (see Section 1). Consequently, their energy bill is higher, generating energy poverty among people already disadvantaged. So, low-income households are less able to invest in protective measures and are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, such as increased energy costs due to the transition to renewable energy sources (EEA 2024).

Sustainable small and micro-enterprises. Policies and measures aimed at improving energy efficiency and popularising renewable energy options in small and micro-enterprises have already been discussed above (Section 1), where it was pointed out that, when the implementation of such measures is not mandatory, the entrepreneurs, who do not even consider them, are mainly disadvantaged people, often in socio-economic difficulties, as shown by a study carried out among vulnerable micro-entrepreneurs in Belgium, Greece, Italy, Norway, and Romania within the framework of the ACCTING project (Strid and Zorell 2023). Indeed, most of the enterprises run by these micro-entrepreneurs, sometimes referred to as “ignorant enterprises” (Palm 2009), do not have a specific focus on energy or environmental issues and generally do not have dedicated staff working on these issues. Yet the vulnerable entrepreneurs who conceive and sometimes implement a pro-environmental agenda face many problems, as some of the ACCTING project’s findings suggest. Some show environmental awareness and have ideas about what they could carry out to improve their energy efficiency but are hindered by bureaucratic hurdles and a lack of financial resources. Some also face resistance from within their business and even (sometimes) from their customers, as adopting environmental practices may increase the price of goods or services (Quinti et al. 2024). As we have said, all this cannot be generalised, but it is enough to raise questions about the compatibility of such policies with people living (and working) in disadvantaged conditions. Thus, the more disadvantaged entrepreneurs are, the less ‘virtuous’ they can be.

Low-emission livestock. The livestock sector is a major contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions, and an increasing one, given that, as the European Commission (EC 2023) points out, livestock production is increasing in an attempt to meet the higher demand for milk and meat in developing countries. Livestock contribute to climate change by emitting GHG, either directly through enteric fermentation or indirectly, for example, through feed production, deforestation, and manure (Bellarby et al. 2013). Therefore, climate change mitigation requires a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from livestock production (Cassandro 2020) and, according to the EC, more than 500 million livestock farmers in tropical countries would have to make cuts. For this to be feasible, changes in production practices appear to be fundamental, such as the identification of animals with low GHG emissions, the use of more nutritious feeds and feed supplements, and the restoration of degraded pasture lands (EC 2023). However, these strategies are neither easily implemented nor particularly widespread among poor breeders, so efforts are being made to define and implement relevant functional actions (Rege et al. 2011). It would therefore appear that similar problems to those mentioned in the previous points are encountered with regard to climate change mitigation policies relating to livestock farming.

Avoidance of deforestation/reforestation. Reforestation and the fight against deforestation are not only functional for climate change adaptation (see the previous Section), but also very important for climate change mitigation. Therefore, what was said above also applies here.

We now turn to examine the policies and measures aimed at alleviating the negative impacts of climate change policies on vulnerable populations. In this regard, numerous good practices can also be identified. Firstly, the slow but steady spread in Europe of energy and solidarity communities, based on the self-production and self-consumption of energy from renewable sources, and at the same time on social action to combat energy poverty, which also involves the active and often free participation of poor people and people with other vulnerable profiles (e.g., physically and mentally disabled) (Boostani et al. 2024). Energy and solidarity communities can mitigate the potential negative impacts of low-emission building policies.

Also worth mentioning are projects that have been underway for some years to encourage poor farmers to adopt better environmental practices, involving technologically simple steps in livestock management, which could potentially generate USD 1.3 billion per year by selling the carbon saved on global markets (EC 2023).

Finally, we can mention the numerous forms of assistance and support for vulnerable micro-entrepreneurs to facilitate the adoption of energy efficiency measures and the increased use of renewable energy sources, promoted both by large companies and by associations and networks, including informal ones, between entrepreneurs, and by non-profit voluntary organisations (Strid and Zorell 2023).

Perhaps even more important are the ‘just transition’ measures that have been—and are being—designed and implemented to alleviate the undesirable social effects of the ‘decarbonisation of industry’ mitigation policy. According to the United Nations, just transition means “greening the economy in a way that is as fair and inclusive as possible for all concerned, creating decent work opportunities and leaving no one behind” (UNDP 2022). This concept is increasingly mentioned in various documents of international organisations and the European Commission, which, among other things, established the Just Transition Fund (JTF)4. The JTF provides support to EU Member States that have identified the territorial areas (e.g., mining areas) most likely to be affected by the transition to climate neutrality. It therefore supports the economic diversification and conversion of the affected areas, as well as the recovery of regions that might otherwise suffer and be left behind in a net-zero economy Europe, through the upgrading and re-training of workers and job search assistance for people who lose their jobs as a result of industrial conversion. Just transition measures should be particularly important in addressing gender inequalities resulting from climate change, recalling (see Section 1) that women are more likely to experience job losses in climate-sensitive sectors and have fewer opportunities to transition to new areas of employment (Jordan et al. 2021). The European Commission has also established the Social Climate Fund (European Parliament 2023a), which aims to contribute to a socially just transition to climate neutrality by addressing the social impacts of including GHG emissions from buildings and road transport. To this end, the fund aims to alleviate the adverse effects of the climate change transition on vulnerable groups. However, social climate measures under the Social Climate Fund will only be implemented from 2026 onwards.

In the following

Table 1. Some climate policies with unintended negative effects in relation to vulnerable people.

Adaptation	Mitigation
Avoidance of deforestation/reforestation	Avoidance of deforestation/reforestation
Avoidance of houses in flooded areas	Decarbonisation in industry
Early warning system (EWS) development	Car-free mobility measures
Increased and shared preparedness	Low-emissions buildings
Management of emergencies	Sustainable small and micro-enterprises
	Low-emission livestock

, as a kind of reminder, we list all the policies with unintended negative effects in relation to vulnerable people we dealt with in Section 3.

4. Discussion: An Uncertain and Precarious Situation

In the previous section, we highlighted the significant limitations of some adaptation policies in protecting the most vulnerable from the impacts of climate change and pointed to their possible anti-equalisation effects in the sense that such policies tend to protect those who are better off and much less or not at all those who are worse off. There are also constraints in some mitigation policies, which, as they are often currently designed, are not relevant or are even harmful to many vulnerable groups, who therefore are neglected by these policies, even sometimes openly opposing them.

Nevertheless, much is being carried out to contrast these limitations on both sides of mitigation and adaptation, as shown above. The emerging global picture is therefore uncertain, with both light and shade, and a somewhat uneven situation in terms of the consideration of social aspects in the definition and implementation of climate change adaptation and mitigation policies. As noted by the United Nations, “Just as the effects of climate change are distributed unevenly, so too are the policies designed to counter them” (UNDESA 2020).

This paper cannot pretend to resolve this state of uncertainty, but rather merely proposes, much more modestly, some issues to focus on in order to try to move towards solutions that make climate policies more compatible with the protection of the disadvantaged and, therefore, more equitable in their implementation.

4.1. Resistances

We have discussed above that some climate policies have negative impacts on vulnerable people and risk provoking resistance from these people. This is sometimes active resistance (e.g., protests against policies for the decarbonisation of industry, car-free mobility, or low-emission livestock measures), or more often passive resistance (e.g., apathy/non-participation in policies aiming at moving out from flooded areas or stopping deforestation). Active resistance often hinders, or even prevents, the implementation of such policies, while both active and passive resistance limit their effectiveness anyway.

The issue of resistance to environmentally sustainable policies has been dealt with extensively in the oft-cited ACCTING project. The question was how to bring about positive change to achieve the objectives of climate policies that is at the same time socially just, with particular reference to socially marginalised or disadvantaged groups. This is the issue to be addressed, which is hidden or expressed in resistance to sustainable policies.

Scholars have identified a rich repertoire of resistance, ranging from hesitation, avoidance, and foot-dragging to strikes, demonstrations, and noncompliance (Brink et al. 2023). What they and the ACCTING (Duzel et al. 2025) highlight

“… is that it is essential to recognise resistance as a legitimate, complex response to work with, rather than as a hurdle to overcome. By acknowledging and working with resistance, policymakers can uncover gaps in inclusivity, barriers to access or mistrust stemming from marginalisation. This recognition can foster constructive dialogue and result in policies rooted in equality and justice”.

We can emphasise that climate policy is in the public interest because the provision of a stable climate is a global public good (Lipari et al. 2024) and therefore resistance is negative. However, there is no single definition of public interest, which means that there are a plurality of publics and their resulting interests. Therefore, there should be a conscious effort to bring these publics together to find and leverage common interests and manage conflict in a constructive way, starting through mapping different forms of active conflict (Brink et al. 2023) and also passive resistance. In addition, it is important to value the knowledge of vulnerable individuals and groups (Reid et al. 2015), while engaging them in the co-creation of solutions to various problems associated with climate change. This should also lead to coalition building, which can act as ‘transformative encounters’ that produce or induce wider social change or provide opportunities for learning and knowledge exchange (Berriane and Duboc 2020).

4.2. Disadvantaged People as Agents of Change for Climate Action

From what has just been discussed, it is quite clear that, despite their condition and the negative consequences they may suffer from some climate policies, disadvantaged people can and do actually play a positive active role in relation to climate change and are often among the key actors in managing the climate transition, especially when they form groups and networks to address these issues collectively (Schor and Thompson 2014).

Women—including those living in vulnerable conditions—are more sensitive to natural and human risks because they are more aware of the social, microeconomic, and environmental aspects of everyday life that affect them and their families, and because they are more likely than men to pay attention to emergency warnings and to be more safety-conscious (WMO 2024).

Older people have knowledge (e.g., historical memory of past disasters in the area where they live) that should not be wasted but, on the contrary, should be used to improve preparedness for future hazards. For example, in the Vajont disaster case, the local older population knew full well that the area where the dam was built was prone to landslides: the mountain proven to be the source of the landslide was called ‘Toc’ (onomatopoeic for the sound of a rock falling), which means ‘rotten’ in the local dialect. Despite this element (and the fact that scientific studies of the site’s geology confirmed what the inhabitants had known for generations), no attention was paid to that knowledge and work proceeded with the development of the project called ‘Grande Vajont’, followed by the disaster on 9 October 1963 (Aria 2010; Quinti and Guaschino 2016).

Children are often among the best-educated members of a community and more aware of the risks, having benefited from educational programmes at school. They are often an effective means of transmitting relevant information to their families and, broadly, in their communities (WMO 2024; Rodríguez et al. 2025). Furthermore, young people with education can often be agents of change, entrepreneurs, and innovators, and their skills can accelerate climate action.

The following Figure 2 summarises and connects the phenomena we have discussed so far in this article.

4.3. Combine Climate Justice and Social Justice

Looking at the ongoing climate policies (and related social issues), it has already been pointed out that much is being carried out to counteract the economic and social disadvantages of climate policy. However, some criticism has also been voiced in this respect. If we look at the European JTF, which we have mainly focused on, for example, it has been argued that sufficient funding is lacking (Pianta and Lucchese 2020) or that there is a risk that some disadvantaged areas will be excluded from it (Sarkki et al. 2022). Other critics argue that the establishment of just transition funds will inadvertently lead to the indefinite subsidisation of the fossil fuel industry (Heffron and McCauley 2022). Finally, it has been highlighted that the JTF appears to favour male-dominated sectors and neglect those where women are disproportionately represented, often characterised by low wages and job insecurity. This trend therefore risks reinforcing existing gender segregation and other inequalities within these sectors and the wider labour market (Allwood 2020).

Approaches such as the European Just Transition Mechanism, which aims to mitigate the negative impacts of climate policy on disadvantaged people, seem to be the first steps on a path out of the uncertainty and volatility we have tried to outline in the previous pages, despite the limitations we have just mentioned.

However, from what has been outlined so far, it seems that these approaches are far from being universal in the design and implementation of mitigation and adaptation.

Let us now try to delve a little deeper into some of the concepts that underpin these approaches.

There are authors (Stevis and Felli 2016) who consider fundamental a combination of climate justice and social justice perspectives, possibly following a path similar to the one drawn in the previous pages, also considering an intersectional approach, as stated by Liao et al. (2023): “To consider social justice in the context of climate policy, it is key to acknowledge the large variety of inequalities along different dimensions and impact categories, including intersectionality and trade-offs”.

Indeed, some further approaches to climate justice already include these social concerns (so, climate justice includes social justice). According to Colon (2022), for example,

“Climate justice connects the climate crisis to social, racial, and environmental issues, recognizing the disproportionate impacts of climate change on low-income people (…). It acknowledges that not everyone has contributed equally to climate change and aims to combat social, gender, economic, intergenerational, and environmental injustices (…). This entails ensuring representation, inclusion, and protection of the rights of those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Solutions must promote equity, assure access to basic resources”.

So, it would seem that there is not much clarity on the concepts of social justice and climate justice and their respective interconnections.

“Climate justice has become prominent in academia, policy circles, and among climate activists, but the notion of justice is highly subjective, and climate justice is often invoked without a clear definition of the concept. To achieve climate justice, it is necessary to clarify what it means in specific contexts (…). Climate justice is social justice in the Global South”.

(Ogunbode 2022)

Further quotes could be added relating to the concepts of social justice, climate justice (and their interactions), just transition, and so on. As highlighted by Heyen (2023), “Several streams of research have discussed important aspects of social inequalities and justice in the context of climate, energy, and environmental issues”.

What has been said, however, appears sufficient to highlight the following:

• There is still a certain conceptual or even terminological confusion on the issue (as is illustrated by the tension between the notions of social and climate justice);
• There is, however, a certain sensitivity on the part of some representatives of both the scientific community and the community of practitioners (e.g., international organisations) to the effective inclusion of social justice issues in the design and implementation of policies related to climate change;
• Nevertheless, on the one hand, this awareness is still limited and, on the other hand, the combination of all this is very complex and there do not seem to be any already elaborated and validated schemes on how to proceed;
• Finally, the empirical situations to refer to are very diverse, so, it is not surprising to find, so far, a limited impact on mitigation and adaptation policies (see Section 3).

4.4. Identifying Some Policy Recommendations

A first broad recommendation should be systematically mainstream equality and equity into climate policies. According to Jayaraman (2019),

“There is a tendency in the public debate on climate change to present the use and development of green technologies as a miracle solution or panacea. We often forget one aspect: it is crucial to ensure that their development goes hand in hand with social justice (…). Without equality and equity—in other words, without peace and security—we cannot effectively fight climate change”.

For this purpose, it would be useful to look at an example from another sector.

For several decades, one of the most prominent international organisations, the World Bank, has been implementing programmes with different approaches aimed, in the broadest sense, at economic growth, development, and poverty reduction. A few years ago, following a prolonged and exhaustive discussion, both internally and with all its primary partners (governments, NGOs/civil society, the scientific community, etc.), a comprehensive Environmental and Social Framework was defined (World Bank 2017), which stipulates that all projects seeking financial backing from the World Bank are obligated to adhere to a series of social ‘safeguard’ clauses. These clauses pertain to a range of social concerns, related to social inclusion, the protection of disadvantaged groups, and the promotion of gender issues, among other considerations. Failure to comply with these clauses may result in the project’s rejection, regardless of its other merits. It should be highlighted that a similar path has been started by many further international organisations dealing with development and environmental issues, such as the World Health Organisation, Food and Agricultural Organisation of the UN, World Wildlife Fund, International Labour Organisation, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, among others.

By analogy, and well beyond the scope of the World Bank (and others), the same should always be performed in the design and implementation of all climate change adaptation and mitigation policies. Specific social safeguards should be identified and applied for each situation and wherever M&A policies are implemented.

This recommendation may initially appear to be a mere slogan or even a potential hazard, as it could entail the risk of ‘blocking everything’ in the name of the failure to adopt safeguard clauses. Such an approach could potentially result in significant implications of ‘adding extra red tape’, as is often observed in the context of renovations in historic cities, which are frequently impeded in the name of safeguarding historical and cultural heritage (this is a context that is far from the one we are talking about, but it gives an idea of what is meant to be suggested).

The solution we are proposing should therefore be translated into concrete, effective, and sustainable lines of action, including the integration of social justice issues into climate policies, at the risk of their partial lack of effectiveness. In order to initiate this process, it appears imperative, firstly, to acknowledge the existence of the problem, if only to comprehend the ‘resistance’ (see above) that can be engendered by the implementation of some policies that, whilst ‘correct’ from the standpoint of environmental sustainability, prove to be socially unjust (see above). The second step is to acknowledge the role of disadvantaged groups as agents of change, thereby recognising their agency (see above). Consequently, rather than merely being part of the problem, these groups should be regarded as part of the solution. The third step, which is yet to be determined, involves negotiations between positions that initially appear irreconcilable.

Beyond the above, some further specific recommendations for policymakers can be proposed in order to better engage with people, including those in disadvantageous conditions, from the perspective of socially just climate policies, as elaborated in the frame of the ACCTING project (Duzel et al. 2025; Gajdusek et al. 2025; Strid et al. 2025). Among others, some are outlined below.

• Make agendas (from policymakers to NGOs) inclusive so that inequalities become more visible, and the organisation can generate egalitarian/just/inclusive policy alternatives.
• Encouraging administrations in charge of climate change challenges to share targeted resources ensures that local (vulnerable) groups receive the necessary support.
• Promoting a local approach where policymakers and scientists team up with citizens that rarely get a voice can be a game changer. Actively monitoring and understanding the local impacts of climate change can be a starting point for further action. The on-ground understanding can be a trigger for action, e.g., to mitigate risks, improve disaster response, or increase the adaptive capacity of communities in view of the climate-change related crisis.
• Recognising and celebrating positive stories and initiatives to inspire replication and highlight the success and impact of local community-led efforts. By acknowledging and sharing success stories, we inspire and motivate others to engage in similar initiatives, fostering a culture of innovation and resilience.
• Employing various tools for facilitation, conflict resolution, and dialogue-building to navigate the processes being slowed down by resistance, and to encourage the voluntary inclusion of marginalised groups.
• Identifying hotspots where sustainability transitions and transformations are likely to lead to tensions between social and environmental concerns. Pre-existing axes of inequality often shape vulnerability and disadvantage. Insights gained from resistance can contribute to long-term solutions to complex matters such as human rights and social equity, cultural heritage protection, and safety from natural hazards.

5. Limitations

Before reaching conclusions, it is useful to highlight some of the limitations of this text.

Firstly, this paper is not based on a systematic review of the existing literature, which undoubtedly makes it appear weak. On the other hand, dealing systematically with such a broad topic as the social impacts of climate policies on disadvantaged people would have required considerable additional time and resources. These policies are inherently broad and diverse, varying significantly across contexts in terms of their composition, implementation, and terminology. They are often referred to differently in various regions and involve complex overlaps and trade-offs. We have deliberately chosen not to narrow our focus to a specific policy or sector. While much of the existing literature addresses these issues within the framework of individual policies, our approach aims to offer a broader overview from the perspective of disadvantaged populations, with particular attention to the experiences and needs of society’s most marginalised groups.

Furthermore, adopting this perspective, we have sought to develop a framework that, while undoubtedly incomplete, offers meaningful insights. To this end, we examined evidence from a variety of fields related to climate policies—including energy efficiency, natural disaster management, reforestation, livestock, and urban mobility—across diverse geographic contexts. In this sense, our approach is integrated and holistic, albeit potentially eclectic, as it combines knowledge from multiple disciplines and attempts to harmonise these insights within the overarching theme of our study. Our aim is to highlight a critical issue, the potentially serious social consequences of climate policies, and to propose solutions grounded in the social effectiveness of future policy design.

Our work does not constitute first- or second-degree research in a strict sense, which could otherwise lead to confusion. Rather, we began with insights derived from the research activities within the European ACCTING project, in which the authors were actively involved, and supplemented these with findings from the literature review we conducted—an exercise that can be classified as second-degree research.

Ultimately, this article should not be seen as a conclusive achievement. Rather, its primary purpose is to draw attention to an issue that transcends individual climate policies or specific geographic regions, reflecting a holistic and global challenge. In this context, more detailed and focused studies are needed, studies that can be further refined with respect to geographical or disciplinary scope once a general framework has been established.

6. Conclusions

This paper examines the current limitations of some climate change policies, which often seem to exclude or penalise many disadvantaged people, and which also lend some of them to forms of resistance (active or passive) from the latter, at risk of becoming non-negligible producers of emissions that cause climate change. Moreover, it suggests that these policies could be much more effective if they were designed and implemented by better combining the needs of mitigation and adaptation to climate change with social equity features, based on a better understanding of the characteristics of the different forms of vulnerability specific to the territories and actors to whom these policies are addressed.

Several examples have been provided to show how the problem concretely emerges and some cases of solutions already tested or underway have been briefly described while highlighting some limitations and possible ways forward. Further research should be conducted to determine the feasibility of these possible ‘ways forward’ and how they can be operationalised in relation to each specific adaptation/mitigation policy.

In this picture, there are at least three gaps that need to be addressed first, which can be summarised as follows.

Theoretical gap. It is appropriate to continue theoretical research in order to bring more order between the concepts used and the phenomena to which they refer. Some aspects to be deepened are the following: the interrelationships between social justice and climate justice, between social justice and just transition, and between vulnerability, inequality, and social exclusion in relation to environmental sustainability and climate change (to name just a few of the current theoretical gaps).

Social actors’ knowledge gap. It has already been pointed out how some policies that function to mitigate and/or adapt to climate change have a differentiated impact on different social groups, often even negatively affecting some disadvantaged/marginal/poor groups according to their vulnerability profiles. One could speculate that this situation also depends on the lack of knowledge about the characteristics and needs of these various social groups within the contexts in which policies are implemented from most of the various stakeholders (from civil protection officials to energy managers; from urban planners to environmentalists, activists, etc.) who are officially or unofficially responsible for the implementation of climate policies at different levels (from local to international). This is a gap of which, moreover, many of these actors are not even aware (UNFCC 2018; WMO 2024). Indeed, an awareness gap could also be highlighted.