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Article

How Does News Coverage of a Rival Nation Affect People’s Attitudes about Their Own Countries? Evidence from China

School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
Soc. Sci. 2023, 12(12), 661; https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci12120661
Submission received: 2 September 2023 / Revised: 19 November 2023 / Accepted: 23 November 2023 / Published: 29 November 2023
(This article belongs to the Section Contemporary Politics and Society)

Abstract

:
Mass media are a key source of public news, significantly influencing the accessibility of certain issues through media coverage. While media coverage of rival nations is known to influence public perceptions, its potential impact on citizens’ attitudes toward their own country is less explored. This study addresses this gap by investigating Chinese respondents’ reactions to U.S. news stories related to food safety issues. The research reveals that exposure to negative news stories about a rival nation’s food safety scandal can lead to a more favorable assessment of one’s own government when the domestic government is perceived to be handling a similar issue better. Conversely, positive news about the rival nation’s food safety issues or slightly negative news about a less severe issue diminishes government satisfaction. The findings suggest that the impact of international news coverage on citizens’ views is shaped by comparisons between nations’ performances. These findings shed light on the complex dynamics of international news and its influence on domestic perceptions.

1. Introduction

Along with the rapid development in recent decades, China has narrowed the gap with the U.S. and widened the gaps with other countries, which has led to a bipolar dynamic (Zhao 2022). The two superpowers are in collision, resulting in ideological hostility. This intensified rivalry has given rise to a blame game between the two nations, both vying for global public support (Rikkonen et al. 2022).
Mass media serve as a primary source of public news, and an issue’s accessibility is greatly influenced by media coverage (Pan et al. 2023). It is widely recognized that public opinion closely correlates with media coverage (Besova and Cooley 2009). The influence of media on public attitudes toward foreign countries has been extensively researched (Wanta et al. 2004; Brewer et al. 2003). Evidence demonstrates that international news in mass media is a prominent source of information about foreign nations and effectively shapes public perceptions of those nations (Zhang and Meadows 2012; Wanta et al. 2004; Kiousis and Wu 2008). The impact of these perceptions goes beyond non-governmental interactions between countries and extends to public support for foreign policy (Bartels 1995; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992), incentivizing authorities to exert control over the media (Pan and Shu 2022). Actors in the international arena are making deliberate efforts to shape their media coverage. Evidence reveals that both the Chinese and the U.S. governments serve as crucial sources of information for news media, framing political news issues to align with their foreign policies (Ha et al. 2022). Although domestic media may not necessarily offer negative portrayals of rival countries (Lee and Hong 2012; Manheim and Albritton 1984; Stocking 1985), the frequency of the negative news published about a foreign country has been found to positively correlate with international public relations (Ramirez and Rong 2012).
However, few have examined the side effects of international news coverage: individuals’ attitudes about their own countries can be influenced. Social identity theory suggests that people’s in-group evaluation can be impacted by comparing it with other groups (Mummendey et al. 2001). Consequently, individuals may engage in inter-group comparisons based on international news that reveals information about other nations. They may set a high value on their nations when the comparison with other nations is favorable. As a result, media coverage of other countries, whether positive or critical, may lead to shifts in people’s attitudes toward their own nation. Positive public sentiments toward the government are crucial for upholding social stability and unity. There is an increasing argument that government-led hard propaganda is ineffective in shaping public opinion. Negative media coverage of foreign countries, if proven to be effective in fostering supportive opinions toward one’s own country, could serve as a supplementary or alternative approach to traditional propaganda. Thus, we contend that it holds significant importance to explore the impact of international news coverage on people’s attitudes toward their own country, along with its underlying mechanism, both theoretically and practically.
This work addresses a gap in the literature by unveiling how news coverage of the U.S. impacts the satisfaction of Chinese audiences with their own country across distinct out-group comparison conditions. Currently, there is a growing trend of utilizing social media platforms for news consumption. According to the 2023 Statistical Report on Internet Development, the number of online news consumers in China has reached 781 million, accounting for 72.4% of the overall netizens (CNNIC 2023). Therefore, this research conducted an online experiment to furnish empirical evidence for the inquiry, and Chinese online news consumers were recruited as our respondents. It revolves around food safety, a notable shortcoming in China’s governance. By scrutinizing the effects of a positive U.S. news story and two U.S. scandals (one surpassing the severity of China’s food safety issue, and the other being less severe) on Chinese social media users’ satisfaction with their government, we deciphered how individuals’ in-group appraisals of their nation fluctuate in tandem with varying out-group comparisons.
The findings suggest that a positive news story relating to U.S. food safety exacerbates Chinese respondents’ discontent with their government. This effect is comparable to a news story that discloses a U.S. food safety scandal of lesser severity than a similar incident in China. Conversely, the disclosure of a more severe U.S. food safety scandal compared to China’s considerably heightens people’s support for their government. Therefore, we contend that a favorable comparison with a rival nation amplifies citizen satisfaction with their own country, whereas an unfavorable comparison diminishes it. This study offers a contribution by exploring the nexus between news coverage of a rival nation and individuals’ contentment with their own government, an aspect that has received limited attention and scrutiny. Furthermore, it enhances comprehension of how contrasts with rival nations shape individuals’ assessments of their own nation. These findings are applicable to other nations embroiled in rivalries and who provide their citizens with updates on their rival countries’ affairs.
The subsequent sections are structured as follows: Firstly, we conduct a review of the literature on agenda settings and empirical research pertaining to the media’s influence on audiences’ perceptions of foreign nations. Additionally, we introduce social identity theory and put forward hypotheses that elucidate the impact of inter-group comparisons with other nations on in-group evaluations of one’s government. The Methods section presents our online experiment, which was administered to a representative sample of Chinese online news followers. In the Results section, we present our findings regarding how positive and negative news stories concerning U.S. food safety, varying in severity, influence Chinese respondents’ satisfaction with their government. Furthermore, we discuss how individuals’ evaluation of their own country should be interpreted as an outcome of comparisons with rival nations. The final section underscores the limitations and implications of this research.

2. Agenda Setting

The agenda-setting theory concerns the “transfer of salience from the mass media pictures of the world to the pictures in our heads” (Kassed and Mustaffa 2014). Agenda setting operates at three levels (Seaver 1998; Zhang and Meadows 2012), indicating that the media can guide audiences in what to think about, how to think about it, and what and how to associate (Kim et al. 2002; Guo et al. 2012). First-level agenda setting emphasizes issue salience (Dearing and Rogers 1996; McCombs 2004). Research has demonstrated that the public gauges the relative importance of each issue based on the quantity of media coverage (Wanta et al. 2004), tending to attribute significance to issues receiving more media attention (McCombs and Shaw 1972). Hence, mass media wield the power to shape the issues audiences are informed about and consider important. Agenda-setting effects in the digital media era have been examined in the media landscape of Chinese society. It is found that the salience of topics transfers from official mainstream news media to online media and then disseminates to audiences (Jiang and Deng 2011).
Second-level agenda setting centers on attributes or sub-issues of each subject (McCombs and Reynolds 2009). Journalists offer particular portrayals of their thought processes by selecting certain attributes of an issue while disregarding others (Weaver 2008). Attributes can be categorized into affective descriptions and cognitive descriptions (McCombs et al. 1997). The former involve valences or tones used in issue reporting, while the latter are related to the information conveyed about the issue in the news coverage (McCombs et al. 1997). Compelling evidence demonstrates a correlation between the public’s attribute agenda and the prominence of attributes in media coverage (McCombs and Reynolds 2009; Golan and Wanta 2001). News coverage that presents an attribute agenda can influence how audiences evaluate issues, and public perceptions of a newsmaker are primarily shaped by the attributes emphasized by the media (Wanta et al. 2004).
Framing, closely tied to the second level of agenda setting, is defined as “the selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda when a particular object is discussed” (McCombs 1997, p. 37). It is acknowledged that the presentation and shaping of information can significantly influence the audience’s interpretation and evaluation of the described issue (Entman 1993; Sheufele and Iyengar 2017). While framing and the second level of agenda setting are related concepts with similarities, they are not widely considered equivalent. Gamson (1992) conceptualized framing using a “signature matrix”, which comprises two parts: condensing symbols like taglines, depictions, and visual images and reasoning devices such as causes and consequences or moral claims. Due to the perception that condensing symbols are more likely to be seen as attributes of a given item than reasoning devices, some argue that second-level agenda setting aligns more closely with the first part of this matrix (Weaver et al. 2004).
The third-level agenda model, which is referred to as the Network Agenda Setting Model (NAS), was developed in the early 2010s (Guo et al. 2012). Unlike the assumptions of the first and the second agenda-setting theories, as well as priming and framing effects, NAS challenges the idea that human representation of reality is strictly logical and linear (Vu et al. 2014). Guo et al. (2012) suggest that individuals generate a network-shaped mental picture composed of interconnected attributes. Empirical evidence reveals a substantial network correlation in the salience of bundled issues between the public’s agenda and that of the media (Vu et al. 2014; Wu and Guo 2017). The more frequently two elements were concurrently mentioned in the news media, the higher the likelihood that the audience would perceive these elements as interconnected. Scholars illustrate the impact of digital media, particularly social media, on the public’s agenda setting in China (Nip and Fu 2016; Wang and Liu 2016). Furthermore, Shi and Wang (2023) found the reciprocal effects between the traditional media agenda and the we-media agenda.

3. Media Influence on Attitudes toward Foreign Nations

The foundation of state capacity includes the normative influence, often referred to as “soft power”. According to Warren (2014), symbolic capacities are also the essential tools that modern states can rely on for state-building. The normative influence can be exerted through communication, eliciting voluntary compliance with state authority as a result. Soft power involves technologies that empower governments to communicate normative expectations for state allegiance and national unity more effectively. Scholars see the potential role for media to play in shaping unified and stable political entities (Sun 2010).
There is evidence suggesting that international news coverage can influence the public agenda (McNelly and Lzcaray 1986; Salwen and Matera 1992). As previously mentioned, the two levels of agenda setting correspond to visibility and valence, respectively, and these two intertwined dimensions determine a country’s national image. Visibility is shaped by the extent of media coverage an object receives, while valence is contingent on whether the media coverage is positive or negative (Manheim and Albritton 1984).
When forming subsequent evaluations, audiences may assign higher significance to issues that have been frequently accessed or recently encountered (Higgins et al. 1985). Issues recently highlighted in the press are more likely to be recalled when forming subsequent evaluations. Brewer et al. (2003) discovered that participants tend to base their evaluations of a nation on the issue discussed in the news story they have just read.
News coverage provides frames that associate specific issues with foreign nations by highlighting “some aspects of a perceived reality” (Brewer et al. 2003), and the media can present a country in either a positive or negative light (McNelly and Lzcaray 1986). Additionally, there are frames that explicitly link a nation to a certain issue while conveying an evaluative standpoint. It is found that news coverage can shape public perceptions and sentiments toward foreign nations (Wanta et al. 2004; Kiousis and Wu 2008). To be more specific, prior research indicates that negative news coverage yields more potent agenda-setting effects compared to neutral and positive news coverage (Besova and Cooley 2009). A foreign nation portrayed negatively in the media is more likely to be perceived negatively (Kiousis and Wu 2008; Lee and Hong 2012), whereas positive portrayals of foreign nations have shown limited effectiveness in enhancing public perceptions (Wanta et al. 2004; Besova and Cooley 2009; Zhang and Meadows 2012).

4. Inter-Group Comparisons with Other Nations and In-Group Evaluation

Social identity theory suggests that an individual’s identity is partially derived from the group to which he/she belongs (Tajfel et al. 1979), and individuals tend to hold positive views about the groups they are affiliated with (Tajfel and Turner 1986). The sense of national belonging is regarded as a crucial group membership, implying that people are inclined to hold their nations in high esteem. In order to bolster self-esteem and alleviate uncertainty, individuals strive for a positive social identity (Abrams and Hogg 1988). In-group evaluations can emerge through inter-group comparisons and comparisons based on temporal or other standards (e.g., reference to absolute standards) (Hogg 2000). This entails people assessing their nation by comparing it with other nations, its own past, or their ideal society.
The advent of social media has enabled individuals to connect with like-minded people more easily than ever (Baumeister and Leary 1995). However, the social selectivity and filtering technologies employed by social media platforms can cause psychosocial bubbles, restricting the diversity of online information exposure (Kaakinen et al. 2020). It causes the fragmentation of the public sphere and a diminished regard for diverse perspectives (Bennett and Pfetsch 2018). Users may consequently accept exclusionary nationalist discourse and hate speech and be extremists (Sunstein 2017). Existing research confirms the impact of digital media in fueling nationalism, particularly in China (Jiang 2012; Schneider 2018).
Social comparison theory, introduced by psychologist Festinger (1954), elucidates how individuals evaluate themselves by contrasting their abilities, opinions, and attributes with those of others. This theory posits that people engage in social comparison as a means to evaluate their self-worth and capabilities and to gain insight into their position in the world. Social comparison can transpire both consciously and unconsciously, significantly influencing our self-concept, self-esteem, and emotional well-being. News coverage of foreign nations can shape public perceptions of those nations, potentially prompting audiences to juxtapose their own nation with others. Thus, we contend that individuals might engage in social comparison upon exposure to news about other nations. This comparison could impact their self-esteem, collective identity, and assessment of their own nation.
Social comparison can be taken in an upward or downward direction. Upward social comparison arises when individuals compare themselves to others perceived as superior in specific aspects, while downward social comparison involves contrasting oneself with others viewed as less competent or successful (Wheeler 1966). Research indicates that downward comparison can lead to positive emotions and enhance self-esteem, whereas upward social comparisons are more likely to evoke negative emotions and result in reduced self-esteem (Buunk and Gibbons 2007; Feltman and Szymanski 2018). Scheepers (2009) highlights that having distinctiveness from other groups of relatively high status contributes to a positive social identity, while lacking positive group distinctiveness can threaten social identity.
Social networking sites create an environment conducive to social comparisons (Verduyn et al. 2017), given the unprecedented availability of information about comparable individuals. It is widely found that social media have a negative effect on subjective well-being indicators rather than a positive one (Brailovskaia et al. 2020; Yoon et al. 2019). Numerous scholars identify online social comparison as a crucial mechanism contributing to the detrimental effects of social media. Nevertheless, several other studies have indicated that social comparisons on social media do not consistently lead to decreases in subjective well-being. The nature of the comparison dimension plays a significant role. Social comparison on social media does not correlate with negative emotional outcomes when the focus is on opinions rather than abilities (Yang et al. 2018).
Hence, it can be assumed that individuals’ evaluations of their own country are influenced by the cross-national comparisons prompted by international media coverage. We anticipate that when news stories reveal that their country outperforms a rival nation in a particular aspect, the favorable cross-national comparison can elevate individuals’ satisfaction with their nation. Conversely, when news stories indicate that the rival nation excels in a certain aspect compared to their own country, individuals may lower their assessment of their nations due to the favorable comparison.
Hypothesis 1: 
Individuals exposed to both domestic and foreign news coverage, suggesting a favorable cross-nation comparison, compared to those exposed to domestic scandal news coverage only, are expected to exhibit a higher level of satisfaction with their own government.
Hypothesis 2: 
Individuals exposed to both domestic and foreign news coverage, indicating an unfavorable cross-nation comparison, compared to those exposed to domestic scandal news coverage only, are expected to display a lower level of satisfaction with their own government.
The theory of relative deprivation proposes that individuals experience feelings of anger and frustration when they perceive themselves as disadvantaged in comparison to others (Smith et al. 2011; Power 2018). If the out-group is perceived as having more favorable conditions or outcomes, the in-group might sense relative deprivation, which could lead to decreased in-group evaluation and diminished self-esteem. The perception of relative disadvantage serves as a basis for comparison and is correlated with relative deprivation. Therefore, we predict that the larger the gap between a nation and its rival nation, the greater the sense of relative deprivation individuals feel, resulting in a lower level of expressed satisfaction.
Hypothesis 3: 
When individuals are exposed to both domestic and foreign news coverage, a less favorable cross-nation comparison is anticipated to correspond with a lower level of satisfaction with their own government.

5. Methods

To address the hypotheses, we conducted an online experiment.

5.1. Participants

The recruitment advertisements were posted on Sina Weibo, one of the most widely used Chinese social media platforms (Vuori and Paltemaa 2015). Hashtags, which are keywords describing posts (Small 2011), were utilized in the recruitment process to target participants. By using the latest and most-searched socio-political news as our hashtagged keywords, the recruitment advertisements were shown to news readers who clicked on the hashtagged words related to trending news topics.
A total of 1294 Chinese volunteers took part in the experiment. We excluded 41 participants who spent no more than 1 min completing the survey (40 s for the control group), as well as 6 participants who indicated that they were not long-term residents of mainland China. The final sample comprised 1247 participants, including 661 males (53% of the participants) and 586 females (47% of the participants), with ages ranging from 15 to 49 years old (mean = 30.7 years old, median = 31.0 years old).1 This distribution aligned with the demographic structure of social media news consumers in China (see Supplementary Materials).

5.2. Design and Materials

The experiment aimed to investigate the impact of U.S. food safety news stories on the satisfaction of Chinese respondents with their own government. In China, frequent food safety scandals are exposed by mass media or we-media, raising concerns about the effectiveness of regulatory systems and oversight mechanisms (Liu et al. 2020).
The online survey began with questions about respondents’ demographic characteristics, places of residence, knowledge of the U.S., and general attitudes toward food safety, considering these factors could influence the effect of U.S. food safety news coverage. Additionally, questions about the objectivity and readability of the news texts were included as a guise.
Participants were then randomly assigned to an experiment stimulus. News stories used in the experimental conditions were adapted from real news stories posted by prominent Chinese mainstream media outlets. Recognizing people’s preferences for concise texts in the Internet era, short news texts were provided as treatments, with minor editing to ensure consistent structure and length. Each news story conveyed an evaluative perspective with frames. Given that media outlets in China are known to align their reporting with the official viewpoints of the government, the news texts used in the experiment were shown as posted by People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, known as one of the most authoritative and influential media outlets in the country.
All respondents were asked to read a news post about China’s pickle food safety scandal, adapted from a well-known real news story initially reported on 15 March 2022. The scandal highlighted the deplorable sanitary condition of pickle production. Workers were reported to have entered the pickle pit with bare feet, and they spit and tossed cigarette butts in the production area.
In the control condition, no further treatment was provided apart from the information about China’s pickle scandal. In the other three experimental conditions, each respondent received a U.S. food safety news story in addition to China’s scandal. One U.S. news story portrayed a positive scenario, while the other two depicted negative incidents of varying degrees of severity. All news stories were presented as recently posted, and the specific occurrence timing of all these news events was not disclosed. The post date of China’s scandal was indicated as two days earlier than the U.S. news stories’ publication dates to examine how international news influences individuals’ existing evaluations.
  • Condition 1. In the No Foreign News condition, no foreign news was provided.
  • Condition 2. In the Positive Foreign News condition, respondents were presented with a positive news post about U.S. food safety.
  • Condition 3. In the Highly Negative Foreign News condition, respondents were shown a news story about a significant U.S. food safety scandal indicating a more severe food safety issue than China’s.
  • Condition 4. In the Slightly Negative Foreign News condition, respondents were shown a news story about a less notable U.S. food safety scandal indicating a less severe food safety issue than China’s.
The positive news post reported that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had banned the use of partially hydrogenated oils in the U.S. food supply and introduced the link between partially hydrogenated oils and various health issues, including heart disease. The other two U.S. news stories were negative ones related to food contamination of varying degrees. Respondents were informed that these food safety violations had not been inspected or penalized by government agencies before being disclosed by journalists or ordinary citizens. This situation was similar to China’s pickle scandal, indicating vulnerabilities in government monitoring and supervision systems.
In the context of news consumption, heuristics play a significant role in how people process and interpret information. Therefore, individuals may not accurately assess the emotional tone or severity levels of a news post. Unsystematic message variations and severity ratings were employed. First, we took the type of contaminant, scope and scale, and long-term impact as criteria to reflect the severity of food safety incidents. The slightly negative one is a less notable news text about the cleanliness issue at Sonic Drive-In, a U.S. fast-food chain. Cockroaches were found near the soft ice cream machine in a Sonic Drive-In restaurant. The highly negative one is a news text about the Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) salmonella outbreak. The company was found to have knowingly shipped contaminated products, resulting in hundreds of illnesses and several deaths. The bacteria involved in the latter case caused widespread illness outbreaks and deaths, potentially leading to long-lasting consequences such as chronic health effects or damage to a country’s reputation in the global market. In comparison to China’s pickle scandal news story, this outbreak could lead people to believe that the U.S. was facing a more severe food safety challenge. The slightly negative case did not involve bacteria or toxins that could significantly impact the severity of a food safety incident. It was much smaller in scale, and no evidence suggested any long-term effect, rendering it less notable than China’s incident.
Our design passed a manipulation check involving 24 college students, who were social media news consumers aged from 21 to 28 years old. Using a numerical scale ranging from −5 (extremely negative) to 5 (extremely positive), participants were asked to rate the perceived stances of the four news stories displayed in random order. The average ratings for the four news texts aligned with our expectations, revealing significant differences in the perceived stances of these posts. The positive U.S. news story was perceived as positive, with an average rating of 2.66 (SD = 0.47). The three scandal-related news stories were perceived as negative. Among them, the highly negative U.S. news story about PCA (mean = −4.08, SD = 0.70) was deemed more severe than China’s pickle news story (mean = −3.08, SD = 0.49), while the slightly negative U.S. news story about Sonic Drive-In (mean = −1.88, SD = 0.60) was perceived as less severe than China’s domestic incident.
After exposing respondents to a China-based and a U.S.-based food safety news post, they were asked to assess their satisfaction with the Chinese government on a 1–5 scale, where a higher score indicated more satisfaction. The question posed was, “How satisfied are you with the overall performance of the Chinese government?” This approach aimed to uncover the significance of out-group comparisons in shaping Chinese respondents’ contentment with their governments. Additionally, participants were prompted to offer a concise rationale for their ratings, although this was not obligatory.

6. Results

There were no significant differences among the participants in different groups regarding gender, χ2 (3) = 0.77, p = 0.86; age, F(3, 1243) = 1.64, p = 0.18; knowledge of the U.S., F(3, 1243) = 0.98, p = 0.40; and general attitudes toward food safety, F(3, 1243) = 1.72, p = 0.16.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that compared to those exposed to local scandal news coverage only, Chinese respondents exposed to both local and U.S. news stories should show a higher level of satisfaction with the Chinese government when the comparison with the U.S. is favorable. There is a significant difference in respondents’ government satisfaction levels between group 1 and group 3 (χ2 = 86.26, df = 4, p < 0.01). Respondents in Condition 3 were provided with a news post about China’s pickle scandal and another news post about the U.S. Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) salmonella outbreak, which was perceived as more severe than the domestic pickle scandal, leading to a favorable out-group comparison. As shown in Table 1, the respondents who read China’s pickle scandal news story only (Condition 1) showed a medium level of satisfaction with the government (mean = 2.86, SD = 0.48), while those in Condition 3 showed a higher level of satisfaction with government services (mean = 3.23, SD = 0.55). Exposure to the news coverage about a U.S. food safety scandal that was perceived as more severe than the one in China might have reinforced people’s perceptions of their in-group’s superiority, therefore enhancing participants’ satisfaction with the Chinese government. In other words, the favorable out-group comparison bolstered citizens’ in-group evaluation. Hypothesis 1 was supported.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that, compared to participants in the control condition, individuals exposed to the news coverage of both China and the U.S. should exhibit a lower level of satisfaction with the Chinese government when the comparison with the U.S. is unfavorable. In addition to the news post about China’s pickle scandal, respondents in Condition 2 were presented with a positive U.S. news post, while a slightly negative U.S. news post was shown in Condition 4. In either of these two conditions, participants perceived that China faced a more serious food safety challenge than the U.S. The levels of government satisfaction in Condition 2 and Condition 4 were 2.32 and 2.30, respectively, which were lower than the control group’s mean of 2.86. That is, the awareness of China’s higher severity of food safety issues compared to the U.S. might have led participants to believe that China was less capable than the U.S. in addressing these concerns. The unfavorable out-group comparison with the U.S. led to relatively lower in-group evaluations. This supports Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that exposure to news coverage of both China and the U.S. leads to lower levels of satisfaction with the Chinese government when the comparison with the U.S. is less favorable. We observed that a favorable comparison increased respondents’ satisfaction with the government, while unfavorable comparisons reduced satisfaction. However, no significant difference in government satisfaction levels was found between group 2 and group 4 (χ2 = 10.26, df = 4, p = 0.04). Even though the slightly negative U.S. news story created a more favorable out-group comparison for our Chinese respondents compared to the positive U.S. news post, respondents in the slightly negative U.S. news condition did not show a higher level of satisfaction than those in the positive U.S. news condition.
Among the respondents in Condition 4, 37 provided explanations for their evaluations, with all 37 rating their government satisfaction at or below three. Several participants highlighted that such incidents were commonplace in China, stating “The U.S. incident is not a big deal” and “Incidents like this are too common to mention in our country”. Others expressed dissatisfaction with the reporting of official media, examples included “Put more effort into reporting our own incidents!” and “It is unwise to shift attention to a foreign incident, especially when our problem is bigger”. Therefore, we found no evidence suggesting a correlation between individuals’ government satisfaction and the gap between the countries. Reporting a minor foreign scandal seemed to amplify dissatisfaction among domestic individuals, given the greater severity of the domestic scandal. Consequently, hypothesis 3 is rejected.

7. Discussion

The results suggest that a negative news story about a U.S. food safety scandal, which is perceived as more severe than China’s incident, leads to a favorable out-group comparison with the U.S. and enhances the satisfaction of Chinese respondents with their government. Conversely, a positive news post about a U.S. food safety issue diminishes the satisfaction of Chinese respondents with their government, as does a negative news post about a less severe U.S. food safety scandal compared to China’s incident. In other words, a positive or slightly negative U.S. news post that results in an unfavorable out-group comparison with the U.S. leads to a decrease in government satisfaction.
News coverage about rival nations can prompt individuals to reflect on their own country’s values and achievements. The impact of international news coverage hinges on whether China is performing better in the specific issue. International news stories boost individuals’ satisfaction with their government when they indicate that their government is outperforming the foreign nation. Conversely, international news stories negatively affect individuals’ government satisfaction when they imply that their government performing worse.
We have found no evidence to suggest a correlation between individuals’ government satisfaction and the gaps between the two nations. Despite slightly negative news coverage about the U.S. leading to a less unfavorable out-group comparison than a positive news post, it did not contribute to a more favorable in-group evaluation. Respondents in these two conditions displayed similar levels of government satisfaction. A slightly negative international news story can diminish citizens’ government satisfaction by fostering the belief that a minor incident is inevitable in a nation where a significantly more severe incident has occurred. It can even generate discontent as individuals perceive the official media’s attempt at shifting focus.
China’s history of food safety incidents has raised concerns about the effectiveness of its regulations and enforcement. Notably, coverage of U.S. food safety scandals can elevate Chinese audiences’ satisfaction with the government, even in areas where the government’s performance is criticized. Therefore, the positive impact of scandalous news coverage about rival nations may be substantial in areas where the government is recognized for its efficacy.

8. Conclusions and Limitations

This research examines how exposure to news coverage about foreign nations can shape individuals’ evaluations of their own nation. Specifically, we investigate the effects of U.S. news coverage regarding food safety issues on the post-test satisfaction of Chinese individuals with their nation. Our study suggests that media coverage of a rival nation can influence how citizens perceive their own country, as demonstrated within a controlled laboratory setting.
The findings show that news coverage about a rival country has the potential to impact how individuals evaluate their own nation, with this influence being moderated by the performance disparity between the two countries. Upon encountering an international news story, individuals would carry these thoughts into their domestic evaluations and assess whether their own nation fares better. In comparison to those exposed solely to China’s scandal, individuals exposed to news stories involving both China’s scandal and a more severe incident in a rival nation tend to experience an increase in their satisfaction with their government. Conversely, positive news coverage about a rival country can lead to a decrease in government satisfaction. Additionally, slightly negative news coverage about a rival country, particularly concerning a less notable incident, counterproductively intensifies discontent among Chinese respondents with their government. In summary, a favorable comparison with a rival country elevates individuals’ perceptions of their own nation, while an unfavorable comparison yields the opposite effect.
This study is a contribution to the research on national images, particularly during periods of strategic rivalry. Although domestic media often tend to report negatively about rival or adversarial nations, this work argues that such negative portrayals can have unintended consequences. Negative interactions between exposure to international news coverage and individuals’ government satisfaction are expected when their nation is facing a more significant challenge in governance than the rival nation. Additionally, despite existing research suggesting that positive international news has limited agenda-setting effects, this paper demonstrates that positive news coverage about a foreign nation can be even more influential than negative coverage in shaping public perceptions of their own nation. While variations might exist in terms of audience, issues, and bilateral relations, the cognitive mechanisms revealed in this paper can apply to other nations that publish negatively framed reports about their rivals.
There are potential moderating factors, such as media literacy and pre-existing attitudes toward the Chinese and the U.S. governments, that could influence the extent to which news coverage impacts individuals’ views about their own countries. Also, the study acknowledges inherent limitations within the experimental setting, recognizing that participant behavior might differ in real-world scenarios. Moreover, food safety constitutes a significant concern and critique regarding China’s governance. It is plausible that a positive news story about a rival country might not necessarily decrease citizens’ satisfaction with their own government in areas where the government faces less criticism. As a result, a comprehensive examination within real-world contexts is essential, particularly within areas where the domestic government confronts varying levels of criticism.

Supplementary Materials

The following supporting information can be downloaded at: https://www.mdpi.com/article/10.3390/socsci12120661/s1, Table S1: Comparison of Demographic Characteristics of our Survey Respondents with those of the General News Audiences on Sina Weibo; Table S2: The Frequency Distribution of the Demographic Variables for each Experimental Group.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

This study followed the ethical guidelines in the Declaration of Helsinki. Approval for this particular type of study was not required in accordance with the policy of the corresponding author’s institution.

Informed Consent Statement

Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study.

Data Availability Statement

The datasets generated or analyzed during this study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Note

1
The demographic data related to the participants’ genders, ages, etc. are difficult to verify given the online nature of the interaction with the people who were willing to take part in the experiment.

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Table 1. Participants’ Post-experiment Satisfaction with the Chinese government.
Table 1. Participants’ Post-experiment Satisfaction with the Chinese government.
MeanSD
Condition 1 (no foreign news condition)2.860.48
Condition 2 (positive U.S. news condition)2.320.57
Condition 3 (highly negative U.S. news condition)3.230.55
Condition 4 (slightly negative U.S. news condition)2.300.61
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Pan, Y. How Does News Coverage of a Rival Nation Affect People’s Attitudes about Their Own Countries? Evidence from China. Soc. Sci. 2023, 12, 661. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci12120661

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Pan Y. How Does News Coverage of a Rival Nation Affect People’s Attitudes about Their Own Countries? Evidence from China. Social Sciences. 2023; 12(12):661. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci12120661

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Pan, Yating. 2023. "How Does News Coverage of a Rival Nation Affect People’s Attitudes about Their Own Countries? Evidence from China" Social Sciences 12, no. 12: 661. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci12120661

APA Style

Pan, Y. (2023). How Does News Coverage of a Rival Nation Affect People’s Attitudes about Their Own Countries? Evidence from China. Social Sciences, 12(12), 661. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci12120661

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